AFI31-101.pdf

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

BY ORDER OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 31-101

8 OCTOBER 2009

Security

INTEGRATED DEFENSE

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is only available directly from the OPR.

RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted. This publication is FOUO;

requests for accessibility must be approved by the OPR.

OPR: HQ AFSFC/SFOZ Certified by: AF/A7S

(Mr. David R. Beecroft)

Supersedes: AFI31-101, 1 March 2003; AFI31-

301, 15 May 2002

Pages: 306

This Air Force Instruction (AFI) implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 31-1, Integrated Defense. Compliance with this Instruction is mandatory and applies to all military and civilian Air Force (AF) personnel, members of the Air Force Reserve and Air National

Guard, and other individuals or organizations as required by binding agreement or obligation with the Department of the Air Force. In addition, this instruction is mandatory for all government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) and contractor-owned, contractor-operated

(COCO) facilities when required by contractual agreement. The terms "must," "shall," and

"will" denote mandatory actions in this Instruction. This Instruction requires the collection and maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974. System of Records Notices

(SORN) F031 AF SP F, Notification Letters to Persons Barred from Entry to Air Force

Installations, and F031 AF SP O, Documentation for Identification and Entry Authority, apply.

Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records

Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af61a/afrims/afrims/. This

Instruction provides guidelines, procedures, and minimum physical security levels required for

Protection Level (PL) 1 non-nuclear, 2, 3, and 4 resources, which are necessary for the AF to maintain, project, and execute air power. Non-nuclear installations require only this AFI to perform their ID functions. Nuclear capable installations must comply with the nuclear security standards contained in DOD S-5210.41-M Volumes 1 – 3_AFMAN 31-108, Nuclear Weapon https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af61a/afrims/afrims

2 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

Security Manual, and also apply the requirements of this Instruction to their non-nuclear resources. All Security Forces (SF) units are required to maintain a printed copy of DOD S-

5210.41-M Volumes 1 – 3_AFMAN 31-108 and AFI 31-101 in case of emergencies involving nuclear weapons and weapons systems, as well as for informational and training purposes. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary

Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route

AF Form 847s from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. Contact supporting records managers as required. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply endorsement by the AF. Affected organizations have 180 days from date of publication to implement this AFI or submit applicable deviations to the appropriate deviation authority (as established in paragraph 6.8). Major Commands, Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) and Field

Operating Agencies (FOAs) (hereby referred to collectively as ―MAJCOM‖) will send one copy of supplements to Headquarters, Air Force Security Forces Center (HQ AFSFC), Protection and

Defense Branch (SFOZ), 1517 Billy Mitchell Boulevard, Lackland Air Force Base (AFB) TX

78236.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. Chapter 1, ID

Concept and Responsibilities, provides an understanding of ID concepts and principles.

Chapter 2, The Base Boundary and Base Security Zone, provides an understanding of the ID environment utilizing Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available-Time available and Civil considerations (METT-TC). Chapter 3, Integrated Defense Risk

Management Process (IDRMP), describes how to analyze the mission using the commander‘s ID mission statement vetted against assigned resources, considering Risk, Vulnerability, Threat, and

Assets in a formula to show quantitative values for mitigating threats to resources. Chapter 4 through Chapter 9 describe how to secure assets. Chapter 10, Risk Mitigation Toolkit, provides mitigation options based on the types of deficiencies in which assets are vulnerable. Chapter 11, Security Forces and Other Integrated Defense Forces Equipment, provides the organization and equipment to complete the ID mission. Chapter 12, Integrated Defense Plans, describes how to accomplish an actionable plan and the minimum requirements to be included in the plan.

Chapter 13, Training and Exercises, ensures that the Integrated Defense Plan (IDP) is executable and considers how to exercise ID forces.

Chapter 1 - ID CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITIES 8

1.1. Overview 8

Figure 1.1. Integrated Defense Continuum 8

1.2. Concept of Integrated Defense 9

1.3. Integrated Defense Considerations 10

Figure 1.2. Threat Levels (from JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater) 12

1.4. Coordination with other Programs. 13

AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009 3

1.5. Integrated Defense Training 14

1.6.. Responsibilities 15

Chapter 2 - THE BASE BOUNDARY AND BASE SECURITY ZONE 25

2.1. Base Boundary (BB). 25

2.2. Base Security Zone (BSZ). 25

Figure 2.1. ID Desired Effects in the Base Boundary and Base Security Zone. 26

2.3. Base Boundary Coordination. 27

Table 2.1. METT-TC Factors in the Base Boundary and BSZ. 28

Figure 2.2. The Base Boundary. 31

2.4. Planning Factors for Installation Perimeters and Entry Control. 32

Figure 2.3. ID Desired Effects for Installation Perimeters. 33

Figure 2.4. ID Desired Effects for Installation ECPs. 35

2.5. Inside the Perimeter. 39

2.6. Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC). 40

Figure 2.5. Typical BDOC Organization (AFTTP 3-10.2, Integrated Base Defense

Command and Control).

