Amendment 0006_ ESS_DRAFT_REPORT.pdf

Explosives Safety Submission for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

Naval Support Activity

Crane, Indiana

Preliminary Final

December 2019

N62473-18-D-5801

DECEMBER 2019 iii

BI0313191344NWO

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations vii

1. Background 1-1

1.1 Navy Project Manager...................................................................................................... 1-1

1.2 Site Identifier and Description .......................................................................................... 1-1

1.3 Regional Maps ................................................................................................................. 1-1

1.4 Scope of Munitions Response ......................................................................................... 1-1

1.5 History of Munitions Use .................................................................................................. 1-1

1.6 Previous Studies of Extent of MEC and/or MPPEH Contamination ................................ 1-2

1.7 Justification for No Further Action Decision ..................................................................... 1-2

2. Project Dates 2-1

3. Types of MEC and/or MPPEH 3-1

3.1 Types and Quantities of MEC and/or MPPEH ................................................................. 3-1

3.2 Munitions with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance ...................................................... 3-1

3.3 Maximum Credible Event ................................................................................................. 3-2

3.4 Explosively Contaminated Buildings ................................................................................ 3-2

4. MEC and/or MPPEH Migration 4-1

5. Detection and Positioning Technologies 5-1

5.1 Detection Equipment, Method, and Standards ................................................................ 5-1

5.1.1 Analog Instruments ............................................................................................. 5-1

5.1.2 EM61-MK2 .......................................................................................................... 5-1

5.1.3 Geophysical System Verification ........................................................................ 5-1

5.1.4 Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance........................................... 5-1

5.2 Positioning System, Method, and Standards ................................................................... 5-2

5.3 Equipment Check-out....................................................................................................... 5-2

5.3.1 Detection Systems .............................................................................................. 5-2

5.3.2 Navigational Equipment ...................................................................................... 5-2

5.4 Data Collection and Storage ............................................................................................ 5-2

6. Response Actions 6-1

6.1 Response Technique ....................................................................................................... 6-1

6.1.1 Anomaly and MEC Avoidance ............................................................................ 6-1

6.1.2 Site Preparation .................................................................................................. 6-1

6.1.3 Surface Removal................................................................................................. 6-1

6.1.4 Subsurface Removal ........................................................................................... 6-1

6.1.5 Personnel Protections and Engineering Controls ............................................... 6-3

6.1.6 Munitions Handling Equipment ........................................................................... 6-3

6.1.7 Construction Support .......................................................................................... 6-3

6.2 Exclusion Zones ............................................................................................................... 6-4

6.2.1 Exclusion Zones .................................................................................................. 6-4

6.2.2 Controlling Exclusion Zones ............................................................................... 6-4

6.2.3 Potential Explosion Sites .................................................................................... 6-5

6.2.4 Exclusion Zone Control Protocol ......................................................................... 6-5

6.2.5 Munitions Response Site Exclusion Zone Access Protocol ............................... 6-5

6.3 MEC and/or MPPEH Hazard Classification, Movement, Transportation, and Storage ... 6-6

EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION FOR EXPLOSIVE RAILCAR HOLDING YARD

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY CRANE, INDIANA

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6.3.1 Hazard Classification .......................................................................................... 6-6

6.3.2 Movement ........................................................................................................... 6-6

6.3.3 Storage ................................................................................................................ 6-7

6.4 MEC and/or MPPEH Disposition Processes ................................................................... 6-7

6.4.1 MEC Disposition.................................................................................................. 6-7

6.4.2 MPPEH Disposition ............................................................................................. 6-7

6.5 Explosively Contaminated Soil ......................................................................................... 6-7

6.6 Contaminated Buildings ................................................................................................... 6-8

6.7 Operational Risk Management ........................................................................................ 6-8

6.8 Contingencies .................................................................................................................. 6-8

7. Quality Control and Quality Assurance 7-1

7.1 Quality Control Implementation ........................................................................................ 7-1

7.2 Quality Assurance Implementation .................................................................................. 7-4

8. Technical Support 8-1

8.1 Explosive Ordnance Disposal .......................................................................................... 8-1

8.2 Unexploded Ordnance Contractor ................................................................................... 8-1

8.3 Physical Security .............................................................................................................. 8-1

9. Environmental, Ecological, Cultural, and/or Other Considerations 9-1

9.1 Regulatory Statute, Phase, and Oversight ...................................................................... 9-1

9.2 Environmental, Ecological, Cultural, and/or Other Considerations .................................. 9-1

9.3 Non-Explosive Soil ........................................................................................................... 9-1

10. Residual Risk Management 10-1

10.1 Land Use Controls ......................................................................................................... 10-1

10.2 Long-Term Management ............................................................................................... 10-1

11. Safety Education Program 11-1

12. Stakeholder Involvement 12-1

13. References 13-1

Appendices

A Signature Page

B Supporting Explosives Safety Data

C Explosives Safety Quantity Distance Maps

Tables

3-1 Munitions with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

6-1 Exclusion Zones for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

6-2 Controlling Exclusion Zones for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

6-3 Hazard Analysis Matrix for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

7-1 Quality Control Methods and Pass/Fail Criteria for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

CONTENTS

DECEMBER 2019 v

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Figures

1 Explosive Railcar Holding Yard Location Map

2 Explosive Railcar Holding Yard Boundary Map

DECEMBER 2019 vii

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAR After Action Report 1 AFETA Armed Forces Experimental Training Activity 2 APERS Antipersonnel 3 ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 4

