ISC PWS Rev 01.docx

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM)

INTEGRATION SUPPORT CONTRACT (ISC)

PERFORMANCE WORK STATEMENT (PWS)

FOR

ICBM SPO – AFNWC/NWIX

JANUARY 09, 2012

REV 01 – FEBRUARY 13, 2012

Table of Contents

SECTION I - DESCRIPTION OF SERVICES

1.0 SCOPE

1.1 PURPOSE:

The purpose of this document is to provide a description of the types of services that the Integration Support Contract (ISC) will perform, not to specify to the contractor how to perform required services; it is in no way intended to suppress innovative ideas or approaches for performing required services. Unless otherwise stated, the use of “contractor” refers to the ISC contractor. All references to other contractors will be specifically stated (e.g. subsystem contractors, NSCCA/PATE contractors, etc.).

1.2 BACKGROUND:

Since the commencement of the nation’s land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program, the Air Force never intended to maintain 100% of the necessary technical capability organically. The basis for this model was a 1954 Air Force Advisory Council determination that the specialized and highly technical functions required to develop and sustain ICBMs would be supported by a Systems Engineering/Technical Assistance (SE/TA) contractor. The Air Force employed this SE/TA model for over 40 years, first with Space Technologies Laboratory (STL) and then with Thompson, Ramo and Wooldridge (TRW). In 1997, the Air Force moved away from the SE/TA construct to the ICBM Prime Integration Contract (IPIC). The IPIC model called for much of the weapon system sustainment and program management to be performed by the IPIC contractor. As a result, the Government has lost much of its former organic capacity to integrate, sustain, and manage the weapon system and its associated programs.

The Minuteman III (MMIII) is a mature weapon system that is in the Operation and Support Phase of its life cycle. The primary ICBM activity is the sustainment of the operational force in a state of readiness such that national defense strategies involving these systems can be successfully executed, if required. Top-level system performance parameters that reflect the adequacy of the ICBM force readiness are availability, reliability, accuracy, and hardness. Weapon System Sustainment includes: incorporation of changes to ICBM Systems in response to requirements for performance improvements; to make appropriate use of advances in technology; correction of system deficiencies; determining the need for and executing life extension programs; implementation of policies mandated by Congress or directed by other higher authorities; addressing threat or safety driven changes or other changes in the operational or support environment.

Requirements for changes or modifications to fielded systems are usually applicable at the subsystem or lower level and will be performed primarily by the subsystem contractors. Satisfying these requirements involves acquisition activities that can potentially impact system-level performance. The ICBM System Program Office (SPO), with support from the contractor, will manage the contracts required to integrate and incorporate changes and modifications, and sustain ICBM systems.

The contractor will assist the SPO in its performance of tasks associated with Engineering and Program Management services referenced above. The primary focus will be to ensure any modifications or changes to the system will maintain and/or improve system-level performance. Successful accomplishment of these tasks will ensure an effective process for weapon system and subsystem performance assessment, systems requirement determination, trade studies, subsystem/item specifications, configuration management and control, test and evaluation, and the application of streamlined program management techniques.

The contractor will submit the following schedule and plans: Integrated Master Schedule (IMS), Management Plan, Transition Plan and Contractor’s Risk Management Plan.

The top-level system performance parameters associated with System Readiness are: availability, reliability, accuracy, and hardness. As the ICBM force continues to age and is modified and upgraded, opportunities for changes in capability and performance effectiveness are introduced. At the subsystem/system-level, numerical values have been established for availability, reliability, and accuracy. The actual numerical values are outside the classification scope of this document and will not be specified herein. Hardness is specified at the subsystem-level and there are no numerical threshold values established at the system-level for this performance parameter. Hardness performance is based on subsystem analysis and testing. Reporting of hardness will be provided by the ICBM product IPT organizations of the ground, guidance, propulsion, and reentry vehicle/reentry subsystems. These parameters represent performance values below which the system cannot be allowed to fall unless coordinated decisions are made to allow such degradation based on funding and program considerations.

The contractor’s responsibilities relative to these top level system performance parameters will consist of assisting the Government to continually assess the operational performance of the weapon system. The contractor will assist the Government in determining and reporting the current performance capabilities of the ICBM weapon system relative to the baseline values. They will also identify as early as possible in the assessment process potential areas of performance degradation that would impact capability. Another key element of weapon system sustainment will be to determine the basic causes of potential System Performance degradation. This process, performed primarily at the subsystem-level, includes using engineering analysis techniques such as design analysis, testing, evaluation of operational data, reliability modeling, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), physical failure analysis and other conventional engineering problem identification techniques. The contractor will perform these analyses if an issue is determined to be at the system-level. In all other cases, the contractor will support the SPO by validating the root causes identified by the IPTs and/or subsystem contractors and ensure the problem is isolated to the lowest hardware and/or software levels possible.

