589A5-21-700_Topeka EHRM_IFB_BOD_Blast.pdf
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This is a Basis of Design (BOD) narrative for blast protection requirements related to Electronic Health Record Management (EHRM) infrastructure upgrades at the Colmery-O'Neil VA Medical Center in Topeka, Kansas. The document, prepared by Hohbach-Lewin Inc. for Bancroft Architects and Engineers, outlines blast design requirements for both a new Mission Critical Data Center Addition (DCA) and renovations to 31 existing campus buildings to add TR and TE rooms.
The design specifications detail blast protection measures following the VA Physical Security & Resiliency Design Manual (PSRDM) requirements. Key elements include: standoff distances of 50ft for Mission Critical facilities and 25ft for Life Safety facilities, anti-ram vehicle barriers rated for 4,000-lb vehicles at 30mph, blast-resistant exterior components including walls, doors, and glazing, and specific structural requirements for the new DCA building including steel framing and concrete foundations. The document includes detailed assessments of existing glazing conditions in renovated areas, with recommendations to replace non-compliant windows with aluminum panels. For the new DCA, specifications include 12-inch deep Cold Formed Metal Studs, 14GA steel doors, and a 6.5-inch thick composite metal deck roof structure, all designed to resist specified blast loads.
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COLMERY-O’NEIL VA MEDICAL CENTER
EHRM INFRASTRUCTURE UPGRADES
Topeka, KS
APPENDIX E
BASIS OF DESIGN - BLAST
ISSUE FOR BID (IFB) SUBMITTAL – R2
(HOHBACH-LEWIN PROJECT #: 16330.71)
March 22, 2024
Prepared For:
BANCROFT ARCHITECTS + ENGINEERS
3300 DUNDEE RD.
NORTHBROOK, IL 60062
Prepared By:
HOHBACH-LEWIN, INC.
909 MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 260
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94133
EHRM INFRASTRUCTURE UPGRADES | TOPEKA, KS
BASIS OF DESIGN NARRATIVE – BLAST
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
PROJECT BACKGROUND
RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY & DEFINED THREATS
PHYSICAL SECURITY PHILOSOPHY
DEFINED THREATS
PSRDM BLAST DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
SITE DESIGN
STANDOFF – RENOVATED ROOMS
STANDOFF – NEW DCA
PERIMETER
ANTI-RAM VEHICLE BARRIERS
PARKING
ARCHITECTURAL BUILDING DESIGN
FUNCTIONAL AREAS
EXTERIOR BUILDING ENVELOPE
EXTERIOR BUILDING ENVELOPE - RENOVATED ROOMS
EXTERIOR BUILDING ENVELOPE - NEW DCA
STRUCTURAL BUILDING DESIGN
STRUCTURAL - RENOVATED ROOMS
STRUCTURAL - NEW DCA
UTILITIES & BUILDING SERVICES DESIGN
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
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INTRODUCTION
Hohbach-Lewin, Inc. (Hohbach-Lewin) has been contracted by Bancroft Architects and Engineers
(BAE) to provide blast design consulting services for the Electronic Health Record Management
(EHRM) infrastructure upgrade project located at the Colmery-O’Neil Veterans Affairs (VA) Health
Medical Center in Topeka, Kansas. This project scope includes the design of a new Mission Critical
Data Center Addition (DCA) that will house a Computer Room, building systems, and associated utilities. Additionally the project scope includes renovating existing portions of thirty-one (31) campus building to add TR and TE rooms. The TR room security designation will depend on the security designation of the building that TR room is located in. The new and renovated portions of the existing buildings will be designed in accordance with the VA Physical Security & Resiliency
Design Manual (PSRDM), dated October 1, 2020 (Revised July 1, 2022). The focus of blast protective design efforts will be to protect onsite personnel from malicious attack, provide redundancy of critical systems, and to achieve an elevated degree of post-disaster operational continuity. Where existing conditions do not meet the PSRDM requirements as noted in this narrative, it is assumed that the VA will seek out any necessary waivers and/or exemptions.
