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NIST Special Publication 800 NIST SP 800-171r3

Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and

Organizations

Ron Ross Victoria Pillitteri

This publication is available free of charge from:

https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r3 https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r3

NIST Special Publication 800 NIST SP 800-171r3

Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and

Organizations

Ron Ross Victoria Pillitteri

Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory

This publication is available free of charge from:

https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r3

May 2024

U.S. Department of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo, Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology Laurie E. Locascio, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

NIST SP 800-171r3 Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information

Certain equipment, instruments, software, or materials, commercial or non-commercial, are identified in this paper in order to specify the experimental procedure adequately. Such identification does not imply recommendation or endorsement of any product or service by NIST, nor does it imply that the materials or equipment identified are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications.

Thus, until each publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new publications by NIST.

Organizations are encouraged to review all draft publications during public comment periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST cybersecurity publications, other than the ones noted above, are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

Authority This publication has been developed by NIST in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official. This publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.

NIST Technical Series Policies Copyright, Use, and Licensing Statements NIST Technical Series Publication Identifier Syntax

Publication History Approved by the NIST Editorial Review Board on 2024-04-23 Supersedes NIST Special Publication 800-171r2 (February 2020; Includes updates as of 01-28-2021) https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r2

How to Cite this NIST Technical Series Publication:

Ross R, Pillitteri V (2024) Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations. (National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD), NIST Special Publication (SP) NIST SP 800-171r3. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-171r3

Author ORCID iDs Ron Ross: 0000-0002-1099-9757 Victoria Pillitteri: 0000-0002-7446-7506 https://csrc.nist.gov/publications https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST-TECHPUBS.CROSSMARK-POLICY https://www.nist.gov/document/publication-identifier-syntax-nist-technical-series-publications

Submit Comments 800-171comments@list.nist.gov National Institute of Standards and Technology Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory 100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

Additional Information Additional information about this publication is available at https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/171/r3/final, including related content, potential updates, and document history.

All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

mailto:800-171comments@list.nist.gov https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/171/r3/final i

Abstract

The protection of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) is of paramount importance to federal agencies and can directly impact the ability of the Federal Government to successfully conduct its essential missions and functions. This publication provides federal agencies with recommended security requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI when the information is resident in nonfederal systems and organizations. The requirements apply to components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI or that provide protection for such components. The security requirements are intended for use by federal agencies in contractual vehicles or other agreements established between those agencies and nonfederal organizations. This publication can be used in conjunction with its companion publication, NIST Special Publication 800-171A, which provides a comprehensive set of procedures to assess the security requirements.

Keywords

Controlled Unclassified Information; Executive Order 13556; FIPS Publication 199; FIPS Publication 200; FISMA; NIST Special Publication 800-53; nonfederal organizations; nonfederal systems; organization-defined parameter; security assessment; security control; security requirement.

Reports on Computer Systems Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of other than national security-related information in federal information systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations.

ii

Audience

This publication serves a diverse group of individuals and organizations in the public and private sectors, including:

• Federal agencies responsible for managing and protecting CUI

• Nonfederal organizations responsible for protecting CUI

• Individuals with system development life cycle responsibilities (e.g., program managers, mission/business owners, information owners/stewards, system designers and developers, system/security engineers, systems integrators)

• Individuals with acquisition or procurement responsibilities (e.g., contracting officers)

• Individuals with system, security, or risk management and oversight responsibilities (e.g., authorizing officials, chief information officers, chief information security officers, system owners, information security managers)

• Individuals with security assessment and monitoring responsibilities (e.g., auditors, system evaluators, assessors, analysts, independent verifiers and validators)

The above roles and responsibilities can be viewed from two perspectives:

• Federal perspective: The entity establishing and conveying the security requirements in contractual vehicles or other types of agreements

• Nonfederal perspective: The entity responding to and complying with the security requirements set forth in contracts or agreements iii

Patent Disclosure Notice

NOTICE: ITL has requested that holders of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication disclose such patent claims to ITL. However, holders of patents are not obligated to respond to ITL calls for patents and ITL has not undertaken a patent search in order to identify which, if any, patents may apply to this publication.

