SSP_50062.pdf

SSP 50062

NASA/CSA Bilateral Safety And Mission Assurance Requirements

Canadian Space Agency Space Station Program

March, 1995

Canadian Space Agency

Agence spatiale canadienne

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Space Station Alpha Program Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas

REVISION AND HISTORY PAGE

REV. DESCRIPTION

PUB.

DATEAPPROVAL

A. Poirier– Initial Release (Reference SSCBD 000204, Eff. 07–27–95) 07–24–96 iii

SPACE STATION PROGRAM

NASA/CSA BILATERAL SAFETY AND

MISSION ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

March 1995

LIST OF CHANGES

March,1995

None First Issue iv

NASA/CSA BILATERAL

PRODUCT AND MISSION ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

MARCH 1995

v

PREFACE

The CSA/NASA Bilateral Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements document is a joint National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Canadian Space Agency (CSA) document which describes all safety and mission assurance requirements applicable to the Canadian Space Station Program (CSSP).

The contents of this document are derived from the baseline agreed between NASA/CSA at the S.S. Freedom program managers meeting on November 15th, 1993 at St Hubert PQ, Canada.. The components of that baseline have been incorporated into one document and include Bilateral agreements in Materials and Processes and Safety Analysis reached under the ”meets or exceeds” process.

The Safety and Mission Assurance document is controlled through approval signatures, by the NASA Space Station Program Director and the CSA Program /Manager (MSS Director). Changes to this document are approved by NASA and CSA Program Managers at either Space Station Control Boards, or at NASA/CSA Bilateral Reviews.

All changes require the written approval of both NASA and CSA Program Managers.

After initial joint approval, NASA will maintain this S&MA document including the incorporation of approved changes.

R. H. Brinkley /s/ Alain Poirier4/24/96 Apr–18–96

R.H. Brinkley, Date Alain Poirier, Date Manager, Director General Space Station Program Space Station Program Office vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARAGRAPH PAGE

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1–1

1.1 PURPOSE 1–1

1.2 SCOPE 1–1

1.3 MANAGEMENT APPROACH 1–1

1.4 RELATION TO OTHER PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 1–2

1.5 MOTIVATION 1–2

1.6 INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS FOR NASA OR THE 1–2

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

1.7 DATA REQUIREMENT (DR) DESCRIPTIONS 1–2

1.8 SAFETY AND PRODUCT ASSURANCE DATA BASE 1–2

1.9 MILESTONE REVIEWS 1–3

2.0 SAFETY 2–1

2.1 SAFETY MANAGEMENT 2–1

2.1.1 SAFETY APPROACH 2–1

2.1.2 ORGANIZATION 2–1

2.1.3 SAFETY PLAN 2–1

2.1.4 SAFETY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS 2–2

2.1.8 MISHAP REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION 2–3

2.1.9 SAFETY TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION 2–3

2.1.10 WAIVERS AND DEVIATIONS 2–3

2.2 SYSTEM SAFETY 2–3

2.2.1 SYSTEM SAFETY OBJECTIVES 2–3

2.2.2 SYSTEM SAFETY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS 2–4

2.2.3 SAFETY ANALYSES 2–4

2.2.4 HAZARD ELIMINATION AND CONTROL 2–5

2.2.5 HAZARD REPORT CLOSURE CRITERIA 2–5

2.2.6 HUMAN ENGINEERING 2–6

2.2.7 SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES REVIEW 2–6

2.2.8 NASA OR CSA FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE) SAFETY 2–6

2.2.9 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) SAFETY 2–6

2.2.10 REVIEW OF CHANGES 2–6

2.2.11 REVIEW OF FLIGHT AND GROUND HARDWARE FAILURES 2–7

2.2.12 EVALUATION OF GROUND AND FLIGHT TEST RESULTS 2–7

2.2.13 EVALUATION OF MISSION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY 2–7

2.3 INDUSTIAL SAFETY 2–7

2.3.1 GROUND OPERATIONS SAFETY 2–7

2.4 TEST OPERATIONS SAFETY 2–8

2.4.1 EVALUATION OF SAFETY MARGINS 2–8

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2.4.2 TESTING OF SAFETY CRITICAL EQUIPMENT 2–8

