Attachment H-418-XO-SCMAR-0083_V_2_0-final (003).pdf
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- Attached to
- Geostationary Extended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Phase B Implementation- Final RFP Federal contract opportunity
- Solicitation number
- 80GSFC23R0010F
About this file
This document outlines mission assurance requirements for the Geostationary Extended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Phase B Implementation contract solicitation issued by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. Key requirements include establishing quality management, reliability, software assurance, workmanship, EEE parts control, materials selection, contamination control, metrology and calibration programs. The contractor must also perform system safety analyses and develop plans for reliability assessments, limited-life item management, parts stress analysis and trend monitoring. Adherence to NASA workmanship standards is required along with processes for non-conforming items, MRB/FRB disposition, and reporting of failures and mishaps. The contractor will establish an EEE parts control board to approve parts selection and ensure radiation tolerance.
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Effective Date: September 26, 2023 418-XO-SCMAR-0080 Responsible Organization: GeoXO Flight Project/Code 418 Baseline v2.0
Geostationary Extended Observations (GeoXO) Mission Assurance Requirements (MAR)
Signature/Approval Page
Prepared by:
Electronically approved by:
09/25/2023
Gerd M. Fischer, Ph.D. (he/him) Date GeoXO Program Chief Safety & Mission Assurance Officer GeoXO Flight Chief Safety & Mission Assurance Officer
NASA GSFC, Code 383
Reviewed by:
Steven W. Bidwell GeoXO Flight Project, Mission Systems Engineer NASA GSFC, Code 418
Date
Kuiana E. Carson GeoXO Flight Project Chief Safety & Mission Assurance Officer
NASA GSFC, Code 383
Concurred by:
Michelle P. Rizzo Date GeoXO Flight Project, Observatory Manager NASA GSFC, Code 418
Approved by:
Electronically approved by Chris Wheeler for:
09/26/2023
Cancade C. Carlisle Date GeoXO Flight Project Manager
/GeoXO Flight Project Spacecraft
SCMAR
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance Requirements (MAR)
Version: 2.0 Printed by: rkhoover Printed on: Friday, September 29, 2023
No filter applied.
No sort applied.
Generated from DOORS 9.7.2.4
Contents
1 1 GENERAL
1.1 1 Terminology
1.2 1 Systems Safety and Mission Assurance Program
1.3 1 Management
1.4 2 Requirements Flowdown
1.5 2 Suspension of Work Activities
1.6 2 Surveillance
1.7 3 Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIPS)
1.8 4 Suppliers List
1.9 4 Use of Inherited Products/Items
1.10 4 Risk Management
1.11 4Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) (CCR-X00249)
2 6QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CCR-X00249)
2.1 6Quality Management System - General (CCR-X00249)
2.1.1 6 Suppliers of Procured Critical Hardware
2.1.2 6 Suppliers of Critical Piece Parts
2.2 6 Supplemental Quality Management System Requirements
2.2.1 6 Control of Non-conforming Product
2.2.1.1 6 Preliminary Material Review (PMR)
2.2.1.2 7 Material Review Board (MRB)
2.2.1.3 8 Failure Review Board (FRB)
2.2.2 9 Reporting of Non-Conformances
2.2.3 10 Safety and Mission Assurance Policy
2.2.4 10 Lessons Learned
2.3 10 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR) and End of Mission Plan (EOMP)
3 11 SYSTEM SAFETY
3.1 11System Safety - General (CCR-X00249)
3.2 11 Mission Related Safety Requirements Documentation
3.2.1 11LV Eastern Test Range (ETR) (CCR-X00249)
3.3 12 System Safety Deliverables
3.3.1 12 System Safety Program Plan
3.3.2 12 Safety Requirements Compliance Checklist
3.3.3 12 Hazard Analyses
Project: GeoXO Flight Project Spacecraft Module: SCMAR Baseline Version: 2.0
Contents ii
3.3.3.1 12 Preliminary Hazard Analysis
3.3.3.2 12 Operations Hazard Analysis (OHA) and Hazard Verification Tracking Log (HVTL)
3.3.3.3 12 Mechanical Ground Support Equipment Safety Requirements
3.3.3.4 14 Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA)
3.3.4 14 Safety Data Package (SDP)
3.3.5 15 Verification Tracking Log (VTL)
3.3.6 15 Hazardous Procedures for Payload I&T and Pre-launch Processing
3.3.7 15 Safety Waivers
3.3.8 15 Support for Safety Working Group Meetings
3.3.9 16 Mishap Reporting and Investigation
3.3.10 16 NASA Payload Safety Program Forms (CCR-X00249)
4 17 RELIABILITY
4.1 17 Reliability Program Plan (RPP)
4.2 18 FMECA and Critical Items List (CIL)
4.3 20 Reliability Assessments and Predictions
4.4 21 Limited-Life Items
4.5 21 Parts Stress Analysis
4.6 22 Worst-Case Analysis
4.7 22 Trend Analysis
5 23 SOFTWARE ASSURANCE
5.1 23Software Assurance - General (CCR-X00249)
5.2 23 Software Assurance Program
