Amendment 0003 2014 ESS.pdf

N00101.SF.002995

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH

5090.3c

MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES OF CONCERN SURFACE CLEARANCE FINAL

EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION NOMANS LAND ISLAND NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH MA

07/01/2014

TETRA TECH

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND, ATLANTIC

REMEDIAL ACTION CONTRACT (RAC)

CONTRACT NO. N62472-99-D-0032

CONTRACT TASK ORDER NO. 33

LIMITED MUNITIONS AND EXPLOSIVES OF CONCERN SURFACE CLEARANCE

FINAL EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION

NOMANS LAND ISLAND

Chilmark, Massachusetts

RTN 4-13390

July 2014

Prepared for

Department of the Navy Naval Facility Engineering Command, Mid-Atlantic

9742 Maryland Avenue Norfolk, VA 23511-3095 and

Base Realignment and Closure Program Management Office, East

4911 South Broad Street Philadelphia, PA 19112-1303

Prepared by

Tetra Tech EC, Inc.

160 Federal Street, 3rd Floor

Boston, Massachusetts 02110

Revision Date Prepared By Approved By

0 7/16/14 S. Wilson B. Corbett

Contract No. N62472-99-D-0032 Limited Munitions and Explosives of Concern Surface Clearance CTO 0033 Final Explosives Safety Submission Nomans Land Island July 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................. 1-1 1.0

1.1 NAVY Project Manager .......................................................................................... 1-1

1.2 Munitions Response Site Identifier and Description ............................................... 1-1

1.3 Regional Map(s) ...................................................................................................... 1-1

1.4 Scope of Munitions Response .................................................................................. 1-1

1.5 History of MEC Use ................................................................................................ 1-4

1.6 Previous Studies of Extent of MEC or Material Potentially Presenting an

Explosive Hazard Contamination ............................................................................ 1-4 Areas that Contain MEC ............................................................................. 1-4 1.6.1 Areas Suspected to Contain MEC .............................................................. 1-4 1.6.2

1.7 Justification for no Further Action Decision............................................................ 1-5

PROJECT DATES ................................................................................................................ 1-6 2.0

TYPES OF MEC OR MPPEH .............................................................................................. 3-1 3.0

3.1 Types and Quantities of MEC and MPPEH ............................................................ 3-1

3.2 Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance ............................................... 3-2

3.3 Maximum Credible Event ........................................................................................ 3-2

3.4 Explosive Soil and Contaminated Buildings ........................................................... 3-2

MEC AND MPPEH MIGRATION ...................................................................................... 4-1 4.0

DETECTION TECHNIQUES .............................................................................................. 5-1 5.0

5.1 Detection Equipment, Method and Standards.......................................................... 5-1

5.2 Positional Equipment, Method and Standards ......................................................... 5-1

5.3 Equipment Checkout ................................................................................................ 5-1

Handheld Detector ...................................................................................... 5-1 5.3.1 Positional Equipment .................................................................................. 5-1 5.3.2

5.4 Data Collection and Storage .................................................................................... 5-1 Data Collection ........................................................................................... 5-1 5.4.1 Data Processing and Storage ....................................................................... 5-2 5.4.2

RESPONSE ACTIONS ........................................................................................................ 6-1 6.0

6.1 Response Techniques ............................................................................................... 6-1

MEC ............................................................................................................ 6-1 6.1.1 MPPEH ....................................................................................................... 6-2 6.1.2

6.2 Exclusion Zones ....................................................................................................... 6-2 Identify Exclusion Zones ............................................................................ 6-2 6.2.1 Operations to be Conducted by Work Area ................................................ 6-3 6.2.2 Potential Explosion Site Encumbrances ..................................................... 6-3 6.2.3 EZ Control .................................................................................................. 6-4 6.2.4 MRS EZ Access Protocol ........................................................................... 6-4 6.2.5

6.3 MEC and MPPEH Hazard Classification, Movement, Storage, and Transportation .......................................................................................................... 6-5

Hazard Classification .................................................................................. 6-5 6.3.1 Movement ................................................................................................... 6-5 6.3.2 Transportation ............................................................................................. 6-5 6.3.3

6.3.3.1 On Island Transportation ............................................................... 6-5

6.3.3.2 Off Island Transportation............................................................... 6-6 i

Storage ........................................................................................................ 6-6 6.3.4

6.4 MEC and MPPEH Disposition Process ................................................................... 6-6

MEC Disposition Process ........................................................................... 6-6 6.4.1 MPPEH Disposition Process ...................................................................... 6-6 6.4.2

6.5 Explosive Soil .......................................................................................................... 6-7

6.6 Contaminated Buildings .......................................................................................... 6-7

6.7 Operational Risk Management ................................................................................ 6-7

6.8 Contingencies ........................................................................................................... 6-8

QUALITY ASSURANCE/QUALITY CONTROL ............................................................. 7-1 7.0

7.1 Quality Control Implementation .............................................................................. 7-1

7.2 Quality Assurance Implementation .......................................................................... 7-1

TECHNICAL SUPPORT ..................................................................................................... 8-1 8.0