Figure 2.6. Consolidated ECC and BDOC Expanded View Example. 45

2.7. Security Forces Facilities. 45

2.8. Indicator and Incident Reporting. 45

2.9. Community-Oriented Policing. 47

Chapter 3 - INTEGRATED DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS (IDRMP). 49

3.1. Overview. 49

3.2. Background. 49

3.3. Objective, Methodology and Preparation. 49

3.4. Risk Assessment. 52

3.5. Process Overview. 52

Figure 3.1. Risk Management Process Model from AFI 10-245. 53

Figure 3.2. Risk Tolerance Concept. 54

3.6. Process Execution. 55

Figure 3.3. Asset and Risk Rating Scales. 56

Table 3.1. Example of Critical Asset Worksheet. 56

Table 3.2. Example Threat Tactics. 57

Figure 3.4. Threat Rating Scale. 58

Table 3.3. Example of Threat Assessment Worksheet. 59

Figure 3.5. Vulnerability Rating Scale. 60

4 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

Table 3.4. Example of Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet. 61

Table 3.5. Example of Risk Summary Worksheet. 63

Table 3.6. Example of COA Worksheet. 66

3.7. Additional Information. 67

Chapter 4 - PROTECTION LEVELS 68

4.1. Overview. 68

4.2. Determining Protection Levels. 68

4.3. Identifying Protection Level Resources. 69

4.4. Program Protection Planning. 70

4.5. Systems Security Engineering (SSE). 70

4.6. System Security Standards (SSS). 70

4.7. Protection Level 1 (PL 1) Resources. 71

4.8. Protection Level 2 (PL 2) Resources. . 71

4.9. Protection Level 3 (PL 3) Resources 71

4.10 . Protection Level 4 (PL 4) Resources 72

Chapter 5 - ESTABLISHING SECURITY AREAS 74

5.1. Overview. 74

5.2. Command Authority. 74

5.3. Installation Designation. 74

5.4. Restricted Areas. 74

5.5. Controlled Areas. 74

5.6. Free Zones. 74

5.7. National Defense Areas (NDAs. 74

Chapter 6 - PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 79

6.1. Overview. 79

Figure 6.1. ID Desired Effects and Physical Security Requirements 79

6.2. Physical Security Terms. 79

6.3. Intrusion Detection Systems. 83

6.4. Installation Physical Security Measures. 106

6.5. Restricted Area Physical Security Measures 107

6.6. Controlled Area Physical Security Measures. 113

6.7. Other Physical Security Considerations. 115

6.8. The Deviation Program. 117

Chapter 7 - ENTRY & CIRCULATION CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR RESTRICTED 120

AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009 5

& CONTROLLED AREAS

7.1. Overview. 120

7.2. Authorizing Unescorted Entry for Restricted Areas. 120

7.3. Badge-Issuing Officials. 121

7.4. Supplying and Issuing RABs. 121

7.5. Inventorying, Auditing and Disposing of RABs. 124

7.6. Temporary Badging Systems for RABs. 125

7.7. Implementing Entry and Circulation Control Procedures for Restricted Areas. 126

7.8. Unescorted Entry to Restricted Areas -- Exchange Badge System. 128

7.9. Unescorted Entry to Restricted Areas -- Single Badge System. 129

7.10. Entry Authority Lists. 129

7.11. Escorted Entry to Restricted/Controlled Areas. 131

7.12. AECS Requirements for Restricted and Controlled Areas. 131

7.13. Issuing AECS Badges. 133

7.14. Temporary and Visitor AECS Badges. 133

7.15. Unescorted Entry to Controlled Areas. 134

Chapter 8 - RESOURCE PROTECTION FOR MISSION SUPPORT AND OTHER

ASSETS

8.1. Overview 135

8.2. Responsibilities. 135

8.3 Resource Protection for Mission Support Assets. 138

8.4 Assets Covered by Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Guidance. 143

8.5. Standards For Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Production Systems. 169

Figure 8.1. Protection Levels for SCI Resources. 169

8.6. Standards for Foreign Aircraft at AF Installations. 171

Chapter 9 - SECURING POWER PROJECTION ASSETS 172

9.1. Overview. 172

Table 9.1. ID Desired Effects for Non-Nuclear PL Resources. 172

9.2. Securing PL 1 Non-Nuclear Resources. 173

9.3. Securing PL 2 Resources. 174

9.4. Securing PL 3 Resources. 177

9.5. Aircraft Away from Home Station. 179

9.6. Aircraft in Maintenance. 180

9.7. Test Aircraft. 181

9.8. Alert Crews and Billets. 181

9.9. Standard for Presidential, Senior Executive (SENEX) Mission, Specifically

Designated Special Air Mission (SDSAM), and Special Air Mission (SAM)

6 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

Aircraft.

Figure 9.1. Protection Levels for Presidential, SENEX, SDSAM and SAM Aircraft. 182

9.10. Standard for Space Launch Complexes and Space Launch Systems, DOD Space

Control, Detection and Warning, Space Surveillance, and Support Systems.

