B08 Attachment 0017 Army Reg 380_67 Personnel Security Program 012414.pdf

Army Regulation 380–67

Security

Personnel Security Program

Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 24 January 2014

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY of CHANGE

AR 380–67

Personnel Security Program

This rapid action revision, dated 24 January 2014--o Revises criteria for application of security standards (para 2-4q).

o Incorporates the provisions to provide procedural benefits to afford individuals an opportunity to appeal a final adjudicative decisions to a higher level authority (para 8-6d).

o Adds performance measures (para 11-5).

o Rescinds appendix on reporting of nonderogatory cases (app E).

o Deletes appendix on guidelines for conducting prenomination personal interviews (app G).

o Deletes appendix on the list of designated countries (app H).

o Updates the National Adjudicative Guidelines (app I).

o Adds internal control evaluation (app M).

Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 24 January 2014

Security

Personnel Security Program

*Army Regulation 380–67

Effective 24 February 2014

History. This publication is a rapid action r e v i s i o n . T h e p o r t i o n s a f f e c t e d b y t h i s r a p i d a c t i o n r e v i s i o n a r e l i s t e d i n t h e summary of change.

S u m m a r y . T h i s r e g u l a t i o n i m p l e m e n t s the DOD and Department of the Army P e r s o n n e l S e c u r i t y P r o g r a m a n d t a k e s precedence over all other departmental is-suances affecting these programs. It con-t a i n s t h e p o l i c i e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s f o r access to classified information and as-signment in a sensitive position. It also prescribes the investigative scope and ad-judicative standards and criteria that are necessary prerequisites for such access or employment. It includes due process pro-cedures for appealing adverse administra-tive actions rendered in accordance with the provisions of this regulation. This reg-ulation contains all of DOD 5200.2–R and includes all recommendations of the Com-mission to Review DOD Security Policies and Practices (Stilwell Commission) ap-p r o v e d f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . A r m y i m -plementing instructions in this regulation are set in boldface type.

Applicability. This regulation applies to t h e a c t i v e A r m y , t h e A r m y N a t i o n a l Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. Also, it applies only to A r m y c o n t r a c t o r p e r s o n n e l w h o r e q u i r e access to sensitive compartmented infor-mation in the performance of their duties.

Proponent and exception authority.

The proponent of this regulation is the Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2. The propo-nent has the authority to approve excep-tions or waivers to this regulation that are consistent with controlling law and regu-lations. The proponent may delegate this approval authority, in writing, to a divi-sion chief within the proponent agency or its direct reporting unit or field operating agency, in the grade of colonel or the civilian equivalent. Activities may request a waiver to this regulation by providing justification that includes a full analysis of t h e e x p e c t e d b e n e f i t s a n d m u s t i n c l u d e f o r m a l r e v i e w b y t h e a c t i v i t y ’ s s e n i o r legal officer. All waiver requests will be e n d o r s e d b y t h e c o m m a n d e r o r s e n i o r leader of the requesting activity and for-warded through their higher headquarters t o t h e p o l i c y p r o p o n e n t . R e f e r t o A R 25–30 for specific guidance.

Army internal control process. This regulation contains internal control provi-sions in accordance with AR 11–2 and identifies key internal controls that must be evaluated (see appendix M).

S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n . S u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f this regulation and establishment of com-mand and local forms are prohibited with-out prior approval from the Deputy Chief o f S t a f f , G – 2 , 1 0 0 0 A r m y P e n t a g o n , Washington, DC 20310–1000.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recom-m e n d e d C h a n g e s t o P u b l i c a t i o n s a n d Blank Forms) directly to the Deputy Chief o f S t a f f , G – 2 , 1 0 0 0 A r m y P e n t a g o n , Washington, DC 20310–1000.

Distribution. This regulation is available in electronic media only and is intended for command levels A, B, C, D, and E for t h e a c t i v e A r m y , t h e A r m y N a t i o n a l Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve.

Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number)

Chapter 1 General Provisions, page 1 Purpose • 1–1, page 1 References • 1–2, page 1 Explanation of abbreviations and terms • 1–3, page 1 Responsibilities • 1–4, page 1 Objectives • 1–5, page 1

*This regulation supersedes AR 380–67, dated 9 September 1988.

AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014 i

UNCLASSIFIED

Contents—Continued

Chapter 2 Policies, page 1

Section I Standards for Access to Classified Information or Assignment to Sensitive Duties, page 1 General • 2–1, page 1 Clearance and sensitive position standard • 2–2, page 2 Military service standard • 2–3, page 2

Section II Criteria for Application of Security Standards, page 2 Criteria for application of security standards • 2–4, page 2

Section III Types and Scope of Personnel Security Investigations, page 3 General • 2–5, page 3 National agency check/entrance national agency check • 2–6, page 3 National agency check and written inquiries • 2–7, page 3 DOD national agency check and written inquiries • 2–8, page 3 Background investigation • 2–9, page 3 Special background investigation • 2–10, page 3 Special investigative inquiry • 2–11, page 4 Periodic reinvestigation • 2–12, page 4 Personal interview • 2–13, page 4 Expanded investigation • 2–14, page 5

Section IV Authorized Personnel Security Investigative Agencies, page 5 General • 2–15, page 5 Subversive affiliations • 2–16, page 5 Suitability information • 2–17, page 5 Hostage situations • 2–18, page 6 Overseas personnel security investigations • 2–19, page 6

Section V Limitations and Restrictions, page 6 Authorized requesters and personnel security determination authorities • 2–20, page 6 Limit investigations and access • 2–21, page 6 Collection of investigative data • 2–22, page 6 Privacy Act notification • 2–23, page 6 Restrictions on investigators • 2–24, page 7 Polygraph restrictions • 2–25, page 7

Chapter 3 Personnel Security Investigative Requirements, page 7

Section I Sensitive Positions, page 7 Designation of sensitive positions • 3–1, page 7 Criteria for security designation of positions • 3–2, page 7 Authority to designate sensitive positions • 3–3, page 8 Limitation of sensitive positions • 3–4, page 8 Billet control system for TOP SECRET • 3–5, page 8

Section II Civilian Employment, page 8 ii AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

General • 3–6, page 8 Nonsensitive positions • 3–7, page 8 Exceptions to investigative requirements • 3–8, page 8 Noncritical-sensitive positions • 3–9, page 9 Critical-sensitive positions • 3–10, page 9 Exceptions • 3–11, page 9 Mobilization of DOD civilian retirees • 3–12, page 9

Section III Military Appointment, Enlistment, and Induction, page 10 General • 3–13, page 10 Entrance investigation • 3–14, page 10 Reserve Components and National Guard • 3–15, page 10 Exceptions for certain commissioned officers of Reserve Components • 3–16, page 10 Mobilization of military retirees • 3–17, page 10 Mobilization exercises • 3–18, page 10

Section IV Security Clearance, page 10 General • 3–19, page 10 Investigative requirements for clearance • 3–20, page 11 Naturalized U.S. citizens • 3–21, page 12 Access to classified information by non-U.S. citizens • 3–22, page 12 Access by persons outside the executive branch • 3–23, page 13 Restrictions on issuance of personnel security clearances • 3–24, page 13 Administrative downgrading • 3–25, page 14 Dual citizenship • 3–26, page 14 One-time access • 3–27, page 14 Access by retired flag/general officers • 3–28, page 15

Section V Special Access Programs, page 15 General • 3–29, page 15 Sensitive compartmented information • 3–30, page 15 Retired general officer sensitive compartmented information access determinations • 3–31, page 18 Single Integrated Operation Plan–Extra Sensitive Information • 3–32, page 18 Presidential support activities • 3–33, page 18 Nuclear weapon personnel reliability program • 3–34, page 19 Chemical Personnel Reliability Program • 3–35, page 20 Automation security • 3–36, page 20 Access to North Atlantic Treaty Organization classified information • 3–37, page 20 Other special access programs • 3–38, page 20

Section VI Certain Positions Not Necessarily Requiring Access to Classified Information, page 20 General • 3–39, page 20 Access to restricted areas, sensitive information, or equipment not involving access to classified information • 3–40, Nonappropriated fund employees • 3–41, page 21 Customs inspectors • 3–42, page 21 Red Cross/united service organizations personnel • 3–43, page 21 Officials authorized to issue security clearances • 3–44, page 21 Officials authorized to grant access to sensitive compartmented information • 3–45, page 22 Personnel security clearance adjudication officials • 3–46, page 22 Persons requiring DOD building passes • 3–47, page 22 iiiAR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

Foreign national employees overseas not requiring access to classified information • 3–48, page 22 Special agents and investigative support personnel • 3–49, page 22 Persons requiring access to chemical agents • 3–50, page 22 Education and orientation personnel • 3–51, page 22 Contract guards • 3–52, page 22 Transportation of arms, ammunition and explosives • 3–53, page 22 Personnel occupying information systems positions designated automated data processing–I, –II, and –III • 3–54, Others • 3–55, page 23

