Attachment J-18_ FedRAMP Security Controls Baseline Tailoring.xlsx
XLSX spreadsheet 51 KB Posted
- Attached to
- E-Gov Travel Service, Next Generation (ETSNext) Travel and Expense (T&E) Technology Managed Service
- Solicitation number
- 47QMCB23R0011
- Issued by
-
GSA Federal Acquisition Service
About this file
This document contains a Federal Acquisition Service security controls baseline tailoring spreadsheet for the E-Gov Travel Service, Next Generation (ETSNext) Travel and Expense (T&E) Technology Managed Service. The solicitation seeks proposals for a managed service to provide a cloud-based, Software as a Service travel booking and expense management solution for federal agencies. Key requirements include implementing multi-factor authentication for all system access, including vendors; conducting monthly vulnerability scans of all system components; limiting egress internet access from the system; and preparing and adhering to a supply chain risk management plan. Proposers must also integrate with GSA programs for third-party vendor monitoring and risk assessment. The baseline tailors security controls to the cloud environment and multi-tenant architecture.
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GSA ETSNext FedRAMP Baseline Ta
| NIST 800-53 Security Controls Catalog Revision 5 | GSA ETSNext FedRAMP® Moderate Baseline Tailoring | ||||||
| Family | ID | Control Name | NIST Control Description | ||||
| (From NIST SP 800-53r5 12/10/2020) | NIST Discussion | ||||||
| (From NIST SP 800-53r5 12/10/2020) | M FedRAMP-Defined Assignment / Selection Parameters | ||||||
| (Numbering matches SSP) | M Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance | GSA ETSNext Control Type | GSA ETSNext Control Tailoring | ||||
| ACCESS CONTROL | AC-2 (4) | Account Management | Automated Audit Actions | Automatically audit account creation, modification, enabling, disabling, and removal actions. | Account management audit records are defined in accordance with AU-2 and reviewed, analyzed, and reported in accordance with AU-6. | New Added Control | 1) Implement RBAC elevated privilege reporting and annual re-certification |
2) Standardize roles and permissions across agencies to limit the possibility of accidental over-provisioning of permissions
Role-based privileges should emphasize "need to know" principle. Identify specific user roles/functions and limit access to information needed for the role, in particular PII (e.g. traveler name, email address, address, contact info, travel document info). There shouldn't be a single privileged user role that can access all data within the system.
Refer to IA-8 enhancement below for roles related to invitational travelers.
| ACCESS CONTROL | AC-5 | Separation of Duties | a. Identify and document [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals requiring separation]; and | |
| b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties. | Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes dividing mission or business functions and support functions among different individuals or roles, conducting system support functions with different individuals, and ensuring that security personnel who administer access control functions do not also administer audit functions. Because separation of duty violations can span systems and application domains, organizations consider the entirety of systems and system components when developing policy on separation of duties. Separation of duties is enforced through the account management activities in AC-2, access control mechanisms in AC-3, and identity management activities in IA-2, IA-4, and IA-12. | AC-5 Guidance: CSPs have the option to provide a separation of duties matrix as an attachment to the SSP. | ||
| Tailoring | Review separation of duties in the context of financial fraud and abuse. For example, requester and approver cannot be the same user. System should have controls preventing same user ID from approving requests for travel or payment. | |||
| ACCESS CONTROL | AC-6 (7) | Least Privilege | Review of User Privileges | (a) Review [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] the privileges assigned to [Assignment: organization-defined roles or classes of users] to validate the need for such privileges; and | |
| (b) Reassign or remove privileges, if necessary, to correctly reflect organizational mission and business needs. | The need for certain assigned user privileges may change over time to reflect changes in organizational mission and business functions, environments of operation, technologies, or threats. A periodic review of assigned user privileges is necessary to determine if the rationale for assigning such privileges remains valid. If the need cannot be revalidated, organizations take appropriate corrective actions. | AC-6 (7) (a)-1 [at a minimum, annually] | ||
| AC-6 (7) (a)-2 [all users with privileges] | Tailoring | All user accounts (not just privileged users) must utilize multi-factor authentication to access the system to reduce risk of user roles changing and inadvertent disclosure of more sensitive information to stolen credentials. | ||
| AWARENESS AND TRAINING | AT-2 | Literacy Training and Awareness | a. Provide security and privacy literacy training to system users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors): |
1. As part of initial training for new users and [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter; and
2. When required by system changes or following [Assignment: organization-defined events];
b. Employ the following techniques to increase the security and privacy awareness of system users [Assignment: organization-defined awareness techniques];
c. Update literacy training and awareness content [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and following [Assignment: organization-defined events]; and
