Attachment 02 - AIAMD System of Systems (SoS)(MIS-PRF-56500).pdf

IAMD Program MIS-PRF-56500G System Specification for AIAMD SoS September 14, 2017

Use or disclosure of this report is subject to the restriction on the title page.

System Specification for

Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD)

System of Systems (SoS)

Prepared For:

United States Army Project Office Integrated Air and Missile Defense Program Executive Office Missiles and Space Bldg 5250 Martin Road Redstone Arsenal, Al 35898-8000

Prepared By:

United States Army Project Office Integrated Air and Missile Defense Program Executive Office Missiles and Space Bldg 5250 Martin Road Redstone Arsenal, Al 35898-8000

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. DoD contractors only (Critical Technology) (6/15/2017). Other requests shall be referred to Program Executive Office for Missiles & Space, Integrated Air & Missile Defense (IAMD) Project Office, ATTN: SFAE-MSL-IA, Building 5250, Martin Road, Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-8000.

UNLESS OTHERWISE APPROVED BY THE INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECT OFFICE, ALL ENGINEERING TECHNICAL DATA, SOFTWARE AND COST DATA SHALL BE SUBJECT TO EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AS

FOLLOWS:

WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended. Title 50, U.S.C., app 2401 et seq. Violation of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE - For classified documents, follow the procedures in DoD 5220.22, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), Chapter 5, Section 7, or DoD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, Chapter IX. For unclassified, limited documents, destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Contract W31P4Q-08-C-0418 Attachment 0002

Use or disclosure of this report is subject to the restriction on the title page.

Revision History

Document Revision / DOORS Baseline

Version

Description Date

1.0 Working Draft December 1, 2006

2.0 Working Draft December 21, 2006

3.0 Draft RFP Release February 2, 2007

3.1 Working Draft February 12, 2007

4.0 Independent Review Team March 15, 2007

5.0 Final RFP Release March 28, 2007

5.1 Working Draft (incorporates

changes from 6/22/2007 and 7/17/2007 Review Team Meetings)

August 1, 2007

5.2 Working Draft (incorporates

changes from 8/7/2007 and 8/8/2007 Review Team Meetings, MIL-STD-961 Re-organization)

August 8, 2007

Rev - / 6.0 Initial baseline in support of RFP release

August 30, 2007

Rev – A / 7.0, 8.0 Incorporates Approved ECPs:

MI-N6281, MI-N6282, MI-N6283,

MI-N6284

January 28, 2008

Rev B / 9.0 Incorporation of ECP MI-N7788, MI-N7790, and MI-N7791

September 23, Rev C / 10.0 Incorporation of ECP MI-N7792 and MI-N7793

January 12, 2009

Rev D / 11.0 Incorporation of ECP MI-N7795 April 28, 2010

Rev E / 12.0 Incorporation of ECP MI-N7797 July 14, 2010

Rev F Incorporation of ECP MI-N7828 April 14, 2014

Rev G Post Deployment Build 8, Cybersecurity, CPD, MML, Net R

September 14, Table of Contents

1 SCOPE

1.1 IDENTIFICATION

1.2 OVERVIEW DISCUSSION

1.2.1 ASoS Program Description

1.2.2 IAMD ASoS Definition

1.2.2.1 Net-Centric Architecture

1.2.2.2 Plug and Fight Interface Functionality Distribution

1.2.3 ASoS Mission

1.2.4 Definitions

1.2.4.1 Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense System of Systems

