Loma Linda-60pc.pdf

VA Loma Linda - Jerry L. Pettis VAHCS – Loma Linda, California Electrical Condition Assessment

Prepared for: Dept. of Veterans Affairs Page 1 Prepared by: Wiley|Wilson

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1. Facility Support

2.2. Station Information

2.3. Site Plan

2.4. Medium Voltage Distribution System Overview

2.5. Emergency Power System Overview

2.6. Calculation Methods

2.7. Ground Resistance Test Reports

2.8. Study Assumptions

3. SHORT CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

3.1. Introduction

3.2. Sources of Fault Current

3.3. Calculation Scenarios

3.4. SKM Power*Tools Input Data Reports

3.5. Short Circuit Calculation Results

3.5.1. Medium Voltage

3.5.2. Low Voltage Building Systems (Included in future submissions)

3.6. Equipment Evaluation Results

4. PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION STUDY

4.1. Introduction

4.2. Existing and Proposed Protective Device Settings

4.3. Analysis and Recommendations

4.4. Time-Current Characteristic Coordination Sheets Descriptions and Analysis

4.5. Time-Current Characteristic Coordination Sheets

5. VOLTAGE DROP ANALYSIS

5.1. Introduction

5.2. Basis of Evaluation

5.3. Results

5.4. Load Flow Calculations Medium Voltage

5.4.1. Low Voltage Building Systems (included in future submissions)

6. ARC-FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS

6.1. Introduction

6.2. Basis of Study

6.3. Disclaimer

6.4. Results

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7. CONDITION ASSESSMENT

7.1. General Information

7.2. Medium Voltage Distribution System

7.3. Low Voltage Distribution System

7.4. Summary of Costs

APPENDICES

A. Site Data and Site Plan B. Available Fault Current Information (Included in future submissions) C. Loma Linda VAMC Electrical Load Data D. Minutes of Entrance Briefing E. Photographs (Included in future submissions) F. Comments and Responses (Included in future submissions) G. VHA Electrical Directive Compliance Survey (Included in future submissions) H. One-Line Diagrams

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Wiley|Wilson has been commissioned by Miller-Remick LLC, of Cherry Hill, New Jersey, to perform an Electrical Condition Assessment of the VA Loma Linda Healthcare System for the Department of Veterans Affairs – Office of Construction & Facility Management (OCFM).

The scope of this assessment includes short circuit analysis, protective device coordination study, voltage drop analysis, arc flash analysis, and equipment condition assessment.

This submission is a preliminary report, for review, of the Loma Linda VA Medical Center’s (VAMC) medium voltage power system.

The Loma Linda VAMC electrical distribution system was surveyed by Wiley|Wilson personnel during an initial site visit that began on January 22 and was completed on February 2, 2018. A second visit is currently being scheduled to complete the collection of existing condition information and to resolve discrepancies discovered during the construction of the system models.

The field survey is being performed in order to obtain actual field data required for the modeling of the system, as well as to perform a condition assessment of the system. As expected, some equipment data has not been available and certain assumptions have had to be made. A list of major assumptions can be found under Section 2 - “Study Assumptions.”

The Loma Linda VAMC is electrically served from two Southern California Edison (SCE) feeders. Based on our observation and information provided by the VA staff, the Loma Linda VAMC is normally served from a single SCE feeder with the second feeder serving as an alternate utility source. At the medical center, both feeders terminate at the SCE transfer switchgear. A single feeder runs from this transfer switchgear to the North Main Switchgear in the VAMC’s Central Plant. From this main switchgear, the Loma Linda VAMC’s distribution system consists of two parallel main switchgear which serve eleven unit substations distributed throughout the campus.

This information regarding utility sources and configuration is somewhat cursory due to a 4-6 week lead time on information requested from SCE. We are in the process of obtaining more detailed information regarding the campus service and that information will be included in future submissions. This data includes SCE substation information, feeder configuration data, available fault current, and protective devices within the transfer switchgear.

The short circuit calculations determine available short circuit current levels throughout the electrical distribution system under various operating conditions. The results of these calculations are used to confirm the short-circuit rating of switchgear and to aid in coordinating protective devices. Lacking the most current fault current data from SCE, we are currently using fault data from Loma Linda’s most recent electrical study, dated 2015. This data may change somewhat, but we expect it to be reasonably accurate. We plan to update this information upon receipt of current data (and certainly before our next submission). But with this fault current data, most of the medium voltage equipment appears adequate for the fault current exposure

Prepared for: Dept. of Veterans Affairs Section 1 Page 2 Prepared by: Wiley|Wilson that exists at the Loma Linda VAMC. Lists of all under-rated protective devices and equipment will be included in future submissions.