| d. Incorporate lessons learned from internal or external security incidents or breaches into literacy training and awareness techniques. | Organizations provide basic and advanced levels of literacy training to system users, including measures to test the knowledge level of users. Organizations determine the content of literacy training and awareness based on specific organizational requirements, the systems to which personnel have authorized access, and work environments (e.g., telework). The content includes an understanding of the need for security and privacy as well as actions by users to maintain security and personal privacy and to respond to suspected incidents. The content addresses the need for operations security and the handling of personally identifiable information. | |||
| Awareness techniques include displaying posters, offering supplies inscribed with security and privacy reminders, displaying logon screen messages, generating email advisories or notices from organizational officials, and conducting awareness events. Literacy training after the initial training described in AT-2a.1 is conducted at a minimum frequency consistent with applicable laws, directives, regulations, and policies. Subsequent literacy training may be satisfied by one or more short ad hoc sessions and include topical information on recent attack schemes, changes to organizational security and privacy policies, revised security and privacy expectations, or a subset of topics from the initial training. Updating literacy training and awareness content on a regular basis helps to ensure that the content remains relevant. Events that may precipitate an update to literacy training and awareness content include, but are not limited to, assessment or audit findings, security incidents or breaches, or changes in applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines. | AT-2 (a) (1) [at least annually] | |||
| AT-2 (c) [at least annually] | Tailoring | All vendor staff with access to system (at all levels - application, backend, platform, etc.) must undergo annual security training that includes phishing, social engineering, and email-based threat education. | ||
| AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY | AU-3 | Content of Audit Records | Ensure that audit records contain information that establishes the following: |
a. What type of event occurred;
b. When the event occurred;
c. Where the event occurred;
d. Source of the event;
e. Outcome of the event; and
| f. Identity of any individuals, subjects, or objects/entities associated with the event. | Audit record content that may be necessary to support the auditing function includes event descriptions (item a), time stamps (item b), source and destination addresses (item c), user or process identifiers (items d and f), success or fail indications (item e), and filenames involved (items a, c, e, and f) . Event outcomes include indicators of event success or failure and event-specific results, such as the system security and privacy posture after the event occurred. Organizations consider how audit records can reveal information about individuals that may give rise to privacy risks and how best to mitigate such risks. For example, there is the potential to reveal personally identifiable information in the audit trail, especially if the trail records inputs or is based on patterns or time of usage. | Tailoring | Per FedRAMP, M-21-31 does not apply directly to CSP offerings (unless that CSP is a government system that is developed for or behalf of the government); however, FedRAMP authorized CSOs must comply with M-21-31 by supporting agency implementations within the cloud offering. These requirements are reflected in the FedRAMP Rev. 5 baselines (Related controls are AC-4 (4), AU-11, and SI-4 (10)). | ||||
| AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY | AU-6 (3) | Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting | Correlate Audit Record Repositories | Analyze and correlate audit records across different repositories to gain organization-wide situational awareness. | Organization-wide situational awareness includes awareness across all three levels of risk management (i.e., organizational level, mission/business process level, and information system level) and supports cross-organization awareness. | Tailoring | Prepare daily reporting of atypical account usage by agency customer and send notification for review. Vendor will configure and triage report to minimize false positives for daily review to be manageable by vendor and customer agencies. | |
| AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY | AU-9 | Protection of Audit Information | a. Protect audit information and audit logging tools from unauthorized access, modification, and deletion; and | ||||
| b. Alert [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] upon detection of unauthorized access, modification, or deletion of audit information. | Audit information includes all information needed to successfully audit system activity, such as audit records, audit log settings, audit reports, and personally identifiable information. Audit logging tools are those programs and devices used to conduct system audit and logging activities. Protection of audit information focuses on technical protection and limits the ability to access and execute audit logging tools to authorized individuals. Physical protection of audit information is addressed by both media protection controls and physical and environmental protection controls. | Tailoring | Vendor must utilized a centralized SIEM to consolidate all audit records in near real-time from every component in the system. |
Per FedRAMP, M-21-31 does not apply directly to CSP offerings (unless that CSP is a government system that is developed for or behalf of the government); however, FedRAMP authorized CSOs must comply with M-21-31 by supporting agency implementations within the cloud offering. These requirements are reflected in the FedRAMP Rev. 5 baselines (Related controls are AC-4 (4), AU-11, and SI-4 (10)).
AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY AU-10 Non-repudiation Provide irrefutable evidence that an individual (or process acting on behalf of an individual) has performed [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be covered by non-repudiation]. Types of individual actions covered by non-repudiation include creating information, sending and receiving messages, and approving information. Non-repudiation protects against claims by authors of not having authored certain documents, senders of not having transmitted messages, receivers of not having received messages, and signatories of not having signed documents. Non-repudiation services can be used to determine if information originated from an individual or if an individual took specific actions (e.g., sending an email, signing a contract, approving a procurement request, or receiving specific information). Organizations obtain non-repudiation services by employing various techniques or mechanisms, including digital signatures and digital message receipts. AU-10 [minimum actions including the addition, modification, deletion, approval, sending, or receiving of data] New Added Control Capture log data to correlate user/process activity to user/process identity where possible.
Further, per FedRAMP, M-21-31 does not apply directly to CSP offerings (unless that CSP is a government system that is developed for or behalf of the government); however, FedRAMP authorized CSOs must comply with M-21-31 by supporting agency implementations within the cloud offering. These requirements are reflected in the FedRAMP Rev. 5 baselines (Related controls are AC-4 (4), AU-11, and SI-4 (10)).
CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT CM-8 System Component Inventory a. Develop and document an inventory of system components that:
1. Accurately reflects the system;
2. Includes all components within the system;
3. Does not include duplicate accounting of components or components assigned to any other system;
4. Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting; and
5. Includes the following information to achieve system component accountability: [Assignment: organization-defined information deemed necessary to achieve effective system component accountability]; and
| b. Review and update the system component inventory [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. | System components are discrete, identifiable information technology assets that include hardware, software, and firmware. Organizations may choose to implement centralized system component inventories that include components from all organizational systems. In such situations, organizations ensure that the inventories include system-specific information required for component accountability. The information necessary for effective accountability of system components includes the system name, software owners, software version numbers, hardware inventory specifications, software license information, and for networked components, the machine names and network addresses across all implemented protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). Inventory specifications include date of receipt, cost, model, serial number, manufacturer, supplier information, component type, and physical location. | |||||
| Preventing duplicate accounting of system components addresses the lack of accountability that occurs when component ownership and system association is not known, especially in large or complex connected systems. Effective prevention of duplicate accounting of system components necessitates use of a unique identifier for each component. For software inventory, centrally managed software that is accessed via other systems is addressed as a component of the system on which it is installed and managed. Software installed on multiple organizational systems and managed at the system level is addressed for each individual system and may appear more than once in a centralized component inventory, necessitating a system association for each software instance in the centralized inventory to avoid duplicate accounting of components. Scanning systems implementing multiple network protocols (e.g., IPv4 and IPv6) can result in duplicate components being identified in different address spaces. The implementation of CM-8 (7) can help to eliminate duplicate accounting of components. | CM-8 (b) [at least monthly] | CM-8 Requirement: must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change. | Tailoring | Includes all components within the system including production, test, development, jump boxes/bastion hosts, network equipment, user machines/VDIs with direct connection to system components, and internal/external integrations (refer to Section 11 - System Interconnections of FedRAMP Moderate SSP template). | ||
| IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | IA-2 (1) | Identification and Authentication (organizational Users) | Multi-factor Authentication to Privileged Accounts | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to privileged accounts. | Multi-factor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The authentication factors are defined as follows: something you know (e.g., a personal identification number [PIN]), something you have (e.g., a physical authenticator such as a cryptographic private key), or something you are (e.g., a biometric). Multi-factor authentication solutions that feature physical authenticators include hardware authenticators that provide time-based or challenge-response outputs and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card or the Department of Defense (DoD) Common Access Card (CAC). In addition to authenticating users at the system level (i.e., at logon), organizations may employ authentication mechanisms at the application level, at their discretion, to provide increased security. Regardless of the type of access (i.e., local, network, remote), privileged accounts are authenticated using multi-factor options appropriate for the level of risk. Organizations can add additional security measures, such as additional or more rigorous authentication mechanisms, for specific types of access. | IA-2 (1) Requirement: According to SP 800-63-3, SP 800-63A (IAL), SP 800-63B (AAL), and SP 800-63C (FAL). |
IA-2 (1) Requirement: Multi-factor authentication must be phishing-resistant.
