MIL-HDBK-516BChg1-TACC_Cklist-CertBasis-Amendment5.xlsx

Military Handbook Amendment 5 XLSX spreadsheet 690 KB Posted Apr 22, 2011

Attached to: Light Air Support (LAS) Aircraft
Solicitation number: FA8637-10-R-6000
Issued by: Department of the Air Force Materiel Command Lifecycle Management Center Wright Patterson Air Force Base

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MIL HDBK 516BChg1 TACC Cklist CertBasis (Amendment 5)

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11 government files on GovTribe name MIL-HDBK-516. Different revisions are separate documents; copies of this exact file point search engines to its first posting.

File	Revision	Posted	Attached to
PWS 2.0_jj_MIL-HDBK-516C.pdf	Rev. C	Dec 8, 2022	Contracted Air Services (CAS) Propeller Aircraft Services
MIL-HDBK-516C.pdf_safe.pdf	Rev. C	Nov 22, 2022	KC-135 Center Console Refresh (CCR)
MIL-HDBK-516C.pdf_safe.pdf	Rev. C	Nov 7, 2022	KC-135 Center Console Refresh (CCR)
MIL-HDBK-516C.pdf_safe.pdf	Rev. C	Aug 19, 2022	KC-135 Center Console Refresh (CCR)
MIL-HDBK-516C.pdf-safe.pdf	Rev. C	Aug 12, 2022	KC-135 Center Console Refresh (CCR)
Appendix_A__Proposed_Airworthiness_Bulletin_MILHDBK-516C_(Paragraph_9.1.1)_Revision.pdf	Rev. C	Nov 6, 2015	Advanced Pilot Training (APT) Family of Systems (FoS) program, commonly referred to as "T-X"
Section L - Attachment 14 MIL-HDBK-516B Change 1 - TACC Checklist.xls	Rev. B, Change 1	Oct 29, 2010	Light Air Support (LAS) Aircraft
Mil-HDBK-516B_Expanded.pdf	Rev. B	Oct 12, 2012	Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH)
Mil-HDBK-516B_Expanded.pdf	Rev. B	Sep 13, 2012	Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH)
43_-_AR_MACC_MIL-HDBK_516_Final.xlsx	Revision not stated	Dec 9, 2016	Advanced Pilot Training (APT) Family of Systems (FoS) program, commonly referred to as "T-X"

Who attaches MIL-HDBK-516

Agency	Files
Department of the Air Force Materiel Command Lifecycle Management Center Wright Patterson Air Force Base	6
Department of the Air Force Materiel Command Lifecycle Management Center Tinker Air Force Base	4
Department of the Navy Naval Air Systems Command Naval Air Warfare Center	1

Other files

File	Type	Posted
5_-_Section_L_-_FINAL_Attachment_5_SOO_for_AC_ _GTD_(Afghan_D.O.)_-_Amendment_0010.pdf	PDF	May 30, 2012
Section_J_-_FINAL_Attachment_34_Summary_Pricing_for_IDIQ_Contract_(29_May_2012)_-_Amendment_10.pdf	PDF	May 30, 2012
Amendment_10 1 .pdf	PDF	May 30, 2012
FA8637-10-R-6000-0009.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
Section_L_-_FINAL_Attachment_04_LAS_SOO_for_LAS_Aircraft_and_GTD_(Basic_Contract)_--_(18_May_2012)_-_Amendment_9.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
Section_L_-_FINAL_Attachment_05_SOO_for_AC_ _GTD_(Afghan_D.O.)_-_Amendment_0009.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
Section_L_-_FINAL_Attachment_10_PWS_for_Air_Advisor_Pre-Deployment_Pilot_Maintenance_Training_(18_May_12)_-_Amendment 9.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
(Section J Exhibit B-CDRL -B) Training CDRLs Final	—	May 21, 2012
(Section J Exhibit A-CDRL -A) Administrative CDRLs Final	—	May 21, 2012
Section L - FINAL Instructions to Offers Amendment 0009.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
Section_L_-_FINAL_Attachment_09_PWS_for_OCONUS_Contractor_Logistics_Support_(CLS)_for_GTDs_--_(18_May_2012)_-_Amendment_9.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
Section_J_-_FINAL_Attachment_34_Summary_Pricing_for_IDIQ_Contract_(18_May_2012)_-_Amendment_9.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
Section_L_-_FINAL_Attachment_07_PWS_for_CONUS_Stationed_LAS_Aircraft_ICS_--_(18_May_2012)_-_Amendment_9.pdf.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
Section L - Final Attachment 06 Model Delivery Order.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
FA8637-12-D-6002 21 May 2012.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
Section_L_-_FINAL_Attachment_08_PWS_for_OCONUS_Stationed_LAS_Aircraft_ICS_ _Maintenance_Training_--_(18_May_2012)_-_Amendment_9.pdf	PDF	May 21, 2012
(Section J Exhibit C-CDRL -C) Sustainment CDRLs Final	—	May 21, 2012
18 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 18 Past Performance Client Authorization Letter	—	May 4, 2012
04 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 4 LAS SOO for LAS Aircraft and GTD	—	May 4, 2012
24 - Section J - FINAL Attachment 24 DD254 - Amendment 8.pdf	PDF	May 4, 2012
34 - Section J - FINAL Attachment 34 Summary Pricing for IDIQ Contract	—	May 4, 2012
16 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 16 Past Performance Questionnaire	—	May 4, 2012
C - Section J - FINAL Exhibit C-CDRL - Sustainment CDRLs	—	May 4, 2012
00 - Section L - Instructions To Offerors	—	May 4, 2012
21 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 21 Evaluation Price	—	May 4, 2012
00 - Section M - Evaluation Factors for Award	—	May 4, 2012
29 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 29 Model Contract Clauses to be filled-in by Contractor	—	May 4, 2012
17 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 17 Past Performance Questionnaire Transmittal Letter	—	May 4, 2012
FA8637-10-R-6000 0008.pdf	PDF	May 4, 2012
FA8637-12-D-6002 LAS MODEL CONTRACT - As of Amendment 8.pdf	PDF	May 4, 2012
22 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 22 Sample Evaluation Price	—	May 4, 2012
15 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 15 Past Performance Facts Sheet	—	May 4, 2012
07 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 7 PWS for CONUS Stationed LAS Aircraft ICS --	—	May 4, 2012
23 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 23 CEO Certification	—	May 4, 2012
08 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 8 PWS for OCONUS Stationed LAS Aircraft ICS Maintenance Training --	—	May 4, 2012
01 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 1 LAS RFP Cross Reference Matrix	—	May 4, 2012
20 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 20_Evaluation Price	—	May 4, 2012
05 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 5 SOO for LAS Aircraft and GTDs	—	May 4, 2012
09 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 9 PWS for OCONUS Contractor Logistics Support	—	May 4, 2012
Amend 0008 Cover Letter.pdf	PDF	May 4, 2012
A - Section J - FINAL Exhibit A-CDRL- Administrative CDRLs	—	May 4, 2012
B - Section J - FINAL Exhibit B-CDRL - Training CDRLs	—	May 4, 2012
06 - Section L - FINAL Attachment 6 Model Delivery Order - Amendment 8.pdf	PDF	May 4, 2012
LAS Section M -- 09 June 11 - Amendment 7.pdf	PDF	Jun 17, 2011
Section L - Attachment 4 LAS SOO for LAS Aircraft and GTD	—	Jun 17, 2011
LAS Section L -- 09 June 11 - Amendment 7.pdf	PDF	Jun 17, 2011
FA8637-10-R-6000-0007.pdf	PDF	Jun 17, 2011
(Section J Exhibit B-CDRL-B) Training CDRL	—	Jun 17, 2011
Section L - Attachment 9 PWS for OCONUS Contractor Logistics Support	—	Apr 29, 2011
Section L - Attachment 7 Performance Work Statement	—	Apr 29, 2011