2.4.3 TEST OPERATION REVIEWS 2–8

2.4.4 SAFETY MONITORING 2–8

3.0 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY 3–1

3.1 MANAGEMENT 3–1

3.1.1 ORGANIZATION 3–1

3.1.2 PLANS 3–1

3.1.2.1 RELIABILITY PLANS 3–1

3.1.2.2 MAINTAINABILITY PLANS 3–1

3.1.3 AUDITS AND SURVEYS 3–2

3.1.4 SUPPLIER CONTROL 3–2

3.1.4.1 SUPPLIER RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY CONTROL 3–2

3.1.4.2 OFF THE SHELF HARDWARE EVALUATION 3–2

3.1.5 NASA OR CSA FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE) RELIABILITY 3–3

AND MAINTAINABILITY

3.2 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ENGINEERING 3–3

3.2.1 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CRITERIA 3–3

3.2.2 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES/TRADE STUDIES 3–3

3.2.2.1 RELIABILITY ANALYSES/TRADE STUDIES 3–3

3.2.2.2 MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES/TRADE STUDIES 3–3

3.2.3 HARDWARE FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSES (FMEA)S 3–4

3.2.3.3 PAYLOAD FMEAS 3–4

3.2.4 CRITICALITY CATEGORIES 3–4

3.2.5 CRITICAL ITEM CONTROL 3–5

3.2.6 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY DATA 3–5

3.2.7 LIMITED–LIFE ITEMS 3–5

3.2.8 MILESTONE REVIEWS 3–5

3.2.9 REVIEW OF CHANGES 3–5

3.2.10 PROBLEM REPORTING SYSTEM 3–6

3.2.11 VERIFICATION ASSURANCE 3–6

3.3 ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL (EEE) 3–6

AND MECHANICAL PARTS CONTROL

3.3.1 ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL (EEE) 3–6

PARTS

3.3.2 MECHANICAL PARTS 3–13

3.3.2.1 MECHANICAL PARTS SELECTION 3–13

3.3.2.2 MECHANICAL PARTS SPECIFICATIONS 3–14

3.3.2.3 MECHANICAL PARTS LIST 3–14

3.3.3 REPORTING PARTS AND MATERIALS PROBLEMS AND 3–14

ASSESSING ALERTS

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PARAGRAPH PAGE

4.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE 4–1

4.1 MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING 4–1

4.1.1 PLANNING 4–1

4.1.2 ORGANIZATION 4–1

4.1.3 QUALITY PROGRAM PLAN 4–1

4.1.4 PLANNING FOR ON–ORBIT ACTIVITIES 4–2

4.1.5 MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT DATA 4–2

4.1.6 TRAINING 4–2

4.1.7 INTERNAL QUALITY PROGRAM AUDITS AND SURVEYS 4–2

4.1.8 MILESTONE REVIEWS 4–3

4.2 DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT CONTROLS 4–3

4.2.1 TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS 4–3

4.2.2 QUALITY SUPPORT TO DESIGN REVIEWS 4–3

4.2.3 CHANGE CONTROL VERIFICATION 4–4

4.2.4 PRODUCT/PROCESS DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION 4–4

4.3 IDENTIFICATION AND DATA RETRIEVAL 4–4

4.3.1 GENERAL 4–4

4.3.2 RETENTION OF RECORDS 4–6

4.3.3 RECORD RETRIEVAL 4–6

4.4 PROCUREMENT 4–6

4.4.1 PROCUREMENT CONTROLS 4–6

4.4.2 SELECTION OF CONTRACTOR PROCUREMENT SOURCES 4–6

4.4.3 PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS 4–7

4.4.4 REVIEW OF PROCUREMENT DOCUMENTS 4–8

4.4.5 CSA QUALITY ASSURANCE PERSONNEL AT SOURCE 4–8

4.4.6 RECEIVING INSPECTION 4–8

4.4.7 PROCUREMENT SOURCE DATA 4–8

4.4.8 AUDITS AND SURVEYS OF PROCUREMENT SOURCE OPERATIONS 4–9

4.5 FABRICATION CONTROLS 4–9

4.5.1 FABRICATION OPERATIONS 4–9

4.5.2 ARTICLE AND MATERIAL CONTROLS 4–11

4.5.3 CLEANLINESS/CONTAMINATION CONTROL 4–11

4.5.4 PROCESS CONTROLS 4–11

4.5.5 NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION (NDE) 4–12

4.5.6 WORKMANSHIP STANDARDS 4–12

4.5.7 CONTROL OF TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS AND REMOVALS 4–12

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4.5.8 QUALITY ASSURANCE DESIGNEES 4–13