BEM Buried Explosion Module 5 bgs below ground surface 6

CAAA Crane Army Ammunition Activity 7 C/D class/division 8 CFR Code of Federal Regulations 9

DDESB Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board 10 Det Detachment 11 DGM digital geophysical mapping 12 DoD Department of Defense 13 DODIC U.S. Department of Defense Identification Code 14 DRMO Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office 15

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 16 EODMU Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 17 ER Environmental Restoration 18 ERHY Explosive Railcar Holding Yard 19 ESO Explosives Safety Officer 20 ESQD explosives safety quantity-distance 21 ESS Explosives Safety Submission 22 EZ exclusion zone 23

GSV Geophysical System Verification 24

HAZWOPER hazardous waste operations and emergency response 25 HEAT high-explosive anti-tank 26 HEDP High Explosives Dual Purpose 27 HERO hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance 28 HFD hazardous fragment distance 29

IBD inhabited building distance 30 ICM Improved Conventional Munition 31 IM Interim Measure 32 ISO Industry Standard Objects 33 IVS instrument verification strip 34

LLRW low level radioactive waste 35 LUC land use controls 36

MDAS material documented as safe 37 MEC munitions and explosives of concern 38 MFD-H maximum fragment distance – horizontal 39 MGFD munition with the greatest fragmentation distance 40 MILCON military construction 41 MPPEH material potentially presenting an explosive hazard 42 mm millimeter 43 MR munitions response 44

NAVFAC MIDLANT Naval Facilities Engineering Command Mid-Atlantic 45 Navy Department of the Navy 46 NEESA Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity 47 NEODTD Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division 48 viii DECEMBER 2019

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NEW net explosive weight 1 NOSSA Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity 2 NPM Navy Project Manager 3 NSA Naval Support Activity 4 NSWCIHEODTECHDIV Naval Station Weapons Indian Head Explosives Ordnance Disposal Technology 5

Division 6

OP Ordnance Pamphlet 7 OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 8

PES Potential Explosion Sites 9 PM Project Manager 10 PTR public transportation route 11

QA quality assurance 12 QC quality control 13 QCP Quality Control Plan 14

RTK GPS real-time kinematic global positioning system 15

SAA small arms ammunition 16 SSRA subsurface saturated response area 17 SUXOS Senior Unexploded Ordnance Supervisor 18 SWMU Solid Waste Measure Unit 19

TP Technical Paper 20

USAESCH United States Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Center 21 USEPA United States Environmental Protection Agency 22 UXO unexploded ordnance 23 UXOQCS Unexploded Ordnance Quality Control Specialist 24 UXOSO Unexploded Ordnance Safety Officer 25

DECEMBER 2019 1-1

1. Background

1.1 Navy Project Manager

The Navy Project Manager (NPM) submitting this Explosives Safety Submission (ESS) is Mr. Paul 1 Belamarich of Naval Facilities Engineering Command Mid-Atlantic (NAVFAC MIDLANT): 2

Address: Commanding Officer, NAVFAC MIDLANT (OPHE3) NAVFAC MIDLANT CI Core 3 ATTN: Paul Belamarich, 4 Phone: 757-341-2053 5

Email: paul.belamarich@navy.mil 6

1.2 Site Identifier and Description

The Explosive Railcar Holding Yard (ERHY), referred to as Construction Site going forward, is located on 7 Naval Support Activity (NSA) Crane. The ERHY boundary coincides with the Solid Waste Measure Unit 8 (SWMU) 21 which is an active material processing and recycling facility (Defense Reutilization and 9 Marketing Office (DRMO) Storage Lot) located in the central part of NSA Crane (Figure 1-1 and Figure 10 1-2). The DRMO Storage Lot has been in operation since the late 1940s as a material processing center. 11 Materials processed at the site include scrap metal, wood, cardboard, and paper. The exact startup date 12 of activities at the site is unknown, but it appears to have been shortly after startup of the NSA Crane 13 facility in the 1940s. The NSA Crane facility was a rural, forested, and farmed area when it was 14 commissioned as a Navy facility in 1941, and the site has been part of the Navy facility since that time. 15

1.3 Regional Maps

Figure 1-1 depicts the location of the Construction Site in relation to NSA Crane and the surrounding 16 areas. Figure 1-2 depicts a site map of the Construction Site . 17

1.4 Scope of Munitions Response

The munitions response (MR) is to support the military construction (MILCON) of future facilities at the 18 NSA Crane former DRMO. The planned activities will include: 19

• Site preparation employing anomaly avoidance. 20

• Surface removal of munitions and explosives of concern (MEC) or material potentially presenting an 21 explosive hazard (MPPEH). 22

• Digital geophysical mapping (DGM). 23

• Intrusive Investigation of DGM identified anomalies. 24

• Electromagnetic analog subsurface removal (EM and Dig). 25

• Low-input mechanized operations. 26

• Construction support. 27

• Management of MEC, MPPEH, and material documented as safe (MDAS). 28

• Inspection of MEC, MPPEH, and other debris for low level radioactive waste (LLRW). 29

The future land use is expected to remain the same as the current land use (developed). 30

1.5 History of Munitions Use

The NSA Crane DRMO has been in operation since the late 1940s as a material processing center and is 31 an active recycling facility that processes scrap metal, wood, cardboard, and paper. It has never operated 32

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as an open burn/open detonation site, a weapons handling facility, or an ordnance production facility. 1 Many types of certified inert munitions have been processed at the facility through the years. 2

