Appendice 6 - AFI 31-101 ACC Sup Integrated Defense.pdf

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS AIR COMBAT COMMAND

JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS VA

People First… Mission Always…

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AFI31-101_ACCSUP_ACCGM2021-01

9 MARCH 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR ACC INSTALLATION COMMANDERS

FROM: ACC/A4

130 Douglas Street, Suite 320

Hampton, VA 23665

SUBJECT: Air Combat Command (ACC) Guidance Memorandum (GM) AFI31-

101_ACCSUP_ACCGM2021-01, Integrated Defense

RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted. This publication is FOUO//CUI.

1. By Order of the Commander, Air Combat Command, this ACC GM immediately implements changes to AFI31-101_ACCSUP, Integrated Defense (ID). Compliance with this memorandum is mandatory. To the extent its directions are inconsistent with other ACC publications, the information herein prevails IAW DAFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management.

2. General: This memorandum is intended to assist Defense Force Commanders in the development of comprehensive local operating instructions for the employment of waterborne patrol crafts. Waterborne operations provide an an opportunity for defense forces to enhance

Integrated Base Defense efforts through the patrolling of waters that surround an installation.

Waterborne patrol craft may be used as a force-multiplier for operations within both the base boundary and the base security zone,in close coordination with other law enforcement agencies operating within the base security zone. Commanders may also consider coordination to include

Public Affairs awareness campaigns in order to apprise the local population of their presence on the water and any regulations that may need to be publicized. Installation commanders operationally employing waterborne assets will determine the scope of maritime operations based upon threat and mission needs.

3. Employment: Employment strategies will be incorporated into the local Integrated Base

Defense Plan. Squadrons will establish local operating instructions that will cover, at a minimum, the following topics:

- Roles and Responsibilities

- Jurisdiction Boundaries/Limits

- Legal Authorities

- Rules of Engagement

- Use of Force Considerations (for both deadly weapons and less than lethal)

- Tactical Standard Operating Procedures

- Emergency Water Procedures

4. Waterborne patrol craft will operate in the execution of the Integrated Base Defense mission.

Prior to employing waterborne patrol craft in this role, coordination must be conducted with the installation’s Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and MAJCOM A4S.

Coordination must also be conducted with the appropriate federal, state, tribal and/or local agencies that have jurisdiction over affected waterways. Units conducting waterborne operations must attempt to establish Memorandums of Agreement or Memorandums of Understanding with local law enforcement agencies to the maximum extent possible.

5. Waterborne patrol craft operations include, but are not limited to the following:

a. National Defense Areas (NDA). Waterborne patrol craft have the capability to physically control access in bodies of water where Department of Defense assets may be located due to accidents or incidents. NDAs will be established in accordance with AFI 31-101, Integrated

Defense.

b. Emergency Response. Waterborne patrol craft can provide rapid response to disasters and mass casualty events in portions of the installation not accessible to land-based personnel.

c. Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM). Waterborne patrol craft may be used to provide additional Antiterrorism (AT) measures within the Base Security Zone.

d. Security. Waterborne operations can be used to support the Integrated Base Defense

Plan for the protection of resources whose restricted area perimeters are adjacent to bodies of water.

6. Equipment: Utilization of the proper equipment is essential to mission readiness, capability and safety. Personnel are required to be in possession of the individual standardized equipment found in Attachment 1. Additionally, waterborne patrol craft will be equipped with emergency lights, sirens, public address system and have all the equipment listed in Attachment 2.

7. Dress: The Airman Battle Uniform (ABU), Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP), and

Department of the Air Force Civilian Police utility uniform/Class B are the standard uniforms for waterborne patrol missions; however, the DFC is authorized to locally procure uniform clothing items better suited for waterborne operations (i.e. shorts, police golf/dry fit shirts with UV protection, ball caps/Tilley hats, etc.), as deemed appropriate by their chain of command.

8. Training: All personnel operating or crewing a waterborne patrol craft will comply with AFI

36-2646, Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Programs, Chapter 10, dated

19 December 2019.

9. Funding: With respect to funding the following is noted:

a. Training: All training costs will be covered by the individual wing/unit. Units should

POM for requirements through AFIMSC.

b. O&M: All residual costs associated with the maritime patrol program (i.e. boat maintenance, equipment, replacement, etc.), will be the responsibility of the wing/unit.

10. Risk Management: Safety is paramount in waterborne operations. Commanders will conduct a thorough ORM assessment prior to establishing a waterborne patrol craft program

IAW AFI 90-802, Risk Management; and Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 90-803, Risk

Management (RM) Guidelines and Tools. A mission analysis and risk assessment will be conducted prior to each mission IAW the ACC Form 167, ACC Risk Management (RM)

Worksheet. Crew fatigue is extremely dangerous and will be accounted for during the risk assessment.

11. This Memorandum becomes void after one-year has elapsed from the date of this

Memorandum, or upon publication of an Interim Change or rewrite of the affected publication, whichever is earlier.

TOM D. MILLER, Major General, USAF

Director of Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection

Attachments:

Attachment 1 – Personnel/Operator/Crew Member Individual Equipment List

Attachment 2 – Vessel Required Equipment List

Attachment 1

Personnel/Operator/Crew Member Individual Equipment List

REQUIRED EQUIPMENT FOR AIR FORCE PERSONNEL OPERATING IN A

MARINE ENVIRONMENT

**All below equipment or an equivalent, with the exception of the float coat, are mandatory items for each crew member conducting an AF vessel mission

EQUIPMENT NAME NSN IF AVAILABLE

Life Preserver Survival Vest (LPSV) with no USCG markings.