8.1 Explosives Ordnance Disposal ................................................................................ 8-1

8.2 UXO Contractor ....................................................................................................... 8-1

8.3 Physical Security ...................................................................................................... 8-2

EZ Security ................................................................................................. 8-2 8.3.1

ENVIRONMENTAL, ECOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, AND/OR OTHER 9.0

CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................................................ 9-1

9.1 Regulatory Statute, Phase, and Oversight ................................................................ 9-1

9.2 Environmental, Ecological, Cultural, and or other Considerations ......................... 9-1

9.3 Non-explosive Soil .................................................................................................. 9-1

RESIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT ................................................................................. 10-1 10.0

10.1 Land-Use Controls ................................................................................................. 10-1

10.2 Long-term Management ........................................................................................ 10-1

SAFETY EDUCATION PROGRAM ................................................................................ 11-1 11.0

STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT ................................................................................. 12-1 12.0

REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 13-1 13.0

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A Signature Page Appendix B Appendix B - Supporting Explosives Safety Data Appendix C ESQD Maps ii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1. Regional Map of Nomans Land Island ....................................................................... 1-2 Figure 1-2. Limited MEC Surface Clearance Proposed Plan ........................................................ 1-3 Figure 1-3. 2008 MEC Surface Clearance Results Map ............................................................... 1-6

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3-1. MEC and MPPEH Recovered on Nomans Land Island (1997, 2003, and 2008 Clearances) ............................................................................................................ 3-1

Table 3-2. Primary and Contingency MGFD ......................................................................... 3-2 Table 6-1. Exclusion Zones for Nomans Land Island Surface Clearance .............................. 6-3 Table 6-2. Controlling Exclusion Zones for Limited Surface Clearance ............................... 6-3 Table 6-3. PESs Encumbering Nomans Land Island .............................................................. 6-3 Table 6-4. Hazard Matrix for Nomans Land Island ............................................................... 6-7 Table 6-5. Contingency Measures .......................................................................................... 6-8 Table 7-1. QC Processes ......................................................................................................... 7-1 Table 8-1. UXO Training Requirements ................................................................................ 8-1 iii

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BIP blown-in-place BRAC Base Realignment and Closure CTO Contract Task Order DDESB Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board DMM discarded military munitions DoD Department of Defense EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ESQD explosive safety quantity distance ESS Explosives Safety Submission EZ Exclusion Zone GIS geographic information systems GPS global positioning system HE high explosives HFD hazardous fragmentation distance MassDEP Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection MDAS material documented as safe MEC munitions and explosives of concern MFD maximum fragmentation distance MFD-H maximum horizontal fragment distance MGFD munition with the greatest fragmentation distance mm millimeter MPPEH material potentially presenting an explosive hazard MRS Munitions Response Site Navy U.S. Navy NEW net explosive weight NOSSA Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity OHE ordnance handling equipment ORM Operational Risk Management QA quality assurance QC quality control RAC Remedial Action Contract RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act RPM Remedial Project Manager SUXOS Senior UXO Supervisor TtEC Tetra Tech EC, Inc.

USB universal serial bus USFWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service UXO unexploded ordnance UXOSO UXO Safety Officer UXOQCS UXO Quality Assurance Specialist iv

BACKGROUND 1.0

1.1 NAVY Project Manager

The Navy Remedial Project Manager (RPM) is Brian Helland. Mr. Helland’s contact information is:

Address: Department of the Navy BRAC Program Management Office East

4911 South Broad Street Philadelphia, PA 19112

Telephone: 215-897-4912 E-mail: brian.helland@navy.mil

1.2 Munitions Response Site Identifier and Description

Nomans Land Island is situated off the east coast of the United States, approximately 2.7 miles south of Martha’s Vineyard Island in Massachusetts. The 628-acre island is surrounded on three sides by wave-cut bluffs and narrow beaches, and a gently sloping sand and pebble beach on the north. East to west, the island is 1.6 miles long and slightly more than 1.0 mile wide, north to south. Two large freshwater ponds and several smaller ponds dot the island. Ben’s Pond lies just west of the center of the island and is approximately 1,000 feet east to west and about 500 feet north to south. Rainbow Pond lies on the east end of the island and is approximately 625 feet east to west. Two arms of the pond extend to the north and northwest. The island is heavily vegetated and dominated by rolling hills. Nomans Land Island was transferred from the U.S. Navy (Navy) to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) in July 1998, under the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) and was designated an unmanned wildlife refuge.

The island currently remains a wildlife refuge and there are no plans to change the island’s status.

1.3 Regional Map(s)

Figure 1-1 provides a site location map of Nomans Land Island that shows its location relative to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Martha’s Vineyard Island.

1.4 Scope of Munitions Response

The overall scope of this project is as follows:

• Complete a detector-aided visual survey of the accessible portions of the island identified in Figure 1-2 to locate surface munitions and explosives of concern (MEC), material potentially presenting an explosives hazard (MPPEH), and other munitions-related debris (MD).

• Record information on identified MEC by type, nomenclature, condition and location.

• Digitally photograph MEC.

• Dispose of any MEC found by detonation.

• Take actions necessary to assess and document MPPEH as Material Documented as Safe

(MDAS) in accordance with OP 5, and package it, awaiting demilitarization.

