D_MRESS_Amend No 7 Jan20r.pdf

DEPARTMENT OF THE NA VY

NAVAL ORDNANCE SAFETY AND SECURITY ACTIVITY

FARRAGUT HALL

3817 STRAUSS AVENUE, SUITE 108

INDIAN HEAD, MD 20640-5151

From: Commanding Officer, Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity To: Commander, Joint Region Marianas

Ser N45G/102 24 Jan 20

Subj: TRANSMITTAL OF FINAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY

BOARD APPROVAL OF HYBRID EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION

AMENDMENT 7 FOR GUAM CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT, COMMANDER, JOINT

REGION MARIANAS, GUAM

Ref: (a) NOSSA ltr 8020 Ser N45G/080 of 17 Jan 20 [WebESS ID# 547/ESS 19-24]

(b) DDESB memo DDESB-PE of30 Jul 15 [GG-052]

(c) DDESB memo DDESB-PE of24 Aug 18 [GG-052MOD]

(d) NAVSEA OP 5, Volume 1, Seventh Revision, Change 14

(e) NOSSAINST 8020.150

(f) ASN (EI&E) ltr of24 Jan 2019 [Subj: Secretarial Acceptance of Risk Associated with Previously Disturbed Soil on the Territory of Guam and Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands]

Encl: (1) DDESB memo DDESB-PE of24 Jan 20

(2) Revised Guam Construction Support ESS Amendment 7 [Amended per DDESB

Comments of 21 Jan 20]

1. Final Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DD ESB) approval, enclosure (1 ), is provided for Amendment 7 Explosives Safety Submission (ESS) for construction support on the island of Guam. The subject ESS was endorsed to the DD ESB for review and approval with reference (a). The Amendment 6 and 6A ESSs were approved by references (b) and (c).

2. The following identifies the changes made from the previous ESS amendment:

a. The tables identifying the munitions with the greatest fragmentation distance (MGFD) and maps depicting the explosives safety quantity-distance arcs are now located in appendix l4B.

b. Only one primary and one contingency MGFD are identified for each area.

c. Some areas have been broken out into several smaller areas, but those areas retain the original MGFDs identified in the previous amendment. Additional maps have been incorporated but the required separation distances remain the same. All of the required separation distances for each area are consolidated in table 6-2.1 in appendix 14B.

Subj: TRANSMITTAL OF FINAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY

BOARD APPROVAL OF HYBRID EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION

AMENDMENT 7 FOR GUAM CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT, COMMANDER, JOINT

REGION MARIANAS, GUAM

d. The amendment allows for annexes to be prepared for individual areas within the larger areas using site-specific risk analyses to change the MGFD, target of interest, or likelihood of finding munitions and explosives of concern and/or material potentially presenting an explosive hazard. Annexes will be submitted to NOSSA for review. Those annexes meeting explosives safety criteria will be submitted to the DDESB for review and approval. Those annexes that do not meet explosives safety criteria will be forwarded to Chief of Naval Operations, N4 l , for adjudication.

e. Requirements for remote operations and Advanced Geophysical Classification have been added for potential use during operations.

3. Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) authorizes you to conduct work within unbarricaded (Kl 8) intraline (IL) separation distance from existing potential explosion sites (PESs), as necessary. However, coordinate work schedules with the responsible Explosives Safety Officer to ensure the proposed project and operations at any PES at less than IL distance do not occur simultaneously.

4. All of the stipulations and requirements established by the initial ESS and subsequent amendments, as identified in references (b), (c), and the approvals of previous amendments, remain in effect and unchanged.

5. After submittal of this project to the DD ESB, changes were required to be made to the ESS.

Enclosure (2) contains a complete version of the revised ESS Amendment 7. All changes made were to table 6-2.1 and the maps in appendix 14B. A footnote has been added to the pages in appendix 14B identifying that they were amended per DDESB comments.

6. Paragraph a of enclosure (I) identifies that the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installation and Environment) (ASN(EI&E)) has accepted the risk for previously disturbed soils as documented in reference (f). As such, ASN(EI&E) assumes all risks associated with the procedures detailed in section 1.3.5, Special Condition of Previously Disturbed Soils, of the ESS.

Therefore, it is imperative that those areas that are to be designated as previously disturbed are well documented, including supporting rationale and all records maintained by the command.

7. You must maintain a copy of the current ESS, enclosure (2); reference (a); references (c) and (d), including all other previous DDESB approvals; enclosure (1); and this letter on-site and available to inspectors upon request.

8. If any changes occur, which could increase explosives hazards, an amendment to this ESS must be submitted through NOSSA, to the DDESB, for review and approval, following the requirements ofreferences (d) and (e).

Subj: TRANSMITIAL OF FINAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY

BOARD APPROVAL OF HYBRID EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION

AMENDMENT 7 FOR GUAM CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT, COMMANDER, JOINT

REGION MARIANAS, GUAM

9. The NOSSA points of contact for this matter are Mr. Shawn Jorgensen, who can be reached at commercial (301) 744-5636, DSN 354-5636 or via email at shawn.a.jorgensen@navy.mil, and Mr. Pat Altman, who can be reached at commercial (301) 744-5630, DSN 354-5630 or email daniel.altman@navy.mil.

Copy to:

DASN (SAFETY)

NAVFAC MARIANAS GU (MEC PM)

COMJTREG MARIANAS (RESO; TO)

NA VBASE GUAM (ESO)

COMNA VSEASYSCOM (OOV)

Copy to: (w/o encls)

DASN (IE&F)

CNO (N411 B; N452)

CNIC (N35)

COMNA VF ACENGCOM (ENV3)

NAVFAC PACIFIC (ENV)

"&-A

DALE W. SISSON, JR.

