N3943020R2245 Draft Rev2.pdf

# SUBJECT Section of RFP Paragraph Page # Question EXWC Response 1 Factor 2, Management Plan L 1.11.2.1 48 Section L, paragraph 1.11.2.1 requires resumes for all Key

Personnel. Section C, paragraph 1.7, identifies the Key labor categories. Two of these Key labor categories are plural (Safety Officers and Automated Access Control Point (ACP) Engineers/Developers), which may imply that more than one position is required in each of these labor categories. Would the Government identify how many key personnel are required in each of these two labor categories so that offerors will know how many Key Personnel resumes to submit? Conversely, are offerors expected to determine how many Key Personnel in each of these labor categories are required to implement their proposed solution?

Also, Section L, paragraph1.11.2.1 states that the Key Personnel requirements are listed in paragraph C.5.1 of the PWS. The current PWS does not have a paragraph C.5.1. Would the Government please clarify/correct this paragraph to state that the key personnel are listed in paragraph 1.7 of the PWS or respectfully add paragraph C.5.1?

1) If the position requires, or the offeror desires to use, multiple personnel; submit the number of resumes that the offeror plans to utilize to perform the sustainment task order. Note that CDRL A009 requires a minimum of two personnel. Otherwise, it is the offerors choice on the number of personnel. 2) C.5.1 was renumbered to Section C paragraph 1.7

2 Key Personnel: Automated Access Control Point (ACP)

Engineers/Developers

L 1.7.4 18 Automated Access Control Point (ACP) Engineers/Developers:

Would the government consider allowing offerors to meet the total requirments of this position with multiple personnel?

Yes

3 Factor 2, Management Plan L 1.11.2.1 48 Factor 2 Management Plan requires the completion of the Key Personnel, Staffing Plan, and Training Plans. Please confirm that the Government intends for offerors to provide up to 100 pages for Factor 2.

This has been re-written to exclude resumes and letters of intent from the page limit for this factor.

4 Factor 4, Small Business L 1.11.4.2.3.3 and 1.12 51 The government has asked for 40% of contract value for SB set asides. Section 1.12 details the breakdown of the SB types. Will the government provide the correlating requirements goal and/or market research that was used to support these percentages, please?

The small business subcontracting targets are established by NAVFAC Headquarters. They were not developed specifically for this contract.

5 Supportability Strategy:

Service Level Agreement

M 1.11.1.1.2.7 48 Will the government respectfully provide a "plug number" for the Service Level Agreements needed to support the ATFP systems?

Any "plug number" that could be provided would be reflective of the current incumbant's strategy and not applicable to other offerer's individual solutions.

EXWC does not want to dictate how offerors accomplish the work, but we note that SLAs may not be required if the offeror has a teaming arrangement with the provider.

6 Supportability Strategy:

Service Level Agreement

M 1.11.1.1.2.7 48 Will the government respectfully provide the current SLAs, or the necessary data extract thereto, utilized under the existing NAVFAC ATFP Agreement? To that end, will the government also identify what current Service Level Agreements are required under the contemplated solicitation and the anticipated terms of those agreements?

1. See response to question #18 above. 2. SLA support requirements may be derived from Attachment 9, Section 1.4 Summary of Sustainment and Maintenance Tasks of the Sustainment PWS, in conjunction with Asset data contained in Appendix M Subcomponent Detail for Systems to be Sustained.

7 Supportability Strategy Plan Attachment 9 4.1 15 of

In our proposed implementation of the Supportability Strategy called for in PWS Section 4.1, will the Government allow contractors to leverage newly available technology such as Augmented Reality (AR) and Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) to reduce proposed costs? If so, will the Government consider using a revised Estimate At Completion (EAC) which accounts for the cost savings realized by the new implantation, to accurately reflect proposed costs and enable an equitable comparison?

1) The Government will consider Offerer's Supportability Strategies as proposed, but the offeror should clearly demonstrate the ability to maintain Operational Availability (Ao) requirements.

2) We know of no type of Fixed Price contract (FAR subpart 16.2) that would allow for a revised estimate at completion.

8 Town Hall OPP General n/a n/a Will the Mission Customer hold a virtual “town hall” meeting on this opportunity?

Presently, NAVFAC EXWC personnel have been directed to telework. We currently do not have an approved medium for hosting a virtual industry day.

The Navy is rolling out MS Teams, but we do not have a date for when it will be installed. We are not authorized to use commercial sources such as Zoom. We have not abandoned the concept for an industry day, virtual or otherwise.

9 ACP Engineer / Developers C 1.7 Key Personnel 17 Will the Government specify the number of Key Personnel positions required for the Automated Access Control Point (ACP) Engineers/Developers and Safety Officers?

As stated in Attachment 9, Section 4.4.2.3 of the PWS:

OPTION - Automated Access Control Point (AVP) Engineer/Developer, "AT/FP Ashore requires a sufficient number of ACP Engineers/Developers to support the quantity and location of Automated Vehicle Gates (AVGs) and Automated Pedestrian Turnstiles (APTs) under sustainment within the program. Quantity and location of these systems are identified in Appendix C List of AT/FP Ashore Systems to be Sustained Under the Contract .

It is expected that Offerors will identify how many Key Personnel are required in their respective solution.

10 Small Business Requirements L 1.11.4.2.3.3. 50 Will the Government consider making the 40% SB requirement be 40% of subcontracted dollars instead of total contract value? This allows more flexibility for offerors to build a team that not only meet SB requirements but adds value to the team and to the Government’s mission.

The subcontracting targets are of subcontracted dollars, not total contract value. Clarification added to section L.