Section VII Reinvestigation, page 23 General • 3–56, page 23 Allegations related to disqualification • 3–57, page 23 Access to sensitive compartmented information • 3–58, page 23 Critical-sensitive positions • 3–59, page 23 Critical military duties • 3–60, page 23 Presidential support duties • 3–61, page 24 North Atlantic Treaty Organization staff • 3–62, page 24 Extraordinarily sensitive duties • 3–63, page 24 Foreign nationals employed by DOD organizations overseas • 3–64, page 24 Persons accessing very sensitive information classified SECRET • 3–65, page 24 Access to TOP SECRET information • 3–66, page 24 Personnel occupying computer positions designated automated data processing–I • 3–67, page 24 Critical nuclear duty positions • 3–68, page 24

Section VIII Authority to Waive Investigative Requirements, page 25 Authorized officials • 3–69, page 25 Combat operations, DA-directed mobilization • 3–70, page 25

Chapter 4 Reciprocal Acceptance of Prior Investigations and Personnel Security Determinations, page 25 General • 4–1, page 25 Prior investigations conducted by DOD investigative organizations • 4–2, page 25 Prior personnel security determinations made by DOD authorities • 4–3, page 25 Investigations conducted and clearances granted by other agencies of the Federal Government • 4–4, page 26

Chapter 5 Requesting Personnel Security Investigations, page 26 General • 5–1, page 26 Authorized requesters • 5–2, page 26 Criteria for requesting investigations • 5–3, page 27 Request procedures • 5–4, page 27 Priority requests • 5–5, page 27 Personal data provided by the subject of the investigation • 5–6, page 27 Requests for additional information or clarification • 5–7, page 27 Grounds for denial • 5–8, page 28 Requesting National Agency Check and written inquiries from the Office of Personnel Management • 5–9, page 28

Chapter 6 Adjudication, page 29 General • 6–1, page 29 Central adjudication • 6–2, page 29 Evaluation of personnel security information • 6–3, page 30 iv AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

Adjudicative record • 6–4, page 30 Reporting results of security or suitability determinations for civilian employees • 6–5, page 30

Chapter 7 Issuing Clearance and Granting Access, page 30 General • 7–1, page 30 Issuing clearance • 7–2, page 30 Granting access • 7–3, page 31 Administrative withdrawal • 7–4, page 32

Chapter 8 Unfavorable Administrative Actions, page 32

Section I Requirements, page 32 General • 8–1, page 32 Referral for action • 8–2, page 32 Suspension • 8–3, page 33 Final unfavorable administrative actions • 8–4, page 34

Section II Procedures, page 34 General • 8–5, page 34 Unfavorable administrative action procedures • 8–6, page 34 Requests for reconsideration • 8–7, page 35 Involuntary separation of military members and DA civilian personnel • 8–8, page 36 Exceptions to policy • 8–9, page 36

Section III Reinstatement of Civilian Employees, page 36 General • 8–10, page 36 Reinstatement benefits • 8–11, page 36

Chapter 9 Continuing Security Responsibilities, page 37

Section I Evaluating Continued Security Eligibility, page 37 General • 9–1, page 37 Management responsibility • 9–2, page 37 Supervisory responsibility • 9–3, page 37 Individual responsibility • 9–4, page 38 Coworker responsibility • 9–5, page 38

Section II Security Education, page 38 General • 9–6, page 38 Initial briefing • 9–7, page 38 Refresher briefing • 9–8, page 39 Foreign travel briefing • 9–9, page 39 Termination briefing • 9–10, page 39

Chapter 10 Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records, page 40 General • 10–1, page 40 Responsibilities • 10–2, page 40 vAR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

Access restrictions • 10–3, page 40 Safeguarding procedures • 10–4, page 40 Records disposition • 10–5, page 41 Foreign source information • 10–6, page 41

Chapter 11 Program Management, page 41 General • 11–1, page 41 Responsibilities • 11–2, page 41 Reporting requirements • 11–3, page 42 Inspections • 11–4, page 43 Performance measures • 11–5, page 43

Appendixes

A. References, page 44

B. Investigative Scope, page 48

C. Request Procedures, page 54

D. Tables for requesting investigations, page 56

E. Reporting of Nonderogatory Cases, page 59

F. Personnel Security Determination Authorities, page 59

G. Guidelines for Conducting Prenomination Personal Interviews, page 61

H. List of Designated Countries, page 61

I. Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Collateral Classified Information and Sensitive Compartmented Information and Controlled Access Program Information, page 61

J. Overseas Investigations, page 69

K. ADP Position Categories and Criteria for Designating Positions, page 72

L. Defense Security Briefing Provided U.S. Government Employees Traveling to Communist-Controlled Countries, M. Internal Control Evaluation, page 76

Glossary vi AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

Chapter 1 General Provisions

1–1. Purpose

a. To establish policies and procedures to ensure that acceptance and retention of personnel in the Armed Forces and

United States Army, acceptance and retention of civilian employees in the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of the Army (DA), and granting members of the Armed Forces, Army, DA and DOD civilian employees, DA and DOD contractors, and other affiliated persons access to classified information and assignment to sensitive positions are clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

b. This regulation—

(1) Establishes DA and DOD personnel security policies and procedures;

(2) Sets forth the standards, criteria and guidelines upon which personnel security determinations shall be based;

(3) Prescribes the kinds and scopes of personnel security investigation (PSIs) required;

(4) Details the evaluation and adverse action procedures by which personnel security determinations shall be made;

and

(5) Assigns overall program management responsibilities.