Figure 9.2. Protection Levels for DOD Spacelift and Space Launch Systems. 189

Figure 9.3. Protection Level for Space Control Systems. 189

Figure 9.4. Protection Level for Other Space Support Resources. 190

Figure 9.5. Protection Level for Satellite Command and Control Systems. 191

Figure 9.6. Protection Level for Detection and Warning Systems. 192

9.11. Standard For Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems. 192

9.12. Standards for Air Operations Centers (AOCs). 195

Chapter 10 - RISK MITIGATION TOOLKIT 197

10.1. Overview. 197

10.2. Identifying Gaps. 197

10.3. The ID Desired Effects. 197

10.4. The Toolkit. 199

Figure 10.2. Online ID Toolkit Depiction. 199

Figure 10.3. The ID Toolkit. 199

10.5. Modeling and Simulation Tools. 207

Chapter 11 - SECURITY FORCES AND OTHER INTEGRATED DEFENSE FORCES

EQUIPMENT

11.1. Overview. 208

11.2. Security Forces and ID Forces Composition and Responsibilities. 208

11.3. Arming and Equipping SF and ID Forces. 213

11.4. Arming and Equipping Non-SF ID Forces. 215

11.5. Security Forces Facilities. 215

11.6. BDOC. 216

11.7. Security Forces Vehicles. 210

11.8. Security Forces and ID Force Communication Requirements. 216

Chapter 12 - INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLANS 220

12.1. Overview 220

12.2. Responsibilities. 220

12.3. Writing the IDP. 221

12.4. IDP Requirements. 221

12.5. Planning Considerations. 225

AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009 7

Chapter 13 - TRAINING AND EXERCISES 229

13.1. Overview. 229

13.2. Security Forces Training. 229

13.3. Security Program Exercise (SPE). 229

13.4. Inspections. 229

13.5. Higher Headquarters Exercises 229

13.6. Installation Exercises. 229

13.7. Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs). 230

13.8. Air Force Reserve Component Units. 230

13.9. Prescribed Forms. 231

13.10. Adopted Forms. 231

Attachment 1 - GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 232

Attachment 2 - REQUIRED REPORTS 254

Attachment 3 - UNIT COLLECTION PLAN TEMPLATE AND SAMPLE

COLLECTION PLAN

Attachment 4 - AIR FORCE PROTECTION LEVEL DESIGNATION MATRIX SYSTEM 263

Attachment 5 - INTEGRATED DEFENSE PLAN EXAMPLE 270

Attachment 6 - PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES (AA&E) AT CONTRACTOR-OWNED FACILITIES

Attachment 7 - SENSITIVE CONVENTIONAL ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND

EXPLOSIVES (AA&E) SECURITY RISK CATEGORIES

Attachment 8 - PHYSICAL SECURITY OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

(AA&E) AT MILITARY TERMINALS

Attachment 9 - EXAMPLE OF COMMANDER’S INTENT FOR INTEGRATED

DEFENSE

Attachment 10 - STANDARDIZED POST PRIORITY CHART 285

Attachment 11 - MODELING AND SIMULATION 287

Attachment 12 - AUTOMATED IDRMP TOOL 290

Attachment 13 - STANDARDIZED ENTRY AUTHORITY LIST (EAL) 305

8 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

Chapter 1

ID CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1. Overview: This Instruction describes the concept, planning and execution of ID.

1.1.1. In accordance with AFPD 31-1, Integrated Defense, SF is the enterprise leader for ID operations; however, it is not an entirely ―SF‖ program. Capabilities-based ID is a fundamental battle competency for all Airman, whether garrison or deployed, and requires active participation by all to ensure success. Security of assets that defend our nation, people and equipment, is an inherent responsibility of command and requires the effort of every

Airman regardless of AF specialty, rank or position. This active participation truly integrates defense efforts.

1.1.2. Many of the policies and procedures that governed the defense of our warfighting assets had revolved around our Cold War mission. However, since the end of the Cold War, the threats to our people and resources have changed significantly, but our policies and procedures to defend our warfighting resources have remained the same. Furthermore, the lines between peacetime and wartime are blurred by the ever-present threat of terrorism and as a result, a change in approach to securing our personnel and resources is necessary. ID bridges the gap between peacetime and wartime actions to secure the force, as well as provide all personnel with the necessary tools to determine how to secure their assets. Just as each installation has its own unique mission and challenges, each commander/manager must be capable of applying tailored, threat-based security planning after thorough analysis of the operational environment and available resources.

1.1.3. ID occurs during all facets of AF operations, from routine peacetime activities through crisis development and contingency operations (see Figure 1.1). During peacetime activities, ID efforts focus on criminal activity and pre-operational terrorist planning that may affect our people, resources, and readiness. During contingency operations, ID focuses on

Level I, II, and III threats (see paragraph 1.3.2) that may affect our ability to execute AF missions. This ―continuum‖ makes no distinction between CONUS and OCONUS, garrison or deployed locations. What does change is the threat to our personnel, resources and operating environment. These threats can be just as high at CONUS installations as they are at deployed locations.

Figure 1.1. Integrated Defense Continuum.

1.1.4. The shift to ID requires a significant change of perspective in two central areas. The first change is from resource-based defense posture to a risk-based defense posture. The

AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009 9

second change is from compliance-based operations to effects-based operations. Previous guidance was ―directive-centric‖ and executed through compliance with specific regulations, measures and standards without considerations to their effectiveness. Responsibility was obtained from guidance or instructions, and success was measured by how well checklists were followed. The shift to risk- and effects-based operations focuses on deterring and defeating threats with limited personnel and resources. Previous guidance told us ―what‖ to defend and ―how‖ to defend it without consideration of the threat, vulnerabilities and operating environment unique to each installation.

1.1.5. This Instruction provides the ―tools‖ to plan and execute ID. It guides personnel through a familiar 7-step risk assessment process. Furthermore, working groups that are focused on mutually-supporting components of ID, such as the antiterrorism (AT) program and resource protection program (RPP), may be combined and streamlined. This Instruction provides flexible planning and execution opportunities that allow owners/users of PL 1 non-nuclear, PL 2, PL 3 and PL 4 assets to become actively involved in the defense of their areas;

however, some assets must remain secured IAW higher headquarters (HHQ) directives, such as nuclear weapons; arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E); classified information and

Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) assets.

