ATTACH07_ICD705_Construction and Management_SCIF.PDF

Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented

Information Facilities

VERSION 1.5

IC Tech Spec – for ICD/ICS 705

An Intelligence Community Technical Specification Prepared by the

National Counterintelligence and Security Center

March 13, 2020

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECT OR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

DIRECT OR OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER

WASHINGTO N, DC 20511

NCSC 19-686

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

REFERENCES:

Distribution

Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, Version 1.5 A. (U) D/NCSC Memo NCSC-19-329, Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, Version 1.4, 28 Sep 17 (U)

B. (U) Technical Specifications, Version 1.4, 28 Sep 17 (U) C. (U) ICD 705, Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, 26 May 10 (U) D. (U) ICS 705-01, Physical and Technical Standards for Sensitive

Compartmented Information Facilities, 27 Sep 10 (U) E. (U) ICS 705-02, Standards for the Accreditation and Reciprocal

Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, 22 Dec 16 (U)

This memorandum promulgates Version 1.5 of the Technical Specification for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities to the Intelligence Community, which replaces Version 1.4 (Ref A), effective immediately.

The Technical Specifications was designed to be a living document that enables periodic updates to keep up with changing and emerging technology. Based on input from the Intelligence Community (IC) and as a result of a cooperative effort by physical and technical experts from IC elements and our industrial partners, this Version 1.5 of the Technical Specifications has been updated to meet the needs of the community and enhance the standards identified in ICS 705-01, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (Ref C) and ICS 705-02, Standards for the Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (Ref D).

Questions may be directed to the National Counterintelligence and Security Center's Special Security Directorate NI-NCSC-SSD-CSG-PTSP-Mailbox@cia.ic.gov.

William R. Evanina Date mailto:NI-NCSC-SSD-CSG-PTSP-Mailbox@cia.ic.gov mailto:NI-NCSC-SSD-CSG-PTSP-Mailbox@cia.ic.gov

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, Version 1.5 ii

UNCLASSIFIED

Distribution:

Secretary of State, Department of State Secretary of the Treasury, Department of the Treasury Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Attorney General, Department of Justice Secretary of the Interior, Department of the Interior Secretary of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture Secretary of Commerce, Department of Commerce Secretary of Labor, Department of Labor Secretary of Health and Human Services, Department of Health and Human Services Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Housing and Urban Development Secretary of Transportation, Department of Transportation Secretary of Energy, Department of Energy Secretary of Education, Department of Education Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs Secretary of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Administrator, Executive Office of the President Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency Director, Office of Management and Budget United States Trade Representative Administrator, Small Business Administration Director, National Drug Control Policy Director, Central Intelligence Agency Administrator, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Chairman, Federal Communications Commission Chairman, Federal Maritime Commission Chairman, Federal Reserve System Chairman, Federal Trade Commission Administrator, General Services Administration Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Archivist, National Archives and Records Administration Director, National Science Foundation Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Director, Office of Government Ethics Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board Chairman, Security and Exchange Commission Director, Selective Service System Commissioner, Social Security Administration Administrator, United States Agency for International Development United States Postal Service Chairman, United States International Trade Commission Director, United States Peace Corps

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, Version 1.5 iii

UNCLASSIFIED

Distribution, cont.:

Office of the Chief Administrative Officer

Change History iv

Change History Rev. # Date Page Changes Approver

1.2 04/23/12 Cover Banner Graphic, Version, Date PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 4 Added note to warn users of classification when associating threat information and facility location.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 5 Re-worded approval of CAs to designate the AO as the primary approval authority of Compartmented Areas within SCIFs.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 9-10 Changed “Type X Gypsum” to “wallboard” to remove the standard of fire resistant gypsum and permit use of other wallboard types.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 9-10 Changed references to wall design drawings to “suggested” wall types to enable variety of wall construction techniques to meet the security standards.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 10 Added explanation to glue and screw plywood to ceiling and floor to clarify standard. Stud placement changed to 16 on center to match drawing and correct error.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 11 Added statement to finish wall and paint from true floor to true ceiling in Walls B and C to clarify and equal Type A Wall.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 9-10 Replaced drawings to reflect “suggested” wall construction methods and remove references to “Type X gypsum wallboard”.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 17-19 Replaced drawings to reflect “suggested” wall construction methods and remove references to “Type X gypsum wallboard”.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 56 Updated Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) encryption standards and certification to remove a standard that could not be met by commercial alarm systems.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 64 Replaced FIPS 140-2 with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to remove a standard that could not be met by commercial alarm systems.

PTSEWG

v

Rev. # Date Page Changes Approver

1.2 04/23/12 TEMPEST

Checklist Removed references to “inspectable space” as requested by the TEMPEST Advisory Group (TAG).

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 TEMPEST

Checklist

Removed references to “Red-SCI” information.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 TEMPEST

Checklist

Removed parenthetical reference to cell phones and Bluetooth.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 CA

Checklist

Replaced Compartmented Area Checklist to reflect IC standards.