During the protective device coordination study the ratings and settings of the existing overcurrent protective devices are examined and those that are currently not properly coordinated are identified. In a selectively coordinated system, the protective device closest to the fault will interrupt the circuit thereby minimizing the disruption of electrical service. We develop and plot time current characteristics (TCCs) showing the existing relationships between medium voltage protective relay settings, fuses, and equipment damage curves. Coordination for low voltage systems, as well as TCCs showing proposed changes for all protective devices, will be included in future submissions.

Load flow analysis has been performed in order to determine voltage drop along the length of each feeder. In order to accurately model the load flow of the system, actual system peak demand data has been obtained from electric utility metered data. This information was used to establish loading on the medium voltage system. As prescribed in the project Statement of Work, low voltage loads inside of buildings will be defined as 80 percent of equipment nameplate rating. This level of load data is most certainly inaccurate, but should represent worst case conditions; accurate load data would provide a voltage drop analysis result for the system that is closer to the actual conditions and would result in better functional recommendations.

The arc flash analysis determines the incident energy released by an arcing fault at the location of each device in the electrical distribution system. In addition, an arc flash boundary is defined at the distance where a person is expected to receive a second degree burn when exposed to an arcing fault. Further, based on the above calculations, requirements for personal protective equipment (PPE) are indicated. This data can be found in Section 6 – “Arc Flash Analysis.”

The condition assessment survey has been performed in order to identify equipment in poor or inoperable condition, as well as to generally assess the age of the system equipment. For the purposes of our work, the following grading methodology was used:

Grade A = Like new condition. Majority of useful life span remains. “Excellent” Grade B = Good condition. Over half of useful life span remains. “Good” or

B+ = “Very Good” Grade C = Average condition. Less than half of useful life span remains. “Average,” “Fair,” or

C+ = “Above Average” Grade C- = Workable condition. May be past assigned useful life, but still working. “Keep an eye on it” Grade D = Poor condition. Past assigned useful life. Failure is not critical. “Poor” or

“Problematic” Grade F = Critical condition. Needs immediate attention. “Failing” or “Critical”

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Where degrading conditions exist (i.e., rust, water damage, mechanical damage, etc.), grading was performed using engineering judgment. Where equipment was in good condition, grading was strictly based on age, assuming a standard 40-year life.

Further, we were able to identify issues related to Code compliance, as well as several items specifically requested by the VA in the project Statement of Work. Issues of Code compliance and estimated corrective costs are detailed in Section 7 – “Condition Assessment.”

Cost estimates for corrective action will be included in future submissions, along with recommendations for improvement.

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2. INTRODUCTION

2.1. Facility Support

Wiley|Wilson would like to thank the following individuals who are contributing significantly to the success of this project:

Kenneth Eigen Chief of Engineering, Loma Linda VAMC e-mail: kenneth.eigen@va.gov telephone: 909.854.9025 x2569

Anthony Streletz Assistant Chief of Engineering, Loma Linda VAMC e-mail: anthony.streletz@va.gov telephone: 909.854.9025 x4306

Larry Barrett Energy Manager, Loma Linda VAMC e-mail: larry.barrett@va.gov telephone: 909.825.7084 x2925

David Grzechowiak Maintenance and Operations Chief, Loma Linda VAMC e-mail: david.grzechowiak@va.gov telephone: 909.825.7084 x4303

Jonathon McWhite Electric Shop Supervisor, Loma Linda VAMC e-mail: jonathon.mcwhite@va.gov telephone: 909.825.7084 x2177

Larry Lau Contracting Officer’s Representative, VA OCFM e-mail: larry.lau@va.gov telephone: 202.632.5263

Gary Krupa Technical Engineering Reviewer, VHA e-mail: gary.krupa@va.gov telephone: 402.599.2104

Thomas Chapman Senior Principal, Miller-Remick LLC e-mail: tchapman@miller-remick.com telephone: 856.429.4000

Wiley|Wilson personnel who have participated in the project include:

Steve Bowman Project Manager e-mail: sbowman@wileywilson.com telephone: 434.455.3229

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Toby Burge tburge@wileywilson.com Jack Bauer jbauer@wileywilson.com Don Anderson danderson@wileywilson.com Elizabeth Tuomey etuomey@wileywilson.com Ken Peery kpeery@wileywilson.com Jessica Harber jharber@wileywilson.com

2.2. Station Information

The Loma Linda VAMC is located at 11201 Benton Street in Loma Linda, California and is part of the VA’s Desert Pacific Healthcare Network (VISN 22). The following buildings comprise the Loma Linda Medical Center and are being surveyed by the Wiley|Wilson team:

Bldg Building Name/Function Total

GSF

Service Transformer(s) Field Label*

(SKM Model Name) 1 Main Hospital 773,582 US-1A_US-1B (Service Bay 1-3)

US-2A_US-2B (Service Bay 2-4) US-3A_US-3B (Service Bay 1-3) US-4A_US-4B (Service Bay 2-4)

US-5A_US-5B

US-6

30 Audiology Building 7,805 Served from US-2B 31 Cancer Building - US-7 32 Behavioral Health - Served from US-7 20 Outpatient Pharmacy - XF Outpatient Pharmacy Served from US-7 51 Eye Clinic 9,942 Served from US-3A

S-45 Parking Garage - Served from US-4A

- Fuel Cell - XF T-FCH

Appendix A contains detailed site data related to the Loma Linda Medical Center.