1.2.4.2 ASoS Command and Control

1.2.4.3 ASoS Task Force

1.2.4.4 IBCS Command Posts

1.2.4.5 ASoS C2 Plug and Fight Capability

1.2.4.6 ASoS Network

1.2.4.7 ASoS Patriot Sensor

1.2.4.8 ASoS Improved Sentinel Radar

1.2.4.9 ASoS Patriot Launcher

1.2.4.10 ASoS Multi-Mission Launcher

1.2.4.11 ASoS Communications Relay

1.2.4.12 ASoS Components

1.2.4.13 ASoS Battalion

1.2.4.14 ASoS Battery

1.2.4.15 ASoS Platoon

1.2.5 Key Performance Parameters

1.2.6 Use of Terms

1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION

2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

2.1 GENERAL

2.2 GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

2.3 NON-GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

2.4 ORDER OF PRECEDENCE

3 REQUIREMENTS

3.1 STATES AND MODES

3.1.1 Storage State

3.1.1.1 Long Term Storage Mode

3.1.1.2 Short Term Storage Mode

3.1.2 Movement State

3.1.2.1 Administrative March Order Mode

3.1.2.2 Tactical March Order Mode

3.1.2.3 Command-on-the-Move Mode

3.1.3 Transport State

3.1.3.1 Air Transport Mode

3.1.3.2 Highway Transport Mode

3.1.3.3 Rail Transport Mode

3.1.3.4 Sea Transport Mode

3.1.3.5 Helicopter Transport Mode

3.1.4 Maintenance State

3.1.4.1 Preventive Maintenance Mode

3.1.4.2 Corrective Maintenance Mode

3.1.5 Operations State

3.1.5.1 Emplace Mode

3.1.5.2 Command Mode

3.1.5.3 AMD Operations Mode

3.1.5.4 Training Mode

3.1.5.5 Continuity of Operations Mode

3.1.5.6 Displace Mode

3.1.6 States and Modes Requirements

3.1.6.1 Long Term Storage

3.1.6.2 Short Term Storage

3.1.6.3 Transitions

3.2 SYSTEM CAPABILITIES

3.2.1 Employment

3.2.1.1 Task Force

3.2.1.2 Task Force Tailorability

3.2.1.3 Mobile Operations

3.2.1.4 Remote Operations

3.2.1.5 Modes of Control

3.2.1.5.1 Centralized Control

3.2.1.5.2 Decentralized Control

3.2.1.5.3 Autonomous Operations

3.2.1.6 Reconfigurable Workstations

3.2.2 Integration

3.2.2.1 ASoS Network

3.2.2.2 Air Picture

3.2.2.2.1 Geodetic Registration

3.2.2.2.1.1 Geodetic Registration Functionality

3.2.2.2.1.2 Geodetic Registration Performance

3.2.2.2.2 Sensor Control

3.2.2.2.3 Common Tactical Air Picture

3.2.2.2.3.1 Common Tactical Air Picture Functionality

3.2.2.2.3.2 Common Tactical Air Picture Performance

3.2.2.2.4 Estimate Launch and Impact Point Prediction

3.2.2.2.4.1 Estimate Launch and Impact Point Prediction

3.2.2.2.4.2 Estimate Launch and Impact Point Prediction Performance

3.2.2.2.5 Track Capacity

3.2.2.2.6 Saturation Alleviation

3.2.2.2.7 Single Integrated Air Picture / Early Warning

3.2.2.2.8 Classification, Categorization, Typing, Discrimination and Identification

3.2.2.2.8.1 Identification

3.2.2.2.8.1.1 Identification

3.2.2.2.8.1.2 Identification Completeness and Correctness

3.2.2.2.8.2 Operator Involvement in CCTDI

3.2.2.2.8.3 CCTDI Sources and Integration

3.2.2.3 Common Operational Picture

3.2.2.4 Sensor Data Used for Engagements

3.2.2.5 External Sensor Data Used for Engagements

3.2.2.6 Launch on Remote for PAC-2/Guidance Enhanced Missile (GEM)

3.2.2.7 Reserved

3.2.2.8 Command of THAAD

3.2.2.9 Current Force Patriot Integration

3.2.2.9.1 Current Force Patriot Command and Control

3.2.2.10 Reserved

3.2.2.11 Adjacent ASoS Task Force

3.2.2.12 Net Centricity

3.2.3 Operations

3.2.3.1 Command Post Organization

3.2.3.2 Internal Command Post Collaboration

3.2.3.3 Current Operations