PROJECT BACKGROUND
Figure 1 shows the Topeka VA campus, identifies the location of the new Mission Critical DCA
(Building 19), and identifies the buildings where renovated TRs have existing exterior glazing.
Figure 1: Project Scope
The renovations/upgrades to the existing buildings are isolated to specific room(s) and the scope of the renovation/upgrades affects less than 50% of the building floor area. The scope of
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Do not remove this notice Properly destroy documents when no longer needed renovation is focused on accommodating the technology upgrade and will not replace any part of the existing exterior building envelope or structure. As per Table 2-1 in the PSRDM, the renovated rooms are to comply with the Alteration/Renovation requirements only for the area being altered.
RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY & DEFINED THREATS
PHYSICAL SECURITY PHILOSOPHY
The approach of the PSRDM for physical security reflects the Crime Prevention through
Environmental Design (CPTED) strategy of compartmentalization. Successive layers of security are provided, starting from the perimeter of the site inward toward the interior protected spaces.
A combination of site hardening and strategic site layout serve to achieve a balanced defensive security scheme.
Physical security strategies are aimed toward the following objectives, commonly referred to as the “Four D’s” – See Figure 2. Blast design provisions of the PSRDM primarily involve deterrence, delay, and denial
Figure 2: Four Ds of Physical Security
The VA PSRDM emphasizes the utilization of five consecutive layers of security. These consecutive layers are as follows, starting from the outward in:
1. Outermost Level - Perimeter fencing, controlled gate access, and signage delineates the boundary of the VA campus.
2. Continuous Facility Perimeter - Combination of signage, hardened barriers, and unhardened features (concrete curbs, fencing, etc.) marks the PSRDM’s minimum required setback of to all unscreened vehicles.
3. Staff-Only Access - Segregation of generally accessible public and patient areas from staff-only areas by use of barriers and hardware. Examples of areas restricted to staff-only include pharmacy preparation, food preparation, sterile corridors, research laboratories, and building operations and maintenance areas.
4. Authorized Staff-Only Access - Segregation of authorized and unauthorized staff areas with barriers and access controls such as card reader-activated hardware. Examples of such areas include patient records, laboratories, vivariums, and cash-handling tellers.
5. Innermost Level - Sensitive and critical interior space access is restricted at a minimum with card-reader access controls, SSTV, ISD alarms, and forced-entry and/or ballistic-resistant construction. Examples of such spaces include security control centers, select agent storage, narcotics storage and pharmaceutical caches, and laboratories.
Strategic use of physical hardening and operational physical security measures at all five security layers lowers the likelihoods of attacks and resulting damage: thereby reducing risk exposure.
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DEFINED THREATS
The PSRDM identifies several blast-related threats to be mitigated through hardened construction for Mission Critical (MC) and Life Safety (LSP) facilities. These threat types and associated design assumptions/characteristics are summarized below from Table 7-1 of the PSRDM:
• Interior Design Level Threat (W1): Small concealed charge carried into the facility through backpack, briefcase, or satchel. Assumed locations at high-risk spaces, such as public lobbies, mailrooms, and loading docks.
• Exterior Design Level Threat (W2): Moderately sized charge located within an unscreened vehicle.
• Dynamic Loading Cap (GP2): Maximum cap on dynamic air-blast loading to be considered for the design of exterior nonstructural building envelope components for mission critical designated facilities.
• Dynamic Loading Cap (GP1): Maximum cap on dynamic air-blast loading to be considered for the design of exterior nonstructural building envelope components for life safety designated facilities.
The charge weights and maximum cap loading magnitudes are provided in the VA Physical
Security Design Standards Data Definitions document, which is subject to controlled distribution.
Table 1 provides a summary of the minimum required standoff for each explosive threat type.