2.3. Site Plan

A site plan is also included in Appendix A. This shows the general layout of the buildings on station. This information was provided to Wiley|Wilson by the station personnel.

2.4. Medium Voltage Distribution System Overview

As mentioned earlier, the Loma Linda VAMC is electrically served from Sothern California Edison’s (SCE) transfer switchgear which is located on the Medical Center property. The transfer switchgear receives two feeders from SCE, one of which serves as the normal source and one which serves as an alternate source. We don’t currently have much more detail on the utility service, but are working with SCE to obtain additional

Prepared for: Dept. of Veterans Affairs Section 2 Page 3 Prepared by: Wiley|Wilson information which may help us have a better understanding of the reliability of the utility sources to Loma Linda. This information will be included in our next submission.

Downstream of the SCE transfer switchgear, though, we have collected very detailed data. The transfer switchgear connects to the North Main Switchgear located in the Central Plant of the VAMC. The VAMC’s medium voltage distribution then consists of two pieces of switchgear (North and South) and eleven unit substations throughout the campus. The North and South Main Switchgear are connected through a tie breaker.

The tie is closed during normal operation, and the campus loads are divided between each switchgear. The utility service feeds into the North Main Switchgear, and the 2.0MW emergency generator serves the South Main Switchgear.

Each of the eleven unit substations is served from the two pieces of switchgear. Ten of the unit substations can be switched between either main switchgear. Unit substation US-6 is served solely from the North Main Switchgear. In addition, the North Main Switchgear is the interconnection point for the Medical Center’s fuel cell/cogeneration plant.

The VAMC medium voltage system appears to have sufficient capacity to serve present and future loads. The chart below itemizes system demand and system capacity.

Loma Linda VAMC Electrical Power Capacity Peak Demand (kW) 3,760.0 Average Demand (kW) 3,648.0 Installed Service Capacity (kW) 28,800.0 Installed Transformer Capacity (kW) 19,250.0 Fuel Cell/Cogen Capacity (kW) 800.0 12kV Generator Capacity (kW) 2,000.0 480V Generator Capacity (kW) 2,020.0

2.5. Standby Power System Overview

The Loma Linda VAMC has one 2.0MW standby generator that serves the entire campus. This generator is located in room 1D-19 in the central plant and feeds the south side of the two main switchgear in the central plant.

The Loma Linda VAMC also has two 400kW fuel cell/cogeneration power modules.

These modules are located on the site and are connected to the North Medium Voltage switchgear. The fuel cell produces 480V, 3 phase power and is transformed up to 12kV via a local padmount transformer.

Further discussion of these generators will be discussed in later submissions.

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2.6. Emergency Power System Overview

The Loma Linda VAMC has four 505kW generators that serve the life safety and critical systems in the main hospital building.

Discussion of these generators will be included in later submissions.

2.7. Calculation Methods

As mentioned, this study includes the following elements: short circuit calculations, overcurrent protective device coordination, voltage drop analysis, arc flash analysis, and a condition assessment of electrical equipment.

As required by the project’s Statement of Work, all calculations have been performed using software developed by SKM Systems Analysis, Inc. The software is named Power*Tools, and it is a modular assembly of programs. The following modules have been used for this study:

• System Model Development DAPPER

• Short Circuit Calculations A_Fault

• Protective Device Coordination CAPTOR

• Voltage Drop Analysis DAPPER

• Arc Flash Analysis Arc Flash Evaluation

• Condition Assessment Equipment Evaluation

Version 8.0.2.3 of the Power*Tools software has been used for all of the calculations presented throughout this report. Additional information related to this software package can be found at www.skm.com.

2.8. Ground Resistance Test Reports

As stated in the project Statement of Work and as described in VHA Directive 1028, the facility’s grounding system must be tested and a Facility Ground Resistance Test Report must be produced every 36 months. Station personnel are searching for records of the ground resistance test report at the Loma Linda VAMC. There will be continued evaluation of the grounding system during the final site visit.

2.9. Study Assumptions

Although Wiley|Wilson’s survey team has examined every piece of electrical distribution equipment on the medium voltage system and will complete the examination of the low voltage systems during the next site visit, there were circumstances where the necessary data could not be obtained. This occurred for several reasons: the impracticality of taking a particular device out of service in order to determine a particular rating; the lack of identifiable information on a device due to age, deterioration, or manufacturing method;

Prepared for: Dept. of Veterans Affairs Section 2 Page 5 Prepared by: Wiley|Wilson and the lack of complete as-built drawing data. The following describes data that has been assumed for the purposes of this study:

2.9.1. Diesel generators: It is typically difficult to obtain specific machine data (i.e. Xd’, Xd’’, machine time constants, etc.) which are required to precisely calculate the capability of a generator to produce short circuit current. For this reason, we expect to use typical values for generators of the sizes that exist at the Loma Linda site. The model of Building 1 is currently being built and the coordination study involving the generator sources will be provided, along with models of all other outlying buildings, as part of the low voltage report at the next submission.