1.1.6. Chapter 3 describes the Integrated Defense Risk Management Process (IDRMP), which is used to determine how best to use limited personnel and resources to protect personnel and assets. The IDRMP provides a more precise understanding of how the three risk factors of threat, vulnerability and asset criticality relate to each other at each installation. Understanding the relationships between these factors , as well as continual analysis of the operating environment, assists commanders in mitigating, accepting and reducing risk to appropriate levels.

1.2. Concept of Integrated Defense. Per AFPD 31-1, ID is ―the application of active and passive defense measures, employed across the legally-defined ground dimension of the operational environment, to mitigate potential risks and defeat adversary threats to Air Force operations.‖ ID is planned and executed based on the estimated threat (or combination of threats) and operating environment and approved by the installation commander. The analytical tool used to achieve integrated defense is the ID Risk Management Process whereby the commander manages risks based on the association of the criticality of assigned assets and infrastructure, a comprehensive analysis of the threat, and the respective vulnerabilities to those assets. ID will be employed at all garrisons and expeditionary locations. Note: For the purposes of this Instruction, the term ―Installation Commander‖ is used in lieu of ―Base

Commander‖ to refer to the individual responsible for defense operations performed by an installation.

1.2.1. Protection and defense of air bases requires the coordinated effort of ID, Emergency

Management (EM), AT, and other mission support functions under the Force Protection (FP) umbrella.

1.2.2. All AF activities provide essential capabilities within their purview to facilitate and aid the ID effort. ID forces vary depending on the theater of operation and may also include

US military, Joint Services, civilian employees, Department of Defense (DOD) contractors, government and local law enforcement agencies, civil emergency services, coalition partners, host nations and friendly communities. While ID force participants will vary, one constant

10 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

remains: all AF members are charged to be active participants in the defense of installations, resources, activities, and missions. The blending of ID forces creates unity of effort from which complementary and synergistic effects will emerge. Essentially, the teaming of ID contributors creates a united, seamless defense stronger than the defense efforts of individual contributors. This effort ensures all Airmen are trained to defend themselves and integrate into defense operations while in garrison or deployed.

1.2.2.1. The intent of ID is for an AF Installation Commander‘s (or AF Mission

Commanders when on a non-AF owned installation) force to prepare for and defend critical assets within their assigned areas (in concert with SF).

1.2.2.2. Based on a comprehensive analysis of asset criticality, threats and vulnerabilities, AF Installation Commanders (or AF Mission Commanders when on a non-AF owned installation) will use risk-based decisions to determine which units require the designation of armed or unarmed ID forces.

1.2.2.3. Tasks associated with ID could include, but are not limited to, defending critical resources through active and passive measures, personnel accountability, communication with control centers, and training requirements.

1.2.3. Effective ID requires determined, collaborative, and proactive efforts to establish integrated plans, standard operating procedures (SOPs), Common Operating Pictures (COPs), and the execution of realistic, cohesive training. ID must be viewed as an element of a larger weapons system which relies on the ability of all Service members, support staffs, and civilian agencies to aid in protection and defense without adversely impacting their primary functions. Therefore, a well-defined, networked command and control system that permits rapid information exchange and COPs is essential to achieving effective ID.

1.2.4. In accordance with the JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, effect is defined as ―the result, outcome, or consequence of an action.‖

Within the context of this document, effect more specifically refers to ―the measurable result of an action, device, or process with respect to an actual or perceived adversary or threat.‖

Similarly, capability refers to the potential to achieve an effect. The nine ID Desired Effects are: Anticipate, Deter, Detect, Assess, Warn, Defeat, Delay, Defend, and Recover. Ideally, defense forces receive such good intelligence they are able to anticipate any and all threats.

As this is unlikely, attaining subsequent ID Desired Effects is necessary. For instance, it would be preferred to deter a threat; but if that does not succeed, the next ideal effect would be to detect the threat. Once the threat is detected, assessment by forces occurs. Friendly forces are then warned of the threat and attempts are made to defeat, or eliminate, the threat.

If the threat cannot be defeated, it must be delayed. If not possible, defensive measures must be taken to mitigate the effects of the threat. Recovery actions are then implemented to consolidate and reorganize friendly forces and restore operations. See Chapter 10 for additional information on the ID Desired Effects.

1.3. Integrated Defense Considerations.

1.3.1. Goal . The goal of ID is to neutralize security threats throughout the Base Boundary

(BB) in order to ensure unhindered AF operations. Through ID, commanders must:

minimize mission degradation from threat activity within the Base Boundary and coordinate necessary security operations support within the Base Security Zone (BSZ) when the BSZ is

AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009 11

not congruent with the Base Boundary; minimize loss of life and injury from threat activity;

and protect government property and personnel from hostile and criminal acts. Note: See

Chapter 2 for detailed information regarding the Base Boundary and BSZ. The end state is to create a flexible, responsive ID operation within varying threat environments. Key tasks include the items below. Note: All ID measures must be in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. ID activities are subject to federal laws and regulations governing DOD personnel in the conduct of domestic law enforcement and intelligence activities, including the Posse Comitatus Act (see paragraph 2.9.7.1) and the limitations imposed on law enforcement and intelligence personnel with regard to collecting, retaining, and disseminating information about US persons. It is AF policy to cooperate with US civilian law enforcement officials to the extent feasible, consistent with DOD guidance concerning support to civilian law enforcement.

1.3.1.1. Implement baseline physical security measures IAW this Instruction and other

AF, DOD, and HHQ directives.

1.3.1.2. Dominate the Base Boundary. Domination includes visible ID force presence

(when possible), community integration in security operations, reliability screening and access control.