This vest is C02 based with a water tablet for automatic deployment and self-righting feature

#485 GSA approved

Through LifeSaving

Systems Corp

The following items will be attached to the above LPSV

Blunt Tip Knife with sheath

#60160 McNett "Saturna" from PaperClips

Sirius Personal Strobe light

#640 Through LifeSaving

Fox 40 Whistle

#622 Through LifeSaving

Signaling ·mirror

#208 Through LifeSaving

ACR Personal Locator Beacon (PLB) with GPS

#253/#279 Through LifeSaving Systems Corp

Stearns Anti-Exposure Work Suit (1580) for air and water temps below 60 degrees

GSA approved through

LifeSaving Systems Corp

Polarized marine sunglasses Local procurement

**Below are not mandatory but are recommended

Stearns "Float" coat which is a flotation device, but also used for inclement weather

#344 GSA approved

Through LifeSaving

Systems

Attachment 2

Vessel Required Equipment List

REQUIRED EQUIPMENT FOR AIR FORCE MARINE VESSELS

EQUIPMENT NAME NSN IF AVAILABLE

(1) EPIRB (Emergency Position Indicating Radio

Beacon) 406MHz signal

ACR #2874 Category 1 (automatic hydrostatic deployment)

No NSN available ACR #2874

Lifesaving Systems Corp (LSC)

#258

No NSN available/Lifesavings

Systems

#244 (buoy and #314 ACR Marker)

(1) 24'' PFD Type IV Ring Buoy with ACR Strobe

Illumination Marker attached

Rescue Line Throw Bag (70ft) minimum of (2) per vessel No NSN avail/LSC #226

Boat Hook with expandable pole minimum (2) per vessel No NSN avail/any local marine store

(4) Sets of deck line 25'-:-30', 1/211 braided No NSN avail/any local marine store

VHF radio Vessel should come equipped

GPS Chart Plotter w/ depth finder and radar add-on system Various mfg avail/Furuno

Anchor with line attached Vessel should come equipped

(4) Fenders for each vessel Any local marine store

Boarding ladders if vessel not equipped Any local marine store

Nautical Charts of the area DLA or Ocean Graphics

Nautical Divider set Any local marine store

Nautical Parallel Ruler Any local marine store

Signal Flares (min 3) DLA #MK79

US Coast Guard "Navigation Rules"

COMDTINST M16672.2D

Any local marine store

Extra USCG approved PFD for additional passengers in addition to the crew (min 4)

7-8 lbs ABC type, Dry Chemical, Fire

Extinguisher (min of 2 per vessel)

First Aid Kit NSN 6545-00-922-1200 or equivalent

BY ORDER OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 31-101

25 MARCH 2020

AIR COMBAT COMMAND

Supplement

7 DECEMBER 2020

Security

INTEGRATED DEFENSE (ID)

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available for downloading or ordering on the e-Publishing website at www.e-Publishing.af.mil

RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted. This publication is FOUO.

OPR: AF/A4SP

Supersedes: AFI 31-101, 5 July 2017

Certified by: AF/A4S

(Brig Gen Roy W. Collins)

Pages: 218

(ACC)

OPR: USAF/ACC/A4SO

Certified by: ACC/A4S

(Col Kevin P. Walker)

Pages: 12

This Air Force Instruction (AFI) implements Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5210.65, Security Standards for Safeguarding Chemical Agents, Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) 13-

005, Deviations from the DoD Physical Security Program, and Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD)

31-1, Integrated Defense. This Instruction applies to all military and civilian personnel of the

Regular Air Force (RegAF), Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard (ANG), other individuals or organizations as required by binding agreement or obligation with the Department of the Air Force, all government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) and contractor-owned, contractor-operated

(COCO) facilities when required by contractual agreement. The terms "must," "shall," and "will" denote mandatory actions in this instruction. The nondisclosure provisions in this instruction are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligations, rights, or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to (1) classified information, (2) communications to Congress, (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/

2 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this instruction and are controlling. This Manual requires the collection and maintenance of information protected by the Privacy Act of 1974 authorized by 10 U.S.C. 8013, Secretary of the

Air Force; 18 U.S.C. 922 note, Unlawful Acts note referring to the Brady Handgun Violence

Prevention Act; 28 U.S.C. 534 note, Judiciary and Judicial Procedures, note referring to the

Uniform Federal Crime Reporting Act; 42 U.S.C. 10601 et seq., Crime Victims Fund; and

Amendment to Lautenberg, 18 U.S.C. 922(d) (9) Unlawful Acts; DoD Directive 7730.47, Defense

Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS); Air Force Instruction 31-203, Security Forces

Management Information System; and E.O. 9397 (SSN), as amended. The applicable System of

Records Notices (SORN) F031 AF SF B, Security Forces Management Information System

(Electronic Records), applies. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFI 33-322, Records Management and

Information Governance Program, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records

Disposition Schedule located in the Air Force Records Information Management System.

Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary

Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route

AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. Contact supporting records managers as required. This AFI may be supplemented at any level. Major

Command (MAJCOM) and Direct Reporting Units (DRU) supplements must be provided to

AF/A4S, Integrated Defense Branch, after certification and approval at the MAJCOM. The authorities to waive installation/unit level requirements in this publication and for security requirements in other AFIs are outlined in Paragraph 8.8 The waiver authority for all non-tiered compliance items in this publication is the responsible installation commander or equivalent. Non-tiered compliance items are delegable no lower than Squadron/CC or equivalent, which is consistent with AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, for T-3 compliance items. In accordance with AFI 33-360, the approving authority for deviations from established requirements is based on the tier level designated within the prescribing publication.