In 1978, a Line Throwing Appliance impulse projected rocket was in the process of being dismantled 3 using a cutting torch. The operator, believing the item to be inert, applied the torch to the aft end of the 4 rocket, which ignited the rocket and caused it to fly into a heavily wooded area. A security guard standing 5 nearby received a minor flash burn to his eye (Incident #46. Explosive Incident at the Defense Property 6 Disposal Office Salvage Yard, 25 April 1978). In 1989, a Mk II hand grenade was erroneously turned in to 7 DRMO in an ammunition storage can that was identified as empty. In 2008, DRMO was approved for the 8 onsite demilitarization of 155-mm projectiles for scrap sales. All items were certified inert prior to being 9 shipped to DRMO at NSA Crane. In June 2015, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 10 TWO Detachment (Det) Crane responded to what turned out to be four inert munitions, which included a 11 16-inch projectile, a 250-pound bomb, a 30-mm projectile, and a 105-mm projectile (Explosive Ordnance 12 Disposal [EOD] Report 8027.2015, Emergency Response to DRMO, 23 June 2015). 13

During soil removal activities in 2015, expended small arms ammunition (SAA) casings were observed at 14 the site. The SAA casings have been encountered at the surface and subsurface. 15

1.6 Previous Studies of Extent of MEC and/or MPPEH Contamination

In August 2018 an Interim Measure (IM) to remediate SWMUI 21-DRMO Storage Lot soil and sediment 16 contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls, lead, and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons was conducted. 17 The IM included manual sifting of the top 1 foot of soil in eight locations (See Figure 1-2 for excavation 18 locations). 19

An M23 igniter, possibly filled with white phosphorus, was found. EOD Mobile Unit TWO Detachment 20 Crane took possession of the M23 igniter. After further investigation, it was determined that the M23 21 igniter was empty and contained no explosives (inert). One of the M23 igniters that was discovered during 22 the IM was encountered at approximately 15 inches below ground surface (bgs), the remaining 2,228 23 pounds of MPPEH (later classified as MDAS) was encountered within the top 1 foot of soil. Section 3.0 24 list the types of MPPEH encountered. No MEC was recovered during the IM (TTL Associates, 2018). 25

1.7 Justification for No Further Action Decision

Not applicable. 26

Explosive Railcar Holding Yard Boundary

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NSA

Crane

0 1 20.5

Miles

Figure 1-1 Vicinity Map

Explosive Railcar Holding Yard NSA Crane

Crane, Indiana

Legend Explosive Railcar Holding Yard NSA Crane Boundary

Lead\PCB Area 1A

Lead Area 2

PCB Area 2 Lead Area 3

Lead Area 4

PCB Area 3C

Lead Area 5

PCB Area 4A

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Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

NSA

Crane

0 150 30075

Feet

Figure 1-2 Site Layout

Explosive Railcar Holding Yard NSA Crane

Crane, Indiana

Legend Building Excavated Area SWMU 21 and ERHY Boundary NSA Crane Boundary

DECEMBER 2019 2-1

2. Project Dates

Onsite activities are scheduled to begin following the approval of this ESS and when the MILCON 1 contract has been awarded. It is anticipated that the onsite work outlined in this ESS will be completed 2 within 12 months of initiation. 3

DECEMBER 2019 3-1

3. Types of MEC and/or MPPEH

3.1 Types and Quantities of MEC and/or MPPEH

The quantities of MEC and MPPEH within ERHY are currently unknown. Numerous inert and/or 1 demilitarized munitions have been delivered and recycled at DRMO over the years. Historical records of 2 the items turned-in are incomplete, and the amounts and types are unknown. The following list of 3 MEC/MPPEH items have been recovered during processing or found during studies at the ERHY (TTL 4 Associates, 2018). 5

• Small arms ammunition; expended cartridge casings and primers. 6

• 20-mm; expended cartridge cases, projectiles, and links. 7

• 30-mm; inert projectile 8

• 40-mm; expended cartridge cases. 9

• 50-caliber; expended cartridge cases and projectiles. 10

• 75-mm; expended cartridge cases. 11

• 8-inch; expended cartridge cases. 12

• 90-mm; expended cartridge cases. 13

• 105-mm; expended cartridge cases. 14

• 155-mm; expended cartridge cases. 15

• Cartridge Actuated Devices; expended. 16

• Mk 13 Igniter Tubes; expended. 17

• M23 igniter 18

• Unknown Nose fuze; expended. 19

• Mk II hand grenade 20

• Unknown rifle grenade, smoke; expended. 21

• 16-inch projectile, inert 22

• 250 lb bomb, inert 23

• Mk 82 Bomb; Tail shipping covers and nose covers. 24

3.2 Munitions with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance

The Primary munition with the greatest fragmentation distance (MGFD) selected is the M564 Mechanical 25 Time and Superquick Fuze. The M564 fuze was used in two projectiles that were processed through 26 DRMO, including the U.S. Department of Defense Identification Code (DODIC) D563, Projectile, 155-mm 27 High Explosives Dual Purpose (HEDP) Improved Conventional Munition (ICM) Antipersonnel (APERS) 28 M483 and Cartridge, 105-mm, M413. The M564 fuze was selected in part because the DODIC D563, 29 Projectile, 155-mm HEDP ICM APERS M483 and Cartridge, 105-mm, M413 was an ordnance item that 30 went through the non-destructive demilitarization process on NSA Crane. The demilitarization process 31 requires the M564 fuze to be removed. Although the chances are remote, a possibility exists that 32 additional M564 fuzes were inadvertently mixed into shipments or were not removed from the projectile 33 bodies from CAAA to DRMO. Therefore, only the fragmenting portion of the item, the M564 fuze, will be 34 evaluated for fragmentation distance. 35