PTSEWG

1.2 04/23/12 SCIF Co-Use Request and MOA Form

Replaced Co-Use and MOA Form to include “joint-use” statements.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 Cover Banner change, version, date PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 B-C Appended “D/NCSC Memorandum” PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 D-G “Appended Change History” PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 3 Chapter 2.A (2)(a) Added: “NOTE” regarding prefabricated modular SCIFs.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 9 Chapter 3.C Corrected wording to match wall drawings on p.21.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 14 Chapter 3.G (7)(c.4) Correction and addition of guidance on vents and ducts perimeter protection.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 17-19 Reformatted wall types to reflect correct architectural graphics for prescribed materials.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 53 Chapter 7.A (2)(d) Added requirement for HSS switches.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 54 Chapter 7.A (2)(k) Changed to reflect restrictions on dissemination of installation plans.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 54 Chapter 7.A (3)(a.2) Added exception that sensors must be located within SCIF perimeter.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 55 Chapter 7.A (3)(b.7.e) Replaced “Zones” with “IDE sensor points”.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 56 Chapter 7.A (3)(c.1) Added language for approval authority.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 56 Chapter 7.A (3)(c.2) Added language for integrated IDS and Remote Access.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 56-57 Chapter 7.A (3)(c.2) Added system application software requirements.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 58-59 Replaced “access/secure” with “arm/disarm” throughout.

vi

Rev. # Date Page Changes Approver

1.3 03/26/15 58 Chapter 7.B (2) Added “A record shall be maintained that identifies the person responsible for disarming the system”.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 87 Chapter 12.G (2) Changed Section header to read “Inspections/Reviews, added same where the term “inspection” or “review” used. The responsibility to perform as such was changed from “IC element head” to the AO, or designee.

PTSEWG

1.3 03/26/15 SCIF Co-Use Request and MOA Form

Appended Co-Use Request and MOA Form

PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 Cover Banner change, version, date PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 i-iii Appended “D/NCSC Memorandum” PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 iv-vii “Appended Change History” PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 1 Chapter 1.B.2

Added SAPF Language

PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 12 Chapter 3.E.1.b Added egress device language

PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 60 Chapter 7.C.1.c Added, “…IAW UL 2050 requirements (60 minutes)”

PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 71-74 Chapter 10 Revised PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 75-76 Chapter 11.B.5

Added sub-bullets to address CNSSI

PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 90-91 Chapter 12.L1/2/7 Added clarification language

PTSEWG

1.4 06/27/17 91-92 Chapter 12.M.4 Synchronized bullets

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 3-4 Chapter 2.A.3.a Added clarification language

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 5-6 Chapter 2.C.2 Defined CA Types

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 8 Chapter 3. Added Pre-Construction Checklist language

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 13-15 Chapter 3.E Expanded SCIF Door Criteria

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 30 Chapter 4.E.2 Added reference to Inspectable Materials Checklist vii

1.5 11/13/19 35 Chapter 5.A Added language in Applicability

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 46 Chapter 6.A.1.a Added exception language

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 74-77 Chapter 10 Changed “CSA” to “AO” where appropriate

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 90 Chapter 12.G.8 Added TSCM language to Inspections/Reviews

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 95-97 Chapter 12.N/O/P Added CUA instructions

PTSEWG

1.5 11/13/19 98 Chapter 13 Updated FFC and added CUA Guide and Cancellation Forms, Inspectable Materials Checklist, Pre- Construction Checklist viii

Table of Contents ix

Table of Contents Chapter 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………… 1

A. Purpose………………………………………………………………………………… 1 B. Applicability…………………………………………………………………………… 1

Chapter 2. Risk Management………………………………………………………………... 3 A. Analytical Risk Management Process………………………………………………… 3 B. Security in Depth (SID)………………………………………………………………. 4 C. Compartmented Area (CA) …………………………………………………………... 5

Chapter 3. Fixed Facility SCIF Construction………………………………………………... 8 A. Personnel………………………………………………………………………… B. Construction Security………………………………………………………………….. 9 C. Perimeter Wall Construction Criteria…………………………………………………. 10 D. Floor and Ceiling Construction Criteria……………………………….………….…... 13 E. SCIF Door Criteria………………………………………………………………….… 13 F. SCIF Window Criteria….….....…………………………………………………..…….15 G. SCIF Perimeter Penetrations Criteria…………………………………………………. 15 H. Alarm Response Time Criteria for SCIFs within the U.S. …………………………… 17 I. Secure Working Areas (SWA) ……………………………………………………….. 17 J. Temporary Secure Working Area (TSWA) ………………………………………….. 18

Chapter 4. SCIFs Outside the U.S. and NOT Under Chief of Mission (COM) Authority….. 23 A. General………………………………………………………………………………… 23 B. Establishing Construction Criteria Using Threat Ratings…………………………….. 23 C. Personnel………………………………………………………………………………. 26 D. Construction Security Requirements…………………………………………………. 27 E. Procurement of Construction Materials……………………………………………….. 30 F. Secure Transportation for Construction Material……………………………………… 31 G. Secure Storage of Construction Material……………………………………………… 32 H. Technical Security……………………………………………………………………. 33 I. Interim Accreditations………………………………………………………………… 33

Chapter 5. SCIFs Outside the U.S. and Under Chief of Mission Authority………………… 35 A. Applicability…………………………………………………………………………… 35 B. General Guidelines…………………………………………………………………….. 35 C. Threat Categories……………………………………………………………………… 36 D. Construction Requirements…………………………………………………………… 36 E. Personnel………………………………………………………………………………. 38 F. Construction Security Requirements…………………………………………………. 39 G. Procurement of Construction Materials……………………………………………….. 42 H. Secure Transportation for Construction Material……………………………………… 43 I. Secure Storage of Construction Material……………………………………………… 44 x

