A11 - M-5510.1B.pdf

SWRMC M-5510.1B

25 Apr 25

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL

MAINTENANCE CENTER

SECURITY PROGRAM MANUAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CENTER

3755 BRINSER STREET SUITE 1

SAN DIEGO, CA 92136-5299

IN REPLY REFER TO

SWRMC M-5510.1B

25 Apr 25

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CENTER MANUAL 5510.1B

From: Commanding Officer, Southwest Regional Maintenance Center

Subj: SECURITY PROGRAM MANUAL

Ref: (a) DoD 5200.01 (Volumes 1-3), DoD Information Security Program

(b) DoDM 5200.02, Procedures for the DOD Personnel Security Program (PSP)

(c) DoDM 5220.32 Vol. 1 Change 2

(d) DoDD 5205.02E, DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program

(e) SECNAVINST 5510.37, Department of the Navy Insider Threat Program

1. Purpose. To ensure all local security policies are in compliance with higher authority and to implement the associated procedures in a uniform manner, per references (a) through (e).

2. Cancellation. SWRMCINST 3432.1A, SWRMCINST 5510.1C, SWRMCINST 5510.2A, SWRMC M-5510.1A, and SWRMCNOTE 5210.

3. Scope. All personnel assigned to Southwest Regional Maintenance Center (SWRMC;

military, government civilian and embedded contractors) are responsible for implementing the provisions of this manual and should be read in its entirety.

4. Policy

a. The protection of national security information is a fundamental duty of all personnel assigned to SWRMC. Individuals granted access to classified information and/or assigned to sensitive duties are required under the Continuous Evaluation Program (CEP) to notify the Security Manager of any issues that may affect their or their co-workers continued eligibility for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties. Chapter 2 of this manual (Personnel Security) provides the 13 adjudicative guidelines used for determining continued eligibility for classified access or assignment to sensitive duties.

b. While implementing the provisions of this manual, we must remember that an effective security program recognizes that inadequate secrecy allows our adversaries to acquire the information they need to use against us, but that excessive secrecy inhibits our ability to conduct our own operations. Our goal is to achieve a balance that reduces risk to an acceptable level without excessively impeding our mission.

5. Records Management. Records created as a result of this notice, regardless of media or format, must be managed per Secretary of the Navy Manual 5210.1 of September 2019.

6. Review and Effective Date. Per OPNA VINST 5215.17 A, Code 1100 Department Head will review this manual annually around the anniversary of its issuance date to ensure applicability, currency, and consistency with Federal, Department of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and Navy policy and statutory authority using OPNA V 5215/40 Review of Instruction. This manual will be in effect for 10 years, unless revised or cancelled in the interim, and will be reissued by the 10 year anniversary date if it is still required, unless it meets one of the exceptions in OPNAVINST 5215.17A, paragraph 9. Otherwise, if the manual is no longer required, it will be processed for cancellation as soon as the need for cancellation is known following the guidance in OPNAV Manual 5215.1 of May 2016.

7. Forms or Information Management Control. Forms and information collection requirements mandated by this manual are listed in annexes to each chapter where applicable.

B. A. KAROSICH

Releasability and distribution:

This manual is cleared for public release and is available electronically only via SWRMC Command Portal website: https://extra.swrmc.navy.mil

Record of Changes

IDENTIFICATION

OF CORRECTION

OR CHANGE

DATE OF CHANGE

DATE OF ENTRY

ENTERED BY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

CHAPTER 1 SECURITY MANAGEMENT

1000 Cancellation 1-1 1001 Chain of Command 1-1 Commanding Officer 1-1 Activity Security Manager 1-2 Assistant Security Manager 1-2 Personnel Security Branch 1-3 Operations Security Program Manager 1-3 Physical Security Branch 1-4 Information and Industrial Security Branch 1-4 C1110 Org Chart 1-6

CHAPTER 2 PERSONNEL SECURITY

2000 Purpose 2-1 2001 Definitions 2-2 2002 Policy 2-3 2003 Investigations Required for Eligibility and Access 2-3 2004 Information Technology Category Level Description 2-3 2005 Specific Investigative Requirements by Population 2-4 2006 The Bond Amendment 2-9 2007 Procedures 2-9 2008 Personnel Security Investigation Process 2-13 2009 Continuous Evaluation Program 2-14 2010 Request for Medical Evaluation 2-21 2011 Unfavorable Eligibility Determinations 2-22 2012 Unfavorable Determination Process 2-23 2013 Appeals Process 2-25 2014 Personnel Security Boards and Meetings 2-28 2015 Local Risk Management Determination for Unclassified NMCI

Account Access and Flank Speed Email 2-28 2016 Security Clearance Verification Letter 2-29

2017 Loss of CAC Process 2-29 Annex A Local Risk Determination Letter for NMCI Access 2-30

Access Annex B Clearance Verification Letter 2-31

CHAPTER 3 INFORMATION SECURITY

3000 Purpose 3-1 3001 Policy 3-2 3002 Scope 3-2 3003 Responsibilities 3-2

CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

CHAPTER 3 INFORMATION SECURITY (CONTINUED)