As of the date of publication and following call(s) for the identification of patent claims whose use may be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements of this publication, no such patent claims have been identified to ITL.

No representation is made or implied by ITL that licenses are not required to avoid patent infringement in the use of this publication.

iv

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. The Fundamentals

3. The Security Requirements

References Appendix A. Acronyms Appendix B. Glossary Appendix C. Tailoring Criteria Appendix D. Organization-Defined Parameters Appendix E. Change Log v

List of Tables

Table 1. Security Requirement Families Table 2. Security Control Tailoring Criteria Table 3. Access Control (AC) Table 4. Awareness and Training (AT) Table 5. Audit and Accountability (AU) Table 6. Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring (CA) Table 7. Configuration Management (CM) Table 8. Contingency Planning (CP) Table 9. Identification and Authentication (IA) Table 10. Incident Response (IR) Table 11. Maintenance (MA) Table 12. Media Protection (MP) Table 13. Physical and Environmental Protection (PE) Table 14. Planning (PL) Table 15. Program Management (PM) Table 16. Personnel Security (PS) Table 17. PII Processing and Transparency (PT) Table 18. Risk Assessment (RA) Table 19. System and Services Acquisition (SA) Table 20. System and Communications Protection (SC) Table 21. System and Information Integrity (SI) Table 22. Supply Chain Risk Management (SR) Table 23. Organization-Defined Parameters Table 24. Change Log vi

Acknowledgments

The authors gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the significant contributions from individuals and organizations in the public and private sectors whose constructive comments improved the overall quality, thoroughness, and usefulness of this publication. The authors also wish to thank the NIST technical editing and production staff – Jim Foti, Jeff Brewer, Eduardo Takamura, Isabel Van Wyk, Cristina Ritfeld, Derek Sappington, and Carolyn Schmidt – for their outstanding support in preparing this document for publication. Finally, a special note of thanks goes out to Kelley Dempsey for the initial research and development of the content used in the prototype CUI overlay.

Historical Contributions

The authors also wish to acknowledge the following organizations and individuals for their historic contributions to this publication:

• Organizations: National Archives and Records Administration, Department of Defense

• Individuals: Carol Bales, Matthew Barrett, Jon Boyens, Devin Casey, Christian Enloe, Gary Guissanie, Peggy Himes, Robert Glenn, Elizabeth Lennon, Vicki Michetti, Dorian Pappas, Karen Quigg, Mark Riddle, Matthew Scholl, Mary Thomas, Murugiah Souppaya, Patricia Toth, and Patrick Viscuso

1. Introduction

Executive Order (EO) 13556 [1] established a government-wide program to standardize the way the executive branch handles Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).1

1 CUI is any information that a law, regulation, or government-wide policy requires to have safeguarding or disseminating controls, excluding information that is classified under EO 13526 [2], any predecessor or successor order, or the Atomic Energy Act [3] as amended.

EO 13556 required that the CUI program emphasize openness, transparency, and uniformity of government-wide practices and that the program implementation take place in a manner consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policies and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and guidelines. As the CUI program Executive Agent, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provides information, guidance, policy, and requirements on handling CUI [4]. This includes approved CUI categories and descriptions, the basis for safeguarding and dissemination controls, and procedures for the use of CUI.2

2 Procedures for the use of CUI include marking, safeguarding, transporting, disseminating, reusing, and disposing of the information.

The CUI federal regulation [5] provides guidance to federal agencies on the designation, safeguarding, marking, dissemination, decontrolling, and disposition of CUI; establishes self-inspection and oversight requirements; and delineates other facets of the program.

The CUI regulation requires federal agencies that use federal information systems3

3 A federal information system is a system that is used or operated by an executive agency, by a contractor of an executive agency, or by another organization on behalf of an executive agency. The term system is used in this publication to represent people, processes, and technologies involved in the processing, storage, or transmission of CUI. Systems can include operational technology (OT), information technology (IT), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, Industrial IoT (IIoT) devices, specialized systems, cyber-physical systems, embedded systems, and sensors.

to process, store, or transmit CUI to comply with NIST standards and guidelines. The responsibility of federal agencies to protect CUI does not change when such information is shared with nonfederal organizations.4

4 A nonfederal organization is any entity that owns, operates, or maintains a nonfederal system.

Therefore, a similar level of protection is needed when CUI is processed, stored, or transmitted by nonfederal organizations using nonfederal systems.5

5 A nonfederal system is any system that does not meet the criteria for a federal information system.

To maintain a consistent level of protection, the security requirements for safeguarding CUI in nonfederal systems and organizations must comply with Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS 199) publication [6] and FIPS 200 [7]. The requirements are derived from the controls in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53 [8].

