Amendment 0001 ESS 6.1.22.pdf

N00101_004479

NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH, MA

SSIC 5000-33c

FINAL EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION LIMITED MEC SURFACE

CLEARANCE NOMANS LAND ISLAND CHILMARK NAS SOUTH WEYMOUTH

MA

06/01/2022

USA ENVIRONMENTAL INC

Approved for public release: distribution unlimited.

NIRIS Cover sheet rev. 5, Aug 2020

Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command Mid-Atlantic Norfolk, Virginia

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EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION

LIMITED MEC SURFACE CLEARANCE

NOMANS LAND ISLAND

CHILMARK, MASSACHUSETTS

June 2022

Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command Mid-Atlantic Norfolk, Virginia

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EXPLOSIVES SAFETY SUBMISSION

LIMITED MEC SURFACE CLEARANCE

NOMANS LAND ISLAND

CHILMARK, MASSACHUSETTS

Prepared for NAVFAC Mid-Atlantic USA Environmental, Inc.

720 Brooker Creek Boulevard, Suite 204, Oldsmar, Florida 34677 Contract Number N62470-20-D-0015

CTO N4008522F4490

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Explosives Safety Submission Limited Munitions and Explosives of Concern Surface Clearance

Nomans Land Island, Chilmark, Massachusetts

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. III LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................................... V

LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................................... VI ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................... VII

1. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 1-1

1.1 NAVY PROJECT MANAGER .......................................................................................... 1-1

1.2 SITE IDENTIFIERS AND DESCRIPTIONS ..................................................................... 1-1

1.3 REGIONAL MAP(S) ......................................................................................................... 1-1

1.4 SCOPE OF MUNITIONS RESPONSE ............................................................................ 1-7

1.5 HISTORY OF MUNITIONS USE ..................................................................................... 1-7

1.6 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF EXTENT OF MEC/MPPEH CONTAMINATION .................... 1-7

1.7 JUSTIFICATION FOR NO FURTHER ACTION DECISION .......................................... 1-13

2. PROJECT DATES ........................................................................................................................ 2-1

3. TYPES OF MEC/MPPEH.............................................................................................................. 3-1

3.1 TYPES AND QUANTITY OF MEC/MPPEH .................................................................... 3-1

3.2 MUNITION WITH THE GREATEST FRAGMENTATION DISTANCE ............................. 3-2

3.3 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE EVENT ........................................................................................ 3-3

3.4 EXPLOSIVELY CONTAMINATED BUILDINGS .............................................................. 3-3

4. MEC/MPPEH MIGRATION ........................................................................................................... 4-1

4.1 MEC/MPPEH MIGRATION .............................................................................................. 4-1

5. DETECTION AND POSITIONING TECHNOLOGIES .................................................................. 5-1

5.1 DETECTION AND POSITIONING TECHNOLOGIES ..................................................... 5-1

5.2 DETECTION EQUIPMENT, METHOD, AND STANDARDS ........................................... 5-1

5.3 POSITIONING SYSTEMS, METHODS, AND STANDARDS .......................................... 5-1

5.4 EQUIPMENT CHECKOUT .............................................................................................. 5-1

5.5 DATA COLLECTION AND STORAGE ............................................................................ 5-2

6. RESPONSE ACTIONS ................................................................................................................. 6-1

6.1 RESPONSE TECHNIQUES ............................................................................................ 6-1

6.2 EXCLUSION ZONES ....................................................................................................... 6-2

6.3 MEC/MPPEH HAZARD CLASSIFICATION, MOVEMENT,

TRANSPORTATION, AND STORAGE............................................................................ 6-4

6.3.1 Hazard Classification .......................................................................................... 6-4

6.3.2 Movement ........................................................................................................... 6-4

6.3.3 Transportation ..................................................................................................... 6-5

6.3.4 Storage ................................................................................................................ 6-5

6.3.5 Donor Explosives ................................................................................................ 6-5

6.3.6 Collection Point ................................................................................................... 6-5

6.4 MEC AND MPPEH DISPOSITION PROCESSES ........................................................... 6-5

6.4.1 MEC Disposition Process ................................................................................... 6-5

6.4.2 MPPEH Disposition Process ............................................................................... 6-6

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6.5 EXPLOSIVELY-CONTAMINATED SOIL ......................................................................... 6-6

6.6 CONTAMINATED BUILDINGS ........................................................................................ 6-6

6.7 OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT ........................................................................... 6-6

7. QUALITY CONTROL (QC) AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA) ................................................ 7-1

7.1 QC/QA PROGRAM .......................................................................................................... 7-1

7.2 QC IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................................................... 7-1

7.3 QA IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................................................... 7-3

8. TECHNICAL SUPPORT ............................................................................................................... 8-1

8.1 EXPLOSIVE SAFETY OFFICER ..................................................................................... 8-1

8.2 PHYSICAL SECURITY .................................................................................................... 8-1

8.3 UXO CONTRACTOR ....................................................................................................... 8-1

8.4 EOD ................................................................................................................................. 8-1

9. ENVIRONMENTAL, ECOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, AND/OR OTHER

CONSIDERATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 9-1

9.1 REGULATORY STATUTE, PHASE, AND OVERSIGHT ................................................. 9-1

9.2 ENVIRONMENTAL, ECOLOGICAL, CULTURAL, AND/OR OTHER

CONSIDERATIONS ......................................................................................................... 9-1