1–2. References Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary.

1–4. Responsibilities Responsibilities are listed throughout this regulation.

1–5. Objectives

a. This regulation implements the DOD and DA Personnel Security Program and takes precedence over all other departmental issuances affecting that program.

b. All provisions of this regulation apply to DA and DOD civilian personnel, members of the Armed Forces, excluding the Coast Guard in peacetime, U.S. Army, DA and contractor personnel and other personnel who are affiliated with the DOD and the Army except that the unfavorable administrative action procedures pertaining to contractor personnel requiring access to classified information are contained in DOD 5220.22–R (AR 380–49) and in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5220.6 (AR 380–49).

c. The policies and procedures which govern the National Security Agency are prescribed by Public Laws (PL) 88–290 and 86–36, Executive Orders 10450 (EO 10450) and 12333, DODD 5210.45, Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14 (references (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (l), respectively), and regulations of the National Security Agency.

d. Under combat conditions or other military exigencies, an authority in paragraph 1, appendix F, may waive such provisions of this regulation as the circumstances warrant.

e. This regulation also applies to —

(1) Persons employed, hired on an individual basis, or serving on an advisory or consultant basis (including co-op and summer hire students) for whom Army personnel security clearances are required, whether or not such persons are paid from appropriated or nonappropriated funds.

(2) Employees of the Army National Guard (ARNG), Army-Air Force Exchange Service, American Red Cross, the United Service Organizations (USO), who are required to have Army personnel security clearances.

Chapter 2 Policies

Section I Standards for Access to Classified Information or Assignment to Sensitive Duties

2–1. General

a. Only U.S. citizens shall be granted a personnel security clearance, assigned to sensitive duties, or granted access to classified information unless an authority designated in appendix F has determined that, based on all available information, there are compelling reasons in furtherance of the DOD mission, including, special expertise, to assign an individual who is not a citizen to sensitive duties or grant a limited access authorization to classified information. Non-

1AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

U.S. citizens may be employed in the competitive service in sensitive civilian positions only when specifically approved by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), pursuant to EO 11935. Exceptions to these requirements shall be permitted only for compelling national security reasons.

b. No person is entitled to knowledge of, possession of, or access to classified defense information solely by virtue of office, position, grade, rank, or security clearance. Such information will be entrusted only to persons whose official military or other governmental duties require it and who have been investigated and cleared for access under the standards prescribed by this regulation. Security clearances indicate that the persons con-cerned are eligible for access to classified information should their official duties require it.

2–2. Clearance and sensitive position standard The personnel security standard that must be applied to determine whether a person is eligible for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties is whether, based on all available information, the person’s loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting the person with classified information or assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

2–3. Military service standard The personnel security standard that must be applied in determining whether a person is suitable under national security criteria for appointment, enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces is that, based on all available information, there is no reasonable basis for doubting the person’s loyalty to the Government of the United States.

Section II Criteria for Application of Security Standards

2–4. Criteria for application of security standards The ultimate decision in applying either of the security standards set forth in paragraphs 2–2 and 2–3, above, must be an overall common sense determination based upon all available facts. The criteria for determining eligibility for a clearance or assignment to a sensitive position under the security standard shall include, but not be limited to the following (see app I for further guidance on the application of these factors):

a. Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefore, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any such act.

b. Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

c. Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

d. Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.

e. Unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by statute, Executive order, or regulation.

f. Performing or attempting to perform one’s duties, acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship, or other acts conducted in a manner which serves or which could be expected to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

g. Disregard of public law, statutes, EOs, or regulations, including violation of security regulations or practices.

h. Criminal or dishonest conduct.

i. Acts of omission or commission that indicate poor judgment, unreliability, or untrustworthiness.

j. Any behavior or illness, including any mental condition, which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.

k. Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may cause conduct contrary to the national interest. This may be (1) the presence of immediate family members or other persons to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose interests may be inimical to those of the United States, or

(2) any other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be vulnerable.

l. Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties, or unexplained affluence.

m. Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.