There are two contingency MGFD, Contingency-1 MGFD Mk II hand grenade and Contingency-2 105-mm 36 M393A3 projectile. The Mk II hand grenade was selected as the Contingency-1 MGFD because one was 37 found in a presumed empty ammunition can during an excess property turn-in to DRMO in 1989. 38 Although there is no evidence of a 105-mm projectile being discovered at this Construction Site, a 105-39 mm projectile with no specific nomenclature filled with concrete was found in 2015. Based on this 40 information, a similar worst-case item was included as the Contingency-2 MGFDs. Table 3-1 lists the 41 primary and contingency MGFDs. Appendix B presents the documentation for the minimum separation 42 distances for the MGFDs. 43

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Table 3-1. Primary and Contingency Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

Type Munition Item HFD (feet) 1 MFD-H (feet) 1

Primary MGFD M564, Fuze, Mechanical Time and Superquick

65 305

Contingency-1 MGFD Mk II Hand Grenade1 62 521

Contingency-2 MGFD 105-mm M393A3 Projectile 337 1,933

Notes:

1 Fragmentation Data Review Form (DDESB, 2018).

HFD = hazardous fragment distance; MFD-H = maximum fragment distance – horizontal

If, while executing a munitions response, the unexploded ordnance (UXO) contractor identifies an MEC 1 item that has a greater maximum fragmenting distance – horizontal (MFD-H), hazardous fragment 2 distance (HFD), or K328 distance than the ESS-approved MGFD, but not more than that for the 3 contingency MGFDs, then the Senior UXO Supervisor (SUXOS) will halt all operations, notify the UXO 4 contractor Project Manager, who will notify the Navy Project Manager, who will notify Naval Ordnance 5 Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) (N4). The Project Manager may, with NOSSA concurrence, resume 6 operations only after the increased protection required by the item found or the contingency MGFD is in 7 place. If, while executing a munitions response, the UXO contractor identifies an MEC item that has a 8 greater MFD-H, HFD, or K328 distance than the ESS-approved contingency MGFD, then the SUXOS will 9 halt all operations, notify the UXO contractor Project Manager, who will notify the Navy Project Manager. 10 The Navy Project Manager will submit to NOSSA (N4), via WebESS, an amended ESS that reflects a 11 new MGFD. Operations will resume only after the amended ESS is NOSSA-endorsed and Department of 12 Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB)-approved, and all safeguards associated with the newly 13 selected MGFD are in place. The change in the MGFD will be documented in the After Action Report 14

(AAR). 15

However, if circumstances warrant, written correspondence that work continue at the site while the ESS is 16 being amended will be sent to the NOSSA N4 personnel that reviewed the original ESS. The request will 17 provide all pertinent information regarding the new MGFD (and contingency MGFD, if appropriate), 18 including required separation distances for DDESB-approved operations, and a revised map showing the 19 relevant separation distances. Buried Explosion Module (BEM) printouts for the new MGFDs must also 20 be included, if the BEM will be used during detonation of MEC. The amended ESS will be submitted to 21 NOSSA via WebESS within one week of the written NOSSA authorization for the revised MGFDs and 22 protections must be received before continuing operations. The change in MGFDs will also be 23 documented in the AAR. 24

3.3 Maximum Credible Event

Not applicable. 25

3.4 Explosively Contaminated Buildings

Not applicable. 26

DECEMBER 2019 4-1

4. MEC and/or MPPEH Migration

MEC/MPPEH migration due to naturally occurring phenomena (e.g., flooding, erosion, and drought) is not 1 a realistic concern because the area is flat and covered by structures, paved/gravel lots, and vegetation. 2

DECEMBER 2019 5-1

5. Detection and Positioning Technologies

5.1 Detection Equipment, Method, and Standards

5.1.1 Analog Instruments

Analog instruments will be used by UXO technicians to assist during anomaly avoidance, surface removal 1 of MEC/MPPEH, and during the intrusive investigation of anomalies (to help guide excavations and to 2 identify and investigate anomalies when performing mag-and-dig, if necessary) . The analog instruments 3 to be used will include Schonstedt GA-52Cx fluxgate magnetometers, White’s XLT all-metals detectors, or 4 equivalent. 5

5.1.2 EM61-MK2

DGM dynamic surveys will be performed using the Geonics EM61-MK2 time-domain electromagnetic 6 detector to map any detectable metal in the subsurface. The EM61-MK2 will also be used in analog 7 detection mode during reacquisition and removal verification. The EM61-MK2 is a high-resolution, 8 time-domain electromagnetic instrument designed to detect, with high spatial resolution, shallow ferrous 9 and non-ferrous metallic objects. The technology has been widely demonstrated as an appropriate 10 technology for the conditions and types of items (ferrous and non-ferrous metals in pits or individually 11 buried) that could be present at the site. The EM61-MK2’s transmitter generates a pulsed primary 12 magnetic field, which subsequently induces eddy currents in nearby metallic objects. The eddy currents 13 are measured and recorded by the system for download and interpretation by a geophysicist. 14

The detection capabilities of the EM61-MK2 are well-established and documented through various 15 studies and empirical data across the munitions response industry. In general, the system’s capabilities 16 are to detect items to a depth equal to approximately 11 times a MEC item’s diameter. This relationship 17 reflects the fact that MEC detection capability decreases with greater item depth and/or decreased item 18 size. The equation assumes worst-case orientations for ordnance items—a ratio of length to width of at 19 least 2:1 and that the item is not thin-walled. Smaller items, such as 20-mm or 37-mm projectiles, do not 20 fit within this standard calculation. 21