Table 1: Explosive Threats Summary
Explosive Threat Minimum Standoff
W1 ● 25-ft from the building envelope for LSP designated facilities, VA PSRDM Table 6-1
● 50-ft from the building envelope for MC designated facilities, VA PSRDM Table 6-1
W2 ● 50-ft from the building envelope for MC facilities, VA PSRDM Table 7-1
GP1 ● Maximum Blast load applied to non-structural components of LSP facilities
GP2 ● Maximum Blast load applied to non-structural components of the new DCA and other MC facilities
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PSRDM BLAST DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Table 2 summarizes the physical security designations for the buildings within this project scope that will have renovated TRs. The renovated TR room designations are based off the designation of the building that the renovated TR room is in as per Chapter 1 of the PSRDM. Where buildings could be classified at different physical security designations, the most conservative designation is applied to the design. The new DCA will be classified as a MC facility.
Table 2: Physical Security Designation of Buildings with Renovated TRs
Building Number
Building Name Designation Assumptions
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
Mission Critical
MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES (INPATIENT
AND OUTPATIENT)
SERVICES (INPATIENT
AND OUTPATIENT)
SERVICES, NURSING
HOME, AND WOMEN'S
CLINIC
Life Safety
CLINICAL SUPPORT,
TRAINING AND
PERFORMANCE
IMPROVEMENT, MCCR,
RESEARCH
Life Safety
It is assumed that rehabilitation medicine is classified as outpatient. Additionally it is assumed that the research portion does not include an animal facility or wet lab.
COMMUNITY LIVING
CENTER
Life Safety with Mission Critical Utilities and System Redundancies
VA HEALTH REVENUE
CENTER
DINING ROOM,
KITCHEN,
WAREHOUSE
Life Safety with Mission Critical Utilities and System Redundancies
It is assumed that the kitchen serves inpatient food production
VETERANS
INDUSTRIES,
VOCATIONAL REHAB,
COMPENSATED WORK
THERAPY
22 FINANCE LOGISTICS Life Safety
23 CHAPEL Life Safety
VETERANS SERVICES,
CANTEEN, RETAIL,
EYE CLINIC
Mission Critical It is assumed that the eye clinic is classified as an AMB Surg eye clinic
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Building Number
Building Name Designation Assumptions
GYMNASIUM LOCKER
ROOM
STEAM GENERATING
PLANT
Mission Critical
It is assumed that utility services a MC facility
CARPENTRY PAINTING
STORAGE
Life Safety
It is assumed medical records, hazardous waste, and/or other controlled and sensitive material is not kept in this storage area
42 WAREHOUSE Life Safety it is assumed medical records, hazardous waste, and/or other controlled and sensitive material is not kept in this storage area
ENGINEERING SHOPS
HVAC/PLUMING &
ELECTRIC
44 INCINERATOR Life Safety
45 PUMPHOUSE Mission Critical It is assumed that utility services a MC facility
HAZARDOUS
MATERIAL STORAGE
49 GAS METER Mission Critical
50 CHILLER PLANT Mission Critical It is assumed that utility services a MC facility
GREENHOUSE ART
CERAMIC
53 GENERATOR Mission Critical It is assumed that utility services a MC facility and/or is a emergency backup generator
54 GENERATOR Mission Critical It is assumed that utility services a MC facility and/or is a emergency backup generator
55 GENERATOR Mission Critical It is assumed that utility services a MC facility and/or is a emergency backup generator
56 GENERATOR Mission Critical It is assumed that utility services a MC facility and/or is a emergency backup generator
57 GENERATOR Mission Critical It is assumed that utility services a MC facility and/or is a emergency backup generator
58 PUMPHOUSE Mission Critical
273 VA POLICE Mission Critical
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SITE DESIGN
STANDOFF – RENOVATED ROOMS
The renovated TR rooms have varying designations based on the building that they are located within. Renovated TR rooms require a minimum of 50-ft standoff for MC Facilities and 25-ft LSP facilities. A 5-ft minimum standoff is required for any screened and/or emergency vehicles from both MC and LSP facilities.