11 Evaluation Criteria M 11.2 54 The evaluation criteria, with technical factors combined with past performance being equal to cost makes it very difficult for non-incumbents to successfully compete in this acquisition. Given the detailed pricing (almost 1,000 line items in Attachment 2), the incumbent has an advantage given they are performing the work today and have insight critical to pricing at this level. We recommend that the Government consider a true best value approach that focuses heavily on offerors’ management approaches (organization, corporate tools and processes). Most offerors will retain the majority of the incumbent workforce who possess the day-to-day technical expertise – the real differentiator among offerors is their management solutions. Will the Government consider restructuring Section M to encourage competition and level the playing field?

1) It is NAVFAC policy to have technical factors equal to past performance. 2) The decision to make the combined technical factors and past performance equal to price is done to not mislead offerors as to the true importance of price. There may be technical solutions that the Navy simply cannot afford given the budget for this program. 3) The pricing scheme submitted in this draft is different than prior approaches and we are still evaluating whether is viable.

Incubments will usually have a competitive advantage, we see no way of mitigating that; but do not believe it rises to an unfair competitive advantage.

12 Letters of Intent requirement L 1.11.2.1.1 48 We recommend that the Government remove the requirement for Letters of Intent for contingent hires which may prevent offerors from proposing personnel who may support or have supported the program. Some candidates are fearful to sign a letter of intent due to potential retribution. This requirement favors the incumbent since they have their Key Personnel in place and would not require any additional steps.

We have made this an optional requirement and adjusted both the factor and basis of evaluation.

13 Past Performance criteria M 1.2 54 The Past Performance ratings state that a Very Relevant (highest score possible) requires offerors to possess “essentially the same scope and magnitude of effort and complexities this solicitation requires.” It will be very difficult for most offerors to achieve the highest score given this description. The incumbent performing the work today likely will receive the highest score. We recommend the Government consider making changes to allow for similar, directly relevant work (e.g., similar maintenance activities for other systems/equipment where the maintenance approaches are easily transferrable).

The definitions used in Section M's Tables 1, 2, and 3 are dictated by the DoD Source Selection Manual. The past performance factor allows for the submission of five projects. The incumbent would only be able to submit the current contract as one project. Note that the Narrative Statement affords offeror's the ability to explain how the previous projects are relevant.

14 Overly restrictive criteria General n/a n/a We are very interested in supporting this effort and building on our more than 60 years of service to DOD, including Navy customers CONUS and OCONUS. However, after reviewing the Draft RFP, it is difficult to justify a business case to pursue this opportunity. The Draft RFP has several elements (importance of price, past performance evaluation, etc.) that make it difficult for anyone other than the incumbent to achieve the highest ratings. We have pursued teaming with multiple highly qualified vendors who have decided to no bid due to the structure of the Draft RFP. To increase competition and ensure that the Government receives the best value, we recommend that you restructure the proposal requirements in Section L and the evaluation criteria in M to highlight the true discriminators among bidders.

We hope the explanations provided above demonstrate the rationale for not concuring with all of the requested changes.

15 Industry Days General n/a n/a We recognize the complexities of navigating industry days during the COVID-19 crisis however, we strongly believe that industry days and one-on-one sessions will result in the Government receiving better responses to the RFP. We recommend that the Government conduct such sessions once travel restrictions are lifted.

Industry days also provide networking opportunities for small businesses – ensuring offerors can present a highly qualified team.

By the time the final RFP is released, offerors have already made bid/no bid, teaming decisions, therefore, it would advantageous if the Government considers at least conducting virtual industry day/one-on-one discussions with industry.

See response to question 8.

16 General n/a n/a If the Government makes significant changes to the RFP due to industry feedback, we recommend a release of a revised Draft RFP prior to the final RFP. This will allow offerors to make necessary teaming adjustments and make final pursuit decisions.

The draft RFP is being revised with track changes as changes are made.

17 Management Plan L 1.11.2.1 48 The 100-page limit for the Management Plan, which includes a Staffing Plan and Transition Plan, seems excessive. Will the government consider reducing the page count for Management Plan to 50 pages?

We were expecting comments that it should be more. We will consider depending on other comments received. Note that it is a maximum, not a minimum.

We do appreciate clear and concise proposals. No change made presently.

18 Safety Factor L 1.11.3 49 Under Factor 3, Safety, Section L.1.11.3.1 instructs offerors to complete Attachment 6. The subsections that follow (L.1.11.3.1.1 - 1.11.3.1.2.3.1) appear to provide guidance on completing Attachment 6; however, may intend a separate section on Safety in addition to Attachment 6. If offerors complete Attachment 6, does that constitute a complete response to Factor 3, Safety?

Only attachment 6 is required.

Historically this factor has been confusing for some offerors, so we believe the form helps ensure the submittal is complete. Made some changes to the factor in Section L, and revised the Basis of Estimate in Section M.

19 Small Business L 1.11.4.2 49 - 51 Under Factor 4, Small Business, Section L.1.11.4.2 identifies 3 documents that must be completed by Large Business – Attachment 3, Attachment 4, and Attachment 5. It appears that the remaining sections, starting at L.1.11.4.2.1, relate to these three documents. If large business offerors complete Attachments 3, 4, and 5, does that constitute a complete response to Factor 4, Small Business?

All offerors (large and small) must complete Attachments 3 and 4, which will be evaluated.

Large Businesses must also complete Attachment 5, which will not be evaluated but will serve as the subcontracting plan for the contract.

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45 - 53 X H 54 - 59 salvador.r.vargas1@navy.mil

RATING PAGE OF PAGES

7. ISSUED BY

(Date)

IMPORTANT - Award will be made on this Form, or on Standard Form 26, or by other authorized official written notice.