Executive Director

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY BOARD

4800 Mark Center Drive, Suite 16e12

ALEXANDRIA VIRGINIA, 22350

DDESB-PE

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING OFFICER, NAVAL ORDNANCE SAFETY AND

SECURITY ACTIVITY (ATTENTION: CODE N45)

SUBJECT: DDESB Approval of Amendment 7, Hybrid Explosives Safety Submission for Munitions Response Sites, Guam Construction Support, Joint Region Marianas, Guam

References: (a) NOSSA ltr 8020 Ser N45G/080 of 17 January 2020, Subject: Request for Review and Approval of Hybrid Explosives Safety Submission Amendment 7 for Guam Construction Support, Commander, Joint Region Marianas, Guam

(b) Email from Mr. Shawn Jorgensen (NOSSA) to Ms. Kristene Bigej (DDESB) dated 23 January 2020, Subject: RE: Guam Amend 7

(c) Defense Explosives Safety Regulation 6055.09, Edition 1, 13 January 2019

(d) ASN (EI&E) ltr of 24 Jan 2019, Subject: Secretarial Acceptance of Risk Associated with Previously Disturbed Soil on the Territory of Guam and Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands

(e) DDESB Technical Paper 16 (TP-16), Current Revision, “Methodologies for Calculating Primary Fragment Characteristics” 19 December 2016

(f) DDESB Technical Paper 15 (TP-15), Current Revision, “Approved Protective Construction”

The Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) Staff has reviewed the subject Amendment 7 to the explosives safety submission (ESS) forwarded by reference (a), as modified by reference (b), against the requirements of reference (c). Based on the information provided, approval is granted for removal and destruction of material potentially presenting an explosive hazard (MPPEH) and munitions and explosives of concern (MEC) at Joint Region Marianas, Guam. This approval is based on the following:

a. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installation and Environment) has accepted the risk for previously disturbed soils as documented in reference (d). The Navy assumes all risks associated with the procedures detailed in Section 1.3.5, Special Condition of Previously Disturbed Soils, of reference (a). As such, this DDESB approval excludes the procedures detailed in Section 1.3.5.

JAN 2 4 2r20

b. This amendment identifies the primary and only one contingency munition with the greatest fragmentation distance (MGFD) for each area; incorporates the 3 May 2018 Fragmentation Data Review Forms of reference (e); adds mechanized high input unintentional detonation operations; restricts performance of intentional detonation operations to military Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel; restructures some of the previously identified areas into smaller areas for a total of 26 areas; and specifies that future revisions to the areas will be prepared as Annexes meeting the requirements of reference (c).

c. The efforts addressed in this Hybrid ESS involve manual unintentional detonation operations (to include mechanized unintentional detonation operations employing anomaly avoidance), mechanized low input unintentional detonation operations, and mechanized high input unintentional detonation operations supporting munitions response actions within 26 areas: Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB) Area 1, AAFB Area 2, AAFB Area 3, AAFB Area 4, AAFB Area 5, AAFB Area 6, AAFB Area 7, AAFB Area 8, Andersen South, Apra Heights, Barrigada, Dan Dan, Finegayan, Finegayan Breakout (J-001B), Naval Base, Naval Base Breakout (J-006), Naval Hospital East, Naval Hospital West, Nimitz Hill, Ordnance Annex, Orote Point, Polaris Point, Santa Rosa, Sasa Valley, Tenjo Vista, and Tipalao.

d. The attached Table lists the primary and contingency MGFD for each area; the team separation distance (TSD); the minimum separation distance (MSD) for unintentional detonations for nonessential personnel; and the MSD for intentional single in-grid detonations for all personnel.

e. Collection points are authorized provided the Navy ensures usage of reference (f), paragraph C6.2.7.5.

f. Operators of mechanized equipment will be shielded from hazardous fragments based on an unintentional detonation from low input mechanized operations or an intentional detonation from high input mechanized operations involving the MEC identified in reference (a).

The use of barricades/shields is authorized as an engineering control to prevent fragment penetration provided the Navy ensures usage per reference (e). Additionally, operators will be provided blast overpressure protection based on K24 of the MGFD.

g. The use of hearing protection is authorized as an engineering control for unintentional detonation operations to provide equivalent K24 blast overpressure protection for essential personnel based on K18 of the MGFD. The Navy shall ensure the use of double hearing protection which provides > 9 decibel (dB) attenuation.

h. Intentional detonations, per reference (a), will be performed by military Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel in-grid, at DDESB approved facilities, or as determined in accordance with EOD emergency procedures.

i. If a munition with an unknown fill or chemical warfare material is encountered, all work will cease pending Navy assessment of the need to submit a Chemical Safety Submission.

j. Prior to initiation and through completion of on-site explosives operations, all nonessential personnel will be evacuated and prevented from entering any area/facility encumbered by the MSD required for the operation being conducted, or explosives operations will be suspended if nonessential personnel enter the MSD.

k. MPPEH will be inspected and classified as material documented as safe prior to release to the public.

All other stipulations and requirements established via the original ESS and subsequent amendments remain in effect.

The point of contact for this action is Ms. Kristene Bigej, (571) 372-6705, DSN 372-6705, E-mail address: kristene.a.bigej.civ@mail.mil.

Attachment As stated mailto:kristene.a.bigej.civ@mail.mil

TABLE (page 1 of 2)

Attachment

Area MGFD K18 (ft)

K24 (ft)

TSD1

(ft)

TSD2

(ft)

MSD3 (ft) unintentional detonation

MSD4 (ft) intentional detonation

AAFB Area 1

Primary: 600-pound M32 (TNT filled) Bomb 125 167 278 662 662 3,110

Contingency: 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (TNT filled) Bomb 1595 2125 3535 810 810 3,828

AAFB Area 2, AAFB Area 3, Finegayan, J-001B, Naval Base, J-006, Ordnance Annex, Orote Point, & Polaris Point

Primary: 500-pound M64A1 (Amatol filled) Bomb 1236 1646 2736 6386 6386 2,849

Contingency: 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (TNT filled) Bomb 1595 2125 3535 810 810 3,828

AAFB Area 4 Primary: 5-inch Mk 41 Projectile 33 44 74 359 359 2,377 Contingency: 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (TNT filled) Bomb 1595 2125 3535 810 810 3,828