2.9.2. Distribution transformers: Transformer impedance is based on actual nameplate data. X/R ratio is estimated based on typical values for transformers of this type and size.

2.9.3. Low voltage systems: Assumptions for low voltage systems equipment will be provided in future submissions.

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3. SHORT CIRCUIT ANALYSIS

3.1. Introduction

The short circuit analysis is developed based on the actual data collected from the Loma Linda VAMC electrical distribution system. Using the DAPPER module of SKM Power*Tools, models of the system have been constructed from this data, and calculations have been run using these models. In the interest of simplicity and ease of use, Wiley|Wilson has constructed (or will construct) individual models of the medium voltage distribution system and of each of the other low voltage distribution systems.

One model (medium_voltage) consists of the medium voltage system the 12.0kV SCE service points down through each of the low voltage unit substations.

The low voltage models will begin at each of the pairs of unit substations and extend to the conclusion of the downstream three-phase building electrical systems. Analysis of these low voltage systems will be provided in future submissions.

One-line diagrams of the models that are presently completed are included in Appendix H. Reports showing the complete input data used to construct the medium voltage model are also included in Section 3.4.

3.2. Sources of Fault Current

The short circuit fault current calculations performed for the entire Loma Linda VAMC system are ultimately based on the available fault current from SCE. Due to the long lead time in receiving this information from SCE, we are currently using the available fault current provided to us by Loma Linda (which was obtained from SCE during the Medical Center’s 2015 electrical study). We expect that this information is reasonably accurate, but it will need to be updated with current values once they are received from SCE. A revised short circuit analysis will be included in our next submission.

In summary, based on the 2015 Loma Linda study, the available fault current from the Southern California Edison system is as follows:

Three-Phase Bolted Fault: 6.5kA sym X/R = 12 Single-Phase to Ground: 0.0kA sym X/R = 12

Additional sources of short circuit fault current are the emergency and standby generators and the induction motors which operate throughout the system. Induction motors typically operate as a load on an electrical system. In the event of a short circuit fault, voltage to the motor drops significantly due to the excess fault current flowing through the system; the motor’s inertia continues to drive the rotation of the motor, thereby inducing a current that back feeds to the short circuit location. This current disappears after only a few cycles, after the motor fully decelerates, but does typically last long enough to affect momentary ratings of circuit breakers and to possibly affect interrupting ratings of devices

Prepared for: Dept. of Veterans Affairs Section 3 Page 2 Prepared by: Wiley|Wilson which open very quickly. Induction motors controlled by variable speed drives are modeled with no bypass circuit so there is no fault current contribution from these motors into the system. This is an important consideration for VAMC personnel (as it relates to the selection of variable speed drives) since this short circuit contribution can sometimes be significant, even if short-lived.

3.3. Calculation Scenarios

Based on the configuration of the Loma Linda VAMC electrical system and the SCE fault current data that we currently have, we are presenting only one scenario for the supply of short circuit fault current – the normal operating condition. We expect that, at the next submission, we will have an additional scenario since we expect that the two SCE feeders do not have exactly the same values for source impedance.

3.4. SKM Power*Tools Input Data Reports

SKM Power*Tools input data reports follow for the medium voltage distribution system.

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3.5. Short Circuit Calculation Results

The short circuit analysis calculates available fault current levels throughout the electrical distribution system from the incoming utility feed down through the branch circuit breakers in panelboards. The results of the calculations are then compared against the ratings of buses, relays, circuit breakers, and fuses to ensure the adequacy of their ratings. These results are also used to coordinate the timing of all of the system’s overcurrent protective devices in order to ensure that the device closest to a fault will operate most quickly and minimize the impact of an electrical outage to the smallest area possible. The results of the short circuit analysis are also used to perform an arc flash analysis, since the incident energy that personnel may be exposed to is directly related both to the magnitude of the fault current and how quickly the fault is eliminated from the system.

Using the A_Fault module of SKM Power*Tools, the short circuit fault currents for the medium voltage model has been calculated. The A_Fault module is based on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 141 and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standards C37.010, C37.5, and C37.13. The short circuit fault current calculations follow as described:

3.5.1. Medium Voltage System

3.5.2. Low Voltage Building Systems (included in future submissions)

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3.6. Equipment Evaluation Results

The Equipment Evaluation module of SKM Power*Tools was used to compare system device component ratings against calculated values of short circuit currents. The tables on the following pages provide detailed information comparing the ratings of equipment versus the calculated values of short circuit fault current at those locations. Fault current values for the medium voltage system are based on the maximum available fault current, the results of which are found in Section 3.5.5. Table 3.1 shows the evaluation of all protective devices on the Loma Linda VAMC medium voltage system. Table 3.2 shows only those devices which have inadequate ratings for the level of short circuit fault current experienced on the medium voltage system. Future submissions will show that equipment which is under-rated for the actual short circuit fault current experienced on the low voltage systems. This table, when complete, will also include analysis and recommendations for correction, as well as the probable cost to perform corrections.

