Attachment_10_-_GSIP.pdf

Military Sealift CoMMand

Final April 2010

For Official Use Only

Military Sealift CoMMand

Global Shore InfraStructure Plan

Parsons table of contents executive summary......................................................................................................... es-1

1. introduction

1.1 history and overview

1.2 organization

1.3 shore infrastructure and the msc concept of operations

1.4 purpose of the msc gsip

2. strategic guidance and operational drivers

2.1 strategic foundation

2.1.1 Quadrennial Defense Review

2.1.2 Maritime Strategy

2.1.3 Chief of Naval Operations Guidance

2.1.4 Navy Strategic Plan

2.1.5 Naval Operations Concept

2.2 cno shore investment strategy

2.3 navy strategic laydown

2.4 global facility trends and issues

2.5 operational drivers

3. stakeholder guidance

3.1 msc gsip development

3.2 msc shore infrastructure vision

3.3 msc shore infrastructure guiding principles

3.4 msc shore infrastructure business rules

3.5 msc global shore infrastructure plan assumptions

3.6 future road map

3.6.1 Follow-on GSIPs

3.6.2 Future Studies

3.6.3 GSIP Reviews

3.6.4 Regional Integration Plans

4. capability gap analysis

4.1 gap analysis development i

For Official Use Only

4.2 capability gap analysis

4.2.1 Navy Region EURAFSWA

4.2.2 Navy Region Hawaii

4.2.3 Navy Region Japan

4.2.4 Navy Region Korea

4.2.5 Navy Region Marianas

4.2.6 Singapore Area

4.2.7 Navy Region Mid-Atlantic

4.2.8 Naval District Washington

4.2.9 Navy Region Northwest

4.2.10 Navy Region Southeast

4.2.11 Navy Region Southwest

5. priorities and impact analysis

5.1 global priorities

5.2 region priorities appendix a acronyms appendix b ship requirements appendix c cnic shore capability areas appendix d shore capability gap summary appendix e basic facility requirements figures es-1 capability gap oconus......................................................................................... es-2 es-2 capability gap conus............................................................................................ es-2

1-1 msc organization chart

2-1 strategic laydown and dispersal

5-1 top ten capability area shortfalls ii ii tables

2-1 future mission shore infrastructure drivers

4-1 capability gap color definitions

4-2 navy region eurafswa

4-3 navy region hawaii

4-4 navy region Japan

4-5 navy region korea

4-6 navy region marianas

4-7 singapore area

4-8 navy region mid-atlantic

4-9 naval district washington

4-10 navy region northwest

4-11 navy region southeast

4-12 navy region southwest

5-1 prioritized shortfalls and coas iii

THIS PAGE INTENTIONAlly lEFT blANK iv v vi executive summary The Military Sealift Command (MSC) Global Shore Infrastructure Plan (GSIP) provides strategic guidance to facility planners, informs the Warfare Enterprise GSIPs, and supports the rollup of shore infrastructure requirements in the Fleet Readiness Enterprise (aka “FRE”) GSIP. In the top-down planning process, as a link between Navy Strategic Planning, Warfare Enterprise GSIPs, and regional planners, the MSC GSIP captures the essence of the Navy Shore Infrastructure Vision and establishes the shore infrastructure planning framework to support the MSC Mission. An infrastructure vision is a conceptual, unconstrained description of a future, optimal infrastructure. The MSC GSIP vision is:

“Cost effective infrastructure aligned with mission requirements”

A Guiding Principle (GP) is consistent with the adopted vision, and addresses programmatic decisions related to basing, capital investment, and asset management. There are six GPs developed for the MSC GSIP.

• Wherever possible, leverage existing infrastructure.

• Align, size, and configure infrastructure to support worldwide MSC operations.

• Promote a positive quality of service for MSC personnel.

• Explore alternative operational concepts that could reduce overall infrastructure requirements.

• Enable the future MSC fleet.

Navy Enterprise shore infrastructure is affected by a variety of operational influences. Key operational influences include:

New Platforms such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Poseidon (P-8), Growler (EA-18G), MH-60 R/S Helicopters, littoral Combat Ship (lCS), CVN 78 class ships, Unmanned Vehicles, T-AKE 1 class ships, and the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).

Basing Decisions with respect to CVN Homeports, JSF bases of operation, JHSV bases of operations, lCS homeports, and Unmanned Vehicle homebases.

New Missions/Realignments, including the storage and warehousing transfer to the Defense logistics Agency, transfer of SbX-1 radar platform to MSC, Strategic lift requirements for the 25th Infantry Division light, transfer of various MSC ships from commercial layberths to Navy installation berths, NECE unit relocations, various base Realignment and Closure (bRAC)-related efforts, establishment of U.S. Fourth Fleet, evolution of various Joint Task Forces worldwide, and various joint basing efforts.

Training, including NECE force and unit training location decisions, Undersea Warfare Training Range location decisions, and outlying landing field (OLF) location decisions.

The MSC GSIP team evaluated inputs from all available sources. The initial analysis was presented at Workshop II. The validated gap analysis is presented in the form of a Green, yellow, or Red assessment matrix (aka “stoplight chart”). The stoplight chart for regions outside the continental United States (OCONUS) is shown in figure ES-1. The stoplight chart for regions in the continental United States (CONUS) is shown in figure ES-2.