AAFB Area 5, AAFB Area 6, AAFB Area 7, AAFB Area 8, & Barrigada

Primary: 155mm M107 (Composition B filled) Projectile 47 63 105 450 450 2,630

Contingency: 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (TNT filled) Bomb 1595 2125 3535 810 810 3,828

Andersen South Primary: 8-inch Mk 25 Projectile 47 63 105 445 445 3,434 Contingency: 600-pound M32 (TNT filled) Bomb 125 167 278 662 662 3,4347

1 For essential personnel for manual and mechanized operations with anomaly avoidance based on K40 of MGFD 2 For essential personnel for low and high input mechanized operations based on the HFD of the MGFD 3 For nonessential personnel for manual and low input mechanized operations based on the HFD of the MGFD 4 For nonessential personnel for high input mechanized operations use MSD for intentional single in-grid detonations 5 Based on the 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (Composition B filled) Bomb 6 Based on the 500-pound M64A1 (Composition B filled) Bomb 7 Based on the 8-inch Mk 25 Projectile

TABLE (page 2 of 2)

Area MGFD K18

(ft) K24 (ft)

TSD1

TSD2

MSD3 (ft) unintentional detonation

MSD4 (ft) intentional detonation

Apra Heights, Dan Dan, Nimitz Hill, Santa Rosa, Sasa Valley, & Tenjo

Vista

Primary: 14-inch Mk 22 Projectile 80 107 178 559 559 5,214

Contingency: 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (TNT filled) Bomb 1595 2125 3535 810 810 5,2148

Naval Hospital East & Tipalao

Primary: 5-inch/38 Caliber Mk 35 Projectile 33 45 74 343 343 2,131

Contingency: 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (TNT filled) Bomb 1595 2125 3535 810 810 3,828

Naval Hospital West

Primary: 81mm Japanese Type 97 HE Mortar 19 25 42 207 207 1,481

Contingency: 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (TNT filled) Bomb 1595 2125 3535 810 810 3,828

All Areas – Limited Clearance

Ahead of Construction –

Phase 29

60mm M49A2 Mortar 13 17 28 152 152 1,322

1 For essential personnel for manual and mechanized operations with anomaly avoidance based on K40 of MGFD 2 For essential personnel for low and high input mechanized operations based on the HFD of the MGFD 3 For nonessential personnel for manual and low input mechanized operations based on the HFD of the MGFD 4 For nonessential personnel for high input mechanized operations use MSD for intentional single in-grid detonations 5 Based on the 1,000-pound AN-M65A1 (Composition B filled) Bomb 8 Based on the 14-inch Mk 22 Projectile 9 Applicable only after removal of larger MEC/MPPEH items from the construction footprint as detailed in Section 6.1.5 of reference (a).

MUNITIONS RESPONSE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION

GUAM CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT

AMENDMENT 7

January 2020 (FINAL)

Amendment 7 – January 2020 (FINAL) i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 OVERVIEW OF THE MUNITIONS RESPONSE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION (MRESS)

1.1 BACKGROUND………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1-1

1.2 PROGRAM MANAGER………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-2

1.3 RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION LENS………………………………………………………………… 1-2

1.3.1 Site identifiers and descriptions…………………………………………………………… 1-2

1.3.2 Likelihood definitions………………………………………………………………………….. 1-3

1.3.3 Site specific risk analysis utilizing an annex construct………………………….. 1-4

1.3.4 Special condition of ongoing projects………………………………………………….. 1-5

1.3.5 Special condition of previously disturbed soils…………………………………….. 1-5

1.4 REGIONAL MAPS………………………………………………………………………………………………. 1-6

1.5 SCOPE OF MUNITIONS RESPONSE……………………………………………………………………. 1-7

1.6 HISTORY OF MUNITIONS USE…………………………………………………………………………… 1-7

1.6.1 Historical study…………………………………….……………………………………………… 1-7

1.7 EXTENT OF MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES OF CONCERN (MEC) AND MATERIALS

POTENTIAL PRESENTING AN EXPLOSIVE HAZARD (MPPEH) CONTAMINATION…. 1-8

1.7.1 Incident reports…………………………………………………….…………………………….. 1-8

1.7.2 Geospatial record……………………………………………………….……………………….. 1-8

1.7.3 After Action Reports.…………………………………………………………………………… 1-8

1.8 JUSTIFICATION FOR NO FURTHER ACTION DECISION……………………………………….. 1-8

2.0 PROJECT DATES……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 2-1

3.0 TYPES OF MEC AND MPPEH

3.1 TYPES AND QUANTITITES OF MEC AND MPPEH………………………………………………. 3-1

3.2 MUNITION WITH GREATEST FRAGMENTATION DISTANCE (MGFD)…………………. 3-1

3.3 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE EVENT…………………………………………………………………………… 3-2