Previous Edition is Unusable 33-134 STANDARD FORM 33 (REV. 9-97)

Prescribed by GSA FAR (48 CFR) 53.214(c)

1 59

(If other than Item 7)

15A. NAME 16. NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO

AND

ADDRESS SIGN OFFER (Type or print)

OF

OFFEROR

AMENDMENT NO. DATE

15B. TELEPHONE NO (Include area code) 17. SIGNATURE15C. CHECK IF REMITTANCE ADDRESS

IS DIFFERENT FROM ABOVE - ENTER

SUCH ADDRESS IN SCHEDULE.

18. OFFER DATE

1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED ORDER

UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 700)

2. CONTRACT NO.

N39430 8. ADDRESS OFFER TO

See Item 7

9. Sealed offers in original and 4 copies for furnishing the supplies or services in the Schedule will be received at the place specified in Item 8, or if handcarried, in the depository located in

CAUTION - LATE Submissions, Modifications, and Withdrawals: See Section L, Provision No. 52.214-7 or 52.215-1. All offers are subject to all terms and

Bldg. 1183, Pass and ID Office conditions contained in this solicitation.

10. FOR INFORMATION

CALL:

A. NAME (NO COLLECT CALLS)

SAL VARGAS 805-982-5095

11. TABLE OF CONTENTS

SOLICITATION/ CONTRACT FORM

SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/ COSTS

X I CONTRACT CLAUSES

DESCRIPTION/ SPECS./ WORK STATEMENT X

PACKAGING AND MARKING

3 - 19 J LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

X K REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND

OTHER STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA 22 X

SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

OFFER (Must be fully completed by offeror) 23 - 27 X M

L INSTRS., CONDS., AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS

EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

NOTE: Item 12 does not apply if the solicitation includes the provisions at 52.214-16, Minimum Bid Acceptance Period.

is inserted by the offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered at the price set opposite each item, delivered at the designated point(s), within the time specified in the schedule.

13. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT

(See Section I, Clause No. 52.232-8)

14. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF AMENDMENTS

(The offeror acknowledges receipt of amendments

AMENDMENT NO. DATE

to the SOLICITATION for offerors and related documents numbered and dated):

FACILITY

12. In compliance with the above, the undersigned agrees, if this offer is accepted within calendar days (60 calendar days unless a different period

SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD

X

(X) SEC. DESCRIPTION (X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

PART I - THE SCHEDULE

26. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print) 27. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 28. AWARD DATE

EMAIL:TEL: (Signature of Contracting Officer)

CODE CODE

B. TELEPHONE (Include area code) C. E-MAIL ADDRESS

AWARD (To be completed by Government)

19. ACCEPTED AS TO ITEMS NUMBERED 20. AMOUNT 21. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION

22. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION:

10 U.S.C. 2304(c)( ) 41 U.S.C. 253(c)( ) (4 copies unless otherwise specified)

23. SUBMIT INVOICES TO ADDRESS SHOWN IN ITEM

24. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 7) CODE 25. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY CODE

PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS

28 - 35

PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

NAVFAC EXWC

CODE ACQ / NAVAL BASE VENTURA COUNTY

1100 23RD AVE BLDG 1100

PORT HUENEME CA 93043-4301

FAX:

TEL:

FAX:

TEL:

NOTE: In sealed bid solicitations "offer" and "offeror" mean "bid" and "bidder".

SOLICITATION

36 - 37

6. REQUISITION/PURCHASE NO.

ACQR3877725

5. DATE ISSUED4. TYPE OF SOLICITATION

SEALED BID (IFB)

NEGOTIATED (RFP)

[ X ]

3. SOLICITATION NO.

N3943020R2245

Section B - Supplies or Services and Prices

ITEM NO SUPPLIES/SERVICES QUANTITY UNIT UNIT PRICE AMOUNT

Global Sustainment of ATFP Systems

FFP

Provide labor, materials, and equipment to perform life-cycle sustainment services for ATFP Ashore equipment worldwide in accordance with the Operational Availabilities (Ao) specified in the PWS. Work includes preventive and corrective maintenance, repair and replacement, services calls, and systems/software upgrades.

FOB: Destination

PURCHASE REQUEST NUMBER: ACQR3877725

NET AMT

Section C - Descriptions and Specifications

PERFORMANCE WORK STATEMENT

1. GENERAL

This is a non-personnel services contract to provide sustainment of Anti-Terrorism Force Protection Systems and Assets, worldwide. The Government shall not exercise any supervision or control over the contract service providers performing the services herein. Such contract service providers shall be accountable solely to the Contractor who, in turn is responsible to the Government.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Ashore Program’s mission is to design, procure, integrate, install and sustain the Systems/Equipment to include hardware, associated firmware, and software required to provide the ability to protect mission-critical assets and personnel from natural disasters, acts of terrorism and other human-caused disasters. The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) AT/FP Ashore Program Management Office (PMO) centrally manages the Program and is located at the Washington Navy Yard, DC. The AT/FP Ashore Program Management Office (PMO) oversees the AT/FP Ashore Sustainment Program on behalf of Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC).

The contractor shall provide all personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, transportation, tools, materials, supervision, and other items and non-personal services necessary to perform sustainment of Anti-Terrorism Force Protection Systems and Assets, worldwide.

1.2 BACKGROUND

The NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore Sustainment Program is executed by the NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore PMO, NAVFAC EXWC and NAVFAC regional Facilities Engineering Commands (FECs). These organizations provide support to Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC), CNIC N3/N6, Navy Regions, and coordinate with Navy Systems Commands, and industry to provide sustainment services to Navy Ashore installations, for NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore Program Systems/Equipment worldwide and to facilitate improvements to NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore Sustainment Program activities.

1.3 OBJECTIVE

The primary goal of the NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore Sustainment Program is to provide both preventive and corrective maintenance services to Navy installations as required to sustain NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore Program Systems / Equipment in accordance with their operational requirements.