J. Technical Security…………..………………………………………………………… K. Interim Accreditations………………………………………………………………… 45

Chapter 6. Temporary, Airborne, and Shipboard SCIFs……………………………………. 46 A. Applicability………………………………………………………………………….. 46 B. Ground-Based T-SCIFs………………………………………………………………. 46 C. Permanent and Tactical SCIFS Aboard Aircraft……………………………………... 48 D. Permanent and Tactical SCIFs on Surface or Subsurface Vessels…………………… 50

Chapter 7. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) ……………………………………………… 56 A. Specifications and Implementation Requirements…………………………………….. 56 B. IDS Modes of Operation………………………………………………………………. 61 C. Operations and Maintenance of IDS…………………………………………………… 63 D. Installation and Testing of IDS………………………………………………………… 64

Chapter 8. Access Control Systems (ACS) ………………………………………………… 66 A. SCIF Access Control…………………………………………………………………. 66 B. ACS Administration…………………………………………………………………… 67 C. ACS Physical Protection………………………………………………………………. 67 D. ACS Recordkeeping…………………………………………………………………… 67

. E. Using Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) to Supplement ACS……………………….. 68 F. Non-Automated Access Control………………………………………………………. 68

Chapter 9. Acoustic Protection……………………………………………………………… 70 A. Overview………………………………………………………………………………. 70 B. Sound Group Ratings………………………………………………………………….. 70 C. Acoustic Testing……………………………………………………………………… 70 D. Construction Guidance for Acoustic Protection……….……………………………… 71 E. Sound Transmission Mitigations………………………………………………………. 71

Chapter 10. Portable Electronic Devices with Recording Capabilities and Embedded Technologies (PEDs/RCET)………………………………….…………….………………… 74

A. Approved Use of PEDs/RECET in a SCIF…………………………………………… 74 B. Prohibitions……………………………………………………………………………. 75 C. PED/RCET Risk Levels………………………………………………………………. 75 D. Risk Mitigation………………………………………………………………………… 76

Chapter 11. Telecommunications Systems………………………………………………….. 78 A. Applicability…………………………………………………………………………… 78 B. Unclassified Telephone Systems………………………………………………………. 78 C. Unclassified Information Systems…………………………………………………….. 80 D. Using Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) to Monitor the SCIF Entry Point(s) ……… 80 E. Unclassified Wireless Network Technology…………………………………………. 80 F. Environmental Infrastructure Systems………………………………………………… 81 G. Emergency Notification Systems……………………………………………………… 81 xi

H. System Access………………………………………………………………………… 82 I. Unclassified Cable Control……………………………………………………………. 82 J. Protected Distribution Systems………………………………………………………… 83 K. References……………………………………………………………………………

Chapter 12. Management and Operations…………………………………………………… 86 A. Purpose………………………………………………………………………………… 86 B. SCIF Repository………………………………………………………………………. 86 C. SCIF Management…………………………………………………………….......…... 87 D. SOPs………………………………………….………………………………….....… 88 E. Changes in Security and Accreditation……………………………………………..…. 89 F. General………………………………………………...……………………………… 89 G. Inspections/Reviews…………………………………………………………………… 90 H. Control of Combinations………………………………………………………………. 90 I. De-Accreditation Guidelines…………………………..……………………….……… 91 J. Visitor Access………………………………………………………………………….. 91 K. Maintenance……..………………………………………………….………………… 93 L. IDS and ACS Documentation Requirements……………………………….………….. 93 M. Emergency Plan……………………………………………………………………….. 94 N. SCIF Co-Use and Joint Use……..…………………………………………………….. 95 O. CUA Form and Instructions…..……………………………………………………….. 96 P. CUA Cancellation..…………………………………………………………………….. 97

Chapter 13. Forms and Plans………………………………………………………………… 98 Fixed Facility Checklist TEMPEST Checklist Compartmented Area Checklist Shipboard Checklist Submarine Checklist Aircraft/UAV Checklist SCIF Co-Use/Joint-Use Request SCIF Co-Use/Joint-Use Request Users Guide Cancellation of SCIF Co-Use/Joint-Use Pre-Construction Checklist Construction Security Plan (CSP) Inspectable Materials Checklist xii

Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 1. Introduction

A. Purpose This Intelligence Community (IC) Technical Specification sets forth the physical and technical security specifications and best practices for meeting standards of Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) 705-01 (Physical and Technical Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities). When the technical specifications herein are applied to new construction and renovations of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), they shall satisfy the standards outlined in ICS 705-01 to enable uniform and reciprocal use across all IC elements and to assure information sharing to the greatest extent possible. This document is the implementing specification for Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 705 (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities), ICS 705-01, and ICS 705-02 (Standards for Accreditation and Reciprocal Use of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.

The specifications contained herein will facilitate the protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) against compromising emanations, inadvertent observation and disclosure by unauthorized persons, and the detection of unauthorized entry.

B. Applicability IC Elements shall fully implement this standard within 180 days of its signature.

1. SCIFs that have been de-accredited but controlled at the SECRET level (IAW 32 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 2001 and 2004) for less than one year may be re-accredited. The IC SCIF repository shall indicate that the accreditation was based upon the previous standards.

