Att_34_-_Scenario_2,_Security_Engineering.pdf

DOS Request for Proposals No. SAQMMA17R0168, Attachment 34

SCENARIO FOR

SECURITY ENGINEERING

Introduction

• The third tier of the multi-layer Department defense system is the building’s exterior.

The building’s exterior walls or facade must be difficult to scale and constructed of materials that provide forced entry and/or ballistic resistant (FE/BR) protection to the degree specified according to the threat level.

• Exterior doors must provide the level of protection as specified for each facility type (see 12 FAH-5 H-445). Such doors must have a reverse bevel swing. Emergency exit doors must have an electrical emergency lock with an emergency override and panic exit device.

Applicable Conditions

• Typically, a controlled FE/BR door employs three locks: an electromechanical lock operated both locally and remotely for normal access control; a magnetic bar lock operated remotely for rapid emergency use; and, a forced entry lock that is turned by hand to provide full protection. The magnetic bar lock is typically electronically engaged from the command post in order to temporarily secure the door until the more secure manual forced entry lock can be engaged. The door is certified to meet its rating only when the forced entry locks are engaged. Thus, the full rating of the door is not achieved by remote activation.

• The magnetic bar locks require a significant amount of maintenance to keep them operational.

• The current system does not provide for logging and traceability of equipment failures.

• The current system is compatible with the DOS access control system. A card reader/keypad controls the electromechanical lock on the door.

• Different groups perform installs, networking configuration of the card readers (SMSe), and FE/BR testing/certification.

• Different types of doors (e.g., ADA, fire, regular entry) require different physical solutions and thus different wiring configurations/wire routing to the door frame, with additional local components required (control boxes) for ADA and fire doors.

• A virtualized server is available to for use in the solution.

• “Post 1” is the central command post that oversees and can override any other command post.

• The racks in the Post1 are 3 feet deep and require numerous cables for control of the doors and other security equipment, so the footprint of the controls is a concern.

• There are already numerous wall-mountable power supplies in a limited space and, the currently approved power supplies can only control four devices (enough for 2 typical doors).

• The current FE/BR door’s electrical locks (electromechanical and magnetic) require a large current draw to actuate solenoids. The door is powered from a DC power supply, which is in turn supplied from a circuit panel fed by a large voltage regulator. If power is disrupted to the regulator, the power to the power supply is interrupted. In this situation, the power supply would be fed from batteries - requiring large, well maintained batteries.

Solution Requirements http://fam.a.state.gov/fam/12fah05/12fah050440.html#H445

DOS Request for Proposals No. SAQMMA17R0168, Attachment 34

SCENARIO FOR

SECURITY ENGINEERING

• Doors must obtain full FE/BR resistance via remote activation.

• If access control is included, the solution must be compatible with HSPD-12 requirements

• Solution must be highly reliable, secure and installable by Post technical personnel.

• A physically robust control system is required to withstand the way that a Marine might interact with the controls (i.e., hit with batons). The solution must be “Marine-proof”.

• The solution must allow for multiple simultaneously-operated control locations, given priority and features by location. Local guards are local foreign citizens who protect the perimeter and areas where the public may gain entry, such as Visa Services, etc. The local guard booth controls access to the compound perimeter but does not have emergency lock-down features. Marine Security Guards (MSG) are United States Marines who protect more sensitive areas of the building interior. “Safe area” controls, for example, would have priority over the MSG controls, which would in turn have priority over the local guard booth at the compound perimeter.

• Power supplies are generally located in a central location and provide power over long distances to the doors. Space in these central locations (electric closets) is very limited.

• Back-up run time for equipment currently requires a larger UPS and these power supplies need to be more efficient to reduce this electric power consumption.

• Post1, the space from where the MSGs control the doors, is extremely limited and requires better ergonomics.

• Although access control can be monitored remotely, it must be controlled at the local level, i.e. not cloud-based.

• DOS requires all door locking systems to “fail secure” not “fail-safe.” (i.e. if there is no power, electrical/electronic locks shall not fail in an unlocked condition.)

Scenario Response

• How would you approach the problem? What information would you need?

• Provide an overview of the project management and testing approaches that would be employed.

• Identify the resources to be employed including both human resources and salient other-than-human resources.

• Describe the type of documentation that you would provide to support deployment of the solution by DOS on-site technical personnel. How would you determine that the documentation is sufficiently clear and detailed to permit DOS technical personnel to effectively and independently install, troubleshoot, repair, and maintain it?

• Describe, in detail, any assumptions and/or contingencies upon which the approach for fulfilling the scenario is based.