ES-1

cnic regions - oconus europe africa southwest asia hawaii Japan korea marianas singapore

WATERFRONT OPERATIONS

AIRFIElD OPERATIONS

C5ISR OPERATIONS

EXPEDITIONARy

OPERATIONS

INTER/DEPOT lEVEl

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

ORDNANCE / WEAPONS

OPERATIONS SUPPORT

TRAINING

lOGISTICS & SUPPly

SAIlOR & FAMIly

READINESS

bASE SUPPORT

RDAT&E

UTIlITIES

Figure ES-1 Capability Gaps OCONUS cnic regions - conus midatlantic naval district washington northwest southeast southwest

WATERFRONT OPERATIONS

AIRFIElD OPERATIONS

C5ISR OPERATIONS

EXPEDITIONARy

OPERATIONS

INTER/DEPOT lEVEl

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

ORDNANCE / WEAPONS

OPERATIONS SUPPORT

TRAINING

lOGISTICS & SUPPly

SAIlOR & FAMIly READINESS bASE SUPPORT

RDAT&E

UTIlITIES

Figure ES-2 Capability Gaps CONUS

ES-2

1 introduction The Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for ocean transport of equipment, fuel, supplies, and ammunition to sustain U.S. military forces worldwide. MSC reports to U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) as a force provider for management of Combat logistics, to U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) as its sea transportation component and to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (aka “ASN(RD&A)”) for procurement policy and oversight.

The MSC mission:

1.1 History and Overview

Until 1949 there were four separate government agencies competing for commercial merchant marine resources --the Naval Transportation Service, the Army Transport Service, the U.S. Maritime Commission’s War Shipping Administration, and the Fleet Support Services. The Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) was created in August 1949 under a directive issued by Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, establishing the organization “in order to provide, under one authority, control, operation and administration of ocean transportation…for all agencies or departments of the National Military Establishment.”

MSTS was renamed Military Sealift Command (MSC) in 1970.

The name change also came with a mission change. After 1970, MSC would no longer be used to transport troops. At the height of the Gulf War, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, MSC managed more than 230 ships, government-owned and chartered. MSC distinguished itself as the largest source of defense transportation of any nation involved in those operations.

MSC currently manages up to 180 ships and over 10,000 people. MSC ships are civilian-manned, and are referred to as being “in service,” rather than “in commission.” Some, owned by the U.S. Government, have the prefix USNS, standing for United States Naval Ship, while others, on charter or equivalent, are simply the normal motor vessel (MV) or steamship (SS). The hull number of an MSC ship has the prefix “T” in addition to the normal hull number that an equivalent commissioned vessel in the Navy would have.

1.2 Organization

From the top down, MSC organization includes the headquarters at the Washington Navy yard in Washington, D.C. and a variety of subordinate commands and management offices worldwide (see Figure 1-1).

Headquarters consists of functional directorates and program managers. The functional directorates include:

• N1 Maritime Forces & Manpower Management

• N3 Operations

• N4 Logistics

• N5 Joint Plans, Strategic Studies & War

Gaming

• N6 Command, Control, Communications &

Computer Systems

• N7 Engineering

• N8 Comptroller

• N10 Contracts & Business Management

“MSC provides efficient sea transportation, combat-ready logistics forces and reliable special mission ships for the Department of Defense in peace and war.”

There are four program managers. They are organized by mission:

• The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (PM1) manages ships that provide direct support to Navy ships worldwide. The ships of PM1 are the supply line to the fleet. They provide fuel, food, ordnance, spare parts, mail, and other supplies. They also conduct towing, rescue, and salvage operations and provide floating medical facilities. The ships of PM1 include oilers, dry cargo/ammunition ships, fast combat support ships, ammunition ships, fleet ocean tugs, rescue and salvage ships, and hospital ships. All PM1 ships are Government-Owned and Government-Operated (GOGO). The crews are civil service mariners. In some cases there may be a small group of active duty Navy personnel on board for operations support, supply coordination, and helicopter operation support.

• The Special Mission Program (PM2) supports specialized scientific and technical missions for Department of Defense (DoD) and other federal entities. The missions performed include command and control, ocean surveillance, oceanographic and hydrographic survey, cable laying, missile telemetry collection, submarine support, and navigation test support. Most PM2 ships are Government-Owned and Contractor-Operated (GOCO).

• The Prepositioning Program (PM3) is critical to U.S.

military readiness. PM3 provides ships loaded with military stores at forward, at-sea staging areas worldwide. PM3 ships include over 30 ships spread among three squadrons supporting the U.S. Marine Corps, the U.S. Army, the Navy, Defense logistics Agency, and the U.S. Air Force. There are three Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadrons that operate within specified areas or “tether boxes”:

• MPS Squadron One: Assigned to the Eastern Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea

• MPS Squadron Two: Assigned to the Indian Ocean

• MPS Squadron Three: Assigned to the Western Pacific

PM3 also manages high speed vessels designed to transport combat troops and support U.S. Fleet Forces missions, an offshore petroleum distribution platform that can deliver fuel from up to 8 miles offshore and aviation logistics ships. PM3 ships are a combination of GOCO and Contractor-Owned and Contractor- Operated (COCO) ships. MPS Squadron staffs are embarked on a flagship and include a Commodore.

The squadron staff are active duty Navy personnel.