2. When the technical specifications herein have been applied to new construction, renovations, and operation of Special Access Program Facilities (SAPFs), those facilities shall satisfy the standards outlined in ICD 705 to enable uniform use across all IC elements for accreditation by IC elements as a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility.

a) Accreditation of a SAPF as a SCIF will be based upon a review of all required SCIF construction documentation to ensure all ICD 705 requirements were met in the construction, maintenance, and operation of the SAPF.

b) The Accrediting Official (AO) will conduct a review of all SAPF accreditation documentation for compliance with the technical specifications herein.

(1) If all required documentation is available and correct, the AO will issue SCIF accreditation.

(2) If all required documentation is not available and correct, or waivers have been authorized, the AO is not required to issue SCIF accreditation.

Chapter 1 Introduction

c) If the facility is to be maintained as a SAPF and co-utilized as a SCIF, the security posture of the facility will be to the highest requirement of the two.

(1) The AO may issue a more restrictive accreditation based upon the SCI requirements associated with the new SCIF accreditation. For example, 5 minute response versus 15 minutes, or Closed Storage versus Open Storage.

(2) Program indoctrination will be coordinated as part of the co-utilization agreement. Compartmented Areas may be utilized, but no other sub-division of the facility will be permitted. Facilities requiring additional protections are not suitable for co-utilization.

Chapter 2 Risk Management

Chapter 2. Risk Management

A. Analytical Risk Management Process

1. The Accrediting Official (AO) and the Site Security Manager (SSM) should evaluate each proposed SCIF for threats, vulnerabilities, and assets to determine the most efficient countermeasures required for physical and technical security. In some cases, based upon that risk assessment, it may be determined that it is more practical or efficient to mitigate a standard. In other cases, it may be determined that additional security measures should be employed due to a significant risk factor.

2. Security begins when the initial requirement for a SCIF is known. To ensure the integrity of the construction and final accreditation, security plans should be coordinated with the AO before construction plans are designed, materials ordered, or contracts let.

a) Security standards shall apply to all proposed SCI facilities and shall be coordinated with the AO for guidance and approval. Location of facility construction and or fabrication does not exclude a facility from security standards and or review and approval by the AO. SCI facilities include but are not limited to fixed facilities, mobile platforms, prefabricated structures, containers, modular applications or other new or emerging applications and technologies that may meet performance standards for use in SCI facility construction.

NOTE: Advertised claims by manufactures that their product(s), to include mobile platforms, prefabricated structures, containers and modular structures are built to SCIF standards and can be accredited without modification may not be accurate. AOs are responsible for ensuring security controls spelled out in the ICD/ICS 705 series and this document are implemented to protect the security integrity of the proposed SCIF prior to accreditation.

b) Mitigations are verifiable, non-standard methods that shall be approved by the AO to effectively meet the physical/technical security protection level(s) of the standard. While most standards may be effectively mitigated via non-standard construction, additional security countermeasures and/or procedures, some standards are based upon tested and verified equipment (e.g., a combination lock meeting Federal Specification FF-L 2740) chosen because of special attributes and could not be mitigated with non-tested equipment. The AO’s approval is documented to confirm that the mitigation is at least equal to the physical/technical security level of the standard.

c) Exceeding a standard, even when based upon risk, requires that a waiver be processed and approved in accordance with ICD 705.

3. The risk management process includes a critical evaluation of threats, vulnerability, and assets to determine the need and value of countermeasures. The process may include the following:

a) Threat Analysis. Assess the capabilities, intentions, and opportunity of an adversary to exploit or damage assets or information. For SCI Facilities under Chief of Mission (COM) authority or established on a permanent or temporary basis within or on U.S. diplomatic facilities/compounds, use the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB), Security Environment Threat List (SETL) to determine technical threat to a location. When evaluating for TEMPEST, the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authorities (CTTA) shall use the National Security Agency Information Assurance (NSA IA) list as an additional resource for specific technical threat information. NOTE: These threat documents are classified. Associating the threat level or other threat information with the SCIF location (including country, city, etc.) will normally carry the same classification level identified in the threat document. Ensure that SCIF planning documents and discussions that identify threat with the country or SCIF location are protected accordingly. It is critical to identify other occupants of common and adjacent buildings. (However, do not attempt to collect information against U.S. persons in violation of Executive Order (EO) 12333.) In areas where there is a diplomatic presence of high and critical technical threat countries, additional countermeasures may be necessary.

b) Vulnerability Analysis. Assess the inherent susceptibility to attack of a procedure, facility, information system, equipment, or policy.

c) Probability Analysis. Assess the probability of an adverse action, incident, or attack occurring.

d) Consequence Analysis. Assess the consequences of such an action (expressed as a measure of loss, such as cost in dollars, resources, programmatic effect/mission impact, etc.).

B. Security in Depth (SID)

1. SID describes the factors that enhance the probability of detection before actual penetration to the SCIF occurs. The existence of a layer or layers of security that offer mitigations for risks may be accepted by the AO. An important factor in determining risk is whether layers of security already exist at the facility. If applied, these layers may, with AO approval, alter construction requirements and extend security alarm response time to the maximum of 15 minutes. Complete documentation of any/all SID measures in place will assist in making risk decisions necessary to render a final standards decision.