1.4 SCOPE OF THE CONTRACT

The scope of the contract includes the sustainment of ATFP systems and assets, programatic support of Information Assurance requirements, technological refreshment and upgrades, disposal of old systems, and performance of repairs caused by third-party damage or acts of God. Sustainment includes Corrective Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, and response to service calls. The systems to be sustained under this contract includes systems that are currently in place, systems that may be constructed or installed in the future and require sustainment after expiration of the warranty period, or new ATFP systems currently under development that may be fielded at a later date. The types of systems to be sustained or services to be provided include, but are not limited to, the following:

1.4.1 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence (C4I)/Emergency Management (EM)

The Anti-Terrorism, Force Protection, and Public Safety missions all require that the Navy maintain a robust capability to respond to emergency situations for protection of U.S. Navy personnel and assets. This is accomplished through a fast and effective First Response to emerging situations as well as a scalable Command and Control capability to effectively assimilate large amounts of breaking information, aid in decision-making, and facilitate effective communications with response forces and the Navy population.

1.4.1.1 The Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)/Emergency Management (EM) mission includes the following capabilities:

1.4.1.1.1 Communications

1.4.1.1.1.1.Emergency Land Mobile Radio (ELMR)

1.4.1.1.2 Operations Centers

1.4.1.1.2.1 Regional Operation Centers (ROC)

1.4.1.1.2.2 Emergency Operation Centers (EOC)

1.4.1.1.3 Dispatch Centers

1.4.1.1.3.1 Regional Dispatch Centers (RDC)

1.4.1.1.3.2 Local Dispatch Centers (LDC)

1.4.1.1.3.3 Continuity Data Centers (CDC)

1.4.1.1.3.4 Sensor Assessment Cells (SAC)

1.4.1.1.4 Mass Notification Systems

1.4.1.1.4.1 Giant Voice/Indoor Voice (GV/IV)

1.4.1.1.4.2 Net Centric Mass Notification system (NMS)

1.4.1.1.4.3 Emergency 911 Telephone

1.4.1.1.4.4 Computer Desktop Notification System (CDNS)

1.4.1.2 Enterprise Land Mobile Radio (ELMR) System – Digital Trunking Infrastructure The Scope of this PWS applies to ELMR System infrastructure assets that fall under U.S. Navy administration as part of the Joint National Capital Region Land Mobile Radio (J-NCR LMR) System, serving the Navy District Washington area of responsibility. Land Mobile Radio assets in other Navy Regions are not included in this PWS.

Land Mobile Radio subscriber units (portable, vehicle, and consolette radios) are not covered under this PWS.

The J-NCR Land Mobile Radio (LMR) System is a digitally controlled trunk radio system that provides Navy first responders with critical emergency communications. The J-NCR LMR System is a digital trunked LMR System fielded to coordinate the deployment and actions of the first responder community. It is recognized that effective emergency communications is a key element in reducing the loss of life and property in any crisis or incident. The J-NCR LMR System network allows a coordinated response between Navy emergency services and other federal, state and local agencies involved in public safety. Additionally, LMR will provide interoperability within and between the service components. The J-NCR LMR System infrastructure includes the following:

1.4.1.2.1 Antennas (including Microwave Dishes and cabling)

1.4.1.2.2 Lightning arrestors, Pre-selectors, Multi-couplers, Combiners

1.4.1.2.3 Repeaters

1.4.1.2.4 Zone Cores at Regional Dispatch Center

1.4.1.2.5 Channel Banks

1.4.1.2.6 Radio Dispatch Work Stations

1.4.1.2.7 Encryption Key Management Client Work Stations

1.4.1.2.8 Radio System Management Client Work Stations

1.4.1.2.9 Microwave Links

1.4.1.2.10 Multiplexers

1.4.1.2.11 Radio Gateways at Dispatch Centers

1.4.1.3 Operations Centers

The Emergency Operation Center (EOC) serves as the C4I/EM point for the base commander to gather information and gain situational awareness. During incidents affecting tenants within a specific installation or geographic area, the EOC is used to conduct emergency management functions. The installation’s EOC assumes command and control unless the incident escalates beyond the scope of the base-level commander. The EOC interfaces directly with the Regional Operations Center (ROC). The ROC, in turn, interfaces with the Navy Shore Operations Center (SHOC) where CNIC coordinates with the U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) Command.

The ROC is the operational and command support center for all Navy installations in a designated Navy region. The ROC is co-located with the Regional Commander to provide the capability to oversee and respond to any incident and can display and operate in classified, sensitive-but-unclassified, controlled unclassified and unclassified information environment. The four functions handled by the ROC includes gathering of regional information, gain situational awareness, exercise control of forces, and interact with other government agencies.

1.4.1.4 Dispatch Centers

The Regional Dispatch Center (RDC) and the Local Dispatch Center (LDC) provide continuous 24 hour per day, 7 days per week, 365 days per year capability that monitors normal operations on one or more Navy installations and directs an appropriate first response to questionable situations or confirmed incidents that endanger Navy personnel or the Navy mission. Response is enacted using the available Security, Firefighting, and Medical resources assigned to the area of the incident as well as civil authorities when appropriate. The Dispatch Center serves as the Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) that fields incoming emergency telephone calls from the public that originate from within a U.S. Navy installation. It also monitors and directs the initial response to numerous Security and Fire Alarms throughout its area of responsibility.

Enterprise Navy Emergency Response Management System (E-NERMS) is at the center of emergency response for the RDC. E-NERMS is a consolidated Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system that combines traditional emergency dispatch services with modern Geographic Information Systems (GIS) real-time services, such as Address Verification, Automatic Vehicle Location, Recommendation and Routing, Map Displays, and Online GIS Updating. E-NERMS provides an enterprise system that standardizes equipment, operating processes, and capability across all RDCs in continental United States (CONUS). Outside CONUS, this emergency response functionality is provided by the OCONUS Navy Consolidated Emergency Response System (ON-CERS). It provides a standardized VMware virtualized environment that accommodates services such as a CAD Infrastructure that supports centralized administration and two redundant Service Delivery Point (SDP) datacenters for RDC off-site storage, CAD failover, and failback capability. Hardware for E-NERMS is located at both the RDC and SDP.

