TE-35__FY_15_Key_Observations_(final).pdf

UNCLASSIFIED

MCTP FY15 KEY OBSERVATIONS

DECISIVE ACTION EXERCISES

COL EDWARD T. BOHNEMANN

COMMANDER, MCTP

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

APRIL 4, 2016

MCTP FY15 Key Observations

Mission Command Training Program’s (MCTP) key observations expresses the impressions collected by its observers, coaches, trainers (OC/Ts) during training exercises throughout fiscal year (FY) 2015. The information within this document comprises the most recent and salient points distilled from multi-echelon, multi-component, mission command training exercises conducted in the decisive action training environment (DATE). The authors, a collaborative group of field grade OC/Ts, wrote their observations not only for future training audiences, but for all brigade through corps commands and staffs. Therefore, this document seeks to increase readiness by serving as a resource for commands and staffs to use in home station training, whether in preparation for a MCTP exercise or an operational mission.

MCTP linked these key observations to three major mission command challenges that permeate throughout warfighter exercises (WFXs), brigade WFXs (BWFXs) and Army Service Component Command (ASCC) exercises: defining the corps versus division versus brigade fights (U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-94: Theater Army, Corps and Division Operations), understanding and correctly applying operational frameworks (Army Doctrine and Training Publication (ADRP) 3-0:

Unified Land Operations (ULO)), and using processes and procedures to support the commander’s decision making (ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process; FM 6-0: Commander and Staff organization and Operations). The key observations in this paper will illuminate the prevalence of these three challenges. For example, in the case of defining the fights, division staffs often become absorbed by river crossings because of a tendency to assume coordination and execution responsibilities for brigade level tasks, losing the opportunity to shape future operations. An underdeveloped application of operational frameworks leads to improper employment of the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), creating issues in the security area. Division battle rhythms inundated with working group meetings struggle to maintain the operational tempo required to support their commander’s decision making.

These examples and others in this paper are key observations of mission command challenges.

MCTP tied recommendations to the key observations, referencing doctrine but also selecting best practices of ULO in DATE. As such, MCTP publishes this paper with the desire to enhance commands’ and staffs’ performance of mission command and to promote the continued development of our Army’s most senior leaders.

Decisive Victory!