9.3 NON-EXPLOSIVE SOIL .................................................................................................. 9-1

10. RESIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................. 10-1

10.1 LAND USE CONTROLS ................................................................................................ 10-1

10.2 LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................... 10-1

11. SAFETY EDUCATION PROGRAM ............................................................................................ 11-1

12. STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT .............................................................................................. 12-1

13. REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 13-1

14. APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................. 14-1

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 3-1: MPPEH from 1998 Ordnance Debris Removal RAM ............................................................... 3-1

Table 3-2: MPPEH from 2014 Limited MEC Surface Clearance ............................................................... 3-2

Table 3-3: Primary and Contingency MGFDs ............................................................................................ 3-2

Table 6-1: Exclusion Zones for Nomans Land Island Surface Clearance ................................................. 6-2

Table 6-2: Controlling EZs for Nomans Land Island Surface Clearance ................................................... 6-3

Table 6-4: Hazard Analysis for Nomans Land Island ................................................................................ 6-7

Table 7-1: Quality Control Methods and Pass/Fail Criteria ........................................................................ 7-1

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1-1: Regional Location Map ............................................................................................................ 1-3

Figure 1-2: ESS Project Areas Map ........................................................................................................... 1-5

Figure 1-3: Historical Aerial Imagery of Known Target Areas .................................................................... 1-9

Figure 1-4: Historical MEC/MPPEH Locations Map ................................................................................ 1-11

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

% Percent 3Rs Recognize, Retreat, and Report AAR After Action Report ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire Arms and Explosives BRAC Base Realignment and Closure CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act CFR Code of Federal Regulations CTO Contract Task Order DDESB Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board DFW Definable Features of Work DoD Department of Defense DON Department of the Navy EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EODMU Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit ESQD Explosive Safety Quantity-Distance ESS Explosives Safety Submission EZ Exclusion Zone ft foot/feet GIS Geographic Information Systems GPS Global Positioning System HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response HE High Explosives HFD Hazard Fragmentation Distance IAW in accordance with In. inch, inches INST Instruction ISO Industry Standard Object ITS Instrument Test Strip lb pound, pounds MA Massachusetts MassDEP Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection MCE Maximum Credible Event MCP Massachusetts Contingency Plan MDAS Material Documented as Safe MDEH Material Documented as an Explosive Hazard MEC Munitions and Explosives of Concern MFD-H Maximum Fragmentation Distance-Horizontal MGFD Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance Mk Mark mm millimeter

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MPPEH Material Potentially Presenting an Explosives Hazard MR-QAPP Munitions Response Quality Assurance Plan NAVFAC Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command NAVSEA Navy Sea Systems Command Navy U.S. Navy NEW Net Explosive Weight NOSSA Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity OHE Ordnance Handling Equipment OP 5 Ordnance Pamphlet 5 OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations Instruction OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration PES Potential Explosion Site PM Project Manager QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control QCP Quality Control Plan RAM Release Abatement Measure ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle RPM Remedial Project Manager SCAR Sub-Caliber Aircraft Rocket SHSP Site Health and Safety Plan SOP Standard Operating Procedure SUXOS Senior UXO Supervisor TP Technical Paper TNT 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene TtEC Tetra Tech EC, Inc.

U.S. United States USAE ESO USA Environmental Explosives Safety Officer USFWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service UTV Utility task vehicle UXO Unexploded Ordnance UXOQCS UXO Quality Control Specialist UXOSO UXO Safety Officer UXOTII UXO Technician I UXOTII UXO Technician II UXOTIII UXO Technician III

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1. BACKGROUND

This Explosives Safety Submission (ESS) was prepared for the limited munitions and explosives of concern (MEC) limited surface clearance activities at the Nomans Land Island (NLI) located in Chilmark, Massachusetts (MA). This ESS was prepared in accordance with (IAW) the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Ordnance Pamphlet 5 (OP 5), Volume 1, Seventh Revision and the Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) Instruction (INST) 8020.15E, 2020.

1.1 NAVY PROJECT MANAGER

The Naval Facilities and Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) Remedial Project Manager (RPM) is Brian Helland. Mr. Helland’s contact information is presented below:

Address: NAVFAC Mid-Atlantic BRAC PMO East 4911 South Broad St Philadelphia, PA 19112

Telephone: 610-544-1807 E-mail: brian.j.helland.civ@us.navy.mil

1.2 SITE IDENTIFIERS AND DESCRIPTIONS

Site identifier and description information is summarized below.

Name of Site: Nomans Land Island

Host Installation: Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA

Command: NAVFAC Mid-Atlantic

Location: Nomans Land Island, Chilmark, MA

Nomans Land Island is situated off the east coast of the United States, approximately 2.7 miles south of Martha’s Vineyard Island, in MA. The 628-acre island is surrounded on three sides by wave-cut bluffs and narrow beaches, and a gently sloping sand and pebble beach on the north. The island is 1.6 miles long, east to west, and slightly more than 1 mile wide, north to south. Two large and many small surface water areas (ponds) are present on the island. One of the large ponds, Ben's Pond, lies just west of the center of the island and is approximately 1,000 feet (ft) across, from east to west, and approximately 500 ft across, from north to south. The other large pond, Rainbow Pond, lies on the east end of the island, and is approximately 625 ft across, east to west. Two extensions of the pond are present to the north and northwest. The island is heavily vegetated and dominated by rolling hills. Nomans Land Island was transferred from the U.S. Navy (Navy) to the USFWS in July 1998, under the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC), and was designated an unmanned wildlife refuge. The island currently remains an unstaffed wildlife refuge and there are no plans to change the island’s status.