The contractor will assist the Government in evaluating corrective actions developed by the IPTs and/or subsystem contractors and in planning the resources necessary to implement the solution. In those cases where the proposed solution involves actions outside the scope of contractor responsibilities (Government Depot Maintenance, storage, supply, transportation, procurement of replacement spares, materials, parts, and pieces to support maintenance or Government processes and procedures) the Government will implement the solution. The contractor’s role will be to monitor and assess the effectiveness of the corrective action, reporting results to the SPM. In cases where the proposed solution involves modification affecting interfaces (i.e. changes to the form, fit, or function of the existing design) the contractor will, in consultation and cooperation with the IPTs and/or subsystem contractors, verify correct allocations of the system performance parameters to the hardware/software level requiring change and will provide integration support where necessary.

Field operations introduce factors that are outside the control of designers (maintenance management policies and procedures, storage, supply, transportation, procurement of replacement spares, materials, parts, and pieces to support maintenance, utilization, and environment). Because of this, operational values of reliability, maintainability, and availability are typically not used directly for contractual requirements. Therefore, the contractor will translate required operational performance parameters into inherent design performance parameters that can be used to define, measure, and evaluate design (modification) programs. The translation process will ensure traceability between the proposed design performance parameters and the top-level system operational performance values.

1.3 OCI HARDWARE/SOFTWARE EXCLUSION:

In order to assure objectiveness of all ISC contractor recommendations to the Government, the successful Offeror for the ISC will have a hardware/software restriction imposed. See contract clause for details.

1.4 FUTURE ICBM SUSTAINMENT AND ACQUISITION CONSTRUCT (FISAC) DESCRIPTION:

The ICBM SPO must prepare a sustainment concept to ensure a safe, secure and reliable MMIII weapon system until 2030. This activity designated the FISAC, will replace the current IPIC when it ends 30 September 2012 and is described in detail below.

FISAC Structure:

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Integration Support Contractor (ISC)

ICBM SPO

Guidance/Test/SELECT Re-Entry sub-system Propulsion sub-system Ground sub-system Hardware/Software Exclusion Other SPO led efforts (e.g. BGRC, NSCCA/PATE) Guidance sub-system

Figure 1 FISAC Working Relationships:

Figure 2 ISC/SPO Relationship:

The contractor will assist the Government in performing its roles as ICBM weapon system integrator and the program management office. The contractor’s main functions will be in support of weapon system integration to include Systems Engineering, Integration and Program Management support. Most of these functions are being performed by the IPIC today. The role envisioned is similar to the role TRW performed prior to IPIC. The contractor will, along with the subsystem contractors, provide transition support of industrial ICBM technical expertise and knowledge to the ICBM organic workforce. This contract will augment organic resources by providing breadth and depth of capabilities for nuclear surety, system safety and security, system engineering and integration, sustaining engineering, program management, risk management, technical assessment, strategy development, interface with operations and logistics, business analysis, mission effectiveness, and ICBM Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Applications Programs. This contract will be flexible and allow for adjustments to the contractor workforce to gain efficiencies based on the changing requirements, policy, realities of the industrial base, and the Government’s capability to support MMIII.

ISC/Subsystem Relationship:

The subsystem support contractors will provide the preponderance of sustaining engineering support to the subsystems. The contractor will provide subsystem expertise to validate subsystem contractor analyses and produce requirements and other documentation for subsystem acquisitions that would create an OCI if produced by the subsystem contractor. As programs are initiated for the subsystems, new Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) will be added to the ISC for tasks that specifically support those programs. This is required to ensure the proper appropriations are used and each program pays for the additional support required associated with their program.

In order to competently and conscientiously support MMIII, the AF requires its contractors and their major subcontractors to effectively share information concerning the status of programs and technical issues with the weapon system. This communication will need to occur with the Government, whether represented by AF or contractor personnel, and among other system support contractors to the maximum extent consistent with proper protection of classified and/or other sensitive information. To achieve this, the contractor must be able to have appropriate Non-Disclosure Agreements with subsystem contractors and subcontractors and demonstrate the ability and willingness to communicate openly. The contractor will not provide contractual direction to Government contractors.

ISC/Other SPO Managed Contracts Relationships:

The contractor will maintain awareness of the progress, technical issues and status of all F-900 and other SPO managed Non-FISAC programs (i.e. SACCS, MMPU, etc.) to ensure integration with the weapon system and smooth transition to the follow-on phase(s). The relationships with other contractors are the same as for the subsystem contractor relationship in paragraph 1.4.2.2. The IPIC was structured with the F-900 clause to prevent disruption of ongoing efforts. Performance will continue until completion of the task, subject to availability of funds, unless terminated, regardless of whether or not a succeeding option for engineering services is exercised. Additional tasks will not be added to the contract after the end of the period of performance of the last exercised option.