• Demilitarize MDAS in accordance with Department of Defense (DoD) 4160.21-M-1, Defense

Demilitarization Manual. This demilitarization may occur at an off-site recycling facility.

• Remove from the island and properly recycle/dispose of MDAS.

1-1 mailto:brian.helland@navy.mil

1-2 helene.conlan Rectangle

1-3

1.5 History of MEC Use

Prior to 1943 the island was used for various purposes including fishing and game hunting, and at one time a small group of people lived there. In 1943 the Navy leased the island for use as a practice bombing site and ordered the civilian population to leave. The Navy dropped live munitions on island targets between 1943 and 1952 but afterwards only dropped inert, dummy munitions. The Navy purchased the island in 1952 and continued to train pilots there until 1996. Because the island was an active military target range it is designated as Restricted Area R-4105 and civilians are not permitted to visit the island without a military escort.

1.6 Previous Studies of Extent of MEC or Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard Contamination

There have been several previous studies to determine the nature and extent of MEC contamination on Nomans Land Island, specifically:

• Nomans Land Island Clearance Post OP Report. 1997. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit TWO Detachment Newport. 22 May;

• Survey Report for the Radiological Screening Survey on Nomans Land Island. 1998. Inter-Link Group Ltd. and Duke Engineering & Services Environmental Laboratory. July 2;

• Report on Airborne Geophysical Survey of Nomans Land Island, Massachusetts. 2002. Oak Ridge National Laboratory. March;

• Supplemental Environmental Baseline Survey. 2003. Tetra Tech FW. December 3;

• Release Abatement Measure Completion Report (Ordnance Debris Removal), Nomans Land

Island. 2004. Tetra Tech FW. May 14;

• After Action Report, Nomans Land Island, Chilmark, Massachusetts. 2004. Engineering Field

Activity Northwest, Poulsbo, Washington and Engineering Field Activity Northeast, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. August;

• Draft Phase IIA Comprehensive Site Assessment, Supplemental Investigation, Risk to the Environment Report. 2004. Tetra Tech FW. September; and

• After Action Report, Nomans Land Island, Chilmark, Massachusetts. 2009. Engineering Field Activity Southwest, San Diego, California. March.

Areas that Contain MEC 1.6.1

There is no known MEC remaining on the surface of Nomans Land Island; however, the potential for buried munitions to be exposed due to natural conditions exists. Additionally, some of the cliffs had targets above them, and poorly aimed rockets impacted the cliff faces below them. These cliffs undergo considerable erosion on their faces every year and rockets and rocket motors are routinely exposed as the soil recedes. Other components from errantly fired rockets that landed in the ocean sometimes wash ashore on the beaches below the former targets.

Areas Suspected to Contain MEC 1.6.2

MEC may potentially exist anywhere on the island, but the three areas with the highest munitions concentrations are:

1-4

• The former target area located on the west end of the island;

• The former aviation landing strip (which had also been used as a target area) in the southwestern edge of the island; and

• The island summit, located on the southeastern to central portion of the island.

All three of the areas were littered with practice munitions, other metal debris, and targets.

Additionally, live munitions were used on the island until 1952, and no landside geophysical survey and intrusive investigation of anomalies have been completed. This, coupled with a 3-foot frost line could result in frost heave that could force buried munitions to the surface. Figure 1-3 shows the areas where munitions concentrations were found (the red grids) during the 2008 surface clearance.

1.7 Justification for no Further Action Decision

Not applicable.

1-5

1-6

PROJECT DATES 2.01

The limited MEC surface clearance is scheduled to begin in August 2014 and be completed by the end of 2

September 2014. Minor changes to this field schedule may be needed in the event of unforeseen 3 circumstances (i.e., plan acceptance, permitting, weather delays, equipment outages, etc.). 4

2-1

TYPES OF MEC OR MPPEH 3.0

3.1 Types and Quantities of MEC and MPPEH

The following table summarizes the MEC and MPPEH recovered from Nomans Land Island during previous clearance operations. Note that none of the MEC items had high-explosive (HE) fillers; rather, they were either rockets potentially containing residual propellant or practice bombs potentially containing unexpended spotting charges. As a precautionary measure all of these items, and those which were considered suspect, were explosively vented. The quantities of recovered MEC/MPPEH are unknown.

Table 3-1. MEC and MPPEH Recovered on Nomans Land Island (1997, 2003, and 2008 Clearances)

MEC MPPEH

MK25

5” rocket pod

MK 41

Sonobuoy

MK 43

Signal smoke

MK 76

MK 4 Mod 3 Cart

Mk 81 SUS

Mk 82

Mk 83

M106

M117

M124

5” rocket warhead

40 mm practice

2.25” rockets

2.75” rockets

250 pound old style

3” rocket

40 mm WH Star

BDU 48

3.5” bazooka

3-1

M230 fuze

Bull pup missile

3” projo

Note: This table originates from the RAM Completion Report (Ordnance Debris Removal), dated October 2000.