4.5.9 INSPECTION PROCEDURES 4–13

4.6 TEST CONTROLS 4–13

4.6.1 VERIFICATION 4–13

4.6.2 TEST PROCEDURES 4–13

4.6.3 TEST PERFORMANCE 4–15

4.6.4 INSPECTION AND TEST RECORDS AND DATA 4–15

4.7 NONCONFORMING ARTICLES AND MATERIALS 4–17

4.7.1 NONCONFORMANCE CONTROL SYSTEM 4–17

4.7.2 IDENTIFICATION OF NONCONFORMANCE 4–17

4.7.3 NONCONFORMANCE EVALUATION 4–17

4.7.4 NONCONFORMANCE DISPOSITIONS 4–17

4.7.5 CSSP MATERIAL REVIEW BOARD (MRB) ACTION 4–18

4.7.6 PROBLEM REPORTING 4–20

4.8 METROLOGY 4–20

4.8.1 METROLOGY CONTROLS 4–20

4.8.2 CALIBRATION RECORDS 4–20

4.8.3 MEASUREMENT ACCURACY 4–21

4.8.4 CALIBRATION CONTROLS 4–21

4.8.5 REMEDIAL ACTION AND RECURRENCE CONTROL 4–22

4.9 STAMP CONTROLS 4–22

4.9.A STAMP AND MARKING MATERIALS 4–22

4.9.B STAMP TRACEABILITY 4–22

4.9.C STAMP APPLICATION 4–22

4.9.D ELECTRONIC DATA CONTROL 4–22

4.9.E STAMPING/MARKING APPLICATION 4–23

4.9.F STATUS STAMPING 4–23

4.9.G STAMPING METHODS 4–23

4.9.H STAMP SIGNIFICANCE 4–23

4.9.I CONTRACTOR STAMP DESIGNS 4–24

4.10 HANDLING, STORAGE, PRESERVATION, MARKING, LABELLING 4–24

PACKAGING, PACKING, AND SHIPPING

4.10.1 PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS CONTROL 4–24

4.10.2 HANDLING 4–24

4.10.3 STORAGE 4–24

4.10.4 PRESERVATION 4–25

4.10.5 PACKAGING AND PACKING 4–25

4.10.6 MARKING AND LABELLING 4–25

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4.10.7 SHIPPING 4–25

4.11 SAMPLING PLANS, STATISTICAL PLANNING, AND ANALYSES 4–26

4.11.1 SAMPLING PLANS 4–26

4.11.2 STATISTICAL ANALYSES 4–26

4.12 CONTROL OF NASA AND CSA PROPERTY 4–26

4.12.1 CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITY 4–26

4.12.2 UNSUITABLE NASA OR CSA PROPERTY 4–27

5.0 SOFTWARE PRODUCT ASSURANCE (SPA) 5–1

5.1 MANAGEMENT 5–1

5.1.1 ORGANIZATION 5–1

5.1.2 SOFTWARE PRODUCT ASSURANCE PLANNING 5–2

5.1.3 FORMAL AND INTERNAL REVIEWS 5–2

5.1.4 SUBTIER REQUIREMENTS 5–2

5.1.5 NONDEVELOPMENTAL SOFTWARE 5–2

5.1.6 NASA OR CSA FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE) 5–3

5.1.7 PROGRESS REPORTING 5–3

5.1.8 CONTROL BOARDS 5–3

5.1.9 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 5–3

5.1.10 TRAINING 5–3

5.1.11 SOFTWARE TOOLS 5–3

5.1.12 SOFTWARE PRODUCT ASSURANCE RECORDS 5–3

5.2 SOFTWARE QUALITY ASSURANCE 5–4

5.2.1 AUDITS 5–4

5.2.2 TOOLS, TECHNIQUES, AND METHODOLOGIES 5–4

5.2.3 SOFTWARE DOCUMENTATION 5–4

5.2.4 SOFTWARE CODE INSPECTION 5–5

5.2.5 SOFTWARE TESTING 5–5

5.3 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 5–5

5.3.1 CONFIGURATION IDENTIFICATION, STATUS ACCOUNTING AND 5–6

VERIFICATION

5.3.2 CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL 5–6

5.3.3 SOFTWARE DELIVERY 5–6

5.3.4 SOFTWARE LIBRARIES 5–6

5.3.5 DEVIATIONS AND WAIVERS 5–6

5.4 NONCONFORMANCE/PROBLEM REPORTING AND 5–6

CORRECTIVE ACTION

5.4.1 NONCONFORMANCE REPORTING 5–7

5.4.2 PROBLEM REPORTING AND CORRECTIVE ACTION 5–7

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5.5 SOFTWARE RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY 5–7

5.5.1 SOFTWARE FAULT ANALYSIS 5–7

5.6 SOFTWARE SAFETY 5–7

5.7 STANDARDS 5–8

5.8 TRADE STUDIES 5–8

5.9 INTEGRATION ASSURANCE 5–8

5.10 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 5–8

5.11 INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION (IV&V) 5–8

5.12 CERTIFICATION 5–8

5.13 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ASSURANCE 5–9

6.0 APPLICABLE AND REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 6–1

6.1 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 6–1

6.2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS 6–3

6.3 EQUIVALENCY OF PROCESS DOCUMENTS 6–5

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX PAGE

A ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS A–1

B GLOSSARY B–1

C DATA REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTS (DRS) C–1

ANNEXES

ANNEXE PAGE

1 NASA “MEETS OR EXCEEDS” C–58

1–1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

This document establishes programmatic hardware and software safety and product assurance (reliability, maintainability, and Quality Assurance) requirements for the Canadian Space Station Program in the design, development, production, test, and operation of the MSS elements and components of the International Space Station Alpha.

1.2 SCOPE

These safety and product assurance requirements are applicable to all flight equipment, Orbital Support Equipment (OSE), Flight Support Equipment (FSE), and certain Ground Support Equipment (GSE) (as specified herein) and related software supplied for International Space Station Alpha.

The implementation of the requirements of this document may be tailored by CSA, as appropriate, consistent with International Space Station Alpha program objectives.

1.3 MANAGEMENT APPROACH

Management of safety and product assurance shall include the following:

1.3.A Defining the major hardware and software safety and product assurance tasks and assuring that they are performed as integral parts of all phases of the program

1.3.B Evaluating the safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality of hardware, software, and operations through analyses, tests, reviews, and assessments

1.3.C Providing timely status reporting through periodic project reviews and as a part of overall project status reports

1.3.D Ensuring compatible safety and product assurance requirements among manufacturing, test, launch, and ground operations sites

1.3.1 A safety and product assurance management plan shall be prepared. This plan shall define the tasks and products of the Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) activities of the CSSP and the organizational responsibilities for task implementation. The plan will provide visibility of SRM&QA activities to be accomplished during the life of the CSSP. Safety and product assurance management shall have direct unimpeded access to the management level having full project responsibility.

1–2

1.4 RELATION TO OTHER PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

The Bilateral Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements document, SSP 50062 both responds, and is subordinate, to the requirements of the Joint Management Plan SSP 50022. The safety and product assurance analytical and verification requirements set forth in this document shall take precedence in cases of conflict with requirements contained in subtier documents. The safety and product assurance design requirements are contained in SSP 41167, MSS Segment Specification.

1.5 MOTIVATION

A product–oriented motivational (awareness) activity shall be implemented by the CSSP contractors as an integral part of and making maximum use of existing motivational activities. The objective of this activity shall be the prevention of human error by instilling in personnel an awareness of their personal responsibility for International Space Station Alpha success.

1.6 INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS FOR NASA OR THE INTERNATIONAL

PARTNERS

NASA and the CSA reserve the right to appoint independent representatives to assist in safety and product assurance evaluation activities. These representatives will provide technical support to the applicable parent organization and determine effectiveness of and recommend improvements for safety and product assurance activities.

1.7 DATA REQUIREMENT (DR) DESCRIPTIONS

DRs which define the applicable safety and product assurance documentation requirements for NASA International Space Station Alpha Program Elements (ISSAPEs) are included as appendix B of this document. CSA has the flexibility to add, combine, separate, or expand the DRs as appropriate but the basic DR requirements are mandatory.

1.8 SAFETY AND PRODUCT ASSURANCE DATA BASE

Safety and product assurance data bases shall be established and shall be compatible with the applicable technical and management information system requirements.

1–3

1.9 MILESTONE REVIEWS

Safety and product assurance activities shall include supporting internal and supplier design reviews, and NASA and CSA design and readiness reviews. Participation in milestone reviews shall assure that safety and product assurance requirements are adequately considered.