3004 Action 3-3 3005 Classifying Information 3-4 3006 Original Classification Authority 3-5 3007 Challenges to Classification 3-5 3008 Declassification and Changes in Classification 3-5 3009 Marking Classified Information 3-6 3010 Protection of Classified Information 3-9 3011 Storage 3-10 3012 Transmission and Transportation of Classified Information 3-14 3013 Classified Meetings 3-17 3014 Reproduction 3-19 3015 Destruction 3-19 3016 Emergency Plan 3-22 3017 INFOSEC Security Education Training and Awareness 3-25 3018 Clean Desk Policy 3-25 3019 Security Incidents Involving Classified Information 3-26 3020 IT Issues for the Security Manager 3-29 3021 Required Encryption of Unclassified Data 3-29 3022 Personally Identifiable Information 3-30 3023 Controlled Unclassified Information 3-30 Annex A Courier Authorization Card 3-32 Annex B Checklist for Classified Meetings 3-34

CHAPTER 4 INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

4000 Policy 4-1 4001 References 4-1 4002 Responsibilities 4-2 4003 Classified Access Contracts 4-4 4004 Controlled Unclassified Information 4-4 4005 Personally Identifiable Information 4-4 4006 Contract Security Classification Specification (DD-254) 4-4 4007 Disclosures to SWRMC Contractors Contractor Related Security 4-9 Violations 4008 Contractor Facility Clearances 4-9 4009 Personnel Security Clearance Under the National Industrial 4-9 Security Program 4010 Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence 4-10 4011 National Interest Determination 4-11

CHAPTER 5 SECURITY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

5000 Purpose 5-1 5001 Policy 5-1

CHAPTER TITLE PAGE

CHAPTER 5 SECURITY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (CONTINUED)

5002 Responsibilities 5-1 5003 Action 5-1

CHAPTER 6 OPERATIONS SECURITY

6000 Policy 6-1

CHAPTER 7 INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM

7000 Policy 7-1

CHAPTER 8 ANTITERRORISM

8000 Policy 8-1

CHAPTER 9 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS

9000 Purpose 9-1 9001 Scope 9-1 9002 Responsibilities/Actions 9-1 9003 Foreign Intelligence Entities and Insider Threats – Contacts, Activities, Indicators, and Behaviors: Reportable 9-2 Indicators

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SECURITY MANAGEMENT

References

(a) SECNAV M-5510.30C, Department of the Navy Personnel Security Program

(b) SECNAVINST 5510.37A, Department of the Navy Insider Threat Program

(c) OPNAVINST 5530.14E (CH-3), Navy Physical Security and Law Enforcement Program

(d) NAVSEAINST 3432.1A, Operations Security

(e) DoD 4500.54-G, Foreign Clearance Guide

(f) DoD 5200.01 (Volumes 1-3), DoD Information Security Program

(g) SECNAV M-5510.36B, Department of the Navy Information Security Program Manual

(h) DoDI 5200.48 Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)

1000 Cancellation

(a) SWRMCINST 5510.2A Personnel Security (PERSEC) Program

(b) SWRMCINST 5510.1C Information Security (INFOSEC) Manual

(c) SWRMCINST 3423.1A Operations Security (OPSEC) Program

1001 Chain of Command

1. Commanding Officer, Southwest Regional Maintenance Center.

a. The Commanding Officer (CO), Southwest Regional Maintenance Center (SWRMC), is responsible for compliance with and implementation of the Navy’s security programs within SWRMC, per references (a) through (h). The CO is directly supported in this task by the Activity Security Manager (ASM), Activity Assistant Security Manager (AASM), and the staff of the Security Management Office (Code 1110).

b. Appoint in writing the following:

(1) Activity Security Manager/Security Officer

(2) Activity Assistant Security Manager

(3) Information Systems Security Manager

(4) Antiterrorism Officer (ATO)

(5) Operations Security Program Manager (PM)

(6) Key Control Officer

(7) Information Security and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Security PM

CHAPTER 1:

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2. The ASM will:

a. Be appointed in writing and delegated the authority and responsibility for the effective management of SWRMC’s Security Programs per reference (a).

b. The ASM will act as the CO’s representative on all matters pertaining to the command security program and establishes, administers, oversees, implements, and evaluates policy required for the proper management of the SWRMC Security Programs.

c. The ASM is afforded direct access to the CO and administratively reports to the department head, corporate operations, and deputy department head is the First Line Supervisor (Code 1100).

d. Per reference (a), develop, implement, direct, evaluate, and conduct oversight of security strategies, policies, processes, and procedures for SWRMC.

e. Establish the Physical Security (PHYSEC) Office (Code 1111). The PHYSEC office is a direct report to the ASM.

f. Establish the Personnel Security (PERSEC) Office (Code 1112). The PERSEC office reports to the AASM.

g. Establish the Operations Security (OPSEC) Program Code 1110B. The OPSEC Program office is a direct report to the ASM.

h. Establish the Information Security Program (ISP) and Industrial Security (INDSEC) Program (Code 1113). The ISP and INDSEC programs report to the AASM.