5.3 23 Surveillance of Software Development, Maintenance, and Assurance Activities
6 25 WORKMANSHIP
6.1 25Workmanship - General (CCR-X00249)
6.2 27 Design and Process Qualification
6.3 27 Electrostatic Discharge Control (ESD)
6.4 27 Printed Circuit Board (PCB) Procurement, Test Coupons, and Verification Tests
6.5 28Reserved (CCR-X00249)
6.6 28 Lead-Free and Tin Whisker Control Measures
6.7 28 Ground System Equipment That Interface with Space Flight Hardware
6.8 29 Training and Certification
6.9 29 Handling
6.10 30 Preservation and Packaging
6.11 30 Splices, Trace Cuts and Jumper Wires (CCR-X00249)
7 31 EEE PARTS
Contents iii
7.1 31EEE Parts - General (CCR-X00249)
7.1.1 31 Single Point of Contact
7.2 32EEE Parts Control Board (CCR-X00249)
7.2.1 32 EPCB Responsibilities (CCR-X00249)
7.2.2 32 E PCB Meetings and Notification (CCR-X00249)
7.2.3 33 EPCB Membership (CCR-X00249)
7.3 33 Part Selection and Processing
7.3.1 33 Radiation Requirements for Part Selection
7.3.1.1 33 Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
7.3.1.2 34 Displacement Damage
7.3.1.3 34 Single-Event Effects (SEE)
7.3.2 34 Custom or Advanced Technology Devices
7.3.3 34 Parts Approved on Prior Programs
7.3.4 34 Parts Used in Off-the-Shelf Assemblies
7.4 35Reserved (CCR-X00249)
7.5 35 Failure Analysis
7.6 35 Re-use of EEE Parts and Materials
7.7 35 Master EEE Parts List
7.8 35 Data Requirements
7.8.1 35Reserved (CCR-X00249)
7.8.2 35 Retention of Data and Test Samples
8 36 MATERIALS AND PROCESSES
8.1 36 M&P Selection, Control, and Implementation Plan (MPSCIP)
8.2 36 Material Usage Agreement (MUA)
8.3 36 Materials Identification and Usage List (MIUL)
8.4 36 Life Test Plan and Final Report for Lubricated Mechanisms
8.5 36 Additive Manufacturing Control Plan (AMCP)
8.6 36 AM Part Production Plan (PPP)
9 37 CONTAMINATION CONTROL
9.1 37Contamination Control Plan (CCR-X00249)
9.2 37 Material Outgassing (CCR-X00249)
9.3 37Foreign Object Debris Program (CCR-X00249)
9.4 37Spacecraft Contamination Model and Report (CCR-X00249)
10 38 METROLOGY AND CALIBRATION
10.1 38 Metrology and Calibration Program
10.2 38 Use of Calibrated and Non-Calibrated Instruments
Contents iv
11 39 GIDEP ALERTS AND PROBLEM ADVISORIES
11.1 39 Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
11.2 39 Alert Disposition
11.3 39 GIDEP Reporting
11.4 39 Review Reporting
12 41 Appendix A. Acronym List
13 44Appendix B - RESERVED (CCR-X00249)
14 45 Appendix C. Mission Assurance Compliance Matrix
15 56Appendix D - RESERVED (CCR-X00249)
16 57 Appendix E: Applicable Documents
17 61 Appendix F: Reference Documents
Contents v
Page 1 of 61 Printed Friday, September 29, 2023
ID
SCMAR1
SCMAR2
SCMAR3
SCMAR4
SCMAR5
SCMAR6
SCMAR7
SCMAR8
SCMAR9
SCMAR10
SCMAR12
SCMAR13
SCMAR14
Object Number
1.1
1.1.0-1
1.1.0-2
1.1.0-3
1.1.0-4
1.1.0-5
1.2
1.2.0-1
1.2.0-2
1.2.0-3
1.3
1.3.0-1
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
1 GENERAL
1.1 Terminology
The following requirements terminology is used throughout this document:
The use of “shall” designates a requirement that must be met.
The use of “should” designates an expectation based on best practices.
The use of “will” designates a statement of fact or intention of the Government.
The use of “may” designates that permission has been granted by the Government.
(CCR-X00249)
The term “(TBD)” means, “to be determined” and is used when no value is available with subsequent study needed to obtain it.
The term “(TBR)” means “to be refined/reviewed” for a value that is subject to review for appropriateness and is subject to revision. The vendor is liable for compliance with the information marked “TBR” as if the “TBR” notation did not exist.
The term “days” refers to calendar days, unless specified as business days.
1.2 Systems Safety and Mission Assurance Program
The Contractor shall plan and implement a safety and mission assurance program that is consistent with contractual requirements. (CCR-X00249)
The program shall at a minimum cover:
⦁ Flight hardware that is designed, built, or provided by the Contractor, its subcontractors, their sub-tier suppliers or furnished by the Government, from project initiation through launch and mission operations
⦁ The Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and test scripts that interfaces with flight items to the extent necessary to assure the integrity and safety of flight items
⦁ This includes but is not limited to any electrical, optical, laser, Mechanical GSE (MGSE) that interfaces with flight articles.
⦁ Procedures shall specifically reference this in Contractor project documentation and drawings.
⦁ All software critical for mission success ⦁ Ground data systems required for spacecraft communication, command and control, health and safety monitoring, and science data processing/distribution as required by the Statement of Work (SOW).
(CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall submit a SCMAR Compliance Matrix that identifies variance and acceptance rationale for processes, procedures, and standards to be used by the Contractor and its subcontractors and suppliers that are proposed as alternatives to those specified by the contract (CDRL # MA 01-1). (CCR-X00249)
1.3 Management
The Contractor shall designate a manager for assurance activities, the Assurance Manager. (CCR-X00249)
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ID
SCMAR15
SCMAR16
SCMAR17
SCMAR18
SCMAR19
SCMAR20
SCMAR21
SCMAR22
SCMAR23
SCMAR24
SCMAR25
SCMAR26
Object Number
1.3.0-2
1.3.0-3
1.3.0-4
1.4
1.4.0-1
1.4.0-2
1.4.0-3
1.5
1.5.0-1
1.6
1.6.0-1
1.6.0-2
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
The Assurance Manager shall not be responsible for project costs and schedules other than those pertaining to assurance activities. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall ensure that the Assurance Manager has direct access to upper management that is independent of project management. (CCR-X00249)
The Assurance Manager shall have the functional freedom and authority to interact with all elements of the project. (CCR-X00249)
1.4 Requirements Flowdown
The Contractor shall ensure flow down of the processes, products, and services to be provided including the identification of relevant technical data (e.g., specifications, drawings, process requirements, work instructions) and SMA requirements to all subcontractors and suppliers based on the work to be performed and establish a process to verify compliance, with the exception of items identified through the Inherited Item Risk Assessment process (see Section 1.9 "Use of Inherited Products/Items"). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor’s contract review and purchasing processes shall indicate the method for documenting, communicating, and reviewing requirements with subcontractors and sub-tier suppliers to ensure requirements are met. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall ensure that quality plans, processes, procedures, hardware, and software submitted by the subcontractors and sub-tier suppliers are compliant with the requirements in this MAR, as applicable. (CCR-X00249)
1.5 Suspension of Work Activities
The Contractor shall direct the suspension of any work activity that presents a hazard, imminent danger, or future hazard to personnel, property, or mission operations resulting from unsafe acts or conditions that are identified by inspection, test, or analysis. (CCR-X00249)
1.6 Surveillance
The work activities, operations, and documentation performed by the Contractor, subcontractors and sub-tier suppliers shall be subject to evaluation, review, audit, inspection, and survey by Government-designated representatives as directed in the 418-PLN-0109 Flight Project Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP). These audits, assessments, inspections, or surveys may be performed by NASA Project representatives and/or by NASA Supply Chain Quality representatives at various points over the program/project development lifecycle. Surveillance plans will focus on suppliers of project-defined critical items. (per NPR 8735.2C w/Change 2). (CCR- X00249)
In accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 46.103, 46.104, 46.202-2, 46.4, and 46.5, the Contractor shall grant physical or remote access to NASA representatives to conduct an on-site and/or remote audit, assessment, inspection, or survey upon notice. A 30-day notice will be provided to the supplier prior to the start of an assessment. (CCR-X00249)
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ID
SCMAR27
SCMAR28
SCMAR29
SCMAR30
SCMAR31
SCMAR32
SCMAR33
SCMAR34
SCMAR35
Object Number
1.6.0-3
1.6.0-4
1.6.0-5
1.6.0-6
1.6.0-7
1.7
1.7.0-1
1.7.0-2
1.7.0-3
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
The Contractor shall supply personnel, documents, records, equipment, and an acceptable work area within the Contractor’s facilities to assist with the audit/assessments/inspection/surveys. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall report to NASA on a quarterly basis during the PMSR the monthly status of facility operations and quality metrics for the prior six months. (CCR-X00249)
The reports shall include:
⦁ Quality escapes - Any product released by an internal or external supplier that is subsequently determined to be nonconforming to contract and/or product specification requirements.
⦁ First Pass Yield - A measure of quality in a process that reflects the percentage of product made correctly without any rework or corrective activity.
⦁ Supplier Defect Rate - The supplier defeat rate measures the percentage of materials or product received from suppliers that do not meet required or compliance specifications.
⦁ Internal Audit results
This quarterly report should include 1st tier and 2nd tier suppliers of project-defined critical items within scope of the contract. (CCR-X00249)
Reserved (CCR-X00249)
1.7 Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIPS)
The Contractor shall provide a plan for proposed GMIPs, consistent with the requirements of NPR 8735.2C w/Change 2 “Hardware Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Programs and Projects”, and subject to Government approval. (CCR- X00249)
The Contractor shall develop criticality identification method, determine critical items and develop a plan to address them using hardware quality data management analytics per NPR 8735.2C w/ Change 2. (CCR-X00249)
Prior to the start of manufacturing, the Contractor shall provide work instructions, procedures, drawings, etc. that are required for performing the planned inspections.
(CCR-X00249)
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ID
SCMAR36
SCMAR37
SCMAR38
SCMAR39
SCMAR40
SCMAR41
SCMAR42
SCMAR43
SCMAR44
SCMAR45
SCMAR46
SCMAR47
Object Number
1.7.0-4
1.7.0-5
1.7.0-6
1.8
1.8.0-1
1.9
1.9.0-1
1.9.0-2
1.9.0-3
1.10
1.10.0-1
1.11
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
The following activities shall be subject to GMIPs:
⦁ Circuit Card Assemblies ⦁ Final solder inspection before staking and conformal coating ⦁ Post conformal coating ⦁ Pre-closure of boxes ⦁ Harness – pre-integration (pre-staking or potting) ⦁ Unit and component-level assembly – witness final assembly ⦁ Mechanical – final assembly and acceptance test (unit/component, subsystem, and top-level assembly) ⦁ Rework and repairs to flight hardware ⦁ Software acceptance test ⦁ Pre-ship inspection
(CCR-X00249)
The Contractor may exclude non-critical items (as defined in NPR 8735.2C w/ Change 2 and determined by the GeoXO Project) or where GMIP requirements have been relieved as a result of the Inherited Item Risk Assessment (see Section 1.9 "Use of Inherited Products/Items"), or by the GeoXO Project through terms of the procurement for COTS items. (CCR-X00249)
Reserved (CCR-X00249)
1.8 Suppliers List
The Contractor shall provide a list of suppliers used for product(s) and services produced under this contract (CDRL # MA 01-2). (CCR-X00249)
1.9 Use of Inherited Products/Items
For Inherited Products/Items, defined as those that will be build-to-print (BTP), or rebuilt with modification, or are available as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), or were previously developed and exist (e.g., spares), the Contractor may propose to follow the processes documented in GPR 8730.5A "Safety and Mission Assurance Acceptance of Inherited and Build-to-Print Products" (Inherited Item Risk Assessment). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall comply with all requirements of the MAR and SOW for the Inherited Product unless specifically relieved by the GeoXO Project as a result of the Inherited Item Risk Assessment. (CCR-X00249)
Use of this process does not relieve the Contractor from meeting contractual performance and functional requirements for the Inherited Product. (CCR-X00249)
1.10 Risk Management
SMA activities should be tightly linked with the Contractor’s Risk Management processes. For example, see the Section 4 Reliability discussion regarding risks managed in the project’s risk database that evolve from reliability analyses. (CCR- X00249)
1.11 Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) (CCR-X00249)
Page 5 of 61 Printed Friday, September 29, 2023
ID
SCMAR48
SCMAR49
SCMAR51
Object Number
1.11.0-1
1.11.0-2
1.11.0-3
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
This document references CDRLs for deliverables, however the CDRLs reside in the GeoXO Flight Project Spacecraft Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) (418-XO- SCCDRL-0053). The Contractor shall deliver data items per the requirements of the applicable CDRL. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall perform work in accordance with the definitions in the CDRL document. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor may combine deliverables if the requirements for the individual deliverables are addressed, and indications are provided as to which deliverable(s) is (are) satisfied with the submission. (CCR-X00249)
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ID
SCMAR52
SCMAR53
SCMAR54
SCMAR55
SCMAR56
SCMAR57
SCMAR58
SCMAR59
SCMAR60
SCMAR61
SCMAR62
SCMAR63
SCMAR64
SCMAR65
SCMAR66
SCMAR67
SCMAR68
Object Number
2.1
2.1.0-1
2.1.1
2.1.1.0-1
2.1.2
2.1.2.0-1
2.2
2.2.0-1
2.2.1
2.2.1.0-1
2.2.1.0-2
2.2.1.0-3
2.2.1.0-4
2.2.1.1
2.2.1.1.0-1
2.2.1.1.0-2
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
2 QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CCR-X00249)
2.1 Quality Management System - General (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall have a quality management system that is compliant with the requirements of SAE AS9100D Quality Systems - Aerospace - Model for Quality Assurance in Design, Development, Production, Installation and Servicing. (CCR- X00249)
2.1.1 Suppliers of Procured Critical Hardware
Suppliers of procured critical hardware systems (e.g., components, subassemblies, functional systems, mission payloads, spacecraft, or launch systems) and launch services shall be compliant to AS9100D. Third-party certification to AS9100D is preferred over compliance to AS9100D. (CCR-X00249)
2.1.2 Suppliers of Critical Piece Parts
Supplier of piece parts determined to be critical items, or special process execution (e.g., plating, polishing, soldering, brazing, addictive manufacturing) determined to be critical or services excluding launch services (e.g., machining, laboratory testing, transportation, and storage) determined to be critical, shall maintain a current QMS that complies with one of the following: AS9100D (preferred), ISO9001:2015, AS9003B.