(ACC) This supplement implements and extends the guidance of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-

101, Integrated Defense. This supplement describes ACC’s procedures for use in conjunction with parent AFI. This instruction applies to all military and civilian Air Force (AF) personnel, members of the Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard (gained mission under Title 10 authority for 180 consecutive days) while assigned and working on ACC installations, and other individuals or organizations as required by binding agreement or obligation with the Department of the Air Force.

In addition, compliance is mandatory for all government-owned, contractor-operated and contractor-owned, contractor-operated facilities when required by contractual agreement. This supplement also applies to other DoD agencies while assigned and working on ACC installations.

The terms "must," "shall," and "will" denote mandatory actions. In accordance with (IAW) DAFI

33-360, Publications and Forms Management, the authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements are identified with a Tier (T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3) number following the compliance statement. See DAFI 33-360 for a description of the waiver authorities associated with the tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the Publications OPR for non-tiered compliance items. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained IAW

AFI 33-322, Records Management and Information Governance Program, and disposed of IAW

Air Force Records Information Management System Records Disposition Schedule. Refer

AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020 3

recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility

(OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional chain of command. Contact supporting records managers as required. This publication may not be supplemented or further implemented/extended.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been substantially revised and needs to be completely reviewed. Major changes include: Chapters representing Integrated Defense Planning and Arms, Ammunition, and

Equipment were removed and published as AFMAN 31-101, Volumes 1 and 2, respectively.

Guidance for installation access control point (IACP) operations was updated in Chapter 3 and an IACP methodology matrix was added at Attachment 2; updated guidance on Waterborne

Operations and Fly Away Security were added to Chapters 3 and 5 respectively. Additionally, updated references are used throughout the document and Chapter 8 contains updated guidance on the security deviation process and tiers requirements in accordance with AFI 33-360.

(ACC) This publication has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed in its entirety. Significant changes include Chapter 1, Information Fusion Cell, Chapter 2, SF Vehicles, and Chapter 3, Responsibilities of the Installation Entry Controller.

Chapter 1— INTEGRATED DEFENSE (ID) CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITIES 9

1.1. Overview

1.2. Concept of Integrated Defense (ID)

Figure 1.1. ID Concept (ref: AFPD 31-1)

1.3. ID Considerations

1.4. Coordination with other Programs

1.5. ID Force Contributors

1.6. Roles and Responsibilities

Figure 1.2. 7-Day Effects Based Planning Cycle

Chapter 2— INTEGRATED DEFENSE FORCES 35

2.1. Overview

2.2. SF Composition and Responsibilities

2.3. Arming and Equipping SF and ID Forces

2.3. Arming and Equipping SF and ID Forces

2.4. Arming and Equipping Non-SF ID Forces

2.5. Additional ID Forces

4 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

Figure 2.1. UMP Equipment

2.6. SF Training

2.7. SF Vehicles

2.8. SF and ID Force Notification and Communication Requirements

Chapter 3— INSTALLATION PERIMETER AND ACCESS CONTROL POINTS 52

3.1. Overview

3.2. Base Boundary (BB)

Figure 3.1. The Base Boundary

3.3. BSZ

3.4. Base Boundary Coordination

3.5. Planning Factors for Installation Perimeters and Access Control

3.6. Installation Access Control Points (IACP)

Figure 3.2. Access Control Point Zones

3.7. Waterborne Operations

3.8. Inside the Perimeter

3.9. Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS)

Chapter 4— PROTECTION LEVELS 68

4.1. Overview

4.2. Determining PLs

4.3. Requesting and Recommending PLs

4.4. Identifying PL Resources

4.4. Identifying PL Resources

4.5. Program Protection Planning

4.6. System Security Standards

4.7. Protection Level 1 (PL-1) Resources

4.8. Protection Level 2 (PL-2) Resources

4.9. Protection Level 3 (PL-3) Resources

4.10. Protection Level 4 (PL-4) Resources

AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020 5

4.11. Protection Level for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Production

Systems

Figure 4.1. PLs for SCI Resources

4.12. Protection Level for AF Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM) Assets

Chapter 5— SECURING POWER PROJECTION ASSETS 76

5.1. Overview

5.2. Securing PL-1 Non-Nuclear Resources

5.3. Securing PL-2 Resources

5.4. Securing PL-3 Resources

5.5. Aircraft Away from Home Station

5.6. Aircraft in Maintenance

5.7. Test Aircraft

5.8. Airfields and Mission Support Aircraft

5.9. Alert Crews and Billets

5.10. Standards for Presidential Aircraft and Executive Airlift (EA) Missions Directed by the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (AF/A3)

Table 5.1. PLs for Presidential and Executive Aircraft

Table 5.2. Aircraft Security Requirements

5.11. Standard for Space Launch Complexes and Space Launch Systems, DoD Space

Control, Detection and Warning, Space Surveillance, and Support Systems

5.12. Standards for Command and Control Facilities

Chapter 6— ESTABLISHING SECURITY AREAS 97

6.1. Overview

6.2. Command Authority

6.3. Installation Designation

6.4. Restricted Areas

6.5. Controlled Areas

6.6. Free zones

6.7. National Defense Areas

6 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

Chapter 7— ENTRY & CIRCULATION CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR RESTRICTED