3. The AASM (Code 1110A) will:

a. Ensure coordination and dissemination of SWRMC security-related policies throughout the command and assist in implementation.

b. Oversee the SWRMC Security Education Training and Awareness (SETA) Program through initial, annual refresher, and other periodic informational, educational, and awareness enhancement opportunities. The SETA Program will include general security orientation briefings to new employees and supervisors, disseminating updated policies and best practices, and seize opportunities to enhance security awareness at SWRMC.

c. Assist in the management of the OPSEC program to identify critical information and deny adversary insight to NAVSEA's technologies, planning, processes, and operations. Per reference (d), the OPSEC PM is functionally responsible for administering the OPSEC Program within SWRMC and acts as the CO’s representative on all matters pertaining to OPSEC. The SWRMC OPSEC PM will provide guidance, oversight, and assessments of OPSEC requirements, and review Department of Defense (DoD) Contract Security Classification Specification DD Form 254s (DD-254) submitted for OPSEC compliance.

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d. Provide training and awareness briefings as requested by the ASM.

4. The OPSEC Manager/Privacy Act (PA) Coordinator/Personally Identifiable Information (PII) PM (Code 1110B) will:

a. Manage and execute the OPSEC program to identify critical information and deny adversary insight to NAVSEA's technologies, planning, processes, and operations. Per reference (d), the OPSEC PM is functionally responsible for administering the OPSEC Program within SWRMC and acts as the CO’s representative on all matters pertaining to OPSEC. The SWRMC OPSEC PM will provide guidance, oversight, and assessments of OPSEC requirements, and review DoD DD-254 submitted for OPSEC compliance and all unclassified contracts identified for review.

b. Manage and execute the PA/PII Programs per higher directives and ensure that all actions are being carried out and adhered to.

5. The PERSEC Branch (Code 1112) will:

a. Function under the direct supervision of the AASM.

b. Ensure personnel who handle classified information and will be assigned to sensitive duties are appropriately vetted through coordination with the adjudicating facilities and requests for Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) are properly prepared, submitted, and monitored.

c. Ensure access to classified information is limited to those who are eligible and have a verified “Need to Know” (NTK).

d. Ensure PSI, clearances, and accesses are properly recorded.

e. Coordinate the command program for continuous evaluation of eligibility for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.

f. Provide training and awareness briefings as requested by the ASM for the SETA Program.

g. Execute the SWRMC SETA Program through initial, annual refresher, and other periodic informational, educational, and awareness enhancement opportunities. The SETA Program will include general security orientation briefings to new employees and supervisors, coordination of annual counterintelligence (CI) briefings, disseminating updated policies and best practices, and seize opportunities to enhance security awareness at SWRMC.

h. Track all Defense Information System for Security (DISS) Visit Requests via the SWRMC portal and submit through DISS.

i. Track all (civilian and military) Foreign Travel notifications via the SWRMC portal and submit into respective DISS records.

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6. The Physical Security (Code 1111) Branch Head will:

a. Function under the direct supervision of the ASM.

b. Be designated, in writing, as the ATO.

c. Manage the Antiterrorism Force Protection (AT/FP) Program. The purpose of the program is to detect and prevent terrorist attacks against SWRMC personnel, their families, facilities, and infrastructure critical to the mission accomplishment. The ATO will assist the Insider Threat Program by leveraging AT/FP techniques to deter, detect, and mitigate insider threats before damage is done to national security, personnel, resources, and capabilities per reference (b).

d. Manage the Key & Lock Control Program for the maintenance and control of keys, locks, and safes per reference (c). The program is designed to prevent, deter, and detect compromises of classified information, secure areas, and equipment that fall under the jurisdiction of SWRMC’s loss prevention objective.

e. Manage the Physical Security program in the application of security measures to protect personnel, assets, facilities, and information; prevent, deter, and detect compromises of classified information. The Physical Security Program is concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, prevent unauthorized access to equipment, materials, documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

f Control access to and movement within SWRMC through an Access Control Program. The common access card (CAC) is the primary credential for access to SWRMC spaces. The Physical Security Office will encode CAC’s in accordance with the Access Control standard operating procedure. The SWRMC portal is the primary system of record to request access and requires departmental approval. Access to restricted areas must also be approved via departmental approvers, for NTK, and in coordination with PERSEC for background investigation status.

g. Establish and manage a Foreign Travel Program (FTP). The physical security office will ensure SWRMC travelers comply with all applicable directives for foreign travel.

h. Provide training and awareness briefings as requested by the ASM for the SETA program.

7. The SWRMC Information and Industrial Security Branch (Code 1113) will:

a. In the classification management role, conduct training and provide guidance on the proper use of classification terms, inadvertent disclosure, and proper use of classification levels.

Conduct classification and declassification reviews, as requested.

b. Oversee the investigation of classified electronic spillages and potential compromise of classified information.

c. INDSEC Lead will serve as the Security Contracting Official (SCO) for Security matters.

Certify DD-254s, monitor processing of applicable DD-254s submitted to SWRMC OPSEC PM, 1-5 verify contractor facility clearances, and monitor disclosure of SWRMC information to contractors.

d. Ensure marking, safeguarding, dissemination, transmission, transportation, storage, and destruction of classified information is in compliance with governing directives. This includes program implementation, oversight and evaluation, as well as making assessments as part of security violation investigations.

e. The Information Security PM must be designated, in writing, as the CUI Coordinator.

f. Provide training and awareness briefings as requested by the ASM for the SETA program.