(CCR-X00249)
2.2 Supplemental Quality Management System Requirements
The following requirements supplement identified portions of the AS9100 requirements.
2.2.1 Control of Non-conforming Product
The Contractor shall have a documented closed loop system for identifying, reporting, and correcting product non-conformances. (CCR-X00249)
The system shall ensure that the adequacy of corrective action is determined by audit or test, that objective evidence is collected, and that preventive action is implemented to preclude recurrence.
The Contractor shall provide electronic access to the non-conformance system to designated local and remote Government representatives. (CCR-X00249)
Non-conformances shall be reported in accordance with (CDRL # MA 02-1). (CCR- X00249)
2.2.1.1 Preliminary Material Review (PMR)
The material review process shall be initiated with the identification and documentation of a non-conformance.
A preliminary review shall be the initial step performed by Contractor-appointed personnel to determine if the non-conformance is minor and therefore can readily be processed using the following disposition actions:
Scrap — the product is not usable
Page 7 of 61 Printed Friday, September 29, 2023
ID
SCMAR68
SCMAR69
SCMAR70
SCMAR76
SCMAR71
SCMAR72
SCMAR73
SCMAR74
SCMAR75
SCMAR77
SCMAR78
SCMAR79
SCMAR80
Object Number
2.2.1.1.0-2
2.2.1.1.0-3
2.2.1.1.0-4
2.2.1.1.0-5
2.2.1.2
2.2.1.2.0-1
2.2.1.2.0-2
2.2.1.2.0-3
2.2.1.2.0-4
2.2.1.2.0-5
2.2.1.2.0-6
2.2.1.2.0-7
2.2.1.2.0-8
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
Re-work — the product will be re-worked to conform to requirements Return to supplier — the product will be returned to the supplier
(CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall refer the non-conformance to the Material Review Board when the above actions do not apply to the nonconformance. (CCR-X00249)
Note: Preliminary Review does not negate the requirement to identify, segregate, document, report, and disposition non-conformances.
For each reported non-conformance, there shall be an investigation and engineering analysis sufficient to determine cause and corrective actions for the non-conformance.
2.2.1.2 Material Review Board (MRB)
Non-conformances not dispositioned by Preliminary Review shall be referred to the MRB for disposition.
The Contractor shall have a documented process for the establishment and operation of an MRB to process major non-conformances, which are those that affect form, fit, function of the product, requires a software change, involves domestic or foreign object debris, or involves elevated risk per assessment by the Contractor. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor process shall include definitions of major and minor nonconformances.
(CCR-X00249)
The MRB process shall investigate and perform engineering analysis sufficient to determine intermediate causes and root cause, if possible, corrective action(s), and proper disposition in a timely manner. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall appoint an MRB chairperson who is responsible for implementing the MRB process and ensuring that the MRB actions are performed in compliance with this standard as implemented by Contractor procedures. (CCR-X00249)
The MRB shall consist of a core team of functional and project representatives with other disciplines brought in as necessary.
The MRB process shall include the GeoXO Project Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) or designee as a voting member. The CSO or designee reserves the right to include and poll the Government project representatives (e.g., Systems Engineers, Discipline Leads, etc.) in the MRB before giving approval. (CCR-X00249)
The MRB shall use the following disposition actions:
Scrap — the product is not usable Re-work — the product will be re-worked to conform to requirements Return to supplier — the product will be returned to the supplier Repair — the product will be repaired using a repair process approved by the
MRB
Use as is — the product will be used as is
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ID
SCMAR81
SCMAR82
SCMAR83
SCMAR84
SCMAR85
SCMAR86
SCMAR547
SCMAR87
SCMAR88
SCMAR89
SCMAR90
SCMAR91
SCMAR92
SCMAR93
SCMAR94
SCMAR95
SCMAR96
Object Number
2.2.1.2.0-9
2.2.1.2.0-10
2.2.1.2.0-11
2.2.1.2.0-12
2.2.1.2.0-13
2.2.1.2.0-14
2.2.1.2.0-15
2.2.1.2.0-16
2.2.1.2.0-17
2.2.1.3
2.2.1.3.0-1
2.2.1.3.0-2
2.2.1.3.0-3
2.2.1.3.0-4
2.2.1.3.0-5
2.2.1.3.0-6
2.2.1.3.0-7
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
The Contractor shall submit all standard repair procedures to NASA Workmanship Alternate Process Evaluation System (NWAPES). Once NWAPES approves the standard repair, the CSO will communicate with the Contractor via an approval letter. (CCR- X00249)
All MRB meetings shall be documented in the Contractor’s data management system and include a list of the attendees (virtual and in person), key discussions, action items, and decision of the voting members. (CCR-X00249)
Written authorization shall be documented to disposition the nonconforming product.