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Cover Page

System Information Tailored Airworthiness Certification Criteria (TACC) Checklist for the Light Air Support (LAS) Aircraft

Date: 14 Jan 2011

Version: LAS TACC CertBasis v1.0-14Jan11

Managing Office: ASC/WWYA

System Description:

The Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft is a non-developmental aircraft being procured for Building Partnership Capacities (BPC) air forces and USG agencies. The aircraft mission includes conducting advanced flight training, surveillance, air interdiction and close air support. The LAS aircraft shall be a single-engine turboprop fixed-wing aircraft with tricycle, retractable landing gear, tandem two-place pressurized cockpit with ejection seats, capable of operating from semi-prepared air fields and employing various munitions from NATO-compatible hard points. Ground training devices will be procured to support pilot training. Interim Contractor Support (ICS) will be required for all maintenance and supply requirements for the aircraft and associated support equipment for the first two years of LAS operations, with options for additional ICS as required.

Certification Basis:

The certification basis defined by this document was derived from MIL-HDBK-516B, Change 1, Airworthiness Certification Criteria, dated 29 Feb 2008. Aircraft certification shall be based on aircraft operation with weapons required to perform the LAS Combat Mission as described in the LAS System Requirements Document (SRD). For certification purposes, the LAS aircraft is not considered a commercial derivative. The LAS Airworthiness Plan has been developed by the LAS Program Office in coordination with the USAF ASC Engineering Directorite, as the USAF Airworthiness Authority. To support a USAF Military Type Certification (MTC), access to technical certification data (including required proprietary data), per DFAR clause 252.227-7013, will be provided for USAF review so that certification can be accomplished prior to Functional Configuration Audit (FCA) and Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) . FCA/PCA and Acceptance Flight Test are required before DD250 and Issuance of First Aircraft Airworthiness Letter.

Changes:

Changes to this document are denoted in green text.

4 Systems Eng

	ParaNum
(A)	Certification Criteria (MIL-HDBK-516BChg1)
(B)	Applicable (Y/N)
(C)	Rationale for Non-Applicable Criteria
(D)	Standard
(E)	Method of Compliance
(F)	Reference

(G)