1.3.1.3. Operationalize Force Protection Intelligence (FPI) in order to maintain optimal situational awareness throughout the Base Boundary and BSZ. This can be accomplished for the Defense Force Commander (DFC) through the development of a robust intelligence/information collaboration, analysis and fusion capability, utilizing the support prescribed in AFI 14-105, Unit Intelligence Mission and Responsibilities, AFI

14-119, Intelligence Support to Force Protection (FP), and AFPAM 14-118, Predictive

Battlespace Awareness: Air and Space Intelligence Preparation of the Operational

Environment.

1.3.1.4. Increase ID force readiness as threats and Force Protection Condition (FPCON) levels escalate.

1.3.1.5. Apply appropriate lethal and non-lethal force IAW AFI 31-207, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel, local rules of engagement (ROE) and Status of Forces

Agreements (SOFAs).

1.3.1.6. Execute emergency response procedures designed to isolate, contain, and defeat hostile actions and restore normal operations as quickly and efficiently as possible.

1.3.2. The Threat. Traditional and non-traditional ground threats could include, but are not limited to, crime, espionage, hostile surveillance, sabotage, subversion, civil unrest, terrorism, irregular or unconventional warfare, and conventional warfare. Furthermore, criminal activity such as pilferage of critical items, information theft, and violent crimes may also have an impact on air operations. At higher levels of conflict, the threat may include

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) weapons, as well as air-to-surface and surface-to-surface attacks with conventional weapons. The adversary‘s acquisition of technologically advanced equipment, such as portable surface-to-air missiles, guided mortar munitions and night vision devices increases the difficulty to detect or neutralize threats to air bases. This range of potential adversaries includes the three traditional levels of threats described below, as outlined in JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations

12 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

in Theater. These threats may occur simultaneously and are not necessarily dependent on one another. Doctrinal threat levels are illustrated in Figure 1.2

Figure 1.2. Threat Levels (from JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater).

1.3.2.1. Level I Threats. Typical Level I threats include enemy agents and terrorists whose primary missions include espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Enemy activity and individual terrorist attacks may include random or directed killing of military and civilian personnel, kidnapping, and/or guiding special-purpose individuals or teams to targets. The most effective way to defeat the Level I threat is to disrupt the planning process through the use of sound AT techniques before an attack occurs. Base defense forces must be capable of detecting and defeating Level I threats.

1.3.2.2. Level II Threats. Level II threats include small-scale, irregular forces conducting unconventional warfare that can pose serious threats to military forces and civilians. These attacks can cause significant disruptions to military operations as well as the orderly conduct of local government and services. Base defense forces must be capable of disrupting or delaying Level II threats until the arrival of response forces.

These response forces are normally military police units assigned to the joint security area (JSA).

1.3.2.3. Level III Threats. Level III threats have the capability of projecting combat power by air, land, or sea, anywhere into the operational area. Level III threats necessitate the command decision to commit a tactical combat force or other significant available forces in order to counter the threat. This threat level is beyond the capability of base defense and response forces.

1.3.3. Theaters of Operation. ID is conducted worldwide and commanders must adapt to a variety of operational requirements. Therefore, ID forces must be prepared to operate in a variety of operating locations to include Main Operating Bases (MOB), Forward Operating

Bases (FOB), and Joint Operating Bases (JOB) as defined in JP 1-02. Some AF resources may be geographically separated from the base, such as communications facilities that are

AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009 13

often isolated and sited on high ground to maximize their effectiveness. Regardless of location, forces conducting ID employ the basic tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) as those employed at home station during routine peacetime operations; however, ID forces must adjust TTPs to counter evolving enemy tactics. Adjustments to TTPs should be based on the specific threat, the dynamics of operating in an international environment, or the manner ID efforts are integrated with joint, civilian, and host nation forces.

1.3.4. Joint Operations for ID. Contemporary conflict requires inherently joint or combined operations. Joint or combined campaigns are the integrated military activities of two or more service components: Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine Corps.

Major Commands should refer to JP 3-10 for guidance on conducting ID in a joint or combined security area. In a joint operations area, the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) may elect to establish a Joint Security Coordination Center (JSCC) using the designated Joint

Security Coordinator (JSC) staff elements and representatives from the components operating within the operational area. Component and staff representation will vary IAW mission, forces, and security zone requirements. The JSCC serves as the JSC‘s full time centralized planning, coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directing agency for the operational area.

It coordinates with other elements on the JSC staff, with higher, lower, and adjacent command staffs, and with host nation and allied command staffs. The JSCC is manned with full-time staff for key personnel and augmented with subject matter expertise as available.

1.3.5. Host Nation Support. The JSC and appropriate subordinate commanders must consider host nation capabilities when planning and conducting security operations. The JSC typically serves as the executive agent to manage and coordinate host nation support for ID.

AF senior commanders and deployed units conducting ID should address potential issues with the JSC when seeking host nation support. The effective use of host nation support enhances the capability of US forces to achieve success during any military operation. Many host nations can provide valuable support for conducting security operations and can frequently perform many functions as well as, or better than, US personnel or units because of their familiarity with language, local customs, terrain, transportation and communications networks, facilities, and equipment. However, the scope of host nation support is limited by the availability of resources, the capability of the host nation, and the ability of the US and host nation to reach agreements. Note: The contents of this paragraph primarily affect expeditionary environments.

1.3.6. Host Installation Support. In deployment operations, the Combatant Commander

(CCDR) will define guidance on security responsibilities. The host installation commander will have the responsibility for the installation and perimeter. In virtually all cases, AF senior commanders will be responsible for securing their combat assets on the flightline.