3.2 Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance

Based on the MEC/MPPEH identified in the above table, the Mk 83 will be the primary munition with the greatest fragmentation distance (MGFD) with the Mk 84 as the contingency MGFD. The explosive safety quantity distance (ESQD) arcs are provided in Table 3-1 and shown on Figure C-1 in Appendix C.

Appendix B contains the Fragmentation Data Review Forms for primary and contingency MGFD.

Table 3-2. Primary and Contingency MGFD

MGFD Type Munitions Item HFD (feet) MFD-H (feet)

Primary Mk 83 1000 pound bomb 8161/ 3,4471/ Contingency Mk 84 2000 pound bomb 9631/ 4,0211/

Notes: 1/ From Fragmentation Data Review Form, updated April 14, 2013.

3.3 Maximum Credible Event

Not applicable.

3.4 Explosive Soil and Contaminated Buildings

Not applicable.

3-2

MEC AND MPPEH MIGRATION 4.0

MEC migration on the upland and shoreline portions of Nomans Land Island is expected to be caused primarily by one of three natural mechanisms: erosion, frost heave, and wave action in the marine environment. Each of these mechanisms is further discussed below.

Erosion: Wind and rain over time will lead to the erosion of the unstable cliff faces. As this erosion progresses, the exposed face of the cliff will recede back from the shoreline. Any munitions that had previously been fired into the side of the cliff or were dropped onto the ground and penetrated the ground surface near the former edge of the cliff may then become exposed to the elements at the receding cliff face. The exposed munitions would eventually fall down the cliff onto the narrow beach below. This fall may cause further damage to the item and have an effect on its sensitivity to detonate if handled. In addition, heavy rains may saturate the upland ground on the island and the ensuing precipitation run-off could lead to gully erosion that exposes previously buried munitions.

Coastal erosion is the wearing away of the land along a shoreline and the removal of beach sediments by wave action, tidal currents, wave currents, or drainage. Waves, generated by storms, wind, or fast moving motor craft, cause coastal erosion, which may take the form of long-term losses of sediment and rocks along the shore, or merely the temporary redistribution of coastal sediments. Erosion in one location may result in accretion nearby. If an area containing subsurface munitions (e.g., a beach area where munitions were dropped and penetrated the surface or where munitions previously fell onto from a cliff face and were covered up by re-deposited material) becomes subject to coastal erosion, the MEC and MPPEH it contains may be exposed by the coastal erosion processes. Once exposed, these items may be further transported via wave action (see below).

Frost Heave: In general, during freezing conditions in the atmosphere soil will freeze from the top (i.e., the ground surface) downward. As a result, a boundary is established between frozen and unfrozen soil. If conditions are right, the deeper unfrozen ground can become a reservoir of water. This water percolates up through the soil toward the colder, frozen layer of ground. When the water reaches the frozen soil, it also will freeze, causing the frozen region to expand and cause pressure on the surrounding soil. This pressure will displace the soil and form what is called an ice lens. These ice lenses "heave" the ground upward, and anything in that layer of ground as well. Any munitions in the subsurface could be carried upward via this mechanism. Upward migration on the order of cms/year can result from frost heave given certain soil texture properties, amounts of available moisture in the soil, ground surface albedo, and air temperature conditions. The upward rate and potential distance of frost heave MEC migration also depend on the size, shape, subsurface orientation and weight of the MEC and MPPEH in the ground.

Wave Action: Some munitions may have been errantly fired and landed directly in the ocean or on the beach areas while other may have originally landed on the island and been subsequently exposed by erosion or frost heave and ended up on the beach or the intertidal areas around the island. Once “released” from the land, these items may be more easily transported by wave action and storm surge. Depending on the hydrodynamic conditions at the specific location along the shore during routine and/or storm events, these items may be pushed farther up onto the island by wave action, may be carried back into the deeper water, or may be transported laterally along the shoreline with entrained sediments and beach debris. This potential for highly variable transport of MEC and MPPEH results in uncertainties relative to potential

4-1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beach http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sediment http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tide http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erosion http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rock_(geology) exposures to the items. In addition, the forces associated with wave action may be sufficient to impart further damage to the affected items and change their susceptibility to detonation (i.e., making them more or less likely to detonate upon handling).

4-2

DETECTION TECHNIQUES 5.0

5.1 Detection Equipment, Method and Standards

The limited MEC surface clearance of Nomans Land Island will be restricted to items on or protruding from the ground surface. The clearance will consist of a number of UXO technicians (or qualified sweep personnel) in a line abreast formation, who will systematically search portions of Assessable Shore Area Sample Grids and Road Sample Grids (see Figure 1-2 and Section 5.4.1) while visually searching the ground surface for MPPEH and munitions debris. Hand-held metal detectors (e.g., Schonstedt locators or equivalent) will be used to assist in the search and will provide an audible alert when metal objects are encountered.

5.2 Positional Equipment, Method and Standards

This project is neither an Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis nor a remedial investigation, so the Field geographic information systems (GIS)/global positioning system (GPS) instrument will be used to install grid corners and record the locations of discovered MEC. This system has a stated positioning accuracy of less than 1 meter, though greater accuracy has been the more common occurrence on this site. This site-specific Field GIS/GPS System has been employed on this site successfully during all recent clearance events and remedial efforts.