5.1.3 Geophysical System Verification

DGM equipment will be validated through the Geophysical System Verification (GSV) process and a 22 series of daily quality control (QC) tests. The GSV is a physics-based technology process in which signal 23 strength and sensor performance are compared to known response curves of Industry Standard Objects 24 (ISO) to verify the performance of DGM systems before and during site surveys. The GSV process is 25 designed to perform initial verification of the DGM system using an instrument verification strip (IVS) 26 followed by a blind seeding program for continued verification throughout the field operations. 27

The MILCON contractor will establish an IVS containing small ISOs (1-inch by 4-inch pipe segments) 28 buried at depths of approximately 3 and 7 times the ISO diameter to the center of the ISO mass. The IVS 29 will be surveyed at the beginning of the DGM survey to verify that the EM61-MK2 system response to the 30 buried ISOs is within industry accepted standards (within 20 percent of the modeled response curve for 31 the ISO as published by Naval Research Laboratory in NRL/MR/6110--09-9183, EM61-MK2 Response of 32 Three Munitions Surrogates, March 12, 2009). 33

The GSV process also includes blind seeding throughout the DGM area for ongoing validation of the 34 DGM systems. This process is discussed in more detail in Section 7.1. 35

5.1.4 Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance

White’s XLT all-metals detector and EM61-MK2 emit an electromagnetic field and induce eddy currents 36 as part of their operations. The Navy has evaluated the EM61-MK2 and determined it to be hazards of 37

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electromagnet radiation to ordnance (HERO) safe to use in areas containing electrically initiated UXO 1 (Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division, 2011). Because the White’s XLT generates an 2 electromagnetic field that is equal to or substantially smaller than that produced by the EM61-MK2, no 3 HERO evaluation of this instrument is required. The Schonstedt GA-52Cx does not require HERO 4 evaluation because it is a passive instrument that does not emit an electromagnetic field. 5

5.2 Positioning System, Method, and Standards

Boundary points, QC seeds, grid corners, control points/monuments, DGM surveys, and DGM target 6 reacquisition will be surveyed using real-time kinematic global positioning system (RTK GPS), 7 conventional Total Station survey equipment (depending on location within the site), and/or fiducially. All 8 other tasks may use handheld GPS units with sub-meter post-processing accuracy. 9

A licensed professional land surveyor in the state of Indiana will be used to install control 10 points/monuments. 11

5.3 Equipment Check-out

5.3.1 Detection Systems

When scheduled for use, the EM61-MK2 and analog instruments will undergo functional checks twice a 12 day (at the beginning and end of each day) to demonstrate the systems are operating properly. The 13 systems will be checked at the IVS to demonstrate that the system adequately detects the ISOs buried in 14 the IVS. The systems will also be checked at the IVS after the batteries have been replaced or after a 15 critical system component has been repaired or replaced. Malfunctioning or inoperable sensors will be 16 taken out of service until they can be repaired or replaced. This process will be followed during DGM as 17 well as when EM61-MK2 systems and analog instruments are scheduled for use during intrusive 18 operations. 19

5.3.2 Navigational Equipment

When scheduled for use, the handheld GPS, RTK GPS, and/or total station equipment will be checked 20 against a known monument at the beginning of the day. The monument used for this check will be 21 established by a licensed, professional land surveyor in the state of Indiana. The accuracy will be 22 checked by comparing measured coordinates against the land surveyor-supplied ground truth information 23 for that point. 24

5.4 Data Collection and Storage

Records of all data, field forms, maps, photographs, and related files will be retained in the MILCON 25 contactor office. Electronic files of final MEC data, maps, QC data, and other relevant data will be 26 archived on read-only DVD and provided for the Administrative Record as part of the completion report 27 and summarized in the AAR. Paper and electronic copies of draft and final reports and submittals will 28 occur as specified in the project work plan. 29

DECEMBER 2019 6-1

6. Response Actions

6.1 Response Technique

6.1.1 Anomaly and MEC Avoidance

Anomaly avoidance includes the visual observation of the ground surface by UXO Technicians and where 1 needed, instrument-assisted detection using an appropriate metal detector and/or magnetometer. The 2 instrument will be used to check inside heavy vegetation (such as a thick brush), if necessary, where it is 3 not possible for the UXO Technician to visually check the area. Anomaly avoidance will be used for all 4 tasks not conducted by UXO personnel and during site preparation activities such as those described 5 herein. 6

6.1.2 Site Preparation

Site preparation activities will be executed by UXO-qualified personnel using anomaly avoidance 7 procedures. UXO technicians performing operations onsite will be outfitted in the appropriate personal 8 protective equipment (PPE). 9

6.1.2.1 Site Survey

A professional land surveyor registered in the state of Indiana will perform a land survey including 10 placement of the grid corners as applicable to aid the surface and subsurface removals. Surveying 11 activities will be conducted under anomaly avoidance performed by a UXO-qualified person. 12

6.1.2.2 Vegetation Removal

Vegetation removal activities will be supervised by a UXO-qualified person who will ensure that the tools 13 used for vegetation reduction will not intentionally contact the ground. Personnel will use chain saws, 14 power trimmers, pole saws, and other manually operated cutting tools to cut vegetation, or personnel may 15 use mechanical methods such as a tractor with a brush deck or weed eaters. Cut vegetation will be 16 moved from the area so as not to create a safety hazard. Vegetation will be cut no closer than 6 inches 17 above the ground surface. Personnel cutting vegetation will wear appropriate personal protective 18 equipment for the task, such as, but not limited to, chaps, heavy work boots, gloves, hardhats, and eye 19 protection. Personnel designated to remove cut vegetation will remain away from the area being cut until 20 all cutting ceases. 21