1.1. Purpose and Applicability

This publication provides federal agencies with recommended security requirements6

6 The term security requirement refers to the protection needs for a system or organization. Security requirements may be derived from laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, mission and business needs, or risk assessments.

for protecting the confidentiality of CUI7

7 In accordance with EO 13526 [2] and 32 CFR 2002 [5], the scope of CUI protection is primarily focused on confidentiality. However, the security objectives of confidentiality and integrity are closely related since many of the underlying security mechanisms support both objectives. Therefore, the security requirements in this publication address the protection of CUI from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

when such information is resident in nonfederal systems and organizations and where there are no specific safeguarding requirements prescribed by the authorizing law, regulation, or government-wide policy for the CUI category listed in the CUI registry [4]. The requirements do not apply to nonfederal organizations that are collecting or maintaining information on behalf of a federal agency or using or operating a system on behalf of an agency.8

8 Nonfederal organizations that collect or maintain information on behalf of a federal agency or that use or operate a system on behalf of an agency must comply with the requirements in FISMA [9].

The security requirements in this publication are only applicable to components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI or that provide protection for such components.9

9 System components include workstations, servers, notebook computers, smartphones, tablets, input and output devices, network components, operating systems, virtual machines, database management systems, and applications.

The requirements are intended for use by federal agencies in contractual vehicles or other agreements that are established between those agencies and nonfederal organizations.

Appropriately scoping requirements is an important factor in determining protection-related investment decisions and managing security risks for nonfederal organizations. If nonfederal organizations designate system components for the processing, storage, or transmission of CUI, those organizations may limit the scope of the security requirements by isolating the system components in a separate security domain. Isolation can be achieved by applying architectural and design concepts (e.g., implementing subnetworks with firewalls or other boundary protection devices and using information flow control mechanisms). Security domains may employ physical separation, logical separation, or a combination of both. This approach can provide adequate security for CUI and avoid increasing the organization’s security posture beyond what it requires for protecting its missions, operations, and assets.

1.2. Organization of This Publication

The remainder of this special publication is organized as follows:

• Section 2 describes the assumptions and methodology used to develop the security requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI, the format of the requirements, and the tailoring criteria applied to the NIST guidelines to obtain the requirements.

• Section 3 lists the security requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI in nonfederal systems and organizations.

The following sections provide additional information to support the protection of CUI:

• References

• Appendix A: Acronyms

• Appendix B: Glossary

• Appendix C: Tailoring Criteria

• Appendix D: Organization-Defined Parameters

• Appendix E: Change Log

2. The Fundamentals

This section describes the assumptions and methodology used to develop the requirements to protect the confidentiality of CUI in nonfederal systems and organizations. It also includes the tailoring10

10 Tailoring is the process by which control baselines are modified to achieve certain organizational goals and objectives [13].

criteria applied to the controls in SP 800-53 [8].

2.1. Security Requirement Assumptions

The security requirements in this publication are based on the following assumptions:

• Federal information designated as CUI has the same value, whether such information resides in a federal or nonfederal system or organization.

• Statutory and regulatory requirements for the protection of CUI are consistent in federal and nonfederal systems and organizations.

• Safeguards implemented to protect CUI are consistent in federal and nonfederal systems and organizations.

• The confidentiality impact value for CUI is no less than moderate.11

11 In accordance with 32 CFR 2002 [5], CUI is categorized at no less than the FIPS 199 [6] moderate confidentiality impact value. However, when federal law, regulation, or government-wide policy establishing the control of CUI specifies controls that differ from those of the moderate control baseline, then the applicable law, regulation, or government-wide policy is followed.