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. Mission Command

1.1. Conducting Effective IPB/MA during Operations

1.2. Organizing to Maintain Flexibility during a Decisive Action Fight

1.3. Understanding Decision Points

1.4. Orders Transitions

1.5. Capturing and Disseminating Commander’s Guidance

1.6. Accounting for Mission Command System Challenges during Offensive Operations

1.7. Roles and responsibilities of the NCO

1.8. Understanding Critical Path

1.9. Staff Assessments during Operations

1.10. Mission Command Information System Architecture and Integration

1.11. Understanding Space and Cyber Domains’ Impacts on Operations

1.12. Managing Battle Rhythm

1.13. Improving Understanding through Knowledge Management Processes

1.14. Interoperability: Mission Command System Networks

1.15. Special Staff

1.15.1. Information Operations

1.15.1.1. Information Operations Working Groups (IOWG)

1.15.1.2. IO Establishment of an Information Environment COP

1.15.1.3. IO Integration with the Targeting Cycle

1.15.2. Public Affairs Office (PAO)

1.15.2.1. PAO: Shared Understanding with the Information Environment

1.15.2.2. Understanding How to Employ Public Affairs Assets

1.15.3. Operational Law (OPLAW)

1.15.3.1. Legal Support Services Enhancement of Unit’s Ability to Accomplish its Mission

1.15.3.2. Providing Operational Law Support

2. Maneuver

2.1 Employment of Infantry and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams in the Attack

2.2. Planning Reconnaissance and Security Operations

2.3. Use of a Decision Authorities Matrix (DAM)

2.4. Maintaining the Common Operational Picture

3. Maneuver Support

3.1. Conducting a Protection Working Group (PWG)

3.2. Producing the CAL and DAL

3.3. MEBs versus Engineer Brigades: Enabling Deliberate Wet Gap Crossings

3.4. Line of Communication (LOC) Bridging

3.5. Obstacle Intelligence and Tracking

3.6. Supervising, Prioritizing and Synchronizing Obscuration Missions

3.7. Detainee Operations: Staff Integration during Mission Analysis

3.8. Assigning and Controlling Base Cluster Defense

3.9. Convoy Protection in the Support Area

4. Intelligence

4.1. Product Support to IPB and the MDMP

4.2. Achieving Predictive Analysis

4.3. Inadequate Mission Command Information Systems Training

4.4. Enemy COP Production

4.5. Nesting PIR with Decision Points

4.6. Intelligence Personnel Roles and Responsibilities

5. Fires

5.1. Integrating and Synchronizing Intelligence Collection Assets in the Division Targeting Cycle . 38

5.2. Exercising Mission Command as the Force Field Artillery Headquarters

5.3. Airspace Clearance Procedures

5.4. Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Sustainment

6. Aviation

6.1. Roles and Responsibilities for Effective Employment of Aviation Assets

6.2. Understanding the Capabilities of the MQ-1C Gray Eagle to Achieve Division Objectives

6.3. Employment of the CAB

7. Sustainment

7.1. Organizing Sustainment Staff by WfF

7.2. Division Transportation Officer and Movement Control Battalion Planning and Integration

7.3. Security Operations within the Divison Support Area

7.4. Use of the COP

7.5. Distribution Management Planning Horizons

7.6. Orders Process and Battle Tracking

7.7. NCOs, Warrant Officers, and Mission Command

7.8. Knowledge Management

7.9. Air Mobility Liaison Officer Integration

7.10. Munitions Management

7.11. Division Material Management Capabilities

7.12. Religious Support

7.12.1. Lack of Clarity and Communication

7.12.2. Lack of Depth and Breadth

7.12.3. Lack of Operational Understanding

7.12.4. Growing Success in Staff Integration

8. SOF

8.1. SOF Incorporation into Conventional Force Planning at the Initiation of Operations

8.2. Incorporation of SOF LNOs into Battle Rhythm Events

8.3. Utilization of SOF LNOs by Division Intelligence Sections

8.4. SOF Integration into Deep Fires Efforts

8.5. Integration of IO & Psychological Operations Activities

8.6. Coordination between SOF and CF Logistics Planners

9. Cyber

9.1. Understanding Cyberspace Operations

9.2. Electronic Warfare (EW) Missions

List of Acronyms Used

Introduction

MCTP conducts tactical level mission command training for Army National Guard (ARNG) brigade combat teams (BCTs), functional and multi-functional brigades, and divisions and corps headquarters. MCTP facilitates operational level mission command training for ASCC headquarters.

In FY15, MCTP participated in four WFXs, one United Endeavor exercise, six ASCC exercises and four BWFXs for ARNG BCTs. To provide coherence to the notes collected from the different echeloned staffs in the WFXs, ASSC exercises and BWFXs, this document arranges key observations by center of excellence (COE). The sections are named and ordered as follows: 1) mission command, 2) maneuver, 3) maneuver support, 4) intelligence, 5) fires, 6) aviation, 7) sustainment, 8) special operations forces (SOF) and 9) cyber. Further, the mission command section addresses interoperability and special staff, including IO, PAO and operational law (OPLAW). The sustainment section includes religious support observations.

A basic familiarity with the WFX will help provide context to MCTP’s key observations. A WFX is a distributed, simulation-driven, master scenario events list (MSEL) supported, multi-echelon, tactical command post exercise. Training audiences fight against a live, freethinking adversary designed to train and rehearse units in the sustainable readiness pool for missions as a contingency expeditionary force or regionally aligned force. MCTP conducts WFXs based on specific guidance directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and scheduled by Forces Command (FORSCOM). Each exercise integrates functional and multi-functional brigades, sustainment units, and multi-component forces.

MCTP collaborates with the Joint Staff, J7-South, and other training partners to support exercise design with additional joint context to support the training of units designated as future joint task forces (JTFs). MCTP develops the exercise scenario using the operating environment outlined in the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2-developed DATE. Incorporating CSA, FORSCOM, and Army Command (ACOM) guidance, MCTP adapts the exercise scenario from a common base scenario to meet the training audience commanders’ training objectives.

Before the execution of a WFX, MCTP delivers a higher command order to the senior training audience. The senior training audience then prepares its order, which in turn, is used by subsequent subordinates for planning. When a WFX commences, the training audiences start at the beginning of Phase III operations, fighting under current ULO doctrine. MCTP’s computer simulation replicates combat and battlefield effects in the WFX to stimulate commanders’ and their staffs’ continuous performance of mission command and the operations process. During this period, MCTP OC/Ts observe the staffs and collect notes for mid and final after action reviews (AARs). Recently retired general officers participate as senior mentors to the training audience commanders, nesting with MCTP’s collective coaching effort. The key observations are thus generated from the many informal and formal discussions held by MCTP OC/Ts, senior mentors and training audiences during exercises.

1. Mission Command

1.1. Conducting Effective IPB/MA during Operations

Observation: Insufficient effort or collaboration during intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(IPB) and mission analysis (MA) conducted for branch, sequel and adjustment plans.

Discussion: Staffs do an adequate job of conducting IPB/MA during initial planning; however, during subsequent deliberate or rapid planning, staffs often fail to apply the same rigor to conducting

IPB/MA. While the initial IPB/MA will impact most subsequent planning efforts, failure to update staff estimates during execution often fails to identify threats or opportunities that will impact operations. Units routinely fail to conduct multi-functional analysis before developing new courses of action (COAs); specifically they fail to identify significant changes to the IPB/MA that may impact planning. No single authority manages the planning process to determine which efforts require full or abbreviated MA. Staffs often do not receive sufficient guidance when directed to conduct rapid planning efforts to clarify prioritization of staff effort and time requirements for outputs. Planners rarely receive feedback from a decision authority about the suitability of subsequent planning efforts prior to briefing the commander or publication. When plans are reviewed it is often the first time many staff directorates have an opportunity to provide feedback.