The Topeka VA Campus is congested and there are multiple locations where the required standoff is violated between the renovated room and existing parking and/or internal roadways.
Specifically, standoff violations to existing parking and roadways exists at buildings 1, 2, and 23 as shown in Figure 3 through Figure 5. It is assumed that the VA does not wish to alter existing internal roadways and parking areas to achieve the PSRDM required standoffs, nor to require extensive blast hardening of individual rooms undergoing minor renovations within the existing buildings. It should be noted that throughout the Topeka VAMC Campus, signage and vehicle access control is provided throughout the site to deter/delay unauthorized access/parking in certain areas. Though signage and vehicle access control does not eliminate unscreened vehicle threats, these countermeasures do provide an additional layer of protection. Therefore, given the intent of the PSRDM and the existing countermeasures, it is assumed that the VA will not require full compliance of the standoff requirements for the renovated rooms.
Figure 3: Building 1 Site Violations (North-West Isometric Perspective)
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Figure 4: Building 2 Site Violations (North-West Isometric Perspective)
Figure 5: Building 23 Site Violations (West Isometric Perspective)
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STANDOFF – NEW DCA
As per Table 3-1 in the PSRDM for MC facilities, the new DCA is required to be located a minimum of 50-ft from the curb line of any adjacent internal roadways and parking. Figure 6 shows the location of the new building relative to the adjacent site roads and parking. As currently sited, the new DCA building meets the minimum standoff to all internal roadways and parking. A new non-rated access control system will be provided at the existing grasscrete drive lane to prevent unauthorized vehicles from traveling closer than 50ft to the building. These standoffs will continue to be enforced as the design continues.
Figure 6: Location of Internal Site Roads and Parking Adjacent to the New DCA
PERIMETER
Chapter 3 of the PSRDM states that alterations/renovations that do not have campus upgrades within the project scope do not need to consider upgrades to the existing perimeter. Campus upgrades are not within the project scope and therefore the existing perimeter elements around the renovated rooms complies with the PSRDM.
As per Table 2-1, Row 2, in the PSRDM the new DCA building does not include scope to revise campus level requirements such as the perimeter fencing. Therefor the existing campus perimeter is assumed to be sufficient.
ANTI-RAM VEHICLE BARRIERS
MC and LSP facilities require passive anti-ram barriers located outside of main entry/lobby entrances to protect against vehicle attack. Similarly, passive barriers are required at any utility connections, emergency power supplies, hazardous-materials storage, HVAC, and external critical telecom and IT resources when deemed at risk from vehicular strike. Passive barriers take the form of fixed bollards and all such barriers must resist a 4,000-lbs vehicle impacting at 30-mph, with a maximum penetration distance of 3.3-ft.
For MC facilities, active anti-ram barriers must be utilized at roadways that may provide access to unscreened (non-emergency) vehicles within 50-ft of the facility.
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ANTI-RAM VEHICLE BARRIERS - RENOVATED ROOMS
As noted previously, existing site roads and parking violate the required standoff to the renovated
TR rooms and would therefore require active and passive anti-ram system to enforce the standoff.
However, because the renovation effort is minor, it is assumed that it is not the intent of the VA to require anti-ram protection to comply with a single room.
ANTI-RAM VEHICLE BARRIERS – NEW DCA
Figure 6 shows the existing grasscrete drive lane that allows vehicles to encroach on the required
50-ft standoff to the new DCA. To prevent vehicles from encroaching on the 50-ft standoff, the
VA PSRDM requires vehicle access control to be provided at the grasscrete drive lane. Due to the fact that the grasscrete drive lane is not a formal vehicle access point, and that any access controls provided at the grasscrete could be circumvented by driving on the grass, non-rated access controls are assumed to be acceptable in lieu of a rated active anti-ram barrier. Additionally, due to the location of the access controls it will not be possible for hostile vehicles to attain the 30-mph impact velocity considered rated anti-ram systems. Therefore, the non-rated access controls are assumed to comply with the intent of the VA PSRDM.