2. SID is mandatory for SCIFs located outside the U.S. due to increased threat.

3. The primary means to achieve SID are listed below and are acceptable. SID requires that at least one of the following mitigations is applied:

a) Military installations, embassy compounds, U.S. Government (USG) compounds, or contractor compounds with a dedicated response force of U.S.

persons.

b) Controlled buildings with separate building access controls, alarms, elevator controls, stairwell controls, etc., required to gain access to the buildings or elevators. These controls shall be fully coordinated with a formal agreement or managed by the entity that owns the SCIF.

c) Controlled office areas adjacent to or surrounding SCIFs that are protected by alarm equipment installed in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions. These controls shall be fully coordinated with a formal agreement or managed by the entity that owns the SCIF.

d) Fenced compounds with access controlled vehicle gate and/or pedestrian gate.

e) The AO may develop additional strategies to mitigate risk and increase probability of detection of unauthorized entry.

C. Compartmented Area (CA)

1. Definition

A CA is an area, room, or a set of rooms within a SCIF that provides controlled separation between control systems, compartments, sub-compartments, or Controlled Access Programs.

2. CA Types

a) Type I CAs are intended for workstation environments that are used to view and process compartmented information. These areas may be comprised of open bays, open spaces, or a set of rooms with multiple cubicles in an accredited SCIF. Within these areas, compartmented information may be securely viewed and/or processed via an approved computer workstation by authorized personnel. Workstations in these environments may include computers with single or multiple monitors. When monitor positioning alone will not adequately protect the material from unauthorized viewing, i.e., shoulder surfing, polarized privacy screens shall be used. Compartmented data shall never be openly displayed on a monitor that faces a primary door or common work area. In addition to processing compartmented information on approved computer workstations, Type I CAs may also include the use of printers, copiers, and scanners if appropriate procedures for control of hard copy material have been established and approved by the AO. No storage or discussion is authorized, logical and/or physical.

b) Type II CAs are areas where discussions of compartmented information may take place. If so equipped and approved, compartmented information may also be viewed and processed. This CA comprises a room, e.g., office or conference room, inside an accredited SCIF where compartmented discussions may be held by authorized personnel. All Type II CAs must meet existing sound transmission class (STC) requirements per ICS 705-1 to ensure that the room or office retains sound within its perimeter. In addition to compartmented discussions, Type II CAs may be used for secure video teleconferencing (SVTC) and related communication conferencing and the use of secure telephones for compartmented discussions. The use of printers, scanners, fax, copiers, and the secure transfer of data to approved removable media require prior approval. No storage is authorized, logical and/or physical.

c) Type III: A restricted discussion area used for viewing, processing, printing, copying, storage and control of accountable compartmented information. This CA is

Risk Management intended for storing and retaining compartmented information when accountability and strict control of compartmented program information is required. This includes, but is not limited to: notes, briefs, slides, electronic presentations, analytic papers, removable hard drives, field packs, thumb drives, laptops, personal electronic devices (PEDs) (see Chapter 10) or hand-held devices that store compartmented information.

In addition to the storage of compartmented material in a GSA-approved container, Type III CAs may be used for processing compartmented information on approved computer workstations; the use of printers, scanners, and copiers; the secure transfer of data to approved removable media; the use of secure facsimile machines; and the use of secure telephone equipment (STE) for compartmented discussions. All personnel residing within or who have unfettered access to a Type III CA must be formally briefed into all compartments that reside within the Type III CA. Visitors are permitted within Type III areas only when all compartmented information (for which the visitor is not briefed) is stored within containers, out of sight, and no compartmented discussions occur.

3. Requirements

a) The CA shall be approved by the AO with the concurrence of the CA Program Manager or designee. The CA Checklist (Chapter 13) shall be used to request approval.

b) Any construction or security requirements above those listed herein require prior approval from the element head as described in ICS 705-2.

4. Access Control

a) Access control to the CA may be accomplished by visual recognition or mechanical/electronic access control devices.

b) Spin-dial combination locks shall not be installed on CA doors.

c) Independent alarm systems shall not be installed in a CA.

5. Visual Protection of CA Workstations If compartmented information will be displayed on a computer terminal or group of terminals in an area where everyone is not accessed to the program, the following measures may be applied to reduce the ability of “shoulder surfing” or inadvertent viewing of compartmented information:

• Position the computer screen away from doorway/cubicle opening.

• Use a polarizing privacy screen.

• Use partitions and/or signs.

• Existing private offices or rooms may be used but may not be a mandatory requirement.

6. Closed Storage

When the storage, processing, and use of compartmented information, product, or deliverables is required, and all information shall be stored while not in use, then all of the following shall apply:

a) Access and visual controls identified above shall be the standard safeguard.

b) Compartmented information shall be physically stored in a General Services Administration (GSA) approved safe.

7. Open Storage In rare instances when open storage of information is required, the following apply:

a) If the parent SCIF is accredited for open storage, a private office with access control on the door is adequate physical security protection.

b) If the parent SCIF has been built and accredited for closed storage, then the CA perimeter shall be constructed and accredited to open storage standards.

c) The CA AO may approve open or closed storage within the CA. Storage requirements shall be noted in both the CA Fixed Facility Checklist (FFC) and, if appropriate, in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

8. Acoustic and Technical Security

a) All TEMPEST, administrative telephone, and technical surveillance countermeasure (TSCM) requirements for the parent SCIF shall apply to the CA and shall be reciprocally accepted.

b) When compartmented discussions are required, the following apply:

(1) Use existing rooms that have been accredited for SCI discussions.

(2) Use administrative procedures to restrict access to the room during conversations.