5.3 Equipment Checkout

Handheld Detector 5.3.1

Because the field work will be a limited MEC surface clearance and the detectors will only be used to augment the visual search, an instrument verification strip is not required. The equipment check of the hand-held detectors will consist of a function check over a known metal object at the start of each work session for each detector that will be used that day. The results of the tests will be recorded by the UXO Quality Control Specialist (UXOQCS) in the quality control (QC) logbook.

Positional Equipment 5.3.2

Daily function and accuracy checks will be performed on the Field GIS/GPS System that will be used that day prior to beginning field work.

5.4 Data Collection and Storage

Data Collection 5.4.1

Data collection will be performed by experienced teams of engineers, geoscientists, and specially trained UXO technicians. Data will be recorded for GPS locations of munitions-related items. The items will be photographed and a narrative description will be recorded manually and/or entered in an electronic data base. To maintain consistency with past efforts, a grid sheet may also be used to record clearance information. It should be noted that the areas of interest during this effort is more limited than in past events. Therefore, entire grids will not be surveyed since the shoreline and roads only encompass partial coverage within grids.

5-1

Data Processing and Storage 5.4.2

Data will be transferred from field recording sheets and/or electronic capture devices to laptop computers for processing and storage. Storage of data will be on Microsoft® Office products (Excel, Access, etc.).

Back-up copies will be stored on networked servers and also on recordable electronic media (CDs, DVDs, and USB thumb drives).

5-2

RESPONSE ACTIONS 6.0

6.1 Response Techniques

There is no intrusive work planned for this project. A limited MEC surface clearance of accessible shoreline and road areas (shown on Figure 1-2) will be conducted to remove MEC/MPPEH either on or protruding (as appropriate) from the ground surface.

MEC will be cataloged, photographed, and either blown-in-place (BIP) or left-in-place, flagged, and moved just prior to detonation. Hand-held equipment used in this project will consist primarily of ferrous metal detectors (i.e., Schonstedt) used to assist in the visual search of the island. MEC that is deemed “not acceptable-to-move” will be BIP.

The area to be cleared is shown on Figure 1-2. A numbered grid system will be used to demarcate portions of the roadways and shoreline that will be cleared. The grid system used in previous clearances is shown for reference.

The extent of each grid, as it relates to the coverage area, will be accurately located using the Field GIS/GPS System, as practicable, so that the field teams know which applicable grid they are working within. Furthermore, the Field GIS/GPS System will show the teams’ location within each grid in real-time. The Field GIS/GPS System will also be used to determine the locations of significant items on the island, such as large munitions locations and survey monuments. Maps of the grid network will be produced to use for planning and monitoring the progress of the clearance. The applicable coverage of each grid will be marked with pin-flags and a grid reference number will be marked on the flags accordingly.

A previous surface clearance discovered two, concrete-filled Mk 82 (500 lb) bombs, which were removed from the island in 2008. Moving similar items will require the use of ordnance handling equipment (OHE) in the form of non-metallic slings, shackles and tag lines. The major concern of the OHE used in this project is that the safe working load of the slings used is sufficient to safely lift the primary MGFD Mk 83 bomb, which weighs 1,000 pounds or the contingency Mk 84 bomb, which weighs 2000 pounds.

To ensure the OHE is capable of lifting this weight, at least 2-inch nylon slings (18,000 pound breaking strength) or 3/8-inch wire rope (12,200 pound breaking strength) tag lines will be used to stop the sway of items being lifted.

OHE will be verified by the manufacturer to have been load tested. When the project is completed, use of the OHE will be discontinued; therefore, the 4-year inspection requirement required by OP 5, Chapter 10, will be avoided.

A backhoe is expected to be brought to the island for lifting or pulling heavy MDAS items and other debris, and pickups or utility vehicles will be used to transport them to a staging location on the northern shore of the island for later transportation.

MEC 6.1.1

UXO technicians will search the accessible shoreline and roads using standard detector-aided visual surface clearance procedures. The detector will be the Schonstedt gradiometer (or equivalent). All surface

6-1

MEC will be identified and removed. Because partially buried MEC items will also be identified and removed, limited manual digging may be required (if appropriate). No effort will be made to remove suspect MEC buried entirely below the ground surface.

The Sweep Teams will use the line abreast method, removing and recording munitions-related items located. This method involves team members walking side by side, separated by a distance that does not exceed visual coverage of the adjoining person’s field of view, visually scanning the surface terrain. Each Sweep Team member will use a hand-held magnetometer to assist in finding metallic items. The line will be staggered such that the detectors do not interfere with each other. Traffic cones may be placed in helpful areas or at the borders of the grid/area to aid the team in walking a straight line, and the person on the end of the sweep line will “guide on” the traffic cone until the team reaches the edge of the grid, then the traffic cone will be moved over to be used on the next pass. In areas where the traffic cone approach cannot work (i.e., dense vegetation), each area/grid will be subdivided with stake and string (or other method, as directed by the Senior UXO Supervisor [SUXOS]) into lanes or subgrids to ensure complete coverage. This procedure will be repeated until the entire area/grid has been searched.