& CONTROLLED AREAS 102

7.1. Overview

7.2. Authorizing Unescorted Entry for Restricted Areas

7.3. Badge-Issuing Officials

7.4. Supplying and Issuing RABs

7.5. Inventorying, Auditing and Disposing of RABs

7.6. Temporary Badging Systems for RABs

7.6. Temporary Badging Systems for RABs

7.7. Implementing Entry and Circulation Control Procedures for Restricted Areas

7.8. Unescorted Entry to Restricted Areas – Exchange Badge System

7.9. Unescorted Entry to Restricted Areas – Single Badge System

7.10. EALs

7.11. Escorted Entry to Restricted/Controlled Areas

7.12. AECS Requirements for Restricted and Controlled Areas

7.13. Issuing AECS Badges

7.14. Temporary and Visitor AECS Badges

7.15. Unescorted Entry to Controlled Areas

Chapter 8— PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 119

8.1. Overview

8.2. Physical Security Terms

8.3. Installation Physical Security Measures

8.4. Restricted Area Physical Security Measures

8.5. Controlled Area Physical Security Measures

8.6. SF Facilities

Figure 8.1. Typical BDOC Organization

8.7. Other Physical Security Considerations

8.8. The Security Deviation Program

Figure 8.2. AF Form 116 Routing for Tier 0 Requirements

AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020 7

Figure 8.3. AF Form 116 Routing for Tier 1 Requirements (reviewed by AF/A4S and approved by MAJCOM/DRU Commander)

Figure 8.4. AF Form 116 Routing for Tier 2 Requirements (reviewed by

MAJCOM/DRU/A4S and approved by MAJCOM/DRU Commander)

Figure 8.5. AF Form 116 Routing for Tier 3 Requirements (reviewed by DFC or Group/CC equivalent and approved by installation commander)

Figure 8.6. AF Form 116 Routing for Tier 0 Requirements

Figure 8.7. AF Form 116 Routing for Tier 1 Requirements (reviewed by ANG/A4S and approved by TAG/ATAG [Air])

Figure 8.8. AF Form 116 Routing for Tier 2 Requirements (reviewed by ANG/A4S and approved by TAG/ATAG [Air])

Figure 8.9. AF Form 116 Routing for Tier 3 and Non-Tiered Requirements (reviewed by

ANG/A4S and approved by installation commander)

Chapter 9— INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 144

9.1. Overview

9.2. IDS Concepts and Planning

9.3. Testing IDS

9.4. Approving IDS

9.5. Selecting IDS

9.6. IDS Characteristics

9.7. Procuring IDS

9.8. Replacing IDS

9.9. Detection Requirements

9.10. Annunciation and Display Requirements

9.11. Transmission Line Security for PL 1-4 Resource IDS

9.12. Protection of Badge Enrollment Systems

9.13. Alternate Power Supplies

9.14. Relocatable Sensors

9.15. Immediate Visual Assessment

9.16. Test and Turnover

9.17. Certification Requirements

8 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

9.18. ESS Programs

9.19. Testing Requirements and Procedures

9.20. Vulnerability (Adversarial) Test Requirements

9.21. Recording Alarm and Maintenance Data

9.22. IDS Failure

9.23. Reporting Requirements

9.23. Reporting Requirements

Chapter 10— RESOURCE PROTECTION FOR MISSION SUPPORT AND OTHER

ASSETS 170

10.1. Overview

10.2. Responsibilities

10.3. Resource Protection for MSAs

10.4. Controlled Areas

10.5. Protecting Funds, Controlled Substances, and Dangerous Agents

10.6. Protecting SCI Production Systems

Attachment 1— GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 184

Attachment 2— INSTALLATION ACCESS CONTROL POINT METHODOLOGY

MATRIX 203

Attachment 3— AIR FORCE PROTECTION LEVEL DESIGNATION MATRIX

SYSTEM 208

Attachment 4— STANDARDIZED EAL 215

AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020 9

Chapter 1

INTEGRATED DEFENSE (ID) CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1. Overview. This Instruction describes the concept, planning and execution of ID.

1.1.1. This Instruction provides guidelines, procedures and minimum physical security levels required for Protection Level (PL) 1, 2, 3, and 4 resources, which are necessary for the

Department of the Air Force (DAF) to maintain, project and execute air, space, and cyber power. Installations require this AFI to perform their ID functions. Affected organizations have

180 calendar days from date of publication to implement this AFI or submit applicable deviations. In addition, nuclear capable installations must comply with the nuclear security standards contained in all three volumes of DOD S 5210.41-M_AFMAN_31-108: Volume 1, The Air Force Nuclear Weapon Security Manual; Volume 2, General Nuclear Weapon

Security Procedures; and Volume 3, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual: Nuclear Weapon

Specific Requirements; as well as DoD S-5210.92-M, Physical Security Requirements for

Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) Facilities. (T-3). Refer to all DOD S 5210.41-

M_AFMAN_31-108 Volumes for missile field security requirements. All DAF installations must maintain a hard copy of the basic DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Volumes 1-3, and associated AFMAN 31-108 Supplements. (T-3). Unit commanders determine the number of copies maintained. (T-3).

1.1.2. ID bridges the gap between peacetime and wartime actions to protect the force, as well as provide all personnel with the necessary tools to determine how to mitigate risk to their assets. Just as each installation has its own unique mission and challenges, each commander should be capable of applying tailored, risk- and effects-based security planning after thorough analysis of the operational environment and available resources.

1.1.3. The security environment is one where terrorism remains a persistent condition, trans-national criminal organizations and other malicious non-state actors have increasingly sophisticated capabilities, and revisionist powers and rogue regimes will use ambiguous or denied proxy operations to achieve their ends short of open warfare. Revisionist powers and rogue regimes can also use the steady state period to ‘prep the battlefield’ for both Continental

United States (CONUS) and Outside of the Continental United States (OCONUS). ID occurs during all facets of DAF operations, from normal peacetime activities through crisis development and contingency operations. ID makes no distinction between CONUS and

OCONUS, garrison or deployed locations. What does change are the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed by threat actors against our assets and the local vulnerabilities exploitable by these TTPs.