Recommendations:

-Staffs must codify standards for orders production and ensure that deviations from those standards were based on clear directives.

-When abbreviating the MDMP process, the senior staff must provide additional guidance about where to accept risk when planning, and should consider applying additional guidance to ensure critical information is captured and addressed during rapid decision planning.

-Staff integration is critical during this phase; maintaining a ‘seven-minute drill’ agenda to ensure all attendees are present and prepared is also critical.

-Ensure multi-functional analysis and collaboration is applied during and after Operational Plan

(OPLAN) and Operations Orders (OPORD) development.

References: FM 6-0; ADRP 5-0

1.2. Organizing to Maintain Flexibility during a Decisive Action Fight

Observation: Units often task organize resources and capabilities to subordinates, which degrades their ability to conduct deep and security operations in support of offensive and defensive activities.

Discussion: Units are improving at defining the deep, close, and security operations when conducting operations in a decisive action fight. Improvements include defining areas of responsibility in relation to geographical space or time, defining when transitions will occur, and assigning command roles and responsibilities to command posts (CPs) including specific delegations of authority.

Units struggle with assigning sufficient resources to accomplish the tasks, particularly deep and security operations in the support areas. Corps and divisions do not develop a ground reconnaissance plan, nor do they assign tasks to subordinates to support collection ahead of maneuver brigades. Instead, units often rely entirely on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for collection. Transitions of responsibilities regarding collection and shaping are not adequately addressed in orders or rehearsals. Lack of understanding on how and when deep operations will transition to subordinates in the close fight prevents understanding of desired conditions favorable for friendly actions, prevents subordinates from seizing and maintain the initiative, and provides opportunities to enemy forces. Negative impacts to staffs include a limited ability to predict, anticipate, or respond to new information due to a lack of understanding in how the plan had intended to shape operational environment.

Corps and division headquarters often task organize functional brigades (fires and aviation) so that no assets are available to conduct deep operations nor support operations within the support area. Units miss opportunities to exploit success or lose the initiative while they realign resources once threats are presented. When units do identify opportunities, they often must rely on external resources to target or exploit success because of the lack of assets available under their control.

Recommendations:

- Use all appropriate operational frameworks to describe shifting priorities between phases and sub-phases (see ADRP 3-0).

- Consider the impacts of excessive task organization; maintaining enabling headquarters allows for more rapid shifting of efforts of enabling brigades as priorities change.

- Higher headquarters should consider operational frameworks being used by subordinates and determine the need for consistency throughout echelons.

- Consider the use of support relationships to maintain sufficient control of resources to execute desired tasks in the deep area with the understanding that numerous transitions will limit the allocation of resources to subordinate headquarters for the duration of operations.

- Consider what capacity must remain at the divisions and corps level to support deep, close, and security operations, including what enablers are likely to require rapid adjustment when main and supporting efforts change.

References: ADRP 3-0; FM 6-0; ADP 5-0; ADRP 6-0

1.3. Understanding Decision Points

Observation: Units fail to identify appropriate decisions points (DPs) as starting points for commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and collection planning.

Discussion: Throughout MDMP, initial information requirements are developed that support early collection planning while COAs are developed and refined. When staffs develops COAs, identification of DPs is a specified task which allows for the focus of collection and shaping efforts to understand conditions in anticipation of a decision point. CCIR should support commanders’ decision making. After initial CCIR development, units neglect updating the CCIR when their commanders’ clarify their vision for the operation, thereby not taking into account the rapidly changing battlefield.

Some staffs struggle to identify if a decision is pending or to update commanders with conditions prior to asking them to make a decision. Common causes include tracking too many CCIR at one time, failing to focus CCIR on upcoming decisions or confusing other information requirements (such as essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) or “wake-up criteria”) with

CCIR thereby preventing the current operations cell from sharing critical information with commanders in advance of a decision. Finally, CCIR are rarely answered definitively; assessment methods are neither developed nor refined following COA development. Since staffs fail to provide complete assessments, commanders must rely on their own intuitive processes to determine conditions related to anticipated decisions.

Recommendations:

-Limit the number of CCIR for tracking and collection to only those relevant for decision points.

-Include assessments on information requirements (IR) collection in the battle rhythm to allow commanders to anticipate when a decision is needed.

-Ensure that CCIR are separated from other IR to allow current operations to prioritize collection efforts and reporting.

-Review update active CCIR as the operation progresses during routine updates to the commander and as potential decision points change.

References: FM 6-0

1.4. Orders Transitions

Topic: Orders transitions (future plans, future operations, and current operations) and rehearsals

(plans to operations transitions) are not effective.

Discussion: Units often conduct a series of rehearsals prior to mission execution. However, once decisive action begins, units rarely conduct subsequent rehearsals when transitioning to new operation phases or when executing branch or sequel plans. Subordinate echelons, and the current operations cell, often execute plans with a poor understanding of the synchronization requirements during offensive operations. Because back briefs are rarely conducted, orders are transitioned or passed from planners to current operations without effective products to synchronize an operation.