Chapter 3 Fixed Facility SCIF Construction

Chapter 3. Fixed Facility SCIF Construction Requirements outlined within this chapter apply to all fixed facility SCIFs. The SCIF Pre-

Construction Checklist is found in Chapter 13 and may be completed and sent to the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA) and/or AO as part of the concept approval process. All questions about the checklist content and expected information should be directed to the project CSA/AO. Additional information and requirements for facilities located outside the U.S., its possessions or territories, are found in Chapters 4 and 5. Additional information and requirements for temporary SCIFs are described in Chapter 6.

A. Personnel

Roles and responsibilities of key SCIF construction personnel are identified in ICS 705-1 and restated here for reference.

1. AO Responsibilities

a) Provide security oversight of all aspects of SCIF construction under their security purview.

b) Review and approve the design concept, Construction Security Plan (CSP), and final design for each construction project prior to the start of SCIF construction.

c) Depending on the magnitude of the project, determine if the Site Security Manager (SSM) performs duties on a full-time, principal basis, or as an additional duty to on-site personnel.

d) Accredit SCIFs under their cognizance.

e) Prepare waiver requests for the IC element head or designee.

f) Provide the timely input of all required SCIF data to the IC SCIF repository.

g) Consider SID on USG or USG-sponsored contractor facilities to substitute for standards herein. (SID shall be documented in the CSP and the FFC.)

2. Site Security Managers (SSMs) Responsibilities

a) Ensure the requirements herein are implemented and advise the AO of compliance or variances.

b) In consultation with the AO, develop a CSP regarding implementation of the standards herein. (This document shall include actions required to document the project from start to finish.)

c) Conduct periodic security inspections for the duration of the project to ensure compliance with the CSP.

d) Document security violations or deviations from the CSP and notify the AO within 3 business days.

e) Ensure that procedures to control site access are implemented.

3. CTTA Responsibilities

a) Review SCIF construction or renovation plans to determine if TEMPEST countermeasures are required and recommend solutions. To the maximum extent practicable, TEMPEST mitigation requirements shall be incorporated into the SCIF design.

b) Provide the CSA and AO with documented results of review with recommendations.

4. Construction Surveillance Technicians (CSTs) Responsibilities

a) Supplement site access controls, implement screening and inspection procedures, as well as monitor construction and personnel, when required by the AO.

b) In low and medium technical threat countries, begin surveillance of non-cleared workers at the start of SCIF construction or the installation of major utilities, whichever comes first.

c) In high and critical technical threat countries, begin surveillance of non-cleared workers at the start of: construction of public access or administrative areas adjacent to the SCIF; SCIF construction; or the installation of major utilities, whichever comes first.

B. Construction Security

1. Prior to awarding a construction contract, a CSP for each project shall be developed by the SSM and approved by the AO.

2. Construction plans and all related documents shall be handled and protected in accordance with the CSP.

3. For SCIF renovation projects, barriers shall be installed to segregate construction workers from operational activities and provide protection against unauthorized access and visual observation. Specific guidance shall be contained in the CSP.

4. Periodic security inspections shall be conducted by the SSM or designee for the duration of the project to ensure compliance with construction design and security standards.

5. Construction and design of SCIFs should be performed by U.S. companies using U.S.

citizens to reduce risk, but may be performed by U.S. companies using U.S. persons (an individual who has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) or who is a protected individual as defined by Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (a)(3)). The AO shall ensure mitigations are implemented when using non-U.S.

citizens. These mitigations shall be documented in the CSP.

6. All site control measures used shall be documented in the CSP. Among the control measures that may be considered are the following:

• Identity verification.

• Random searches at site entry and exit points.

• Signs at all entry points listing prohibited and restricted items (e.g., cameras, firearms, explosives, drugs, etc.).

• Physical security barriers to deny unauthorized access.

• Vehicle inspections.

C. Perimeter Wall Construction Criteria

1. General

a) SCIF perimeters include all walls that outline the SCIF confines, floors, ceilings, doors, windows and penetrations by ductwork, pipes, and conduit. This section describes recommended methods to meet the standards described within ICS 705-1 for SCIF perimeters.

b) Perimeter wall construction specifications vary by the type of SCIF, location, use of SID, and discussion requirements.

c) Closed storage areas that do not require discussion areas do not have any forced entry or acoustic requirements.

d) Open storage facilities without SID require additional protection against forced and surreptitious entry.

e) When an existing wall is constructed with substantial material (e.g., brick, concrete, cinderblock, etc.) equal to meet the perimeter wall construction standards, the existing wall may be utilized to satisfy the specification.

2. Closed Storage, Secure Working Area (SWA), Continuous Operation, or Open Storage with SID - Use Wall A - Suggested Standard Acoustic Wall (see construction drawing for details).

a) Three layers ⅝ inch-thick gypsum wallboard (GWB), one layer on the uncontrolled side of the SCIF and two on the controlled side of the SCIF, to provide adequate rigidity and acoustic protection (Sound Class 3).

b) Wallboard shall be attached to 3 ⅝ inch-wide 16 gauge metal studs or wooden 2 x 4 studs placed no less than 16” on center (o.c.).

c) 16 gauge continuous track (top & bottom) w/ anchors at 32” o.c. maximum) – bed in continuous bead of acoustical sealant.

d) The interior two layers of wallboard shall be mounted so that the seams do not align (i.e., stagger joints).

e) Acoustic fill 3 ½ “ (89mm) sound attenuation material, fastened to prevent sliding down and leaving void at the top.

f) The top and bottom of each wall shall be sealed with an acoustic sealant where it meets the slab.

g) Fire safe non-shrink grout, or acoustic sealant in all voids above/below track both sides of partition.

h) Entire wall assembly shall be finished and painted from true floor to true ceiling.