6.1.3 Surface Removal

An instrument-aided surface removal will be performed prior to subsurface removal (analog, digital, or 22 mechanical). Any metallic items 2 inches long or greater in any dimension which protrude or are visible 23 from the top of ground (soil) surface (that is, below leaf litter) will be removed as part of the surface 24 removal. Recovered MEC and MPPEH will be detonated in accordance with the procedures discussed in 25 Sections 6.3 and 6.4. A LLRW survey will be with the surface removal effort. The LLRW survey will 26 include inspection of all recovered MEC, MPPEH, and other debris. LLRW will be managed and disposed 27 of in accordance with the 10 CFR 2001. 28

6.1.4 Subsurface Removal

A subsurface removal will be performed ahead of MILCON earth disturbing activities. The subsurface 29 removal will be limited to the top 1-foot of soil. Earth disturbing activities deeper than 1-foot will be 30 supported with onsite-construction support as reflected in Section 6.1.7. Subsurface removal will be 31 conducted by one of the following methods based on the site condition and the subsurface construction 32 activity for that area: (1) performing a DGM survey followed by manual intrusive investigation to remove 33 subsurface anomalies, (2) conduct an EM and Dig to detect and remove MEC/MPPEH manually, and/or 34

(3) low-input mechanical soil excavation and screening. 35

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Along with the selected subsurface removal effort, all MEC, MPPEH, and other debris recovered will be 1 inspected for LLRW. LLRW will be managed and disposed of in accordance with the 10 CFR 20.2001. 2

6.1.4.1 DGM

DGM may follow the instrument-aided surface removal and be conducted to identify geophysical 3 anomalies that represent potential subsurface MEC with an EM61-MK2 described in Section 5.1.2 4 above. Where site conditions or project requirements are unfavorable for DGM, the EM and Dig process 5 or mechanical soil sifting will be utilized. 6

Geophysical anomalies identified for intrusive investigation will be reacquired to an exact location using 7 an RTK GPS, conventional Total Station survey equipment, or fiducial positioning. Using a polyvinyl 8 chloride flag with the unique identifier number recorded in indelible ink, a flag will be positioned 1-foot 9 north of the anomaly using anomaly avoidance techniques. 10

A UXO technician with the aid of the handheld metal detector (Schonstedt GA-52Cx fluxgate 11 magnetometer or White’s XLT all-metals detectors, or equivalent) or an EM61-MK2 will refine or verify the 12 precise location of the subsurface anomaly source location from the surface. A UXO Technician will start 13 the excavation from the side of the item, carefully digging from the side until the item is identified. 14 Excavation operations will employ a step-down or offset access method. Debris and soil will be cleared 15 from the item sufficiently to permit identification of the item and to apply the necessary disposition 16 procedure. 17

6.1.4.2 EM and Dig

The UXO technicians will establish 3 to 5-foot-wide lanes and sweep the lanes to ensure 100 percent 18 coverage. UXO-qualified technician will use a handheld metal detector (Schonstedt GA-52Cx fluxgate 19 magnetometer or White’s XLT all-metals detectors, or equivalent) to detect subsurface anomaly sources. 20 When an anomaly is located, the UXO technician will either immediately investigate the anomaly or place 21 a flag 1-foot north of the anomaly location for investigation at a later time. 22

6.1.4.3 Verification of Anomaly Source Removal

During the intrusive investigation of DGM or analog detected subsurface anomaly locations, removal of 23 anomaly sources will be verified. Verification of anomaly source removal will be performed using the 24 same or an instrument of similar detection capabilities as the instrument initially used to detect the 25 anomaly source. The anomaly source will be determined to be removed when only background response 26 is detected. If the instrument response suggests that the anomaly source was not entirely removed, the 27 location will either be reinvestigated, or a comment will be entered along with the investigation result 28 indicating the reason for non-removal. For example, “Anomaly location consists of buried utility line that 29 cannot be removed from the location.”. Results of intrusive investigations will be reviewed against the 30 original anomaly amplitudes by the Project Geophysicist. 31

Based on the August 2018 IM, it is anticipated that the majority of anomaly sources will be within the top 32 1-foot of soil. In the event anomaly sources and/or MEC/MPPEH is encountered at depths greater than 1-33 foot additional/deeper subsurface removal effort may be warranted. See Section 6.1.7 for details on 34 construction support. 35

6.1.4.4 Low-input Mechanized Operations

In lieu of manual excavation methods, mechanical equipment may be used to excavate and process soil 36 that may contain MEC/MPPEH. Shielded earth moving equipment (for example, a backhoe or track hoe) 37 may be used to remove soil in shallow lifts. Soil may then be spread out in 6-inch lifts aside of the 38 excavation and inspected by UXO techs using handheld metal detector (Schonstedt GA-52Cx fluxgate 39 magnetometer or White’s XLT all-metals detectors, or equivalent) or an EM61-MK2 to detect and remove 40 MEC/MPPEH, or processed through a soil sifting plant. 41