PARKING
Surface parking is required to comply with the minimum standoffs for MC facilities (50-ft) and
LSP facilities (25-ft). Parking areas must be segregated for the following functions:
• Patients/Visitors
• Employees/Staff
• Service/Delivery vehicles
• Emergency Vehicles
Note that emergency vehicles may approach within 50-ft for emergency response and patient drop-off.
As noted previously, some existing surface and structured parking violates the required standoff to the renovated/upgraded TR rooms. However, because the renovation effort is minor, it is assumed that it is not the intent of the VA to require removal of existing parking and therefore the location of the renovated TR rooms is acceptable to the VA.
For the new DCA, all parking is located a minimum of 50-ft from the new DCA and therefore the new DCA location complies with the VA PSRDM parking requirements for MC buildings.
ARCHITECTURAL BUILDING DESIGN
FUNCTIONAL AREAS
Functional areas referenced in the PSRDM are considered at higher risk of malicious acts. The increased vulnerability and criticality associated with loading docks, mailrooms, and other spaces require additional physical security and protective hardening measures in accordance with
Chapter 5 of the PSRDM.
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As per section 5.4.1, the new DCA must not be located closer than 50-ft from the main entrance, Loading Docks, personnel and package screening areas, uncontrolled parking, and mailrooms.
The new DCA does not have any of the functional areas such as Loading docks, mailrooms, main entrances, or personnel/package screening and therefore the VA PSRDM requirement is met. As noted previously, the new DCA is located a minimum of 50-ft from all parking.
EXTERIOR BUILDING ENVELOPE
EXTERIOR BUILDING ENVELOPE - RENOVATED ROOMS
No part of the existing exterior building envelope (non-load bearing exterior walls, fenestrations, doors, or roofs) is to be replaced as part of this renovation effort. However, some renovated TR rooms have existing exterior glazing. Hohbach-Lewin performed a site visit during the 65% design phase to survey the existing glazing conditions. The survey collected data regarding the size of the glazing panes and the layup of the glazing. The layup of the glazing was determined using the Glass-Chek Elite (Model Number GC3200) which can determine the total thickness of the glazing as well as the thickness of the individual panes and laminate interlayers. The results of the field survey and required mitigation options are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Rooms with Existing Exterior Glazing and Recommended Mitigation
Building
Number Building Name
Room
Number Mitigation Options
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
A144A
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
A223A
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
A348
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
A443A
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
A401
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
A544
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
A501
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MAIN HOSPITAL
BUILDING
A601
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES
(INPATIENT AND
OUTPATIENT)
A233G No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
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Building
Number Building Name
Room
Number Mitigation Options
MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES
(INPATIENT AND
OUTPATIENT)
A233H No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES
(INPATIENT AND
OUTPATIENT)
A337 Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES
(INPATIENT AND
OUTPATIENT)
A20A Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES
(INPATIENT AND
OUTPATIENT)
A129B No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES,
NURSING HOME,
AND WOMEN'S
CLINIC
C21 No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES,
NURSING HOME,
AND WOMEN'S
CLINIC
C-242 No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
CLINICAL
SUPPORT,
TRAINING AND
PERFORMANCE
IMPROVEMENT,
MCCR, RESEARCH
A101C No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
CLINICAL
SUPPORT,
TRAINING AND
PERFORMANCE
IMPROVEMENT,
MCCR, RESEARCH
A160 No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
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Building
Number Building Name
Room
Number Mitigation Options
CLINICAL
SUPPORT,
TRAINING AND
PERFORMANCE
IMPROVEMENT,
MCCR, RESEARCH
A201 No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
CLINICAL
SUPPORT,
TRAINING AND
PERFORMANCE
IMPROVEMENT,
MCCR, RESEARCH
A257 No mitigation is required. Existing glazing complies with the PSRDM.