This will also be the case where an AF senior commander is located on an installation hosted by another Service outside of a combat theater. In the majority of cases, the AF senior commander will execute security through the use of AF Security Forces. The AF senior commander cannot cede security responsibility for combat coded resources; however, in unusual situations the AF senior commander can execute the responsibility through host forces that follow the security procedures in accordance with this Instruction.

1.4. Coordination with other Programs. ID does not stand alone to protect personnel and resources; planners create an effective security program by coordinating with other DOD and AF programs. Protection and defense of air bases requires the coordinated effort of ID, EM, AT and

14 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

other mission support functions forces under the FP umbrella. ID is the decisive operation in protection and defense; EM, AT, and other activities conduct shaping and sustaining operations affecting ID. This coordinated planning provides a seamless progression of protection programs and completes the installation‘s ―defense in depth‖ picture.

1.5. Integrated Defense Training. As outlined in paragraph 1.2.2, all Airmen have a responsibility in ID. The Integrated Defense Council (IDC) will identify units and personnel specifically tasked with ID responsibilities and define their roles in the Integrated Defense Plan

(IDP). ID force personnel tasked in the IDP typically fall into one of five categories: Security

Forces; armed SF augmentees; armed owner/user protection personnel (civilians can be armed as prescribed in their position description/assigned duties IAW AFPAM 10-243); unarmed owner/user protection personnel; and unarmed ID force contributors.

1.5.1. Implementing the Training Program. Commanders will ensure that assigned personnel with ID responsibilities have been trained in tasks identified in AFPAM 10-100, Airman’s Manual, and the IDP. Ensure the training program pertains to unit personnel‘s particular job or assignment. SF will train ID force personnel on SF-specific skill sets as determined locally. Local SF will document this training IAW AFPAM 10-243, Augmentation Duty, and AFI 36-2225, Security Forces Training and Standardization

Evaluation Programs. Some potential training items are listed below:

1.5.1.1. SF concepts and operations.

1.5.1.2. The threat and how it applies to their area of responsibility.

1.5.1.3. Military jurisdiction as it applies to the local installation.

1.5.1.4. Use of force (UOF) IAW AFI 31-207 and local ROE.

1.5.1.5. ID concepts and theory (to include local procedures, roles, and responsibilities).

1.5.1.6. Location of critical resources.

1.5.1.7. Identification of boundaries and layout of each area for which they are responsible, including adjacent land.

1.5.1.8. Reporting information to the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) (e.g., SALUTE report).

1.5.1.9. Challenging.

1.5.1.10. Blood-borne pathogens.

1.5.1.11. Use of individual protective equipment (e.g., body armor, tactical vest).

1.5.1.12. Weapons familiarity and qualification (as required).

1.5.1.13. Cover and concealment.

1.5.1.14. Individual and team movements.

1.5.1.15. Reaction to hostile fire.

1.5.1.16. Defensive fighting positions and fields of fire.

1.5.2. Implementation of the training program will remain flexible to the Installation

Commander‗s mission analysis and risk assessment (RA).

AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009 15

1.5.3. Unit commanders are ultimately responsible for the defense of their assigned assets.

Therefore, personnel assigned ID responsibilities should conduct practical exercises and training without adversely impacting their primary functions at the discretion of the unit commander.

1.6. Responsibilities.

1.6.1. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AF/A2).

1.6.1.1. Provides operational, planning, programming and budgeting guidance for AF intelligence support to FP and ID operations.

1.6.1.2. Provides guidance supporting intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) and other intelligence threat information and staff estimates which support DFCs (see paragraph 1.6.13 for DFC responsibilities) IAW AFI 14-119.

1.6.2. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations, and Mission Support, Directorate of Security Forces (AF/A7S). The Director of Security Forces is the

Air Force Chief of Staff‘s (CSAF) primary advisor for ID.

1.6.2.1. Is the approval authority for FP and ID guidance.

1.6.2.2. Plans, develops and monitors all AF ID programs. Develops and coordinates AF

ID policy directives, and approves and publishes ID-specific Air Force tactics, techniques and procedures (AFTTPs) and AFMANs.

1.6.2.3. Serves as office of primary responsibility (OPR) for developing guidance for AF arming policies.

1.6.2.4. Coordinates on war and mobilization plans and theater Operation Plan (OPLAN) time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) development to ensure consistency with ID doctrine.

1.6.2.5. Manages distribution of ID equipment, weaponry and vehicles received through central procurement.

1.6.2.6. Manages the ID Program Objective Memorandum (POM) funding process.

1.6.2.7. Approves SF capabilities and mission essential task lists (METLs), establishes and programs for standing contingency capability, and plans/programs contingency backfill capability.

1.6.2.8. Acts as the officer and enlisted career field manager.

1.6.3. Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center (HQ AFSFC). HQ AFSFC drafts and coordinates Air Force ID Instructions, Manuals and TTPs; defines SF capability sets and capability standards, applicability and effects of delivery; develops METLs and associated training tasks, conditions and standards; and coordinates ID guidance with other programs and functional specialties.

1.6.3.1. Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center, Operations Division (HQ

AFSFC/SFO).

16 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

1.6.3.1.1. Incorporates and adapts installation security guidance into AFIs; develops installation security standards and procedures; and monitors effectiveness of ID program.

1.6.3.1.2. Provides expertise in operational guidance development in the areas of ID, Police Services, and military working dog (MWD) employment.