1.1.4. This instruction provides flexible planning and execution opportunities that allow owners/users of PL-1 non-nuclear, PL-2, PL-3, PL-4, Combatant Commander (CCDR) task critical assets, and identified critical infrastructure to become actively involved in the defense of their areas. However, some assets remain secured in accordance with higher headquarters

(HHQ) directives, such as nuclear weapons; arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E); and classified information.

1.1.5. AFMAN 31-101v1, Integrated Defense Planning, describes the Integrated Defense Risk

Management Process (IDRMP), which is used to determine how best to use personnel and

10 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

resources to protect personnel and assets. The IDRMP provides a more precise understanding of how the three risk factors of threat, vulnerability and asset criticality relate to each other at each installation. Understanding the relationships between these factors, as well as continual analysis of the operating environment, assists commanders in either accepting or reducing risk through mitigating actions to acceptable levels.

1.2. Concept of Integrated Defense (ID). ID, as depicted in Figure 1.1, is the incorporation of multidisciplinary active and passive, offensive and defensive capabilities, employed to mitigate potential risks to DAF, joint, and coalition operations within the Base Boundary (BB) and the Base

Security Zone (BSZ) in order to ensure mission accomplishment. The formal decision-making process used to support ID is IDRMP, whereby the commander manages risks based upon the association of the criticality of assigned assets and associated systems, a comprehensive analysis of the threat, and the respective vulnerabilities to those assets and associated systems.

Figure 1.1. ID Concept (ref: AFPD 31-1)

1.3. ID Considerations.

1.3.1. Goal. The goal of ID is to mitigate risks to DAF, joint, and coalition operations within the BB and the BSZ in order to ensure mission accomplishment. Note: See Chapter 3 for detailed information regarding the BB and BSZ.

AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020 11

1.3.2. The Threat. Threats include, but are not limited to, terrorists, insiders, Foreign

Intelligence Entities (FIEs), and criminals. It is critical to integrate ID efforts with other AF capabilities to achieve synergistic effects using an all-hazards approach in coordination with

Emergency Management (EM) in accordance with AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency

Management Program; and Mission Assurance (MA) in accordance with DoDD 3020.40, Mission Assurance and DoDI 3020.45, Mission Assurance Construct. The range of potential adversaries includes the three traditional levels of threats described below, as outlined in JP 3-

10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

1.3.2.1. Level I Threats. Typical Level I threats include enemy agents and terrorists whose primary missions include espionage, sabotage and subversion. Enemy activity and individual terrorist attacks may include random or directed killing of military and civilian personnel, kidnapping and/or guiding special-purpose individuals or teams to targets. The most effective way to defeat the Level I threat is to disrupt the planning process through the use of sound before an attack occurs. ID Forces are capable of countering Level I threats.

1.3.2.2. Level II Threats. Level II threats include small-scale, irregular forces conducting unconventional warfare that can pose serious threats to military forces and civilians. These attacks can cause significant disruptions to military operations as well as the orderly conduct of local government and services. ID forces are capable of deterring and defeating

Level II threats.

1.3.2.3. Level III Threats. Level III threats have the capability of projecting combat power by air, land or sea anywhere into the operational area. Level III threats are beyond the capability of ID Forces and necessitate the command decision to commit a Tactical Combat

Force (TCF) or other significant available forces in order to counter the threat.

1.3.3. Theaters of Operation. ID is conducted worldwide and commanders adapt to a variety of operational requirements. Some DAF resources may be geographically separated from the base, such as communications facilities often isolated and sited on high ground to maximize their effectiveness. Regardless of location, forces conducting ID employ the basic TTPs as those employed at home station during normal peacetime operations; however, ID forces adjust

TTPs to counter evolving enemy tactics. Adjustments to TTPs should be based on the specific threat, the dynamics of operating in an international environment, or the manner ID efforts are integrated with joint, civilian and host nation forces.

1.3.4. Joint Operations for ID. Contemporary conflict requires inherently joint or combined operations. In a joint operations area, the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) may elect to establish a Joint Security Coordination Center (JSCC) using the designated Joint Security Coordinator

(JSC) staff elements and representatives from the components operating within the operational area. Component and staff representation varies in accordance with mission, forces, and security zone requirements. The JSCC serves as the JSC’s full time centralized planning, coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directing agency for the operational area. It coordinates with other elements on the JSC staff, with higher, lower, and adjacent command staffs, and with host nation and allied command staffs.

1.3.5. Host Nation Support. The JSC and appropriate subordinate commanders consider host nation capabilities when planning and conducting security operations. The JSC typically serves as the executive agent to manage and coordinate host nation support for ID. DAF senior

12 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

commanders and deployed units conducting ID should address potential issues with the JSC when seeking host nation support. Host nations can provide valuable support for conducting security operations and can frequently perform many functions as well as, or better than, US personnel or units because of their familiarity with language, local customs, terrain, transportation and communications networks, facilities, and equipment. However, the scope of host nation support can be limited due to availability of resources, capabilities and US/host nation agreements.

1.3.6. Host Installation Support. In deployment operations, the CCDR defines guidance on security responsibilities. In virtually all cases, DAF senior commanders are responsible for securing their combat assets. This is also the case where a DAF senior commander is located on an installation hosted by another Service outside of a combat theater. In the majority of cases, the DAF senior commander executes security through the use of AF Security Forces.