ISC/576 FLTS Launch Analysis Group (LAG) Relationship:

The purpose of the LAG is to determine the root cause of a mission anomaly and interpret data. The LAG will be comprised of, but not limited to, the following: 576 FLTS/TEMA, 30 SW/SE representatives and AFNWC/NWI representatives. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its associated laboratories and the Western Range and its associated contractors may also be a part of the LAG composition. For anomalies, the LAG may obtain additional expertise as necessary for the investigation. In the case of a mishap, the LAG will provide and interpret the telemetry data and/or any other data to both the safety and accident investigation board. The ICBM SPO and the ISC will support LAG anomaly investigations, as requested.

Technical Council:

The contractor will act as the secretariat and be a participant on the ICBM Technical Council. The ICBM SPO will establish and chair this council which will meet periodically, as determined by the SPM, and be comprised of contractor and SPO representatives from each of the subsystems. The Technical Council will provide a forum where the ICBM SPO and key suppliers at various levels can directly, and on an equal level, engage on issues important to ICBM systems.

Government Members:

System Program Manager (SPM) (Chair), Director of Engineering (Alt Chair), Technical Director, ICBM Flight Systems, Technical Director, ICBM Ground Systems, Technical Director, ICBM Systems Engineering, AFGLSC (748 SCMS/GUEA), AFGSC (HQ/OL-J), AFNWC/EN, AFNWC/XR, AFPEO/SS, 309th Maintenance Wing, and others as determined appropriate by the SPO.

Associate Government Members:

Associate government members are designated by the relevant IPT Chief or Director of Engineering.

Contractor Primary Members:

Contractor, Guidance System Contractor, Propulsion System Contractor, Reentry System Contractor, Ground System Contractor, Partial Bridge Contractor, and F-900 Contractor.

Associate Contractor Members:

Associate contractor members are designated by the relevant government IPT SPO Director of Engineering from among the contractors or subcontractors currently on contract to perform ICBM support. Examples of expected members are inertial instrument designers and producers, solid propulsion provider, liquid propulsion provider, flight control provider and Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) console provider. If an associate contractor is also a subsystem contractor and primary technical council member, then additional membership is not required.

Ground Rules:

Technical Council meetings shall be a process for candid discussion of ICBM issues. This body makes no decisions, nor provides contractual direction. Technical council members shall not coerce or censor discussion through existing contractual relationships.

Administration:

The SPO Director of Engineering is the process owner of the ICBM Technical Council. The contractor will provide a secretary to record minutes, schedule meetings and file presentations given at the ICBM Technical Council. The contractor will assist the SPM and SPO Director of Engineering in updating the charter as required and coordinating it with the other Technical Council members. Meetings will initially be held quarterly. The frequency and duration of meetings will be adjusted by the SPO Director of Engineering in consultation with the SPM and the ICBM Technical Council members as the forum matures.

Subsystem Contractors:

Each subsystem sustainment contract in the FISAC will include the sustaining engineering efforts for that subsystem and any relevant Operations and Maintenance (O&M) support tasks required to sustain the subsystem that are not accomplished on a different contract or by an organic entity. For example, repair of the guidance subsystem is accomplished on a separate government contract to the Boeing Guidance Repair Center (or its replacement), which also includes inertial instrument repair for other weapon systems. Test equipment programs and modifications may also be performed on the contract as long as the dollar threshold for the contract is not exceeded. Software IV&V will be managed under a separate contract with Nuclear Safety Cross Check Analysis (NSCCA/PATE) contractor. Major modifications, such as a fuze replacement or Gyro Stabilized Platform replacement will be separately competed as these programs will be ACAT 1D programs and are likely to provide an opportunity for innovation from the larger industrial base to improve weapon system performance. However, ACAT II, ACAT III and non-ACAT programs may be executed by a subsystem contractor.

Special Considerations:

The subsystem contractors will need to act in cooperation with the ISC and the Government for the overall success of the total weapon system integration. The contractor will be required to negotiate appropriate Non-disclosure Agreements (NDAs) with all subsystem contractors so that information needed in support of ICBM weapon system can be freely shared between the subsystem contractors and the ISC contractor. While the contractor maintains a close relationship with the SPO, the contractor is not allowed to perform inherently governmental functions. The responsibility to direct other contractors and ultimately approve or disapprove reports and other products remains with the SPO.

Transition Strategy:

Notional Transition:

Figure 3. Notional Transition Timeline Transition Description:

The SPO, with contractor and subsystem contractor support, will ensure a smooth transition for the ICBM weapon system from the IPIC to the series of contracts awarded under the Future ICBM Sustainment and Acquisition Concept (FISAC).