8. Written appointments will be submitted to the NAVSEA 00P Director of Security Programs and updated whenever changed.

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SECURITY MANAGEMENT OFFICE

CODE 1110 ORG CHART

ACTIVITY SECURITY

MANAGER/SECURITY

OFFICER

CODE 1110

Personnel Security Specialist

CODE 1112

Physical Security Branch Head

CODE 1111

Personnel Security Specialist

Industrial Security Specialist

INFOSEC/INDSEC

Lead

CODE 1113

Industrial Security Specialist

Physical Security Specialist

Physical Security Specialist

Physical Security Specialist

Personnel Security Specialist

Industrial Security Specialist

Physical Security Specialist

Personnel Security Specialist Industrial Security

Specialist

Personnel Security Specialist

ASSISTANT ACTIVITY

SECURITY MANAGER

CODE 1110A

Operations Security Program Manager

CODE 1110B

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PERSONNEL SECURITY

References:

(a) SECNAVINST 5510.30C, DON Personnel Security Program Instruction

(b) SECNAV M-5510.30, DON Personnel Security Program Manual

(c) Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information

(d) Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information

(e) Executive Order 13467, as amended, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for

Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information

(f) DoDM 5200.02, Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP)

(g) Title 5, CFR 732 National Security Positions

(h) SECNAV M-5510.36B, DON Information Security Program Manual

(i) DoDINST 5220.22-M, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM)

(j) NAVSUPINST 4650.7, Navy Policies for Operation and Management of the Government

Travel Charge Card

(k) NAVSUPINST 4200.99C, DON Government-Wide Commercial Purchase Card Program

Policy

(l) MILPERSMAN 1910-156, Separation by Reason of Unsatisfactory Performance

(m) MILPERSMAN 1910-133, Failure to Complete Change of Rating (Conversion)

(n) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors

(o) DoDI 1000.13, Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed Services, Their

Dependents and Other Eligible Individuals

(p) ODNI SEAD 4 National Security Adjudicative Guidelines

(q) ALNAV 001/16, Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information or Controlled

Unclassified Information on DON Information Systems

(r) Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency Personnel Security Management Office for

Industry (PSMO-I) website

(s) Title 5, CFR 1400, Designation of National Security Positions in the Competitive Service and

Related Matters

(t) OPNAVINST 5350.4E, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control

(u) OPNAVINST 1752.2C, Family Advocacy Program

(v) USD (C3I) Memo dtd 4 Nov 02, Suspension of Access to Classified Information Due to

Abuse or Misuse of Government Charge Cards

(w) DODI 8500.01 Cybersecurity

(x) DoD 5400.11-R Department of Defense Privacy Program

Annexes:

Annex A: Risk Mitigation Letter for NMCI Access and Flank Speed Email Annex B: Security Clearance Verification Letter

2000 Purpose

1. Per references (a) through (w), the objective of the Personnel Security Program (PSP) is to authorize initial and continued access to classified information and/or initial and continued assignment to sensitive duties to those persons whose loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness

CHAPTER 2:

2-2 are such that entrusting them with classified information or assigning them to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Additionally, the PSP ensures that no final unfavorable personnel security determination will be made without compliance with all procedural requirements provided in reference (b).

2. The SWRMC ASM is responsible for implementation of the PSP on behalf of the CO.

2001 Definitions

1. A “Security Clearance” is comprised of several unique components:

a. Access: The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. An individual, in fact, may have access to classified information by being in a place where such information is kept, if the security measures that are in force do not prevent the individual from gaining knowledge of such information. Access is managed locally and may be withdrawn by the CO whenever the CO determines an employee access to classified material is not consistent with the best interests of national security.

b. Eligibility: The Defense CI and Security Agency Adjudication Vetting Services (DCSA AVS) determines security clearance eligibility. DCSA AVS adjudicates security clearance eligibility for military, civilian, and contractor personnel based upon a favorable review of a standardized PSI, that an individual meets National Security Adjudicative Standards per reference (c), and is therefore eligible for access to classified national security information or assignment/retention in sensitive national security duties, or other designated duties requiring national security investigation and adjudication. Once eligibility is determined, the cleared employee maintains compliance with the personnel security standards and has no break in service exceeding 24 months, eligibility remains valid.

c. Need-to-Know: A determination made by an authorized holder of classified information that a prospective recipient requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist in the performance of lawful and authorized government function essential to fulfillment of an official U. S. Government program. Knowledge, possession of, or access to, classified information will not be afforded to any individual solely by virtue of the individual’s office, rank, position, or security clearance eligibility. At SWRMC, need-to-know is generally established by a supervisor in support of an authorized work effort. In accessing classified information outside of SWRMC, a visit request is submitted through the DISS to communicate access, eligibility, and need-to-know to the supporting activity.

d. Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA): An agreement between an individual, who will be permitted access to classified national security information, and the U. S. Government, acknowledging and agreeing to obligations for protecting national security information. Per reference (f) employees must sign the Classified Information NDA (SF-312) prior to being granted access to classified information or materials. The President established this requirement in reference (d), which states, "All persons with authorized access to classified information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access." Cleared personnel who have signed an earlier nondisclosure agreement, the SF-189, need not sign the SF-312, but they may elect to replace their SF-189 with a signed SF-312. The SF-189 and 312 are maintained for 50 years from the date of signature.