When AF Security Forces are not available the DAF Senior Commander will work with host forces to ensure the security procedures in this Instruction are applied to combat assets. (T-3).

1.4. Coordination with other Programs. ID does not stand alone to protect personnel and resources; planners create an effective security program by coordinating with other DoD and DAF programs. Protection and defense of air bases requires the coordinated effort of ID, EM, AT, Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM), Continuity of Operations (COOP), Force Health

Protection, Cybersecurity, and other mission support function forces under the Mission Assurance

(MA) umbrella. ID is the decisive operation in protection and defense; EM, and other activities conduct shaping and sustaining operations affecting ID. This coordinated planning provides a seamless progression of protection programs and completes the installation’s “defense in depth” picture.

1.5. ID Force Contributors. All Airmen have a responsibility in ID. The Integrated Defense

Council (IDC) identifies units and personnel specifically tasked with ID responsibilities and defines their roles in the IDP. ID force personnel tasked in the IDP typically fall into one of several categories: SF; armed SF Augmentees; armed owner/user protection personnel (civilians can be armed as prescribed in their position description/assigned duties in accordance with Air Force

Pamphlet (AFPAM) 10-243, Augmentation Duty); authorized Unit Marshal Program personnel;

unarmed owner/user protection personnel; and ID force contributors. ID force contributors are both civilians and military personnel not assigned specific ID roles, but through their situational awareness and vigilance provide the ID effort another layer of detection and ability to sound the alarm when necessary.

1.5.1. Manpower Utilization. SF units are organized, trained and equipped for an 8-hour duty schedule, with associated post time (arming, guard mount, report completion, weapons turn-in, etc.) extending the normal duty day to approximately 10 hours. Working in excess of these times for prolonged periods poses increased risk to both Airmen and installation assets, and should only be done as a last resort and only for short periods of time (e.g., deployment bundle overlap periods, higher Force Protection Condition (FPCON) posting surges, etc.).

1.5.2. 12-hour Shift Approval. For ID forces in schedules with 12-hour shifts, or considering

12-hour shifts for a prolonged period of time (in excess of 30 calendar days), installation commanders will be the approval authority. (T-1). Installation commanders will be briefed on associated risks and presented possible courses of action (COA) to mitigate risks associated with extended shifts. (T-3). If ID forces are in a 12-hour shift schedule, installation

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commanders must review and approve the schedule within 120 calendar days of assuming command. (T-1). See Defender Performance Optimization information at https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/10139/SitePages/S3T.aspx.

1.6. Roles and Responsibilities.

1.6.1. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (AF/A2).

1.6.1.1. Provides policy for planning, programming, training, and budgeting resources necessary to ensure the AF has the capability to collect, analyze, produce and disseminate all-source intelligence information used to support FP operations.

1.6.1.2. Provides guidance supporting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) and other intelligence capabilities which enable intelligence support to Defense Force

Commanders (DFC).

1.6.1.3. Employs subject matter experts (SMEs) within Air Force Cognizant Security

Authority (AF/A2WZ) and subordinate offices to interpret policies for all Sensitive

Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) security matters and recommends policy changes to AF/A4S supporting future AF/A2 security related techniques, concepts and guidance.

1.6.1.4. Coordinates on DAF, DoD and Intelligence Community (IC) policies affecting

FPI.

1.6.1.5. Collaborates with HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations and AF/A4S on

FP information, policy, processes and assessments.

1.6.1.6. Provides oversight for the security of DAF SCIFs.

1.6.1.7. Air Force Cognizant Security Authority (AF/A2WZ). Approves request for deviations from protection standards for SCIFs within PL-4 areas, prior to submitting to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

1.6.2. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (AF/A3).

1.6.2.1. Serves as approval authority for all PL designation request packages.

1.6.2.2. Executes Mission Assurance primary focus on the identification, assessment, analysis and management of risk of loss to assets and supporting infrastructure deemed critical to execution of DoD and DAF core capabilities, functions and missions.

1.6.2.3. Provides COOP guidance to installation planners for integration into local plans to ensure the performance of essential operations and functions of the DAF across a wide range of potential emergencies.

1.6.2.4. Serves as the primary coordinating agency for Presidential Aircraft and Executive

Airlift (EA) Missions.

1.6.2.5. Approves executive airlift security waivers for Foreign Head of State-tasked aircraft.

https://cs2.eis.af.mil/sites/10139/SitePages/S3T.aspx

14 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

1.6.3. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, Directorate of Security Forces (AF/A4S). The Director of Security Forces is the AF Chief of

Staff’s (CSAF) primary advisor for ID.

1.6.3.1. Serves as approval authority for ID guidance.

1.6.3.2. Incorporates ID and other guidance into AFMANs and AFTTPs, as required.

1.6.3.3. Coordinates on war and mobilization plans and theater Operation Plan (OPLAN) time-phased force and deployment data development to ensure consistency with ID doctrine.

1.6.3.4. Approves SF capabilities and mission essential task lists (METLs). MAJCOM/SF and the Air Force Installation & Mission Support Center (AFIMSC) establish and program for standing and contingency backfill capability.

1.6.3.5. Executes the strategic planning function.

1.6.3.6. Conducts ID strategic analysis involving the conduct of mission and vision analysis in order to determine what SF do, for whom it is done and why.

1.6.3.7. Develops SF strategy by formulating a vector from the anchor points of the ID mission and vision and translating that into a SF strategy to include broad goals, specific objectives and detailed tasks.