2 AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

n. Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, or sale of or addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance, narcotic, cannabis, or other dangerous drug.

o. Any knowing and willful falsification, cover up, concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact from any written or oral statement, document, form or other representation or device used by DOD or any other Federal agency.

p. Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or provide information required by a congressional committee, court, or agency in the course of an official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of the individual’s trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment. Refusing or intentionally failing to provide a current personal security questionnaire (PSQ) or omitting material facts in a PSQ or other security form. Refusing to submit to a medical or psychological evaluation when information indicates the individual may have a mental or nervous disorder or be addicted to alcohol or any controlled substance.

q. Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or which may subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. No adverse inference may be made solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.

Section III Types and Scope of Personnel Security Investigations

2–5. General The types of PSIs authorized below vary in scope of investigative effort required to meet the purpose of the particular investigation. No other types are authorized. The scope of a PSI may be neither raised nor lowered without the approval of the DUSD(P).

2–6. National agency check/entrance national agency check Essentially, a national agency check (NAC) is a records check of designated agencies of the Federal Government that maintain record systems containing information relevant to making a personnel security determination. An entrance national agency check (ENTNAC) is a NAC (scope as outlined in para B–1, app B) conducted on inductees and first-term enlistees, but lacking a technical fingerprint search. A NAC is also an integral part of each background investigation (BI), special background investigation (SBI), and periodic reinvestigation (PR). Chapter 3 prescribes when a NAC is required.

2–7. National agency check and written inquiries The OPM conducts a NAC and written inquiries (NACI) on civilian employees for all departments and agencies of the Federal Government, pursuant to EO 10450. NACIs are considered to meet the investigative requirements of this regulation for a nonsensitive or noncritical-sensitive position and/or up to a SECRET clearance and, in addition to the NAC, include coverage of law enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools covering the last 5 years.

2–8. DOD national agency check and written inquiries The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) will conduct a Department of Defense National Agency check with written inquiries (DNACI), consisting of the scope contained in paragraph B–2, appendix B, for DOD military and contractor personnel for access to SECRET information. Chapter 3 prescribes when a DNACI is required.

2–9. Background investigation The BI is the principal type of investigation conducted when an individual requires TOP SECRET clearance or is to be assigned to a critical-sensitive position. The BI normally covers a 5-year period and consists of a subject interview, NAC, local agency check (LAC)s, credit checks, developed character references (3), employment records checks, employment references (3), and select scoping as required to resolve unfavorable or questionable information. (See paraB–3, app B.) Chapter 3 prescribes when a BI is required.

2–10. Special background investigation

a. An SBI is essentially a BI providing additional coverage both in period of time as well as sources of information, scoped in accordance with the provisions of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14 but without the personal interview. While the kind of coverage provided for by the SBI determines eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI), DD has adopted this coverage for certain other special access programs. Chapter 3 prescribes when an SBI is required.

b. The OPM, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Secret Service, and the Department of State conduct specially scoped BIs under the provisions of DCID 1/14. Any investigation conducted by one of the above-cited agencies under DCID 1/14 standards is considered to meet the SBI investigative requirements of this regulation.

3AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

c. The detailed scope of an SBI is set forth in paragraph B–4, appendix B.

2–11. Special investigative inquiry

a. A special investigative inquiry (SII) is a PSI conducted to prove or disprove allegations relating to the criteria outlined in paragraph 2–4 of this regulation, except current criminal activities (see para 2–17d, below), that have arisen concerning an individual upon whom a personnel security determination has been previously made and who, at the time of the allegation, holds a security clearance or otherwise occupies a position that requires a trustworthiness determination.

b. Special investigative inquiries are scoped as necessary to address the specific matters requiring resolution in the case concerned and generally consist of record checks and/or interviews with potentially knowledgeable persons. An SII may include an interview with the subject of the investigation when necessary to resolve conflicting information and/or to provide an opportunity to refute or mitigate adverse information.

c. In those cases when there is a disagreement between DIS and the requester as to the appropriate scope of the investigation, the matter may be referred to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (DUSD(P)) for resolution.

Requests for resolution will be forwarded through command channels to HQDA (DAMI–CIS), Washington, DC 20310–1051.

2–12. Periodic reinvestigation As referred to in paragraph 3–55 and other national directives, certain categories of duties, clearance, and access require the conduct of a PR every 5 years according to the scope outlined in paragraph B–5, appendix B. The PR scope applies to military, civilian, contractor, and foreign national personnel.