3. Open Storage without SID -- Use Wall B - Suggested Wall for Expanded Metal or Wall C - Suggested Wall for Plywood.

a) Three layers of ⅝ inch-thick GWB, one layer on the uncontrolled side of the SCIF and two on the controlled side of the SCIF to provide adequate rigidity and acoustic protection (Sound Class 3).

b) Wallboard shall be attached to 3 ⅝ inch-wide 16 gauge metal studs or wooden 2 x 4 studs placed no less than 16” o.c.

c) 16 gauge continuous track (top & bottom) w/ anchors at 32” on center (o.c.)

maximum) – bed in continuous bead of acoustical sealant.

d) Wall B - Suggested Wall for Expanded Metal (see drawing for Wall B-Suggested Construction for Expanded Metal).

(1) Three-quarter inch mesh, # 9 (10 gauge) expanded metal shall be affixed to the interior side of all SCIF perimeter wall studs.

(2) Expanded metal shall be spot-welded to the studs every six inches along the length of each vertical stud and at the ceiling and floor.

(3) Hardened screws with one inch washers or hardened clips may be used in lieu of welding to fasten metal to the studs. Screws shall be applied every six inches along the length of each vertical stud and at the ceiling and floor.

(4) Fastening method shall be noted in the FFC.

(5) Entire wall assembly shall be finished and painted from true floor to true ceiling.

e) Wall C - Suggested Wall for Plywood (see drawing for Wall C-Suggested Construction for Plywood).

(1) Three layers of ⅝ inch-thick GWB, two layers on the uncontrolled side and one layer GWB over minimum ½ ” plywood on the controlled side of the SCIF.

NOTE: CTTA recommended countermeasures (foil backed GWB or layer of approved Ultra Radiant R-Foil) shall be installed in accordance with (IAW) best practices for architectural Radio Frequency (RF) shielding. Foil shall be located between the layer of plywood and GWB.

(2) 1/2" Plywood affixed 8’ vertical by 4’ horizontal to 16 gauge studs using glue and #10 steel tapping screws at 12 o.c.

(3) GWB shall be mounted to plywood with screws avoiding contact with studs to mitigate any possible acoustic flanking path.

(4) 16 gauge continuous track (top & bottom) w/ anchors at 32” o.c. maximum)

– bed in continuous bead of acoustical sealant.

(5) Fire safe non-shrink grout, or acoustic sealant in all voids above/below track both sides of partition.

(6) Entire wall assembly shall be finished and painted from true floor to true ceiling.

4. Radio Frequency (RF) Protection for Perimeter Walls

a) RF protection shall be installed at the direction of the CTTA when a SCIF utilizes electronic processing and does not provide adequate RF attenuation at the inspectable space boundary. It is recommended for all applications where RF interference from the outside of the SCIF is a concern inside the SCIF.

b) Installation of RF protection should be done using either the drawings or Best Practices Guidelines for Architectural Radio Frequency Shielding, prepared by the Technical Requirements Steering Committee under the Center for Security Evaluation. This document is available through the Center for Security Evaluation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (NCSC/CSE).

5. Vault Construction Criteria GSA-approved modular vaults meeting Federal Specification AA-V-2737 or one of the following construction methods may be used:

a) Reinforced Concrete Construction

(1) Walls, floor, and ceiling will be a minimum thickness of eight inches of reinforced concrete.

(2) The concrete mixture will have a comprehensive strength rating of at least 2,500 pounds per square inch (psi).

(3) Reinforcing will be accomplished with steel reinforcing rods, a minimum of ⅝ inches in diameter, positioned centralized in the concrete pour and spaced horizontally and vertically six inches on center; rods will be tied or welded at the intersections.

(4) The reinforcing is to be anchored into the ceiling and floor to a minimum depth of one-half the thickness of the adjoining member.

b) Steel-Lined Construction Where Unique Structural Circumstances Do Not Permit Construction of a Concrete Vault

(1) Construction will use ¼ inch-thick steel alloy-type plates having characteristics of high-yield and high-tensile strength.

(2) The steel plates are to be continuously welded to load-bearing steel members of a thickness equal to that of the plates.

(3) If the load-bearing steel members are being placed in a continuous floor and ceiling of reinforced concrete, they must be firmly affixed to a depth of one-half the thickness of the floor and ceiling.

(4) If floor and/or ceiling construction is less than six inches of reinforced concrete, a steel liner is to be constructed the same as the walls to form the floor and ceiling of the vault. Seams where the steel plates meet horizontally and vertically are to be continuously welded together.

All vaults shall be equipped with a GSA-approved Class 5 vault door.

D. Floor and Ceiling Construction Criteria

1. Floors and ceilings shall be constructed to meet the same standards for force protection and acoustic protection as walls.

2. All floor and ceiling penetrations shall be kept to a minimum.

E. SCIF Door Criteria

1. Door type definitions:

a) Primary door: A SCIF perimeter door recognized as the main entrance.

b) Secondary door: A SCIF perimeter door employed as both an entry and egress door that is not the Primary door.

c) Emergency egress-only door: A SCIF perimeter door employed as an emergency egress door with no entry capability.