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2002 Policy

1. When any one of the above components of a security clearance is missing, access cannot occur. As each component is independently necessary and vital to access to classified information, they will frequently be referred to independently and distinctly throughout the remainder of this manual in order to better articulate the issue impacting a security clearance.

Where the term clearance is used, it will be understood to necessarily require all four components.

2. Only U. S. citizens who are either members of the executive branch of the U. S. Government or employees of contractors under the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) are potentially eligible for security eligibility. No distinction is made between U. S. citizens by birth, U. S. nationals, or those who acquired citizenship through naturalization.

2003 Investigations Required for Eligibility and Access

1. Top Secret (TS)

a. Initial: Tier 5 (T5)

b. Re-Investigation: Tier 5R (T5R)

2. Secret

a. Initial: Tier 3 (T3)

b. Re-Investigation: Tier 3 (T3R)

2004 Information Technology (IT) Category Level Descriptions

1. IT-I Position (Privileged Access) include those in which the incumbent has:

a. Responsibility for the development and administration of government computer security programs, including direction and control of risk analysis and/or threat assessment.

b. Been designated as the Information Assurance Manager or Information Assurance Officer.

c. Significant involvement in life-critical or mission-critical systems.

d. Responsibility for the preparation or approval of data for input into a system, which does not necessarily involve personal access to the system, but with relatively high risk for effecting grave damage or realizing significant personal gain.

e. Relatively high-risk assignments associated with or directly involving the accounting, disbursement, or authorization for disbursement from systems of:

(1) dollar amounts of $10 million per year or greater, or

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(2) lesser amounts if the activities of the individual are not subject to technical review by higher authority in the IT-I category to ensure the integrity of the system.

f. Positions involving major responsibility for the direction, planning, design, testing, maintenance, operation, monitoring, and/or management of systems hardware and software.

g. Other positions as designated by the CO that involve relatively high risk for effecting grave damage or realizing significant personal gain.

2. IT-II Position (Limited Privilege) includes those in which the incumbent has:

a. Responsibility for systems design, operation, testing, maintenance, and/or monitoring that is carried out under technical review of higher authority in the IT-I category.

b. Access to and/or processing of proprietary data, information requiring protection under the PA of 1974, and government-developed privileged information involving the award of contracts.

Access to the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and Flank Speed E-mail constitutes access to the information described in this paragraph.

c. Accounting, disbursement or authorization for disbursement, from systems of dollar amounts less than $10 million per year.

d. Other positions are designated by the CO that involve a degree of access to a system that creates a significant potential for damage or personal gain less than that in IT-I positions.

3. IT-III Position (Non-Privileged)

2005 Specific Investigative Requirements by Population

1. Government Civilian (Civil Service).

a. Civilian Positions and Sensitivity Levels. Consistent with references (a) and (g), all SWRMC civilian position designations (PD) are designated as National Security Positions and involve activities of the U. S. Government that are concerned with the protection of the nation from foreign aggression or espionage, including development of defense plans or policies, intelligence or counter-intelligence activities, and related activities concerned with the preservation of the military strength of the U. S. All civilian positions will be designated with a sensitivity level. Civilian position sensitivity will not be downgraded solely to facilitate recruitment or retention of personnel or to accommodate adverse security determinations. There are three levels of sensitivity that pertain to civilian personnel in national security positions:

(1) Special-Sensitive (SS): A SS national security position is one with potential for inestimable damage to national security or for inestimable adverse impact to the efficiency of the Department or the Military Departments. This includes:

(a) Positions requiring eligibility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.

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(b) Positions requiring eligibility for access to unique or uniquely productive intelligence-related SS information or involvement in a Special Access Program (SAP).

(c) DON designated IT-Designated Approving Authority positions due to inherent exceptional privilege and exceptional control risk levels.

(d) Any other civilian position the CO determines to be at a higher level than critical-sensitive (CS) due to special requirements that complement references (c) and (e).

(2) CS: Any civilian national security position that has the potential to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security including, but not limited to:

(a) Positions requiring eligibility for access to TS or Department of Energy (DOE) “Q” level classified information.

(b) Positions involving development or approval of war plans, major or special operations of war, or critical and extremely important items of war.

(c) National security policymaking or policy-determining positions, the duties of which have the potential to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

(d) Positions involving investigative duties, including handling of CI investigations or background investigations, the nature of which has the potential to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

(e) Positions related to the adjudication, recommendation of adjudicative determinations, or granting of national security eligibility.

(f) Positions involving duty on personnel security boards.

(g) Positions concerned with development or approval of plans, policies, or programs that affect overall DoD or DoD component operations.

(h) Positions related to the conduct of CI activities.

(i) Senior management positions in key programs, the compromise of which could result in grave damage to national security.