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In addition to or instead of spreading the soil in 6-inch lifts for analog inspection sifting may be used. A 1 specific screening plant has not been selected, but it is anticipated that the general procedures described 2 in this ESS will apply to any used. The screening plan may use a series of screens and magnets to 3 remove MEC/MPPEH suspended in the soil. If the final screen has perforations small enough to retain a 4 20-mm projectile, then the soil may be moved to the temporary stockpile area. If the smallest screen will 5 not retain a 20-mm projectile, then the soil will need to be spread out in 6-inch lifts and inspected by UXO 6 techs before being moved to the temporary stockpile area. The inspection of material spread into 6-inch 7 lifts will be conducted in the same fashion as specified above for EM and Dig. Once the soil is 100 8 percent inspected by UXO technicians it may be moved to the temporary stockpile area. 9

All materials removed from the excavated soil will be visually inspected by UXO-qualified personnel to 10 determine if further inspection or treatment (e.g., disposal, destruction, or demilitarization) is required, 11 such as for MEC or MPPEH, as described in Section 6.4. 12

Material will ideally be screened at the point of excavation, however, if site conditions (e.g., wet material) 13 prevent maneuvering the screen within the excavation area, material will be transported to an alternate 14 area to be screened. 15

After screening, materials (excluding MEC and MPPEH, as described in Section 6.4) will be transported 16 out of the excavation area using off-road dump trucks or trailers to a temporary stockpile area. Screened 17 material will be stockpiled in the material handling area in preparation for use onsite or for off-site disposal 18 in accordance with the disposal facility requirements (e.g., landfill debris or daily cover material). The 19 stockpiled material will be segregated into stockpiles by QC lot. Each QC lot will be delineated with 20 indicator flagging and posted with signage indicating the status in the QC process. Once the QC lot has 21 been through the complete QC process, it will be marked as acceptable for final use. Frequency of QC 22 inspection are discussed in Section 7. 23

6.1.5 Personnel Protections and Engineering Controls

All equipment used to excavate, handle, process, or haul soil that may retain MEC/MPPEH will be 24 equipped with shields to defeat hazardous fragments from the MGFD. The DDESB Fragmentation Data 25 Review Forms dated 3 May 2018 included in Appendix B specifies the appropriate shielding. Because 26 this is a low-input mechanized operation, the shields will be the unintentional detonation thickness. 27 In addition to being protected by shielding, the operator of the equipment, and essential personnel will be 28 at the K24, or the K18 distance if double hearing protection that provides greater than or equal to 9 29 decibels attenuation. Either a physical barricade consisting of vertical and horizontal markers with high-30 visibility tape, PVC pipe with fluorescent tape, an electro-mechanical device, or other suitable visual 31 indicators will be utilized to maintain required K18 and K24 distances. The public and non-essential 32 personnel will be separated from the low-input mechanized operation by the HFD. 33

During intentional detonations of MEC, engineering controls will be implemented to reduce minimum 34 separation distances. Engineering controls may include sandbag mitigation or use of the Buried Explosion 35 Module (BEM) version 7.2. Controlling exclusion zones for MEC operations are presented in Table 6-2. 36

If night work is required, auxiliary lighting will be utilized. The work area will be lit to at least 37 10 foot-candles per table D-3 of 29 CFR 1926.56. 38

6.1.6 Munitions Handling Equipment

Not applicable. 39

6.1.7 Construction Support

On-site construction support will be utilized during MILCON activities. A UXO-qualified person will be 40 onsite evaluating all ground disturbance activities. 41

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If MILCON activities require earth disturbing activities, a 1-foot subsurface removal will be performed. 1 Construction support will be utilized for MILCON earth disturbing activities following the subsurface 2 removal. In portions of the site that have already received a MR (surface and subsurface), on-site 3 construction support is not required for the top 1-foot of soil. 4

If while performing construction support, the probability of MEC/MPPEH being encountered elevates to 5 moderate or high, construction support will be suspended, and further subsurface removals will be 6 performed ahead of MILCON activities. 7

6.2 Exclusion Zones

6.2.1 Exclusion Zones

Exclusion Zones (EZs) are established by their respective operation. If non-essential personnel enter the 8 EZ, work will cease. Table 6-1 provides the EZ for the Primary and Contingency MGFDs presented in 9 Table 3-1. 10

Table 6-1. Exclusion Zones for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

MGFD

NEW

(pounds)1

EZs (feet)2

Fragmentation Effects Blast Overpressure Effects

HFD MFD-H K328 K40 K24 K18

M564, Fuze, Mechanical Time and Superquick (Primary) 0.088 65 305 146 18 11 8

Mk II Hand Grenade (Contingency-1) 0.125 62 521 164 20 12 9

105-mm M393A3 Projectile (Contingency-2) 7.194 337 1,933 633 77 46 35

Notes:

NEW = net explosive weight 1 TNT equivalent weight - pressure

2 DDESB Fragmentation Data Review Forms dated 5/3/2018 included in Appendix B.

6.2.2 Controlling Exclusion Zones

Table 6-2 presents the operations to be conducted at Construction Site , the potential for intentional or 11 unintentional detonation, the exposed sites, and the basis and size of the explosives safety quantity-12 distance (ESQD) arcs based on the Primary, Contingency-1, and Contingency-2MGFD. 13

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Table 6-2. Controlling Exclusion Zones for Explosive Railcar Holding Yard

Operation Sited as Exposed Site Basis1 ESQD (feet)2

Manual Operations2 Unintentional

Detonation

UXO teams K40 of the MGFD Primary-1: 183

Contingency-1: 203

Contingency-2: 773

Public and non-essential personnel

HFD of the MGFD Primary-1: 653

Contingency-1: 653,4

Contingency-2: 3373

Low-input

Mechanized

Operations5

Unintentional

Detonation

Essential personnel K24 of the MGFD

Primary-1: 113,6

Contingency-1: 123,6

Contingency-2: 463,6

Public and non-essential personnel HFD of the MGFD

Primary-1: 653

Contingency-1: 653,4,5

Contingency-2: 3373

Notes:

ATF = Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; IBD = inhabited building distance; PTR = public transportation route

1 The primary-1 MGFD is the M564 Mechanical Time and Superquick Fuze; contingency-1 MGFD is the Mk II Hand Grenade;

and contingency-2 is the 105mm M393A3 projectile.