1.3 REGIONAL MAP(S)

A map showing the location of NLI is shown on Figure 1-1. Figure 1-2 illustrates the accessible areas that will require the limited MEC surface clearance under this contract task order.

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Figure 1-1: Regional Location Map

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Figure 1-2: ESS Project Areas Map

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1.4 SCOPE OF MUNITIONS RESPONSE

NAVFAC Mid-Atlantic (NAVFAC MIDLANT) contracted Sevenson-USA Joint Venture (JV) to perform the Limited MEC Surface Clearance at NLI located at Chilmark, MA. The Record of Decision for NLI (Navy, 2022) requires limited MEC surface clearances every 5-years to manage MEC that has been exposed due to erosion or frost heave. This project will be conducted under the JV’s Environmental Remedial Action Contract (RAC) Single Award Task Order Contract (SATOC), Contract Task Order (CTO) N4008522F4490 of Contract N62470-20-D-0015. Under the JV, Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. will provide overall contractual administrative services and USA Environmental, Inc. (USAE) will be conducting all the Work Elements as defined in the Performance Work Statement (PWS), dated 26 October 2021.

The overall objective of this project is to complete a limited detector-aided surface clearance of, and to locate and remove, material potentially presenting an explosives hazard (MPPEH) from the accessible portions of NLI (e.g., beaches/shoreline, roads/trails, and dried ponds) as depicted in Figure 1-2. Under this limited surface clearance, only those MEC/MPPEH items laying on the ground surface, or partially protruding from the ground surface, will be removed. The overall scope of work includes:

• Approximately 50 acres of accessible beaches/shorelines surface clearance. While conducting clearance along the beach/shoreline, the MEC team will also visually survey the shoreline cliffs. If MPPEH is identified within the cliffs, and can be safely accessed by the unexploded ordnance (UXO) team, these items will be removed.

• Approximately 15 acres of accessible roads/trails surface clearance. To allow access to the ground surface of the accessible roads/trails (including 5-ft buffer on each side), the vegetation will be cut using a skid-steer with mowing deck. MEC avoidance techniques (along with a visual surface sweep) will be used during the vegetation cutting.

• Approximately 3 dried ponds surface clearance.

• Conduct explosive detonation operations of all recovered MEC at the end of the surface clearance activities. One on-call explosives shipment will be supplied for this purpose.

• Perform the final material documented as safe (MDAS) inspection and certification that the materials are free of explosives hazard using the MDAS certification form DD Form 1348-1A. MDAS recovered will be drummed, palletized, and transported to a qualified recycler and smelter.

1.5 HISTORY OF MUNITIONS USE

Prior to 1943, the island was used for various purposes (e.g., fishing and game hunting). In 1943, the Navy leased the island for use as a practice bombing site. The Navy conducted live munitions training on island targets (between 1943 and 1952), but, afterwards, only the training with inert/practice munitions. Some of these known NLI former target areas are presented in Figure 1-3. The Navy purchased the island in 1952 and continued to train pilots there until 1996. The island is designated as a restricted area and as an unstaffed wildlife refuge, controlled by USFWS.

1.6 PREVIOUS STUDIES OF EXTENT OF MEC/MPPEH CONTAMINATION

There have been several previous studies to determine the nature and extent of MEC contamination on NLI. Two of these previous responses included 1) MEC/MPPEH removal of the 1998 Release Abatement Measure (Ordnance Debris Removal), and 2) the 2014 Limited Munitions and Explosives of Concern Surface Clearance.

During the summer of 1998, approximately 671,306 pounds (lbs) of munitions debris and 59,847 lbs of scrap were removed from the island surface as part of a (Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection) MassDEP-approved Release Abatement Measure (RAM). Table 3-1 in Section 3.1 lists the types and quantities of MEC/MPPEH known to have been recovered during this 1998 Ordnance Debris Removal RAM.

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In 2014, a limited MEC surface clearance was performed at the accessible portions of NLI (approximately 65 acres) that resulted in the removal of 164 munitions-related items, and recycling of 3,650 lbs of MDAS.

Table 3-2 in Section 3.1 lists the types and quantities of MPPEH known to have been recovered during the 2014 limited MEC surface clearance response action. No MEC items were recovered during the 2014 clearance effort.

Figure 1-4 presents the location of the documented MEC/MPPEH items recovered (from 2001 to present) on NLI.

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Figure 1-3: Historical Aerial Imagery of Known Target Areas

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Figure 1-4: Historical MEC/MPPEH Locations Map

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1.7 JUSTIFICATION FOR NO FURTHER ACTION DECISION

Not applicable.

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2. PROJECT DATES

The limited MEC surface clearance is scheduled to begin in August 2022. The start of the field activities is contingent on the NOSSA endorsement and Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) approval of this ESS, and NAVFAC acceptance of the MR-QAPP. The estimated project field duration is approximately 8 weeks, following mobilization.

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3. TYPES OF MEC/MPPEH

3.1 TYPES AND QUANTITY OF MEC/MPPEH

The following tables summarize the MEC/MPPEH recovered from NLI during previous response actions.