• Nonfederal organizations can directly implement a variety of potential security solutions or use external service providers to satisfy security requirements.

2.2. Security Requirement Development Methodology

Starting with the SP 800-53 controls in the SP 800-53B [12] moderate baseline, the controls are tailored to eliminate selected controls or parts of controls that are:

• Primarily the responsibility of the Federal Government,

• Not directly related to protecting the confidentiality of CUI,

• Adequately addressed by other related controls,12

12 “Adequately addressed by other related controls” means that the protection capability offered by the control is provided by another control in the same or different control family. Using this tailoring option helps to eliminate potential redundancy in requirements without affecting the protection of CUI in nonfederal systems and organizations.

or

• Not applicable.

SP 800-171 security requirements represent a subset of the controls that are necessary to protect the confidentiality of CUI. The security requirements are organized into 17 families, as illustrated in Table 1. Each family contains the requirements related to the general security topic of the family. Certain families from SP 800-53 are not included due to the tailoring criteria.

For example, the PII Processing and Transparency (PT) family is not included because personally identifiable information (PII) is a category of CUI, and therefore, no additional requirements are specified for confidentiality protection. The Program Management (PM) family is not included because it is not associated with any control baseline. Finally, the Contingency Planning (CP) family is not included because it addresses availability.13

13 CP-09 and CP-09(08) are included by exception to ensure the confidentiality of backup information is projected.

Table 1. Security Requirement Families

Access Control Maintenance Security Assessment and Monitoring

Awareness and Training Media Protection System and Communications Protection

Audit and Accountability Personnel Security System and Information Integrity

Configuration Management Physical Protection Planning

Identification and Authentication Risk Assessment System and Services Acquisition

Incident Response Supply Chain Risk Management

Organization-defined parameters (ODPs) are included in certain security requirements. ODPs provide flexibility through the use of assignment and selection operations to allow federal agencies and nonfederal organizations to specify values for the designated parameters in the requirements.14

14 NIST does not establish or assign values for ODPs. If ODP values for selected security requirements are not formally established or assigned by a federal agency or a consortium of federal agencies, nonfederal organizations must assign those values to complete the requirements.

Assignment and selection operations provide the capability to customize the security requirements based on specific protection needs. The determination of ODP values can be guided and informed by laws, Executive Orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, guidance, or mission and business needs. Once specified, the values for the organization-defined parameters become part of the requirement.

ORGANIZATION-DEFINED PARAMETERS

Organization-defined parameters are an important part of a security requirement specification.

ODPs provide both the flexibility and specificity needed by organizations to clearly define their CUI security requirements, given the diverse nature of their missions, business functions, operational environments, and risk tolerance. In addition, ODPs support consistent security assessments in determining whether specified security requirements have been satisfied. If a federal agency or a consortium of agencies do not specify a particular value or range of values for an ODP, nonfederal organizations must assign the value or values to complete the security requirement.

A discussion section is included with each requirement. It is derived from the control discussion sections in SP 800-53 and provides additional information to facilitate the implementation and assessment of the requirements. The discussion section is informative, not normative. It is not intended to extend the scope of a requirement or influence the solutions that organizations may use to satisfy a requirement. The use of examples is notional, not exhaustive, and does not reflect the potential options available to organizations. A references section provides the source https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_0/home?element=CP-9 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_0/home?element=CP-9 controls15

15 With few exceptions, the security controls in SP 800-53 are policy-, technology-, and sector-neutral, meaning that the controls focus on the fundamental measures necessary to protect information across the information life cycle.

from SP 800-53 and a list of NIST Special Publications with additional information on the topic described in the security requirement. The structure and content of a typical security requirement is provided in the example below.

03.13.11 Cryptographic Protection

Implement the following types of cryptography when used to protect the confidentiality of CUI: [Assignment: organization-defined types of cryptography].

DISCUSSION

Cryptography is implemented in accordance with applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidelines. FIPS-validated cryptography is recommended for the protection of CUI.

REFERENCES

Source Control: SC-13

Supporting Publications: FIPS 140-3 [38]

The term organization is used in many security requirements, and its meaning depends on context. For example, in a security requirement with an ODP, an organization can refer to either the federal agency or the nonfederal organization establishing the parameter values for the requirement.