(j) Positions having direct involvement with diplomatic relations and negotiations.

(k) Positions involving independent responsibility for planning or approving continuity of government operations.

(l) Positions involving major and immediate responsibility for, and the ability to act independently without detection to compromise or export the protection, control, and safety of the nation’s borders and ports or immigration or customs control or policies, where there is a potential to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

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(m) Positions involving major and immediate responsibility for and the ability to act independently without detection to compromise or export the design, installation, operation, or maintenance of critical infrastructure systems or programs.

(n) Positions in which the occupant has the ability to independently damage public health and safety with devastating results.

(o) Positions in which the occupant has the ability to independently compromise or export biological select agents or toxins, chemical agents, nuclear materials, or other hazardous materials.

(p) Positions in which the occupant has the ability to independently compromise or export the nation’s nuclear or chemical weapons designs or systems.

(q) Positions in which the occupant obligates, expends, collects, or controls revenue, funds, or items with monetary value in excess of $50 million, or procures or secures funding for goods or services with monetary value in excess of $50 million annually, with the potential for exceptionally grave damage to national security.

(r) In support of reference (q), positions in which the occupant has unlimited access to and control over unclassified information, which may include private, proprietary, or other CUI, but only where the unauthorized disclosure of that information could cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

(s) Positions in which the occupant has direct, unrestricted control over supplies of arms, ammunition, or explosives or control over any weapons of mass destruction.

(t) Positions in which the occupant has unlimited access to or control of access to designated restricted areas or restricted facilities that maintain national security information classified at the TS or “Q” level.

(u) Positions working with significant life-critical or mission-critical systems, such that compromise or exportation of those systems would cause exceptionally grave damage to essential government operations or national infrastructure.

(v) Department of the Navy (DON) designated IT-I positions due to inherent privileged access risk levels.

(w) Positions in which the occupant conducts internal or external investigation, inquiries, or audits related to the functions associated with SS and Critical Sensitive Positions, where the occupant’s neglect, action, or inaction could cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

(x) Any other position designated by the Command.

(2) Non-Critical Sensitive (NCS): Any civilian national security position that has the potential to cause significant or serious damage to national security. This may include civilian national security positions:

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(a) Requiring eligibility for access to SECRET or DOE “L” level information.

(b) Not requiring eligibility for access to classified information, but having the potential to cause significant or serious damage to national security.

(c) With access to automated systems that contain military active duty, guard, or reservists’ PII or information pertaining to Service Members that is otherwise protected from disclosure per reference (x), where such access has the potential to cause serious damage to national security.

(d) DON designated IT-II positions due to inherent limited privileged, sensitive information access risk levels.

(e) Any other position designated by the Command.

b. Civilian Positions and Investigative Requirements

(1) SS and CS. Civilian personnel in SS and CS positions require a favorably adjudicated T5 background investigation (BI).

(2) Noncritical-sensitive. Civilian personnel in noncritical-sensitive positions require a favorably adjudicated T3 BI.

2. Military Personnel

a. The appointment, enlistment, and induction of each member of the military departments or their Reserve components will be based on a favorably adjudicated PSI.

b. A T3 or its equivalent is the minimum investigation required for entry into the military and must be maintained per reference (a).

c. A T3 or its equivalent, will be conducted upon re-entry to any military department component when there has been a break in service longer than 24 months.

3. Positions of Trust

a. Contractors who occupy a position of trust and do not require eligibility to access classified information, but do require access to sensitive or CUI, will be required to undergo a background investigation.

b. The Facility Security Office (FSO) from a contractor's company, that holds a current DD- 254 with SWRMC, is required to initiate and submit the employee’s electronic application (e- App). Facility Security Office’s from a contractor that does not hold a DD-254 with SWRMC, will provide the employee details per reference (i) to the PERSEC branch so a National Background Investigative Service (NBIS) e-App can be initiated.

c. Contractors who require IT-I or IT-II and do not have a current T3 or T5 investigation will follow the procedures in section 2007.

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d. Contractors who require IT-III will complete the SF-86 for a T3 investigation.

e. PERSEC will initiate an e-App.

f. Contractors must thoroughly complete the SF-86, answering all questions. No information may be omitted. PERSEC will review the SF-86.

g. When complete, PERSEC will submit the SF-86 to DCSA for investigation. Defense CI and Security Agency will complete the investigation and if no derogatory information is found, DCSA AVS will make a favorable position of trust determination.

h. When questionable or unfavorable information is discovered during a T3 investigation, DCSA AVS will forward the investigative results to the Command for a local determination.

The SWRMC Security Manager will be responsible for making local determinations.

4. Emergency Appointments. If the appointee does not have the necessary investigative basis for appointment, he/she may be placed in a non-critical sensitive position only as an emergency measure after the CO determines that delay in appointment would be harmful to national security (not to exceed 180 days), the T3 has been requested, favorable fingerprint result received, and a check of locally available records is favorable. The CO's justification for the emergency appointment will be recorded in writing. Commands must maintain a central file of all emergency appointments for review during security and personnel management evaluations. The record of emergency appointments will include:

a. Identifying data on the appointee to include full name, social security number, date and place of birth, position or job title.

b. Organizational location of the position.

c. Position sensitivity and designation criterion.

d. Certification and justification by the CO that emergency appointment is necessary.