Note that none of the MEC items had high-explosive (HE) fillers; rather, they were either rockets potentially containing residual propellant, or practice bombs potentially containing unexpended spotting charges. As a precautionary measure, all of these items (and those considered suspect) were explosively vented. The quantities of recovered MEC/MPPEH are unknown.

Listed below are the types and quantities of MEC/MPPEH known to have been recovered during 1998 response action. The quantities indicated are estimated based on the 1998 Ordnance Debris Removal Release Abatement Measure (TtEC 2004).

Table 3-1: MPPEH from 1998 Ordnance Debris Removal RAM

Item Description Quantity

MK76 Practice Bomb 2,799 MK106 Practice Bomb 4,823 40mm Projectile 224 MK41 Practice Bomb 23 MK15 Practice Bomb 59 MK7 Bomb 20 MK117 Bomb 2 M124 Bomb 697 MK81 Bomb 33 MK82 Bomb 451 MK83 Bomb 8 3-inch Projectile 6 6-inch Projectile 2 5-inch Rocket Warhead 72 2.25-inch Rocket 442 2.75-inch Rocket Warhead 244 5-inch Rocket Motor 19 MK25 Marine Marker 1

MK64 SUS 2

Small Arms 1,114

Total: 11,021

Listed below are the types and quantities of MPPEH known to have been recovered during the 2014 limited MEC surface clearance response action (TtEC 2016). No MEC items were recovered during the 2014 clearance effort.

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Table 3-2: MPPEH from 2014 Limited MEC Surface Clearance

Item Description Quantity

37mm Projectile 1 2.25-inch Sub-Caliber Aircraft Rocket (SCAR) 96 2.75-inch Rocket Warhead 1 3.5-inch Rocket Motor 13 3.5-inch Rocket Warhead 1 3.5-inch Rocket 10 5-inch Rocket Motor 4 5-inch Rocket Warhead 10 3-inch Rocket Motor 1 3-inch Rocket Warhead 1 MK 23 Practice Bomb 7 MK 26 Practice Bomb 1 MK 76 Practice Bomb 10 500-lb MK82 Practice Bomb 7 250-lb Old-Style Bomb (Half) 1

Total: 164

3.1.1 The project efforts do not involve decontaminating or demolishing explosively-contaminated buildings or installed equipment.

3.2 MUNITION WITH THE GREATEST FRAGMENTATION DISTANCE

Based on the MEC/MPPEH identified in the above tables, the 1000-lb Bomb Mk83 is selected as the Primary Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance (MGFD) with the 2000-lb Bomb Mk84 as the Contingency MGFD. Appendix A provides the Fragmentation Data Review Forms for Primary MGFD and the Contingency MGFD. The explosive safety quantity distance (ESQD) arcs are provided in Table 3-3 and shown on Figure B-1 in Appendix B.

Table 3-3: Primary and Contingency MGFDs

MGFD Type Munitions Item a HFD (ft) a MFD-H (ft) a Primary 1000-lb Bomb, Mk83 815 3,447 Contingency 2000-lb Bomb, Mk84 (H-6 filled) 962 4,021

Table Notes:

a From DDESB FDRF (DDESB, 6/5/2020) HFD: Hazardous fragmentation distance MFD-H: Maximum fragmentation distance, horizontal.

3.2.1 The 1000-lb Bomb Mk83 is the only known munition item and is selected as the Primary MGFD for this project.

3.2.2 Quantities of MEC/MPPEH previously identified are not considered in MGFD selection.

3.2.3 The 2000-lb Bomb Mk84 as the Contingency MGFD to reduce the potential for work stoppage in the event a munition larger than the MGFD identified is found on the site.

3.2.4 Greatest fragmentation distance sources of information for both the primary and contingency MGFDs are located in Appendix A.

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3.2.5 The primary and contingency MGFDs presented in Table 3-3, based on DDESB FDRF

(DDESB, 6/5/2020).

3.2.6 Not applicable.

3.2.7 If, while executing the munition response, a MEC item is identified that has a greater Maximum Fragmentation Distance-Horizontal (MFD-H), Hazard Fragmentation Distance (HFD), or K328 distance than the ESS-approved MGFD, then the Senior UXO Supervisor (SUXOS) will halt all operations and notify the Task Order Project Manager (PM), who will notify the Navy RPM, who in-turn will notify NOSSA (N4). If the UXO Contractor identifies a MEC item at the site with an HFD or MFD-H between the ESS-approved Primary and Contingency MGFDs, the PM may, with NOSSA concurrence, resume operations only after the increased protections required by the munition item found are in place.

Alternatively, if circumstances warrant, an email may be sent to the NOSSA N4 personnel that reviews the original ESS requesting that work continue at the site while the ESS is being amended. The email must provide all pertinent information on the new MGFD (and contingency MGFD, if appropriate), including required separation distances for DDESB-approved operations, and a revised map(s) showing the relevant separation distances. The amended ESS must be submitted to NOSSA via WebESS within two weeks of NOSSA authorization to continue operations, or the authorization will expire. The change in MGFD must be documented in the After Action Report (AAR).

3.2.8 Not applicable.

3.3 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE EVENT

The proposed munitions response is not anticipated to involve remediation of bulk explosives; therefore, no maximum credible event (MCE) is identified.

3.4 EXPLOSIVELY CONTAMINATED BUILDINGS

The proposed munitions response will not involve remediation of explosively contaminated buildings and equipment.