Military Sealift Fleet Support Command

Strategic Sealift & Prepositioning

PO2

Sealift Logistics Command Atlantic; Norfolk, VA

MSCOs: Earle; Sunny Point;

Charleston; Beaumont; Port

Canaveral; Jacksonville

Sealift Logistics Command Pacific; San Diego, CA

MSCOs: Pearl Harbor; Seattle;

San Francisco

Sealift Logistics Command Europe; Naples, IT MSCOs: Spain; Greece

Sealift Logistics Command Central; Bahrain MSCOs: Kuwait

Sealift Logistics Command Far East; Singapore

MSCOs: Okinawa; Korea;

Diego Garcia

Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force

PM1

Special Mission

PM2

Ship Support Units:

Bahrain Yokohama Guam San Diego Naples Singapore

Sealift

PM5

Prepositioning

PM3

Strategic Sealift & Prepositioning Detachment Scott AFB

Joint Plans, Strategic Studies & War Gaming

N5

Command Master Chief

N00A Reserve Programs

N00R Counsel N00L Inspector General

N00I Fleet Surgeon

N00M Public Affairs

N00P

Commander Military Sealift Command

Executive Director N01

Chief of Staff N02

Contracts & Business

Management N10

Maritime Forces & Manpower Management

N1

Command, Control, Communications & Computer Systems

N6

Operations N3

Engineering N7

Logistics N4

Comptroller N8

Figure 1-1 MSC Organization Chart

• The Sealift Program (PM5) provides marine transportation support to satisfy DoD sealift requirements. The ships of PM5 transport breakbulk, containers, roll-on/roll-off (RORO) cargo, as well as other specialty items (heavy lift cargo, float-on/float-off cargo). More than 90 percent of U.S. warfighting equipment and supplies are transported by sea. To support this, PM5 manages a combination of Government-Owned and long-term chartered ships.

by law and policy, MSC must first look to the U.S.-flagged market to meet requirements. Government-owned vessels can only be used if U.S.-flagged commercial ships are not available. During wartime and other contingencies, MSC has the authority to charter international ships and activate ships from the Government-Owned surge fleet (including Ready Reserve Force ship from the United States Maritime Administration). PM5 would support the management of such vessels should the need arise.

GOGO ships require higher levels of support and management. This support and management includes life-cycle management, ship readiness, maintenance, repair, and logistics support. In October 2006 MSC established the Military Sealift Fleet Support Command (MSFSC). MSFSC is responsible for crewing, training, equipping, and maintaining the GOGO ships of the MSC fleet. MSFSC is also responsible for afloat Information Technology (IT) support to all MSC ships worldwide. This support is executed from a headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia through a network of Ship Support Units (SSU) around the world.

MSC’s strategic sealift mission is executed through five geographically assigned Sealift Logistics Commands (SEALOG). Each SEAlOG exercises tactical control of all assigned TRANSCOM forces and MSC forces not otherwise assigned to a numbered fleet commander.

SEAlOG commodores are usually dual-hatted. As such they may also exercise tactical control of the MSC forces assigned to the numbered fleet commander, usually as a task force commander. SEAlOGs are supported by the local SSUs. This in-theater administrative support is in the functional areas of supply, IT, and comptroller.

In ports where MSC conducts regular, sustained operations, MSC Offices (MSCO) have been established. Each MSCO provides direct support to MSC ships and acts as a liaison with local commands. MSCO support includes coordination of logistics, ship husbanding services, port loading, voyage repair coordination, mail delivery, bunkering, travel arrangements, and administrative support.

1.3 Shore Infrastructure and the MSC Concept

of Operations

The foundation of the MSC Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is that the majority of MSC ships are always performing their wartime mission. The only difference between wartime and peacetime is the volume of material transported or number of operations conducted. This means that MSC ships do not spend a lot of time in port.

Another facet of the MSC CONOPS to consider while planning MSC infrastructure is that most of the material and equipment transported by MSC is not controlled by MSC until it is on the ship. Ammunition, fuel, and stores require a large amount of infrastructure on land. That infrastructure is not part of MSC; it is controlled by Navy Munitions Command, Defense Energy Support Center, and the Navy Supply System, respectively. It should be remembered that shortfalls in that infrastructure could, however, impact MSC operations by delaying or prolonging the loading/off-loading process.

In comparison with the warfare enterprises, MSC’s shore infrastructure requirements are generally fewer; however, there are two exceptions: base Support and Waterfront Operations. The headquarters in Washington, D.C., MSFSC and the various SEAlOGs, SSUs, and MSCOs, all require space to support the assigned staffs. Therefore, administrative space requirements are similar to other Navy entities. In the case of Waterfront Operations, infrastructure requirements for MSC can be significant. A large, Medium Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (lMSR) class vessel requires nearly as much berthing space as an aircraft carrier.

1.4 Purpose of the MSC GSIP

The MSC GSIP provides strategic guidance to future shore infrastructure planning efforts. It is a companion to Warfare Enterprise GSIP efforts and a contributor to the Fleet Readiness Enterprise (FRE) GSIP. In the top-down planning process, it serves as a link between Navy strategic planning and regional shore infrastructure planning efforts.

It captures the essence of the Navy Ashore Vision in the context of the MSC mission, and establishes the shore infrastructure planning framework for MSC.

• build the security capacity of partner states;

• Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;

• Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and

• Operate effectively in cyberspace.

2.1.2 Maritime Strategy

The Maritime Strategy is a “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” This document represents the first time the maritime forces of the United States (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) joined together to create a unified strategy that integrates sea power with other elements of national power, and those of friends and allies.