1.6.3.8. Develops and maintains a single source document that states the commonmission and vision, and through a strategy to task process, details the source for all SF activities to include ID.

1.6.3.9. Provides a broad, multi-service, multi-national perspective on SF ID policy reviews. Reviews ID policy documentation and recommends changes to support developing ID concepts and doctrine.

1.6.3.10. Retains the roles of strategy development, planning, policy, guidance, career field resource advocacy, engagement with external agencies and career field management.

1.6.3.11. Provides Air Staff direction, advocacy, and approval for the Research and

Development (R&D), validation, staffing, acquisition, sustainment, and demilitarization/disposal of SF operational requirements and capability development in support of all AF physical security systems acquired to meet ID policy requirements.

1.6.3.12. Provides nuclear security strategic direction, policy, planning guidance, program management, and deviation control. In this context, AF/A4S retains all nuclear security policy and AF-level program management responsibilities.

1.6.3.13. Provides strategic direction, policy, and planning guidance for Weapon System

Security, Contingency Planning, and directed by their governing DoD Issuances and AF publications.

1.6.3.14. In coordination with AF/A2, resolves any conflicts between this instruction and other guidance (e.g., manpower and physical security aids).

1.6.4. HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations (HQ AFOSI).

AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020 15

1.6.4.1. Contributes information and intelligence to the ID mission derived from investigations, counterintelligence (CI) activities, and specialized investigative techniques and FP support; includes information gleaned from liaising with federal, state, local and foreign nation law enforcement, CI and security agencies.

1.6.4.2. Provides the DFC CI information within the Area of Interest as well as establishing an effective liaison with federal, state, and local agencies, including host nation intelligence, security, and law enforcement counterparts.

1.6.4.3. Maintains the capability to respond to felony-level criminal activities.

1.6.4.4. Provides immediate, worldwide, complementary support to the deployed area commander by conducting CI activities, AT, protective service operations and CI support to FP.

1.6.4.5. Plans and programs support to FP operations including participation in MAJCOM and installation ID and AT working groups.

1.6.5. MAJCOM/DRU Commanders.

1.6.5.1. Define specific commander’s intent and issues ID mission statements as appropriate. (T-3).

1.6.5.2. Establish assessment and planning staffs as appropriate. (T-3).

1.6.5.3. Direct development of operational level ID planning, as required. (T-3).

1.6.5.4. Direct validation of manpower and resource allocation in support of ID. (T-3).

1.6.5.5. May direct alternate organizational constructs for their Threat Working Group

(TWG)/Information Fusion Cell (IFC) functions.

1.6.5.6. Supplement Resource Protection Program (RPP) as deemed necessary with emphasis on owners/users. (T-3).

1.6.6. The National Guard Bureau, Directorate of Air National Guard Security Forces

(ANG/A4S). The Director of ANG Security Forces is the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s primary advisor for ANG ID.

1.6.6.1. Organizes, trains and equips ANG SF units for wartime duties in coordination with the gaining MAJCOM/SF and AF/A4S.

1.6.6.2. Ensures ANG SF personnel assigned to a Unit Type Code (UTC) are postured for contingency or steady-state deployments (coded DW, DX or DP).

1.6.6.3. Serves as the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the ANG between the Department of the Air Force and the states and territories.

1.6.7. MAJCOM Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Directorates

(MAJCOM/A2).

1.6.7.1. Ensures intelligence support to force protection capability of unit intelligence personnel to provide near real-time combat information and intelligence data about adversarial forces to the DFC.

1.6.7.1.1. Coordinates FP-related products (e.g., daily intelligence summaries, terrorist handbooks, threat documents and briefings, etc.) and services with appropriate Air

16 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) regions, MAJCOM SF and operations personnel, appropriate higher headquarters critical asset risk management assessors, etc., to de-conflict work responsibilities and ensure that customer requirements are satisfied.

1.6.7.1.2. Coordinates with AFOSI, SF and Intelligence Support to Force Protection customers to jointly develop MAJCOM FP-related Priority Intelligence Requirements

(PIR) that serves to drive both theater and national Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance (ISR) and CI collections.

1.6.7.2. Upon request, reviews other threat estimates, special subject summaries and related reports.

1.6.7.3. Directs collection and processing of all source intelligence to help commanders during wartime and contingencies. Establishes procedures to rapidly receive, evaluate, analyze and disseminate all relevant intelligence threat data with AFOSI, SF and other Staff

FP elements.

1.6.7.4. Plans, programs, and budgets for intelligence resources necessary to support ID operations.

1.6.7.5. As appropriate, provides theater-specific intelligence training and materials to unit personnel to support ID operations.

1.6.7.6. Develops, in coordination with AFOSI FIR/Det, a command intelligence estimate for ID planning and provides it and other related threat materials to units.

1.6.7.7. Participates as a member in MAJCOM Antiterrorism Working Groups (ATWG), TWGs and other working groups as set forth in DoDI O-2000.16V1_AFI 10-245-O, Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation, and applicable CCMD guidance. (T-0).

1.6.7.8. Ensures adequate security expertise within MAJCOM staff to interpret, adjust and enforces policy for all Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility security matters.

Support HQ AF/A2WZ with recommendations for policy changes that support AF/A2 related security techniques, concepts and guidance.

1.6.8. MAJCOM/DRU SF.

1.6.8.1. The MAJCOM/DRU SF staff agencies:

1.6.8.1.1. Define ID requirements for MAJCOM/DRU operational missions. (T-3).

1.6.8.1.2. Prioritize MAJCOM/DRU ID requirements. (T-3).

1.6.8.1.3. Execute MAJCOM/DRU-assigned missions. (T-3).

1.6.8.1.4. Serve as the senior advisor to the MAJCOM/DRU CC on all matters for ID.

(T-3).