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4. MEC/MPPEH MIGRATION

4.1 MEC/MPPEH MIGRATION

MEC/MPPEH migration on the upland and shoreline portions of NLI is expected to be caused primarily by one of three natural mechanisms: erosion, wave action in the marine environment, and frost heave. Each of these mechanisms is further discussed below.

4.1.1 Erosion: Wind and rain over time will lead to the erosion of the unstable cliff faces. As this erosion progresses, the exposed face of the cliff will recede back from the shoreline. Any munitions fired into or near the side of the cliff may become exposed or fall to the beach as the face recedes. The exposed munitions would eventually fall down the cliff onto the narrow beach below. This fall may cause further damage, effecting its sensitivity when handled. In addition, heavy rains may saturate the upland ground and the ensuing precipitation run-off could lead to gully erosion that exposes previously buried munitions.

Coastal erosion is the wearing away of the land along a shoreline and the removal of beach sediments by wave action, tidal currents, wave currents, or drainage. Waves, generated by storms, wind, or fast-moving motor craft, cause coastal erosion, which may take the form of long-term losses of sediment and rocks along the shore, or merely the temporary redistribution of coastal sediments. Erosion in one location may result in accretion nearby. If an area containing subsurface munitions (e.g., a beach area where munitions were dropped and penetrated the surface or where munitions previously fell onto from a cliff face and were covered up by re-deposited material) becomes subject to coastal erosion, the MEC/MPPEH it contains may be exposed by the coastal erosion processes. Once exposed, these items may be further transported via wave action (see below).

4.1.2 Wave Action: Some munitions may have been fired directly into the ocean while others hit the island, eventually shifting to the beach or intertidal areas. Once “released” from the land, munitions may be more easily transported by wave action and storm surge. Depending on the hydrodynamic conditions, they could be pushed onto the island, carried back into the water, or transported laterally along the shoreline with entrained sediments and debris. This degree of variability may result further damage and change their susceptibility to detonation.

4.1.3 Frost Heave: during freezing conditions in the atmosphere, soil will freeze from the top creating a boundary between frozen and unfrozen soil. If conditions are right, the deeper unfrozen ground can become a reservoir of water. This water percolates up through the soil toward the colder, frozen layer of ground. When the water reaches the frozen soil, it also will freeze, causing the frozen region to expand and cause pressure on the surrounding soil. This pressure will displace the soil and form what is called an ice lens. These ice lenses "heave" the ground upward, potentially moving munitions with it. Upward migration, on the order of centimeters per year, is dependent on specific conditions: soil texture properties, available moisture in the soil, ground surface albedo, and air temperature. The upward rate and distance of frost heave migration also depends on the size, shape, subsurface orientation and weight of the MEC/MPPEH in the ground.

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5. DETECTION AND POSITIONING TECHNOLOGIES

5.1 DETECTION AND POSITIONING TECHNOLOGIES

The detection techniques directly impact the overall effectiveness of the response actions and the residual explosives safety hazards. This section describes the technologies that will be utilized to accomplish the scope of the munitions response.

5.2 DETECTION EQUIPMENT, METHOD, AND STANDARDS

The limited MEC surface clearance will be restricted to items on or protruding from the ground surface.

The MEC team, in a line abreast formation, will systematically search portions of the grids along the accessible beach/shore and road/train areas (see Figure 1-2), while visually searching the ground surface for MEC/MPPEH. Hand-held metal detectors (e.g., Schonstedt or Minelab E-Trac) will be used to assist the search and provide an audible alert when metal objects are encountered.

5.2.1 Because the field work will be a limited MEC surface clearance and the detectors will only be used to augment the visual search, an instrument test strip (ITS) will be set up with Quality Control (QC) seed items installed on the ground surface. The detectors will be checked twice daily over known ITS QC seed items before starting the work and after battery changes.

Equipment found to be inoperable, damaged, or out-of-calibration will be tagged and segregated until the discrepancy is corrected and verified by a member of the QC staff. Note:

The use of ISOs as blind seeds is discussed in Interstate Technology & Regulatory Council document, “Quality Considerations for Multiple Aspects of Munition Response Sites-2018.”

5.2.2 The NAVFAC Munitions Response Quality Assessment spreadsheet will be used to establish and validate quality metrics of the munitions response project.

5.2.3 The analog systems selected for use on this project has been approved at the appropriate NAVFAC (Environmental) level.

5.2.4 There are no know site-specific conditions (such as volcanic soil and other environmental features) that will lead to excessive background noise which can drastically change the detection of surface items with the magnetometer sensors.

5.2.5 Not applicable.

5.2.6 Not applicable. However, the magnetometer is a passive device; it does not transmit an energy field, nor does it need be HERO-certified.

5.3 POSITIONING SYSTEMS, METHODS, AND STANDARDS

GPS units such as a Trimble ProXRT system (or equivalent) will be utilized to determine positioning during fieldwork and have a stated positioning accuracy of one meter. The GPS will be used to install grid corners and record the locations of discovered MEC/MPPEH. GPS positioning systems require a consistent clear view of the sky, requiring adequate vegetation removal. GPS units will operate on the Universal Transverse Mercator NAD83 Zone 19N coordinate system with units in meters. Configuration and back check accuracy requirements for GPS units are detailed in the MR-QAPP.