Appendix C describes the security control tailoring criteria used to develop the security requirements and the results of the tailoring process. The appendix provides a list of controls from SP 800-53 that support the requirements and the controls that have been eliminated from the moderate baseline in accordance with the tailoring criteria.

ASSESSING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

SP 800-171A [84] provides a set of procedures to assess the security requirements described in this publication. The assessment procedures are based on the procedures described in SP 800-53A [57].

https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_0/home?element=SC-13

3. The Security Requirements

This section describes 17 families of security requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI in nonfederal systems and organizations. When used in the context of the requirements in Sec. 3, the term system is defined to be nonfederal systems or system components that process, store, or transmit CUI or that provide protection for such systems or components. Not all security requirements mention CUI explicitly. However, the requirements are included because they directly affect the protection of CUI during processing, while in storage, and when in transmission between different locations.

Some systems, including specialized systems (e.g., industrial/process control systems, medical devices, computer numerical control machines), may have limitations on the application of certain security requirements. To accommodate such issues, the system security plan — as reflected in requirement 03.15.02 — is used to describe any enduring exceptions to the security requirements. Individual, isolated, or temporary deficiencies are managed though plans of action and milestones, as reflected in requirement 03.12.02.

SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The security requirements in this section are only applicable to components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI or that provide protection for such components.

3.1. Access Control

03.01.01 Account Management

a. Define the types of system accounts allowed and prohibited.

b. Create, enable, modify, disable, and remove system accounts in accordance with policy, procedures, prerequisites, and criteria.

c. Specify:

1. Authorized users of the system,

2. Group and role membership, and

3. Access authorizations (i.e., privileges) for each account.

d. Authorize access to the system based on:

1. A valid access authorization and

2. Intended system usage.

e. Monitor the use of system accounts.

https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC

f. Disable system accounts when:

1. The accounts have expired,

2. The accounts have been inactive for [Assignment: organization-defined time period],

3. The accounts are no longer associated with a user or individual,

4. The accounts are in violation of organizational policy, or

5. Significant risks associated with individuals are discovered.

g. Notify account managers and designated personnel or roles within:

1. [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when accounts are no longer required.

2. [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when users are terminated or transferred.

3. [Assignment: organization-defined time period] when system usage or the need-to-know changes for an individual.

h. Require that users log out of the system after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of expected inactivity or when [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances].

DISCUSSION

This requirement focuses on account management for systems and applications. The definition and enforcement of access authorizations other than those determined by account type (e.g., privileged access, non-privileged access) are addressed in

03.01.02. System account types include individual, group, temporary, system, guest, anonymous, emergency, developer, and service. Users who require administrative privileges on system accounts receive additional scrutiny by personnel responsible for approving such accounts and privileged access. Types of accounts that organizations may prohibit due to increased risk include group, emergency, guest, anonymous, and temporary.

Organizations may choose to define access privileges or other attributes by account, type of account, or a combination of both. Other attributes required for authorizing access include restrictions on the time of day, day of the week, and point of origin.

When defining other system account attributes, organizations consider system requirements (e.g., system upgrades, scheduled maintenance) and mission and business requirements (e.g., time zone differences, remote access to facilitate travel requirements).

Users who pose a significant security risk include individuals for whom reliable evidence indicates either the intention to use authorized access to the system to cause harm or that adversaries will cause harm through them. Close coordination among mission and business owners, system administrators, human resource managers, and legal staff is essential when disabling system accounts for high-risk individuals. Time periods for the notification of organizational personnel or roles may vary.

Inactivity logout is behavior- or policy-based and requires users to take physical action to log out when they are expecting inactivity longer than the defined period.

Automatic enforcement of inactivity logout is addressed by 03.01.10.

REFERENCES

Source Controls: AC-02, AC-02(03), AC-02(05), AC-02(13)

Supporting Publications: SP 800-46 [14], SP 800-57-1 [15], SP 800-57-2 [16], SP 800- 57-3 [17], SP 800-77 [18], SP 800-113 [19], SP 800-114 [20], SP 800-121 [21], SP 800-

162 [22], SP 800-178 [23], SP 800-192 [24], IR 7874 [25], IR 7966 [26]

03.01.02 Access Enforcement

Enforce approved authorizations for logical access to CUI and system resources in accordance with applicable access control policies.