1.6.3.1.3. Plans, develops and reviews programs concerning ID training and owner/user personnel in support of ID.

1.6.3.1.4. Reviews ID training requirements and recommends curriculum changes.

1.6.3.1.5. Coordinates with supporting MAJCOM/A7S staffs for wartime deployment of ID forces.

1.6.3.1.6. Monitors SF participation in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises.

1.6.3.1.7. Actively participates in HQ AFSFC Lessons Learned process.

1.6.3.2. Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center, Programs and Requirements Division (HQ AFSFC/SFX).

1.6.3.2.1. Incorporates and adapts installation security guidance into AFIs; develops installation security standards and procedures; and monitors effectiveness of ID

Program.

1.6.3.2.2. Manages current and future requirements, based on operational deficiencies and provides requirement oversight in the development, review and validation, and/or emerging technology to fulfill operational capabilities.

1.6.3.2.3. Receives requirements from the field.

1.6.3.2.4. Researches material to find solutions to meet needs.

1.6.3.2.5. Actively participates in HQ AFSFC Lessons Learned process. Provides expertise in weapons, equipment, doctrine and training.

1.6.3.3. Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center, Doctrine and Training Branch (HQ AFSFC/SFXD).

1.6.3.3.1. Facilitates development of AF SF operational concepts and doctrine by drafting, reviewing and recommending changes to guidance, and providing subject matter expertise to participate in conferences and committees in order to execute all aspects of the FP mission.

1.6.3.3.2. Develops SF doctrine and concepts in order to execute the mission for all aspects of ID (home station and deployed bases).

1.6.3.3.3. Drafts guidance to support new SF initiatives.

1.6.3.3.4. Provides a broad, multi-service, multi-national perspective on SF policy reviews.

1.6.3.3.5. Reviews AF policy and recommends changes to support development of

SF concepts and guidance.

AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009 17

1.6.3.3.6. Provides SF specialist representation on committees developing new concepts and doctrine.

1.6.3.3.7. Provides critical analysis for SF transformation office when developing way ahead for future concepts of SF employment.

1.6.3.3.8. OPR for SF METL development.

1.6.3.4. Headquarters Air Force Security Forces Center, Training and Force Development Branch (HQ AFSFC/SFXT).

1.6.3.4.1. Develops guidance for Security Forces, Combat Arms, and security awareness/education training programs.

1.6.3.4.2. Provides professional career field management for all SF personnel.

1.6.3.4.3. Coordinates with MAJCOM/A7S to develop and implement Career Field

Education and Training Plans (CFETP) for SF, identifies life-cycle education and training requirements, training support resources, and minimum core task requirements.

1.6.3.4.4. Provides state-of-the-art training tools and products for AF Security Forces community in the most cost effective delivery mediums available.

1.6.3.4.5. Develop and distribute standardized lesson plans.

1.6.4. Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (HQ AFCESA).

1.6.4.1. Provides field expertise, recommendations, support and other input for structural, environmental, Fire Emergency Services, Explosive Ordnance Disposal

(EOD), EM, CBRNE operations, and other engineer areas of expertise.

1.6.4.2. Ensures engineers have input in acquiring necessary equipment and resources by coordinating their conditions and limitations into Air Force requirements for research and development efforts.

1.6.4.3. Develops engineer-related FP training standards and equipment requirements.

1.6.5. HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI).

1.6.5.1. Provides counterintelligence (CI) activities to include collection and production of information concerning foreign intelligence, investigations of terrorism, sabotage and related acts, offensive operations against foreign intelligence services and AT services.

1.6.5.2. Provides the DFC CI information within the AOI as well as establishing an effective liaison with host nation intelligence, security, and law enforcement sources.

1.6.5.3. Maintains the capability to respond to criminal activities.

1.6.5.4. Provides immediate, worldwide, complementary support to the deployed area commander by conducting specialized CI, AT, protective services details and FP operations.

1.6.5.5. Plans and programs support to FP operations.

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1.6.6. MAJCOM Commanders.

1.6.6.1. Define specific commander‘s intent and issue ID mission statements as appropriate.

1.6.6.2. Establish assessment and planning staffs as appropriate.

1.6.6.3. Direct development of operational level ID planning, as required.

1.6.6.4. Direct validation of manpower and resource allocation in support of ID.

1.6.7. HQ Air National Guard Bureau (HQ ANGB).

1.6.7.1. Organizes, trains, and equips ANG SF units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/A7S and AF/A7S.

1.6.7.2. Ensures ANG SF personnel assigned to a Unit Type Code (UTC) for contingency or steady-state deployments (coded "DWX" or "DWS"), complete ground combat skills training identified in AFI 36-2225 at least every 3 years, not to exceed 4 years.

1.6.8. MAJCOM Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (MAJCOM/A2).

1.6.8.1. Ensures the DFC receives real-time combat information and intelligence data about adversarial forces in their AI.

1.6.8.2. Upon request, reviews other threat estimates, special subject summaries and related reports.

1.6.8.3. Collects and processes all source intelligence to help commanders during wartime and contingencies.

1.6.8.4. Plans, programs and budgets for intelligence resources necessary to support ID operations.

1.6.8.5. Provides theater-specific intelligence training and materials to unit personnel to support ID operations.

1.6.8.6. Develops a command intelligence estimate for ID planning and provides it and other related threat materials to units.