5.4 EQUIPMENT CHECKOUT

Detection and positioning equipment will be inspected and operationally checked according to the manufacturer’s requirements prior to field use. Field equipment checks will be documented and records will be kept on site by the UXOQCS. All equipment inspections will be conducted by persons with specific training and experience.

Because the field work will be a limited MEC surface clearance and the detectors will only be used to augment the visual search, an ITS will be set up with QC seed items installed on the ground surface. The

Final Page 5-2 detectors will be checked twice daily over a known ITS QC seed items before starting the work and after battery changes. Equipment found to be inoperable, damaged, or out-of-calibration will be tagged and segregated until the discrepancy is corrected and verified by a member of the QC staff.

Daily function and accuracy checks of positioning equipment will be performed on the Field Geographic Information System (GIS)/ Global Positioning System (GPS) prior to field work.

Equipment checkout will be repeated at the end of the work day to verify functionality. If a QC failure occurs, a root cause analysis will be performed and corrective actions will be implemented, as necessary. Table 7- 1 provides further equipment check out details.

5.5 DATA COLLECTION AND STORAGE

Data collection and management will be performed by an experienced team of engineers, GIS specialists, and trained UXO personnel. Data will be recorded for GPS locations of MEC/MPPEH items. The items will be photographed and a narrative description recorded and entered in an electronic database using a GPS/Tablet Data collector. To maintain consistency with past efforts, a manual grid sheet will be used to record surface clearance information.

The UXO contractor will photograph and label all recovered MEC/MPPEH with date, unique photo identifying number, and brief description.

The UXOQCS will periodically check the photographs to ensure all required data is incorporated and accurate. The SUXOS maintains the Photographic Logbook and ensures the logbook is updated with all photographs prior to entry into the project database.

The UXO contractor will document the results of the surface clearance in the AAR. Following submission of the Final AAR, the UXO Contractor will prepare and submit a CD/DVD-ROM of all deliverables and recorded data to NAVFAC.

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6. RESPONSE ACTIONS

6.1 RESPONSE TECHNIQUES

Prior to on-site activities, the UXO Contractor will, at a minimum, meet with support personnel from USFWS, BRAC PM Office, and NAVFAC RPM to review the work to be performed and ensure proper coordination and notification procedures are implemented. All project MEC operations will be conducted by the MEC team and under the supervision of the SUXOS. A dual-hatted UXOSO/QCS will implement the Site Health and Safety Plan (SHSP) and the project Quality Control Plan (QCP).

The following sections describe each of the MEC operations and techniques to be performed.

6.1.1 Prior to surface clearance, the MEC team will cut vegetation to 6 in. above ground surface.

A skid-steer with mower deck (Bobcat or similar) will be used to cut along the accessible roads/trails (including a 5-ft buffer), the MPPEH management area, and the base camp (see Figure 1-2). The MEC team will perform a visual surface sweep (along with MEC avoidance techniques) in front of the machine to ensure no MEC/MPPEH is within its path.

6.1.2 An instrument-aided limited MEC surface clearance of accessible beach/shoreline, roads/trails, and dried pond (see Figure 1-2) will be conducted to remove MEC/MPPEH either on or protruding from the ground surface. The Sweep Teams will use the line abreast method, removing and recording MEC/MPPEH items. This method involves team members walking side-by-side, separated by a distance that does not exceed the adjoining person’s field of view, scanning the surface terrain. Each MEC team member will use a Schonstedt hand-held magnetometer to assist in finding metallic items. The line will be staggered to eliminate detector interference. Traffic cones may be placed to maintain a straight line; the person on the end of the sweep line will “guide on” the traffic cone until the team reaches the edge of the grid, then the traffic cone will be moved over for the next pass. In areas of dense vegetation or where this approach is infeasible, each area/grid will be subdivided with stake and string (or other method, as directed by the SUXOS) into lanes or sectors to ensure complete coverage. This procedure will be repeated until the entire area/grid has been searched and the ground surface is cleared.

6.1.3 Not applicable.

6.1.4 MEC/MPPEH will be managed IAW the approved ESS and MR-QAPP. When encountered, MPPEH items will be initially evaluated as found and placed into two categories, either safe to move or unsafe to move. Safe-to-move decisions for MEC/MPPEH items must be documented in writing by the SUXOS and UXOSO prior to movement. This documentation will consist of acknowledgement by the SUXOS in the MEC accountability log as well as the UXOSO daily safety report. MEC/MPPEH determined safe-to-move will be transferred to the designated MEC/MPPEH Staging Area (see Figure 1-2) for future consolidated explosive detonation operation. MEC/MPPEH determined unsafe-to-move will be detonated in-place.

6.1.5 MPPEH will be subjected to a dual inspection process (certification and verification), certified as MDAS (with DD Form 1348-1A), packaged, weighed, and shipped to Bonetti Explosives for final disposition. Base on previous findings of large concrete-filled practice bombs and moving these large heavy items will require the use of ordnance handling equipment (OHE) in the form of non-metallic slings, shackles and tag lines. A backhoe will be used to move heavy items.

6.1.6 As proven safe and effective during the 2014 clearance, a portable chop saw will be used to reduce the size of large MDAS located in remote areas of the island that cannot be accessed by a backhoe or a utility task vehicle (UTV). The objective is to cut up the large 500-lbpractice items and safely moved to the MDAS collection area before off-site recycling. The UXOSO

Final Page 6-2 will ensure that the use of munitions handling equipment complies with the safety provisions identified in NAVSEA OP 5.