Upon execution of the ISC, each subsystem contract, and the Partial Bridge Contract (PBC), the ISC contractor will be required to meet with the Government and the PBC contractor and/or subsystem contractor to jointly plan transition of the workload from the PBC to the applicable contract. The transitions will include all data, tools and models used in the execution of engineering support to the weapon system or particular subsystem. The ISC or Subsystem Transition Plan will clearly state the point at which responsibility for a task is transferred to the ISC or Subsystem contractor. Responsibility transfer will be documented at transfer by the PBC contractor and contractor or subsystem contractor. The contractor will support the Government in assessing and monitoring progress on Subsystem Transition Plans created after ISC award. The PBC contractor will present any issues regarding rights to the data, tools and models used in the execution of engineering support to the Government Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) in a timely manner for resolution. The PBC contractor and contractor or subsystem contractor will then execute to that transition plan once it has been approved by the Government. The PBC contractor and contractor or subsystem contractor will report progress on the transition plan to the Government. The PBC contractor and subsystem contractor will complete transition of all subsystem tasks not later than six months after execution of the relevant contract. Transition of system engineering tasks are detailed in section 1.6.5 TRANSITION.

1.5 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS:

See Appendix A

1.6 REQUIREMENTS:

The requirements described in this section are intended to describe all capabilities potentially necessary to sustain the weapon system and encompass the scope of effort expected to be executed for this contract. Capabilities may be applied to future planning and analysis, applications programs, technology insertion, major modifications competed separately from the FISAC contracts, or requirements definition for a follow-on system. Use of ISC capabilities for these future efforts would be incorporated as add-on CLINs as the tasks and/or funds are identified and available.

WEAPON SYSTEM SUSTAINMENT:

The AFMC definition of Sustaining Engineering is: “Engineering effort on systems, products, or materials, required to resolve technical or supportability deficiencies revealed in operational service.” For ICBMs, a major portion of Sustaining Engineering efforts are dedicated to assessment of ICBM weapon system status relating to key performance requirements. It includes, but is not limited to: assessing deficiency indicators; defining the characteristics and causes of deficiencies; determining the impact on the affected product; identifying and evaluating alternative solutions; recommending preferred solution; and designing, integrating and validating the solution. It includes all associated efforts (e.g., engineering and technical data, modeling, simulation, and testing) which are integral to the completion of the overall engineering task as well as the engineering effort necessary to define and specify necessary embedded system and associated test system software changes after establishment of an initial software production baseline.

The contractor shall perform the following sustaining engineering activities as they apply to weapon system-level and shall support the SPO for sustainment activities at the subsystem-level. The activities fall into two broad areas: Systems Engineering and Integration; and, Hardware and Software Sustaining Engineering. The particular activities pursued at a given time will be consistent with workload resources and priorities.

System Engineering & Integration (SE&I):

The contractor shall perform technical services related to SE&I as directed by the Government.

The Systems Engineering process consists of evolving functional and design requirements. It has as its goal the achievement of the proper balance between operational, economic, and logistics factors. It employs a sequential and iterative methodology to reach cost effective sustainment solutions. Information developed from this process is used to plan and integrate the engineering effort for the system as a whole. Systems engineering is the application of scientific and engineering effort to:

· Transform an operational need into a description of system performance parameters and a preferred system configuration (both hardware and software) through the use of an iterative process of functional analysis, synthesis, optimization, definition, design, test, and evaluation.

· Integrate related technical parameters and assure compatibility of all physical, functional, and program interfaces in a manner that optimizes the total system definition and design.

· Integrate reliability, maintainability, logistics support, safety, producability, security, survivability, structural integrity, human factors and other related specialties into the total engineering effort.

For both contractor activities and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Systems Division (ICBMSD) activities, the contractor shall provide support to maintain the process architecture, map Systems Engineering Assessment Model (SEAM)/AS9100 requirements, maintain command media, identify process area gaps, establish process ownership, develop and update operating instructions and plans, develop and implement awareness training for operating instructions.

For both contractor activities and ICBMSD activities, the contractor shall identify SEAM key performers, develop SEAM overview briefs, conduct SEAM overview briefs, collect and update SEAM evidence, conduct SEAM self assessments, identify gaps and develop actions, facilitate external SEAM validations, identify gaps and continuous process improvement action plans, and share results in the SEAM.

The contractor shall conduct Technical Peer Reviews on appropriate deliverables including but not limited to documents, trade studies, requirements, presentations and any other product delivered or formally presented to the Government. The Technical Peer Reviews shall include subcontractors, government personnel and other key parties that contribute at a working group type level.

The contractor shall participate in the identification of, planning for, conduct of and review of technical design reviews identified in MIL-STD-1521 and the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management System process chart.