The Maritime Strategy identifies six capabilities that represent the core of U.S. maritime power and reflect an increase in emphasis on those activities that prevent war and build partnerships. This document was released in October 2007 and can be found at http://www.navy.mil/ maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf. Those six core capabilities are:

• Forward Presence

• Deterrence

• Sea Control

• Power Projection

• Maritime Security

• Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster

Response

2.1.3 Chief of Naval Operations Guidance

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Guidance provides the CNO’s vision, intentions, and expectations for implementing the Maritime Strategy. The guidance for 2010 refines the scope and emphasizes the measurement of progress for the 18 intentions first identified in the CNO Guidance for 2007-2008. The document can be found at:

www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202010.pdf.

2.1.4 Navy Strategic Plan

The Navy Strategic Plan, currently under revision, is a classified document that translates the six core capabilities of the unclassified Maritime Strategy into guidance for Navy planners and programmers to ensure the Navy Program Objective Memorandum (POM) reflects CNO priorities. It ensures the Navy balances requirements to

2 strategic guidance and operational drivers The MSC GSIP is not a stand alone document. Its concepts are based on guidance that originates in the National Strategy and weaves through Defense and Navy policy, procedures, and guidance. The sections below summarize over arching strategic guidance and strategic guidance specific to shore infrastructure and MSC.

2.1 Strategic Foundation

There are five strategic documents that form the foundation of requirements that MSC is tasked to support. A brief description of each follows.

2.1.1 Quadrennial Defense Review

The most recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) was released in February 2010. It remains a comprehensive examination of potential military threats and the national defense strategy that guides current and future U.S. military doctrine. Its purpose is to help shape policy that will provide the United States with strong, sound, and effective warfighting capabilities over the next 20 years. As of March 2010, the full impact of the new QDR is not known. The document is under detailed review.

The QDR cited was released in February 2010, it can be found at: www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_ of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

Generally, the QDR guidance informs decisions in six key mission areas:

• Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;

• Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower october 2007

Naval Operations Concept2006

• Shore investment drives Sailor and family readiness through informed investments using output metrics aligned with Fleet requirements.

• Navy shore installations planning and investment strategies continually ensure that installations and facilities are properly sized, configured, sustained, and aligned to the Navy Strategic Plan.

The desired end state is achieved through application of the following investment principles:

• Informed, Capabilities-Based Investment: Shore infrastructure will be improved through a comprehensive assessment of mission contribution, condition, capacity, configuration, and capability of installations linked to Navy Mission Essential Tasks.

• Mission Alignment and Readiness: Shore infrastructure will be properly sized and configured to support Joint Region/basing capabilities, the Navy’s current and future force structure, force laydown, and operational concepts in an adaptive warfighting environment.

• Quality of Service: Shore infrastructure must work in three dimensions:

� Have the capability to maintain warfighting platforms.

� Train Sailors to perform their warfighting mission.

� Provide support facilities/network essential for the physical and emotional needs of Navy families.

• Joint and Community Integration: Navy shore infrastructure investment is optimized through innovative and effective partnering with the surrounding communities, other Services, and regional commands to achieve mission readiness and Quality of Service.

build the future force, maintain warfighting readiness, and develop and support Sailors and Navy civilians. The Navy Strategic Plan also provides global and regional strategic context to guide the Navy’s investment decisions during development of the budget submission in the current resource-constrained environment. It is the strategic link to the Naval Operations Concept.

2.1.5 Naval Operations Concept

The Naval Operations Concept, currently under revision, describes how the Navy-Marine Corps team will fight within the context of the Maritime Strategy. It represents a unified vision for the future and describes how, when, and where the Navy and Marine Corps will contribute to the national defense and maritime security strategies.

2.2 CNO Shore Investment Strategy

The vision of the CNO Shore Investment Strategy is:

“To provide ‘world class’ facilities for our Sailors and families through a prudent, sustained resource investment strategy”

This vision guides an important effort to arrest and reverse the decline in capability, condition, and readiness of the Navy’s shore platforms. The strategy will achieve this by increasing shore investments, aligning them with warfighting requirements, and improving Sailor and family readiness.

There are three elements to the desired end state:

• Navy shore infrastructure investments are aligned with the FRE and Provider Enterprise outputs to support the warfighting mission and directly contribute to current and future Fleet readiness.

2.3 Navy Strategic Laydown

This GSIP was informed by the Draft CNO Strategic laydown and Dispersal for the 313 Ship and 2813 Airframe Navy plan of Feb. 2009. Originally, the document was designated “For Official Use Only”. In its final form it has been classified “Secret”. As a result, the current document is reflected only to the extent that it is consistent with the draft cited above. As the guidance in the new document is disseminated through various decision-making processes its impact will become known. For now, the MSC GSIP reflects the current MSC force distribution. This distribution is shown in Figure 2-1 and in Appendix b.

2.4 Global Facility Trends and Issues

During development of the MSC GSIP, the project team identified a number of facility planning trends and issues.

MSC global infrastructure trends and issues are identified below:

• Double Hull Requirements Currently, three of 14 MSC oilers are double-hulled. It is possible that when the International Maritime Organization single hull phase-out is completed, signatory nations may not let single-hull oilers into port, thereby limiting MSC port choices. based on national responses to the regulation amendments, the high risk areas are Spain, UAE, Singapore, and brunei. There is a medium risk in Egypt, Australia, Greece, and Sweden. Regional shore infrastructure usage will be influenced by a smaller list of berthing options. Specific impacts will depend on the national response to the regulation.

• Onboard Storage Changes New surface platforms will have less onboard storage. This will require more frequent logistics support. Additionally, the new Navy Standard Core Menu is based on pre-cooked food, which takes up more refrigerated space. This will impact loading and scheduling. Specific impacts on shore infrastructure could be extended and more frequent loading operations, but will depend on the size of the menu packaging and the capacity of onboard storage.