2 Manual operations involve investigating anomalies with hand tools and assessing the explosive safety status of MPPEH.

3 DDESB Fragmentation Data Review Form dated 5/3/2018 in Appendix B.

4 The HFD of the primary is used as it is greater than that of contingency-1.

5 Low-input mechanized operations include mechanical excavation and sifting.

6 The K18 distances for the primary, contingency-1, and contingency-2 of 8, 9, and 35 feet, respectively, may be used in lieu of the K24 distance when personnel wear double hearing protection that provides greater than or equal to 9 decibels attenuation.

The shielding shall comply with the DDESB Fragmentation Data Review Form dated 5/3/2018 in Appendix B under unintentional detention for minimum thickness to prevent perforation.

6.2.3 Potential Explosion Sites

No Potential Explosion Sites (PES) or PES interline distances encumber the Construction Site. 1

6.2.4 Exclusion Zone Control Protocol

Only essential project personnel and authorized visitors will be allowed within the EZ during MEC removals 2 and demolition operations. The maximum extent of the operational EZs at any time is shown on 3 Figures C-1, C-2, and C-3. Limits of the applicable EZ will be established using barricades and/or visual 4 flagging. The UXOSO, with assistance by all essential personnel, will monitor the limits of the EZ to ensure 5 non-essential personnel do not enter the EZ. When an EZ crosses a roadway, walking path, or entry point, 6 signage posted with “Do Not Enter” and the construction manager’s contact phone number or other 7 appropriate site management’s number and 8

6.2.5 Munitions Response Site Exclusion Zone Access Protocol

The UXOSO will be responsible for conducting an operational risk management assessment in 9 accordance with Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 3500.39D (CNO, 2018) prior 10 to initiating response actions involving MEC at the site. In addition, the UXOSO will determine the 11 maximum number of persons (essential personnel and authorized visitors) that can be in the EZ at one 12 time. The ratio of UXO-qualified escorts to visitors will be determined by the UXOSO based on this site-13 specific operational risk analysis. Based on the risk posed by the MR operation underway, the UXOSO 14

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may decide that access to the EZ is unsafe for visitors. However, every effort will be made to 1 accommodate the authorized visitor’s needs. 2

With concurrence of the NPM, the UXOSO will grant EZ access to authorized visitors. Access to the site 3 will be based upon the operational risk analysis of the scheduled MEC operations and availability of 4 escorts, as well as a demonstrated visitor need and subsequent completion of visitor safety briefings. 5

Persons requiring access to the EZ must demonstrate a legitimate need for access and obtain 6 authorization from the NPM and UXOSO. At a minimum, the request for authorization will include names 7 of the individual requesting access, the identification of emergency contacts for these individuals, purpose 8 of visit, task(s) to be performed, and rationale to support EZ access. Persons requesting access will 9 submit their request for authorization to the NPM and UXOSO prior to the proposed date of the site visit. 10 This advance notice will allow time for the UXOSO to support the visit request by assigning a qualified 11 escort, conducting an operational risk analysis on the operations planned for the date of the site visit, and 12 preparing a site-specific visitor safety briefing for the planned operations. A log of all personnel (essential 13 and non-essential) accessing the site will be maintained by the UXOSO. 14

Prior to entry, all authorized visitors will receive a site-specific safety briefing describing the specific 15 hazards and safety procedures to be followed within the EZ for operations underway that workday. Each 16 authorized visitor will be required to acknowledge receipt of this briefing in writing. 17

Authorized visitors to the EZ will be escorted at all times by a UXO-qualified person. Any authorized 18 visitor who violates the established safety procedures will be immediately escorted out of the EZ and/or 19 site for his or her own protection and to protect essential personnel working at the site. 20

6.3 MEC and/or MPPEH Hazard Classification, Movement, Transportation, and Storage

6.3.1 Hazard Classification

The hazard classification and net explosive weight of MPPEH will be based on characteristics of the type 21 of MPPEH involved, its packaging (if any), and the maximum number of explosives potentially present. 22 Recovered MEC or MPPEH will be managed as Class/Division 1.1 unless otherwise classified by NOSSA 23 (N85). 24

6.3.2 Movement

The SUXOS and UXOSO will determine that a MEC/MPPEH item is safe to move in accordance with 25 Naval Sea Systems Command OP-5, Volume 1, Paragraph 14-8.1.1 (NAVSEA, 2017). If a MEC item is 26 determined to be safe to move by the SUXOS and UXOSO, this decision will be documented in writing 27 prior to the movement. MEC and/or MPPEH may be carried by hand by the contractor within the site to a 28 collection point. MEC/MPPEH will not be moved by the contractor off the MRS. 29

6.3.3 Transportation

The MILCON contractor will not transport any MEC. 30

If MEC is recovered and determined safe to transport by Crane Army Ammunition Activity (CAA), CAAA 31 will take possession and transport the MEC to the NSA Crane operational range for disposal.