SF243-D013.pdf

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CCDM (Camouflage, Concealment, Deception, and Maneuver) Interrogation
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SF243-D013
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SF243-D013: CCDM Interrogation - Space Force Small Business Innovation Research Topic

This document is a Space Force Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) topic solicitation for development of a software capability to automatically detect and assess camouflage, concealment, deception, and maneuver (CCMD) activities associated with space objects. The Space Systems Command (SSC) Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Tap Lab seeks a solution that interrogates characteristics of Unusual Candidate Track (UCT) candidate orbits and objects classified as unknown (UNK), debris, rocket body, or inactive payload to identify potential threatening behavior. The solution must assess 21 specified technical indicators including orbital stability changes, maneuvers, radio frequency detection, sub-satellite deployment, signature mismatches, area-to-mass anomalies, and coverage gap activities. The software must integrate seamlessly with existing USSF operator workflows through open APIs, support classified system requirements, and provide automated notification of objects assessed at specified threat levels.

Phase I requires applicants to provide feasibility documentation, stakeholder identification, and a proof-of-concept framework design demonstrating accurate detection and assessment of CCMD activities, with no Phase I awards made under this topic. Phase II focuses on refining assessment methodology, scoring metrics, and software performance through enhanced evaluation metrics (accuracy, precision, F1 score) while improving API integration capabilities. Phase III emphasizes scaling the model to analyze all launch events beyond UCT objects and exploring dual-use applications for commercial space operators and international partners. The technology is restricted under International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) 22 CFR Parts 120-130 and Export Administration Regulation (EAR) 15 CFR Parts 730-774; offerors must disclose any proposed foreign nationals and their intended work tasks. No CMMC level requirement applies. No Technical Point of Contact is listed.

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SF243-D012.pdf Revision not stated Foreign Space Launch Detection
SF243-0003.pdf Revision not stated Reentry Events and Impact Location Prediction
SF243-D002.pdf Revision not stated Low Earth Orbit Space Domain Awareness Optical Fence
SF243-D011.pdf Revision not stated Launch Cycle Initiation Detection
SF243-D017.pdf Revision not stated Advancing Expeditionary Space Domain Awareness
SF243-D008.pdf Revision not stated RETURN (Returning ExoaTmospheric Unique Research is Novel)
SF243-0004.pdf Revision not stated Responsible Space Behavior Event Classification
SF243-D003.pdf Revision not stated Characterization and Typing of Hard-to-Acquire Targets using Advanced Machine Learning Methods on WFOV Staring Data
SF243-D009.pdf Revision not stated ASAT Launch Detection and Threat Assessment
SF243-D016.pdf Revision not stated Tactical High Orbit Fast Transfer
SF243-0001.pdf Revision not stated Event Based Data Fusion for Temporal Super Resolution in Image Based Tracking
SF243-D018.pdf Revision not stated Space Sustainment & Maneuver: Advancing Strategic Superiority in Orbital Operations
SF243-D010.pdf Revision not stated Object Transiting Tracking
SF243-D006.pdf Revision not stated Future Space Architectures through Advanced Mission Design and In-Space Development Platforms
SF243-D014.pdf Revision not stated Responsive, Radiation-hardened GEO Rideshare Capability
SF243-D004.pdf Revision not stated Nitramine Cost Reduction Development
SF243-D015.pdf Revision not stated Advancing Space Capabilities for Joint Warfighting Opportunities
SF243-0002.pdf Revision not stated Spectral-Binning Focal Plane Array for Infrared Spectroscopy
SF243-D001.pdf Revision not stated Manufacturing of New Nosetip Materials for Reentry Vehicles
SF243-D005.pdf Revision not stated Event-Based Sensor Readout Integrated Circuit
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SF243-D013: CCDM (Camouflage, Concealment, Deception, and Maneuver) Interrogation

PROJECTED CMMC LEVEL REQUIREMENT:

N/A

TECHNOLOGY AREAS:

Space Platforms

MODERNIZATION PRIORITIES:

Emerging Threat Reduction

KEYWORDS:

Camouflage, concealment, deception, and maneuver; threat assessment; risk assessment; UCT; unknown space objects; space domain awareness; SDA

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

N/A

OBJECTIVE:

Delivery of software capability that automatically assesses and interrogates characteristics of UCT candidate orbits (or objects classified in the catalog as UNK, debris, rocket body, or in active payload) for likelihood that an object is taking activity associated with camouflage, concealment, deception, or maneuver (CCMD). Solution must be able to integrate with existing workflows through open API that can be leveraged with existing systems and meets development and operational environment requirements.

ITAR:

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 3.5 of the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.

DESCRIPTION:

Operational surprise presents an increased risk to space operations and national security. As space operations continue to grow in demand and variability, there are novel methods used to gain tactical and strategic advantages. The ability to operate and/or maneuver a satellite without detection provides an advantageous posturing for the satellite owner and can be a sign of on-orbit activity that could present value to US space operations. In recent years there has been instances where unknown satellites or objects assumed to be inactive or non-maneuverable suddenly began to maneuver in very deliberate manners. These types of activities, and similarly related ones, need to be identified and notification sent to space operators for professional assessment.

Finding these anomalous objects will allow battle managers to triage attention, plan and develop response options, and detect threatening behavior.