2–1

2.0 SAFETY

2.1 SAFETY MANAGEMENT

2.1.1 SAFETY APPROACH

Safety management activities shall be an integral part of the CSSP Design Development process, and shall be developed, planned, and implemented to assure that hazards and their consequences are identified, evaluated, and controlled during all phases of the CSSP Program. These activities shall provide an overall qualitative safety risk assessment including identification of residual hazards, and retention rationale for program management decision on acceptance. The safety program shall encompass all activities of the CSSP Program.

2.1.2 ORGANIZATION

Organization of the safety effort shall assure effective planning, management, implementation and performance of system safety, industrial safety, and test operations activities. While the accomplishment of all safety tasks may not be the responsibility of the same organizational element, management of the safety efforts shall assure that all tasks are effectively accomplished. Safety management shall have direct access and shall report regularly to the program/project manager who has the responsibility for risk management decisions.

2.1.3 SAFETY PLAN

The CSSP contractor safety organization shall prepare, implement, and maintain a plan which describes the compliance with requirements set forth herein. The plan content shall be readily identifiable with each cited requirement and shall cover all safety activities.

2.1.3.1 A safety plan shall be prepared that describes the safety tasks to be performed and identifies the safety organization which provides the basis for coordinating the system safety, industrial safety, and test operations safety for all items. The plan shall cover concept definition, design, development, manufacturing, test, handling/transportation, preflight, mission including Alpha Assembly and Operations as applicable. This safety plan will integrate and describe the relationship of all safety activities. The safety plan shall be coordinated and integrated with the other program plans to avoid overlaps and conflicts among the technical disciplines. The plan will provide clear and concise definitions of each discrete task, task implementation methods, and task products. The safety plan shall be prepared in accordance with DR SSQ–S–001.

2–2

2.1.3.2 A launch site safety plan shall be prepared. The plan content shall be defined and agreed upon in coordination between the launch site safety office and the CSA . The plan shall be approved by the Launch Site Safety Office prior to first hardware delivery to the launch site. The plan will become appendix A of the safety plan and shall be in conformance will applicable launch site safety requirements.

2.1.4 SAFETY REVIEW REQUIREMENTS

2.1.4.1 Space Station Review and Certification. The CSSP will support the phase safety review process described in SSP 30599, Safety Review Process for International Space Station Alpha.

2.1.4.2 Space Station User Payload Safety Reviews. The payload developer shall perform hazard analyses for its payload. CSA shall conduct safety reviews for the payloads it sponsors and assess safety compliance in accordance with the requirements of NHB 1700.7B with ISSA addendum at major design reviews. NASA will be invited to attend these safety reviews. CSA shall participate in NASA safety reviews for payloads handled or serviced by the MSS, as a member of the Payload Safety Review Panel. CSA shall also be invited to attend all safety reviews on other payloads. CSA shall participate in the three phase review process with NASA at one level, the payload, integrated, or station integrated element component level as described in NSTS 13830, as modified for ISSA program.

2.1.5 Safety Audit Teams and Surveys. Safety Audit Teams selected from the applicable CSA or contractor organizations will be responsible for carrying out periodic safety audits and reviews of safety organizations, programs and activities. NASA observers will be invited to participate in the CSA audit and review activities. Likewise, the CSA will be invited to participate in NASA audit and review activities. NASA, as well as the CSA, shall have the right to participate in contractor and subcontractor safety surveys addressing an SSPE for which it has responsibility.

2.1.6 Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI)s. The safety organization shall provide for readiness inspections prior to performing any ground operation or test that is potentially hazardous; has a high risk in terms of program success; or involves hardware, facilities, or effort of significant expense. A safety assessment shall be made of facilities, test articles, support equipment, procedures, personnel training, experience, certification, and management. The safety organization will also assess previous ground test or operations data and perform visual inspection of the configuration. Operation Readiness Inspection results will be presented at the respective MSS element or MSS system level Acceptance or Safety Phase III review as appropriate.

2–3

2.1.7 Facility Safety Reviews. Reviews of facilities, equipment, handling and transportation operations, personnel certifications, procedures, fire protection systems, hazardous operations (e.g., high pressure systems, hazardous materials, etc.), and construction activities shall be made by designated contractor/governmental agency safety personnel as defined by government laws applicable at the particular site.

2.1.8 MISHAP REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION

Mishaps occurring during manufacturing, testing, and operations shall be investigated and reported as specified in the NHB 1700.1 (V1–A), ”Basic Safety Manual,” NHB

1700.1 (V2), ”Guidelines for Mishap Investigation [or CSSP specifications which meet or exceed NHB 1700.1 (VI–A) and NHB 1700.1 (V2)],” and reported in accordance with DR SSQ–S–006. Technical assistance shall be provided to NASA or CSSP boards investigating mishaps that are within their jurisdictions. The NASA or applicable CSSP organizations, including contractors and subcontractors, will cooperate fully with the investigation and will provide any records, data, trends, and other administrative or technical support and services.

2.1.9 SAFETY TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION

Personnel who perform hazardous operations and activities shall be appropriately trained and certified. The safety organization shall participate in the development of the training activities and shall approve the programs that are developed. Positions requiring training and certification shall be identified. A current record of certification status shall be maintained. Protective devices and emergency equipment shall be identified and included in safety training. Hazards will be brought to the attention of trainees. Proficiency demonstrations of training, to the degree feasible, will be required for hazardous operations. Personnel training and certification shall be in accordance with approved procedures and regulations applicable at the particular site.

2.1.10 WAIVERS AND DEVIATIONS

Safety shall evaluate proposed hardware, software, and operational waivers and deviations, and recommend disposition for management concurrence. A hazard report will be initiated, or an existing hazard report will be updated to show the status of the waiver or deviation.