When a UXO technician locates an item, he/she will alert the sweep line leader who will halt the line. The sweep leader will then examine the discovered item and determine if it is live or inert. Inert items will be marked with blue flags, suspect items with yellow flags, and dangerous (live) items with red flags. If an item is partially above the surface, it will be marked with an appropriately colored pin flag for later excavation and removal (if applicable). (Note: the flag colors may vary depending on availability and the SUXOS will ensure all involved personnel are aware of the color designations.)

MPPEH 6.1.2

MPPEH that is recovered during the limited MEC surface clearance will be taken to the collection points within the area/grid. The MPPEH will be photographed and evaluated in accordance with OP5 Chapter 13 and will be entered within the Field GIS/GPS System. (The SUXOS may develop an equivalent tracking system if desired.) At the collection point the MPPEH will be assessed. If it does not present an explosive hazard it will be documented as MDAS. This material is no longer considered MPPEH so long as chain-of-custody has been established and maintained.

6.2 Exclusion Zones

Identify Exclusion Zones 6.2.1

The Exclusion Zones (EZs) for primary and contingency MGFDs are found in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. The EZ during unintentional detonation for nonessential personnel is the HFD during low-input activities.

Low-input processing operations (e.g., on-site transport, dumping, screening, raking, spreading, sifting, and magnetically separating) are not intended to intentionally deform material including MEC being processed, and certain excavations depending upon the risk assessment. Since no high-input activities (e.g., crushing or shredding) will take place during the limited surface clearance, operations have been categorized as low-input. Neither the MGFD or contingency ESQD arcs overlap any inhabited structures or areas.

6-2

Table 6-1. Exclusion Zones for Nomans Land Island Surface Clearance

MGFDs Exclusion Zones (feet)

Description

NEW/2

(lbs)

Fragmentation Effects1/ Blast Overpressure Effects1/

HFD MFD K328 K40 K241/

Mk 83 Bomb 614.1 816 3447 2788 340 204 Mk 84 Bomb 1304.1 963 4021 3584 437 262 1/ From Fragmentation data Review Form, updated April 14, 2013.

HFD – hazardous fragmentation distance MFD – maximum fragmentation distance NEW – net explosive weight 2/ TNT-Equivalent Weight

Operations to be Conducted by Work Area 6.2.2

Operations to be conducted in the Munitions Response Site (MRS) are shown in Table 6-2 below.

Table 6-2. Controlling Exclusion Zones for Limited Surface Clearance

Operation Sited As Exposed Sites Basis3/4/ ESQD (feet) Manual operations1/ Unintentional

Detonation UXO Teams

K40 of the MGFD Primary 3404/

Contingency 4374/ Manual operations1/

Unintentional Detonation

Public and nonessential personnel HFD of the MGFD

Primary 8164/

Contingency 9634/ Disposal operations2/

Intentional Detonation

UXO Teams, Public and nonessential personnel MFD-H of the

MGFD

Primary 34474/

Contingency 40214/

Notes:

1/ Manual operations involve removing soil from partially buried MEC with hand tools and moving MEC that is acceptable to move to the disposal location.

2/ Disposal operations consist of open detonation at the disposal site or blow in place open detonation.

3/ Primary MGFD is the Mk 83 bomb and contingency MGFD is the Mk 84 bomb.

4/ From Fragmentation data Review Form, updated April 14, 2013.

5/ From Fragmentation data Review Form, updated April 14, 2013.

Potential Explosion Site Encumbrances 6.2.3

Table 6-3. PESs Encumbering Nomans Land Island

PES

BLDG/

Area

PES

Type/

Operation

Closest Distance to site (ft)

IL/

K18 from PES (ft)

PES Explosive Limits By class division (lbs)

1.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.3 1.4

(MCE) (MCE)

N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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EZ Control 6.2.4

Nomans Land Island is an uninhabited island that is only accessible by boat or helicopter. The only personnel that will be on the island during the surface removal will be essential personnel from contractor work party and authorized visitors. When exclusion zones are required, they will be established using the distances from Table 6-2 and will be controlled using barricades at entry control points with warning signs that state” DANGER, EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED, ACCESS BEYOND THIS POINT IS PROHIBITED. FOR ACCESS, PLEASE CALL XXX-XXX-XXXX”. The entry control points for intentional detonations are shown on Figure C-1.

When the EZ is established, the SUXOS will complete a visual sweep of the area to ensure that no nonessential personnel are present. During disposal operations, the SUXOS will assign one of the Tetra Tech EC, Inc. (TtEC) team members to be a safety observer, with that person assigned to continually scan the ocean for personnel or vessels approaching the EZ. That safety observer will sound an air horn (or similar device) if an EZ breach is imminent so that all operations can be stopped.