Completed MRB’s shall be approved by NASA/Government representative in accordance with SCMAR79. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall submit MRB reports no later than twenty-four (24) hours after occurrence. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall provide notice to the Government no later than twenty-four (24) hours in advance of scheduled MRB meetings. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall provide applicable documentation, including Non-Conformance Reports, no later than one (1) hour in advance of the scheduled MRB meeting in the Contractor’s section of Government Portal. (CCR-X00249)
After each MRB meeting, the Contractor shall upload the updated MRB documentation, including action items and decisions of the voting members no later than one (1) business day after the MRB meeting to the Contractor’s section of the Government Portal for approval (CDRL # MA 02-1). (CCR-X00249)
Reserved (CCR-X00249)
2.2.1.3 Failure Review Board (FRB)
Non-conformances not dispositioned by Preliminary Review or Material Review Board shall be referred to the Failure Review Board for disposition.
Non-conformances to be dispositioned by FRBs shall include those that have resulted in hardware or software test failures and damage or potential damage to hardware.
The Contractor shall have a documented process for the establishment and operation of an FRB to process non-conformances. (CCR-X00249)
The FRB process shall investigate, in a timely manner, each nonconforming item in sufficient depth to determine proper disposition.
For each reported non-conformance, there shall be an investigation and engineering analysis sufficient to determine intermediate causes, root cause, if possible and corrective actions for the non-conformance. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall appoint an FRB chairperson who is responsible for implementing the FRB process and ensuring that the FRB actions are performed in compliance with this standard as implemented by Contractor procedures. (CCR-X00249)
The FRB shall consist of a core team of functional and project representatives with other disciplines brought in as necessary.
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ID
SCMAR97
SCMAR98
SCMAR99
SCMAR100
SCMAR101
SCMAR102
SCMAR103
SCMAR104
SCMAR545
SCMAR105
SCMAR106
SCMAR107
SCMAR108
Object Number
2.2.1.3.0-8
2.2.1.3.0-9
2.2.1.3.0-10
2.2.1.3.0-11
2.2.1.3.0-12
2.2.1.3.0-13
2.2.1.3.0-14
2.2.1.3.0-15
2.2.1.3.0-16
2.2.1.3.0-17
2.2.2
2.2.2.0-1
2.2.2.0-2
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
The FRB process shall include the GeoXO Project Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) or designee as a voting member. The CSO or designee reserves the right to include and poll the Government project representatives (e.g. Systems Engineers, Discipline Leads, etc.) in the FRB before giving approval. (CCR-X00249)
The FRB shall use the following disposition actions:
Scrap — the product is not usable Re-work — the product will be re-worked to conform to requirements Return to supplier — the product will be returned to the supplier Repair — the product will be repaired using a repair process approved by the
FRB
Use as is — the product will be used as is
(CCR-X00249)
All FRB meetings shall be documented in the Contractor’s data management system and include a list of the attendees (virtual and in person), key discussions, action items, and decision of the voting members. (CCR-X00249)
Written authorization shall be documented to disposition the nonconforming product.
Completed FRB’s shall be approved by NASA/Government representative.
The Contractor shall document and inform the Government of FRB actions (CDRL #
MA 02-1). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall submit FRB reports no later than 24 hours after occurrence.
(CCR-X00249)
The Government shall be provided notice no later than twenty four (24) hours in advance of scheduled FRB meetings. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall provide applicable documentation, including Failure Reports, no later than one (1) hour in advance of the scheduled FRB meeting in the Contractor’s section of Government Portal. (CCR-X00249)
Failures that cannot be duplicated, have unknown root cause, or cannot be verified shall be assessed for residual risk, and brought to the project risk board for disposition.
2.2.2 Reporting of Non-Conformances
The Contractor shall report:
⦁ Major hardware nonconformances beginning with the first application of power at the component level
⦁ Major software non-conformances beginning with flight software acceptance testing and when interfacing with flight hardware
⦁ Major mechanical system nonconformances beginning with the first operation.
⦁ All nonconformances for review on a periodic basis as deemed appropriate by the Government or Contractor SMA teams
(CCR-X00249)
Non-conformance reporting shall continue through formal Government acceptance of the end item on orbit.
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ID
SCMAR109
SCMAR110
SCMAR111
SCMAR112
SCMAR113
SCMAR114
SCMAR115
SCMAR116
SCMAR117
Object Number
2.2.2.0-3
2.2.3
2.2.3.0-1
2.2.3.0-2
2.2.4
2.2.4.0-1
2.3
2.3.0-1
2.3.0-2
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
Note: a component is defined as a functional subdivision of a subsystem and generally as a self-contained combination of items performing a function necessary for the subsystem's operation and synonymous with Unit. (CCR-X00249)
2.2.3 Safety and Mission Assurance Policy
The Contractor and subcontractors shall ensure that appropriate review processes are in place at their level to certify the safety and operational readiness of flight hardware/software, mission-critical support equipment, hazardous facilities/operations, and high-energy ground-based systems. (CCR-X00249)
Notwithstanding any other requirements the Contractor and subcontractors shall direct the suspension of any operation that presents an immediate and unacceptable danger to personnel, property, or mission operations. (CCR-X00249)
2.2.4 Lessons Learned
The Contractor shall collect lessons learned in accordance with major review packages (SRR, PDR, CDR, PER and PSR) and provide them to the GeoXO Project. (CCR-X00249)
2.3 Orbital Debris Assessment Report (ODAR) and End of
Mission Plan (EOMP)
The Contractor shall provide the information necessary for the development of the ODAR and the EOMP deliveries per the content defined in NASA-STD-8719.14C Process for Limiting Orbital Debris (CDRL # MA 02-2). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall provide inputs/data to ensure the implementation of orbital debris mitigation measures for all mission hardware in Earth orbit. (CCR-X00249)
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ID
SCMAR118
SCMAR119
SCMAR120
SCMAR121
SCMAR122
SCMAR559
SCMAR560
SCMAR123
SCMAR124
SCMAR125
SCMAR126
SCMAR196
Object Number
3.1
3.1.0-1
3.1.0-2
3.1.0-3
3.1.0-4
3.1.0-5
3.2
3.2.0-1
3.2.0-2
3.2.1
3.2.1.0-1
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
3 SYSTEM SAFETY
3.1 System Safety - General (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall document and implement a system safety program to include their facility, and the launch facilities; support the Safety Review Process as defined in Chapter 3 of NPR 8715.7B, Payload Safety Program; comply with launch service provider requirements; and comply with launch range safety requirements. (CCR- X00249)
The System Safety program shall provide for early identification and control of hazards during design, fabrication, test, transportation, and ground activities.