Nuclear Surety:

The Air Force uses the DoD definition for Nuclear Weapons Surety as: Materiel, personnel, and procedures which contribute to the security, safety, and reliability of nuclear weapons and to the assurance that there will be no nuclear weapon accidents, incidents, unauthorized weapon detonations, or degradation in performance at the target. As such, the contractor shall integrate nuclear surety requirements into the ICBM System Engineering process.

The contractor shall, in coordination and cooperation with subsystem contractors, support the ICBM SPO in maintaining its nuclear weapon system surety program in accordance with Department of Defense (DoD) requirements detailed in DoD 3150.2-M and DoDD 3150.2.

Air Force implementation of DoD requirements are described in AFPD 91-1 and further detailed in: AFI 91-101, AFI 91-102, AFI 91-103, AFI 91-104, AFI 91-105, AFI 91-106, AFI 91-107, AFI 91-114, AFI 91-117, AFMAN 91-118, AFMAN 91-119, AFMC and AFNWC supplements. The above policies are tailored for applicability to new or modified ICBM and Air Launch Control System (ALCS) (installed in Navy E-6B aircraft) hardware and software components, subsystems and systems, support equipment, ICBM facilities, special test and maintenance programs. Engineering data delivered in support of the DoD and Air Force policies may include: Nuclear Certification Impact Statements (NCIS), Certification Requirements Plan (CRP) Nuclear Certification Plan (NCP), Nuclear Surety Evaluation (NSE) Report, Fault Tree Analysis, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Unauthorized Launch Studies, Launch Action Studies, Briefing Materials (Nuclear Surety Briefings, Point Papers and White Papers), Safety & Nuclear Surety Technical Memorandum, Assessments of Subsystem Contractor Deliverables and source data to ICBM Technical Orders and OPCERT/DECERT Technical Orders procedures for ICBM Nuclear Critical Components according to Technical Manual Contract Requirements (TMCR 86-01).

1.6.1.1.1.1 The contractor shall, in cooperation and coordination with subsystem contractors, support the ICBM SPO in maintaining the nuclear certification program and preserving the nuclear certification of MMIII. The nuclear certification program shall be in accordance with AFI 63-125. Applicable certification criteria shall be derived for new or modified ICBM hardware and software components, subsystems and systems, support equipment, facilities, special test and maintenance programs. The contractor shall review and provide assessment of deliverables to include: Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (NCIS), Certification Requirements Plan (CRP) Ground Launched Missile Nuclear Safety Analysis Report (NSAR), Nuclear Surety Evaluation (NSE) Report, Briefing Materials (Nuclear Surety-Briefings, Point Papers and White Papers), Safety & Nuclear Surety Technical Memoranda, source data for ICBM Technical Orders IAW TMCR 86-01, Changes to the ICBM Items in the Master Nuclear Certification List (MNCL), Nuclear Certification Plan (NCP), Engineering Evaluation Report (EER) (Nuclear Surety), Aircraft Nuclear Safety Analysis Report (NSAR) for (Flight Safety Analysis) & (Nuclear Safety Analysis Report and Software Certification Plan (SCP). At the Government’s request, the contractor shall provide these documents for issues that have system wide impacts.

1.6.1.1.1.2 The contractor shall prepare Nuclear Certification actions that document:

1.6.1.1.1.2.1 Adverse effects on primary safety devices and ICBM weapon system features which control the following nuclear critical functions: Authorization, Pre-arming, Launching, Releasing, Arming, and Targeting as detailed in AFI 91-107.

1.6.1.1.1.2.2 Compliance with AFI 91-107 Table 1 which gives the Air Force established numerical probability requirements for obtaining an unintentional significant nuclear yield because of faults and failures in the ICBM system.

1.6.1.1.1.2.3 Compliance with AFI 91-107 Table 2 which gives the Air Force established numerical probability requirements for preventing inadvertent critical function activation because of system faults and failures.

1.6.1.1.1.3 The contractor shall support the ICBM System Integrity Verification (SIV) team by providing nuclear surety support and monitoring for compliance of applicable AFI 91 series policies.

1.6.1.1.1.3.1 The contractor shall support the review of: ICBM TO change recommendations produced by field units, SPO, AFGLSC, ICBM Depot organizations, and/or subsystem contractors; TO data produced by ICBM modification programs; field or SPO generated -107 ETAR requests per TO 00-25-107; depot generated AFMC IMT/Form 202 requests; field generated -107 Maintenance Assistance Requests (MAR) requests per TO 00-25-107; depot generated AFMC IMT/Form 202 requests; Test Directives, Test Plans and engineering procedures developed in support of depot and operational test and maintenance projects.