2.2 SYSTEM SAFETY

2.2.1 SYSTEM SAFETY OBJECTIVES

The system safety objectives are to identify and evaluate MSS design and operational activities to assure that measures are taken to minimize risks. The system safety

2–4 objectives shall be accomplished using NHB 1700.1, System Safety Volume (or CSSP specifications which meet or exceed NHB 1700.1), to include the following:

2.2.1.A Performing safety analyses to identify the hazards associated with hardware, software, and operations during all program phases

2.2.1.B Assuring that proper design and performance requirements eliminating or controlling the identified hazards are developed, documented, and implemented

2.2.1.C Performing an overall risk assessment including the identification of residual hazards/risks and providing recommendations with supporting data and rationale for management awareness and decision on acceptance of the residual hazards/risks.

2.2.2 SYSTEM SAFETY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

Safety technical requirements contained in SSP 41167, MSS Segment Specification shall be identified and incorporated in system design, operations, and procurement documentation including facilities, GSE, and flight hardware and safety critical software.

A system to show compliance with these requirements shall be developed, implemented, and maintained. The verification system will be used to do the following: maintain current requirements documents and reference the next higher or lower requirement document, assure specific requirements are imposed, and report implementation status of requirements.

2.2.3 SAFETY ANALYSES

Safety analyses shall be performed in accordance with SPAR–SS–PP–0096 Safety Plan Space Station MSS and SPAR–SS–PL–0273 Instructions for the Preparation of Hazard analyses. SPAR–SS–PL–0273 provides instructions for performing analyses, implementing the safety risk management program, and applying criteria for qualitative and quantitative risk assessment. The development of these analyses shall be the responsibility of safety personnel. These analyses shall identify hazards and safety risks associated with system design including; hardware and, software (including GSE, FSE, and OSE), the operations and operational environments and shall be documented in accordance with DRs SSQ–S–002. The analyses and reports shall include the likelihood of occurrence for hazard causes and effects. The results of these analyses shall be evaluated formally through the design review and milestone review processes. Hazardous conditions, causes, effects, controls, and verification methods shall be identified and

2–5 documented. The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) shall not be used in lieu of safety analysis but, shall be used as an input to the safety analyses.

2.2.4 HAZARD ELIMINATION AND CONTROL

The foremost consideration for resolving hazards shall be to eliminate them by design through removal of hazard sources and hazardous operations. Corrective action priorities shall be established to achieve maximum benefit in reducing potential personnel and material losses. Actions for satisfying safety engineering requirements shall be in the following order of precedence:

2.2.4.A Hazard Elimination. The hazard source or the hazardous operation shall be eliminated.

2.2.4.B Design for Minimum Hazard. The major goal throughout the design phase shall be to ensure inherent safety through provisions of appropriate design features, materials and parts selection, and safety factors. Damage control, containment, and isolation of potential hazards and failure tolerance considerations are to be included in design considerations.

2.2.4.C Safety Devices. Known hazards which cannot be eliminated by design shall be reduced to an acceptable level by incorporating safety devices as part of the system, subsystem, or equipment.

2.2.4.D Warning Devices. Where it is not possible to preclude the existence or occurrence of a known hazard, warning devices shall be employed for the timely detection of hazardous conditions and the generation of adequate warning signals.

2.2.4.E Special Procedures. Where it is not possible to reduce the magnitude of an existing or potential hazard by design or by use of safety and warning devices, special procedures [including the requirement for Personal Protective Clothing/Equipment] shall be developed to counter hazardous conditions for enhancement of ground and flight crew safety.

2.2.5 HAZARD REPORT CLOSURE CRITERIA

A hazard report shall be considered closed only after at least one of the following conditions have been satisfied:

2–6

1) The hazard has been eliminated by a design or operational change, and the change has been implemented and verified or;

2) The hazard has been controlled in accordance with at least one of the corrective actions identified in paragraph 2.2.4.B through 2.2.4.E, and the controls have been verified by successful completion of the required design change, test programs, analytical studies, or training programs or;

3) The hazard has been accepted by program management in accordance with the criteria specified in SSP 30309, para. 5–4, Closure Status & Rationale.

2.2.6 HUMAN ENGINEERING

To minimize human errors, procedures and criteria shall be developed to assure that safety–related human engineering principles are applied in accordance with SSP 50005, International Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard (NASA–STD–3000/T) or CSSP standard which meets or exceeds SSP 50005 to eliminate or mitigate potential hazards associated with the man–machine interface during design, development, manufacture, test, maintenance, and operation of the system or subsystem.

2.2.7 SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES REVIEW

Specifications, standards, and procedures for manufacturing, testing, maintenance, and operations shall be reviewed to assure that adequate personnel warnings are included and that the inherent safety of the design is preserved.

2.2.8 NASA OR CSA FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE) SAFETY

Safety data needed for GFE shall be identified by the contractor or supplying agency and shall be supplied by the supplying agency. When examination of these data or testing indicates that GFE and/or GFE documentation is not consistent with the safety requirements of the International Space Station Alpha, the safety organization of the supplying agency shall be formally and promptly notified.

2.2.9 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) SAFETY

The safety analysis approach described in paragraph 2.2.3 shall apply to GSE.

2.2.10 REVIEW OF CHANGES

When changes are proposed for equipment design (hardware and software) or procedures, the safety organization shall assure the identification and resolution of

2–7 hazards that may be introduced into the system. These hazards shall be documented on hazard reports per DR SSQ–S–002. Based on this review, the safety organization shall provide concurrence or nonconcurrence with proposed changes through participation in Configuration Control Board (CCB) activities.

2.2.11 REVIEW OF FLIGHT AND GROUND HARDWARE FAILURES

The safety organization shall review, provide recommendations and concur in failure resolutions associated with catastrophic and critical hazards including Criticality Category 1 items and also monitor lower criticality failure resolutions for safety impact.

Safety participation in the failure resolution activity will be consistent with SSP 30223, Problem Reporting and Corrective Action System Requirements for the International Space Station Alpha Program

2.2.12 EVALUATION OF GROUND AND FLIGHT TEST RESULTS

Safety shall assure evaluation of the results of testing that verifies design safety compliance. Emphasis will be placed on test plans and procedures, reports, and verification of safety parameters.