Similarly, Table 3.3 shows the evaluation of all equipment (i.e., switchgear, switchboards, and panelboards) on the Loma Linda VAMC medium voltage system. Table 3.4 will be included in future submissions and will show only that equipment which is under-rated for the actual short circuit fault current experienced, and it will also include analysis and recommendations for correction, as well as the probable cost to perform corrections.

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4. PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION STUDY

4.1. Introduction

The protective device coordination study examines the settings of all existing overcurrent protective relays and breaker trip devices. Wiley|Wilson will provide analysis of the existing settings and determine whether proper coordination is currently being achieved.

Where a lack of coordination exists, recommendations for improved settings will be provided. In certain cases, due to limitations of the existing protective devices, improved coordination may not be possible and the replacement of equipment will be required in order to achieve selective coordination.

In a selectively coordinated system, relays, circuit breakers, and fuses protect equipment from the damaging effects of overload and short circuit currents. When a disruption of this kind occurs, the protective device closest to the fault should interrupt the current and isolate the downstream portion of the circuit. The benefits of a coordinated power system include the least possible disruption of electrical service to the Medical Center, as well as reduced potential for damage to electrical equipment.

In a system lacking coordination, an overcurrent device may not adequately protect equipment from overload or short circuit currents, or a device further upstream of the device closest to a fault may interrupt the circuit. In either case, there is a disruption to the Medical Center that could have been avoided with proper coordination. Associated with this type of event are costs related to damaged equipment and/or VAMC downtime that could also have been avoided.

4.2. Existing and Proposed Protective Device Settings

Tables will be included in future submissions which provide detailed information on the settings of protective devices. Table 4.1 includes settings for all protective devices on the medium voltage system. Table 4.2, when complete, will list settings for those protective devices on the low voltage system for which modifications are recommended.

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4.3. Analysis and Recommendations

This submission includes time-current characteristic (TCC) coordination sheets for the Loma Linda VAMC medium voltage distribution system. We have produced coordination sheets for the protective devices and unit substation transformers in the medium voltage system. The 12kV main breaker relays are shown and compared to the feeder breaker relays and to the individual unit substation transformer fuses.

Coordination sheets for the low voltage systems, along with analysis, will be provided in future submissions.

This work has been done using the CAPTOR module of SKM Power*Tools, which also utilizes the short circuit current calculations described in Section 3. Data defining the characteristics of the overcurrent protective devices and their settings are entered into the program. With this information, time-current characteristic curves are developed which compare the characteristics of each device, transformer damage points, transformer inrush current, feeder damage curves and other information required to determine coordination.

The medium voltage system is well protected and generally coordinated. The areas of concern are with the large service transformers where feeder relays show some miscoordination with transformer fusing and multiple levels of active residual ground fault protection with settings that are likely to cause nuisance trips or partly melted (pre-conditioned) transformer fuses. These areas will be evaluated more thoroughly after the utility relay information has been received in conjunction with the evaluation of the low voltage systems at these buildings. In this way, we will ensure coordination between the 12kV devices as well as the low voltage main breakers. This information will be provided in the next submission.

Preliminary recommendations for improvements to the medium voltage protection scheme are included in Table 4.1 and will be updated in future submissions.

Improvements to the low voltage systems will be listed in Table 4.2, which will be included in future submissions. Analysis follows in Section 4.4.

4.4. Time-Current Characteristic Coordination Sheets Descriptions and Analysis

Following are brief descriptions and comments for each TCC coordination sheet. Printed TCC coordination sheets follow in Section 4.5.

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4.5. Time-Current Characteristic Coordination Sheets

Time-current characteristic coordination sheets illustrating existing conditions for all protective devices on the medium voltage system follow. Recommended curves follow immediately after the curve showing the existing condition.

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5. VOLTAGE DROP ANALYSIS

5.1. Introduction

The voltage drop analysis utilizes the system models described in Section 3 of this report and the DAPPER module of SKM Power*Tools. A load flow calculation has been run to determine current flow through the various feeders and voltage levels at each system bus. From these results, voltage drop at each bus is easily determined by comparing actual voltage level against nominal values.

A significant factor in accurately calculating voltage drop is establishing correct electrical load levels at each system bus. The project Statement of Work dictates that load be assumed at 80 percent of equipment nameplate rating. Experience would indicate that 80 percent is a very high load level when applied throughout the entire electrical system and is likely inaccurate.