The Contractor shall incorporate three independent inhibits in the design (dual failure tolerant) if a system failure can lead to a catastrophic hazard. A prelaunch catastrophic hazard is a payload-related hazard, condition, or event occurring prior to launch that could result in a fatal injury to personnel or loss of a ground facility. A post-launch catastrophic hazard is a payload-related hazard, condition, or event occurring after launch and up to payload separation that could result in a fatal injury or loss of flight termination system. The system is defined as all flight hardware, all supporting equipment, interfacing EGSE and MGSE, and facilities. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall incorporate two independent inhibits in the design (single failure tolerant) if a system failure can lead to a critical hazard. A critical hazard is defined as a hazard, condition or event that can cause severe injury or occupational illness or major property damage to facilities. The system is defined as all flight hardware, supporting equipment, interfacing EGSE and MGSE, and facilities as applicable. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall adhere to specific detailed safety requirements, including compliance verification that must be met for design elements with hazards that cannot be controlled by failure tolerance. The process by which safety is incorporated into these design elements (e.g., structures and pressure vessels) is called "Design for Minimum Risk". (CCR-X00249)
3.2 Mission Related Safety Requirements Documentation
The Contractor shall implement the launch range safety requirements that are applicable to the launch site. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall implement the most stringent safety requirement in the event there are conflicting requirements. (CCR-X00249)
3.2.1 LV Eastern Test Range (ETR) (CCR-X00249)
⦁ NASA-STD 8719.24A (with Annex RevB w/ Change 1) NASA Payload Safety
Requirements ⦁ KNPR 8715.3-1C KSC Safety Practices Procedural Requirements (applicable at
KSC property, KSC-controlled property, and offsite facility areas where KSC has operational responsibility)
⦁ NPR 8715.7B Payload Safety Program ⦁ Launch Site Integration Facility-specific Safety Requirements, as applicable
(e.g., Astrotech)
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ID
SCMAR127
SCMAR128
SCMAR129
SCMAR130
SCMAR131
SCMAR132
SCMAR133
SCMAR134
SCMAR135
SCMAR136
SCMAR137
SCMAR138
SCMAR139
SCMAR140
SCMAR141
SCMAR142
SCMAR143
Object Number
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.1.0-1
3.3.2
3.3.2.0-1
3.3.2.0-2
3.3.3
3.3.3.1
3.3.3.1.0-1
3.3.3.1.0-2
3.3.3.1.0-3
3.3.3.1.0-4
3.3.3.1.0-5
3.3.3.2
3.3.3.2.0-1
3.3.3.2.0-2
3.3.3.3
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
3.3 System Safety Deliverables
3.3.1 System Safety Program Plan
The Contractor shall prepare a System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) that describes the tasks and activities of system safety management and engineering required to identify, evaluate, and eliminate or control hazards to the hardware, software, and system design by reducing the associated risk to an acceptable level throughout the system life cycle, including launch range safety requirements (CDRL # MA 03-1). (CCR-X00249)
3.3.2 Safety Requirements Compliance Checklist
The Contractor shall document and implement a Safety Requirements Compliance Checklist to demonstrate that the payload complies with NASA and range safety requirements (CDRL # MA 03-2). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall document non-compliances to safety requirements in waivers per section 3.3.7 of this document. (CCR-X00249)
3.3.3 Hazard Analyses
3.3.3.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis
The Contractor shall perform a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) in accordance with NASA-STD-8719.24A to obtain an initial risk assessment and to identify safety critical areas of a concept or system. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall base the PHA on the best available data, including mishap data from similar systems and other lessons learned. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall evaluate hazards associated with the proposed design or function for severity, control approach (fault tolerance or design for minimum risk), hazard probability and operational constraints. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall identify safety provisions and alternatives that are needed to eliminate hazards or reduce their associated risk to an acceptable level. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall deliver the PHA with the SDP I (CDRL # MA 03-3). (CCR-X00249)
3.3.3.2 Operations Hazard Analysis (OHA) and Hazard Verification Tracking Log (HVTL)
The Contractor shall document, implement, and maintain an Operations Hazard Analysis (OHA) and a Hazard Verification Tracking Log (HVTL) to demonstrate that hardware operations, test equipment operations, and integration and test (I&T) activities comply with the safety requirements of the facilities where the activities will be performed and that hazards associated with those activities are mitigated to an acceptable level of risk (CDRL # MA 03-4). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall update and maintain the Hazard Verification Tracking Log during I&T activities to track open issues. (CCR-X00249)
3.3.3.3 Mechanical Ground Support Equipment Safety Requirements
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ID
SCMAR144
SCMAR145
SCMAR146
Object Number
3.3.3.3.0-1
3.3.3.3.0-2
3.3.3.3.0-3
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
The MGSE, including but not limited to, lifting slings/spreader bars, handling and support fixtures, and shipping containers, shall provide the required mechanical support from lower level assembly operations through final Satellite I&T at all Spacecraft vendor facilities and the Launch Site Payload Processing Facility.