DISCUSSION

Access control policies control access between active entities or subjects (i.e., users or system processes acting on behalf of users) and passive entities or objects (i.e., devices, files, records, domains) in organizational systems. Types of system access include remote access and access to systems that communicate through external networks, such as the internet. Access enforcement mechanisms can also be employed at the application and service levels to provide increased protection for CUI. This recognizes that the system can host many applications and services in support of mission and business functions. Access control policies are defined in 03.15.01.

REFERENCES

Source Control: AC-03

Supporting Publications: SP 800-46 [14], SP 800-57-1 [15], SP 800-57-2 [16], SP 800- 57-3 [17], SP 800-77 [18], SP 800-113 [19], SP 800-114 [20], SP 800-121 [21], SP 800-

162 [22], SP 800-178 [23], SP 800-192 [24], IR 7874 [25], IR 7966 [26]

03.01.03 Information Flow Enforcement

Enforce approved authorizations for controlling the flow of CUI within the system and between connected systems.

https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-02 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-02 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-02 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-02 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-03

DISCUSSION

Information flow control regulates where CUI can transit within a system and between systems (in contrast to who is allowed to access the information) and without regard to subsequent accesses to that information. Flow control restrictions include keeping CUI from being transmitted in the clear to the internet, blocking external communications traffic that claims to be sourced from within the organization, restricting requests to the internet that are not from the internal web proxy server, and limiting CUI transfers between organizations based on data structures and content.

Transferring CUI between organizations may require an agreement that specifies how the information flow is enforced (see 03.12.05). Transferring CUI between systems that represent different security domains with different security policies introduces the risk that such transfers violate one or more domain security policies.

In such situations, information owners or stewards provide guidance at designated policy enforcement points between interconnected systems. Organizations consider mandating specific architectural solutions when required to enforce specific security policies. Enforcement includes prohibiting CUI transfers between interconnected systems (i.e., allowing information access only), employing hardware mechanisms to enforce one-way information flows, and implementing trustworthy regrading mechanisms to reassign security attributes and security labels.

Organizations commonly use information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms to control the flow of CUI between designated sources and destinations (e.g., networks, individuals, and devices) within systems and between interconnected systems. Flow control is based on characteristics of the information or the information path. Enforcement occurs in boundary protection devices (e.g., encrypted tunnels, routers, gateways, and firewalls) that use rule sets or establish configuration settings that restrict system services, provide a packet-filtering capability based on header information, or provide a message-filtering capability based on message content (e.g., implementing key word searches or using document characteristics). Organizations also consider the trustworthiness of filtering and inspection mechanisms (i.e., hardware, firmware, and software components) that are critical to information flow enforcement.

REFERENCES

Source Control: AC-04

Supporting Publications: SP 800-160-1 [11], SP 800-162 [22], SP 800-178 [23]

03.01.04 Separation of Duties

a. Identify the duties of individuals requiring separation.

b. Define system access authorizations to support separation of duties.

https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-04

DISCUSSION

Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and reduces the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes dividing mission functions and support functions among different individuals or roles, conducting system support functions with different individuals or roles (e.g., quality assurance, configuration management, network security, system management, assessments, and programming), and ensuring that personnel who administer access control functions do not also administer audit functions.

Because separation of duty violations can span systems and application domains, organizations consider the entirety of their systems and system components when developing policies on separation of duties. This requirement is enforced by 03.01.02.

REFERENCES

Source Control: AC-05

Supporting Publications: SP 800-162 [22], SP 800-178 [23]

03.01.05 Least Privilege

a. Allow only authorized system access for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that is necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks.

b. Authorize access to [Assignment: organization-defined security functions] and [Assignment: organization-defined security-relevant information].

c. Review the privileges assigned to roles or classes of users [Assignment:

organization-defined frequency] to validate the need for such privileges.

d. Reassign or remove privileges, as necessary.