MRS EZ Access Protocol 6.2.5

In general, access to EZ’s is limited to personnel essential to the operation being conducted. However, under specific conditions and on a case-by-case basis, authorized visitors may be granted access to the EZ when operations are being conducted. In addition to general munitions response site access requirements, formal written procedures addressing EZ access, including authorized visitor access, must be developed in support of response actions involving MEC and/or MPPEH and must address the following requirements:

Access to an EZ while munitions response operations are occurring is limited to essential personnel and authorized visitors.

a. The Unexploded Ordnance Safety Officer (UXOSO) is responsible for conducting an operational risk management assessment in accordance with OPNAVINST 3500.39 (series) prior to initiating response actions involving MEC and/or MPPEH. In addition, the UXOSO must determine the maximum number of persons (essential personnel and authorized visitors) that can be in the EZ at one time. The ratio of UXO-qualified escorts to visitors will be determined by the UXOSO based on this site-specific operational risk analysis.

b. Based on the risk posed by the munitions response operation underway, the UXOSO may determine that access to the EZ is unsafe for visitors. However, every effort should be made to accommodate the authorized visitor’s needs. With concurrence of the responsible project manager, the UXOSO will grant EZ access to authorized visitors. Access to the site will be based upon the operational risk analysis of the scheduled MEC and/or MPPEH operations and availability of escorts, as well as a demonstrated visitor need and subsequent completion of visitor safety briefings.

c. Persons requiring access to the EZ must demonstrate a legitimate need for access and obtain authorization from the responsible project manager and UXOSO. At a minimum, the request for authorization will include: names of the individual requesting access, the identification of emergency contacts for these individuals, purpose of visit; task(s) to be performed; and rationale

6-4 to support EZ access. Persons requesting access must submit their request to the responsible project manager and UXOSO prior to the proposed date of the site visit. This advance notice will allow time for the UXOSO to support the visit request by assigning a qualified escort, conducting an operational risk analysis on the operations planned for the date of the site visit, and preparing a visitor site-specific safety briefing for the planned operations.

d. Prior to entry, all authorized visitors must receive a site-specific safety briefing describing the specific hazards and safety procedures to be followed within the EZ for operations underway that work day. Each authorized visitor must acknowledge receipt of this briefing in writing.

e. Authorized visitors to the EZ must be escorted at all times by a UXO-qualified person assigned to the project.

f. Any authorized visitor that violates the established safety procedures will be immediately escorted out of the EZ and/or site for their own protection and to protect essential personnel working at the site.

6.3 MEC and MPPEH Hazard Classification, Movement, Storage, and Transportation

The subsections below describe the processes that will be used to classify, store, and transport, MEC and MPPEH recovered during the limited surface clearance.

Hazard Classification 6.3.1

Munitions related items encountered during the systematic sweep of the grids will be positively identified as either MEC or MPPEH. All recovered MEC and MPPEH will have a hazard class/division (C/D) 1.1.

Movement 6.3.2

The SUXOS and UXOSO will both inspect MEC that is discovered by the sweep team. If both the SUXOS and UXOSO agree that the item is acceptable to move, the item will be moved to the collection point at the end of the field work on the day of disposal. The determination of acceptable to move will be documented in writing and signed by both the SUXOS and UXOSO. TtEC interim UXO Procedure 15 will be utilized for this purpose.

Transportation 6.3.3

6.3.3.1 On Island Transportation

Pickup trucks, utility vehicle (s), or other vehicles will be used to transport MEC, MPPEH and donor explosives to the demolition site (s) on the island. If a truck is used, it will be configured to be compliant with section 5-7 in NAVSEA SW02-AG-WHM-010 (On Station Shipment of Ammunition and Explosive) and will use either floor blocking or webbing tie down assemblies to secure the items. If a utility vehicle is used to transport MEC, MPPEH or donor explosives, an operational risk management analysis will be conducted to address unique vehicle features, required safety equipment, and operational restrictions.

Section 5-7.2 requires the utility vehicle cargo space to have a wooden deck. Additionally, the vehicle inspection and driver training criteria of NAVSEA SW020-AF-010 will be followed.

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Items that are inspected and certified as MDAS will be transported to the MDAS storage location where the site connex boxes are located.

6.3.3.2 Off Island Transportation

Only MDAS will be transported off the island. The MDAS will be loaded onto a vessel/barge for transport back to Martha’s Vineyard where it will be loaded onto a truck for transportation to a recycling facility.

Storage 6.3.4

Because of the remoteness of Nomans Land Island, and the absence of explosives storage magazines there, no MEC or MPPEH will be stored on the island, but either treated in situ or in a consolidated shot.

Donor explosives will also not be stored on the island, but will be transported there on a vessel by the vendor or TtEC personnel for same-day use.

The MDAS items will be placed in locking storage containers and added to the inventory on the turn-in document manifest. This location is shown on Figure C-1.

6.4 MEC and MPPEH Disposition Process

MEC Disposition Process 6.4.1

As discussed in Section 6.1, the SUXOS will determine whether the item is MEC or MPPEH. The SUXOS and UXOSO will verify the preliminary identification made by the team leader and determine the classification of the MEC based on visual observations and inspection. If they are able to verify that the item is acceptable to move, the determination will be documented in writing by both the SUXOS and UXOSO (in accordance with TtEC interim UXO-15 procedure). MEC will be disposed of by open detonation either at collection points within the area/ grid or in place if deemed not acceptable to move.

The demolition will occur at the end of the field work on a single day when donor charges are transported to the island by vessel. No more than one MK 83 bomb will be detonated at one time (if necessary).

