DTRA-CTR-CTRICIII_RequestforInformation_20160615_Revised.pdf
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- Attached to
- HDTRA1-16-R-0027 DRAFT RFP Federal contract opportunity
- Solicitation number
- HDTRA116R0027
- Issued by
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency
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Revised RFI 61616 - pdf
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TITLE: Request for Information for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Cooperative Threat Reduction
1.0 DESCRIPTION
1.1 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency and United States Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (DTRA/SCC-WMD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) is seeking information regarding nuclear, chemical, and biological nonproliferation capabilities. Potential sources may be asked to provide services across CTR’s portfolio including Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE), Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD), Global Nuclear Security (GNS), Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP), and Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Program (WMD-PPP).
• SOAE – Dismantle and eliminate strategic weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery systems in cooperation with partner nations.
• CWD – Secure and eliminate chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles and eliminate chemical agent research and production facilities.
• GNS – Secure threats posed by vulnerable nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and former nuclear weapons programs through cooperative engagements at the national level while leveraging Department of Defense (DoD) expertise and resources.
• CBEP – Secure and consolidate collections of Select Agents and Toxins and their associated research at a minimum number of secure facilities.
• WMD-PPP– Deny terrorist and states of concern access to WMD by assisting cooperative nations to strengthen their ability to prevent, deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD, related, materials, and technology.
1.2 This request for information (RFI) is for information and planning purposes only, assisting the United States Government (USG) in performing market research and determining industry interest and technical capability. This RFI does not commit the USG to contract for any supply or service whatsoever. The Government will retain and not return any documentation submitted. Furthermore, DTRA/SCC-WMD is not at this time seeking proposals and will not accept unsolicited proposals. The respondents will not receive compensation any information or administrative costs incurred in response to this RFI; all costs associated with responding to this RFI will be solely at the interested party’s expense.
Not responding to this RFI does not preclude participation in any future solicitation, if any, is issued. If DTRA/SCC-WMD releases a solicitation, it will be on the Federal Business Opportunities (https://www.fbo.gov) website. It is the responsibility of the potential offers to monitor the site for additional information pertaining to this requirement.
2.0 REQUIREMENT
The general requirement includes, but is not limited to the following:
• See REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA/SCC-WMD) COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
(CTR) ATTACHMENT A
Responses should address the following capabilities:
• Ability to collaboratively develop an alliance of people, systems, business structures and practices into a process that connects the talents and insights of all participants to optimize project results, increase value to the owner, reduce waste, and maximize efficiency through all phases of project execution."
• Demonstrated subject matter expertise in CTR-related mission requirements, and knowledge of chemical, biological, and nuclear nonproliferation concepts and how to apply them to real world problem sets.
• Demonstrated experience working with sovereign nations and international partners while observing sensitivities to government/professional/religious cultures that establishes a long lasting relationship built on transparency and trust.
• Demonstrated identification and adherence to partner nation’s local laws and regulations (e.g. licensing, permitting, site access, and certification) during implementation.
• Demonstrated effective application of Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department (DOS) travel requirements including but not limited to processes (Country Clearance Requests [CCR], Foreign Clearance Guide [FCG], Force Protection Plan [FFP]) and training (Anti-Terrorism [AT], Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape [SERE], and Isolated Personnel Report [ISOPREP].
Global travel is required.
3.0 RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
3.1 Potential sources who believe they possess the qualifications, expertise and experience are requested to provide capability statements to this RFI by submitting electronic responses to the below point of contacts no later than close of business June 29, 2016
3.2 Capability statement responses SHALL NOT CONTAIN CLASSIFIED INFORMATION and shall clearly mark any proprietary information.
3.3 Capability statement responses shall not exceed 10-page pages in total, using 12-point Times New Roman font and 1" margins, including all appendices or attachments. Font inside tables and figures shall be no smaller than 10 point size. Cover letter, title page and Table of Contents do not count against the page limit. The company information and questionnaire requested under Section 3.5 below do not count against the 10-page limit.
3.4 The Government may use non-Government (contractor) support personnel as subject matter experts in the review of responses received, including the review of any marked or unmarked proprietary information provided. Appropriate non-disclosure agreements have been executed between the third party, non-Government (contractor) support personnel and the Government and are on file with the Government. A submission of a response to this RFI constitutes the respondent’s acknowledgement and agreement that the information provided in the response, including any marked or unmarked proprietary or source selection information, may be disclosed to these third party, non-Government (contractor) support personnel.