6.1.7 To facilitate daily safe access to NLI, a floating dock/pier and two mooring systems will be installed on the northern side of the island (see Figure 1-2). MEC avoidance techniques will be used to support the installation of the floating dock supporting posts and the placements of the concrete blocks of the mooring systems. The qualified-UXO Technicians will use a combination of the instrument-aided (handheld metal detector), and/or an underwater Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) visual inspection of the ocean surface, to ensure the work areas do not contain any MEC. The MEC avoidance SOP-01 and ROV Operations SOP-08 are provided in the MR-QAPP for this project.

6.2 EXCLUSION ZONES

6.2.1 The exclusion zones (EZs) for the Primary and Contingency MGFDs for the NLI Surface

Clearance are identified in Table 6-1. The ESQD arcs map is provided as Figure B-1 in Appendix B. Table 6-2 identifies the controlling EZ during limited MEC surface clearance operations to be conducted on NLI. The ESQD arcs map is provided as Figure B-1 in Appendix B.

Table 6-1: Exclusion Zones for Nomans Land Island Surface Clearance

MGFDs EZs (ft)

Description

NEW

(lbs) a, b

Fragmentation Effects

Blast Overpressure Effects

HFD b MFD-H b K328 b K40 b K24 b K18 b

Primary MGFD:

1000-lb Bomb, Mk83

614.1 815 3,447 2,788 340 204 153

Contingency MGFD:

2000-lb Bomb, Mk84 (H-6 Filled)

1304.1 962 4,021 3,584 437 262 197

Table Notes:

a 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT) Equivalent Weight.

b From FDRF (DDESB, 6/5/2020) lb: pound K: K factor NEW: net explosive weight (W).

6.2.2 Not applicable.

6.2.3 Table 6-2 identifies the controlling EZ during limited MEC surface clearance operations to be conducted on NLI. The ESQD arcs map is provided as Figure B-1 in Appendix B.

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Table 6-2: Controlling EZs for Nomans Land Island Surface Clearance

Operation Sited As Exposed Sites Basis ESQD (ft) c,d

Manual Operation a

Unintentional Detonation UXO Teams K40 of the MGFD

Primary – 340 Contingency – 437

Unintentional Detonation

Public and Non- Essential Personnel

HFD of the MGFD Primary – 815

Contingency – 962

Disposal Operation b Intentional Detonation

Public and All Personnel MFD-H of the MGFD

Primary – 3,447 Contingency – 4,021

Table notes:

a Manual operations involve handling of and excavating partially buried MEC/MPPEH items with hand tools.

b Disposal operations consist of open detonation at the disposal site or destruction-in-place open detonation.

c Primary MGFD is the Mk83 Bomb and Contingency MGFD is the Mk84 Bomb.

d From FDRF (DDESB, 6/5/2020).

6.2.4 The blast overpressure protection that will be employed primarily involves strict control of EZs.

6.2.5 There are no potential explosion sites (PES) that encumber any part of NLI.

6.2.6 EZ Control: Nomans Land Island is uninhabited, accessible by boat or helicopter. The only personnel allowed on the island during the surface removal will be deemed essential contractors and authorized visitors. When exclusion zones are required, they will be established using the distances from Table 6-2 and will be controlled using barricades at entry control points with warning signs. The entry control points for intentional detonations are shown on Figure B-1 in Appendix B.

When the EZ is established, the SUXOS will complete a visual sweep of the area to ensure that no non-essential personnel are present. During intrusive operations, handling/moving safe to move MEC/MPPEH, and explosive detonation operations, the SUXOS will assign one of the MEC team members to be a safety observer, with that person assigned to continually scan the ocean for personnel or vessels approaching the EZ. That safety observer will sound an air horn (or similar device) if an EZ breach is imminent so that all operations can be stopped.

6.2.7 Not applicable.

6.2.8 Exclusion Zone Access Protocol: under specific conditions and on a case-by-case basis, authorized visitors may be granted access to the EZ during operations.

6.2.9 In addition to general munitions response site access requirements, formal written procedures addressing EZ access, including authorized visitor access, must be developed in support of response actions involving MEC and/or MPPEH and must address the following requirements:

1) Access to an EZ while munitions response operations are occurring is limited to essential personnel and authorized visitors.

2) The UXOSO is responsible for conducting an operational risk management assessment IAW OPNAVINST 3500.39D prior to initiating response actions involving MEC and/or MPPEH. In addition, the UXOSO must determine the maximum number of persons (essential personnel and authorized visitors) that can be in the EZ at one

Final Page 6-4 time. The ratio of UXO-qualified escorts to visitors will be determined by the UXOSO based on this site-specific operational risk analysis.

3) Based on the risk posed by the munitions response operation underway, the UXOSO may determine that access to the EZ is unsafe for visitors. However, every effort should be made to accommodate the authorized visitor’s needs. With concurrence of the responsible PM, the UXOSO will grant EZ access to authorized visitors.

Access to the site will be based upon the operational risk analysis of the scheduled MEC and/or MPPEH operations and availability of UXO escorts, as well as a demonstrated visitor need and subsequent completion of visitor hazard control briefings.