Space Systems Command (SSC) Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Tap Lab is seeking solutions to provide a software capability that can automatically detect, interrogate, assess, and notify of activities for evidence of camouflage, concealment, deception, or maneuver (CCMD). Assessment will look at the characteristics listed below of UCT candidate orbits or satellites in the catalog classified as UNK, debris, rocket body, or inactive payload. The solution should provide a method to assess, evaluate, and score the probability (or some other scoring metric) that associates the object with CCMD activities. Characteristics provided below are indicators that have been curated from industry’s historical understanding of space-based threats. These are indicators that an unknown object may be a weapon system or a force enhancement capability that support weapon systems. The characteristics include:

Appears stable• Stability changed• Maneuvers or RF detected• Sub-satellites deployed• Maneuvers or RF POL out of family• Violates stated ITU or FCC filing/slots• Class disagreement between analysts• Orbit is out of family• Optical, Radar signature out of family• Optical, Radar signature mismatch• Object stimulated by blue• Area to mass is out of family• Proximity events are imaging passes• Maneuver resulted in imaging pass• Imaging maneuvers also POLV• Maneuvers in coverage gap, during solar/lunar exclusion• Sudden Area to mass changes• Cataloged objects from launch > manifest• From SLC or SLV known to deploy threats• UNK/DEB has SMA > parent• True UCT while in eclipse•

Cataloged UCTs (or satellites in the catalog classified as UNK, debris, rocket body, or inactive payload) that have been assessed as an active object should be linked together, if applicable. The solution will need to notify operators of objects assessed at a specified threat assessment level.

The software product must be able to be integrated into existing toolchains that are used by USSF operators and the SDA Tap Lab. As this capability is only one specific functionality to be used in conjunction with other tools to provide a wholistic understanding of space domain awareness and space operations, it is pivotal that the solution be able to seamless integrate with existing systems through API call. The solution must also meet all development and operational requirements for system integration and use on classified systems.

PHASE I:

This topic is intended for technology proven ready to move directly into Phase II. Therefore, Phase I awards will not be made for this topic. The applicant is required to provide detail and documentation in the D2P2 proposal which demonstrates accomplishment of a “Phase I-type” effort, including a feasibility study. This includes determining, insofar as possible, the scientific and technical merit and feasibility of ideas appearing to have commercial potential. It must have validated the product-mission fit between the proposed solution and a potential Air Force and/or Space Force stakeholder. The applicant should have defined a clear, immediately actionable plan with the proposed solution and the DAF customer and end-user.

The feasibility study should have:

1. Clearly identified the potential stakeholders of the adapted solution for solving the Air Force and/or Space Force need(s).2. Described the pathway to integrating with DAF operations, to include how the applicant plans to accomplish core technology development, navigate applicable regulatory processes, and integrate with other relevant systems and/or processes.

3. Describe if and how the solution can be used by other DoD or Governmental customers.

In addition to feasibility, applicants will demonstrate a framework design to use as proof of concept that can assess and interrogate UCT objects of CCMD activities. The tool should be able to accurately detect, interrogate, and assess the likelihood an object is demonstrating CCMD activities.

PHASE II:

Phase II will involve developing and refining the concept outlined in Phase I, with a primary focus on improving evaluation metrics, model performance, and the ability to assess and interrogate Unusual Candidate Track (UCT) objects for characteristics indicative of camouflage, concealment, deception, or maneuver (CCMD) activities. This phase will aim to enhance the software capability to automatically detect, interrogate, assess, and notify of CCMD activities associated with UCT candidate orbits or objects classified in the catalog as UNK, debris, rocket body, or inactive payload.

The development process in Phase II will include refining the assessment methodology and scoring metrics to accurately evaluate the likelihood that an object is demonstrating CCMD activities. Additionally, the solution will be enhanced to integrate seamlessly with existing workflows through open APIs, ensuring compatibility and interoperability with existing systems used by USSF operators and the SDA Tap Lab.

Furthermore, Phase II will involve improving the performance of the software solution by focusing on enhancing evaluation metrics such as accuracy, precision, F1 score, and other relevant metrics. This may involve refining algorithms, optimizing data processing techniques, and expanding the scope of input data to further enhance the analysis of UCT objects and their associated CCMD activities.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS:

Phase III will focus on scaling the finalized model developed in Phase II to encompass the analysis of all launch events, broadening its scope beyond UCT objects to include comprehensive analysis of all launch events for potential CCMD activities. This expanded capability will enhance space domain awareness and operational readiness by providing timely detection and assessment of suspicious activities associated with camouflage, concealment, deception, or maneuver (CCMD) in the space environment.

Additionally, Phase III will prioritize expanding notification functionality to provide actionable alerts regarding all significant launch events with potential CCMD indicators. This may involve the development of advanced notification systems capable of disseminating critical information to relevant stakeholders in real-time or near-real-time, facilitating prompt decision-making and response to potential threats.

Furthermore, Phase III will explore the dual-use potential of the solution, identifying opportunities for its application beyond military and national security contexts. This may include adaptation for commercial space operators, international partners, and other stakeholders interested in enhancing their space situational awareness and security.

REFERENCES:

S. Lawler, H. Rein, & A. Boley, "Satellite Visibility During the April 2024 Total Eclipse", March 2024.1.

S. Walsh, B. Wilman, & H. Jerjen, "The Invisibles: A Detection Algorithm to Trace the Faintest Milky Way Satellites", December 2008.

2.

J. Pavur, I. Martinovic, "On Detecting Deception in space Situational Awareness", June 2021.3.

TECHNICAL POINT OF CONTACT (TPOC):

None

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