3.5 The submissions should provide administrative information to include the following:
3.5.1 Company Information:
3.5.1.1 Company name, CAGE Code, DUNS Number.
3.5.1.2 Business type (large business, small business, small disadvantaged business, 8(a) certified small disadvantaged business, HUBZone small business, woman-owned small business, very small business, veteran-owned small business, service-disabled veteran-owned small business). Please refer to Federal Acquisition Regulation FAR 19 for detailed information on Small Business Size Standards.
The FAR is available at http://www.arnet.gov.
3.5.2 Name, mailing address, phone number, e-mail of designated point of contact.
3.5.3 RFI Questionnaire:
3.5.3.1 Is your company currently providing similar services under any U.S. Government contracts?
If yes, for which agency(s)? What is/are the contract number(s)? What contract type? Who is/are the Contracting Officer(s) and Administrative Contracting Officer(s)? What are their pertinent phone numbers, e-mail addresses, etc.? What types of labor categories are you providing under these contracts?
3.5.3.2 How long has your company been providing these types of services? How long has your company provided this type of service to the Federal/DoD/State government?
3.5.3.3 Please describe your geographic focus (i.e. state specific, regional specific, nationwide, overseas, etc.) If you operate overseas, do you experience any delays or specific challenges with operating overseas?
3.5.3.4 Which NAICS codes do you perform this service under? Which code(s) do you feel best represent this requirement?
3.5.3.5 What do you see as the primary risk areas and/or potential issues associated with an acquisition of this type? How do you propose to mitigate any risk(s)?
3.5.3.6 The Government desires to promote small business participation in this process.
Please provide suggestions on industry best practices and the associated advantages versus disadvantages in your approach.
4.0 OTHER INFORMATION
4.1 CTR is researching the use of Government-wide Acquisition Contracts (GWACs) such as One Acquisition Solution for Integrated Services (OASIS). Both small and large businesses are encouraged to provide recommendations regarding similar Government contracting mechanisms that promote best value to the Government.
4.2 Procuring Contracting Office:
Defense Threat Reduction Agency 8725 John J. Kingman Road Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060 United States
4.3 Point of Contact:
Name: Ms. Consuelo Reyes-Salas Phone: (703) 767-3580 Email: consuelo.f.reyes-salas.civ@mail.mil
Name: Ms. Tammy M. Feige Phone: (703) 767-2993 Email: tammy.m.feige.civ@mail.mil
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
AND UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
-ATTACHMENT A-
1.0 Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE):
1.1 Provide project management services and best practices for SOAE activities globally.
1.2 Coordinate and support SOAE logistics management in all areas of operation (AOR).
1.3 Supply subject matter expertise with knowledge in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery systems and their support infrastructure (production facilities, rockets, air-breathing weapons, bombers, submarines, and other platforms) and their disposal of residual products and by products of such systems.
2.0 Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD):
2.1 Quickly mobilize to support CWD projects in permissive environments and AORs that could follow political upheaval in countries possessing chemical weapons (CW) delivery systems. One example of these operations was DTRA/SCC-WMD and international efforts aboard the U.S. motor vessel (MV) Cape Ray (T-AKR-9679) that destroyed chemical weapon stockpiles in Syria.
2.2 Enhance CW security globally through technical support, training, and physical security.
2.3 Conduct strategic and contingency planning by identifying gaps/opportunities for destroying known or emerging CW stockpiles throughout the world.
2.4 Foster relationships with CW experts, laboratories, and research facilities to expand
CWD’s mission for eliminating chemical weapons.
2.5 Coordinate and collaborate with interagency partners to achieve CWD mission objectives.
2.6 Provide project management and logistics management for chemical weapons security and/or destruction in potentially less than permissive environments.
2.7 Demonstrate subject matter expertise and knowledge of chemical materials, CWD technologies, and Chemical Weapons Convention and other national and international regulatory bodies.
3.0 Global Nuclear Security (GNS):
3.1 Coordinate with U.S. and global partners to secure weapons and nuclear materials from their sale, theft, diversion or accidental release.
3.2 Develop curriculum and institute training and exercises to strengthen nuclear security practices while adhering to international guidelines and best practices.
3.3 Transport nuclear material and high threat radiological material safely and securely for consolidation, destruction, and disposal.
3.4 Identify sustainable opportunities for ongoing and future GNS projects.
3.5 Foster relationships with experts, laboratories, and research facilities to expand GNS’ mission for eliminating nuclear threats.