3.4 EXPLOSIVELY CONTAMINATED BUILDINGS……………………………………………………… 3-2

4.0 MEC AND MPPEH MIGRATION…………………………………………………………………………………….. 4-1

5.0 DETECTION AND POSITION TECHNOLOGIES

5.1 DETECTION EQUIPMENT, METHOD, AND STANDARDS.……………………………………. 5-1

5.1.1 Sensor Equipment………..…………………………………………………………………….. 5-1

5.1.2 Detection Methods……………………………………………………………………………... 5-2

5.1.3 Detection Standards…….……………………………………………………………………... 5-3

5.2 POSITIONING SYSTEMS, METHODS, AND STANDARDS…………………………………….. 5-3

5.2.1 Position Systems…..…………………………………………………………………………….. 5-3

5.2.2 Positioning Standards……..………………………………………………………………….. 5-4

5.3 EQUIPMENT CHECKOUT…………………………………………………………………………………... 5-4

5.3.1 Detection Equipment Checks…….………………………………………………………… 5-4

5.3.2 Positioning System Checks…….……………………………………………………………. 5-6

5.4 DATA COLLECTION AND STORAGE…………………………………………………………………… 5-6

Amendment 7 – January 2020 (FINAL) ii

6.0 RESPONSE ACTIONS

6.1 RESPONSE TECHNIQUES…………………………………………………………………………………… 6-1

6.1.1 UXO Escort………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6-2

6.1.2 Anomaly Avoidance…………………………………………………………………………….. 6-3

6.1.3 Construction Support………………………………………………………………………….. 6-5

6.1.4 Full Clearance Ahead Of Construction…………………………………………………. 6-6

6.1.5 Limited Clearance Ahead Of Construction.…………………………………………. 6-11

6.1.6 Remote Operations…………………………………………………………………………….. 6-13

6.1.7 Night Work…………………………………………………………………………………………. 6-13

6.1.8 Processes For Changing An ESS Area’s Likelihood Designation..………….. 6-13

6.2 EXCLUSION ZONES (EZS) FOR MUNITIONS ENCOUNTERED AT PROJECT SITES…. 6-15

6.2.1 Exclusion Zones ….………………………………………………………………………………. 6-15

6.2.2 Operations To Be Conducted………….…………………………………………………… 6-16

6.2.3 Potential Explosion Sites Encumbering Munitions Response Areas...…… 6-16

6.2.4 Exclusion Zone Control………………………………………………………………………… 6-17

6.2.5 Exclusion Zone Access Protocol………..…………………………………………………. 6-17

6.3 MEC AND MPPEH HAZARD CLASSIFICIATION, MOVEMENT, TRANSPORTATION,

AND STORAGE………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6-18

6.3.1 Hazard Classification…………………………..……………………………………………….. 6-18

6.3.2 Movement…………………………………………..………………………………………………. 6-18

6.3.3 Transportation…………………………………………………………………………………….. 6-18

6.3.4 Storage………………………………………………………………………………………………… 6-19

6.4 MEC AND MPPEH DISPOSITION PROCESSES……………………………………………………… 6-19

6.4.1 MEC Disposition Process………………………………………………………………………. 6-19

6.4.2 MPPEH Disposition Process………………………………………………………………….. 6-19

6.5 EXPLOSIVELY CONTAMINATED SOIL………………………………………………………………….. 6-20

6.6 CONTAMINATED BUILDINGS…………………………………………………………………………….. 6-20

6.7 OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT………………………………………………………………….. 6-20

6.8 CONTINGENCIES……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 6-21

7.0 QUALITY CONTROL (QC) / QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA)

7.1 QC IMPLEMENTATION………………………………………………………………………………………. 7-1

7.1.1 Surface Clearance……………….………………………………………………………………… 7-3

7.1.2 Subsurface Clearance…….…………………………………………………………………….. 7-3

7.1.3 Excavated Soil…..………………………………………………………………………………….. 7-4

7.1.4 MEC Disposition Process………………………………………………………………………. 7-4

7.1.5 MPPEH Disposition Process…..……………………………………………………………… 7-5

7.1.6 Deficiency Management…..………………………………………………………………….. 7-5

7.2 QA IMPLEMENTATION………………………………………………………………………………………. 7-5

8.0 TECHNICAL SUPPORT

8.1 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL……………………………………………………………………… 8-1

8.2 MEC CONTRACTOR……………………………………………………………………………………………. 8-1

8.3 PHYSICAL SECURITY…………………………………………………………………………………………… 8-2

9.0 ENVIRONMENTAL, ECOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

9.1 REGULATORY STATUTE……………………………………………………………………………………… 9-1

Amendment 7 – January 2020 (FINAL) iii

9.2 HISTORIC AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES……………………………………………………………. 9-1

9.3 NON-EXPLOSIVE SOIL………………………………………………………………………………………… 9-2

10.0 RESIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT

10.1 LAND USE CONTROLS………………………………………………………………………………………… 10-1

10.2 LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT……………………………………………………………………………… 10-1

10.3 AFTER ACTION REPORTS……………………………………………………………………………………. 10-1

11.0 SAFETY EDUCATION PROGRAM……………………………………………………………………………………… 11-1

12.0 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT……………………………………………………………………………………….. 12-1

13.0 REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 13-1

14.0 APPENDICES

A. Signature Page……………………………………………………………………………………………………..…. 14A B. Historical Figures and Tables…………………………………………………………………………………..... 14B C. Supporting Explosives Safety Data……………………………………………………………………………. 14C D. Annex Template………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 14D

15.0 ANNEXES (as developed)

[THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

Amendment 7 – January 2020 (FINAL) iv

TABLES

1-1 Munitions Response Areas…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 14B-2

1-2 Types of Munitions Potentially Used During War Activities by Area……………………………... 14B-11

3-1 Previous MEC and MPPEH Encountered………………………………………………………………………… 14B-13

3-2 Historical Primary and Contingency MGFD……………………………………………………………………. 14B-21

6-1 Historical Exclusion Zones (EZs)…………………………………………………………………………………….. 14B-25

6-2 Controlling EZs 6-2.1 Historical Controlling EZs…………………………………………………………………………………… 14B-32 6-2.2 All Areas, Limited Clearance Ahead of Construction (Phase 2)…..………………………. 14B-33

6-3 Potential Explosion Sites (PESs) Encumbering the Munitions Response Areas

6-3.1 AAFB…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 14B-60

6-3.2 Orote Point……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 14B-77 6-3.3 Polaris Point……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14B-80 6-3.4 Ordnance Annex……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 14B-81

6-4 Hazard Analysis Matrix for All Construction Areas………………………………………………………… 6-21

7-1 QC Methods and Pass/Fail Criteria……………………………………………………………………………….. 7-1

8-1 Personnel Training ………………………………………………….……………………………………………………. 8-2

FIGURES

1-1 Guam ESS Areas……………………………………………….…………………………………………………………… 14B-1

1-2 Historical Likelihood of Encountering MEC and MPPEH 1-2a AAFB & Northwest Field…………………………………………………………………………………… 14B-3 1-2b Finegayan………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14B-4 1-2c Andersen South, Barrigada, & Tumon Maui Well…………………………………………….. 14B-5 1-2d Naval Hospital West/East, Nimitz Hill, Piti, & Sasa Valley…………………………………. 14B-6 1-2e Naval Base, Orote Point, Apra Wharves, Polaris Point, Tipalao, Apra Heights, & Tenjo Vista……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 14B-7 1-2f Ordnance Annex & DanDan……………………………………………………………………………… 14B-8

1-3 Battlefields of Guam……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14B-9

1-4 Japanese Infantry and Tank Positions – July 1944…………………………………………………………. 14B-10

6-1 Historical EQSD Arcs Maps (Series)……………………………………………………………………………….. 14B-34

Amendment 7 – January 2020 (FINAL) v

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR After Action Report AGC Advanced Geophysical Classification AGC QAPP AGC Quality Assurance Project Plan AFB Air Force Base AP Armor piercing APP Accident Prevention Plan BSI Blind Seed Item BUD Berkley UXO Discriminator C/D Class / Division CES Civil Engineering Squadron CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act CFR Code of Federal Regulations CGJ Consulate General of Japan cm centimeter CNIC Commander Navy Installations Command CNMI Commonwealth of Northern Marianas Islands COA Corrective Action CPR Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation CRM Cultural Resources Manager DAGCAP DoD Advanced Geophysical Classification Accreditation Program DDESB Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board DGM Digital Geophysical Mapping DGPS Differential Global Positioning System DoD Department of Defense DPAA Defense Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Accounting Agency DR Determination Request ECP Entry Control Point EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EODMUFIVE EOD Mobile Unit Five EM Electromagnet Induction, Engineer Manual ESO Explosives Safety Officer ESQD Explosive Safety Quantity-Distance ESS Explosives Safety Submission ESS DR ESS Determination Request EZ Exclusion Zone ft foot / feet GIS Geographical Information System GPS Global Positioning System GSV Geophysical System Verification HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response HC HC Mixture, a White Screening Smoke HE High Explosive(s) HFD Hazardous Fragment Distance Hz hertz IBD Inhabited Building Distance

Amendment 7 – January 2020 (FINAL) vi

IL Intraline INST Instruction ISO Industry Standard Object IVS Instrument Verification Strip JA Japanese JRM Joint Region Marianas lb pound(s) LSF Line / Station / Fiducial MCE Maximum Credible Event MDEH Material Documented as Explosive Hazard MDAS Material Documented as Safe MEC Munitions and Explosives of Concern MEC WP MEC Work Plan MFD Maximum Fragment Distance MFD-H MFD-Horizontal MGFD Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance MILCON Military Construction mm millimeter MMR Military Munitions Rule MPIT MEC Process Improvement Team MPPEH Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard MPV Man Portable Vector MRESS Munitions Response ESS MRS Munitions Response Site NAVSEA Navy Sea Systems Command NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Command NFM NAVFAC Marianas NFP NAVFAC Pacific NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service NEW Net Explosive Weight NBG Naval Base Guam NOSSA Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity NTOI Non MEC-like Targets of Interest NTR Navy Technical Representative OP 5 Ordnance Pamphlet 5 ORM Operational Risk Management OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration PLS Professional Land Surveyor PDA Personal Digital Assistant PES Potential Explosion Site PM Project Manager PRTC Pacific Regional Training Center QA Quality Assurance QAPP Quality Assurance Project Plan QC Quality Control QCP Quality Control Plan RCA Root Cause Analysis RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

Amendment 7 – January 2020 (FINAL) vii

RESO Regional Explosives Safety Officer ROC Regional Operations Center RTS Robotic Total Station SHPO State Historic Preservation Officer SUXOS Senior UXO Supervisor TL Team Leader TM Technical Manual TNT Trinitrotoluene TOI Target of Interest TP Technical Paper US United States UXO Unexploded Ordnance UXOQAS UXO Quality Assurance Specialist UXOQCS UXO Quality Control Specialist UXOSO UXO Safety Officer UXOTII/I UXO Technician II/I UXOTIII UXO Technician III WP White Phosphorus WWII World War II

Amendment 7 – January 2020 (FINAL) 1-1

1.0 OVERVIEW OF THE MUNITIONS RESPONSE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION (MRESS)

This Munitions Response Explosives Safety Submission (MRESS) supports planned construction, repair, and maintenance projects on Department of the Navy (DON) property on Guam, and on non-DON property when the Navy or its contractor conducts the work.

This MRESS is the 7th Amendment to the “Guam Construction Support” ESS, first submitted and approved in 2010. This document establishes a disciplined process for the Commander, Joint Region Marianas (CJRM) to implement explosive safety principles and accept prudent risk in accordance with established DoD and DON explosive safety criteria while accomplishing their assigned missions.

This MRESS was prepared in accordance with Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Ordnance Pamphlet 5 (OP 5), Volume 1, Seventh Revision, Naval Ordnance Safety Security Activity (NOSSA) Instruction 8020.15D, and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5100.1K.

1.1 BACKGROUND

Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC) are known or suspected to be present at various sites on Guam as a result of World War II battles and subsequent military activities. MEC is a safety hazard and may constitute an imminent and substantial endangerment to personnel and the local population.

This amendment departs from previous versions, which were based on knowledge obtained from historical records with risk assignments extended to the limits of military-controlled property parcels rather than planned construction site limits. This was a conservative approach, appropriately used out of an abundance of caution at the time; this amendment takes a different approach.

This MRESS introduces a defined, recordable, and repeatable risk determination process for CJRM to conduct site-specific risk assessments, determine the anticipated presence and nature of MEC, implement appropriate mitigation, and report and record the results and lessons from intrusive soil activities at locations known or suspected of containing MEC.

This amendment is intended to reinforce reliable, safe practices operating in an environment where explosive risk exists with variable levels of uncertainty. Further, this amendment highlights the team, comprised of CJRM, NOSSA, the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N41, and Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations, and Environment) [OASN (EI&E)], who must work together as partners to ensure construction operations occur in a safe, prudent, and cost-efficient manner, protective of property and worker safety.

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1.2 PROGRAM MANAGER

The Regional Explosives Safety Officer (RESO) is Larry Reisher.

Address: NFM, PSC 455, Box 201, FPO AP 96540-1000 Telephone: 671-349-9294 E-mail: larry.reisher@fe.navy.mil

The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Marianas MEC Program Manager is Pete Jimenez:

Address: NFM, PSC 455, Box 195, FPO AP 96540-2937 Telephone: 671-349-2277 E-mail: pedro.jimenez@fe.navy.mil

1.3 RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION LENS

The purpose of this section is to enable informed risk decisions at the appropriate level of leadership, and specifically to provide CJRM with a process-driven, risk-based decision procedure for conducting intrusive soil operations on Guam. This MRESS departs from prior safety submissions that used island-wide likelihood determinations. This document transitions explosive safety risk assessment to a project specific determination. The Department of the Navy, after consulting with the DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB), considers this a valid approach to document work effort and memorialize the historical explosive profile on Guam.

1.3.1 SITE IDENTIFIERS AND DESCRIPTIONS

Whereas most munitions response actions are executed on munitions response sites (MRSs), the proposed munitions response actions described in this MRESS will take place on DoD/military installation properties, and other non-DON properties when conducted by or for the Navy, on the island of Guam. These areas include but are not limited to: Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), Pacific Regional Training Center (PRTC), Andersen South, Apra Heights, Apra Wharves, Barrigada, DanDan, Finegayan (future Camp Blas), Naval Base, Naval Hospital East, Naval Hospital West, Nimitz Hill, Ordnance Annex, Orote Point, Polaris Point, Santa Rosa, Sasa Valley, Tenjo Vista, and Tipalao. Each of the Areas is identified in Figure 1-1 and Table 1-1 (Appendix B).

mailto:larry.reisher@fe.navy.mil mailto:pedro.jimenez@fe.navy.mil

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1.3.2 LIKELIHOOD DEFINITIONS

Based on the collection of data obtained from historical records, military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) incident reports, and recent MEC clearance results, each of the MRESS Areas were previously assigned a probability of encountering MEC or MPPEH. This historical information is depicted for each of the 25 respective Guam MRESS Areas in Figures 1-2a through 1-2d (Appendix B).

This MRESS will be departing from this scheme on a likely or unlikely determination as defined below.

A “high-likelihood” determination may be assigned to those areas for which a search of available historical records and/or on-site investigation data indicates it is probable to encounter MEC or MPPEH. This assessment must include factors such as: military or munitions-related activities that occurred at the site, previous MEC discovery, clearance actions, and whether the site is undisturbed from its natural state. Construction activities on a site determined to be a high-likelihood of encountering MEC or MPPEH requires a MEC clearance of the three-dimensional limits of the construction footprint as described in Section 6 of this MRESS.

Note: Throughout the remainder of this document, a high-likelihood determination of encountering MEC/MPPEH will be referred to as “likely”.

A “low-likelihood” determination is assigned to those areas for which a search of available historical records and/or on-site investigation data indicates it is improbable to encounter MEC or MPPEH. This assessment must include factors such as: military or munitions-related activities that occurred at the site, previous MEC discovery, clearance actions, and whether the site has been previously disturbed. Construction activities on a site determined to be a low-likelihood of encountering MEC or MPPEH requires On-Call Construction Support as defined by

NAVSEA OP 5.

Note: Throughout the remainder of this document, a low-likelihood determination of encountering MEC/MPPEH will be referred to as “unlikely”.

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1.3.3 SITE SPECIFIC RISK ANALYSIS UTILIZING AN ANNEX CONSTRUCT

An Annex structure is hereafter adopted for each project or activity that CJRM decides is, based upon a site-specific risk assessment: “likely” of encountering MEC, or “unlikely” of encountering MEC in an area previously determined “likely” per the historical figures and tables documented in Appendix 14B. Each Annex will follow an approved NOSSA, OPNAV N41, ASN (EI&E) template per Appendix D and shall:

1. Demonstrate relevant risk using Conceptual Site Model (CSM) considerations of the site specific conditions to determine: likelihood, Target of Interest (TOI), Munitions with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance (MGFD), and Exclusion Zones (EZ) for the specific project.

2. Identify information relevant to the site-specific risk assessment and CJRM determinations.

Annexes at a minimum shall include the following figures and tables (Figures and Tables not applicable to an “unlikely” decision shall be annotated “NA”):

a. Figure – Likelihood of Encountering MEC/MPPEH (similar to Fig. 1-2 series)

b. Table – Type of Munitions Potentially Used During War Activities (per Table 1-2)

c. Table – Previous MEC/MPPEH Encountered (similar to Table 3-1 series). If no

MEC/MPPEH was previously encountered, indicate any previous soil disturbance or excavation, including timeframe, in the project area.

d. Figure – Figure showing the locations where previous MEC/MPPEH were encountered at the project site and surrounding area using the JRM MEC GIS database.

e. Table – Primary and Contingency Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance (similar to Table 3-2 series)

f. Table – Exclusion Zones (similar to Table 6-1 series)

g. Table – Controlling Exclusion Zones (similar to Table 6-2 series)

h. Table – Potential Explosion Sites Encumbering the Munitions Response Areas similar to

Table 6-3 series)

i. Table – Supporting Explosives Safety Data (similar to Appendix C)

j. Figure – Explosive Safety Quantity-Distance Arcs

3. Generate a unique identifier for each project site submission, starting with “A01”, “A02”, and so on. For example, the first Annex submitted will be named: “Guam MRESS Amendment 7 Annex A01, [insert project name]”.

Annexes prepared under this paragraph shall be submitted to NOSSA at least 60 days prior to commencement of work. Annexes shall reflect endorsements by the Public Works Officer, Regional Explosives Safety Officer, and MEC Program Manager. NOSSA will review and document as official correspondence. If NOSSA concurs with a CJRM submission, the project will be endorsed to DDESB for approval and copies of the correspondence will be provided to OPNAV N41 and Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations and Environment) (ASN (EI&E)), Attention Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Safety) (DASN(Safety)) within 10 working days. If NOSSA objects to a CJRM decision, the documentation must be forwarded to OPNAV N41 within 10 working days for review, adjudication and risk decision; a copy of this correspondence will be provided to ASN (EI&E), Attention: DASN (Safety).

Upon OPNAV N41 approval, each Annex shall be submitted to DDESB, with a copy provided to NOSSA within 10 working days.

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Upon completion of soil disturbing activities associated with a project performed under a DDESB approved Annex to this MRESS, CJRM shall submit an After Action Report (AAR) to close out the Annex.

1.3.4 SPECIAL CONDITION OF ONGOING PROJECTS (GRANDFATHER CLAUSE)

Projects that began prior to the approval of Amendment 7 may continue to utilize historical risk determinations and associated historical tables and figures in this document, or CJRM may decide to adopt the annex structure established in this Amendment for any ongoing or newly awarded project.

1.3.5 SPECIAL CONDITION OF PREVIOUSLY DISTURBED SOILS

Previously disturbed soils where no MEC or MPPEH was found may be considered unlikely of containing MEC and MPPEH. Previous disturbance shall be based on knowledge of previous work as established by CJRM procedures to visually inspect the site and review drawings. This special condition applies to the three-dimensional limits of previous soil disturbance.

If MEC or MPPEH is discovered after commencement of intrusive soil activities in previously disturbed soils, CJRM shall conduct the following actions:

1. Stop work and perform an EOD response.

2. Consult with the JRM MEC Process Improvement Team (MPIT) to assess the circumstances of the discovery, determine whether site safety conditions differ from those initially considered, assess the extent of the impacted area, and determine if risk levels should increase.

3. In order to minimize safety risk to the greatest extent possible, CJRM’s risk assessment conducted after discovery of MEC or MPPEH in previously disturbed soil shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the following guidelines:

a. Discovered MEC is determined to have originated from the site, but missed during previous activities. CJRM shall independently assess whether the discovery represents a change from the initial determination and decide whether risk levels should change before proceeding with soil disturbing activities. If no change in risk level was made and additional MEC is discovered, a similar assessment shall be conducted and documented.

b. Discovered MEC is determined to be a reseeded item from imported soil. CJRM shall independently assess the extent of imported fill and decide whether risk levels should change before proceeding with soil disturbing activities. If no change in risk level was made and additional MEC is discovered, a similar assessment shall be conducted and documented.

c. MEC is discovered in an area incorrectly believed to be previously disturbed.

CJRM shall independently assess the three-dimensional extent of undisturbed soil at the project or activity site and decide whether risk levels or risk-associated boundaries should change before proceeding with soil disturbing activities. A

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4. The following responses shall be conducted depending on the new limits of risk established by the CJRM decision:

a. In the three-dimensional area where CJRM has determined risk should increase, an approved response per the MRESS shall be performed in this area before a new likelihood characterization is made. Based on historical data and discovered MEC, CJRM may determine the necessary Maximum Greatest Fragmentation Distance (MGFD) and Target of Interest (TOI) for the area. CJRM shall decide when the increase of likelihood warrants an Annex submission.

b. In the area CJRM determines the risk remains unlikely, intrusive work may recommence in accordance with the original work plan.

5. Decisions exercised under this paragraph shall be documented per Section 6.1.8.1 and submitted to NOSSA within 24 hours. Documentation shall include MEC PM and RESO recommendations – if the CJRM decision differs from these recommendations, a justification will be included. NOSSA will review and document as official correspondence.

If NOSSA concurs with a CJRM submission, a copy of the correspondence will be provided to DDESB, OPNAV N41 and ASN (EI&E), Attention: DASN (Safety) within 10 working days. If NOSSA objects to a CJRM decision, the documentation must be forwarded to OPNAV N41 within 10 working days for review, adjudication and risk decision; a copy of this correspondence will be provided to ASN (EI&E), Attention: DASN (Safety), with a copy provided to NOSSA and DDESB within 10 working days.

1.4 REGIONAL MAPS AND HISTORICAL FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures and Tables in this MRESS are derived from historical records, military EOD incident reports, MEC clearance results, and knowledge of previous soil disturbance. This information has been consolidated to Appendix B as a historical record.

This information shall be used as a point of departure for further investigation by consulting the database of record when conducting a site specific risk assessment established in chapter 1.3.

Information drawn from historical figures and tables included herein will be addressed in the future individual annexes.

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1.5 SCOPE OF MUNITIONS RESPONSE

The overall scope of the proposed actions is to detect and remove MEC or MPPEH from the three-dimensional limits of DoD projects/sites on Guam. No other response actions will be taking place concurrent with the proposed munitions response. Given the variable nature of the planned construction and maintenance activities, this MRESS covers the below-listed Response Techniques, which have been developed to provide flexibility while still ensuring appropriate explosives safety criteria are met:

1. UXO Escort

2. Anomaly Avoidance

3. Construction Support

4. Limited Clearance ahead of Construction

5. Full Clearance ahead of Construction

Descriptions of these Response Actions are provided in Section 6.0.

1.6 HISTORY OF MUNITIONS USE

Guam has been part of the United States since 1898, and retained a small 500-man U.S. Military Garrison until 1941, when the Japanese attacked Naval Forces on Guam at the same time as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, HI. In the days that followed, Japan invaded Guam with over 5,000 troops. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States declared war on Japan and officially entered World War II (WWII). The U.S. military returned to Guam in July 1944 to liberate the island from Japan.

Prior to the initial amphibious landing of U.S. troops on the island of Guam, an intense pre-invasion bombardment was conducted by U.S. Naval forces that would continue without letup for days with round-the-clock naval gunfire. The U.S. Navy bombarded Japanese defensive positions and strategic areas on Guam prior to landing troops on 21 July 1944. The objective of intense naval bombardment was to reduce the Japanese capability to conduct defensive ground operations. Landings were conducted on the west coast of Guam at Asan and Agat beaches. Figure 1-3 (Appendix B) depicts Guam’s WWII battlefields and Figure 1-4 (Appendix B) shows the Japanese infantry and tank positions in July 1944.

1.6.1 HISTORICAL STUDY

The Historical Ordnance Assessment, P-50 Territory of Guam, NAVFACPAC, summarizes the various WWII-related battles that took place during the liberation of Guam. The assessment addresses the types of munitions used during the battles and the likelihood of encountering MEC or MPPEH during current and future construction projects within the Areas. The table at Appendix B presents the munitions confirmed or suspected of being used within each Area, as summarized by the historical assessment.

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1.7 EXTENT OF MEC OR MPPEH CONTAMINATION

Although no studies of the extent of MEC or MPPEH have been conducted specifically for the designated construction, pertinent information has been gathered and reviewed to assess the likelihood of encountering MEC or MPPEH within each MRESS Area.

1.7.1 INCIDENT REPORTS

U.S. Navy EOD incident reports from 1991-2018 and U.S. Air Force EOD incident reports from 1992-2018 are summarized in the MEC or MPPEH Encountered tables in Section 3.1.

1.7.2 GEOSPATIAL RECORD

CJRM has developed a geospatial layer in the regional planning database that will be used as the basis for all Conceptual Site Models, project planning, and reporting. This database consists of all information obtained from historical records, military EOD incident reports, MEC clearance results, and knowledge of previous soil disturbance. CJRM will maintain currency of this database as Response Actions are completed within individual project sites. CJRM shall have a plan to maintain the MEC database.

1.7.3 AFTER ACTION REPORTS (AAR)

After Action Reports will be submitted for each project or annex providing essential data elements and follow the process in accordance with NOSSAINST 8020.15 (series) within 90 days from project completion to NOSSA as a matter of record. NOSSA will review, document as official correspondence, and determine whether clarification or further documentation is required. Within 10 business days, NOSSA will either accept and forward to DDESB for acknowledgement, or respond to CJRM requesting clarification or further documentation. In both cases, a copy of the correspondence will be provided to DDESB and ASN (EI&E), Attention: DASN (Safety).

This document acknowledges the fact not all information is available to satisfy AAR requirements per NAVSEA OP5 for projects conducted prior to October 2018. Information is available in accordance with DDESB requirements per Defense Explosives Safety Regulation (DESR) 6055.09 V7.E4.7. CJRM will submit AARs for the 25 projects between 2010 and October 2018, and annotate any incomplete information. NOSSA will review, document as official correspondence, and forward to DDESB for the record. A copy of this correspondence will be provided to ASN (EI&E), Attention: DASN (Safety).

1.8 JUSTIFICATION FOR NO FURTHER ACTION DECISION

This section is not applicable.

Justifications for no further action decision will be provided on an individual basis for each AAR by project Annex.

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2.0 PROJECT DATES

This ESS is in support of all ongoing, planned, and future DoD construction, service maintenance and repair projects on Guam not covered by a military munitions response program related ESS.

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3.0 TYPES OF MEC AND MPPEH

3.1 TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF MEC AND MPPEH

Table 3-1 (Appendix B) identifies the types and quantities of MEC and MPPEH known or suspected to have been recovered within or around each of the identified ESS Areas as of May 2018. It should be noted that not all of the listed MEC and MPPEH was recovered within the boundaries of each Area. Due to the lack of specific location information contained within the available EOD incident reports, many of the items listed recovery locations near or adjacent to the ESS Area.

3.2 MUNITION WITH THE GREATEST FRAGMENTATION DISTANCE (MGFD)

Given the development of the JRM MEC Global Information System (GIS) Database and the uncertainties regarding the accuracy of the reported locations of previously recovered MEC and MPPEH, a spatial reassessment was performed to validate the locations of MEC and MPPEH that were actually discovered with the boundaries of each of the respective ESS Areas. Based on this spatial assessment, selection of the primary MGFD, and one or more contingency MGFDs were reassigned. The MGFDs establish the explosives safety distances to be employed during intrusive operations.

Each ESS Area’s primary MGFD has been assessed based on the actual munition type located inside boundaries of the ESS Areas listed in the historical Table 3-1 (Appendix B) and having the maximum fragment distance-horizontal (MFD-H) and hazardous fragment distance (HFD) greater than the other munitions listed. Contingency MGFDs are munitions items having MFD-H’s greater than the primary MGFD that may have been found adjacent to, in the general area of, or in an area near the designated ESS Areas, and have the potential to be found in the respective ESS Areas. As noted in paragraph 1.3.2, this MRESS departs from the previous assignment of probability of encountering MEC or MPPEH, and instead utilizes an Annex structure (see para 1.3.3) for each project or activity that requires a site-specific risk assessment. Therefore, Table 3-1 (Appendix B) is provided for historical purposes only.

The correct explosive safety distances are being assigned for each of the ESS Area’s selected MGFDs, a review of historical ordnance publications/technical data was conducted for munitions types and their explosive fillers utilized during WWII (Part 6, Chapter 17, Section 5 of NAVSEA OP 1164, dated 28 May 1947; with Change-1 of January 1969). Based on this review, it was noted the primary high explosive filler (main charge) for U.S. military munitions (ie., general-purpose bombs and artillery) prior to 1949 was the explosive filler trinitrotoluene (TNT). Based on this documented information for military munitions explosive fillers during the WWII period of 1944 when the Liberation Battle of Guam took place, munitions items with a primary explosive filler (main charge) of TNT is the most probable military munition to be found on Guam as a result of WWII battle. However, due to the known and documented fact that the external painted color coding for WWII military munitions was the only true identification feature for determining the munitions probable primary explosive filler, and the fact that this external painted color coding is no longer visible on unearthed/recovered WWII military munitions from this time period, a positive identification of the primary explosive filler cannot be made.