MGSE is divided into the following three categories:
⦁ Lifting devices and equipment (LDE);
⦁ Support and Handling MGSE;
⦁ Work Platforms, Stands, and other Personnel Access MGSE.
(CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall comply with the following safety requirements for LDE when performing NASA work at non-NASA facilities:
⦁ Ensure overhead cranes, winches, and wire rope hoists have a dual hoist braking system and hoist dual upper limit switches installed per the NASA- STD-8719.9B w/ Change 1 (Lifting Standard), Sections 5.4 and 7.4. If not commercially available dual upper limit switches and dual brakes do not apply to chain hoists. A single hoist motor holding brake in combination with a Variable Frequency Drive (VFD) dynamic braking system is an acceptable dual braking system.
⦁ Label and tag LDE the NASA-STD-8719.9B w/ Change 1, Section 4.9 requirements with no more than its Working Load Limit (WLL) as determined by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or its current certified WLL if that value is lower than the OEM rated WLL.
⦁ Perform an initial one-time proof load test per the following NASA-STD-8719.9B w/ Change 1, Section 4.5 requirements:
⦁ 1.25X WLL for overhead cranes.
⦁ 1.25X WLL for mobile aerial platforms that will be used near critical hardware.
⦁ 1X WLL for mobile cranes and derricks (.95X to 1X is acceptable).
⦁ 1.25X WLL for below-the-hook (BTH) lifting devices.
⦁ Ensure slings (i.e., wire rope, synthetics, chain, etc.) are only proof load tested beyond its WLL with OEM approval.
⦁ 2X WLL for rigging hardware items used for critical lifts (i.e., shackles.
hoist rings. turnbuckles, etc.).
⦁ Perform a 1X WLL load test every four years after the initial proof test on all LDE.
⦁ In addition to visual inspection, perform a post load test Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) inspection (e.g., radiographic, ultra-sonic, magnetic particle, dye penetrant, etc.) on crane hooks and critical welds. A critical weld is one in which a failure would result in a failure of the hardware. Ensure that the inspections are performed by an American Society of Non-destructive Testing (ASNT) or equivalently trained inspector.
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ID
SCMAR147
SCMAR150
SCMAR151
SCMAR152
SCMAR153
SCMAR154
SCMAR155
SCMAR156
SCMAR157
SCMAR158
SCMAR160
SCMAR161
SCMAR162
SCMAR163
SCMAR164
Object Number
3.3.3.3.0-4
3.3.3.3.0-5
3.3.3.3.0-6
3.3.3.3.0-7
3.3.3.3.0-8
3.3.3.3.0-9
3.3.3.3.0-10
3.3.3.3.0-11
3.3.3.3.0-12
3.3.3.3.0-13
3.3.3.4
3.3.3.4.0-1
3.3.3.4.0-2
3.3.4
3.3.4.0-1
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
A critical lift is defined as a lift during which failure/loss of control presents an elevated risk of serious injury, loss of life, or loss of one-of-a-kind articles, or high dollar items, whose loss would have serious programmatic or institutional impact.
Any lift hardware which attaches to the Spacecraft or Spacecraft component below the respective center of gravity shall be verified by an analysis to show that the lift is stable.
Support and Handling MGSE that is not being delivered to the Launch Site shall meet factors of safety requirements as defined in NASA-STD-5005D Standard for the Design and Fabrication of Ground Support Equipment, Section 5.1.2 Factor of Safety. (CCR- X00249)
Support and Handling MGSE that is not being delivered to the Launch Site shall be proof load tested to 150% of rated load.
LDE MGSE that interfaces to flight hardware and is not being delivered to the Launch Site shall meet requirements as defined in Chapter 14 of NASA-STD-8719.9B w/ Change 1 Lifting Standard. (CCR-X00249)
Support and Handling MGSE shall be recertified at minimum to the working load once every four years.
A surface non-destructive test of all Support and Handling MGSE single point failure critical welds shall be performed after all proof load tests.
Work Platforms, Stands, and other Personnel Access MGSE shall meet requirements as defined in CFR 29 OSHA 1910.28 Duty to Have Fall Protection and Falling Object Protection. (CCR-X00249)
Work Platforms, Stands, and other Personnel Access MGSE and dollies shall be subjected to stability analysis.
MGSE that is being delivered to the Launch Site shall meet requirements as defined in NASA-STD-8719.24 Annex RevB w/ Change 1. (CCR-X00249)
3.3.3.4 Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA)
The Contractor shall perform an Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA) to evaluate activities for hazards introduced during testing, transportation, storage, integration, and prelaunch operations at the launch site. The primary purpose is to evaluate the adequacy of procedures used to eliminate, control, or mitigate identified hazards to ensure implementation of safety requirements for personnel, procedures, and equipment during activities at the launch site. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall submit the results of the O&SHA as a part of the SDP II and SDP
III (CDRL # MA 03-3). (CCR-X00249)
3.3.4 Safety Data Package (SDP)
The Contractor shall prepare an integrated SDP to document the results of hazard analyses identifying the prelaunch, launch and ascent hazards associated with personnel, the flight system, ground support equipment, and their interfaces in hazard reports (CDRL # MA 03-3). (CCR-X00249)
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ID
SCMAR165
SCMAR166
SCMAR167
SCMAR168
SCMAR169
SCMAR170
SCMAR171
SCMAR541
SCMAR172
SCMAR173
SCMAR174
SCMAR175
SCMAR176
SCMAR178
SCMAR179
SCMAR180
SCMAR181
Object Number
3.3.4.0-2
3.3.5
3.3.5.0-1
3.3.5.0-2
3.3.5.0-3
3.3.5.0-4
3.3.5.0-5
3.3.5.0-6
3.3.5.0-7
3.3.6
3.3.6.0-1
3.3.6.0-2
3.3.6.0-3
3.3.7
3.3.7.0-1
3.3.8
3.3.8.0-1
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
The spacecraft Contractor shall integrate ISAR inputs from the instrument contractors into the SDP. (CCR-X00249)
3.3.5 Verification Tracking Log (VTL)
The Contractor shall document and implement a VTL that documents a Hazard Control and Verification Tracking process as a closed-loop system that ensures safety compliance has been satisfied per NASA-STD 8719.24A (with Annex Rev B w/ Change
1). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall document in the VTL the process of verifying the control of hazards by test, analysis, inspection, similarity to previously qualified hardware, or any combination of these activities. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall ensure that verifications listed on the hazard reports refer to specific test, analysis, or inspection reports with a summary of the pertinent results.
(CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall make the results of these tests, analyses, and inspections available for Government review. (CCR-X00249)
The VTL shall identify hazard controls that are not verified as closed (CDRL # MA
03-3). (CCR-X00249)
The VTL shall be delivered with the SDP III (CDRL # MA 03-3). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall provide regular electronic updates of the VTL until all hazard controls are verified as closed. (CCR-X00249)
3.3.6 Hazardous Procedures for Payload I&T and Pre-launch
Processing
The Contractor shall document the hazardous procedures that will be implemented when integration and test activities and pre-launch activities are performed at processing facilities and the launch site (CDRL # MA 03-5). (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall ensure that the procedures comply with applicable facility safety requirements. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall provide safety support for the implementation of hazardous procedures. (CCR-X00249)
3.3.7 Safety Waivers
The Contractor shall request waivers for variations from the applicable safety requirements per paragraph 1.4 of NPR 8715.7B Payload Safety Program. The waiver form is available at URL http://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/PayloadSafety/Forms. (CCR- X00249)
3.3.8 Support for Safety Working Group Meetings
Contractor safety personnel shall support Safety Working Group (SWG) meetings, Payload Safety Working Group (PSWG) meetings, Technical Interface Meetings (TIMs), and technical reviews, as required. The PSWG will meet as necessary to review
Page 16 of 61 Printed Friday, September 29, 2023
ID
SCMAR181
SCMAR182
SCMAR183
SCMAR184
SCMAR185
SCMAR186
SCMAR187
Object Number
3.3.8.0-1
3.3.9
3.3.9.0-1
3.3.9.0-2
3.3.9.0-3
3.3.10
3.3.10.0-1
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR) procedures and analyses that contain or examine safety critical functions, or as convened by the GeoXO project to discuss any situations that may arise with respect to overall project safety. The timeline for all safety reviews, beginning with the Payload Safety Introduction Briefing, is contained in NPR 8715.7B, Section 3.4. (CCR-X00249)
3.3.9 Mishap Reporting and Investigation
The Contractor shall prepare a Pre-Mishap Plan, prior to initiating any project operations with potential for personnel injury or hardware damage, that describes appropriate mishap and close call notification, reporting, recording, and investigation procedures in accordance with NPR 8621.1 NASA Procedural Requirements for Mishap and Close Call Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping (CDRL # MA 03-6). (CCR- X00249)
The Contractor shall report accidents, test failures, or other mishaps and close calls promptly to NASA. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall promptly investigate to determine the root cause. (CCR-X00249)
3.3.10 NASA Payload Safety Program Forms (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall prepare NASA Payload Safety Forms. The forms are available at URL http://kscsma.ksc.nasa.gov/PayloadSafety/Forms. (CCR-X00249)
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ID
SCMAR188
SCMAR189
SCMAR554
SCMAR190
SCMAR191
SCMAR192
SCMAR193
SCMAR194
SCMAR195
SCMAR197
Object Number
4.0-1
4.0-2
4.0-3
4.0-4
4.0-5
4.0-6
4.1
4.1.0-1
4.1.0-2
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
4 RELIABILITY
Reliability activities should be coordinated with the project’s Risk Management processes. For example, risks that evolve from reliability analyses that affect overall mission objectives should be managed in the project’s risk database when not eliminated or mitigated to noncredible likelihood levels; likewise for safety risks (threats to personnel, the public, the environment, hosts, and facilities).
Note: The Government Technical Authority will determine credibility of failure. (CCR- X00249)
Single Point Failures (SPFs) shall be analyzed and considered for management within the Contractor’s Risk Management process. (CCR-X00249)
In addition, as designs evolve and change, the analyses described in this section shall be updated. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall perform reliability analyses concurrent with design so that identified problem areas are addressed, and corrective action taken in a timely manner.
(CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall provide technical support to the GeoXO Project for the NASA-chaired Reliability Working Group (RWG) meetings and technical reviews, as required.
The RWG will meet as necessary, and as convened by NASA, to review reliability requirements and analyses, to assist in resolving reliability issues and concerns, and to discuss any situations that may arise with respect to the overall mission reliability defined in NASA-STD-8729.1A. (CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall formally report on the progress of their reliability efforts through the PMSR and provide progress reports to the GSFC GeoXO Reliability Engineer through periodic reliability working group meetings as well as informal communications such as teleconferences and e-mails. (CCR-X00249)
4.1 Reliability Program Plan (RPP)
The Contractor shall document and implement an RPP that includes both qualitative and quantitative techniques to support decisions regarding mission success and safety throughout system development (CDRL # MA 04-1) that interacts effectively with other disciplines, including systems engineering, risk management, hardware design, software design, and product assurance to:
a. Demonstrate that the stress applied to parts meets applicable derating criteria assuming worst-case conditions;
b. Identify single failure points, their effect on the attainment of mission objectives, and possible safety degradation;
c. Identify limited-life items and ensure that special precautions are taken to conserve their useful life for on-orbit operations; and
d. Perform trend analysis during fabrication and pre-launch I&T activities.
(CCR-X00249)
The Contractor shall include a detailed approach to the analysis of hardware and software for their contributions to system reliability and mission success. (CCR-X00249)
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ID
SCMAR558
SCMAR198
SCMAR199
SCMAR200
SCMAR201
SCMAR202
SCMAR203
SCMAR204
Object Number
4.1.0-3
4.2
4.2.0-1
4.2.0-2
4.2.0-3
4.2.0-4
4.2.0-5
4.2.0-6
418-XO-SCMAR-0083, RM Version, Geostationary eXtended Observations (GeoXO) Spacecraft (SC) Mission Assurance
Requirements (MAR)
The Contractor should perform reliability analyses concurrent with design and maintain…
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