2. Primary door criteria:

a) There shall be only one Primary door to a SCIF.

b) The Primary door shall be equipped with the following:

(1) A GSA-approved pedestrian door deadbolt meeting the most current version of Federal Specification FF-L-2890. Previously AO-approved FFL-2740 integrated locking hardware may be used. Additional standalone and flush-mounted dead bolts are prohibited.

(2) A combination lock meeting the most current version of Federal Specification FFL- 2740. Previously AO-approved combination lock or deadbolt lock type may be used.

(3) An approved access control device (see Chapter 8). May be equipped with a by-pass keyway for use in the event of an access control system failure.

(4) Include requirements in E.5 below.

3. Secondary door criteria:

a) Secondary doors may be established with AO approval and as required by building code, safety and accessibility requirements,

(1) Secondary doors shall:

(a) Be equipped with a GSA-approved pedestrian door egress device with deadbolt meeting the most current version of Federal Specification FF-L-2890 for secondary door use. An AO-approved alternate device with similar functionality may be authorized.

Additional standalone and flush-mounted deadbolts are prohibited.

(b) Have approved access control hardware (see Chapter 8). The access control system must be deactivated when the SCIF is not occupied, or as determined by the AO.

(c) Include requirements in E.5 below.

4. Emergency Egress-only doors shall:

a) Be installed as required by building code, safety and accessibility requirements.

b) Be equipped with GSA-approved pedestrian door emergency egress device with deadbolt configuration meeting the most current version of Federal Specification FF- L-2890 for exit only door use. An AO-approved alternate device with similar functionality and no exterior hardware may be authorized. Additional standalone and flush-mounted deadbolts are prohibited.

c) Be alarmed 24/7 and have a local audible annunciator that must be activated if the door is opened.

d) Include requirements in E.5 below.

5. Criteria for all SCIF perimeter doors:

a) All SCIF perimeter doors shall comply with applicable building code, safety, and accessibility requirements as determined by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

b) Ensure SCIF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) includes procedures to ensure all doors are secured at end of day.

c) All SCIF perimeter pedestrian doors shall be equipped with an automatic, non-hold door-closer which shall be installed internal to the SCIF.

d) Door hinge pins that are accessible from outside of the SCIF shall be modified to prevent removal of the door, e.g., welded, set screws, dog bolts, etc.

e) SCIF perimeter doors and frame assemblies shall meet acoustic requirements as described in Chapter 9 unless declared a non-discussion area.

f) All SCIF perimeter doors shall be alarmed in accordance with Chapter 7.

g) SCIF Perimeter doors shall meet TEMPEST requirements per CTTA guidance.

h) When practical and permissible, SCIF entry doors should incorporate a vestibule to preclude visual observation and enhance door acoustic protection.

6. SCIF door fabrication and unique criteria:

a) Wooden SCIF doors shall be 1 ¾ inch-thick solid wood core (i.e. wood stave, structural composite lumber).

b) Steel doors shall meet following specifications:

(1) 1 ¾ inch-thick face steel equal to minimum 18-gauge steel.

(2) Hinges reinforced to 7-gauge steel and preferably a lift hinge.

(3) Door closure installation reinforced to 12-gauge steel.

(4) Lock area predrilled and/or reinforced to 10-gauge steel.

c) Vault doors shall not be used to control day access to a facility. To mitigate both security and safety concerns, a vestibule with an access control device may be constructed for the purpose of day access to the vault door.

d) Roll-up Doors shall be minimum 18-gauge steel and shall be secured inside the SCIF using dead-bolts on both the right and left side of the door and alarmed in accordance with Chapter 7.

e) SCIF perimeter Double Door Specifications:

(1) The fixed leaf shall be secured at the top and bottom with deadbolts.

(2) An astragal shall be attached to one door.

(3) Each leaf of the door shall have an independent security alarm contact.

f) Adjacent SCIF adjoining doors:

(1) Doors that join adjacent SCIFs, not required for emergency egress, shall:

(a) Be dead bolted on both sides.

(b) Be alarmed on both sides according to chapter 7.

(c) Meet acoustic requirements as required.

(d) Be covered by AO SOP.

g) Other door types shall be addressed on an individual basis as approved by the AO.

F. SCIF Window Criteria

1. Every effort should be made to minimize or eliminate windows in the SCIF, especially on the ground floor.

2. Windows shall be non-opening.

3. Windows shall be protected by security alarms in accordance with Chapter 7 when they are within 18 feet of the ground or an accessible platform.

4. Windows shall provide visual and acoustic protection.

5. Windows shall be treated to provide RF protection when recommended by the CTTA.

6. All windows less than 18 feet above the ground or from the nearest platform affording access to the window (measured from the bottom of the window), shall be protected against forced entry and meet the standard for the perimeter.

G. SCIF Perimeter Penetrations Criteria

1. All penetrations of perimeter walls shall be kept to a minimum.

2. Metallic penetrations may require TEMPEST countermeasures, to include dielectric breaks or grounding, when recommended by the CTTA.

3. Utilities servicing areas other than the SCIF shall not transit the SCIF unless mitigated with AO approval. This restriction does not apply to secure communication lines required to transit a SCIF to service an adjacent SCIF through a common perimeter surface.

4. Electrical Utilities should enter the SCIF at…