4.0	SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
4.1	Design criteria.
4.1.1	Verify that the design criteria, including requirements and rules, adequately address safety for mission usage, full permissible flight envelope, duty cycle, interfaces, induced and natural environment, inspection capability, and maintenance philosophy.	Y
4.1.2	Verify that the design criteria address all components, system and subsystem interfaces, and software.	Y
4.1.3	Verify that, for commercial derivative air vehicles, the air vehicle's certification basis addresses all design criteria appropriate for the planned military usage.	N	Not Commercial Derivative A/C
4.1.4	Verify that failure conditions have been adequately addressed in the design criteria.	Y
4.2	Tools and databases.
4.2.1	Verify that all tools, methods, and databases used in the requirements definition/allocation, design, risk control and assessments of safety have been adequately validated and/or certified.	Y
4.3	Materials selection.
4.3.1	Verify that the material selection process uses validated and consistent material properties data, including design mechanical and physical properties such as material defects, and corrosion and environmental protection requirements. (For Navy aircraft, see section 19, Materials)	Y
4.4	Manufacturing and quality.
4.4.1	Verify that key product characteristics have been identified.	Y
4.4.2	Verify that all critical process capabilities exist to meet key product characteristic requirements.	Y
4.4.3	Verify that all critical process controls exist to assure key product characteristic requirements are met.	Y
4.4.4	Verify that production allowances and tolerances are within acceptable limits and assure conformance to design.	Y
4.4.5	Verify that nondestructive inspection (NDI) accept/reject criteria have been validated.	Y
4.5	Operator's and maintenance manuals/technical orders.
4.5.1	Verify that processes are in place to identify and document all restrictions, warnings, and cautions.	Y
4.5.2	Verify that processes are in place to identify and document the technical data, and that the technical data reflects the defined functional and product baseline.	Y
4.5.3	Verify that procedures are in place for establishing and maintaining flight vehicle integrity.	Y
4.6	Configuration identification.
4.6.1	Verify that the functional baseline is properly documented, established, and brought under configuration control.	Y
4.6.2	Verify that the product baseline is properly documented, established, and brought under configuration control.	Y
4.7	Configuration status accounting.
4.7.1	Verify that the configuration status accounting (CSA) information system has the capability to track the configuration of safety-critical items.	Y

&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14Section 4.0 Systems Engineering

&"Arial,Italic"&9MIL-HDBK-516A 20 January 2004 &"Arial,Bold Italic"&12MQ-1L (Predator) &"Arial,Italic"&8Page &P

5 Structures

	ParaNum
(A)	Certification Criteria (MIL-HDBK-516BChg1)
(B)	Applicable (Y/N)
(C)	Rationale for Non-Applicable Criteria
(D)	Standard
(E)	Method of Compliance
(F)	Reference

(G)