An overlooked aspect of rehearsals is the understanding of how mission command responsibilities will transition when multiple command posts are employed during operations; rehearsals should include transitions of control responsibilities during operations, decision making authorities, and procedures for creating shared understanding prior to shifting control.

When synchronizing operations, planners rarely consider the status of subordinate echelons in relation to their ability to receive and distribute digital information. When physical attendance of subordinates at rehearsals is not possible, digital rehearsals over Command Post of the Future

(CPOF) can be extremely effective at clarifying commander’s intent, identifying gaps in planning products, and allowing for clear understanding of transition points between planners and current operations.

Recommendations:

- Develop standards and products for digital rehearsals under conditions that do not support full rehearsals (limited time or availability of subordinate echelons.)

- Units should identify clear transitions for orders within planning timelines to include directing the types of rehearsal required based on the complexity of a plan or the deviation from the base order.

- Dedicate sufficient time to execute rehearsals within the Main Command Post (MCP) between plans and operations, and deliberate transitions between other CPs and subordinates.

-Timelines for development of planning efforts must include rehearsals and be approved by Chiefs of

Staff (CoS) or Operations Officers.

References: ADRP 5-0; FM 6-0

1.5. Capturing and Disseminating Commander’s Guidance

Observation: Units do not understand the importance of developing processes and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to capture and disseminate commander’s guidance.

Discussion: Commanders provide critical guidance in multiple venues often in settings away from the staff or with limited staff participation. Units often fail to develop a process to capture their commanders’ guidance in diverse venues as commanders conduct battlefield circulation.

Continuously distributing commanders’ guidance is critical to ensuring staffs achieve shared understanding and synchronized efforts in accordance with commanders’ priorities. The dynamic pace of combined arms maneuver often results in a demanding timeline for production of orders.

Personnel and Knowledge Management (KM) processes dedicated to capturing and disseminating commander’s guidance is crucial for effective planning, orders production, and synchronization with subordinate commanders. These challenges can be compounded when multiple CPs are employed with certain authorities delegated, as it may increase the number of sources from which planners receive guidance. Staffs should establish single planning authority (CoS or G3) to review incoming guidance, assign staff priorities, and seek clarification on critical points if necessary before planning efforts begin.

Recommendations:

Chiefs of staff must establish a system that allows capturing key information when commanders are at non-standard venues (such as during battlefield circulation or in commander’s planning groups). Scribe requirements include: knowledge of operations at headquarters level, travels with the commanding general (CG) and access to information sharing tools. Dedicated scribes are preferable to aides or secretaries of general staff because dedicated scribes can singly focus on capturing information and sharing it in a timely manner.

A designated staff officer (G3 or CoS) must determine if information is commanders’ guidance that needs to be actioned by the staff and subordinate commands or if the information is purely for situational awareness.

References: ADRP 5-0; FM 6-0

1.6. Accounting for Mission Command System Challenges during Offensive Operations

Observation: Units do not grasp Mission Command system challenges when conducting offensive operations.

Discussion: Many recent operations involved establishing HQs at fixed locations, without a displacement requirement, amidst on-going operations. Over that same period, mission command

(MC) systems requirements have increased to include personnel, Army Battle Command Systems, and other C4I associated with brigade and higher level command posts. During decisive action, a unit may be required to plan for and execute multiple CP moves and transition responsibilities between their MCP and tactical command post (TAC) for operational or survivability reasons. Units struggle to understand the time considerations required to conduct these moves (break down, movement, and set-up) and how and when key personnel or functions will transition between CPs. Units inadequately account for how responsibilities will shift and who maintains primacy for particular activities as CPs move or when multiple CPs are operational. Units often fail to consider how the MC system impacts operational reach between forward BCTs conducting offensive operations and a fixed

MCP. Units fail to address risk from potential losses of communications or lack of shared understanding from subordinates operating in a degraded state for an extended period. Rarely do staffs have procedures in place to adjust requirements for subordinates based on their anticipated conditions. Staffs also neglect to restrict data, a useful measure to accommodate working in a degraded digital capacity. Consequently, brigade level units conducting moves during operations are therefore disconnected from the upper tactical internet.

Units typically do not produce robust primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency

(PACE) communication plans. Units do not plan for combat net radio (CNR) or conduct battle rhythm events on CNR. Those units that do utilize CNR networks often only use them for radio checks and not for synchronizing or controlling operations. G6 sections should conduct detailed retransmission planning and assist the G3/G5 in understand and plan for communications during operations. Units do a good job of communication planning for major events but fail to describe and understand conditions during the approach or exploitation following a major event.

Recommendations:

- Units should plan and rehearse how they will conduct operations using only CNR.

-As part of MDMP, consider capabilities of MC systems, specifically impacts to the tempo and operational reach during offensive operations.

-Clearly define responsibilities between MCP and TAC, when employed.

-Establish clear criteria for displacing the MCP and the battle handover procedures required for the

TAC to control the entire fight for an extended period.