The Loma Linda VAMC has provided utility data from SCE which contains electricity consumption and demand data between October 2016 and December 2017. This document is included in Appendix C. The load data, as provided, shows a maximum load during this time span of 3.76MW occurring in June 2017.

The 3.76MW peak value has been used as the basis for our calculation; we have applied loads throughout the medium voltage system as a percentage of this peak demand, as compared to system connected load.

Load flow calculations for the low voltage building system models will be done using load levels that are between 80 and 100 percent of the service transformer nameplate rating.

This is also in keeping with the project Statement of Work. These calculations will be included in future submissions.

5.2. Basis of Evaluation

The National Electrical Code® (NEC®), in Articles 210.19(A) Informational Note No. 4 and 215.2(A)(1) Informational Note No. 2 recommend a maximum allowable voltage drop of 3 percent for branch circuits and a maximum allowable voltage drop of 5 percent for the combination of feeder and branch circuit. This typically applies to voltage drop measured from a building’s electrical service entrance to the furthest downstream electrical device (i.e., wall receptacle, light fixture, equipment motor, etc.).

On the medium voltage distribution system, tap settings for the service transformers should be properly set to obtain output voltage as close as possible to the transformer’s nominal low voltage setting. In that regard, using the very conservative load levels described above is not helpful to determine correct transformer tap settings. If taps are set based on these load levels, under normal operation the system will likely experience high voltage levels throughout.

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Although not within the scope of this project, it is recommended that the VA obtain accurate loading data by measurement at the main switchgear feeder breakers and at each unit substation location for better calculation of system voltage levels.

5.3. Results

The results of the voltage drop calculations for the medium voltage system follow in Section 5.4. Calculations for the low voltage system will be included in future submissions.

SKM output files are presented for the medium voltage scenario. This scenario is the same as the one used in evaluating short circuit fault current in Section 3, which is the normal operating condition. Once information is received from SCE regarding the normal and alternate source to the facility, this calculation will be updated. The VAMC loads are loop fed from the main service switchgear North and South. Each unit substation, except for US-6, can be switched and fed either from Feeder A (North switchgear) or Feeder B (South switchgear). All of the feeders to each unit substation are all routed the same direction making all A and B feeders the same length. There will likely be two scenarios for this calculation. Scenario 1 will be the normal configuration from the normal SCE source and Scenario 2 will be from the alternate SCE source. Further discussion will be provided in future submissions.

Initial voltage drop calculations indicate that voltage levels are within appropriate boundaries and are not a current problem for the Loma Linda VAMC. This situation will be more fully explored in later submissions since low voltage systems are still in the modeling process and we do not yet have calculated results for those systems.

5.4. Load Flow Calculations

SKM Power*Tools load flow calculation reports are provided as follows:

5.4.1 Medium Voltage System

5.4.2 Low Voltage Building Systems (included in future submissions)

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6. ARC FLASH ANALYSIS

6.1. Introduction

Arc flash hazard is defined by IEEE as “a dangerous condition associated with the release of energy caused by an electric arc.” The focus of industry on electrical safety and the recognition of arc flash burns as significant have highlighted the need for the protection of employees from all arc flash hazards. Article 110.16 of the NEC® states in part that “switchboards, switchgear, panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures, and motor control centers that are in other than dwelling occupancies and are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized shall be field or factory marked to warn qualified persons of potential electric arc flash hazards.” From this statement, it can be inferred that flash protection may be required when examining, adjusting, servicing, or maintaining energized equipment.

The 2018 Edition of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 70E – Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace – Article 130.5 states the following:

“An arc flash risk assessment shall be performed and shall:

1. Identify the arc flash hazards

2. Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of injury or damage to health and the potential severity of injury or damage to health

3. Determine if additional protective measures are required, including the use of

PPE.”

Article 130.5 (C) adds “When protective measures include the use of PPE, the following shall be determined:

1. Appropriate safety-related work practices

2. The arc flash boundary

3. The PPE to be used within the arc flash boundary.”

Further, Article 130.5 (E)(1) states “The arc flash boundary shall be the distance at which the incident energy equals 1.2 cal/cm2 (5 J/cm2).”

And finally, Article 130.5 (G) stipulates that “The incident energy analysis shall be updated when changes occur in the electrical distribution system that could affect the results of the analysis. The incident energy analysis shall also be reviewed for accuracy at intervals not to exceed 5 years.”

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It should be noted that the above mentioned article has undergone significant revision in the last two editions of this standard. There has been a marked shift in emphasis from simply conducting an analysis of the hazard to performing an overall risk assessment.

This study seeks to satisfy the requirements of Article 130.5(C)(2) and (3) as though a determination has already been made that the arc flash hazard risk exists. In fact, this determination has not been made, but is instead dependent upon many factors relating to the work task to be performed, some of which can only be assessed near to the time of the work itself. The Medical Center is strongly encouraged to develop a plan for performing the required risk assessment while contemplating work on energized equipment. When a determination is made that a risk exists, and a decision is made to proceed with energized work, the results of this arc flash analysis can then be consulted for guidance on the arc flash boundary and PPE levels until such time as it is either rendered invalid by physical modifications to the system or five years have passed and a review is required.