5.0	STRUCTURES
5.1	Loads
5.1.1	Verify that the limit loads used in the design of the aircraft include the maximum and most critical combination of loads that can result from authorized ground and flight loading conditions for the air vehicle. These include loads during piloted or autonomous maneuvers, loss of control maneuvers, gusts, turbulence, take-off, landing, catapult (if applicable), shipboard and land based arrestments (if applicable), ground operations, maintenance activity, systems failures from which recovery is expected, and loads expected to be seen throughout the specific lifetime of usage.	Y
5.1.2	Verify that the ultimate loads used in the design of the airframe are obtained by multiplication of limit loads by the appropriate factor of safety, or in the case of crash conditions, the ultimate loads are obtained by applying the appropriate crash load factors sufficient to prevent injury to occupants and to maintain the integrity of egress paths.	Y
5.1.3	Verify the design service loads spectra include all sources of repeated loads.	Y
5.1.4	Verify that loads used in the design of the airframe include loads due to foreign object damage (FOD) from birds, hail, runway, taxiway, and ramp debris.	Y
5.1.5	Verify that the airframe is designed such that ultimate loads are obtained by multiplication of limit loads by the appropriate factors of safety. Also verify that the ultimate loads are used in the design of elements of the airframe subject to a deterministic design approach.	Y
5.1.6	Verify that the airframe is designed such that all sources of repeated loads are considered and included in the development of the service loads spectra and do not detract from the airframe service life.	Y
5.1.7	Verify that the airframe is designed such that the power or thrust of the installed propulsion system is commensurate with the ground and flight conditions of intended use, including system failures, and the capabilities of the propulsion system and crew.	Y
5.1.8	Verify, in the generation of loads, that flight control and automatic control devices, including load alleviation and ride control devices, are to be in all modes (operative, inoperative, and transient) for which use is required. This includes use due to, or likely due to single or multiple system failure conditions.	Y
5.1.9	Verify that flight loading conditions are based upon essentially realistic, physically achievable conditions of airframe response to pilot induced or autonomous maneuvers, loss of control maneuvers, gusts, and turbulence. Also verify that the realistic conditions considered are both required and expected to be encountered critical combinations of configurations, gross weights, centers of gravity, thrust or power, altitudes, speeds, and type of atmosphere and are used in the design of the airframe.	Y
5.1.10	Verify that the airframe is designed for ground loading conditions which reflect ground and maintenance operations.	Y
5.1.11	Verify that in the generation of loads the airframe is able to withstand crashes and to protect personnel to the extent reflected by the ultimate loading conditions and parameters.	Y
5.2	Structural dynamics
5.2.1	Verify that the air vehicle, in all configurations including store carriage and system failures, is free from flutter, whirl flutter, divergence, and other related aeroelastic or aeroservoelastic instabilities, including transonic aeroelastic instabilities, for all combinations of altitude and speed encompassed by the limit speed (VL/ML) versus altitude envelope enlarged at all points by the airspeed margin of safety. Also, verify that all aerodynamic surfaces and components of the air vehicle are free from aeroelastic divergence and that the inlet, transparency, and other aerodynamically loaded panels are designed to prevent flutter and limited amplitude oscillations when exposed to high transonic or supersonic flow.	Y
5.2.2	Verify that the control surfaces and tabs contain sufficient static and dynamic mass balance, or sufficient bending, torsional, and rotational rigidity; or a combination of these means to prevent flutter; or limited-amplitude instabilities of all critical modes under all flight conditions for normal and failure operating conditions of the actuating systems. Verify that all control surfaces and parts thereof are free from single-degree-of-freedom flutter, such as buzz. Also verify that all other air vehicle components exposed to the airstream, such as spoilers, dive brakes, scoops, landing gear doors, weapon bay doors, ventral fins, movable inlet ramps, movable fairings, and blade antennae are free from aeroelastic instability.	Y
5.2.3	Verify that the airframe structure (including cavities), equipment, and equipment provisions withstand the aeroacoustic loads and vibrations induced by the aeroacoustic environment for the air vehicle specified service life and usage without cracking or functional impairment.	Y
5.2.4	Verify that sound pressure levels in areas of the air vehicle occupied by personnel during flight are controlled as required by human factors requirements.	Y
5.2.5	Verify that the airframe is designed such that it can operate in the vibration environments induced by the operational use for the specified service life. Also verify that the airframe is designed such that no fatigue cracking or excessive vibration of the airframe structure or components occurs that would result in the air vehicle or the components of the air vehicle systems not being fully functional.	Y
5.2.6	Verify that equipment and structure behind and near vents and louvers are designed for the effects of flow through the vents and louvers during conditions of normal and reverse flows.	Y
5.3	Strength
5.3.1	Verify the sufficient static strength is provided to react all design loading conditions without yielding and detrimental deformations (including delamination) at 115 percent of limit loads, unless higher loads are specified, without structural failure at ultimate loads, and when applicable, without detrimental deformations resulting from the application of Navy design landing loads. Verify sufficient strength for operations, maintenance functions, occurrences of system failures, and any tests that simulate load conditions. This includes modifications, new or revised equipment installations, major repairs, extensive reworks, extensive refurbishment, or remanufacture.	Y	Exclusion: No Navy design landing loads have been identified.
5.3.2	Verify that the allowables for materials are derived using statistical compensations appropriate to part criticality and the nature of the material; are established considering component and assembly variability, the expected environmental extremes, fabrication processes, repair techniques, and quality assurance procedures; and are validated. Verify that conditions and properties associated with material repairs satisfy design requirements.	Y
5.3.3	Verify that stresses and strains in structural members are controlled through proper sizing, detail design, and materials selection. Verify that for all limit, design (including the Navy design landing condition, where applicable), and ultimate loads are reacted resulting in zero or positive margins of safety for all configurations within allowable operating conditions (including probable failure and defined emergency conditions).	Y	Exclusion: No Navy design landing loads have been identified.
5.4	Damage tolerance and durability (fatigue).
5.4.1	Verify that all safety-of-flight (SOF) structure, including dynamic components, have adequate safe life or damage tolerance capability (depending on certification authority).for the required service life.	Y
5.4.2	Verify the airframe structure has sufficient durability to preclude adverse safety, economic, operational, maintenance, repair, or modification cost impacts throughout its intended service life.	Y
5.4.3	Verify that a durability and damage tolerance control process is established and implemented in the engineering design and manufacturing process.	Y
5.4.4	Verify that corrosion prevention systems remain effective during the service life. Specific corrosion prevention and control measures, procedures, and processes are to be identified and established commensurate with the operational and maintenance capability required of the airframe.	Y
5.5	Mass properties
5.5.1	Verify that the mass properties fully support safe vehicle operations for all defined mission requirements, variation in useful load, basing/deployment concepts, interfaces, and necessary maintenance.	Y
5.5.2	Verify that center of gravity margins are properly defined to handle aerodynamic, center of gravity, and inertia changes resulting from fuel usage, store expenditure, asymmetric fuel and store loading, fuel migration at high angle of attack and roll rates, and aerial refueling, and release of external sling loads, and air drop of internal cargo.	Y
5.5.3	Verify that flight and maintenance manuals are consistent and contain all required checklists and loading data necessary to conduct required weight and balance checks while complying with specific weight and balance requirements.	Y
5.6	Flight release
5.6.1	Verify that the flight release is based on up-to-date design criteria and mass properties, and the completion of all required analyses; laboratory, ground, and flight tests relating to loads, strength, durability, damage tolerance, structural dynamics, and stiffness; and verify that the structural data generated by the required analysis and test substantiates the integrity and flight worthiness of the design.	Y

&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14Section 5.0 Structures

&"Arial,Italic"&9MIL-HDBK-516A 20 January 2004 &"Arial,Bold Italic"&12MQ-1L (Predator) &"Arial,Italic"&8Page &P

6 Flight Tech

	ParaNum
(A)	Certification Criteria (MIL-HDBK-516BChg1)
(B)	Applicable (Y/N)
(C)	Rationale for Non-Applicable Criteria
(D)	Standard
(E)	Method of Compliance
(F)	Reference

(G)