MPPEH Disposition Process 6.4.2

If the item is MPPEH, the item will be visually inspected by two UXO personnel to determine whether it is classified as MDAS or remains MPPEH. MPPEH that cannot be certified as MDAS will be disposed of by open detonation either at collection points within the area/ grid or in place if deemed not acceptable to move. The demolition will occur at the end of the field work on a single day when donor charges are transported to the island by vessel.

MPPEH that can be certified as MDAS will be processed following the MDAS inspection process below.

Inspection of MDAS will be conducted at collection points within the grids in accordance with OP5 13-

15.4.1.2 and the certification of MDAS will be in accordance with OP5 13-15.5.1.2 and 13-15.5.1.3 as follows:

• The first signatory must be technically qualified and may be either a DoD employee or DoD contractor. This signatory must have performed or witnessed the initial 100 percent inspection or DDESB-approved processing of the material.

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• The second signatory must be a technically qualified U.S. citizen who may be either a DoD employee or a DoD contractor and does not report to the SUXOS. For this project, the UXOQCS will act as the second inspector. This signatory must have performed or witnessed the independent 100 percent re-inspection or conducted an independent quality assurance inspection of processed material using an approved sampling method.

MDAS items will be subjected to a certification/verification process at the collection point. The SUXOS will perform the first 100 percent inspection (certification). The second 100 percent inspection (verification) will be conducted by a UXO Technician III (UXOQCS or qualified government representative) who does not report to the SUXOS. For this project, the UXOQCS will act as the second inspector. By their signature, they will acknowledge the following statement, which will be on the form:

“This certifies that the material potentially presenting an explosive hazard listed has been 100 percent properly inspected and to the best of our knowledge and belief, is inert and/or free of explosives or related materials.”

Following the inspection and certification process, MDAS will be stored in a locked container until transported to a demilitarization and recycling facility.

6.5 Explosive Soil

No explosive soils are anticipated to be the encountered during the execution of this project.

6.6 Contaminated Buildings

There are no contaminated buildings at the site.

6.7 Operational Risk Management

Munitions response actions involve inherent risks and require evaluation of those risks using facts, prudence, experience, judgment, and situational awareness. Table 6-4 is the hazard analysis matrix for the planned project activities.

Table 6-4. Hazard Matrix for Nomans Land Island

Process Step Hazard Triggering Event

Initial Risk

Index Hazard Mitigation Final Risk Index

1 Area/Grid Layout MEC reacts to movement or impact.

C/III/4 SOPs, Qualified UXO Technicians

D/IV/5

2 Surface Sweep MEC reacts to movement or impact

C/II/3 SOPs, Qualified UXO Technicians

D/II/4

3 Manual removal of partially buried MEC

MEC reacts to movement or impact

C/II/3 SOPs, Qualified UXO Technicians

D/II/4

4 Receipt, handling, and holding of donor charges

Heat, shock and friction, electrostatic charge

C/II/3 SOPs, Qualified UXO Technicians

D/II/4

5 MEC OD Treatment MEC and donor charges react to heat, shock, friction

C/II/3 SOPs, Qualified UXO Technicians

D/II/4

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6.8 Contingencies

Table 6-5 summarizes the most common events/conditions and potential contingency measures that are available for all proposed removal action activities.

Table 6-5. Contingency Measures

Event/Condition Contingency Plan/Procedure Unanticipated Munitions (larger than estimated MGFD)

If MEC is found with a greater fragmentation distance than the contingency MGFD identified in this ESS, the ESQD arcs will be adjusted and the ESS amended.

Unanticipated Munitions (chemical munitions)

Project personnel will immediately cease work and withdraw along cleared paths upwind from the discovery. A team consisting of a minimum of two personnel will secure the area to prevent unauthorized access. The SUXOS will notify the Navy RPM and EOD-MU 12 Det Newport immediately. In addition, if it is decided that a chemical warfare material response is necessary, response actions that involve the intentional physical contact with a chemical agent, regardless of configuration, or the conduct of ground-disturbing or other intrusive activities in areas known or suspected to contain chemical agents shall not begin until the required Chemical Safety Submission is approved by the DDESB.

Adverse Weather The weather will be monitored, and in the event of adverse weather conditions, the UXOSO or designee will determine if work can continue without risking the safety of field workers. Project personnel will take shelter until conditions improve to a point where work can resume.

Equipment Inadequacies The instruments and methods planned for this project are routine in the industry and are known to operate in even the most extreme conditions. If shortcomings develop, the equipment and/or methods will be analyzed and an alternate approach will be recommended to NOSSA.

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QUALITY ASSURANCE/QUALITY CONTROL 7.0

7.1 Quality Control Implementation

This limited surface clearance is a maintenance action on a former range that has restricted access to the public. There are no formal quality standards specified for the performance of the clearance; however, the UXOQCS will check for quality in each definable feature of work.

The table that follows presents the minimum QC effort that will be accepted. The fundamental principles of the QC plan are to ensure the following: (1) MEC and MPPEH that are visible on the ground surface are removed; and (2) that no MEC or MPPEH are contained in the debris shipped off-island. Table 7-1 provides a summary of the QC process.

7.2 Quality…