2–13. Personal interview Investigative experience over the years has demonstrated that, given normal circumstances, the subject of a PSI is the best source of accurate and relevant information concerning the matters under consideration. Further, restrictions imposed by the Privacy Act of 1974 dictate that Federal investigative agencies collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual’s rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs. Accordingly, personal interviews are an integral part of the DOD personnel security program and shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in the following paragraphs of this section.

a. Background investigation/periodic reinvestigation. A personal interview shall be conducted by a trained DIS agent as part of each BI and PR.

b. Resolving adverse information. A personal interview of the subject shall be conducted by a DIS agent (or, when authorized, by investigative personnel of other DOD investigative organizations designated in this regulation to conduct PSIs), when necessary, as part of each special investigative inquiry, as well as during the course of initial or expanded investigations, to resolve or clarify any information which may impugn the subject’s moral character, threaten the subject’s future Federal employment, raise the question of subject’s security clearability, or be otherwise stigmatizing.

c. Hostage situation. A personal interview shall be conducted by a DIS agent (or, when authorized, by investigative personnel of other DOD investigative organizations designated in this regulation to conduct PSIs) in those instances in which an individual has immediate family members or other persons bound by ties of affection or obligation who reside in a nation whose interests are inimical to the interests of the United States. (See para 2–18.)

d. Applicants/potential nominees for DOD Military or civilian positions requiring access to sensitive compartmented information or other positions requiring an special background investigation. A personal interview of the individual concerned shall be conducted, to the extent feasible, as part of the selection process for applicants/potential nominees for positions requiring access to SCI or completion of an SBI. The interview shall be conducted by a designee of the component to which the applicant or potential nominee is assigned. Clerical personnel are not authorized to conduct these interviews. Such interviews shall be conducted utilizing resources in the order of priority indicated below:

(1) Existing personnel security screening systems (for example, Air Force Assessment Screening Program, Naval Security Group Personnel Security Interview Program, U.S. Army Personnel Security Screening Program); or

(2) Commander of the nominating organization or such official as they have designated, in writing (for example, deputy commander, executive officer, security officer, security manager, S–2, counterintelligence specialist, personnel security specialist, or personnel officer); or

(3) Agents of investigative agencies in direct support of the component concerned.

e. Administrative procedures.

(1) The personal interview required by paragraph d, above, shall be conducted in accordance with appendix G.

(2) For those investigations requested subsequent to the personal interview requirements of paragraph d, above, the following procedures apply:

(a) The DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation) shall be annotated under Item 20 (Remarks) with the statement “Personal Interview Conducted by (cite the duty assignment of the designated official (for example, 4 AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014 commander, security officer, personnel security specialist, and so forth))” in all cases in which an SBI is subsequently requested.

(b) Unfavorable information developed through the personal interview required by paragraph d, above, will be detailed in a written report attached to the DD Form 1879 to include full identification of the interviewer. Failure to provide such information may result in conduct of an incomplete investigation by DIS.

(c) Whenever it is determined that it is not feasible to conduct the personal interview required by paragraph d, above, prior to requesting the SBI, the DD Form 1879 shall be annotated under Item 20 citing the reason for not conducting the interview.

2–14. Expanded investigation If adverse or questionable information relevant to a security determination is developed during the conduct of a PSI, regardless of type, the investigation shall be expanded, consistent with the restrictions in paragraph 2–24, to the extent necessary to substantiate or disprove the adverse or questionable information.

Section IV Authorized Personnel Security Investigative Agencies

2–15. General The DIS provides a single centrally directed personnel security investigative service to conduct PSIs within the 50 states, District of Columbia, and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for DOD components, except as provided for in DODD 5100.23. DIS will request the military departments or other appropriate Federal agencies to accomplish DOD investigative requirements in other geographic areas beyond their jurisdiction. No other DOD component shall conduct PSIs unless specifically authorized by the DUSD(P). In certain instances provided for below, the DIS shall refer an investigation to other investigative agencies.

2–16. Subversive affiliations

a. General. In the context of DOD investigative policy, subversion refers only to such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. Specifically, this is limited to information concerning the activities of individuals or groups that involve or will involve the violation of Federal law, for the purpose of:

(1) Overthrowing the Government of the United States or the government of a State;

(2) Substantially impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. Government policies or decisions:

(a) The functions of the Government of the United States, or

(b) The functions of the government of a State;

(3) Depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

b. Military department/Federal Bureau of Investigation jurisdiction. Allegations of activities covered by criteria a through f of paragraph 2–4 of this regulation are in the exclusive investigative domain of either the counterintelligence agencies of the military departments or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), depending on the circumstances of the case and the provisions of the Agreement Governing the Conduct of Defense Department Counterintelligence Activities in Conjunction with the FBI . Whenever allegations of this nature are developed, whether before or after a security clearance has been issued or during the course of a PSI conducted by DIS, they shall be referred immediately to either the FBI or to a military department counterintelligence agency, as appropriate.

c. Defense Investigative Service jurisdiction. Allegations of activities limited to those set forth in criterion g through q of paragraph 2–4 of this regulation shall be investigated by DIS.