2.2.13 EVALUATION OF MISSION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

Safety shall participate in mission operational activities and make safety evaluations of anomalous conditions. These safety evaluations will provide guidance to plan future activities and to establish necessary corrective actions. Identified hazards with resolution will be entered into the hazards data base for lessons learned purposes.

2.3 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

Industrial and personnel safety functions for the MSSP shall be performed in accordance with the applicable, industrial safety and occupational health and safety government regulations at the particular site.

2.3.1 GROUND OPERATIONS SAFETY

Safety shall assure that safe methods are implemented for ground handling and operations of the flight equipment, test equipment, and associated GSE to assure that hardware, software, personnel, and facilities are protected during handling, operations and storage.

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2.4 TEST OPERATIONS SAFETY

2.4.1 EVALUATION OF SAFETY MARGINS

Safety shall assure that required design margins exist for hardware and functions and that design margins are verified by either test or analyses. Which of these methods of verification shall be used shall be specified in the specification verification matrices.

2.4.2 TESTING OF SAFETY CRITICAL EQUIPMENT

Safety shall review test plans before ground and on–orbit testing of safety critical equipment. The review must assure that the test plans include verification of hazard control and that personnel, facilities, hardware, and software are protected.

2.4.3 TEST OPERATION REVIEWS

Reviews of facilities, equipment, and procedures shall be made by designated safety personnel prior to test initiation. Detailed test procedures and related documents for hazardous testing and operations shall be reviewed and approved by the responsible safety personnel.

2.4.4 SAFETY MONITORING

Hazardous tests and operations shall be monitored to assure that safety requirements are being met and approved procedures are being used.

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3.0 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY

3.1 MANAGEMENT

Reliability and maintainability activities shall be planned and developed to be an integral part of MSS design, development, test and evaluation, and operational activities.

Scheduled status reporting will be used to provide visibility and assist in controlling the reliability and maintainability effort. Objectives will be to plan and establish the reliability and maintainability effort; to define the major reliability and maintainability tasks and their place as an integral part of the design and development process; to assure the effective implementation of reliability and maintainability requirements; to evaluate system reliability and maintainability characteristics through a program of analysis, review, and test/demonstration; and to conduct trade –off studies between reliability, maintainability, and related disciplines to establish optimum availability.

3.1.1 ORGANIZATION

Organization of the reliability and maintainability efforts shall assure effective planning, management, implementation, and performance of reliability and maintainability activities. While the accomplishment of all reliability or maintainability tasks may not be the responsibility of the same organizational element, management of the reliability and maintainability efforts shall assure that all tasks are effectively accomplished. Reliability and maintainability management shall have direct access and shall report regularly to program/project management.

3.1.2 PLANS

3.1.2.1 RELIABILITY PLANS

The CSSP reliability organization shall prepare, implement and maintain an integrated reliability plan which describes the compliance with requirements set forth herein. The plan content shall be readily identifiable with each cited requirement and shall cover all reliability activities. Reliability plans for separate sites shall be governed by self–contained, separate sections of the overall reliability plan or by a separate plan written for each site. Those sites for which a separate plan is required shall be identified.

The reliability plans shall describe how the reliability requirements will be implemented, controlled and verified and shall be prepared and maintained in accordance with DR

SSQ–R–001.

3.1.2.2 MAINTAINABILITY PLANS

The contractor maintainability organization shall prepare, implement and maintain an integrated maintainability plan which describes the compliance with requirements set

3–2 forth herein. The plan content shall be readily identifiable with each cited requirement and shall cover all maintainability activities. Maintainability plans for separate sites shall be governed by a self–contained, separate sections of the overall maintainability plan or by a separate plan written for each site. Those sites for which a separate plan is required shall be identified. The contractor maintainability plans shall describe how the maintainability requirements will be implemented, controlled and verified and shall be prepared and maintained in CSA approved format.

3.1.3 AUDITS AND SURVEYS

The reliability and maintainability efforts shall include contractor internal audits and vendor/supplier surveys to evaluate the progress and effectiveness of reliability and maintainability activities and to determine the need for adjustments or changes. Audits and surveys shall be conducted regularly at intervals as defined by the reliability and maintainability plans.

3.1.4 SUPPLIER CONTROL

3.1.4.1 SUPPLIER RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY CONTROL

The reliability and maintainability efforts shall assure that hardware obtained from any source meets the reliability and maintainability requirements of the CSSP. This applies to items obtained from contractors, subcontractors, or suppliers, or whether the item is obtained by an intracompany order from any organization. Management controls shall be provided to assure the adequacy of subcontractor implementation of the requirements.

The level of requirements imposed on subcontractors and suppliers shall be appropriately tailored and identified to be consistent with those imposed on the contractor.

3.1.4.2 OFF THE SHELF HARDWARE EVALUATION

When off–the–shelf hardware is proposed for use, the selection of that hardware shall be based on its intended application and historical reliability and maintainability such as other contractor and program requirements and operations experience. If the historical data are not available or cannot be readily obtained, the reliability and maintainability characteristics shall be based upon analyses factors such as operating stress levels, derating, FMEAs, and logistics support considerations. The results of the examination of these data analyses shall be documented and additional controls, as appropriate, shall be applied to assure that the hardware meets all applicable requirements prior to procurement authorization.

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3.1.5 NASA OR CSA FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE) RELIABILITY AND

MAINTAINABILITY

Reliability and maintainability data needed for GFE shall be identified by the contractor or supplying agency and shall be supplied by the supplying agency. When examination of these data or testing indicates that GFE/ and/or GFE documentation is not consistent with the reliability and/or maintainability requirements of the CSSP, the supplying agency shall be formally and promptly notified.