(In determining whether emergency appointment is justified, a delay in appointment may be considered harmful to national security if regulatory requirements and mission-essential functions or responsibilities cannot be met, and no other cleared or otherwise qualified personnel are available on a temporary basis to do the work.)

e. A statement that a check of locally available records was favorable.

f. The date that the required BI was requested. For a CS position, the record will also include the date of the T3 that formed the basis for emergency appointment.

g. To keep emergency appointments to the absolute minimum, activities must anticipate the need to fill a sensitive position and request the required investigation sufficiently in advance of the desired date of appointment.

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h. Additional investigative requirements for assignment to selected job series or duties are established and authorized by reference (a), which documents the requirements used for BI planning and budgeting.

i. Mobilization. For the purpose of mobilizing selected civilian annuitants under reference

(a) with a break in active service greater than 24 months, investigative requirements will be expedited or waived, depending on the sensitivity of the position. Priority will be afforded to mobilized re-employed annuitants being assigned to intelligence and security activities with respect to granting security clearances.

2006 The Bond Amendment

1. The Bond Amendment repeals 10 U. S. C. Section 996 (formerly known as the Smith Amendment). The Bond Amendment imposes restrictions that are similar to those formerly applied under the Smith Amendment, however, they are now applicable to all federal government agencies.

2. The Bond Amendment prohibits any federal agency from granting or renewing security eligibility for any covered person who is an unlawful user of a controlled substance or is an addict. This prohibition applies to all clearances. For the purpose of this prohibition:

a. An unlawful user of a controlled substance is a person who uses a controlled substance and has lost the power of self-control with reference to the use of a controlled substance and any person who is a current user of a controlled substance in a manner other than as prescribed by a licensed physician.

NOTE: State laws allowing the sale, possession, and consumption of Marijuana (Cannabis), even for medical purposes, do not exempt an individual from the Bond Amendment. Federal law lists marijuana as a Schedule 1 controlled substance.

b. "Use" includes any use recent enough to indicate that the individual is actively engaged in such conduct and is an addict (lost the power of self-control or habitual user).

c. An "addict" of a controlled substance is any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger public morale, health, safety, or welfare; or is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his/her addiction.

2007 Procedures

1. The appropriate level of background investigation and suitability adjudication for military personnel is determined by their:

a. Rating (military occupational Specialty) or,

b. Assigned billet

2. The appropriate level of background investigation and suitability adjudication for federal

2-10 civilian positions are designated according to potential risk. Sensitive positions must be formally designated for federal civilians according to the position sensitivity level. The supervisor in coordination with the Human Resources Office (HRO) and the Manpower Division will conduct the following tasks:

a. Review PD for accuracy and adequacy.

b. Identify any changes to the position description and update as necessary; should be done regularly and with every Request for Personnel Action (RPA) or classification action.

c. Identify appropriate level of access (record in block 24 of OF8; see Figure 1).

Figure 1 Identifying level of access in OF8

d. Use the Position Designation Tool (PDT) developed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to determine the appropriate sensitivity level and submit a copy of the PDT to the Manpower Division for retention with the position description per reference (s).

(1) Record sensitivity level in block 12 of OF8.

Figure 2 Position Sensitivity Level

(2) Annotate clearance eligibility requirements as a condition of employment in the body of the position description: “This is a <Noncritical Sensitive OR Critical Sensitive> position that requires the incumbent to obtain and maintain security clearance eligibility at the <Secret OR Top Secret> level”.

24. Remarks Access required: SECRET

25. Description of Major Duties and Responsibilities (See Attached)

NSN 7540-00-634-4265 Previous Edition Usable 5008-106

11. Position Is 12. Sensitivity

D Supervisory □ 1--Non-

Sensitive D Managerial

2--Noncritical

□Neither Sensitive

OF 8 (Rev. 1-85) U.S. Office of Personnel Management FPM Chapter 295

D 3--Critical -

□ 4--Special

Sensitive I

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NOTE: Any determinations of “Non-Sensitive” requires review by the PERSEC Branch prior to submission to Manpower Division for classification or RPA. Personnel occupying “non-sensitive” billets are not authorized access to unclassified NMCI and Flank Speed E-mail will not be granted access without submission of the proper background investigation and processing of an updated PD sensitivity designation.

3. Interim Access

a. Civilian and Military Personnel

(1) In the absence of adverse information, the CO may grant interim access to civilians and military personnel pending completion of full investigative requirements and pending establishment of security clearance eligibility by the DCSA AVS via risk management decision supporting access signed by direction. Interim access is an exception to the requirement for a completed BI and eligibility determination prior to access. Interim access is a stopgap measure taken to minimize operational impact. As such, compensatory security measures are required, and will generally involve the supervisor monitoring and limiting access to classified materials based on a strict need-to-know basis.

(2) Interim access employees shall not be afforded open/close privileges or be the first employees to arrive or the last to leave; they should be shadowed by appropriately cleared personnel until such time as they are granted final security clearance eligibility commensurate with their assignment.