• New Surface Platform CONOPS The concept of operations for new surface platforms is based on optimal manning and rotational crews. This translates into more mission support being based ashore and reliance on more long distance support. both will impact OCONUS shore infrastructure requirements.

Specific impacts to shore infrastructure could be a requirement for more office space and longer inport periods but will depend on the new ship CONOPS.

• Combined Commodity Ships Each T-AKE class combined commodity (Fuel, Stores and Ammunition) ship is replacing several smaller, single commodity ships. Using fewer ships to accomplish the same mission has a generally favorable impact on shore infrastructure; however, since shore infrastructure is rarely sited to support all three commodities at one location, the T-AKE can require multiple intra harbor/ region berth shifts. As the concept of operations evolves, other loading and scheduling impacts on shore infrastructure could become apparent. Specific impacts to shore infrastructure could be longer inport periods, harbor and/or berth dredging and berth extensions but will depend on the ship’s CONOPS.

• Net Explosive Weight (NEW) Limitations Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) arcs and NEW limits ashore continue to be a significant influence on where certain MSC ships can berth. As NEW capacities aboard ships increase, available port options may decrease and new infrastructure may be required at new locations.

Figure 2-1 Strategic Laydown and Dispersal

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• Hotel Service Cost Allocation When an MSC vessel berths at a Navy installation, hotel services are charged to MSC based on a variety of criteria. Providing metered services and standardized criteria could help reduce MSC hotel service cost. Since this could reduce port costs, it could subsequently drive an increase in usage of Navy-owned shore infrastructure.

• Increased Demand from Other Agencies and Services As anti-terrorism/force protection requirements and general at-berth service costs increase, the trend for USCG, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (aka “NOAA”), Maritime Administration (aka “MARAD”), Army, and MSC ships to request infrastructure support at Navy installations will also increase. This could drive a requirement for more shore infrastructure.

• Aging Infrastructure The average age of infrastructure analyzed for this plan exceeds 35 years. The useful life expectancy for most infrastructure is 50 years.

This will be a critical decision element for all infrastructure planning, particularly in the case of any footprint reduction. Aging infrastructure can increase infrastructure shortfalls as well as sustainment and modernization costs.

• Historic Infrastructure Various infrastructure across the Navy has been designated historic. This increases consultation requirements prior to demolition and/or renovation. In some cases demolition may not be permitted.

• Global Standardization As the GSIP process matures, infrastructure planning will increasingly seek to leverage the benefits of standardization. Regional standardization efforts (e.g., fender and pier design) will evolve to a global approach. This will influence decisions regarding solutions to shore infrastructure shortfalls.

• Changing Hotel Service Requirements New platforms will require increased shore power as the Fleet transitions toward an all-electric configuration.

Additionally, increased bandwidth is required for evolving information systems. This drives a requirement to modernize waterfront operations related shore infrastructure.

• Host Nation Decision-Making and Funding Strategically important installations can be significantly affected by factors beyond DoD control. This can lead to short notice, high demand signals for infrastructure in other nearby locations. Consequently, more DoD facilities in need of recapitalization may require funding through DoD funding processes in lieu of host nation support. Specific impacts on shore infrastructure will be determined on a case by case basis following accelerated, but traditional planning processes.

• Maintenance Congressionally mandated distribution of depot level maintenance between public and private shipyards will impact waterfront and maintenance infrastructure (see Title 10 USC 2460 and 2466). This can influence operations, particularly in the case of MSC ships approved for overseas homeport designation.

This operational influence can subsequently impact the usage of shore infrastructure, however, the specific impact will depend on the location.

• Weapons Magazine Incompatibility Globally, most Navy magazines are “igloo” type. The configuration of this type of magazine is incompatible with modern weapons. The old “igloo” magazines will either need to be reconfigured or replaced with magazines that can support modern weapons. Existing capacity shortfalls can reduce the efficiency of loading and off-loading operations and therefore increase demand on shore infrastructure.

• U.S. Marine Corps Force Distribution It is expected that up to 8,000 Marines will relocate from some USMC bases on Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The complete impact is still being studied; however, there are likely to be impacts on amphibious ship lift, logistical, and infrastructure port loading requirements.

• U.S. Marine Corps End-Strength Changes It is expected that the Marine Corps end-strength will increase by approximately 27,000. The complete impact is still being studied; however, there are likely to be impacts on amphibious ship lift, logistical, and infrastructure port loading requirements. Specific impacts on shore infrastructure will be determined by several planning studies currently in progress.

• Small Arms Training Various Navy security forces and shipboard personnel have recurring requirements for individual combat arms training in support of Anti- Terrorism Force Protection (AT/FP) requirements.

Thus, it is essential that personnel have access to firing ranges for small arms weapons training. Specific impacts on shore infrastructure will be determined by other planning studies.

2.5 Operational Drivers

Navy Enterprise shore infrastructure is affected by a variety of operational influences. Key operational influences (summarized by Navy Region in table 2-1) include:

New Platforms such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Poseidon (P-8), Growler (EA-18G), MH-60 R/S Helicopters, lCS, CVN 78 class ships, Unmanned Vehicles, T-AKE 1 class ships, and the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).

Basing Decisions with respect to CVN Homeports, JSF home bases, JHSV bases of operations, and Unmanned Vehicle home bases.