6.0	FLIGHT TECHNOLOGY
6.1	Stability and control.
6.1.1	Control power.
6.1.1.1	Verify control power:	Y	Except where noted.
6.1.1.1.a	At minimum controllable speeds	Y
6.1.1.1.b	For rotation on takeoff	Y
6.1.1.1.c	To handle control surface mis-trim on takeoff	Y
6.1.1.1.d	To prevent or stop over-rotation in takeoff	Y
6.1.1.1.e	To provide safe control for go-around with engine(s) failure (critical engine(s) inoperative)	Y
6.1.1.1.f	To provide safe maneuver margins during trimmed flight on approach	Y
6.1.1.1.g	For sufficient trim capability	Y
6.1.1.1.h	To provide safe control margins in the event of abnormal or asymmetric fuel function operation	Y
6.1.1.1.i	To safely handle transient effects	Y
6.1.1.1.j	To safely handle problems arising from asymmetric or symmetric failures of trim controls and any adverse control surface positioning or special use surface(s)/devices	Y
6.1.1.1.k	To safely handle unwanted deployment or activation of thrust reverser or vectored thrust equipment whenever the possibility is not extremely improbable	N	No requirement for thrust reverser or vectored thrust equipment.
6.1.1.1.l	Sufficient for unique vehicle performance	Y
6.1.1.1.m	To safely handle engine failures during take-off ground roll	Y
6.1.2	Stability characteristics and transients.
6.1.2.1	Verify that safe static and dynamic stability exists with augmentation or active control functions operating. If sufficient redundancy is not provided in the air vehicle flight control functions to provide fail-safe operation, verify that the basic airframe (unaugmented) possesses the required stability characteristics and safety margins.	Y
6.1.2.2	Verify that augmentation function(s), active control function(s), and related flight mode(s) engagements and disengagements do not result in unsafe transients.	Y
6.1.2.3	For autonomous vehicle control, verify that the net stability, with the guidance and control system operating, is safe for the intended mission under normal operating conditions.	N	No requirement for autonomous flight.
6.1.3	Flying, handling, and ride qualities.
6.1.3.1	Verify safe flying quality characteristics in turbulence (including ship's airwake/burble).	Y
6.1.3.2	Verify that the control law concepts employed are compatible with mission and safety requirements.	Y
6.1.3.3	Verify that the design exhibits safe vehicle flying characteristics for:	Y
6.1.3.3.a	Classical, safe, second-order response in pitch	Y
6.1.3.3.b	First-order, well-behaved response in roll without roll ratcheting or other roll sensitivities	Y
6.1.3.3.c	Equivalent system time delay	Y
6.1.3.4	Verify that aeroelastic, nonlinear, discontinuous, and unsteady aerodynamic effects demonstrate a safe vehicle.	Y
6.1.3.5	Verify that aircraft pilot coupling (APC) and pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) tendencies and flight characteristics are safe.	Y
6.1.3.5.1	Verify safe phase and gain margins.	Y
6.1.3.5.2	Verify, under high gain conditions, that the design does not exhibit unsafe limit cycle oscillations, unbounded oscillations, unsafe triggering mechanisms during mode transitions, or unsafe sudden/steep gain changes.	Y
6.1.3.6	Verify general ground handling characteristics to be safe for:	Y
6.1.3.6.a	Positive steering control	Y
6.1.3.6.b	Steering sensitivities	Y
6.1.3.6.c	Steering fade in/out	Y
6.1.3.6.d	Failure conditions	Y
6.1.3.6.e	Ground control paths	Y
6.1.3.7	Verify safe aerodynamic/flight characteristics for	Y
6.1.3.7.a	High angle of attack	Y
6.1.3.7.b	Pitch-up tendencies	Y
6.1.3.7.c	Recovery from stall angles of attack	Y
6.1.3.7.d	Post-stall maneuvering/control	Y
6.1.3.7.e	Recovery from the loss of control during accelerated/nonaccelerated flight	Y
6.1.3.7.f	Recovery from buffet effects	Y
6.1.3.7.g	Normal and abnormal effects of secondary/infrequently used control surfaces/devices	Y
6.1.3.7.h	High slip angles	Y
6.1.3.7.i	Large and unusual attitudes	Y
6.1.3.7.j	Spin recovery	Y
6.1.3.8	Verify hinge moment characteristics are adequate to satisfy safety requirements.	Y
6.1.3.9	Verify safe stability and control dynamics under symmetrical and asymmetrical maneuvers, with and without stores, for:	Y
6.1.3.9.a	Control surface float angles	Y
6.1.3.9.b	Control surface blow-back	Y
6.1.3.9.c	Control surface nonlinearities	Y
6.1.3.9.d	The vehicle control system or actuation functions to overcome actual moments	Y
6.1.3.9.e	Establishing levels of flying qualities for the vehicle	Y
6.1.3.9.f	Control surface hinge moment limiting	Y
6.1.3.10	Verify that the stability and control effects of basic design features, as well as unique features, are safe in the entire flight envelope(s).	Y
6.1.3.11	Verify all rate-limiting functions of the control function are safe to fly under flight scenarios employing all types of gain changes.	Y
6.1.4	Mission evaluations including flight path guidance.
6.1.4.1	Verify that the air vehicle responds safely in all axes to commands coming from the flight path guidance devices and processors.	Y
6.1.4.2	Verify that flight path guidance systems safely compensate for degraded modes/failures of operation.	Y
6.1.4.3	Verify that all transitions to and from normal flight path guidance modes, whether augmented or manually selected, are safe.	Y
6.1.5	Other effects.
6.1.5.1	Verify that no unsafe roll-yaw-pitch coupling(s) occur due to aerodynamic, kinematic, or inertial effects.	Y
6.1.5.2	Verify that no unsafe roll-yaw-pitch coupling(s) occur due to engine coupling for symmetrical or asymmetrical thrust and gyroscopic effects.	Y
6.1.5.3	Verify that stall or loss of control warning function(s) and limiting and prevention functions to be safe for all required combinations of maneuver configurations, flight conditions, and loadings.	Y
6.1.5.4	Verify that "WRONG CONFIGURATION" warning functions are safe in all flight regimes. These include wing sweep, flap and landing gear position, and other variable geometry features.	Y
6.1.5.5	Verify that flying quality nonlinear effects are safe when these effects or characteristics influence the vehicle characteristics including degradation and retention of critical pilot vehicle interface (PVI) and vehicle control functions (VCF) due to failures.	Y
6.1.5.6	Verify adequate actuator dynamics for a safe vehicle.	Y
6.1.5.7	Verify sensor dynamic characteristics for a safe vehicle.	Y
6.1.5.8	Verify adequate cockpit control dynamics for a safe vehicle.	Y
6.1.5.9	Verify safe failure mode effects with operator-in-the-loop.	Y
6.1.5.10	Verify that control gradient forces are safe for the entire range of applications.	Y
6.1.5.11	Verify safe, unimpeded crew visual characteristics for all flight and ground conditions.	Y
6.1.5.12	Verify that proposed ship launch/recovery wind envelopes and ship pitch and roll limits are safe.	N	No requirement for ship launch and recovery.
6.1.5.13	Verify that the control tasks and workload levels associated with flight profiles are safe.	Y
6.1.5.14	Verify that handling qualities with backup power sources are safe.	Y
6.1.6	Envelopes.
6.1.6.1	Verify that stability and response characteristics are safe for the anticipated critical flight conditions for the entire ground and flight envelopes.	Y
6.1.6.2	Verify that the air data function is safe.	Y
6.1.6.3	Verify that the flight-critical parameters list for completeness.	Y
6.1.6.4	Verify that the flight manual, and any supplements containing the air vehicle/engine operating limits, adequately describes the air vehicle's:	Y
6.1.6.4.a	Performance	Y
6.1.6.4.b	Flight characteristics under normal and emergency conditions	Y
6.1.6.4.c	Control functions under normal and emergency conditions	Y
6.1.6.4.d	Other critical limits to ensure safe flight.	Y
6.1.7	Store carriage and separation.
6.1.7.1	Verify that store carriage and separation response characteristics and limitations are safe.	Y
6.1.7.2	Verify that existing stores are safe for use in the intended envelope and environment.	Y