4) Persons requiring access to the EZ must demonstrate a legitimate need for access and obtain authorization from the responsible PM and UXOSO. At a minimum, the request for authorization will include: names of the individual requesting access and emergency contact information; purpose of visit; task(s) to be performed; and rationale to support EZ access. Persons requesting access must submit their request to the responsible PM and UXOSO prior to the proposed date of the site visit. This advance notice will allow time for the UXOSO to support the visit request by assigning a qualified escort, conducting an operational risk analysis on the operations planned for the date of the site visit, and preparing a visitor site-specific hazard control briefing for the planned operations.

5) Prior to entry, all authorized visitors must receive a site-specific hazard control briefing describing the specific hazards and safety procedures to be followed within the EZ for operations underway that work day. Each authorized visitor must acknowledge receipt of this briefing in writing.

6) Authorized visitors to the EZ must be escorted at all times by a UXO-qualified person assigned to the project.

7) Any authorized visitor that violates the established safety procedures will be immediately escorted out of the EZ and/or site for their own protection and to protect essential personnel working at the site.

6.3 MEC/MPPEH HAZARD CLASSIFICATION, MOVEMENT, TRANSPORTATION, AND STORAGE

The subsections below describe the processes that will be used to classify, store, and transport MEC and MPPEH recovered during the limited surface clearance.

6.3.1 Hazard Classification

All recovered MEC/MPPEH will be managed and initially classified as Hazard Class/Division (CD) 1.1 per NAVSEA OP 5 unless otherwise classified by NOSSA (N85).

6.3.2 Movement

Prior to on-site movement, MEC/MPPEH must be evaluated and determined to be safe-to-move by the SUXOS and UXOSO. They must determine that the risk associated with movement is acceptable and that the movement is necessary for the efficiency of the activities being conducted or the protection of people, property, or critical assets. In such cases, the responsible SUXOS and UXOSO must agree with the risk determination and document this decision in logbooks and in writing prior to movement of the MEC or munitions item. Recovered MEC/MPPEH that is determined safe-to-move will be moved to the collection point at the MPPEH Management Area.

Final Page 6-5

6.3.3 Transportation

MEC/MPPEH will not be transported off-site. The UXO Contractor will only move recovered MEC/MPPEH on-site and IAW applicable guidelines outlined in Chapter 12, Chapter 13, and Chapter 14 of NAVSEA OP

5. Safe-to-move MEC/MPPEH is transported to the MEC/MPPEH management area (see Figure 1-2) or to the designated consolidated demolition location. Delivery of donor explosives will be as needed and properly coordinated IAW with the MR-QAPP to ensure that prescribed routes are followed and that an escort meets and guides the delivery vessel along the correct route to the island.

Only certified-MDAS will be transported off the island for final disposition by a qualified smelter/recycler.

The MDAS will be loaded onto a vessel/barge for transport to a transfer area on Martha’s Vineyard where the MDAS containers will be loaded onto a truck for transportation to a recycling facility.

6.3.4 Storage

All requirements established by NAVSEA OP 5 will be strictly adhered to by the UXO Contractor personnel during handling and collection of MEC/MPPEH. Because of the remoteness of NLI, and the absence of explosives storage magazines there, no MEC/MPPEH will be stored on the island, but either treated in situ or in a consolidated shot.

6.3.5 Donor Explosives

Donor Explosives will also not be stored on the island, but will be ordered in quantities that can be consumed during the day of demolition operations and transported there on a vessel by the vendor or the MEC team for same-day use. The MDAS items will be placed in locking storage containers and added to the inventory on the turn-in document manifest. This location is shown on Figure 1-2.

6.3.6 Collection Point

A collection point will be used during this munitions response prior to temporarily staging MEC/MPPEH for processing, evaluation, and classification and until MEC and MPPEH (determined by the SUXOS to present an explosive hazard) can be detonated through properly coordinated and controlled detonation. The maximum net explosive weight of the collection point is 6,125 lbs to ensure that the K40 distance does not exceed the 815-ft HFD of the primary MGFD, meeting the requirements of DDESB Technical Paper (TP) 15, paragraph 6.2.7.5.3. The recovered items will be removed from the collection point by the end of the work day for either disposition or storage.

6.4 MEC AND MPPEH DISPOSITION PROCESSES

Upon discovery of a potential MEC/MPPEH item and once the operation has thereby stopped, a UXOTIII will visually inspect it and determine if it is a MEC/MPPEH item or is other debris. If the suspected item is believed to be MEC/MPPEH, the SUXOS and the UXOSO will further investigate the item to make positive identification. Where possible, the identification should be determined according to munitions type by function, fuzing type by function and condition, and whether or not it is safe-to-move. After assessment, MPPEH items that still pose an explosive hazard will be managed as MEC. MEC items will be disposed of per Section 6.4.1. MPPEH items will be disposed of per Section 6.4.2.

6.4.1 MEC Disposition Process

Recovered MEC/MPPEH items MEC will be disposed of by open detonation either at collection points within the area/grid or destruction-in-place if deemed safe-to-move. The demolition will occur at the end of the field work on a single day when donor charges are transported to the island by vessel. No more than one MK83 bomb will be detonated at one time (if necessary). There will be no off-site transported of material documented as an explosive hazard (MDEH) on this project. The UXO Contractor will have explosives Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire Arms and Explosives (ATF) user certificate and on-site MA licensed blaster to support the on-site MEC explosive detonation operation.

Final Page 6-6

6.4.2 MPPEH Disposition Process

During MEC field operations, all MPPEH will be recovered, inspected, and…