| IA-2 (1) Guidance: Multi-factor authentication to subsequent components in the same user domain is not required. | Tailoring | All vendor staff with access to the system must use multi-factor authentication. The system shall only allow multi-factor authentication including for vendor provided help desk, developers and integrators. The system shall require multi-factor authentication for all backend systems (not just customer agency user application interface), including jump/bastion hosts, user machines/VDIs with direct connection to system components, servers, tools, and devices. Multi-factor authentication options for help desk, developers, and integrators shall be phishing-resistant. | ||||
| IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION | IA-2 (2) | Identification and Authentication (organizational Users) | Multi-factor Authentication to Non-privileged Accounts | Implement multi-factor authentication for access to non-privileged accounts. | Multi-factor authentication requires the use of two or more different factors to achieve authentication. The authentication factors are defined as follows: something you know (e.g., a personal identification number [PIN]), something you have (e.g., a physical authenticator such as a cryptographic private key), or something you are (e.g., a biometric). Multi-factor authentication solutions that feature physical authenticators include hardware authenticators that provide time-based or challenge-response outputs and smart cards such as the U.S. Government Personal Identity Verification card or the DoD Common Access Card. In addition to authenticating users at the system level, organizations may also employ authentication mechanisms at the application level, at their discretion, to provide increased information security. Regardless of the type of access (i.e., local, network, remote), non-privileged accounts are authenticated using multi-factor options appropriate for the level of risk. Organizations can provide additional security measures, such as additional or more rigorous authentication mechanisms, for specific types of access. | IA-2 (2) Requirement: According to SP 800-63-3, SP 800-63A (IAL), SP 800-63B (AAL), and SP 800-63C (FAL). |
IA-2 (2) Requirement: Multi-factor authentication must be phishing-resistant.
| IA-2 (2) Guidance: Multi-factor authentication to subsequent components in the same user domain is not required. | Tailoring | Implement a one-time code process and function for the help desk. Customer agency users contacting the help desk would be sent a one time code for verification prior to the help desk assisting with the customer agency user request. The one time code shall be sent to the user primary email address on record (.gov, .mil. .edu). This reduces the risk of impersonation threat attempting to exploit help desk to get PII or other non-public info about a user/customer. | ||
| RISK ASSESSMENT | RA-3 (1) | Risk Assessment | Supply Chain Risk Assessment | (a) Assess supply chain risks associated with [Assignment: organization-defined systems, system components, and system services]; and | |
| (b) Update the supply chain risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency], when there are significant changes to the relevant supply chain, or when changes to the system, environments of operation, or other conditions may necessitate a change in the supply chain. | Supply chain-related events include disruption, use of defective components, insertion of counterfeits, theft, malicious development practices, improper delivery practices, and insertion of malicious code. These events can have a significant impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system and its information and, therefore, can also adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The supply chain-related events may be unintentional or malicious and can occur at any point during the system life cycle. An analysis of supply chain risk can help an organization identify systems or components for which additional supply chain risk mitigations are required. | Tailoring |
Vendor wil prepare and submit a C-SCRM Plan that adheres to GSA C-SCRM guidelines. Vendor will integrate with GSA Vendor Risk Assessment Program (VRAP) for third party vendor monitoring for all downstream service providers/vendors (e.g. Interos and BitSight).
RISK ASSESSMENT RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning a. Monitor and scan for vulnerabilities in the system and hosted applications [Assignment: organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-defined process] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system are identified and reported;
b. Employ vulnerability monitoring tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:
1. Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations;
2. Formatting checklists and test procedures; and
3. Measuring vulnerability impact;
c. Analyze vulnerability scan reports and results from vulnerability monitoring;
d. Remediate legitimate vulnerabilities [Assignment: organization-defined response times] in accordance with an organizational assessment of risk;
e. Share information obtained from the vulnerability monitoring process and control assessments with [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to help eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other systems; and
f. Employ vulnerability monitoring tools that include the capability to readily update the vulnerabilities to be scanned. Security categorization of information and systems guides the frequency and comprehensiveness of vulnerability monitoring (including scans). Organizations determine the required vulnerability monitoring for system components, ensuring that the potential sources of vulnerabilities—such as infrastructure components (e.g., switches, routers, guards, sensors), networked printers, scanners, and copiers—are not overlooked. The capability to readily update vulnerability monitoring tools as new vulnerabilities are discovered and announced and as new scanning methods are developed helps to ensure that new vulnerabilities are not missed by employed vulnerability monitoring tools. The vulnerability monitoring tool update process helps to ensure that potential vulnerabilities in the system are identified and addressed as quickly as possible. Vulnerability monitoring and analyses for custom software may require additional approaches, such as static analysis, dynamic analysis, binary analysis, or a hybrid of the three approaches. Organizations can use these analysis approaches in source code reviews and in a variety of tools, including web-based application scanners, static analysis tools, and binary analyzers.