The integrated technologies enable the Navy to consolidate emergency calls and dispatch functions for police, fire, and emergency medical agencies.

NOTE: Hardware for E-NERMS is located in the Service Delivery Points (SDP) and may require additional access requirements.

1.4.1.4.1 Dispatch operations benefit from use of the following technologies to optimize emergency communication and response times:

1.4.1.4.1.1 Alarm Monitoring & Automation

1.4.1.4.1.1.1 Regional Alarm Monitoring & Automation System (RAMAS)

1.4.1.4.1.1.2 Local Alarm Monitoring & Automation System (LAMAS)

1.4.1.4.1 1.3 Alarm front end / field panels / alarm receivers / head end panels feeding to LAMAS or alarm receiver panels

1.4.1.4.1.1.4 Designated alarm points such as Navy Munitions Command (Class I and II)

1.4.1.4.1.2 Navy Emergency Response Management System (NERMS), Enterprise Navy Emergency Response Management System (E-NERMS) and OCONUS Navy consolidated Emergency Response System (ON-CERS) in

OCONUS.

1.4.1.4.1.2.1 Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), Geographic Information System (GIS), and Management Information System (MIS)

1.4.1.4.1.2.2 Records Management System (RMS) which includes Fire RMS (FRMS) and Police RMS (PRMS)

1.4.1.4.1.2.1 RMS connectivity to National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) and Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center (CLEOC)

1.4.1.4.1.3 Integrated National Crime Information Center (NCIC) Lookup

1.4.1.4.1.3.1 Integrated Fire Station Alerting in CAD

1.4.1.4.1.3.1.1 Local Mobile Data Computer (MDC) with WiFi Hotspot connectivity

1.4.1.4.1.4 Physical Security Information Management (PSIM)

1.4.1.4.1.1.5 Voice Recorders for 911 Telephone and Radio Traffic

1.4.1.4.1.1.6 Enterprise Land Mobile Radio (ELMR)

1.4.1.4.1.1.7 Sensor Management Display System

1.4.1.4.1.1.8 Dispatch Console with CAD, GIS, LAMAS, and RAMAS Display Systems

1.4.1.5 Mass Notification Systems (MNS)

Mass Notification Systems are employed to comply with Department of Defense (DoD) Instruction 6055.17 “Mass Warning and Notification”, providing all DoD installations with notifications to warn all personnel immediately, but no longer than ten (10) minutes, following the verification of an incident. All DoD installations must possess, operate, and maintain dedicated access to communication capabilities at the EOC or another designated centralized location to ensure mass warning and notification.

1.4.1.5.1 Net Centric Mass Notification system (Automated Telephone Notification System (ATNS) /Computer Desktop Notification System (CDNS)) The NetCentric Mass Notification system alerts establish groups of individuals via the telephone and/or computer.

The system supports mass alerting via desktop popup, email, SMS texting, and telephone/cell phone.

1.4.1.5.2 Giant Voice (GV)

Giant Voice (GV) provides Mass Notification alerts and follow-on directions to personnel located in outdoor areas.

GV is comprised of an Outdoor Voice/Alert function and a System Control function. The System Control function provides an autonomous operation and allows authorized personnel to operate the system manually. The outdoor component consists of the outside speaker(s) positioned on poles and buildings across the installation. The GV system is installed as a base-wide system to provide a siren signal and pre-recorded and live voice messages. In order to create the right level of sound output, multiple poles and speakers will be positioned across the installation.

1.4.1.5.3 Indoor Voice (IV)

Indoor Voice (IV) is part of the individual building MNS and is comprised of IV, Interior Notification, and System Control functions. The IV function is intended to provide real-time alert and follow-on directions. The System Control function allows authorized personnel to operate the system manually or autonomously. The Interior Notification function is intended to be provided by loud speakers, warning lights, and illuminated signs or displays.

Speakers are provided at all locations in and around the building at entrances/exits and other outdoor areas (such as courtyards) commonly used by the building occupants.

1.4.1.5.4 Emergency 911 Telephone

1.4.1.5.5 Computer Desktop Notification System (CDNS)

1.4.1.6 Physical Security/Access Control (PS/AC) Systems

Physical Security/Access Control systems are important components of the AT/FP Ashore posture at Navy installations worldwide. Descriptions of the NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore PS/AC Systems are provided in the following paragraphs in this section.

PS/AC functionality, including Access Control Points (ACPs), Electronic Security Systems (ESSs), Enclave perimeter security, and other capabilities, are typically implemented from a single infrastructure for each Navy Region. A Regional Physical Access Control System (PACS) and a Regional Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) system infrastructure provides a centralized administration, monitoring, and integrated functionality for NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore PS/AC systems and components throughout the region.