3.2 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ENGINEERING

Reliability and maintainability engineering tasks shall be accomplished, to the extent specified, for all flight equipment, flight support equipment, orbital support equipment, and ground support equipment which could cause personnel injuries or damage to the facility or which interfaces with flight hardware (including GFE. All maintainability activities shall be consistent with the International Space Station Alpha maintenance concept described in SSP 50011–03 Rev A, Concept of Operations and Utilizations.

Maintainability engineering efforts shall support maintenance planning efforts as appropriate.

3.2.1 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN CRITERIA

The reliability and maintainability efforts shall include the establishment of reliability and maintainability design criteria and assure that the criteria are incorporated in each design. The reliability and maintainability efforts shall include a systematic approach for reviewing and concurring in design and procurement specifications and in design changes to assure that all design items reflect proper and complete reliability and maintainability design criteria and that the specifications contain applicable reliability and maintainability requirements.

3.2.2 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES/TRADE STUDIES

3.2.2.1 RELIABILITY ANALYSES/TRADE STUDIES

The reliability effort shall include participation in design trade off studies and assessments utilizing reliability modelling and numerical predictions as appropriate.

Reliability criteria, such as failure modes and effects, frequency of failures, and operating life, shall be evaluated as part of engineering and operational trade studies.

3.2.2.2 MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES/TRADE STUDIES

The maintainability effort shall include participation in design trade off studies and assessments utilizing maintainability modelling and numerical predictions as appropriate.

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Maintainability criteria, such as mean–time–to–repair, restorability considerations and maintenance crew time shall be evaluated as part of engineering and operational trade studies.

3.2.3 HARDWARE FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSES (FMEA)S

A system for preparing, maintaining, and controlling FMEAs shall be established in accordance with SSP 30234, Instructions for Preparation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Critical Items List for Space Station, or CSSP documentation that meets or exceeds SSP 30234, and the applicable DR SSQ–R–002.

3.2.3.1 Flight Hardware FMEAs. FMEAs shall be prepared to the component level to ascertain the hardware functional criticality. For Criticality 1 and 2 single failure points and Criticality 1R items which do not meet the failure tolerance requirements of SSP 41167, MSS Segment Specification, analysis shall be performed within the component to the level necessary to identify all potential failure modes. The FMEAs shall be used as part of an ongoing process throughout the program to identify single failure points as candidates for elimination and to indicate where program failure tolerance requirements are not being met. It is also required that interfaces between the various subsystems and systems be addressed in the FMEA.

3.2.3.2 GSE FMEAs. GSE FMEAs shall be prepared in accordance with SSP 30234 Instructions for Preparation of FMEAs and CIL for Space Station. The GSE FMEA task may use information from the safety analysis task to preclude duplication of analytical work and documentation. (Refer to paragraph 2.2.3 )

3.2.3.3 PAYLOAD FMEAS

All payloads shall be analyzed to determine any unsafe effects of payload failure which could propagate across the interface between the payload and the International Space Station Alpha. Payload FMEAs shall be prepared to the component level, to ascertain the hardware functional criticality, and shall be formally documented only for those functions containing failure modes which could cause Criticality Categories 1 and 2 effects.

3.2.4 CRITICALITY CATEGORIES

Criticality Categories shall be as defined in SSP 30234 Instructions for Preparation of FMEAs and CIL for Space Station.

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3.2.5 CRITICAL ITEM CONTROL

3.2.5.1 Critical Items List (CIL) Preparation. Based on results of the FMEAs, a CIL, which includes retention rationale, shall be prepared in accordance with SSP 30234 and DR SSQ–R–003. The CIL shall consist of those items identified in the FMEA which meet the criteria in SSP 30234.

3.2.5.2 CIL Controls. CIL items shall be controlled in accordance with the requirements of SPAR–SS–PP–0097 Reliability Plan.

3.2.5.3 CIL Prioritization. The CIL shall be prioritized in accordance with SSP 30234.

3.2.6 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY DATA

Reliability and Maintainability data shall be compiled for all flight hardware in accordance with DRs DID P.1101–29 and DID P.1101–512.

3.2.7 LIMITED–LIFE ITEMS

The life–limiting criteria and characteristics for limited–life items shall be established, and limited–life items shall be identified including GFE specified by the supplying agency. The status of limited–life items shall be recorded in accordance with paragraph 4.5.2.A and reported to enable refurbishment and replacement of these items and projection of their remaining life. Limited–life hardware identification and status reporting shall be in accordance with DR SSQ–R–004.

3.2.8 MILESTONE REVIEWS

Reliability and maintainability activities shall include supporting internal and supplier design reviews and NASA and CSA design and readiness reviews. Participation in reviews shall assure that reliability and maintainability requirements are adequately considered in decisions which affect hardware design, manufacturing, configuration controls, initiation of subsystem and integrated testing, shipment and readiness for flight.

3.2.9 REVIEW OF CHANGES

When changes are proposed for equipment design (hardware and software) or procedures, the change shall include a review of the reliability and maintainability impact

3–6 of the proposed change. Based on this review, the reliability and maintainability organization shall provide concurrence or nonconcurrence with proposed changes through participation in Configuration Control Board (CCB) activities.

3.2.10 PROBLEM REPORTING SYSTEM

Reliability and maintainability activities shall support the problem reporting system as defined in paragraph 4.7.6 of this document.

3.2.11 VERIFICATION ASSURANCE

Reliability and maintainability shall assure that an effective verification program for reliability and maintainability requirements is established and implemented. Reliability and maintainability activities shall include participation in such verification processes as development, certification, acceptance, checkout and maintainability verification. The reliability and maintainability plans shall delineate the degree of participation.

3.3 ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL (EEE) AND

MECHANICAL PARTS CONTROL

3.3.1 ELECTRICAL, ELECTRONIC, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL (EEE) PARTS

3.3.1.1 General. A system shall be developed and implemented in accordance with SPAR–SS–PL–0192 MSS Program Plan for EEE and Mechanical Parts and SPAR–SS–SG–0536 EEE Parts Requirements for MSS Program . The requirements of these documents will be used for assessing the acceptability of off–the–shelf designs or equipment, or for identification of required changes during the review prior to the procurement decision.