Vulnerability monitoring includes scanning for patch levels; scanning for functions, ports, protocols, and services that should not be accessible to users or devices; and scanning for flow control mechanisms that are improperly configured or operating incorrectly. Vulnerability monitoring may also include continuous vulnerability monitoring tools that use instrumentation to continuously analyze components. Instrumentation-based tools may improve accuracy and may be run throughout an organization without scanning. Vulnerability monitoring tools that facilitate interoperability include tools that are Security Content Automated Protocol (SCAP)-validated. Thus, organizations consider using scanning tools that express vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) naming convention and that employ the Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) to determine the presence of vulnerabilities. Sources for vulnerability information include the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) listing and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). Control assessments, such as red team exercises, provide additional sources of potential vulnerabilities for which to scan. Organizations also consider using scanning tools that express vulnerability impact by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
Vulnerability monitoring includes a channel and process for receiving reports of security vulnerabilities from the public at-large. Vulnerability disclosure programs can be as simple as publishing a monitored email address or web form that can receive reports, including notification authorizing good-faith research and disclosure of security vulnerabilities. Organizations generally expect that such research is happening with or without their authorization and can use public vulnerability disclosure channels to increase the likelihood that discovered vulnerabilities are reported directly to the organization for remediation.
| Organizations may also employ the use of financial incentives (also known as bug bounties) to further encourage external security researchers to report discovered vulnerabilities. Bug bounty programs can be tailored to the organization’s needs. Bounties can be operated indefinitely or over a defined period of time and can be offered to the general public or to a curated group. Organizations may run public and private bounties simultaneously and could choose to offer partially credentialed access to certain participants in order to evaluate security vulnerabilities from privileged vantage points. | RA-5 (a) [monthly operating system/infrastructure; monthly web applications (including APIs) and databases] |
| RA-5 (d) [high-risk vulnerabilities mitigated within thirty (30) days from date of discovery; moderate-risk vulnerabilities mitigated within ninety (90) days from date of discovery; low risk vulnerabilities mitigated within one hundred and eighty (180) days from date of discovery] | RA-5 Guidance: See the FedRAMP Documents page> Vulnerability Scanning Requirements |
https://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/ RA-5 (a) Requirement: an accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.
RA-5 (d) Requirement: If a vulnerability is listed among the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerability (KEV) Catalog (https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog) the KEV remediation date supersedes the FedRAMP parameter requirement.
RA-5 (e) Requirement: to include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP
RA-5 Guidance: Informational findings from a scanner are detailed as a returned result that holds no vulnerability risk or severity and for FedRAMP does not require an entry onto the POA&M or entry onto the RET during any assessment phase.
Warning findings, on the other hand, are given a risk rating (low, moderate, high or critical) by the scanning solution and should be treated like any other finding with a risk or severity rating for tracking purposes onto either the POA&M or RET depending on when the findings originated (during assessments or during monthly continuous monitoring). If a warning is received during scanning, but further validation turns up no actual issue then this item should be categorized as a false positive. If this situation presents itself during an assessment phase (initial assessment, annual assessment or any SCR), follow guidance on how to report false positives in the Security Assessment Report (SAR). If this situation happens during monthly continuous monitoring, a deviation request will need to be submitted per the FedRAMP Vulnerability Deviation Request Form.
Warnings are commonly associated with scanning solutions that also perform compliance scans, and if the scanner reports a “warning” as part of the compliance scanning of a CSO, follow guidance surrounding the tracking of compliance findings during either the assessment phases (initial assessment, annual assessment or any SCR) or monthly continuous monitoring as it applies. Guidance on compliance scan findings can be found by searching on “Tracking of Compliance Scans” in FAQs.
Tailoring Includes all components within the system including production, test, development, jump boxes/bastion hosts, network equipment, user machines/VDIs with direct connection to system components, and internal/external integrations (refer to Section 11 - System Interconnections of FedRAMP Moderate SSP template).
For external integrations, vendor must clearly identify endpoints they are unable scan.
Must comply with BOD 22-01.
| SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION | SA-9 (1) | External System Services | Risk Assessments and Organizational Approvals | (a) Conduct an organizational assessment of risk prior to the acquisition or outsourcing of information security services; and | |||
| (b) Verify that the acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated information security services is approved by [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. | Information security services include the operation of security devices, such as firewalls or key management services as well as incident monitoring, analysis, and response. Risks assessed can include system, mission or business, security, privacy, or supply chain risks. | Tailoring | External integrations will include third parties (e.g.Travel Management Companies) and the vendor needs to validate with GSA PMO the minimum data elements that will be shared and ensure contracts/interconnection agreements with third parties are in place to ensure data is handled securely and according to applicable Federal laws, policies, requirements, and guidelines. Refer to FedRAMP Laws, Regulations, Standards, and Guidance Reference | |||
| SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION | SA-11 (1) | Developer Testing and Evaluation | Static Code Analysis | Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to employ static code analysis tools to identify common flaws and document the results of the analysis. | Static code analysis provides a technology and methodology for security reviews and includes checking for weaknesses in the code as well as for the incorporation of libraries or other included code with known vulnerabilities or that are out-of-date and not supported. Static code analysis can be used to identify vulnerabilities and enforce secure coding practices. It is most effective when used early in the development process, when each code change can automatically be scanned for potential weaknesses. Static code analysis can provide clear remediation guidance and identify defects for developers to fix. Evidence of the correct implementation of static analysis can include aggregate defect density for critical defect types, evidence that defects were inspected by developers or security professionals, and evidence that defects were remediated. A high density of ignored findings, commonly referred to as false positives, indicates a potential problem with the analysis process or the analysis tool. In such cases, organizations weigh the validity of the evidence against evidence from other sources. | SA-11 (1) Requirement: The service provider must document its methodology for reviewing newly developed code for the Service in its Continuous Monitoring Plan. |
If Static code analysis cannot be performed (for example, when the source code is not available), then dynamic code analysis must be performed (see SA-11 (8))
Tailoring Ensure deployed applications developed as part of the system are scanned/tested (dynamic application security testing) for security vulnerabilities.
Ensure mobile applications developed to interact with the system are incorporated into the FedRAMP system boundary and the deployed software application is scanned/tested (dynamic application security testing) for security vulnerabilities along with other software developed for the system.
Ensure mobile applications developed to interact with the system are incorporated into the FedRAMP system boundary and software source code is scanned/tested (static code analysis) for security vulnerabilities along with other software developed for the system. Mobile application shall store sensitive data on the mobile device in a manner that is not accessible to other applications on the mobile device or other external entities.
SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION SA-11 (2) Developer Testing and Evaluation | Threat Modeling and Vulnerability Analyses Require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to perform threat modeling and vulnerability analyses during development and the subsequent testing and evaluation of the system, component, or service that:
(a) Uses the following contextual information: [Assignment: organization-defined information concerning impact, environment of operations, known or assumed threats, and acceptable risk levels];
(b) Employs the following tools and methods: [Assignment: organization-defined tools and methods];
(c) Conducts the modeling and analyses at the following level of rigor: [Assignment: organization-defined breadth and depth of modeling and analyses]; and
| (d) Produces evidence that meets the following acceptance criteria: [Assignment: organization-defined acceptance criteria]. | Systems, system components, and system services may deviate significantly from the functional and design specifications created during the requirements and design stages of the system development life cycle. Therefore, updates to threat modeling and vulnerability analyses of those systems, system components, and system services during development and prior to delivery are critical to the effective operation of those systems, components, and services. Threat modeling and vulnerability analyses at this stage of the system development life cycle ensure that design and implementation changes have been accounted for and that vulnerabilities created because of those changes have been reviewed and mitigated. | Tailoring | Ensure mobile applications developed to interact with the system are incorporated into the FedRAMP system boundary and software functionality has been threat modeled and vulnerabilities analyzed along with other software developed for the system. | ||
| SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION | SC-5 | Denial-of-service Protection | a. [Selection: Protect against; Limit] the effects of the following types of denial-of-service events: [Assignment: organization-defined types of denial-of-service events]; and | ||
| b. Employ the following controls to achieve the denial-of-service objective: [Assignment: organization-defined controls by type of denial-of-service event]. | Denial-of-service events may occur due to a variety of internal and external causes, such as an attack by an adversary or a lack of planning to support organizational needs with respect to capacity and bandwidth. Such attacks can occur across a wide range of network protocols (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). A variety of technologies are available to limit or eliminate the origination and effects of denial-of-service events. For example, boundary protection devices can filter certain types of packets to protect system components on internal networks from being directly affected by or the source of denial-of-service attacks. Employing increased network capacity and bandwidth combined with service redundancy also reduces the susceptibility to denial-of-service events. | SC-5 (a)-1 [Protect against] | |||
| SC-5 (a)-2 [at a minimum: ICMP (ping) flood, SYN flood, slowloris, buffer overflow attack, and volume attack] | Tailoring | Implement a WAF for the public-facing application components. Develop custom WAF rules for the application, and implement TLS inspection so the WAF rules can see the traffic. |
Implement a Content Delivery Network (CDN) in front of the web application(s).
Use a highly globally scaled DNS provider to thwart and absorb DNS DDoS attacks.