6.1.7.3	Verify the safety and envelope of intentional and unintentional asymmetric stores combinations.	Y
6.1.8	Validation of modeling, simulation and analysis tools
6.2	Vehicle control functions (VCF).
6.2.1	VCF architecture design.
6.2.1.1	Verify the functional criteria to be safe.	Y
6.2.1.2	Verify the VCF high-level architecture function to be safe for the supporting control function.	Y
6.2.1.3	Verify that the integrated VCF architecture safely implements the proper levels of redundancy, fault tolerance, physical/functional separation of flight/safety-critical functions/components and other aspects.	Y
6.2.1.4	Verify the autonomy of each function integrated in or by the VCF design to be safe.	Y
6.2.1.5	Verify that failure mode effects are safe for the entire VCF operation.	Y
6.2.1.6	Verify that special failure states of single fail, dual fail, and special single fail/combination failure(s), as well as order of failure(s), are safe.	Y
6.2.2	Basic VCF.
6.2.2.1	Verify that the VCF which transmit crew control commands or generate and/or convey commands are safely implemented for the entire range of vehicle and crew responses.	Y
6.2.2.2	Verify that functional characteristics of friction levels, breakout forces, dead zones, hysteresis, and backlash are safe.	Y
6.2.2.3	Verify that longitudinal, lateral-directional, lift, drag, performance limiting, and variable geometry control functions are safely mechanized.	Y
6.2.2.4	Verify that the vehicle control system is safely able to obtain the maximum required control surface positions without mechanical interference.	Y
6.2.2.5	Verify actuation for surface rate and hinge moments under normal conditions and capability under blowback conditions to be safe.	Y
6.2.2.6	Verify that the cockpit control forces are safe for any control mechanization.	Y
6.2.2.7	Verify that functional control nonlinearities are safe.	Y
6.2.2.8	Verify that trim ranges and rates are safe.	Y
6.2.2.9	Verify that trim failure protection is safe.	Y
6.2.2.10	Verify that control devices in normal and failed states intended for intermittent operation are safe (e.g., flaps, speed brakes, geometry mechanisms, auxiliary control devices).	Y
6.2.2.11	Verify that safety protection functions/devices are safely implemented.	Y
6.2.2.12	Verify that alternate control paths available for each control axis or mode are safe.	Y
6.2.2.13	Verify that ratio changers and artificial feel devices with proper protection are safely implemented.	Y
6.2.2.14	Verify that no single, like dual, second, or single combination failure points in any VCF function result in an unacceptable probability of loss of function.	Y
6.2.2.15	Verify that the VCF components meet safety requirements.	Y
6.2.2.16	Verify that no unsafe mechanical interference or jamming situations exist in VCF mechanization.	Y
6.2.2.17	Verify that the clearances available safely tolerate foreign object damage (FOD).	Y
6.2.2.18	Verify that control laws are safe for the normal intended application.	Y
6.2.2.19	Verify that control laws transients for gain and mode changes prevent unsafe flight conditions.	Y
6.2.2.20	Verify that control laws do not induce any kind of unsafe oscillatory effects.	Y
6.2.2.21	Verify that control laws do not have unsafe PIO tendencies.	Y
6.2.2.22	Verify that control laws redundancy and failure management designs are safely implemented.	Y
6.2.2.23	Verify that control laws sensitivity margins and phase and gain margins for each feedback loop are safe (see 6.1).	Y
6.2.2.24	Verify that functional command control authority limits are safe.	Y
6.2.2.25	Verify that dynamic VCF functional performance is safe.	Y
6.2.2.26	Verify that the vehicle provides the crew with the capability to override the design-limited vehicle control functions safely.	Y
6.2.2.27	Verify that nonoperative devices/programs can be safely locked out of any functions.	Y
6.2.2.28	Verify that engage/disengage functions/devices are safely assigned and identified for the crew.	Y
6.2.2.29	Verify that interlocks safely preclude incompatible modes, simultaneous engagement, and engagement with incompatible flight conditions or air vehicle configurations.	Y
6.2.2.30	Verify that engage and disengage transient times are safe.	Y
6.2.2.31	Verify that mode change transient times are safe.	Y
6.2.2.32	Verify that warning and caution functions safely operate and properly notify the crew.	Y
6.2.2.33	Verify that sensors are safely located to minimize/avoid structural mode coupling including vibration from configuration loading and gun fire, and to have safe sensitivity margins.	Y
6.2.2.34	Verify that sensitivities with variations in slope and bias conditions of air data functions have safe margins.	Y
6.2.2.35	Verify that the processor design of VCF is safe.	Y
6.2.2.36	Verify that preflight checklists of VCF are all-inclusive and safe.	Y
6.2.2.37	Verify that interfaces/integration with other functions and sub-functions are safe.	Y
6.2.2.38	Verify the effects of loss of function(s) on safety.	Y
6.2.2.39	Verify that any functional modes do not defeat any limiters designed for vehicle safety.	Y
6.2.2.40	Verify that data transfer and update rates are safe with adequate margins.	Y
6.2.2.41	Verify that air vehicle functional/transient interruption characteristics are safe.	Y
6.2.2.42	Verify that failure mode effects for critical maneuvers and critical flight regions are safe.	Y
6.2.2.43	Verify that flow rates for hinge moment, stiffness, and control surface rates are safe.	Y
6.2.2.44	Verify that the actuator design meets safety requirements for	Y
6.2.2.44.a	Actuator redundancy techniques	Y
6.2.2.44.b	Failure isolation design capability and limitations	Y
6.2.2.44.c	Hydraulic contamination effects	Y
6.2.2.44.d	Bottoming and snubbing	Y
6.2.2.45	Verify that the actuation system is safe (e.g., burst pressure, normal performance, high and low temperature, pressure impulses).	Y
6.2.2.46	Verify that motor/torque tube driven and similar control actuation mechanisms are safe (e.g., performance, implementation, redundancy management).	Y
6.2.2.47	Verify that command and control communications on the vehicle, other linked vehicles, and ground control are integrated safely with an acceptable probability of failure.	Y
6.2.2.48	Verify that all command and control communications are secure against unwanted intrusions and security techniques used are implemented safely.	Y
6.2.2.49	Verify that single space radiation upset events do not cause loss of control and that the probability of encountering multiple upsets producing loss of control is acceptably low.	Y
6.2.2.50	Verify that propulsion control integration, control mechanisms, feedback loops, automatic throttle control systems, asymmetric thrust controlling conditions, special thrust control use conditions, atmospherics and hypersonic effects on thrust control are safe.	Y
6.2.2.51	Verify that VCF primary and integrated control function(s) security design is implemented safely.	Y
6.2.2.52	Verify that air data is safe for the following:	Y
6.2.2.52.a	Implementation	Y
6.2.2.52.b	Accuracy	Y
6.2.2.52.c	Ground and air safety provisions	Y
6.2.2.52.d	Anti-ice or ice prevention	Y
6.2.2.52.e	Bird strike vulnerability	Y
6.2.2.53	Verify that the environmental design and the equipment installation are safe.	Y
6.2.2.54	Verify that vehicle control, payload, and ground system latencies and synchronizations are safe for mission accomplishment.	Y
6.2.2.55	Verify that emergency procedures are appropriate and safe for the emergency that they address.	Y
6.2.2.56	Verify, for rotary wing air vehicles, adequate transient response for single axis (collective or pedal) inputs.	N	Not a rotary wing aircraft.
6.2.2.57	Verify that multi-axis inputs (e.g., collective, pedal, and cyclic) are safe during typical operational mission maneuvers.	N	Not a rotary wing aircraft.
6.2.3	VCF power source criteria.