New Missions/Realignments, including the storage and warehousing transfer to the Defense logistics Agency, transfer of the SbX-1 radar platform to MSC, Strategic lift requirements for the 25th Infantry Division light, transfer of various MSC ships from commercial layberths to Navy installation berths, NECE unit relocations, various base Realignment and Closure (bRAC)-related efforts, establishment of U.S. Fourth Fleet, evolution of various Joint Task Forces worldwide, and various joint basing efforts.

Training, including NECE force and unit training location decisions, Undersea Warfare Training Range location decisions, and outlying landing field (OlF) location decisions.

Table 2-1 Future Mission Shore Infrastructure Drivers future mission shore infrastructure drivers

DRIVERS EURAFSWA HI JAPAN KOREA MARIANAS SI MA NDW NW SE SW

new platforms

CG/CGN(X) X X X X X

CVN 78 X X X X

DDG 1000 X X X X

E-2D X X X

EA-18G GROWlER X X

F-18E X

F-35 JSF X X X X

JHSV X X X X X X X

lCS X X X X X X

MH-60R X X X X

MH-60S X X X X X

T-ATF / T-ARS X X X X X X

P-8 POSEIDON X X X X X

T-6 & T-45 X

T-AKE X X X X X X X

T-AOX X X X X X X X X

UAV (bAMS & MQ-8A) X X X X X X X basing decisions

CVN HOMEPORTS X X X X X

lCS HOMEPORTS X X X X X X

UNMANNED VEHIClE HOMEbASE X X X X X X X

SSN HOMEPORT X X X X X

SSbN HOMEPORT X X X

SSGN X X X

T-AGOS SUPPORT X X

TRANSIENT CVN SUPPORT X

USMC END STRENGTH INCREASE X X X X X

USMC RElOCATION X X

NEW MISSIONS / REALIGNMENTS

bRAC-RElATED IMPACTS X X X

DDG REPlACE FFG X

DlA CONSOlIDATION X X X X X X X X X

EVOlUTION OF JTFS X X

FOURTH FlEET X X

JOINT bASING X X X X

MSC lAybERTHS X X X X

NECE REAlIGNMENT X X X X

NNFE REAlIGNMENT X X

SbX-1 TRANSFER TO MSC X

STRATEGIC lIFT 25TH INFANTRy DIV X training

JOINT EOD TRAINING X

NECE TRAINING X

OlF X

USWTR X X

X Indicates future mission requirement will influence Navy Enterprise shore infrastructure in Region.

with the adopted vision and, in the case of infrastructure planning, address programmatic decisions related to basing, capital investment, and asset management. Five Guiding Principles were developed for the MSC GSIP, they are:

• Wherever possible, leverage existing infrastructure

• Align, size, and configure infrastructure to support worldwide MSC operations

• Promote a positive quality of service for MSC personnel

• Explore alternative operational concepts that could reduce overall infrastructure requirements

• Enable the future MSC fleet

3.4 MSC Shore Infrastructure Business Rules

business rules are designed to align with the guiding principles and articulate optimum rules for infrastructure development and planning. They are intended to assist MSC in complying with the guiding principles in support of the vision. Four business rules were developed during the GSIP process. MSC infrastructure business rules are:

• Wherever possible, utilize existing infrastructure

• Nesting of ships will be utilized when necessary

• Pursue solutions that seek to mitigate the impacts of ESQD Arcs

• Reduce infrastructure requirements wherever possible

3 stakeholder guidance

3.1 MSC GSIP Development

In 2006 Submarine Forces (SUbFOR) started the first Warfare Enterprise GSIP. based on the initial success of the SUbFOR GSIP, the remaining four Warfare Enterprise GSIP planning processes began in early 2007. During development of the Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE) GSIP, it became apparent that a significant user of Navy infrastructure was not represented in the shore infrastructure planning process.

beginning in October 2008, the MSC GSIP was developed through a collaborative effort of representatives from across MSC, including representatives of USFF, Commander Pacific Fleet (PACFlT), Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC), Navy Regional Commanders, and Navy Munitions Command. The effort included over 70 site visit interviews, data collection within MSC, analysis, and a schedule of workshops that kept momentum of the planning process consistently moving forward.

Workshop I was held in Norfolk, Virginia in June 2009.

During this meeting the planning team developed the MSC infrastructure Vision and Guiding Principles and outlined the central analysis element for shore infrastructure. In September 2009, the MSC GSIP team reconvened in San Diego, California for its Workshop II. During this two-day event, participants validated the Vision and Guiding Principles and reviewed the Shore Capability Gap Analysis.

The outcome of this overall collaborative effort formed the basis of this document.

3.2 MSC Shore Infrastructure Vision

An infrastructure vision is a conceptual, unconstrained description of a future, optimal infrastructure. Throughout the GSIP process two principle elements of the future infrastructure surfaced. MSC infrastructure must be cost effective and must support the mission. The GSIP process resulted in the following vision of MSC’s future infrastructure:

“Cost effective infrastructure aligned with mission requirements”

3.3 MSC Shore Infrastructure Guiding

Principles

A global infrastructure plan must support the vision of future infrastructure. Guiding principles add detail to the vision and permit planners the ability to see the next level of implementation of that vision. They should be consistent

3.5 MSC Global Shore Infrastructure Plan

Assumptions

Assumptions permit the planning process to proceed in the absence of various important information. They apply over the life of the GSIP and help focus data collection and analysis.