1.4.1.6.1 The Physical Security/Access Control mission includes the following capabilities:

1.4.1.6.1.1 Access Control Points (ACPs)

1.4.1.6.1.1.1 Vehicle Gates (VGs)

1.4.1.6.1.1.1.1 Active Vehicle Barriers (AVB)

1.4.1.6.1.1.1.2 Multi-Mode AVBs (M-AVB)

1.4.1.6.1.2 Automated Vehicle Gates (AVGs)

1.4.1.6.1.2.1 Automated Vehicle Gate – Enclave (AVG-E)

1.4.1.6.1.2.2 Automated Vehicle Gate – Low Volume (AVG-L)

1.4.1.6.1.2.3 Automated Vehicle Gate – High Volume (AVG-H)

1.4.1.6.1.2.4 Automated Vehicle Gate – Bi-Directional (AVG-B)

1.4.1.6.1.3 Pedestrian Gates (PGs)

1.4.1.6.1.3.1 Automated Pedestrian Turnstiles (APT)

1.4.1.6.1.4 Electronic Security Systems (ESSs)

1.4.1.6.1.4.1 Airfield Enclave

1.4.1.6.1.4.2 Perimeter Enclave

1.4.1.6.1.4.3 Pier Enclave

1.4.1.6.1.4.4 Building Enclave

1.4.1.6.1.4.5 NMC Enclave

1.4.1.6.1.4.6 Tenant Systems

1.4.1.6.1.5 Waterside Security Systems

1.4.1.6.1.5.1 Electronic Harbor Security System (EHSS)

1.4.1.6.1.5.2 Waterside Defensive System (WDS)

1.4.1.6.1.6 Inspection Systems

1.4.1.6.1.6.1 Personnel Inspection System

1.4.1.6.1.6.2 Vehicle Inspection System

1.4.1.6.1.7 Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) System

1.4.1.6.1.8 Physical Security Access Control- Enterprise Architecture (PSAC-EA)

1.4.1.6.1.9 Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS)

1.4.1.7 Access Control Point – Vehicle Gate (ACP-VG)

An active vehicle barrier requires some action, either by personnel, equipment, or both, to permit or deny entry of a vehicle. The system has some form of moving parts controlled by external activation. Active vehicle barrier systems can include active bollards, active drop-arm beams, active nets, actives wedges (plate or fingers) or active gates.

1.41.8 Active Vehicle Barriers (AVB)

The design of an Entry Control Facility (ECF)/Access Control Point (ACP) must ensure that vehicles are contained through an arrangement, which includes Active Vehicle Barriers (AVB). AVBs require some action, either by personnel, equipment, or both, to prevent entry of an unauthorized vehicle. ECFs/ACPs must be provided with Active Vehicle Barriers (AVBs) to enable the ECF/ACP to be closed (fully contained) and to prevent an unauthorized vehicle from breeching the security. The design of the ECF/ACP must include provisions to protect innocent users of the ECF/ACP from operation of the AVB whether deployment is accidental, during a test, or during an actual response to a threat.

AVB systems are categorized into three primary areas; 1) baselined multi-mode active vehicle barriers, 2) baselined active vehicle barriers, and 3) legacy active vehicle barriers. Baselined active vehicle barriers are selected from the NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) authorized list. All other active vehicle barriers are considered legacy.

1.4.1.9 Access Control Point – Automated Vehicle Gate (ACP-AVG) ACP-AVGs are employed to provide perimeter security to Navy installations or to restricted access to internal enclaves by checking personnel credentials and allowing access only to individuals who are authorized for entry at that location, on that day, and at that time, through automation. Unauthorized personnel will be denied entry and will be instructed how to leave the area. The automation feature provides a capability to perform this process without the interaction of an onsite security guard. ACP-AVG operation can be monitored remotely at a Dispatch center with assistance from patrol units when necessary or may also be supervised by a local security guard while working other duties at the Access Control Point.

ACP-AVG designs utilize some or all of the following technologies in various configurations as explained in the paragraphs below:

1.4.1.9.1 Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) System

1.4.1.9.2 Active Vehicle Barriers/Drop Arms/Turnstiles

1.4.1.9.3 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Camera Systems

1.4.1.9.4 Network Video Recorder (NVR)

1.4.1.9.5 Access Control (Card Readers, Intercoms, Keypads, and Programmable Logic Controllers)

1.4.1.9.6 Dynamic Message Signs (DMS)

1.4.1.9.7 Gate Automation Systems

1.4.1.9.8 Intercom Systems

1.4.1.9.9 Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)

1.4.1.9.10 Vehicle Presence Sensors

1.4.1.9.11 Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) system

1.4.1.9.12 Badging/Enrollment

1.4.1.9.13 Automated Vehicle Gate – Low Volume (AVG-L)

The AVG-L capability offers the highest level of perimeter security and is intended for public-facing entry points into a Navy installation that either (a) have sufficiently low traffic volumes to be left completely unsupervised for all but the peak traffic hours, or (b) function alongside other supervised traffic lanes of a multi-lane gate, thereby reducing manpower at the site during normal working hours and providing an unsupervised operation during nighttime or weekend hours when traffic volume is sufficiently low. Reduces manpower costs while enhancing the security posture of low vehicular throughput (<60 vehicles/hr).

1.4.1.9.14 Automated Vehicle Gate – Enclave (AVG-E)

The AVG-E capability is intended for use at interior access control points where personnel and vehicles have already been screened once for initial access onto the Navy installation and are now seeking entry into a restricted-access Enclave area. AVG-E is used when a single automated gate (e.g., sliding, tilt, lift) is sufficient to maintain the integrity of the Enclave perimeter while allowing personnel/vehicles to gain access.

1.4.1.9.15 Automated Vehicle Gate – High Volume (AVG-H)

The AVG-H design is intended for multi-lane Access Control Points that serve as the main entry point for a Navy Installation. The AVG-H configuration will typically employ multiple automated ingress and egress lanes under the supervision of one or more local sentries who monitor the automated traffic lanes while manually controlling traffic for at least one inbound lane. Reduces manpower costs while enhancing the security posture of high vehicular throughput (>60 vehicles/hr).

1.4.1.9.16 Automated Vehicle Gate – Bi-Directional (AVG-B)

The AVG-B capability is intended for use at interior access control points where personnel and vehicles have already been screened once for initial access onto the Navy installation and are now seeking entry into a restricted-access Enclave area. AVG-B is used when a single automated gate (e.g., sliding, tilt, lift) is sufficient to maintain the integrity of the Enclave perimeter while allowing personnel/vehicles to gain access. AVG-B utilizes a single lane for both ingress and egress traffic and is intended for gates with very low throughput and with an informed user population.