6.2. Basis of Study

This arc flash analysis utilizes the system models described in Section 3. It relies on the results of the short circuit analysis as well as the protective device coordination study.

The results of the short circuit calculations provide fault current momentary duty, interrupting rating, and short circuit withstand rating of electrical equipment. The results of the protective device coordination study provide the times required for the various protective devices to isolate overload and fault conditions. This information is important since it defines the values of incident energy available at each system location.

Arc flash incident energy calculations have been run with the medium voltage configured in the normal operating condition, as this represents the condition encountered the vast majority of the time. These results can be found in Table 6.1.

The arc flash analysis calculates the incident energy and the flash protection boundary throughout the electrical power distribution system. As specified in the project Statement of Work, these calculations have been performed in accordance with IEEE 1584 and are based on an incident energy level of 1.2 cal/cm2. The calculation results are used to determine the arc flash boundary, the available incident energy, the necessary personal protective equipment requirements, as well as the results of the shock hazard analysis – the limited approach boundary, the restricted approach boundary, and the necessary shock hazard personal protective equipment requirements.

6.3. Disclaimer

As mentioned above, this arc flash analysis utilizes the system models developed for the other phases of this Electrical Condition Assessment. The calculations are based on the current system configuration and assumptions that have been described in this report.

System modifications or assumptions that prove to be false may change the hazard level.

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This analysis is not meant to promote or encourage work on energized equipment. It should not be inferred that the use of personal protective equipment ensures safety while working on energized electrical equipment. Wiley|Wilson recommends de-energizing all electrical equipment prior to gaining access.

This arc flash analysis has been developed using the Arc Flash Evaluation module of SKM Power*Tools and was performed based on the equations and formulas presented in IEEE Standard 1584 and the information given in NFPA 70E related to personal protective clothing and equipment. It is assumed that the user of the analysis is knowledgeable of NFPA 70E which provides information and guidance on protective performance of equipment and various fabrics. It is also assumed that the user has read and is familiar with the pertinent standards and references, such as industry standards and codes dealing with the subject of flash protection, fault analysis, overcurrent device coordination, and the performance of a given system’s electrical equipment under various fault conditions. It is assumed that the user has read and understood all of the related protective device coordination industry standards and understands the theory and concepts. The equations and formulas used in the arc flash analysis are based on experimental data and use theoretical and empirical equations to provide an approximation of the heat falling on a surface. Since temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, arc length, and the location of a fault within any switchgear cubicle, panel, motor control center, or any other electrical equipment, may have a bearing on the arc, an actual arc is likely to produce heat that may differ from the results documented in this analysis.

Therefore, the user should use the results of this Arc Flash Analysis only as a guide. The interpretation and use of the calculated results provided by the flash hazard analysis software program documented in this study are the sole responsibility of the user.

6.4. Results

The SKM output of the arc flash analysis for the Loma Linda VAMC medium voltage system follow in Tables 6.1 & 6.2. The incident energy levels and the corresponding hazard risk category are listed in the next-to-last column. Equipment with incident energy levels at or above 40 calorie/cm2 exceeds levels for which known fire-rated clothing categories are identified in NFPA 70E. An additional danger which exists at these high energy levels is the force of an arc blast which can cause internal injuries regardless of PPE protection. Equipment and locations listed as dangerous should only be approached or worked on when completely de-energized.

Additional detailed analysis and recommendations for improvement in arc flash hazard in the low voltage system will be included in future submissions.

As seen in Table 6.1, of the 15 locations shown two are between 1.2 and 12 calories/cm2.

The remaining 13 locations have incident energy values less than 1.2 calories/cm2. As mentioned in Section 3 we do not have the most up to date fault current data or upstream

Prepared for: Dept. of Veterans Affairs Section 6 Page 4 Prepared by: Wiley|Wilson protection devices from SCE. The medium voltage incident energy levels could change once this information is entered into the model. This information will be updated in future submissions. The primary compartments of the unit substations have very low energy levels, typically less than 1 calorie/cm2. The unit substation secondary compartments will have much higher incident energy levels and it will be confirmed as we begin to consider the impact that the low voltage systems have upon this equipment. The data presented within this report for these locations will be re-evaluated in detail in future submissions of arc flash analysis for each of the low voltage systems.

It is recommended that Loma Linda VAMC personnel continue regular training related to arc flash hazards and the use of personal protective equipment. Daily operation of the Medical Center electrical system presents a number of challenges and the potential for arc flash hazard needs to be considered.