(Note: See section 12 for specific electrical power system criteria.)

6.2.3.1	Verify that hydraulic distribution has no single failure points resulting in loss of more than one hydraulic function.	Y
6.2.3.2	Verify that hydraulic function dynamics do not have any unsafe pressure pulsating or resonant conditions.	Y
6.2.3.3	Verify that backup and emergency hydraulic power function(s) do not have any unsafe effects from reduced flow rates or pressure or flutter margin.	Y
6.2.3.4	Verify that any VCF flight limitations with emergency/backup hydraulic power and switchover time constants are safe.	Y
6.2.3.5	Verify that VCF effects due to loss of each or part of each hydraulic function are safe. (See 8.1 for specific criteria.)	Y
6.2.3.6	Verify that electrical power normal/backup/emergency capability following loss of engine(s) and generator(s) for VCF is safe.	Y
6.2.3.7	Verify that independent electrical power sources provide safe redundancy for VCF.	Y
6.2.3.8	Verify that electrical power transients, both normal and switchover, are safe.	Y
6.2.3.9	Verify that, if batteries are employed for SOF backup power, adequate charging methods and checks are provided and installation provisions for all batteries are safe.	Y
6.2.3.10	Verify that electrical power bus separation for prevention of single failure points is safe.	Y
6.2.3.11	Verify that effects of normal, abnormal, and failure modes of the electrical power function are safe for VCF.	Y
6.2.3.12	Verify that direct, uninterruptible, quality electrical power implementation for VCF is safe.	Y
6.2.4	Flight worthiness evaluations.
6.2.4.1	Verify that flight-critical components meet safety criteria.	Y
6.2.4.2	Verify that all single point failures are identified with the associated probability of failure(s) and that they demonstrate an acceptable flight safety risk.	Y
6.2.4.3	Verify that transient effects of failures impacting controllability or structure do not have any safety impacts to the vehicle or crew.	Y
6.2.4.4	Verify that the VCF can safely recover the air vehicle under worst-case flight envelope and engine failure conditions and identify any flight limitations in the flight manual.	Y
6.2.4.5	Verify that undetected, latent, or unannounced failures do not result in unacceptable flying qualities.	Y
6.2.4.6	Verify that no unsafe handling characteristics are exhibited in critical flight phases for aerodynamic and air data uncertainty sensitivity studies/analyses.	Y
6.2.4.7	Verify that vehicle control's and payload system's latency and synchronization responses are safe.	Y
6.2.5	VCF software.