2–17. Suitability information

a. General. Most derogatory information developed through PSIs of DOD military or civilian personnel is so- called suitability information, that is, information pertaining to activities or situations covered by criteria g through q of paragraph 2–4 of this regulation. Almost all unfavorable personnel security determinations made by DOD authorities are based on derogatory suitability information, although such information is often used as a basis for unfavorable administrative actions not of a security nature, such as action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or removal from Federal employment under OPM regulations.

b . P r e c l e a r a n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . D e r o g a t o r y s u i t a b i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n , e x c e p t t h a t c o v e r e d i n p a r a g r a p h d , b e l o w , developed during the course of a PSI, prior to the issuance of an individual’s personnel security clearance, shall be investigated by DIS to the extent necessary to confirm or refute its applicability to criteria in paragraph 2–4, g through q of this regulation.

c. Postadjudication investigation. Derogatory suitability allegations, except those covered by paragraph d, below, arising subsequent to clearance requiring investigation to resolve and to determine the individual’s eligibility for continued access to classified information, reinstatement of clearance/access, or retention in a sensitive position shall be referred to DIS to conduct a special investigative inquiry. Reinvestigation of individuals for adjudicative reconsidera-tion due to the passage of time or evidence of favorable behavior shall also be referred to DIS for investigation. In such

5AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014 cases, completion of the appropriate statement of personal history by the individual constitutes consent to be investi-gated. Individual consent or completion of a statement of personal history is not required when paragraph 3–56 applies.

Postadjudication investigation of allegations of a suitability nature required to support other types of unfavorable personnel security determinations or disciplinary procedures independent of a personnel security determination shall be handled in accordance with applicable component administrative regulations. These latter categories of allegations lie outside the DOD personnel security program and are not a proper investigative function for departmental counterintel-ligence organizations, component personnel security authorities, or DIS.

d. Allegations of criminal activity. Any allegations of conduct of a nature indicating possible criminal conduct, including any arising during the course of a PSI, shall be referred to the appropriate DOD, military department, or civilian criminal investigative agency. Military department investigative agencies have primary investigative jurisdic-tion in cases where there is probable cause to believe that the alleged conduct will be the basis for prosecution under the UCMJ. Such information will be referred to the installation or unit provost marshal and/or security manager or the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command for action.

2–18. Hostage situations

a. General. A hostage situation exists when a member of an individual’s immediate family or such other person to whom the individual is bound by obligation or affection resides in a country whose interests are inimical to the interests of the United States. The rationale underlying this category of investigation is based on the possibility that an individual in such a situation might be coerced, influenced, or pressured to act contrary to the best interests of national security.

b. DIS jurisdiction. In the absence of evidence of any coercion, influence, or pressure, hostage investigations are exclusively a personnel security matter, rather than counterintelligence, and all such investigations shall be conducted by DIS.

c. Military department and/or the Federal Bureau of Investigation jurisdiction. Should indications be developed that hostile intelligence is taking any action specifically directed against the individual concerned—or should there exist any other evidence that the individual is actually being coerced, influenced, or pressured by an element inimical to the interests of national security—then the case becomes a counterintelligence matter (outside of the investigative jurisdic-tion of DIS) to be referred to the appropriate military department or the FBI for investigation.

2–19. Overseas personnel security investigations Personnel security investigations requiring investigation overseas shall be conducted under the direction and control of DIS by the appropriate military department investigative organization (AR 381–20 applies). Only postadjudication investigations involving an overseas subject may be referred by the requester directly to the Military Department investigative organization having investigative responsibility in the overseas area concerned (see app J) with a copy of the investigative request sent to DIS. In such cases, the military department investigative agency will complete the investigation and forward the completed report of investigation directly to DIS, with a copy to the requester.

Section V Limitations and Restrictions

2–20. Authorized requesters and personnel security determination authorities Personnel security investigations may be requested and personnel security clearances (including special access authori-zations as indicated) granted only by those authorities designated in paragraph 5–1 and appendix F.

2–21. Limit investigations and access The number of persons cleared for access to classified information shall be kept to a minimum, consistent with the requirements of operations. Special attention shall be given to eliminating unnecessary clearances and requests for PSIs.

2–22. Collection of investigative data To the greatest extent practicable, personal information relevant to security determinations shall be obtained directly from the subject of a PSI. Such additional information required to make the necessary personnel security determination shall be obtained as appropriate from knowledgeable personal sources, particularly the subject’s peers, and through checks of relevant records, including school, employment, credit, medical, and law enforcement records.