- Consider PACE and how to conduct operations only on CNR as part of MDMP.

-Clearly define responsibilities and information requirements for CNR.

-Establish clear criteria for PACE execution and rehearse for every event, include mission command information system (MCIS) information.

References: FM 6-0; FM 3-94

1.7. Roles and responsibilities of the NCO

Observation: Units rarely define roles and responsibilities for NCOs operating in the current operations integration cell (COIC) and rarely assign significant duties to NCOs.

Discussion: NCOs incorporated in unit CPs are often unaware of their roles and responsibilities or are under-utilized and poorly managed. NCOs have vast tactical knowledge within their respective military occupational specialties and can contribute much towards their units’ mission accomplishment, but only if empowered to do so. The operations sergeants major rarely synchronize activities between staff sections. The level of training for enlisted Soldiers working within division and corps CPs is extremely low, thereby negatively impacting their ability to contribute to planning and synchronization efforts. Most units maintain only a limited number of Battle Staff trained NCOs, insufficient numbers of Digital Master Gunners Course graduates and limited CPOF trained personnel. NCOs who are proficient on digital systems and are included in developing products, become significant enablers to orders production efforts and maintaining staff running estimates. The effective use of NCOs is critical particularly when distributed CPs are employed.

Recommendations:

- Incorporate the roles and responsibilities of the NCO that are published in “The Staff

Noncommissioned Officer’s Handbook” into doctrine (The Staff Noncommissioned Officer’s

Handbook, OCT 2015).

- Develop and rehearse execution of roles and responsibilities prior to configuring a deployment command post.

- Train soldiers prior to mission execution.

-Define NCO roles and responsibilities in unit stand operating procedures (SOP) and when appropriate, in the unit’s decision authority matrix (DAM).

References: The Staff Noncommissioned Officer’s Handbook, OCT 2015

1.8. Understanding Critical Path

Observation: Battle rhythm events are not nested to facilitate a critical path.

Discussion: The critical path is the linkage of battle rhythm events that must be accomplished by the organization to ensure mission success. The critical path identifies those key battle rhythm events that provide decision makers with required inputs and analysis. Staffs struggle with the identification of the battle rhythm events that must be accomplished. Instead of determining what events are necessary, and being disciplined in development of a battle rhythm, staffs tend to revert to their experiences in a static wide-area security environment where time was not a constraint. Staffs often fail to consider what events are critical to inform commanders, tempo, type of operations, or anticipated ability of subordinates to support events before developing battle rhythms.

Recommendations:

-Conduct detailed staff analysis to identify what key decisions are required, then develop the necessary and associated seven-minute drills required to support those decisions. The result is the necessary battle rhythm.

-Sequencing of battle rhythm events must be in a logical sequence.

-Ensure battle rhythm events are nested to support input/output requirements with adequate time for processing information and developing required outputs.

-Quad charts (seven-minute drills) should be developed for each meeting or event and accessible by all the staff and subordinate units.

-Battle rhythm should support a “circular” versus a “linear” planning cycle.

-Ensure the battle rhythm supports the timings of the inputs and outputs to facilitate staff analysis and key decisions.

-The battle rhythm must be sustainable over time.

References: ADRP 5-0; FM 6-0; JP3-33

1.9. Staff Assessments during Operations

Observation: Staffs struggle to provide assessments that facilitate Commanders’ decision making.

Discussion: Staffs have difficulty integrating running estimates into a collaborative product to facilitate commanders’ ability to understand and make informed decisions. Often, events such as staff updates are simply a review of past events of which commanders are already aware, with little predictive analysis or explanation of the impacts future operations. Assessment metrics are rarely developed prior to transitioning the order to current operations, thereby preventing the identification of conditions that are favorable or disadvantageous to achieving the end state. Often during updates, staffs provide listings of tasks accomplished or raw data instead of providing the ‘so what’ analysis of the impact on a plan or operation.

Recommendations:

-Review ATP 3-60 for details on conducting staff assessments and implement TTPs to facilitate integration.

-Implement an assessments working group and board within the staff battle rhythm to facilitate integration and decision making.

-Develop assessment metrics during planning to facilitate current operations’ assessments.

References: FM 6-0; ATP 3-60

1.10. Mission Command Information System Architecture and Integration

Observation: Units have difficulty correctly integrating all mission command information systems.

Discussion: This is mainly due to not understanding the MCIS architecture or not using best practices to establish the MCIS architecture. Corps, divisions, and brigades are fielded Battle

Command Common Services (BCCS), which includes a CPOF master repository, data distribution server (DDS), and data bridges. Units observed do not distribute data to each echelon because the

MCIS architecture is flawed, which requires units to implement non-technical work arounds to share the data. Understanding MCIS software version control is very important, but a proper MCIS architecture can mitigate some effects of version control. Divisions and corps do not use CPOF exchange services correctly and mitigate this shortfall by using CPOF master repository at the highest level with DDS peer-to-share information. This architecture does not utilize the CPOF master repository at division level and can lead into MCIS data sharing issues. The training of MCIS digital masters gunners (DMG) can assist units to properly integrate and establish a viable MCIS architecture. Integration of all MCIS data over Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-

A), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Tactical Airspace Integration System

(TAIS) and other systems is possible by correctly utilizing the DDS and CPOF architecture. Trained

MCIS DMGs must assist the G3 and G6 to ensure all MCIS are shared correctly between these assets.