DISCUSSION

Organizations employ the principle of least privilege for specific duties and authorized access for users and system processes. Least privilege is applied to the development, implementation, and operation of the system. Organizations consider creating additional processes, roles, and system accounts to achieve least privilege.

Security functions include establishing system accounts and assigning privileges, installing software, configuring access authorizations, configuring settings for events to be audited, establishing vulnerability scanning parameters, establishing intrusion detection parameters, and managing audit information. Security-relevant information includes threat and vulnerability information, filtering rules for routers or firewalls, configuration parameters for security services, security architecture, cryptographic key management information, access control lists, and audit information.

https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-05

REFERENCES

Source Controls: AC-06, AC-06(01), AC-06(07), AU-09(04)

Supporting Publications: None

03.01.06 Least Privilege – Privileged Accounts

a. Restrict privileged accounts on the system to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].

b. Require that users (or roles) with privileged accounts use non-privileged accounts when accessing non-security functions or non-security information.

DISCUSSION

Privileged accounts refer to accounts that are granted elevated privileges to access resources (including security functions or security-relevant information) that are otherwise restricted for non-privileged accounts. These accounts are typically described as system administrator or super user accounts. For example, a privileged account is often required in order to perform privileged functions such as executing commands that could modify system behavior. Restricting privileged accounts to specific personnel or roles ensures that only those authorized users can access and manipulate security functions or security-relevant information. Requiring the use of non-privileged accounts when such access is not needed can limit unauthorized access to and manipulation of security functions or security-relevant information.

REFERENCES

Source Controls: AC-06(02), AC-06(05)

Supporting Publications: None

03.01.07 Least Privilege – Privileged Functions

a. Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functions.

b. Log the execution of privileged functions.

DISCUSSION

Privileged functions include establishing system accounts, performing system integrity checks, conducting patching operations, changing system configuration settings, or administering cryptographic key management activities. Non-privileged users do not possess the authorizations to execute privileged functions. Bypassing intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms or malicious code protection mechanisms are examples of privileged functions that require protection from non-privileged users. This requirement represents a condition achieved by the definition of authorized privileges in 03.01.01 and privilege enforcement in 03.01.02.

https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-06 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-06 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-06 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AU-09 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-06 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-06

The misuse of privileged functions — whether intentionally or unintentionally by authorized users or by unauthorized external entities that have compromised system accounts — is a serious and ongoing concern that can have significant adverse impacts on organizations. Logging the use of privileged functions is one way to detect such misuse and mitigate risks from advanced persistent threats and insider threats.

REFERENCES

Source Controls: AC-06(09), AC-06(10)

Supporting Publications: None

03.01.08 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts

a. Enforce a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined number] consecutive invalid logon attempts by a user during a [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

b. Automatically [Selection (one or more): lock the account or node for an [Assignment: organization-defined time period]; lock the account or node until released by an administrator; delay next logon prompt; notify system administrator; take other action] when the maximum number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded.

DISCUSSION

Due to the potential for denial of service, automatic system lockouts are in most cases, temporary and automatically release after a predetermined time period established by the organization (i.e., using a delay algorithm). Organizations may employ different delay algorithms for different system components based on the capabilities of the respective components. Responses to unsuccessful system logon attempts may be implemented at the system and application levels.

Organization-defined actions that may be taken include prompting the user to answer a secret question in addition to the username and password, invoking a lockdown mode with limited user capabilities (instead of a full lockout), allowing users to only logon from specified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, requiring a CAPTCHA to prevent automated attacks, or applying user profiles, such as location, time of day, IP address, device, or Media Access Control (MAC) address.

REFERENCES

Source Control: AC-07

Supporting Publications: SP 800-63-3 [27], SP 800-124 [28] https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-06 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-06 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-07

03.01.09 System Use Notification

Display a system use notification message with privacy and security notices consistent with applicable CUI rules before granting access to the system.

DISCUSSION

System use notifications can be implemented using messages or warning banners.

The messages or warning banners are displayed before individuals log in to a system that processes, stores, or transmits CUI. System use notifications are used for access via logon interfaces with human users and are not required when human interfaces do not exist. Organizations consider whether a secondary use notification is needed to access applications or other system resources after the initial network logon.