1.6.9. MAJCOM Security Forces (MAJCOM/A7S).

1.6.9.1. Under MAJCOM/CC direction, organize, train, equip and maintain SF ID elements according to this Instruction, AFI 10-402 Volume 1, Mobilization Planning and

Personnel Readiness, AFI 36-2225 and other planning documents. MAJCOM/A7Ss are responsible for managing and guiding the program within their commands.

1.6.9.2. Identify command-wide training requirements for all personnel assigned ID responsibilities.

1.6.9.3. Ensure SF Phase I and II Training programs are developed at all installations, IAW AFI 36-2225.

1.6.9.4. Determine the duration of Phase II continuation training IAW AFI 36-2225. As a minimum, it must be administered annually.

1.6.9.5. Develop procedures for documenting required training.

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1.6.9.6. Monitor manpower, equipment, and performance of assigned UTCs.

1.6.9.7. Prepare plans and documents for acquisition of necessary ID equipment compliant with Chapter 6 of this Instruction.

1.6.9.8. Make recommendations to AF/A7S on policies concerning organizing, training and equipping deployable SF UTCs.

1.6.9.9. Manage command SF participation in JCS, Headquarters, AF (HAF) and

MAJCOM exercises, and MAJCOM training center attendance.

1.6.9.10. Complete and forward Reporting Control Symbol: HAF-SF(SA) 9378, Security Forces Equipment/UTC Report, to the requirements branch (HQ

AFSFC/SFXR).

1.6.9.11. Coordinate on required reports IAW Attachment 2.

1.6.9.12. Develop and submit security requirements for MAJCOM-unique systems, resources and facilities in MAJCOM supplements to this Instruction.

1.6.9.13. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC).

1.6.9.13.1. Organizes, trains and equips AFRC SF units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/A7S and AF/A7S.

1.6.9.13.2. Ensures AFRC SF personnel assigned to a Unit Type Code (UTC) for contingency or steady-state deployments (coded "DWX" or "DWS"), complete ground combat skills training identified in AFI 36-2225 at least every 3 years, not to exceed 4 years.

1.6.10. Installation Commanders. Installation Commanders are responsible for all operations performed by an installation, of which ID operations are a part. Note: For the purposes of this Instruction, the term ―Installation Commander‖ is used in lieu of ―Base

Commander‖ to refer to the individual responsible for defense operations performed by an installation.

1.6.10.1. AF Installation Commanders are responsible for chartering the IDC to implement programs for the protection of personnel, property, and resources under their control. Programs must meet DOD and AF protection criteria. Senior AF commanders who are tenants on sister service installations maintain security responsibility of combat coded aircraft and systems. Note: This body includes the responsibilities of what was formerly known as the Installation Security Council.

1.6.10.2. Directs ID within the Base Boundary. Other service components assigned to the installation for defense will be under the Installation Commander‘s tactical control

(TACON) for defense, except in instances when the JFC has designated a senior base commander as a base cluster commander, and the base cluster commander has TACON of forces assigned to the base primarily for the purpose of local base defense. If the Base

Boundary is not congruent with the BSZ, the Installation Commander mitigates threats appearing outside the Base Boundary but within the BSZ by coordinating via their operational chain of command with the appropriate base cluster commander, area commander, or command authority/host nation responsible for ground forces operating within the BSZ.

20 AFI31-101 8 OCTOBER 2009

1.6.10.3. Establishes the BDOC.

1.6.10.4. Issues the ID mission statement.

1.6.10.5. Establishes commander‘s intent and defines risk tolerance (see Chapter 3 for more information).

1.6.10.6. Accepts, remediates or mitigates risk for assigned assets as appropriate.

1.6.10.7. Elevates risk decisions to higher echelons, when appropriate.

1.6.10.8. Appoints the DFC as the installation‘s enterprise lead to coordinate the ID program IAW this Instruction.

1.6.10.9. Establishes work groups, staffs, and executive councils to conduct and oversee defense and protection assessments and planning as necessary and as required by instruction.

1.6.10.10. Maintains liaison with adjacent installations, base clusters and supporting host nation security agencies, and civil authorities in the BSZ if not congruent with the Base

Boundary. Responsibilities for liaison may be retained by higher authority or delegated to subordinate commands as local circumstances dictate. The installation commander should request direct liaison authorized (dirlauth) to accomplish this, IAW JP 1, Chapter

IV, para. 10.c.

1.6.10.11. Develops defense plans that incorporate tenant units consistent with parent service directives and local MOUs.

1.6.10.12. Disseminates air, ground and missile attack warnings using established warning systems.

1.6.10.13. Where applicable, integrate area security plans with the Joint Security Office and the appropriate operations center that coordinates security in areas where ID forces operate.

1.6.10.14. Acts as the installation executive agent for AT.

1.6.10.15. Coordinates ID, EM, AT and service support operations to ensure unity of effort to achieve the ID mission.

1.6.10.16. Approves the IDP every 12 months or within 120 days of assuming command.

1.6.10.17. Determines which units must designate armed or unarmed ID forces.

1.6.11. Installation Tenant Units. Actively participate in the IDRMP to ensure the criticality of their mission assets are adequately considered. As directed by the Installation

Commander and consistent with parent service directives and local MOUs, support may include ID force participation or deliberate arming of unit personnel to secure mission assets in their immediate work areas and the augmentation of other ID forces.

1.6.12. Unit Commanders. Each unit commander, tenant unit commander, or agency chief or equivalent staff agency chief responsible for nuclear, power projection assets or combat coded equipment, and mission support assets must ensure their security program meets applicable service and/or DOD protection criteria. As directed by the Installation

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Comman…