COMMUNITY
LIVING CENTER
B110
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
VA HEALTH
REVENUE CENTER
C020
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
VA HEALTH
REVENUE CENTER
B107
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
VA HEALTH
REVENUE CENTER
A210
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
VA HEALTH
REVENUE CENTER
A224
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
FINANCE
LOGISTICS
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
23 CHAPEL 103
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
23 CHAPEL 104
Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
VETERANS
SERVICES,
CANTEEN, RETAIL,
EYE CLINIC
A121 Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
VETERANS
SERVICES,
CANTEEN, RETAIL,
EYE CLINIC
A115 Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
VETERANS
SERVICES,
CANTEEN, RETAIL,
EYE CLINIC
A144A Replace existing glazing with aluminum panels.
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EXISTING GLAZING REPLACEMENT
At areas where the existing glazing does not comply with either the VA PSRDM lamination or performance requirements, the existing glazing will be completely removed and an aluminum panel will be installed. This retrofit solution complies with the VA PSRDM Section 6.3.2 because the glazing hazard is completely removed and replaced with a ductile material. The ductile material does not introduce hazardous high velocity fragments and provides a consistent level of protection with the existing non-glazed façade.
EXTERIOR BUILDING ENVELOPE - NEW DCA
Exterior nonstructural building envelope components of MC facilities shall be designed to resist blast loading corresponding to a W1 threat located at 50-ft standoff as per VA PSRDM, Table 6-
1. However, the design blast loading does not need to be taken greater than the GP2 maximum cap load. Note that rebound effects must be considered for MC facilities.
• Exterior Non-Load Bearing Walls: Non-load bearing walls are designed to resist the
W1 @ 50-ft, but not greater than the GP-2 cap loading. The response limits for the metal studs is to meet “Moderate Damage” as defined in the ASCE/SEI 59-22 for the applicable blast load. It is prohibited for brittle failure modes to limit the capacity of the sections (i.e.
shear, fracture, etc.).
The exterior wall of the new DCA will consist of 12in deep Cold Formed Metal Studs
(CFMS). As a proof-of-concept, typical studs are 1200S200-97 CFMS spaced at 16in O.C.
with a ¾in Plywood spanning between the studs. Door jambs will require two (2)
1200S200-118 studs formed into a box section. The final design of the CFMS is delegated to the contractor via a performance specification.
• Exterior Doors: The operable portion of all exterior doors (and the exterior door that connects the DCA to the new covered walkway) shall be designed to open towards the detonation and shall be constructed of heavy gauge metal (minimum 14GA Steel). Mullions and structure serving to support doors shall be designed for the GP-2 blast loading as defined in the Physical Security and Resiliency Design Standards Data Definitions
Document applied over the effective width of the element and tributary width of the door opening. Stationary portions of the door shall meet the requirements stated in Table 6-4 in the PSRDM for MC blast load deformation limits. Supporting structure is to meet
“Moderate Damage” as defined in the ASCE/SEI 59-22 for the applicable GP-2 blast load.
The final design of the door system is delegated to the contractor via a performance specification.
• Roof Structure: The roof structure shall be designed to resist the W1 @ 50-ft, but not greater than the GP-2 cap loading. The response limits for the roof is to meet “Superficial
Damage” for primary members and “Moderate Damage” for secondary members. The response limits for Moderate and Superficial Damage are defined in the ASCE/SEI 59-22.
It is prohibited for brittle failure modes to limit the capacity of the sections (i.e. shear, fracture, etc.).
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The roof structure for all new construction is to be a 6.5in thick composite metal deck that spans horizontally between 18in to 24in deep wide flange members.
Additionally, the new DCA is supported by a new Enclosed Walkway that provides access between the new DCA and the existing Building 21 (see Figure 7). As per the VA PSRDM section 6.1.3, enclosed walkways can be excluded from the blast resistant design if a continuous hardened façade is provided at the new DCA. As shown in Figure 7, a continuous hardened façade has been provided at the new DCA and the enclosed walkway is structurally isolated from the new DCA;
therefore the new covered walkway is exempted from the blast resistant requirements.