Posters or other printed materials may be used in lieu of an automated system message. This requirement is related to 03.15.03.

REFERENCES

Source Control: AC-08

Supporting Publications: None

03.01.10 Device Lock

a. Prevent access to the system by [Selection (one or more): initiating a device lock after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity; requiring the user to initiate a device lock before leaving the system unattended].

b. Retain the device lock until the user reestablishes access using established identification and authentication procedures.

c. Conceal, via the device lock, information previously visible on the display with a publicly viewable image.

DISCUSSION

Device locks are temporary actions taken to prevent access to the system when users depart from the immediate vicinity of the system but do not want to log out due to the temporary nature of their absences. Device locks can be implemented at the operating system level or application level. User-initiated device locking is behavior- or policy-based and requires users to take physical action to initiate the device lock. Device locks are not an acceptable substitute for logging out of the system (e.g., when organizations require users to log out at the end of workdays).

Publicly viewable images can include static or dynamic images, such as patterns used with screen savers, solid colors, photographic images, a clock, a battery life indicator, or a blank screen with the caveat that controlled unclassified information is not displayed.

https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-08

REFERENCES

Source Controls: AC-11, AC-11(01)

Supporting Publications: None

03.01.11 Session Termination

Terminate a user session automatically after [Assignment: organization-defined conditions or trigger events requiring session disconnect].

DISCUSSION

This requirement addresses the termination of user-initiated logical sessions in contrast to the termination of network connections that are associated with communications sessions (i.e., disconnecting from the network) in 03.13.09. A logical session is initiated whenever a user (or processes acting on behalf of a user) accesses a system. Logical sessions can be terminated (and thus terminate user access) without terminating network sessions. Session termination ends all system processes associated with a user’s logical session except those processes that are created by the user (i.e., session owner) to continue after the session is terminated.

Conditions or trigger events that require automatic session termination can include organization-defined periods of user inactivity, time-of-day restrictions on system use, and targeted responses to certain types of incidents.

REFERENCES

Source Control: AC-12

Supporting Publications: None

03.01.12 Remote Access

a. Establish usage restrictions, configuration requirements, and connection requirements for each type of allowable remote system access.

b. Authorize each type of remote system access prior to establishing such connections.

c. Route remote access to the system through authorized and managed access control points.

d. Authorize the remote execution of privileged commands and remote access to security-relevant information.

DISCUSSION

Remote access is access to systems (or processes acting on behalf of users) that communicate through external networks, such as the internet. Monitoring and controlling remote access methods allows organizations to detect attacks and https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-11 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-11 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-12 ensure compliance with remote access policies. Routing remote access through managed access control points enhances explicit control over such connections and reduces susceptibility to unauthorized access to the system, which could result in the unauthorized disclosure of CUI.

Remote access to the system represents a significant potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversaries. Restricting the execution of privileged commands and access to security-relevant information via remote access reduces the exposure of the organization and its susceptibility to threats by adversaries. A privileged command is a human-initiated command executed on a system that involves the control, monitoring, or administration of the system, including security functions and security-relevant information. Security-relevant information is information that can potentially impact the operation of security functions or the provision of security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce the system security policy or maintain isolation of code and data. Privileged commands give individuals the ability to execute sensitive, security-critical, or security-relevant system functions.

REFERENCES

Source Controls: AC-17, AC-17(03), AC-17(04)

Supporting Publications: SP 800-46 [14], SP 800-77 [18], SP 800-113 [19], SP 800-114

[20], SP 800-121 [21], IR 7966 [26]

03.01.13 Withdrawn

Addressed by 03.13.08.

03.01.14 Withdrawn

Incorporated into 03.01.12.

03.01.15 Withdrawn

Incorporated into 03.01.12.

03.01.16 Wireless Access

a. Establish usage restrictions, configuration requirements, and connection requirements for each type of wireless access to the system.

b. Authorize each type of wireless access to the system prior to establishing such connections.

c. Disable, when not intended for use, wireless networking capabilities prior to issuance and deployment.

https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-17 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_1_1/home?element=AC-17…

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