3.6 Equip trusted agents with means to detect, prevent, interdict, and report the use of WMD materials.
3.7 Enhance cyber security to protect sensitive information and networks safeguarding WMD materials.
3.8 Establish a strategic plan and its implementation requirements to enhance human reliability programs for partner countries’ nuclear security programs.
4.0 Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP):
4.1 Develop relationships with experts, laboratories, and research facilities.
4.2 Provide system maintenance plans with analyses of alternatives (AoA) to ensure partner’s capabilities to sustain CBEP investments.
4.3 Procure, transport, install, maintain, and equip partners with means to properly detect, prevent, and report the use of Select Agents and Toxins.
4.4 Identify, consolidate, and secure pathogens of international security concern to prevent their sale, theft, diversion or accidental release.
4.5 Procure, transport, install, maintain, and equip partners with means to properly detect, prevent, interdict, and report the use of biological Select Agent and Toxin stockpiles, and means of delivery regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) materials.
4.6 Institute training and exercises to strengthen health sciences’ abilities to detect, diagnose, surveil, and report Select Agent and Toxin events in a safe and secure manner while adhering to international guidelines and best practices.
4.7 Perform CTR support tasks including construction and renovation support for priority facilities and infrastructure.
4.8 Incorporate U.S. and internationally recognized Systems Engineering practices for designing, developing, testing, constructing, installing, and sustaining products, services, and capabilities.
4.9 Support CTR partner nations in eliminating biological WMD delivery systems and their support infrastructure (production facilities, rockets, air-breathing weapons, bombers, submarines, and other platforms) and dispose of residual products and by products of such systems.
4.10 Support CTR partner nations in developing/updating legislation and Concepts of Operations (CONOPS).
4.11 Quickly mobilize to support CBEP projects in permissive environments and areas of operation (AOR) that could follow events of international security concern. One example of these operations was DTRA/SCC-WMD and international efforts to stem the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa through equipment, materials, and laboratory operations.
4.12 Provide laboratory support, oversight, mentorship, and logistics for CBEP priority facilities or global operations.
4.13 Conduct engagement assessments to identify vulnerability gaps, AoAs, and recommendations to enhance partner’s ability to safely and securely handle pathogens of international security concern.
5.0 Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Program (WMD-PPP):
5.1 Identify and coordinate relationships between DTRA, the U.S. Embassy, and the respective country partners with the mission and responsibility outlined in 1.1 for both green land borders and maritime domains.
5.2 Identify and implement materiel and non-materiel solutions to enhance partner nation’s core competencies in:
5.2.1 Command and Control - capability to plan, direct, manage, control, and coordinate border security resources in response to potential WMD- proliferation threats.
5.2.2 Communications - capability to securely transmit and receive information (data and voice) among the command structure, operational units, and relevant interagency and international stakeholders in support of proliferation prevention activities.
5.2.3 Surveillance - capabilities to detect, classify, and track potential WMD proliferation threats during day, night, and inclement weather.
5.2.4 WMD Detection - capability to detect and identify material, components, and/or persons suspected to be WMD related proliferation threats.
5.2.5 Interdiction - capability to intercept targets of interest related to WMD proliferation threats, temporarily secure the site, materials, components, and/or persons, and transfer to organization(s) responsible for subsequent actions (i.e.
long-term security, follow-up investigations, characterization & analysis, disposition, and/or elimination).
5.2.6 Sustainment and training – reliable sustainment and training resources, procedures, and planning assistance that preserve core competencies above.
5.3 Establish and manage the activities of all subcontractors, either U.S. or foreign.
5.4 Complete site surveys, vulnerability assessments, and analyses of alternatives to design and implement border monitoring and protection solutions, incorporating new and existing infrastructure, communications networks, and interoperability with other components for detection and/or identification of illicit traffickers for interdiction.
5.5 Design, estimate and construct horizontal (e.g., trenching, fences, roads and railroads) and vertical (e.g., buildings, bunkers, and towers) infrastructure.
5.6 Procure, deliver, and train recipient partners on equipment to assist in the performance of their mission.
5.7 Develop and deliver training on techniques, tactics, and procedures to recipient partners to assist in the performance of their mission.
5.8 Organize and facilitate workshops or information exchanges so that partner countries can identify and understand their own interagency relationships with the goal of formalizing concepts of operations (CONOPS) and/or National Response Plans.
5.9 Perform sustainment needs assessments to include life-cycle cost analysis, spare parts, maintenance and repair requirements, warranty support equipment requirements, logistics and transportation, or other related topics.
5.10 Support in-country logistics movements for USG teams.
5.11 Provide interpretation and translation services.
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