3.3.1.2 EEE Parts Selection. EEE parts shall be selected on the basis of suitability for their applications and proven qualifications to the requirements of their specifications.

Selection shall minimize the number of styles and generic types. Parts with proven technologies and with inherent reliability features will be selected. In order to support projected life of International Space Station Alpha parts, selections of obsolete or impending obsolescent devices or technologies are to be avoided.

Approved parts for International Space Station Alpha use are those devices listed in SPAR–SS–R–0930 MSS Preferred Parts List (which also invokes SSP 30423, Space

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Station Approved Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts List (SSAEPL) and MIL–STD–975, NASA Standard Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical Parts List).

3.3.1.2.1 Flight Hardware Including Flight and Orbital Support Equipment. EEE parts for criticality 1, 1R, 2, 2R hardware shall be selected from the SSAEPL or the Grade 1 listing of MIL–STD–975 or , equivalent Grade 1 EEE parts from the respective CSSP Approved Parts List. EEE parts for criticality 3 hardware shall be selected from the SSAEPL or the Grade 1 or Grade 2 listing of MIL–STD–975 or the equivalent Grade 1 or Grade 2 EEE parts from the respective CSSP Approved Parts List. EEE parts proposed for use and not specified on the SSAEPL or MIL–STD–975 are non–standard and require completion of a Non–Standard Part Approval Request (NSPAR) in accordance with SPAR–SS–PL–0192 . All non–standard parts require NSPAR approval prior to procurement and use.

3.3.1.2.1.1 All CSSP NSPARs shall require approval by the CSA. CSA shall submit a summary of all their approved NSPARs for NASA review. The summary shall be submitted for each step of the NSPAR process and shall contain, as a minimum, NSPAR number, procurement specification number, generic part number, part description, manufacturer, and NSPAR step approval date. The contractor shall monitor status at all levels of procurement, test, and fabrication to assure that all changes to nonstandard parts procurement plans are properly and expeditiously approved.

3.3.1.2.1.2 When selecting nonstandard parts, particular attention shall be devoted to the use of current data on the proposed part type, applicability on the basis of qualification, and adequacy of specifications. The results of the selection effort will determine requirements for additional screening, acceptance, and qualification testing.

3.3.1.2.1.3 The order of precedence for the selection of alternative parts for NSPAR approval shall be as follows:

1) Joint Army Navy (JAN) S, class ”S”, or Established Reliability Military Specifications.

2) Parts which have been identified by existing specifications as being Item 1 ”Equivalent” high Reliability parts.

3) Those parts requiring a new specification drawn to International Space Station Alpha requirements.

4) Lower grade parts procured to an existing specification and upgraded by screening tests shown in the closest military specification of Item 1.

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3.3.1.2.2 Ground Support Equipment (GSE). For GSE, MIL–STD–975 Grade 2 parts are preferred. However, commercial end items or parts may be used when they satisfy the GSE function, will not degrade the safety or reliability of the flight system, and are used in a manner consistent with their documented design intent. GSE parts that physically interface with flight hardware (connectors, cable, wire, etc.) shall be of at least the same grade as the interfacing flight components.

3.3.1.2.3 Off–The–Shelf (OTS) Equipment and Off–The–Shelf Design. The contractor shall be responsible for assuring flight, FSE, or OSE OTS hardware and design compliance to the EEE part selection criteria for the proposed applications and corresponding criticalities. The contractor shall differentiate between OTS hardware or design that has not been used in spaceflight versus previously flown spaceflight hardware. CSA review and approval shall be required for the use of all EEE parts identified as defined below. The contractor shall provide CSA, who will provide NASA with the as built or as designed parts list, identifications made, and all supporting documentation. A summary of this data should also be provided.

3.3.1.2.3.1 Off–The Shelf Hardware (no spaceflight history).The evaluation of OTS hardware that has no previous spaceflight history shall include the following:

1) A review of the as–built EEE parts list (or equivalent list) and supporting documentation (e.g. procurement specifications, upgrade specifications, waivers, deviations, etc...); identifying to CSA all EEE parts which do not meet the selection criteria for the corresponding criticality.

2) A review of the as–built parts list for any parts that appear as restricted or suspect items in SPAR–SS–SG–0536 and SPAR–SS–PL–0192, identifying to CSA all EEE parts appearing as such.

3) A review process considering and identifying any available prior history of successful operation, failures, and causes of failures for EEE parts in the proposed hardware. For criticality 3 items; identification of Underwriters Laboratory (UL) approval, Consumer Product Safety Commission history, and user community operation performance are good sources of information.

4) A review identifying construction history, Government–Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) alerts, and manufacturer for the EEE parts.

3.3.1.2.3.2 Off–The–Shelf Hardware (spaceflight proven).The evaluation of OTS hardware that has proven spaceflight history shall include the following:

1) A review of the as–built EEE parts list (or equivalent list) and supporting documentation (e.g. procurement specifications, upgrade specifications, waivers, 3–9 deviations, etc...); identifying to CSA all EEE parts which do not meet the selection criteria for the corresponding criticality.

2) An identification of any known life limiting items within the equipment and determination of expected useful life.

3) A review identifying construction history, Government– Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) alerts, and manufacturer for the EEE parts.

3.3.1.2.3.3 Off–The–Shelf Design (no spaceflight history).The evaluation of OTS designs with no spaceflight history shall include the following:

1) All the requirements specified in 3.3.1.2.3.1 above, except the data shall pertain to the as–designed parts list.

2) An identification of higher reliability parts for possible direct replacement of EEE parts in the as– designed parts list that do not meet International Space Station Alpha selection criteria and order of precedence for the corresponding criticality.

3) An identification/review of any available derating and worst case analysis of the design; providing to CSA all analysis data.

4) An…