1.6.1.1.1.4 The contractor shall provide nuclear surety support to:

1.6.1.1.1.4.1 Complete assigned ICBM SPO action items from ICBM mishaps. Support shall include tracking, providing detailed recommendations to close all assigned action items from DULL SWORD Deficiency Reports, High Accident Potential (HAP) Report, Safety Investigation Board (SIB) Reports, Operational Review Board (ORB) Reports, Discrepancy Reports (DR), Potential Code Compromise (PCC) Reports, and Code Related Event (CRE) Reports. The actions will be used to develop ICBM trend data to identify and correct problems before they occur/recur.

1.6.1.1.1.4.2 Special ICBM test and maintenance programs such as Rivet Minuteman Integrated Life Extension (MILE), Hardness Surveillance Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Program (HSEP), and SELM test or other special test or maintenance action required in the operational ICBM fleet. Support shall include development of assessments and reports such as: Status Reports for Compliance of Nuclear Surety & Safety Support to AFI 91 Series Polices; Briefing Materials for Compliance of Nuclear Surety & Safety Support to AFI 91 Series Polices.

1.6.1.1.1.4.3 Working groups. These include: AFNWC/NWIEV Safety IPTs, ICBM Nuclear Surety Working Group (NSWG), Air Force NWSSG (Nuclear Weapon System Safety Groups), ICBM POG (Project Officers Working Group), ALCS Nuclear Surety Working Group (AINSWG) with US Navy, Nuclear Command and Control (NC2)/Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) study groups, Nuclear Security Working Groups, and ICBM Codes Conference. Support shall include developing working group Meeting Agendas, preparing and consolidating Briefing Materials from other ICBM SPO IPTs, Status Reports on Engineering Assessments or Answers to Assigned Action Items that have been assigned to other ICBM SPO IPTs and providing Meeting Minutes to participants.

1.6.1.1.1.4.4 The contractor shall provide nuclear surety support to a Special Access Program (SAP) in a government cleared facility. Level of support will be established post contract award.

System Safety Program and Safety Risk Management Process:

1.6.1.1.1.5 The contractor shall support the ICBM SPO System Safety Program to identify and control ICBM hazards, to prevent mishaps and track mishaps IAW System Safety Program Plan, Safety Study Plan and Safety Study Report. This task is in support of the ICBM SPO efforts to comply with requirements tailored from MIL-STD-882D, AFPD 91-2, AFI 91-202, AFI 91-204 and AFMAN 91-221 Air Force policies.

1.6.1.1.1.6 The contractor shall support the ICBM SPO to maintain its Safety Risk Management Program IAW MIL-STD-882D and Safety Risk Management Plan. The contractor shall review and provide an assessment of subsystem contractor deliverables to include Risk Assessment Studies, System Safety Hazard Analysis Report (SSHAR), Safety Assessment Reports (SAR), Risk Acceptance Recommendations, Threat Hazard Assessment, Briefing Materials (Briefings, Point Papers and White Papers), Safety & Nuclear Technical Memoranda, source data for ICBM Technical Orders IAW TMCR 86-01and Changes to the ICBM Items in the MNCL when risks are addressed at the subsystem-level. The contractor shall produce any of the listed deliverables when the risk requires system-level resolution. The contractor shall maintain the AF Safety Risk management official files of all risk assessment/acceptance.

1.6.1.1.1.7 The contractor shall support the ICBM SIV team by providing system safety, ground safety, and weapons safety support and monitoring for compliance of applicable AFI 91 series policies.

1.6.1.1.1.7.1 The contractor shall support the review of: ICBM TO drawing and spec changes produced by field units, SPO, AFGLSC, ICBM Depot organizations, and/or subsystem contractors; TO data produced by ICBM modification programs; field or SPO generated -107 ETAR requests per TO 00-25-107; depot generated AFMC IMT/Form 202 requests; field generated -107 Maintenance Assistance Requests (MAR) requests per TO 00-25-107; Test Directives, Test Plans and Engineering Procedures developed in support of depot and operational test and maintenance projects.

1.6.1.1.1.8 The contractor shall, in coordination and cooperation with subsystem contractors as required, provide safety support to:

1.6.1.1.1.8.1 Complete assigned ICBM SPO action items from ICBM mishaps. Support shall include tracking, providing detailed recommendations to close all assigned action items from DULL SWORD Deficiency Reports, High Accident Potential (HAP) Report, Safety Investigation Board (SIB) Reports, Operational Review Board (ORB) Reports, Potential Code Compromise (PCC) Reports, Code Related Event (CRE) Reports and Contractor’s Corrective Action Plan. The actions will be used to develop ICBM trend data to identify and correct problems before they occur/reoccur.

1.6.1.1.1.8.2 Special ICBM test and maintenance programs such as Rivet MILE, HSEP, and SELM test or other special test or maintenance action required in the operational ICBM fleet. Support shall include development of assessments, reports and briefings to verify compliance with applicable AFI 91 series IAW Compliance of Nuclear Surety & Safety Support to AFI 91 Series Policies.