Perhaps their most important function is to provide a trigger or warning of the need to update the GSIP over time. As the assumptions become invalid, the need to update the GSIP becomes greater. The GSIP process developed 19 assumptions.

MSC GSIP assumptions are:

• Planning horizon is 2035

• No new CNIC-sustained installations that can support MSC will be developed

• New T-AO(X) requirements are unknown but could impact infrastructure

• New T-ATF/T-ARS requirements are unknown but could impact infrastructure

• The LCC-R requirements are unknown but could impact infrastructure

• LCC decommissioning will be extended to

• Navy customer force loading will be split

60/40 (Pacific/Atlantic)

• Other agency customer requirements will not change significantly

• MPF(F) requirements are unknown but could impact infrastructure

• SBX-1 requirements are unknown but could impact infrastructure

• JHSV requirements are currently unknown but could impact infrastructure

• Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection requirements as defined by OPNAVINST 5530.14E will not increase

• T-AGOS relocation to Sasebo will not require new infrastructure

• Transfer of storage custody to Defense Logistics Agency will not have negative impact on MSC

• Establishment of Fourth Fleet will not require new, MSC-related infrastructure

• Joint Basing initiatives will not have a negative impact on current infrastructure

• Establishment of new Joint Task Forces will not require new, MSC-related infrastructure

• MSC maintenance philosophy and regulatory requirements will not change significantly

• Ammunition-related MSC infrastructure requirements will not change significantly

3.6 Future Road Map

Shore infrastructure planning is a continuous, iterative, multi-layer effort. In this construct, the GSIP is the primary tool to interpret strategic-level and operational-level guidance into shore infrastructure capabilities. There are several elements to the next step in infrastructure planning including follow-on GSIPs, future studies, GSIP reviews, etc. However, the primary means of implementing or resolving GSIP findings is through the applicable Regional Integration Plan (RIP).

3.6.1 Follow-on GSIPs

A key element in the future road map is a second spiral of GSIPs. The initial round of GSIPs focused mostly on specific operational issues and provided minimal Navy Component Commander (NCC) and Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. Future GSIPs will include more detailed analysis of NCC and CCDR requirements to ensure full requirements and capability gaps are captured. Additionally, the first round included extensive data collection and development of approaches unique to each GSIP. The second round will integrate these concepts into a unified parallel planning and evaluation process. Criteria will be standard, and comparisons normalized on a common basis. Analysis for these plans will be based on existing infrastructure data systems, and the evaluation will be regional. It should be noted that additional GSIPs are subject to the availability of adequate funding. An effort is underway to establish a Shore Capability Area map that links existing facility category codes to specific shore capabilities. With this in place, the analysis process will be standardized.

Additionally, concurrent efforts to improve the accuracy of facilities databases will significantly improve the quality of the analysis.

3.6.2 Future Studies

The GSIP process permits an assessment of shore infrastructure from a new perspective. This new perspective uncovered information gaps that must be filled before certain infrastructure decisions can be made. MSC shore infrastructure topics requiring further study include (these topics are described in further detail in section 2.4, embedded within MSC GSIP guiding principles or listed in section 3.5):

• Multi-Commodity ship CONOPS development including a cost-benefit analysis of moving the commodity to the ship or moving the ship to the commodity within a fleet concentration area (e.g. Guam, Hampton Roads, Southern California, Hawaii, etc.).

• MSC support requirements for the new generation of surface platforms including the impacts of optimal manning, onboard storage changes and rotational crews.

• Impact of increasing NEW capacities on world-wide Navy and commercial berthing options.

• Impact of International Maritime Organization double hull limitations on world-wide Navy and commercial berthing options.

• A consolidated study of new MSC platform infrastructure requirements. In particular, T-AOX, MPF(F), T-ARS/ATF, LCC(R) and Jhsv.

• Cost-benefit analysis of transient personnel berthing off-base versus on-base.

• Impact of evolutionary changes in handling of stores, fuel and ammunition.

• Cost-benefit analysis of requiring shore power at all MSC berths, weighing the expense of installing shore power where required against the cost of onboard generator maintenance.

3.6.3 GSIP Reviews

Section 3.5 described the assumptions that were made to permit the completion of this plan. These assumptions allowed the GSIP to proceed in the absence of critical information and must be reviewed periodically to perform a validity assessment of the plan in the future. This is only possible if a regular, periodic review is conducted to determine the validity of the assumptions. Other shore infrastructure planning groups have determined that an annual review should be conducted. While there are a variety of factors that go into determining the periodicity of conducting GSIP reviews, it is easy to see the benefit and it remains a recommendation of this GSIP that such a review be conducted at least annually.

3.6.4 Regional Integration Plans

The RIP is the primary means of integrating recommendations of all applicable shore infrastructure planning efforts and developing specific solutions to infrastructure capability gaps identified in the GSIPs. Development of the solutions takes into consideration innovative ways to reduce infrastructure costs and includes extensive data collection, installation site visits, and meetings with various stakeholders. Potential solutions are analyzed to identify full investment costs, short and long term costs savings, and net footprint reduction. Results of this analysis are briefed to the Region Mission Integration Group and Shore Mission Integration Group and form the basis for subsequent prioritization of infrastructure requirements and resource allocation via the POM programming and budgeting process.

• Base Support;

• Research, Development, Acquisition, Testing and Engineering (RDAT&E); and

• Utilities.

4.2 Capability Gap Analysis

The MSC GSIP team evaluated inputs from all available data sources. The initial analysis supported a subjective assessment based on evaluations of capacity, condition, and configuration. Capacity was the primary factor, with recognition that condition and configuration affect capacity.