Recommendations:

-Units should send personnel to the DMG Course and track these personnel.

-Establish the MCIS data architecture based on proved best practices.

References: FM 6-0; FM 3-94

1.11. Understanding Space and Cyber Domains’ Impacts on Operations

Observation: Units do not understand how the contested domains of space and cyber can affect operations.

Discussion: Army units struggle to understand operational impacts when space or cyber domains are contested. Most units rely on higher headquarters to plan and assess the space and cyber operating environments. Units can gain situational understanding by monitoring both space and cyber domains and aid protection and denial activities. Units fail to articulate how a contested space or cyber domains may impact operations nor identify means to mitigate risk beyond a PACE plan. Space support elements, space operators, and cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA) experts are not empowered to explain how they can support the commander’s priorities. Near peer adversaries’ investments in space and cyber represent significant threats to the ability of units to effectively control operations, yet these effects are never accounted for during war gamming or COA development. Since the effects of space and cyber activities may be significant on how units operate at the tactical level, developing an understanding of the risks and rehearsing TTPs to mitigate negative effects must be accomplished prior to executing operations.

Recommendations:

-Incorporate space support element and space operations into planning early to understand the adversaries’ effects on tactical elements.

-Incorporate cyber planners in the planning process to better understand adversaries’ capabilities.

References: FM 3-38

1.12. Managing Battle Rhythm

Observation: Poor battle rhythm management overloads staff and prevents integration

Discussion: Staffs struggle with developing battle rhythms that support offensive operations and combined arms maneuver. Determining what critical events must occur to inform decisions or create shared information is often dependent on the staffs’ experience, the tempo of operations, and the commanders’ information requirements. Many staffs struggle to determine the frequency and prioritization of events to satisfy information requirements. Battle rhythms become congested with unnecessary events, providing staff officers and NCOs with insufficient time between meetings to process information, distribute guidance and produce products. A poorly developed battle rhythm results in poor integration of staff warfighting functions (WfFs) and lack of productivity. Many staff members spend their time attending events that do not inform the commander, support decision making, or collaborate on directed planning efforts.

Recommendations:

-Executive officers, deputy commanding officers and chiefs of staff establish battle rhythms that allow sufficient time for work between events.

-Conduct a critical path analysis and routine bottom-up assessments to determine if battle rhythms are sustainable.

-Remain cognizant that changes to higher headquarters’ battle rhythms significantly impact subordinate headquarters.

-Comprehensively develop battle rhythms early to ensure they meet the commanders’ needs.

References: FM 6-0; ADRP 5-0

1.13. Improving Understanding through Knowledge Management Processes

Observation: Units do not employ good knowledge management processes to facilitate understanding among staffs and subordinates.

Discussion: KM is the use of processes, tools, and people within the organization to facilitate greater situational understanding and faster decision making. Units tend to focus only on the tool component of KM, specifically SharePoint, instead of understanding the processes that make an organization functional, help achieve shared understanding, or inform the commander’s decision-making process. KM officers (KMOs) should evaluate unit processes to ensure these processes are efficient and followed. KMOs can assist the organization in ensuring information is quickly presented to commanders to increase commanders’ situational awareness and improve the commanders’ decisionmaking. The CoS can direct KMOs to observe certain processes to verify efficiency and recommend appropriate changes. The organization’s battle rhythm is a process; those events should lead to commanders’ decisions and be part of commanders’ decision cycles. The

KMOs can help the CoS ensure battle rhythms are efficient by providing assessments. All KM procedures should be codified in the Annex Q (KM) developed by KMOs for use by staffs, especially liaison officers. Annex Q should also discuss the process of sharing information with other non-

Department of Defense (DoD) organizations, for example sharing knowledge with Department of

State, coalition forces, host nation forces, and non-governmental agencies.

Recommendations:

-Units schedule Army KM office proponent for senior leader workshops and KM training prior to an event.

-Establish KM functions before execution with a KM Assessment.

-Write and publish Annex Q (Knowledge Management) with guidance from CoS.

References: FM 6-0; ATP 6.1.1

1.14. Interoperability: Mission Command System Networks

Observation: Units struggle developing a Mission Command System architecture with multinational and coalition forces.