2–23. Privacy Act notification Whenever personal information is solicited from an individual preparatory to the initiation of a PSI, the individual must be informed of (1) the authority (statute or Executive order that authorized solicitation); (2) the principal purpose or purposes for which the information is to be used; (3) the routine uses to be made of the information; (4) whether furnishing such information is mandatory or voluntary; (5) the effect on the individual, if any, of not providing the

6 AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014 information; and (6) that subsequent use of the data may be employed as part of an aperiodic, random process to screen and evaluate continued eligibility for access to classified information.

2–24. Restrictions on investigators Investigation shall be carried out insofar as possible to collect only as much information as is relevant and necessary for a proper personnel security determination. Questions concerning personal and domestic affairs, national origin, financial matters, and the status of physical health thus should be avoided unless the question is relevant to the criteria of paragraph 2–4 of this regulation. Similarly, the probing of a person’s thoughts or beliefs and questions about conduct that have no personnel security implications are unwarranted. When conducting investigations under the provisions of this regulation, investigators shall:

a. Investigate only cases or persons assigned within their official duties.

b. Interview sources only where the interview can take place in reasonably private surroundings.

c. Always present credentials and inform sources of the reasons for the investigation. Inform sources of the subject’s accessibility to the information to be provided and to the identity of the sources providing the information. Restrictions on investigators relating to Privacy Act advisements to subjects of PSIs are outlined in paragraph 2–23.

d. Furnish only necessary identity data to a source and refrain from asking questions in such a manner as to indicate that the investigator is in possession of derogatory information concerning the subject of the investigation.

e. Refrain from using, under any circumstances, covert or surreptitious investigative methods, devices, or techniques, including mail covers, physical or photographic surveillance, voice analyzers, inspection of trash, paid informants, wiretaps, or eavesdropping devices.

f. Refrain from accepting any case in which the investigator knows of circumstances that might adversely affect their fairness, impartiality, or objectivity.

g. Refrain from conducting, under any circumstances, physical searches of the subject or their property.

h. Refrain from attempting to evaluate material contained in medical files. Medical files shall be evaluated for personnel security program purposes only by such personnel as are designated by DOD medical authorities. However, review and collection of medical record information may be accomplished by authorized investigative personnel.

2–25. Polygraph restrictions The polygraph may be used as a personnel security screening measure only in those limited instances authorized by the Secretary of Defense in DODD 5210.48, (AR 195–6).

Chapter 3 Personnel Security Investigative Requirements

Section I Sensitive Positions

3–1. Designation of sensitive positions Certain civilian positions within DOD entail duties of such a sensitive nature, including access to classified informa-tion, that the misconduct, malfeasance, or nonfeasance of an incumbent in any such position could result in an unacceptably adverse impact upon the national security. These positions are referred to in this regulation as sensitive positions. It is vital to the national security that great care be exercised in the selection of individuals to fill such positions. Similarly, it is important that only positions which truly meet one or more of the criteria set forth in paragraph 3–2 be designated as sensitive. A sensitive position will not be downgraded or reclassified as nonsensi-tive solely to aid in recruiting personnel.

3–2. Criteria for security designation of positions Each civilian position within DOD shall be categorized, with respect to security sensitivity, as either nonsensitive, noncritical-sensitive, or critical-sensitive.

a. The criteria to be applied in designating a position as sensitive are:

(1) Critical-sensitive.

(a) Access to TOP SECRET information.

(b) Development or approval of plans, policies, or programs that affect the overall operations of the DOD or of a

DOD component.

(c) Development or approval of war plans, plans or particulars of future major or special operations of war, or critical and extremely important items of war.

(d) Investigative and certain investigative support duties, the issuance or adjudication of personnel security clear-ances or access authorizations, or the making of personnel security determinations.

7AR 380–67 • 24 January 2014

(e) Fiduciary, public contact, or other duties demanding the highest degree of public trust.

(f) Duties falling under special access programs.

(g) Category I automated data processing (ADP) positions.

(h) Any other position so designated by the head of the component or designee.

(2) Noncritical-sensitive.

(a) Access to SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL information.

(b) Security police/provost marshal-type duties involving the enforcement of law and security duties involving the protection and safeguarding of DOD personnel and property.

(c) Category II automated data processing positions.

(d) Duties involving education and orientation of DOD personnel.

(e) Duties involving the design, operation, or maintenance of intrusion detection systems deployed to safeguard

DOD personnel and property.

(f) Any other position so designated by the head of the component or designee.

b. All other positions shall be designated as nonsensitive.

3–3. Authority to designate sensitive positions The authority to designate sensitive positions is limited to those authorities designated in paragraph F–7, appendix F.

These authorities shall designate each position within their jurisdiction as to its security sensitivity and maintain these designations current vis-a-vis the specific duties of each position.

3–4. Limitation of sensitive positions It is the responsibility of those authorities…