Ensure the application and database architecture automatically scales and/or includes redundancy to ensure the availability of the system during a DoS attack.
| SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION | SC-7 (10) | Boundary Protection | Prevent Exfiltration | (a) Prevent the exfiltration of information; and | ||||
| (b) Conduct exfiltration tests [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. | Prevention of exfiltration applies to both the intentional and unintentional exfiltration of information. Techniques used to prevent the exfiltration of information from systems may be implemented at internal endpoints, external boundaries, and across managed interfaces and include adherence to protocol formats, monitoring for beaconing activity from systems, disconnecting external network interfaces except when explicitly needed, employing traffic profile analysis to detect deviations from the volume and types of traffic expected, call backs to command and control centers, conducting penetration testing, monitoring for steganography, disassembling and reassembling packet headers, and using data loss and data leakage prevention tools. Devices that enforce strict adherence to protocol formats include deep packet inspection firewalls and Extensible Markup Language (XML) gateways. The devices verify adherence to protocol formats and specifications at the application layer and identify vulnerabilities that cannot be detected by devices that operate at the network or transport layers. The prevention of exfiltration is similar to data loss prevention or data leakage prevention and is closely associated with cross-domain solutions and system guards that enforce information flow requirements. | New Added Control | When implementing this control, egress internet access from the system must be limited to an allowed list of domains required for system/service functionality only. This mitigates the opportunity for beaconing, command and control, and data exfiltration | ||||
| SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION | SC-7 (3) | Boundary Protection | Access Points | Limit the number of external network connections to the system. | Limiting the number of external network connections facilitates monitoring of inbound and outbound communications traffic. The Trusted Internet Connection DHS TIC initiative is an example of a federal guideline that requires limits on the number of external network connections. Limiting the number of external network connections to the system is important during transition periods from older to newer technologies (e.g., transitioning from IPv4 to IPv6 network protocols). Such transitions may require implementing the older and newer technologies simultaneously during the transition period and thus increase the number of access points to the system. | Tailoring | Must comply with BOD 23-02. |
Limit access to administrative APIs and ports to specific IPs or networks. Protect network management interfaces from general internal or external network without additional administrative checks. There should be no direct, broad-based access (i.e. must go through a hot point, known system).
SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management Establish and manage cryptographic keys when cryptography is employed within the system in accordance with the following key management requirements: [Assignment: organization-defined requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction]. Cryptographic key management and establishment can be performed using manual procedures or automated mechanisms with supporting manual procedures. Organizations define key management requirements in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and guidelines and specify appropriate options, parameters, and levels. Organizations manage trust stores to ensure that only approved trust anchors are part of such trust stores. This includes certificates with visibility external to organizational systems and certificates related to the internal operations of systems. NIST CMVP and NIST CAVP provide additional information on validated cryptographic modules and algorithms that can be used in cryptographic key management and establishment. SC-12 [In accordance with Federal requirements] SC-12 Guidance: See references in NIST 800-53 documentation.
SC-12 Guidance: Must meet applicable Federal Cryptographic Requirements. See References Section of control.
| SC-12 Guidance: Wildcard certificates may be used internally within the system, but are not permitted for external customer access to the system. | Tailoring | Adhered to NIST and FIPS requirements for key generation, distribution, storage, access, and destruction. | |||||
| SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION | SC-28 (1) | Protection of Information at Rest | Cryptographic Protection | Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of the following information at rest on [Assignment: organization-defined system components or media]: [Assignment: organization-defined information]. | The selection of cryptographic mechanisms is based on the need to protect the confidentiality and integrity of organizational information. The strength of mechanism is commensurate with the security category or classification of the information. Organizations have the flexibility to encrypt information on system components or media or encrypt data structures, including files, records, or fields. | SC-28 (1)-1 [all information system components storing Federal data or system data that must be protected at the High or Moderate impact levels] | SC-28 (1) Guidance: |
Organizations should select a mode of protection that is targeted towards the relevant threat scenarios.
Examples:
A. Organizations may apply full disk encryption (FDE) to a mobile device where the primary threat is loss of the device while storage is locked.
B. For a database application housing data for a single customer, encryption at the file system level would often provide more protection than FDE against the more likely threat of an intruder on the operating system accessing the storage.