Figure 7: New DCA and Connecting Corridor
STRUCTURAL BUILDING DESIGN
STRUCTURAL - RENOVATED ROOMS
The alterations/renovations for this project are expected to affect less than 50% of the floor area;
therefore, the PSRDM requirements are limited only to the area being altered/renovated. None of the renovated rooms are in public spaces and because the renovation effort is minor it is not the intent of the VA to require hardening or upgrades to the perimeter columns to comply with a single room. Therefore, for this 95% effort the PSRDM requirements stated in 7.2.7 are not applicable and the structure is sufficient for this alteration/renovation effort.
Additionally, no buildings are undergoing a seismic upgrade and therefore evaluation for the base shear as stated in section 7.3.3 is not required.
IFB-R2 SUBMITTAL
March 22, 2024
PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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STRUCTURAL - NEW DCA
The new DCA building will be a steel-framed single-story structure and will be designed to support a future second story vertical expansion. The roof is comprised of concrete over steel deck, which will be supported by steel wide flange beams. Steel wide flange columns will be founded on conventionally reinforced concrete shallow foundations, including spread footings and continuous grade beams. The lateral-force-resisting-system will be comprised of concentric steel brace frames along the perimeter ends of the structure in two principal directions. All structural elements will be designed in accordance with the MC requirements stated in Chapter 7 of the PSRDM.
UTILITIES & BUILDING SERVICES DESIGN
The requirements for utilities vary depending on the MC or LSP designation of the overall building.
Mechanical, Electrical, Civil, Fire Protection, etc. disciplines are responsible for the implementation of Chapters 8 & 9 of the PSRDM, including all MC redundancy, distribution, and proximity/location requirements.
The new DCA will require compliance with Chapters 8 & 9 and the TR rooms will require full compliance with the alteration/renovation portions of Chapters 8 & 9 of the PSRDM if the TR is within a MC or LSP with MC utilities. Some critical blast-related protective requirements are as follows:
• Critical utility & electrical equipment shall be located within the building envelope when possible. If not located within the building envelope, it must maintain 50-ft from any high-risk area (roadway, loading dock, etc.).
• Telecom cable pathways must be underground, located away from other utilities, and be located away from high-risk areas.
• 50-ft standoff must be maintained to high-risk areas (loading dock, mailroom, roadways, etc.) from the following:
o Critical utility and electrical equipment o Feeder entry points o Water & fuel storage, water/fuel pumping, metering, and regulating equipment o Standby generators and electrical systems o Telecommunications Entrance Room (also to be separated by 25-ft min. from exterior walls) o Computer Room o Exterior Intakes & Exhausts
Air intakes and exhausts are not being replaced as part of this effort for the TRs; however, blast hardened louvers will be provided at the north elevation of the new DCA. The design of the blast hardened louvers is delegated to the contractor via a performance specification.
IFB-R2 SUBMITTAL
March 22, 2024
PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COPYING, DISSEMINATION, OR DISTRIBUTION OF THESE DRAWINGS, PLANS,
OR SPECIFICATIONS TO UNAUTHORIZED USERS IS PROHIBITED
Do not remove this notice Properly destroy documents when no longer needed
All new utilities provided as part of this project will either utilize existing pathways, will meet the redundancy requirements, and or locations requirements stated in Section 7.2.5 of the PSRDM.
CONCLUSION
The design of the renovated TR rooms and new DCA will incorporate the blast hardening measures specified in the PSRDM. The new DCA will be designed as an MC protected facility. The design of the renovated TR rooms will comply with the designation of the building where the TR room is located. Project-specific hardening measures will be coordinated with other disciplines as the design progresses.
REFERENCES
[1] American Society of Civil Engineers - Blast Protection of Buildings, ASCE 59-22
[2] Physical Security & Resiliency Design Manual for VA Facilities, October 1, 2020, Revised
July 1, 2022.
[3] Unified Facilities Criteria - Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions, UFC-
3-340-02, 5 December 2008.
File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .