531-325 - Specs-Appx-F.pdf

CONSTRUCT PRIMARY CARE / MENTAL HEALTH BUILDING PROJECT #: 531-325

BOISE VA MEDICAL CENTER - BOISE, ID CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS

APPENDIX F PHYSICAL SECURITY NARRATIVE & BLAST CALCULATIONS

APPENDIX F:

PHYSICAL SECURITY NARRATIVE

CONSTRUCT PRIMARY CARE / MENTAL HEALTH BLDG

Boise Medical Center – Boise, ID

Project #: 531-325

Physical Security Narrative 07/23/21 Page 01

PHYSICAL SECURITY NARRATIVE

The Primary Care/Mental Health facility at the Boise VA Medical Center (BVAMC) will be a standalone, one-story outpatient facility providing about 22,000 gross square feet of space for primary care and mental health services for the BVAMC campus. The project site is within the main campus on an existing parade ground adjacent to Building T111 and across the street from Building 8 as shown in

Figure 1.

Figure 1. Boise VAMC Site Plan

The new building is designed in accordance with the 2020 Physical Security and Resiliency Design

Manual (PSRDM) to a Life-Safety Protected (LSP) level of protection as prescribed by Section 1.4.1.3 for a facility providing outpatient mental health services. This narrative presents the physical security design measures that will be implemented into the Primary Care/Mental Health facility related to vehicle and pedestrian controls, air-blast loading effects, and HVAC protection where specifically addressed in the following PSRDM applicable chapters:

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• Chapter 3 – Site Considerations

• Chapter 4 – Building Entrances and Exits

• Chapter 6 – Building Envelope

• Chapter 7 – Structural System

• Chapter 9 – Building Systems

Chapter 5 does not apply to the project since the facility does not provide functional spaces requiring enhanced protection. Additionally, Chapter 10 is covered in the electronic security basis of design.

The following section are presented in the same order of applicable PSRDM-LSP chapters

Site Considerations

In accordance with the PSRDM-LSP, the building is sited such that a 25-foot standoff is maintained from unscreened vehicles traveling on campus roadways as well as at adjacent parking lots, as shown in Figure 2. The standoff distance is measured from face of building façade to roadway curb edge and parking wheel stop; architectural appurtenances, (i.e., sunshades, canopies, etc.) that do not serve to enclose interior occupied space are allowed to encroach into this area.

Anti-ram vehicle barriers, such as bollards, are provided to protect vulnerable areas from the potential of both an accidental and intentional vehicle impact. These areas include the following:

• Building Entrance Points

• Exterior Areas of Congregation (i.e., outdoor plazas, eating areas, etc.)

• Critical Utilities

• Building Access/Service Roads entering 25-foot standoff distance

Anti-ram barriers at these locations are required to be pretested and certified assemblies capable of stopping a 4,000-pound vehicle traveling at a speed of 30 miles per hour (48 Km/hr) with a maximum penetration distance of 3.3 feet in accordance with ASTM F2656, ASTM F3016 or DOS SD-STD-02.01.

Additionally, site lighting at signage, building entrances, pedestrian pathways, trash enclosures and the parking lot will be provided in accordance with the VA Electrical Design Manual for illumination requirements.

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Figure 2. Physical Security Site Plan

Building Entrances & Exits

There is a single main visitor entrance accessed from pedestrian pathways and new parking lot to the southwest of the building. Prior to entrance into the lobby, visitors/patients will pass through an entrance vestibule sufficiently sized for expected peak throughput and the accommodation for mobility aids. The vestibule will also be provided with the infrastructure (i.e., power, telecommunications, and data connections) to support screening equipment. Additionally, the vestibule structure is intentionally positioned outside of the main building footprint and structurally isolated such that blast hardening is limited to the shared interior wall, as shown in Figure 3.

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Figure 3: Lobby / Vestibule Floor Plan

Upon entrance into the main lobby area, visitors/patients will be received at a kiosk for admittance into the rest of the facility. In accordance with the PSRDM-LSP, controlled access is provided at all doors leading into the facility beyond the lobby waiting area. Additionally, glazing within the lobby is laminated and perimeter partition walls are designed for an internal PBIED with charge weight size of W0 in accordance with the PSRDM. Walls will span floor-to-floor and be anchored to the floor slab-on-grade and roof diaphragm.

Other PSRDM-LSP requirements that are implemented into the design include:

• Entrance vestibule door panel and surrounding window system will have laminated glass

• Anti-ram barriers will serve to protect occupants entering the facility

• Security monitoring of the entrance and main lobby will be provided through CCTV with lighting

• Public entrance doors, including the café door, will be visible and monitored by facility staff and have the capability to be remotely locked and unlocked from the reception desk

• Secondary employee-only entrances with key card access to the north and south also serve as exit-only doors as required for emergency egress

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• Secondary café entrance to the south serves solely as an exit-only door, servicing the café area within the lobby space

• Secondary entrances are equipped with electronic card access control and monitored by CCTV to prohibit unauthorized entry

• Letter boxes and receptacles for trash and smoking paraphernalia will be located greater than 5 feet away from a load-bearing element

Building Envelope

Façade: The exterior facade consists of a 6-inch by 16 gage non-load bearing metal stud walls supporting a 4-inch brick veneer. This facade system is founded on a reinforced concrete strip footing at base and roof metal deck with slip track at top. Additionally, punched windows are supported by built-up box studs along the length of the building where the brick veneer is present. The low roof portions of the building to the north and south utilize a fiber cement panel system in place of a brick veneer. At these locations and at interior side of the screening vestibule, an HSS frame supports the storefront window systems. Table 1 and Table 2 present our blast analysis results, and calculations are provided in Appendix A.

Figure 4: Front Elevation

In accordance with PSDM requirements, the façade system was designed for the air-blast loading effects resulting from the lesser loading of the GP1 capped load when compared to the W1 vehicle

Physical Security Narrative 07/23/21 Page 06 threat at a 25-foot standoff. The design and performance of these systems as provided for in the drawings and specification were designed to meet the following requirements:

• Deformation of metal stud walls and other non-glazed elements meet the B3 response limits of

PDC-TR 06-08, Single Degree of Freedom Structural Response Limits for Antiterrorism

Design

• Exterior window glazing was designed to meet a GSA PC 3b, fragments enter the occupied space and land on the floor no further than 10 feet (3 m) from the façade

• Skylight glazing was designed to meet a GSA PC 2, glass may crack but remain fully retained by their frames and glazing system

• Glass panes consist of laminated glass and meet the minimum frame attachment requirement of

½ in. frame bite and continuous bead of structural silicone sealant

• Mullions were designed to achieve a ‘glass fails first’ performance and sustain deformations of

(1) Blast loading ≤ L/20 (approx. 6°) and (2) Balanced loading ≤ L/14 (approx. 8°)

• HSS frames were designed to a ‘glass fails first’ performance and deformations were limited to the B3 response limits of PDC-TR 06-08.

Table 1. Metal Stud Facade Design Results

Façade Element

Size Max. Trib.

Width

Ductility Shear

Limit Response R (kips) DCR

Metal Stud 600S200-54 16-in.

0.66 1.38 0.23

Punched Window Built-up Jamb

2’-4” Trib.: (2) 600S162-54 & 600T150-54

3-ft. 1.59 4.43 0.13

4’ Trib.: (2) 600S162-54 &

(2) 600T150-54

4.67-ft. 1.82 5.83 0.12

5’ Trib.: (2) 600S200-54 w/

(2) 600T200-54

5.67-ft. 1.93 6.74 0.14

Header Box Stud

(2) 600S200-54 4.5-ft. 1.11 11.3 0.48

Brace Stud 600S200-54 (Max. Capacity) 16-in.

3.00 2.43 0.62

Plywood Sheathing

½” Sheathing 16-in. 0.69 1.06 -

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Table 2. HSS Facade Design Results

Façade Element

Size Max.

Trib.

Width

Rotation Ductility Shear

Limit Response Limit Response R (kips) DCR

Storefront Window Jamb

HSS4x4x1/4 8.5-ft.

10°

6.56

3.24 6.24 0.14

HSS4x4x5/16 14-ft. 8.45 3.81 6.86 0.13

Header HSS4x6x1/4 5.25-ft. 2.83 1.38 8.28 0.19

Windowsill HSS4x4x1/4 3.5-ft. 2.65 1.25 5.99 0.13

Storefront Door Jamb

HSS4x4x1/4 6.42-ft 3.2 2.69 10.8 0.24

The results of our window systems proof-of-concept analysis is as follows:

• Exterior Punched Windows:

o 1-1/8” insulated glazing units of ¼” monolithic outer lite, ½” air gap, 3/8” laminated inner lite with 0.03” PVB interlayer o Both vertical and horizontal mullions utilize a Kawneer Trifab 451UT Framing System

Roof Structure: The building flat roof and attic floor framing consists of a 1½” x 18GA bare metal deck spanning to open web steel joists that in turn are supported by steel girders and columns. In accordance with the PSDM requirements, the roof system secondary elements (i.e., slab and joists) meet the B3 response limits of PDC-TR 06-08 and were designed for air-blast loading effects resulting from the W1 unscreened vehicle explosive (VBIED) threat at a 25-foot standoff, regardless if actual standoff distances to roadways and parking are greater. Primary structural framing members, girders and braced frame beams, were designed for the W1 VBIED and meet the B2 response limits. Table 3 presents our blast analysis results, calculations are provided in Appendix A.

The gabled roof areas, which are of light frame construction with plywood sheathing, are considered

‘sacrificial’ in a blast event based on the expectation that the attic roof serves as the blast hardened building envelope boundary. An exception is at each end of the gabled roofs (4 locations) where an exterior attic window provides daylighting to spaces below by way of a lightwell. At these elements the

Physical Security Narrative 07/23/21 Page 08 lightwell walls are of metal stud construction with plywood sheathing with a metal deck soffit that will serve as the blast hardened boundary.

Table 3. Roof Framing Design Results

Roof Element

Size

Rotation Ductility Shear

Limit Response Limit Response R (kips) DCR

Metal Deck

D1: 1 ½” x 18 GA.

4°

1.93

1.96 0.98 0.29

D2: 1 ½” x 18 GA.

6” Thick.

0.27 0.45 2.17 0.32

OWSJ

01: 24” LH

6°

1.61

1.10 23.3 -

02: 24” K 1.04 1.03 18.0 -

03: 24” LH 0.49 0.54 33.1 -

04: 18” L 1.03 1.34 11.6 -

Beams

W16x36

3°

0.12

0.35 93.5 0.59

W21x44 0.95 0.61 37.1 0.10

Girders

W14x22

3°

1.41

2.07 43.8 0.46

W16x26 0.65 1.08 58.4 0.49

W16x31 1.05 0.84 33.8 0.22

W16x40 1.27 1.06 46.5 0.32

W18x35 1.12 1.12 46.6 0.29

W18x46 1.06 1.00 58.8 0.31

W21x44 1.01 0.72 41.7 0.14

W24x68 0.25 0.37 139 0.18

W24x94 0.45 0.53 152 0.22

OWSJ – Open Web Steel Joist

Physical Security Narrative 07/23/21 Page 09

Structural System

Blast Resistance: The structural system consists of steel frame construction with braced frames providing lateral resistance. Perimeter columns and braced frames were designed to resist the air-blast loading effects due to the W1 VBIED at 25 feet, similar to roof primary elements, with a tributary area accounting for the impingement of façade members. Since these elements are an essential part of the building resistance to catastrophic failure, deformations were limited to the B2 response limits of PDC-

TR 06-08. Table 4 presents our blast analysis results, calculations are provided in Appendix A.

Table 4. Column and Braced Frame Design Results

Primary Element

Size Rotation Ductility Shear

Limit Response Limit Response R (kips) DCR

Column

HSS 6 x 6 x ¼

3°

2.89

1.89 11.8 0.17

HSS 6 x 6 x ½ 2.57 1.57 21.3 0.17

Brace HSS 6 x 6 x ½ 2.08 1.06 18.6 0.15

Brace Column

HSS 6 x 6 x ½ 1.93 1.01 23.1 0.17

HSS 12 x 6 x ½ 0.63 0.77 67.2 0.18

In addition to the structural systems, non-structural elements that are essential to life-safety systems or those that could pose a significant hazard to occupants if failure occurs will be braced for the lateral loading due to the blast base shear. This requirement includes overhead suspended equipment and fixtures weighing more than 31 pounds.

Progressive Collapse: Design for progressive collapse resistance is not required for one-story buildings and is therefore is not implemented.

Blast Base Shear: The blast base shear does not govern the lateral system design when compared to the seismic base shear.

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Interior Column and Wall Protection: Interior columns and non-load bearing partition walls enclosing high-risk spaces (i.e., loading docks, mailrooms and lobbies) are required to be blast hardened in accordance with the PSRDM-LSP. However, columns are concealed within the perimeter wall cavity and not readily identifiable, therefore, explicit hardening for a contact charge, W0, is not required.

Additionally, while it is noted in the PSRDM criteria that partition walls shall be of reinforced masonry or concrete construction, it is our design intent to utilize 6-inch and 8-in by 16 gage metal studs depending on the intended partition depth. Tracks for built-up box-studs at door jambs are 6-in by 12-gage or 8-in by 16-gage. Based on the partition depth, headers at mechanical openings utilize 6-in or 8-in by 1.5-in, 16 gage track studs. Metal studs were designed for the combination of shock and gas pressures associated with the W0 threat placed at the center of the lobby space and meet the B3 response limits of PDC-TR 06-08. Table 5 presents our blast analysis results, calculations are provided in Appendix A.

Door panels are not required to be designed explicitly for blast, but are provided with laminated glass, are heavy gage metal (14-GA min.), and open outwards toward a potential blast

Table 5. Interior Metal Stud Partition Design Results

Façade Element

Size Max. Trib.

Width

Ductility Shear

Limit Response R (kips) DCR

Metal Stud

(2) 600S200-54 Back-to-Back

8-in.

1.67 2.89 0.12

(2) 800S162-54 Back-to-Back 1.57 3.5 0.11

Built-up Jamb

(2) 600S200-54 w/ (2) 600T200-97

2.1-ft.

1.58 9.68 0.12

(2) 800S162-54 w/ (2) 800T150-54

1.95 9.32 0.14

Header Box Stud

(2) 600S200-54

6-ft.

1.45 15 0.64

(2) 800S162-54 1.01 20.2 0.62

Physical Security Narrative 07/23/21 Page 11

Building Systems

Since this building is a Life-Safety Protected facility and its program does not include critical functional areas/services, there are no physical security enhancements beyond standard building code requirements. However, it should be noted that HVAC units are centrally located on the roof with the greatest distance from a potential blast event.

Additionally, all electrical, telecommunication, fire and plumbing utility services will be brought into the building by existing campus utilities and no additional protective measures apply to the new building.