C. For a database application housing data for multiple customers, encryption with unique keys for each customer at the database record level may be more appropriate.
| Tailoring | As a cloud SaaS solution, the vendor may need to support a segregated multi-tenant configuration. With any deployment model e.g. shared service, multi-tenant, etc.data stores must be encrypted uniquely per customer agency and keys managed securely to prevent loss of confidentiality for one customer agency does not lead to loss of confidentiality for all customer agencies. For example, agency specific encryption could be configured at a granular field level (e.g. for PII data elements) or fully encrypt all data elements into dedicated cloud storage buckets per customer. Avoid single key encryption solutions. Implement access controls for the keys. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) could provide options. | ||
| SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | SI-3 | Malicious Code Protection | a. Implement [Selection (one or more): signature based; non-signature based] malicious code protection mechanisms at system entry and exit points to detect and eradicate malicious code; |
b. Automatically update malicious code protection mechanisms as new releases are available in accordance with organizational configuration management policy and procedures;
c. Configure malicious code protection mechanisms to:
1. Perform periodic scans of the system [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and real-time scans of files from external sources at [Selection (one or more): endpoint; network entry and exit points] as the files are downloaded, opened, or executed in accordance with organizational policy; and
2. [Selection (one or more): block malicious code; quarantine malicious code; take [Assignment: organization-defined action]]; and send alert to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] in response to malicious code detection; and
d. Address the receipt of false positives during malicious code detection and eradication and the resulting potential impact on the availability of the system. System entry and exit points include firewalls, remote access servers, workstations, electronic mail servers, web servers, proxy servers, notebook computers, and mobile devices. Malicious code includes viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spyware. Malicious code can also be encoded in various formats contained within compressed or hidden files or hidden in files using techniques such as steganography. Malicious code can be inserted into systems in a variety of ways, including by electronic mail, the world-wide web, and portable storage devices. Malicious code insertions occur through the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. A variety of technologies and methods exist to limit or eliminate the effects of malicious code.
Malicious code protection mechanisms include both signature- and nonsignature-based technologies. Nonsignature-based detection mechanisms include artificial intelligence techniques that use heuristics to detect, analyze, and describe the characteristics or behavior of malicious code and to provide controls against such code for which signatures do not yet exist or for which existing signatures may not be effective. Malicious code for which active signatures do not yet exist or may be ineffective includes polymorphic malicious code (i.e., code that changes signatures when it replicates). Nonsignature-based mechanisms also include reputation-based technologies. In addition to the above technologies, pervasive configuration management, comprehensive software integrity controls, and anti-exploitation software may be effective in preventing the execution of unauthorized code. Malicious code may be present in commercial off-the-shelf software as well as custom-built software and could include logic bombs, backdoors, and other types of attacks that could affect organizational mission and business functions.
In situations where malicious code cannot be detected by detection methods or technologies, organizations rely on other types of controls, including secure coding practices, configuration management and control, trusted procurement processes, and monitoring practices to ensure that software does not perform functions other than the functions intended. Organizations may determine that, in response to the detection of malicious code, different actions may be warranted. For example, organizations can define actions in response to malicious code detection during periodic scans, the detection of malicious downloads, or the detection of maliciousness when attempting to open or execute files. SI-3 (a) [signature based and non-signature based] SI-3 (c) (1)-1 [at least weekly] SI-3 (c) (1)-2 [to include endpoints and network entry and exit points] SI-3 (c) (2)-1 [to include blocking and quarantining malicious code] SI-3 (c) (2)-2 [administrator or defined security personnel near-real time] Tailoring Employ end-point detection and response (EDR) solution for all system components where it is technologically feasible to implement.
Includes all components within the system including production, test, development, jump boxes/bastion hosts, user machines/VDIs with direct connection to system components, and internal/external integrations (refer to Section 11 - System Interconnections of FedRAMP Moderate SSP template).
SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY SI-4 System Monitoring a. Monitor the system to detect:
1. Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with the following monitoring objectives: [Assignment: organization-defined monitoring objectives]; and
2. Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections;
b. Identify unauthorized use of the system through the following techniques and methods: [Assignment: organization-defined techniques and methods];
c. Invoke internal monitoring capabilities or deploy monitoring devices:
1. Strategically within the system to collect organization-determined essential information; and
2. At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of interest to the organization;
d. Analyze detected events and anomalies;
e. Adjust the level of system monitoring activity when there is a change in risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation;
f. Obtain legal opinion regarding system monitoring activities; and
| g. Provide [Assignment: organization-defined system monitoring information] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Selection (one or more): as needed; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. | System monitoring includes external and internal monitoring. External monitoring includes the observation of events occurring at external interfaces to the system. Internal monitoring includes the observation of events occurring within the system. Organizations monitor systems by observing audit activities in real time or by observing other system aspects such as access patterns, characteristics of access, and other actions. The monitoring objectives guide and inform the determination of the events. System monitoring capabilities are achieved through a variety of tools and techniques, including intrusion detection and prevention systems, malicious code protection software, scanning tools, audit record monitoring software, and network monitoring software. |
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