This assessment was presented at Workshop II. The validated gap analysis is the Green, yellow, or Red assessment matrix (aka “stoplight chart”) shown in Appendix D. The meaning of a Red, yellow, or Green assessment can be seen in Table 4-1 below.

The regional assessments follow. Each section includes a description of the capability area assessment as agreed upon by the MSC GSIP team. Descriptions are provided for Red or yellow assessments only.

Table 4-1 Capability Gap Color Definitions

RED –INDICATES A lACK OF ADEQUATE INFRASTRUC- TURE TO MEET MINIMUM PlANNING ASSUMPTIONS AND/

OR CURRENT DEFICIENCIES THAT CAN IMPACT MISSION

READINESS IN THE NEAR-TERM.

yEllOW – INDICATES ADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE TO MEET MINIMUM PlANNING ASSUMPTIONS bUT DEFICIEN- CIES OR OTHER lIMITATIONS EXIST THAT MAy RESTRICT

MISSION READINESS IN THE NEAR-TO MID-TERM.

GREEN – INDICATES THAT EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE

IS lARGEly ADEQUATE AND CAPAblE OF SUPPORTING A MISSION WITHOUT MODERNIzATION.

SUbJECT MATTER EXPERT OVERRIDE.

CAPAbIlITy AREA NOT REQUIRED by MSC.

4 capability gap analysis

4.1 Gap Analysis Development

In the context of a GSIP, infrastructure gap analysis is the process of comparing infrastructure requirements to infrastructure assets. A gap exists when assets are not equal to requirements. Sometimes there is an excess (assets exceed requirements) and sometimes there is a shortfall (requirements exceed assets). In the absence of a validated set of absolute requirements, gap analysis evolves to a simple identification of shortfalls. For the MSC GSIP, gap analysis was achieved using a combination of the two processes. Ship-based infrastructure requirements are shown in Appendix b.

The MSC GSIP Shore Capability Gap Analysis focused on 11 Navy Regions. It provides an assessment of 12 shore capability areas. Those shore capability areas are (supporting shore function tasks are shown in Appendix C):

• Waterfront Operations;

• Airfield Operations;

• Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C5ISR) Operations;

• Expeditionary Combat Operations;

• Intermediate/Depot Level Maintenance

(I/DLM) Support;

• Ordnance/Weapons Operations (O/WO)

Support;

• Training Support;

• Logistics and Supply;

• Sailor and Family Readiness;

4.2.1 Navy Region EURAFSWA

table 4-2 navy region eurafswa SHORE CAPAbIlITy AREA ASSESSMENT

WATERFRONT OPERATIONS

AIRFIElD OPERATIONS

C5ISR OPERATIONS

EXPEDITIONARy OPERATIONS

INTER/DEPOT lEVEl MAINTENANCE

SUPPORT

ORDNANCE / WEAPONS OPERATIONS

SUPPORT

TRAINING

lOGISTICS & SUPPly

SAIlOR & FAMIly READINESS bASE SUPPORT

RDAT&E

UTIlITIES

Waterfront Operations

There is adequate waterfront operations infrastructure across the region; however, deficiencies and limitations exist that restrict mission readiness in the near and mid-term. Specific shortfalls, organized by installation follow:

• The Mina Salman pier at bahrain needs hotel services, is deteriorating, and cannot support the weight of a crane. With only 10.1m at high tide, dredging is required for deeper draft ships.

• There are no hotel services at Gaeta, the pier is too narrow for anything wider than a handcart and sewage effluent is not certified for host nation system. MUSE barge in Gaeta needs replaced or repaired in order to meet power requirements.

• The pier at Souda bay is too small for an lMSR;

although an anchorage site waiver is in progress.

C5ISR Operations

C5ISR Operations infrastructure is adequate; however, a hardened facility for secure communications is required at Jebel Ali.

Expeditionary Operations

Small boat support infrastructure is required at bahrain and Djibouti. This impacts Embarked Security Teams (EST) and ship escort missions, which indirectly impact ship movements in and out of port and can prolong small boat transfers of the EST.

O/WO Support

While there is adequate O/WO Support infrastructure in the region, Mina Salman pier at bahrain cannot support weapons handling because of pier restrictions. There are also magazine capacity shortfalls in bahrain that may restrict mission readiness in the near to mid-term.

Logistics and Supply

There is adequate logistics and Supply infrastructure across the region; however, deficiencies and limitations exist that restrict mission readiness in the near and mid-term. Specific shortfalls, organized by installation follow:

• Small boat fueling and warehouse support is required at bahrain. This directly impacts ESTs and ship escort missions, which indirectly impact ship movements in and out of port and can prolong small boat transfers of the EST.

• Approximately 2,000 square feet of secure storage is required at Gaeta for lCC support.

• Morothy Depot at Souda bay requires an increase in piping capacity to facilitate off-loading of JP-5.

• long term storage options are required at Jebel Ali.

• Warehouse and storage requirements exist but available options are unknown at Djibouti.

Base Support

Although there is adequate base Support infrastructure across the region, deficiencies and limitations exist that restrict mission readiness in the near and mid-term.

Specific shortfalls, organized by installation follow:

• The road to the waterfront from the munitions compound at Augusta bay needs repair. This can potentially impact the ship loading/off-loading schedule

O/WO Support

Although there is overall adequate O/WO infrastructure in the region,“igloo” style magazines at West loch do not support modern weapons.