1.6.1.1.1.8.3 Working groups. These include: Program IPTs, AFNWC/NWIEV Safety IPTs, ICBM POG (Project Officers Working Group), ICBM Codes Conference. Support shall include developing working group Meeting Agendas, preparing and consolidating Briefing Materials from other ICBM SPO IPTs, engineering assessments or answers to assigned ICBM SPO action items and reporting to the Government via Engineering Assessments for Working Groups, and providing Meeting Minutes to participants.

Ground Safety Program:

The contractor shall support the ICBM Program Office Ground Safety program. This support shall include:

- Mishap investigation support IAW Mishap Risk Assessment Report (MRAR)

- Operational safety inspection

- Operational hazard identification, mitigation and closure IAW System Safety Hazard Analysis Report (SSHAR) -Trend Analysis and reporting -Accident/Incident Report

Evaluate Systems Effectiveness:

The contractor shall lead and coordinate a Weapon System Performance Assessment Team. The team will consist of subsystem contractors and ISC experts to perform Minuteman flight system modeling in the following modeling categories: Earth Coordinates, Aerodynamics, Missile Separation, Gravity, Post Boost Reentry Drag, Structural Dynamics, Flight Dynamics, Atmosphere, Chaff Deployment, Propellant Residual, Climatology, RV Reentry, Boost Steering, Propulsion, IM-Flight, Coordinate Systems, Mass Properties*, Control Systems, Guidance Computer, and Parameter Perturbation. Models shall be maintained current, run when new data is available, and used to evaluate flight test results, trends, and system reliability. The contractor shall assemble subsystem inputs and any system-level analysis into the final engineering report via Service Engineering Report (SER). Other models shall be developed if required to evaluate test data and predict system and component performance. Higher level system models will be required to effectively perform telemetry data evaluation, simulate flight performance, and integrate output from other models.

(Note*: Mass properties includes a database of component and system mass properties and a model capable of predicting the weight and center of gravity of the flight vehicle at any time during flight.)

1.6.1.1.4.1 The contractor shall serve as a technical expert on the integration of the overall weapon system. The contractor shall also provide expertise in individual subsystem areas to assist the Government in assessing the impact of subsystem results at the weapon system-level while avoiding any duplication of subsystem contractor efforts. The contractor shall, with input from IPTs/subsystems, maintain a database of all Air Vehicle Equipment down to the Configuration Item level and be able to evaluate the availability and reliability of any specific missile configuration in the field.

1.6.1.1.4.2 The contractor shall continually evaluate reliability and potential problem areas and shall generate and present the annual Weapon System Effectiveness Report (WSER) and meet with the Government, to include the SPO and AFGSC, to discuss and evaluate those findings.

1.6.1.1.4.3 Post flight, the contractor shall lead and coordinate a team including subsystem contractors to reduce flight data and evaluate system-level performance using models such as: Earth Coordinates, Aerodynamics, Missile Separation, Gravity, Post Boost Reentry Drag, Structural Dynamics, Atmosphere, Chaff Deployment, Propellant Residual, Climatology, RV Reentry, Boost Steering, Propulsion, IM-Flight, Coordinate Systems, Mass Properties, Control Systems, and Guidance Computer. If model results differ from actual performance and mass properties, the contractor shall evaluate the flight to determine whether the differences lay with flight performance anomalies or inaccuracies in the models. After the flight, the contractor shall assemble subsystem inputs and any system-level analysis into the final, deliverable performance report which shall be published and models updated if necessary. An overall weapon system effectiveness report shall be assembled, including subsystem inputs, presented to the SPO and AFGSC, and published annually.

Risk Management and Technical Weapon System Analysis:

The contractor shall, in coordination and cooperation with IPTs and subsystem contractors (after subsystem contract awards), implement and maintain a Risk Management Program IAW Weapon System Risk Management Plan to identify and assess risks that could have negative impact to the weapon system, plan to mitigate their chance of occurring or the consequence should they occur, and manage risks to a successful resolution. The contractor shall ensure all risk management activities clearly state the adverse weapon system condition which is being considered. Each set of mitigation actions recommended shall reflect the expected reduction in risk on a realistic program schedule. The contractor’s risk management program shall replace the ICBM SPO risk management program currently employed through IPIC and shall incorporate risks opened by subsystem contractors. Risk management shall include participating in or performing force impact studies, performance effectiveness evaluations, performance and flight analysis, risk assessment, and risk mitigation. The contractor shall follow the standardized DoD process to ensure consistent and thorough identification, assessment, mitigation, management, and reporting of risks IAW Mishap Risk Assessment Report (MRAR). Best practices from industry and government shall be used where appropriate. Risk management efforts shall maintain an appropriate balance between risk management and an affordable weapon system Life Cycle Cost. The end goal is to identify risks lead time away from weapon system impact.