NFPA 70E Table 130.5 (G) specifically discusses PPE selection for users who know incident energy exposures based on the performance of a hazard analysis, and where the calculated incident energy is 1.2 calories/cm2 or greater. By the nature of this study, this is the situation that the Loma Linda VAMC now falls within for the systems studied herein. It can be readily seen that this table does not include or discuss arc flash hazard categories.

While that may be surprising, NFPA clearly states in Paragraph 130.5 (F) that users should select PPE based on either: 1) Incident Energy Analysis, or 2) Arc Flash PPE Categories Method (also commonly described as the “Table Method”). Using a hybrid system utilizing both calculated incident energy values and arc flash categories is clearly prohibited.

With the release of the 2012 Edition of NFPA 70E and continuing with the 2015 and 2018 Editions, Annex H was modified to include substantially more information related to PPE than in previous editions. Although this Annex is clearly noted to be informational in nature and not required under the Standard, it provides very helpful information to guide users in the selection of PPE.

Again, by the nature of this detailed study, the Loma Linda VAMC is provided with an incident energy analysis for the medium voltage and low voltage systems on this campus.

Wiley|Wilson recommends the use of this analysis, along with information provided in Table 130.5 (G) and Annex H of NFPA 70E in order to select appropriate PPE for use in all work situations. A copy of this table is provided on the following page for ease of use.

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Table 6.2 shows the various boundary distances associated with shock protection from energized equipment. This information is based strictly on the potential for shock hazard and comes from Table 130.4(D)(a) of NFPA 70E.

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7. CONDITION ASSESSMENT

7.1. General Information

As required by the VA’s Statement of Work, the following items were addressed during the condition assessment survey:

A. For all electrical equipment, determine if adequate code clearances exist.

1. A complete list of all equipment will be provided in future submissions, along with graded assessment, as Table 7.1. A prioritized list of equipment that currently have code violations as defined by the National Electrical Code® will be included in Table 7.2. This table will also list all equipment graded D or F.

B. Determine if ground-fault protection exists where required by NFPA 70 Articles 215 and 517.

1. The National Electrical Code® requires ground-fault protection under Article 215, Paragraph 215.10 for “each feeder disconnect rated 1000 amperes or more and installed on solidly grounded wye electrical systems of more than 150 volts to ground, but not exceeding 600 volts phase-to-phase, shall be provided with ground-fault protection of equipment in accordance with the provisions of 230.95.” Paragraph 230.95 provides details regarding specific ratings and settings.

2. Each of the Loma Linda VAMC low voltage distribution systems have a service voltage of 480Y/277V. All of these services are rated at or above 1000 amperes and appear to be equipped with ground fault protection as required. The main breakers on each of the unit substation low voltage switchgears appear to be provided with ground fault. This will be confirmed throughout the station after the final site survey is completed.

In addition, NEC® 517.17 states that hospitals, buildings with critical care space, or buildings that support critical care space are required to install an additional step of ground fault protection downstream from a service or feeder disconnecting means which has ground fault protection as required by NEC®

230.95 or 215.10. Building 1 is the main hospital building, and has eight 480Y/277V services which fall under the requirements of Paragraph 517.17. The electrical services at the Loma Linda VAMC appear to be compliant with these requirements; a final determination will be made in a future submission.

There is a 2.0MW diesel generator which provides standby power to the south switchgear within the hospital. There is also a diesel generator plant (consisting of four 505kW machines) located outside of the Central Plant which provides standby and emergency power to each of the VAMC’s service bays. In our initial

Prepared for: Dept. of Veterans Affairs Section 7 Page 2 Prepared by: Wiley|Wilson observation, we believe that ground fault protection is properly applied on both of these systems. This will be confirmed in a future submission

For emergency sources, ground fault indication is required based on the same conditions as for normal sources, per NEC® 700.6(D). Ground fault indication for emergency system sources is required while ground fault protection is not, per NEC® 700.26. Prior to the release of the 2011 NEC®, Article 517.17 had prohibited the use of ground fault protection both between the on-site generating source and the essential electrical system transfer switch as well as anywhere on the load side of an essential electrical system transfer switch. In the 2011 NEC® this language was changed and now the only prohibition is against the use of ground fault protection on the load side of an essential electrical system transfer switch. This language remains unchanged in the 2014 NEC®.

This change would appear to indicate that if the size of an on-site generator output protective device is sufficiently large to require ground fault protection by virtue of Article 215.10, Article 700.26 dictates that indication be used, although protection is not prohibited. In a health care facility meeting the applicability standards of Article 517.17(A), an additional step of ground fault protection is now required on the essential electrical system so long as it remains on the line side of the transfer switch.

The intent of this Code language (along with the various changes) is, of course, to maximize the reliability of a medical center’s essential electrical system.

Ground faults are the most commonly occurring type of fault in electrical systems and the ability to better sectionalize (via selective coordination) a system as close to a fault as possible leads to smaller outages and less impact to medical operations.

Our understanding of these Code changes is that they were motivated by a desire to utilize ground fault protection on the essential electrical system (where it had been…