1.4.1.10 Access Control Point – Pedestrian Gate (ACP-PG)

The Access Control Point capability also includes a pedestrian-only configuration known as an ACP-PG. ACP-PGs are employed both at public-facing entry points for initial access onto a Navy Installation and at interior Enclave perimeters for a restricted-area access. ACP-PGs typically employ automated pedestrian turnstiles (APT) and are often accompanied by a swing gate that complies with Architectural Barriers Act (ABA)/Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines.

1.4.1.11 Access Control Point – Automated Pedestrian Turnstiles (ACP-APT) Automated Pedestrian Turnstiles are employed both at public-facing entry points for initial access onto a Navy Installation and at interior Enclave perimeters for a restricted-area access. Automated Pedestrian Turnstiles may be configured with multiple turnstiles, CCTV camera systems, Network Video Recorder, intercoms and enhanced lighting.

1.4.1.12 Electronic Security System (ESS)

An ESS is intended to provide additional layers of security to a perimeter or area of interest within each Navy Installation that requires an enhanced security posture. Electronic Security Systems (ESS) are comprised of the following capabilities:

1.4.1.12.1 Physical Access Control Systems (PACS)

1.4.1.12.2 Access Control (Card Readers, Intercoms, and Keypads)

1.4.1.12.3 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) / Camera Systems

1.4.1.12.4 Network Video Recorder (NVR)

1.4.1.12.5 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)

1.4.1.12.6 Virtual Perimeter

1.4.1.12.6.1 Video Analytics

1.4.1.12.6.2 Sensors, Sensor Management, Sensor Analytics

1.4.1.12.7 Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) system

1.4.1.12.8 Badging/Enrollment

1.4.1.13 Waterside Security Systems

1.4.1.13.1 Electronic Harbor Security System (EHSS)

An EHSS is intended to protect Navy ships in port from waterside attacks. The operational capability of EHSS includes the following:

1.4.1.13.1.1 Detect and track surface targets

1.4.1.13.1.2 Detect and track subsurface targets

1.4.1.13.1.3 Automatically alert based on security criteria

1.4.1.13.1.4 Aid security forces with assessment, interdiction, response and warning

1.4.1.13.1.5 Output track data for consolidation at higher levels (situational awareness)

1.4.1.13.1.6 Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) system

1.4.1.13.2 Waterside Defensive System (WDS)

WDSs provide standoff, detection and interdiction for protection of afloat naval assets in port. They provide an assertive, scalable, and dynamic system-of-systems that provide a measured response.

1.4.1.14 Inspection Systems

Both Personnel Inspection Systems and Vehicle Inspection Systems are used to screen either personnel or vehicles entering the installation. This screening is necessary for the protection of high value assets by detecting threats such as weapons, other illegal contraband and narcotics.

1.4.1.15 Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) System The PSIM does not provide an operational capability in and of itself, rather, it is an overarching management capability that can assimilate information from many diverse sensors and systems. The PSIM presents the sub-system information to Navy Emergency Management personnel in a Common Operating Picture, and interact with diverse systems allowing an operator control of the various technologies while combining relevant visual intelligence, Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on-screen guidance, and automated tasking.

1.4.1.15.1 PSIM functionality includes the following:

1.4.1.15.1.1 Collection: Device management independent software collects data from any number of disparate security devices or systems.

1.4.1.15.1.2 Analysis: The system analyzes and correlates the data, events, and alarms, to identify the real situations and their priority.

1.4.1.15.1.3 Verification: PSIM software presents the relevant situation information in a quick and easily-digestible format for an operator to verify the situation.

1.4.1.15.1.4 Resolution: The system provides Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), step-by-step instructions based on best practices and an organization’s policies, and tools to resolve the situation.

1.4.1.15.1.5 Reporting: The PSIM software tracks all the information and steps for compliance reporting, training and potentially, in-depth investigative analysis.

1.4.1.15.1.6 Audit trail: The PSIM also monitors how each operator interacts with the system, tracks any manual changes to security systems and calculates reaction times for each event.

1.4.1.15..2 PSIM is deployed to interface with numerous sensors and security cameras from diverse systems, thermal imaging cameras, diverse intrusion detection systems, and access control systems. PSIM is used with the ACP- AVG capability to monitor cameras and alarm events associated with unauthorized entries. PSIM can also be used with other capabilities such as the Electronic Harbor Security System, as directed.

1.4.1.16 Physical Security Access Control- Enterprise Architecture (PSAC-EA) PSAC-EA provides a unified, hardened platform hardware infrastructure in support of the suite of ATFP IT systems.

The enterprise architecture will allow for centralized command and control, monitoring, management, update, maintenance and response.

1.4.1.17 Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS)

C-UAS systems provide interdiction capabilities for protection of personnel and naval assets on installations and in port. C-UAS are designed to disrupt and neutralize Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, engaged in hostile airborne surveillance and potentially malicious activity. C-UASs include both fixed and mobile systems.