Discussion: United States Armed Forces are not resourced to operate or execute mission command with multinational/coalition partners beyond lower tactical internet (Lower TI) connectivity. Corps, division and brigade headquarters require equipment (hardware and software) to install, operate, manage, protect, and maintain a network enclave that all partnered forces can access enabling unified mission command and information sharing across decisive action operations. Nations that have adopted the American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies’ Program (ABCA) standards allow messaging formats to be exchanged between tactical units. Corps, division and brigade headquarters do not have the capabilities to provide common services (e-mail, Voice Over

Internet Protocol (VOIP), web services) and a common secure network (Coalition Wide Area

Network) on tactical systems. The Army is developing these capabilities for corps, division, and brigade headquarters in the Transmission and Expeditionary Forces Information Services (to be renamed) Capability Production Documents (CPDs). The Transmission CPD will field a third enclave network equipment to Expeditionary Signal Battalions (ESBs) from which tactical units can request support. The Expeditionary Force Information Services CPD will establish a fielding timeline for this third suite of Battle Command Systems. Both CPDs are awaiting funding and a fielding schedule.

Once fielded, units must understand the ABCA standards in order to establish a coalition network that enables unified mission command and information sharing with multinational and coalition forces. Although both fieldings will help headquarters with the resource requirements, technical issues must still be resolved with integrating multinational and coalition forces into a common network. Establishing this type of network requires detailed planning and time to ensure all forces can share information. The lead nation is responsible for providing the connection procedures for the network in enough time for network engineers to provide connection information to the lead nation. Discussion on this process should come in a message called “joining membership and exiting instructions” (JMEI).

Establishing a multinational or coalition network is a time consuming event that requires every level of command to ensure information and data that is not releasable is protected. ABCA has mitigated all high level communication gaps to include common operational picture (COP), common information exchange reports and products, collaborative working tools capability (SharePoint, Microsoft Office), common e-mail plus attachment capability, CHAT and secure voice. The gaps not mitigated yet are mostly policy based include ISR sharing policy, coalition information sharing policy, systems accreditation policy, and cyber electromagnetic spectrum policy.

Recommendations:

- Review and understand ABCA standards.

- Coordinate with Higher Headquarters (HHQ) for policy and procedure guidance to share information with partners.

- Coordinate with the HHQ for communications requirements support that cannot be internally sourced.

- Detailed planning with multinational and coalition partners should occur at least six months before operations.

- Contact Mission Command Center of Excellence for any assistance during the planning and execution phase.

References: ABCA Standards; AR 34-1; FM 3-16; FM 3-94; ATP 3-91; FM 6-02

1.15. Special Staff

1.15.1. Information Operations

1.15.1.1. Information Operations Working Groups (IOWG)

Observation: IOWGs struggle to enable a shared understanding between echelons.

Discussion: IOWGs provide the IO staffs the ability to synchronize and integrate Information

Related Capabilities (IRCs) in support of decisive operations. IOWGs often neglect producing outputs to the daily targeting or fragmentary orders for synchronized IRC efforts with an Air Tasking

Order (ATO) cycle. Additionally, IOWGs lack recommended updates to information requirements that inform IO assessments. IOWGs outputs fail to produce products that support Operational

Planning Teams (OPTs) and decision boards instead focusing on internal processes, procedures and products that only feed other IO activities. IOWGs inhibit shared understanding and circumvent the mission command systems used by other staff sections and echelons when products are constructed on PowerPoint and disseminated through email directly to other IO personnel.

Recommendations:

-Ensure IOWGs follow the critical path model to link input and output requirements to support other

OPTs and decision boards.

-Follow FM 3-13 outline for conducting IOWG

-Maximize the use of mission command systems within IOWGs in order to push products between echelons.

References: JP 3-13; FM 3-13; ADRP 6-0, C2

1.15.1.2. IO Establishment of an Information Environment COP

Observation: IO staffs fail to leverage mission command systems to produce an information environment COP (IE COP).

Discussion: IO staffs fail to understand how to maximize the usage of MC systems, such as CPOF, to develop and share the IE COP. The IO staff develops the IE using operational and intelligence inputs and products. The output is an IE COP that provides the physical, informational, and cognitive dimension in support of decisive action in the operational environment. Updates often overwhelm IO staffs because of the amount of data or difficulty in assessing the impacts. Units struggle to consolidate information into effective running estimates. This is often compounded by poor access to SharePoint, software version-control problems and poor understanding of effective knowledge management processes. When IO sections capitalize on CPOFs capabilities, they rapidly increase their shared understanding between echelons.

Recommendations:

-Ensure at least one member of the IO staff is certified to operate CPOF.

-Require the IRC teams to utilize CPOF for IE updates.

-Create a PACE plan for the IO staff to pass information between MC systems; update unit SOPs to reflect the plan.

-Utilize mission command systems, such as CPOF, for the IO input to MDMP.

References: JP 3-13; FM 3-13; ADRP 6-0, C2

1.15.1.3. IO Integration with the Targeting Cycle

Observation: IO staffs fail to integrate IRC effects into the targeting cycle.

Discussion: IO cells often neglect to simultaneously plan and integrate effects into both an ATO cycle (seventy-two hour periods) and long-term shaping efforts (three to twelve months).

Additionally, IO staffs struggle with assigning collection assets per target requests. These two factors contribute to units’ inabilities to conduct shaping operations. Although units develop high-payoff targets and priorities of fires, they often fail to tie collection planning in support of assessments.