(3) Interim secret access requires:

(a) A favorable review of the e-APP questionnaire revealing no derogatory information;

and

(b) The submission of an appropriate investigative request to DCSA.

b. Industrial Contractor Personnel

(1) Per reference (i), industrial contractor personnel applying for TOP SECRET or SECRET security clearance eligibility may be routinely granted temporary eligibility by FSO as appropriate, provided there is no evidence of adverse information of material significance.

(2) Non-U. S. citizens are not eligible for access to classified information on a temporary basis.

(3) Temporary eligibility for SECRET access is valid for classified information at the level of the eligibility granted, except for Restricted Data (RD), Communication Security information, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) information. Temporary eligibility for TOP SECRET access is valid for TOP SECRET information, RD, NATO information, and Communication Security (COMSEC) information at the SECRET level.

(4) Per reference (r), the decision to issue temporary TOP SECRET or SECRET eligibility

2-12 is made per reference (r) adjudicator who considers the same guidelines used to determine whether or not to grant a final personnel security clearance (PCL). Temporary TOP SECRET or SECRET eligibility will be issued only where facts and circumstances indicate access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security interest of the U. S.

(5) All applicants for a PCL submitted by a cleared contractor will be routinely considered for a temporary eligibility. Industry temporary Secret determinations will be based on the following:

(a) Acceptable proof of citizenship,

(b) A favorable review of a completed SF-86,

(c) A favorable review of local personnel, base, military police, medical, and security records as applicable,

(d) An appropriate investigation opened by the Investigation Service Provider, and favorable review of the Federal Bureau Investigations Criminal History Report (fingerprint report).

(6) Temporary TOP SECRET or SECRET determinations will be processed after the DCSA PMSO-I submits the investigation request to the DCSA and receives the fingerprint results. Temporary eligibility will permit the individual to have access to most of the classified information needed to perform his/her duties.

(7) Temporary eligibility will generally remain in effect until an investigation is completed, at which time the applicant is considered for a final eligibility.

4. Civilian New Hire Pre-Screenings. A security assessment pre-screening is required for all potential SWRMC civilian employees before the applicant may begin employment.

a. U. S. Pacific Fleet Human Resources Office (PACFLT HRO) will initiate the request for a security assessment pre-screening of the applicant. PACFLT HRO will provide the Position Designation Package (PDP) and the OF 306 to the SWRMC PERSEC Branch. SWRMC Civilian Manpower Branch will not establish an entry-on-duty date until SWRMC PERSEC has favorably assessed the applicant.

b. PERSEC will review DISS record to ensure the applicant has the necessary investigative basis and security clearance eligibility.

c. PERSEC will initiate an NBIS e-App for applicants without the proper background investigation and/or eligibility for the position indicated on the corresponding PDP. The purpose of the investigation is to show the applicant's characteristics of reliability, trustworthiness, and loyalty to U. S. Government.

d. The applicant must thoroughly complete the e-App, answering all questions. Information may not be omitted, except in such instances as when the question does not specifically pertain

2-13 to the applicant. Failure or refusal to fully answer all questions truthfully will result in an unfavorable suitability determination. Once an applicant has completed and submitted the e- App, PERSEC will review it prior to determine eligibility for interim access.

e. PERSEC will notify HRO by e-mail of the results of the applicant’s security assessment pre-screening. If potentially adverse information is identified, PERSEC will advise HRO whether the applicant is eligible for interim access to classified material and/or assignment to sensitive duties and provide a risk assessment of the likelihood of a successful adjudication of their PSI package. HRO will subsequently advise the applicant’s hiring manager of these results for consideration when making a final hiring decision.

2008 PSI Process

1. The term PSI describes an inquiry by an investigative agency into an individual’s activities for the specific purpose of making a clearance eligibility determination.

2. There are numerous types of PSIs with various scopes. Reference (h) will assist in determining the type of investigation necessary for appointment, reappointment, or assignment to sensitive positions, and level of security clearance needed.

3. Requests for PSI

a. Submit requests for PSIs to PERSEC.

b. Once the need for an investigation or continuous vetting is validated, PERSEC will provide an e-mail notification for the subject to complete an NBIS e-App questionnaire.. Once initiated, personnel must complete and release their investigative questionnaire within 30 calendar days. If 30 days have surpassed from the date of the e-mail notification and the questionnaire has not been completed, the subject may lose the ability to access government computers, building, work area, and access to classified material and systems. In addition, subjects who are non-compliant may be added to the delinquent list, and a “Non-Compliant” incident may be reported to DCSA.

c. When the e-App has been properly completed, PERSEC will review, approve, and forward the completed questionnaire to the investigating agency. PERSEC will request additional information as necessary to support investigative and/or adjudicative information requirements.

2009 Continuous Evaluation Program (CEP)

1. By definition, CEP involves the uninterrupted assessment of an individual for retention of a security clearance eligibility or continuing assignment to sensitive duties. Reference (p) establishes the single, common adjudicative criteria for all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. Annex G of this document outlines the 13 Adjudicative Guidelines that form the structure of CEP.

2. All civilian, military, and embedded contract employees at SWRMC fall under CEP. Per

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