1.4.1.18 Enterprise System Administration and Cybersecurity Administration Support The major elements include:

1.4.1.18.1 Version Control

1.4.1.18.2 Patch Management

1.4.1.18.3 Vulnerability Scanning

1.4.1.18.4 Signature File Updates

1.4.1.18.5 Support for CNIC Security Monitoring

1.4.1.18.6 Region/Local System Administration which includes:

1.4.1.18.6.1 Standard user account troubleshooting

1.4.1.18.6.1 Regional database input

1.4.1.18.6.3 RDC/LDC Patch installation

1.4.1.18.6.4 RDC/LDC to user workstation communications troubleshooting and maintenance

1.4.1.18.2 The following enterprise positions may be required:

1.4.1.18.2.1 Enterprise System/Network/Active Directory Administration Includes:

1.4.1.18.2.1.1 Domain maintenance and administration

1.4.1.18.2.1.2 Active directory policy

1.4.118.2.1.3 Virtual host maintenance

1.4.1.18.2.1.4 Virtual host resource allocation

1.4.1.18.2.1.5 Enterprise database maintenance and support

1.4.1.18.2.1.6 Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) patch repository maintenance

1.4.1.18.2.1.7 Network device maintenance at SDPs and RDCs for enterprise communications maintenance

1.4.1.18.2.1.8 Ongoing STIG Compliance

1.4.1.19 RMF Information Security System Professionals (ISSPs)

ISSPs perform Risk Management Framework (RMF) support for Accreditation Steps 1 through Step 4 and Step 6 (beyond accreditation) throughout the systems cyber security lifecycle. The contractor will provide Information Assurance/Cybersecurity (IA/CS) support including testing, mitigation, annual IA/CS compliance, sustainment, vulnerability and risk management, system engineering support, and preparation, processing, and submission of Assessment and Authorization (A&A) packages in accordance with the references in DED A042 “Cybersecurity and System Administration”. AT/FP Ashore requires a sufficient number of ISSPs to support all Commander, Naval Installations Command (CNIC) and Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I), Physical Security Access Control (PSAC), and Energy systems.

1.4.1.19.1 The ISSP's should work with the A&A package owners and AT/FP Ashore Cyber Security Managers/Officers and provide all levels of documentation and oversight of cyber-security requirement support throughout the Risk Management Framework (RMF) Step 1 through Step 4 and Step 6 (beyond accreditation) throughout the systems cyber security lifecycle for the packages listed. Actions related to RMF Step 1 through Step 4 and Step 6 include, but are not limited to:

1.4.1.19.1.1 RMF Step 1:

1.4.1.19.1.1.1 Establishment of RMF Security Plan in eMASS.

1.4.1.19.1.1.2 Support detailing mission requirements as part of NAVFAC CyberSafe grading determination process.

1.4.1.19.1.2 RMF Step 2

1.4.1.19.1.2.1 Drafting of Architecture, Boundary, and Dataflow diagrams.

1.4.1.19.1.2.2 Inventory and documentation of hardware/software/firmware within assessment boundary.

1.4.1.19.1.2.3 Development of Continuous Monitoring Strategy.

1.4.1.19.1.2.4 Security Control Tailoring including establishment of inheritance models with key security service providers (PSNet-T, C2SOC, PSAC EA).

1.4.1.19.1.2.5 Completion of eMASS Implementation Plan based on Continuous Monitoring Strategy.

1.4.1.19.1.2.6 Assist assigned Validator in drafting the RMF Security Assessment Plan.

1.4.1.19.1.2.7 Support all key stakeholders during RMF Step 2 Concurrence process.

1.4.1.19.1.3 RMF Step 3

1.4.1.19.1.3.1 100% execution of the approved Security Assessment Plan provided from RMF Step 2 Concurrence Checkpoint which includes-

1.4.1.19.1.3.1.1 Perform ACAS automated vulnerability scans on all assets with-in assessment boundary and establish hardened baseline configuration with consistent, repeatable successful results.

1.4.1.19.1.3.1.2 Documentation of DISA STIG compliance utilizing SCAP scripts to provide detailed analysis of security vulnerabilities present on AT/FP IT solutions.

1.4.1.19.1.3.1.3 Analysis and results of NIST SP 800-52 rev. 4 Assessment Procedures and support documentation as evidence of compliance.

1.4.1.19.1.4 RMF Step 4

1.4.1.19.1.4.1 Serve as an IT Security subject matter expert supporting the Validator during on-site Independent Validation and Verification (IV&V) of AT/FP IT solutions.

1.4.1.19.1.4.2 Provide process improvement of the overall control implementation of AT/FP IT solutions.

1.4.1.19.1.5 RMF Step 6

1.4.1.19.1.5.1 Execute and review weekly ACAS scans and upload results into VRAM/CMRS.

1.4.1.19.1.5.2 Maintain the RMF POA&M to accurately portray the risk posture of AT/FP IT Solutions.

1.4.1.19.1.5.3 Detail all relevant changes to IT assets for AT/FP IT solutions through the NAVFAC AT/FP Change Management Process.

1.4.1.19.1.5.4 Detail all relevant mitigation and remediation activities to vulnerabilities noted on the RMF POA&M through the NAVFAC AT/FP Change Management Process.

Monitor HW/SW lifecycles and provide recommendation for upgrade/sustainment to NAVFAC AT/FP leadership.

1.4.1.19.1.5.5 Execute STIG/SCAP updates quarterly for relevant changes to risk posture.

1.4.1.19.1.5.6 Update all RMF documentation based on change and vulnerability management efforts.

1.4.1.19.1.5.7 Provide incident response capability for AT/FP IT solutions.

1.4.1.19.1.5.8 Perform continuous security reviews of RMF Security Controls (1 security control family each month).

1.4.1.19.1.5.9 Respond to risk based on the results of ongoing monitoring activities, risk assessments, and outstanding items in the plan of action and milestones. This may include installing patches in accordance with the established ATFP Ashore configuration change control process.

1.4.1.20 Supported Locations

This PWS is issued in direct support of CNIC for the sustainment of NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore Program Systems / Equipment at Naval Installations world-wide. Table 1 lists Navy Regions/Areas Responsibility (AORs) where Systems sustainment support is currently provided to the Navy Regions by the NAVFAC AT/FP Ashore Program.

Table 1 Navy Regions under CNIC

Navy Region Northwest Navy Region Hawaii Navy Region Southwest Navy Region Southeast…