1.6.8.1.5. Manage and guides the ID program within their command. (T-3).

1.6.8.1.6. Ensure IDRMP asset rankings are aligned with MAJCOM/CCDR priorities during visits and normal operational correspondence. (T-3).

1.6.8.1.7. Develop and submit security requirements for MAJCOM specific systems, resources and facilities in MAJCOM supplements to this Instruction. (T-3).

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1.6.8.2. Make recommendations to AF/A4S on policies concerning organizing, training and equipping deployable SF UTCs. (T-3).

1.6.8.3. Manage command SF participation in JCS, Headquarters AF (HAF) and

MAJCOM exercises. (T-3).

1.6.8.4. In order to best support installation Information Fusion Cell, MAJCOMs are encouraged to develop an Information Fusion Cell similar in structure as defined in

Paragraph 1.6.20

1.6.8.5. Manage Integrated Base Defense Security Systems (IBDSS)/Electronic Security

System (ESS) programs within the MAJCOM. (T-3). Coordinate with SF units and Air

Force Life Cycle Management Center, Force Protection Division (AFLCMC/HBU) to develop and execute projects. (T-3). Collaborate switch physical security experts to program for Installation and Mission Support (I&MS) enterprise needs and sustainment.

(T-3).

1.6.8.6. Incorporate ID guidance from higher headquarters into MAJCOM supplements as required.

1.6.8.7. MAJCOM/DRU SF staffs provide AFIMSC with final approved copies of security deviations for tracking and programming corrective action. (T-3). Note: Those

MAJCOMs/DRUs with direct nuclear mission support retains responsibility for the nuclear deviation program.

1.6.9. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command (HQ AFRC).

1.6.9.1. Organizes, trains and equips AFRC SF units for wartime duties in coordination with AFRC Force Generation Center and AF/A4S.

1.6.9.2. Ensures AFRC SF personnel assigned to a UTC are postured for contingency or steady-state deployments (coded DW, DX or DP), complete the SF training program in accordance with AFI 36-2646, Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation

Progrmas.

1.6.10. Air Force Installation & Mission Support Center (AFIMSC). AFIMSC serves as the single intermediate-level organization providing I&MS oversight and agile combat support

(ACS) capabilities to MAJCOMs/DRUs and their subordinate organizations and installations.

AFIMSC includes AFIMSC HQ Directorates, Detachments and Primary Subordinate Units

(e.g. Air Force Security Forces Center (AFSFC) and Air Force Civil Engineer Center

(AFCEC), etc.). AFIMSC’s responsibilities include the following:

1.6.10.1. Performs SF Enterprise-Wide (E-W) Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and

Execution (PPBE) in coordination with AF/A4S, considering the impact of risk for AF installations. (T-3).

1.6.10.2. Manages SF E-W I&MS programs. (T-3).

1.6.10.3. Solicits, receives, validates, analyzes, prioritizes, and advocates for installation

I&MS SF requirements through the established corporate process and communicates results in coordination with MAJCOMs/DRUs. (T-3).

1.6.10.4. Allocates, distributes, and oversees the execution of funding in support of SF

I&MS requirements. (T-3).

18 AFI31-101_ACCSUP 7 DECEMBER 2020

1.6.10.5. Enables the mission by providing SF specific I&MS implementation guidance for HAF policy and standards for force providers/operational commanders. (T-3).

1.6.10.6. Performs SF Operational, Test, and Evaluation day-to-day management for

I&MS in support of MAJCOM/DRU CC. (T-3).

1.6.10.7. Reviews and evaluates I&MS program performance and compliance in support of SF requirements. (T-3).

1.6.10.8. Analyzes and validates SF requirements, perform gap analysis, Risk Assessment

(RA), and develops COAs. (T-3).

1.6.10.9. Schedules and conducts Air Force Mission Assurance Assessments (MAA), based on established periodicity requirements and Joint Staff/higher headquarters direction. (T-3).

1.6.10.10. Provides SF Logistics Detail (LOGDET)/Manpower and Equipment Force

Packaging System (MEFPAK) programs oversight and coordination. (T-3).

1.6.10.11. Performs Site Operating Location (OL) Airfield Assessments. AFIMSC manages all deliberate (steady state) airfield assessments. (T-3). AFIMSC provides support to MAJCOM/DRU-owned assets for emergent airfield assessments, if C-MAJCOM capabilities are exceeded.

1.6.10.12. Supports MAJCOM/DRU Risk-Management program. (T-3). The MAJCOM senior SF officer (Colonel or Civilian Equivalent) is the Senior FP Advisor to the

MAJCOM/DRU CC and leads this capability. AFIMSC coordinates closely with

MAJCOM/DRU on day-to-day program management due to complementary nature with

ID. (T-3). MAJCOM commanders may opt for alternate organizational constructs for their

TWG/IFC functions. In support, AFIMSC:

1.6.10.12.1. Facilitates RAs/analysis, TWG preparation, COA development, post working group actions and implementation of commander's directed actions. (T-1).

1.6.10.12.2. Provides SMEs in capabilities residing in detachment to supplement

TWGs. (T-3).

1.6.10.12.3. Coordinates across AFIMSC agencies to plan and program for I&MS requirements directly impacting risk management. (T-1).

1.6.10.12.4. Reviews and coordinates on weapon system security deviation requests.

(T-1).

1.6.10.13. Supports FP Management Programs. (T-1). The MAJCOM senior SF officer

(Colonel…