Draft_SAOSS_IFP_14_Nov_2017.pdf

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FA8819‐17‐R‐0010, Attachment 3

Space Superiority Systems Directorate (SY)

Specialized Acquisition and Operations Security Support (SAOSS) Services

OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE PLAN

CONTRACT # FA8819-17-R-0010

Contractor: TBD

Date: TBD

Approved By:

Stephen G. Purdy, Col, USAF Date SMC/SY Program Director

John F. Thompson, Lt. Gen., USAF Date Space and Missile Systems Center

Revision History

Revision Modification # Approval Date Affected Pages Comments

0 TBD All Original

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1 INTRODUCTION

In addition to fixed fee described elsewhere in the contract there is Objective Performance Incentives that the contractor can earn. The available Objective Performance Incentives shall be in addition to the fixed fee and the plan is described herein.

The goal of this SAOSS Incentive Plan is to ensure sustainment services result in acceptable or above acceptable levels of performance. This plan provides the policies and procedures used to determine the objective performance incentive fee. This Incentive Plan is applicable to the Fixed Fee Contract Line Item Numbers (CLIN) used in the execution of the SAOSS contract.

The SAOSS contractor’s overall total Objective Performance Incentive percentage, shall not exceed 5% of the estimated cost that excludes the Cost of Money, Travel, and ODCs. This document will demonstrate how the total incentive pool is broken down into its component parts and how those parts are calculated.

This incentive plan is applicable to sustainment services under CLINs 0001 through 0020 and the applicable nine option periods.

2 GOAL

There are four goals to this plan which are derived from the purpose mentioned above:

A. Ensure Timely Hiring: Filling a vacant position within a specified time

B. Incentivize and limit Key Position Turnover: Ratio of specific positions that must be filled with minimal coverage gaps

C. Incentivize rate of Overall Position Turnover: Ratio of all position turnover including key positions

D. Security Incident Factor: Reduced security incidents

3 INCENTIVE STRUCTURE AND INCENTIVE PERIOD

The total objective performance incentive pool shall not exceed a total of 5% of the estimated cost that excludes the Cost of Money, Travel, and ODCs. The allocation of percentages are shown in Figure #1. Additionally, the performance incentive pool will be broken down into four (4) components: Timely Hiring, Critical Position Turnover Rate, Turnover Rate, and Security Incident Factor. The four (4) proposed components shall not exceed 2%, 1.5%, 1%, and 0.5%; respectively.

The Objective Performance Incentive is designed to achieve the Goals in Section 2.0.

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Table 2: Service Summary Evaluation Criteria

Performance Objectives PWS Paragraph

Evaluation Criteria

Critical Position Turnover Rate.

Reduced annual personnel turnover for sustained critical positions

6.1.1 <10% annual turnover for positions identified as critical as identified in PWS Attachment VI

Timely Hiring. Rapid response to new position requirements

6.1.1 All identified new positions filled

with qualified personnel within 30 calendar days

Turnover Rate. Reduced overall personnel turnover for all positions

6.1.1 <12% annual turnover for all required positions including critical identified in PWS Attachment V

Security. Reduced security incidents 6.1.1 No more than 1 security incidents per 20 positions annually, w/zero security violations

*Note: There cannot be any security violations, if a security violation occurs the incentive value will be set to zero for all areas.

7.2 Security Violation

The Contractor will receive zero Objective Performance Incentive Fee for any year in which a security violation is attributed to one of their employees on this contract, in the event of a security violation in accordance with the PWS, para 6.1.1.

7.3 Methods of Surveillance That May Be Used

7.3.1 Surveillance: The Government may inspect and evaluate, up to 100%, the contractor’s results and overall performance to determine acceptability.

7.3.2 Periodic Surveillance: The Government will inspect and evaluate the contractor’s results and overall performance every month to determine contractor’s overall performance.

7.3.3 Customer Comment: A customer is defined as supported government organizations/units.

Any customer that observes unacceptable services, either incomplete or not performed, for any of the above performance objectives should immediately contact the Government Program Manager (GPM) via e-mail. A meeting with the contractor will follow to address the complaints and review the proper procedures within the PWS. If a deficiency is observed, a Customer Complaint Record (in memo format acceptable) shall be annotated and forwarded to the GPM and PCO on the day of the infraction. If the deficiency requires immediate correction, a phone call may be necessary. When a complaint is received, the GPM validates the complaint by checking the PWS. The GPM must evaluate the complaints on a case-by-case basis. If any Government action or lack of action caused unacceptable performance, the complaint is not valid. If further action is required, the GPM will follow up with necessary corrective actions. At the end of each month, the

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10 INCENTIVE PLAN CHANGE PROCEDURE

All substantive changes to this incentive plan shall be by bilateral modification of the contract, signed by both the Contractor and the Government. Substantive changes are recommended by the Program Manager and approved by both the Government Contracting Officer and the Contractor.

11 TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE

In the event the contract is terminated for the convenience of the Government, the Contractor shall submit a Termination Proposal subject to negotiation and agreement of the parties. Any incentive payment determinations made by the IAO prior to the termination for convenience shall not be affected by the termination for convenience decision.