After developing base plans, staffs rarely return to the commander with their assessments. Lack of assessments, especially on shaping operations, inhibit commanders’ abilities to make informed decisions.

Units provide limited collection efforts on effects from non-lethal activities against high pay-off targets. Compared with lethal activities, units often underestimate the effectiveness of non-lethal methods in creating favorable conditions for subordinates against near-peer competitors. Units are most effective when they achieve collaboration from all warfighting functions prior to targeting boards that synchronize operations, lethal, and non-lethal activities at key points.

Recommendations:

-Establish battle rhythm events to ensure commanders’ priorities, targeting priorities, and collection plans are aligned.

-Consider a wide range of non-lethal effects via information-related capabilities such as military

MISO, CEMA, space, civil affairs and other effects to confront a hybrid threat. These options should be integrated with lethal force. Although effects may be outside the ATO cycle, they can generate alternative combat power across time and maneuver space.

-Ensure all IRCs attend targeting working groups to synchronize efforts in time and space

References: ADP 5-0; FM 3-13; ADRP 3-09

1.15.2. Public Affairs Office (PAO)

1.15.2.1. PAO: Shared Understanding with the Information Environment

Observation: Public affairs offices fail to create shared understanding of the informational environment and its impact on operations.

Discussion: Public affairs personnel do not conduct a thorough media analysis within the unit’s operational environment. In order for the unit to engage internal and external audiences, the commander and staff need to understand the audiences’ information requirements. Operationalizing the information environment enables other warfighting functions to understand how public perception and activities impact their area of operations. The public affairs slide is eliminated from the commanders’ update brief and battle update brief (CUBs, BUBs) due to a lack of analysis, thus further degrading the ability to create a shared understanding for the command and staff.

Recommendations:

-Conduct a thorough media analysis of how the information environment impacts the operational environment giving the commander and staff the impact on current or future operations.

-Create shared understanding of this impact through participation in briefings and working groups and informal communication with other staff members.

References: FM 3-61; ADRP 6-0; FM 6-0

1.15.2.2. Understanding How to Employ Public Affairs Assets.

Observation: Task organization does not accurately reflect PAO assets.

Discussion: Public affairs staff rarely analyze additional assets listed in Annex A nor do they address the command and support relationship (operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON) or administrative control (ADCON)). Furthermore, public affairs should consider how to request these assets in the planning process and determine how these assets are best task organized as the WFX progresses. Further, PAO personnel lack the resources to prepare necessary products and conduct public affairs operations. PAOs or unit public affairs representatives (UPAR) often arrive at exercises without any tools prepared to properly integrate into the CP. For example, PAOs lack Secret Internet

Protocol Router Network (SIPR) or Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPR) connectivity and lack knowledge on how to use CPOF. The use of CPOF is important as it is the MC system that enables staff integration.

Recommendations:

-Public Affairs should conduct a thorough mission analysis and ensure necessary public affairs assets are reflected in Annex A to better enable mission accomplishment.

-PAO or identified UPAR should be equipped to do their job which, including SIPR and NIPR connectivity and a working knowledge of CPOF.

References: FM 3-61; ADRP 6-0; FM 6-0

1.15.3. Operational Law (OPLAW)

1.15.3.1. Legal Support Services Enhancement of Unit’s Ability to Accomplish its Mission

Observation: Legal expertise within OPLAW sections is not utilized to its potential due to a lack of integration with brigade and division staffs.

Discussion: FM 1-04 states that “OPLAW is an essential element of mission command” (FM 1-04, para 2-15). Although Army doctrine clearly places OPLAW within the mission command warfighting function, too often units overlook this change and relegate all legal functions to the sustainment warfighting function (ADRP 1-03). When this occurs, it may create the perception that legal support is not vital to the operations process. One effect of such a perception is lack of legal staff inclusion in critical working groups or in planning efforts. Proactive judge advocate involvement throughout the operations process (planning, preparation, execution, assessment) allows for early identification of legal issues and the provision of information that supports the commander’s situational understanding.

Recommendations:

-Add the OPLAW section as a required member of planning and protection working groups.

-Facilitate maximum legal support to units by maintaining an OPLAW work space in units’ COIC, as well as an expanded legal section in the main command post.

-Allow the OPLAW section to brief by exception at CUB when generally applicable information needs to be disseminated to the entire staff and subordinate commands.

References: FM 1-04; ADRP 1-03

1.15.3.2. Providing Operational Law Support

Observation: Operational Law sections often lack an adequate understanding of the COP because they do not maintain a running estimate and have weak KM systems.

Discussion: During the execution phase of operations, OPLAW personnel will be stretched thin by multiple working groups and meetings. However, the OPLAW section will still need to research and track legal issues, and share knowledge across the section and greater staff. Strong KM systems will help OPLAW sections maintain a clear COP and “track and record pertinent information and provide recommendations to commanders” (FM 6-0). As a starting point, maintaining a legal running estimate will help ensure shared knowledge across the OPLAW section. The running estimate should be updated around the clock, and be visible to all OPLAW personal as a hub of information to synchronize staff efforts.