(Note: VCF software verification is accomplished under section 15.)

6.2.5.1	Verify the safe operation of each computer software configuration item (CSCI)/operational flight program (OFP) from unit to full flight program levels for all modes, inputs, failure detection, reconfiguration techniques, self-check operations, interfaces, and integration under all dynamic conditions.	Y
6.2.5.2	Verify that the flight software version demonstrates acceptable performance and safety.	Y
6.2.5.3	Verify that critical control modes in all flight conditions are safe.	Y
6.2.5.4	Verify that single-point or probable multiple failures that can paralyze redundant controlling functions are within the required safety probabilities.	Y
6.2.5.5	Verify that software compatibility with external, integrating software functions is safe.	Y
6.2.5.6	Verify that effects of the following are safe:	Y
6.2.5.6.a	Software interrupts	Y
6.2.5.6.b	Reinitialization	Y
6.2.5.6.c	Resynchronization	Y
6.2.5.6.d	Recheck	Y
6.2.5.6.e	Reconfiguration	Y
6.2.5.6.f	Restarts	Y
6.2.5.6.g	Resets	Y
6.2.5.6.h	Negation of environmental and generic error	Y
6.2.5.7	Verify that software design of self-check, failure monitoring, redundancy management, reconfiguration, voting, transient suppression, overflow protection, anti-aliasing, saturation, interlocks, memory protection, failure propagation, and other techniques prevent unsafe flight situations.	Y
6.2.5.8	Verify that built-in-test implementation operates failure free and safely identifies, isolates, and corrects malfunctions.	Y
6.2.5.9	Verify that security design of VCF software loading techniques is safe.	Y
6.3	Aerodynamics and performance.
6.3.1	Flight vehicle.
6.3.1.1	Verify that the air vehicle can be recovered safely over the entire flight envelope in the presence of malfunctions.	Y
6.3.1.2	Verify that safe takeoff, landing, and critical field length performance are safe for the intended atmospheric conditions.	Y
6.3.1.3	Verify that engine(s) inoperative performance (if appropriate) is safe, including optimum speeds for energy management and possible autorotation.	Y
6.3.1.4	Verify that the flight manual data limits for takeoff, landing, hover, climb, maneuver, cruise, descent, emergency conditions, including height/velocity diagrams for rotary wing air vehicles, and any other critical factors, are adequate to conduct safe flights.	Y
6.3.1.5	Verify that store carriage and separation characteristics for the prescribed stores are safe.	Y
6.3.1.6	Verify that flight manual specified performance or other predictions of power available, power required, fuel flow, ground effect, engine out and autorotation performance are sufficiently accurate to assure safe conduct of flight operations throughout the range of gross weights and ambient conditions.	Y
6.3.2	Installed propulsion capability.
6.3.2.1	Verify that airframe/inlet/engine compatibility evaluations are adequate for safe operation (see Section 7).	Y
6.3.2.2	Verify safe operation for the following:	Y
6.3.2.2.a	Engine steady and transient response characteristics of the engine and engine control system (see 7.2.4.1.3 and 7.2.4.1.5)	Y
6.3.2.2.b	Fuel flow modulation (see 7.2.2.2 and 7.2.4.1)	Y
6.3.2.2.c	Engine responses to input signals at different frequencies (see 7.2.4.1)	Y
6.3.2.2.d	Engine control and vehicle control system communication (see 7.2.4.1.1)	Y
6.3.2.2.e	Fuel, air induction, exhaust and bleed air extraction systems, ambient temperatures, ambient pressures, and vibratory environment (see 7.2.5.2.2, 7.2.5.2.3, 7.2.5.3, 7.2.5.4, and 7.2.5.5)	Y
6.3.2.2.f	Sensitivity, stability, control response, and torque predictability for engine and vehicle control during engine power changes (acceleration and deceleration) (see 7.2.2.2, 7.2.4.1.3, and 7.2.4.1.5)	Y
6.3.2.2.g	Auxiliary engine control functions (see 7.2.4.1.3 and 7.2.4.1.4)	Y
6.3.2.2.h	Altitude cold start and hot restart capability (see 7.2.2.3 and 7.2.2.4).	Y
6.3.2.3	Verify that engine performance restrictions resulting from thermal boundaries (reflected in the proper databases and manuals) are safe (see 7.1.4).	Y
6.3.2.4	Verify that inlet buzz boundaries and flight limitations are well defined (see 7.1.4).	Y
6.3.2.5	Verify that there are no severe performance impacts due to flow disturbance and blockage items. Also ensure that these items are safely implemented and located, especially ahead of or near the inlets.	Y

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File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated Nov 14, 2017.