System Requirements Analysis and Determination:

System requirements are characteristics of the system that identify the accomplishment levels needed to achieve specific objectives for a given set of conditions. Technical requirements are stated in approved specifications. In all cases the contractor shall ensure requirements recommended are the optimum cost effective solution to achieve the required system performance while maintaining nuclear surety. The contractor shall perform the following tasks associated with System Requirements Determination: Requirements Analysis, Requirements Allocation, and Requirements Definition. The contractor, in consultation with the ICBM SPO/SPO Director of Engineering, shall perform translation of system operational and maintenance factors into specific qualitative and quantitative system design requirements using ICBM-HDBK-01 as a reference. Generally, the contractor will allocate weapon system requirements to the appropriate subsystem and allow the subsystem contractors to allocate and define requirements within the subsystem. In these cases, the contractor shall support the SPO in validating and verifying the allocations and requirements are in compliance with system-level performance requirements. In specific cases, the Government could determine that having the subsystem contractor allocate and define requirements within the subsystem could create an Organizational Conflict of Interest in implementing the change or modification. In these cases, if directed by the Government, the contractor shall perform the allocation and requirements definition even at the subsystem-level. Logical functional analysis and allocation processes shall be used to determine system requirements IAW Systems Requirement Document (SRD). SRD performance will include, at the system-level generally or subsystem-level only if a potential OCI situation exists as described previously, the determination of:

1.6.1.1.1.9 Functional requirements--The necessary system tasks, actions, or activities that must be accomplished

1.6.1.1.1.10 Design requirements--The “build to”, “code to”, and “buy to” requirements for products.

1.6.1.1.1.11 Process requirements--The “how to execute” requirements for processes.

1.6.1.1.1.12 Performance requirements-The quantitative measures characterizing physical or functional attributes relating to execution of a mission or function. This includes quantity, quality, coverage, timeliness, and readiness. Performance requirements are initially defined through requirements analyses and trade studies using customer need, objective, and or requirement statements. They are defined for each identified customer mission and for each identified function as required. They are assigned to lower level systems functions through top down allocation, and are assigned to system elements, configuration items and the system through synthesis (the translation of functions and requirements into possible solutions, resources, and techniques, satisfying basic requirements). They are found in ICBM-HDBK-01.

Recommendation of Requirements:

The contractor shall make System Level Requirement Recommendations for Government approval and shall support the SPO in evaluation of subsystem contractor requirements recommendations. The contractor shall also make recommendations for subsystem requirements if the Government determines a subsystem contractor would have an OCI by making the recommendation. The recommendations will be developed through continuous monitoring of the weapon system using formal assessment and surveillance programs in conjunction with direct interface with users. Requirements are determined in support of buy and repair responsibilities. This activity includes recommending requirements for:

1.6.1.1.1.13 Depot maintenance conversion of repairable assets to serviceable assets.

1.6.1.1.1.14 Materials and parts to support the maintenance process.

1.6.1.1.1.15 Field level sustainment support. The Contractor shall review Technical Engineering Operating Location (OL) reports and scope of activities for compliance with SPM and SPO Director of Engineering’s guidance and for analysis of trends across the missile wings/weapon systems. (Ref: ICBMSD OI 21-08)

1.6.1.1.1.16 New maintenance processes, equipment, tooling and training.

1.6.1.1.1.17 Replacement spares to maintain planned spares inventory levels.

1.6.1.1.1.18 Modifications to the weapon system down through the subsystem, parts and component levels.

1.6.1.1.1.19 Upgraded replacements due to technological improvements or changes in technical performance requirements.

System/Subsystem/End Item Specifications:

The contractor shall, in cooperation and coordination with subsystem contractors, prepare System/Subsystem Level Specification (SSS) and shall generally support the SPO in verification and validation of subsystem contractor/IPT developed specifications. The contractor shall prepare SSS if directed when the Government determines a subsystem contractor would be subjected to OCI restrictions by creating the specification. These specifications will support acquisition and life cycle management and clearly and accurately describe technical requirements and verification procedures for items, materials, and services. Specifications prepared by the contractor that are to be used by the Contractors or the Government to acquire hardware, software, or services in support of the SPM to sustain the ICBM weapon shall be prepared such that they are legally enforceable and contractually binding. As part of the Configuration Management process, the contractor shall maintain and update subsystem and end item (product) baseline specifications. Performance Specifications shall be used to the maximum extent possible. The SSS prepared or validated by the contractor shall define the functional/performance requirements, interface requirements, and technical constraints IAW Performance Specification Documents, Detail Specification Documents, Program-Unique Specification Documents, and Interface Specification for each system element along with the qualification provisions required to verify achievement of each specified requirement. At the product level, the specification shall define a verified design solution that meets the requirements and constraints of the higher level specifications.