3.2.3.3.1 Engagement Planning and Execution

3.2.3.3.1.1 Engagement Planning

3.2.3.3.1.1.1 Threat Evaluation

3.2.3.3.1.1.2 Weapon Assignment

3.2.3.3.1.1.3 Engagement Authorization

3.2.3.3.1.1.4 Firing Doctrine

3.2.3.3.1.1.5 Engagement Methods

3.2.3.3.1.1.6 Keepout Altitudes and Ranges

3.2.3.3.1.1.7 Upper-Tier/Lower-Tier Coordination

3.2.3.3.1.2 Engagement Execution

3.2.3.3.1.2.1 Engagement Processing

3.2.3.3.1.2.2 Missile Command Destruct or Divert

3.2.3.3.1.2.3 Engagement Commands

3.2.3.3.1.2.4 Kill Assessment

3.2.3.3.1.3 Engagement Monitoring

3.2.3.3.1.4 Re-Engage

3.2.3.3.1.5 Simultaneous Engagements

3.2.3.3.1.6 Launcher Control

3.2.3.3.2 Monitor Health & Status

3.2.3.3.3 Movement

3.2.3.3.4 Force Protection

3.2.3.3.5 Short-Term Planning

3.2.3.3.6 C4 Operations

3.2.3.3.7 Intelligence

3.2.3.3.8 Sustainment

3.2.3.3.9 Airspace Management

3.2.3.3.10 GPS Failure

3.2.3.4 Plans

3.2.3.4.1 Analyze Mission

3.2.3.4.2 Develop, Analyze and Compare Courses of Action

3.2.3.4.2.1 Automated Decision Aids

3.2.3.4.2.2 Course of Action Development

3.2.3.4.2.3 Interactive Defense Design

3.2.3.4.3 Select Best Course of Action

3.2.3.4.4 Produce Operations Plan (OPLAN) or Order

3.2.3.4.5 Collaborative Planning

3.2.3.4.6 C4 Operations Planning

3.2.4 Air Defense Performance

3.2.4.1 Target Characteristics

3.2.4.2 Defense Effectiveness

3.2.4.2.1 Maintain Patriot Fire Unit Effectiveness

3.2.4.2.1.1 ASoS Maintain Patriot Fire Unit Effectiveness

3.2.4.2.1.2 IBCS Maintain Patriot Fire Unit Effectiveness

3.2.4.2.2 IFPC Platoon Effectiveness

3.2.4.2.2.1 IBCS Achieve IFPC Platoon Effectiveness

3.2.4.2.2.2 ASoS Achieve IFPC Platoon Effectivenss

3.2.4.2.3 Reserved

3.2.4.2.4 Improved Effectiveness Through Net-Centric Conditions

3.2.4.3 Engagement Envelope

3.2.4.4 Beyond Line of Sight Engagements

3.2.4.5 Simultaneous Engagements

3.2.4.5.1 ASoS Simultaneous Engagements

3.2.4.5.2 IBCS Simultaneous Engagements

3.2.4.6 System Reaction Time

3.2.4.6.1 ASoS System Reaction Time

3.2.4.6.2 IBCS System Reaction Time

3.2.4.7 Span of Control

3.3 SYSTEM EXTERNAL INTERFACES

3.3.1 External System Interfaces

3.3.1.1 Message Timing Related to External Interfaces

3.3.2 Enhanced Update Rate

3.3.2.1 EUR as a Function of Track Update

3.3.2.2 EUR as a Function of Track Position/Velocity

3.3.2.3 EUR Fixed Rate

3.3.3 Cooperative Engagements

3.4 SAFETY

3.5 SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROL

3.5.1 Cybersecurity

3.5.1.1 Policy, Controls, Accreditation

3.5.1.2 Reserved

3.5.1.3 Access Control

3.5.1.4 Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

3.5.1.5 Administration

3.5.1.6 Computer Network Defense

3.5.1.7 Operational Security

3.5.1.8 Key Management

3.5.2 Force Protection & Survivability

3.5.3 Physical Security

3.6 SYSTEM ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

3.6.1 Natural Environments

3.6.1.1 Low Temperature

3.6.1.2 High Temperature

3.6.1.3 Thermal Shock

3.6.1.4 Wind & Blowing Sand

3.6.1.5 Rain

3.6.1.6 Fungus

3.6.1.7 Altitude

3.6.1.8 Salt Fog

3.6.1.9 Ice

3.6.1.10 Snow

3.6.1.11 Humidity

3.6.1.12 Lightning

3.6.2 Induced Environments

3.6.2.1 Induced Environment from Transportation

3.6.2.2 Induced Environment from Mobility

3.6.2.3 Host Platform Environments

3.6.3 Chemical, Biological, Radiological (CBR)

3.6.4 Electromagnetic Environments

3.6.4.1 Electromagnetic Radiation

3.6.4.2 Electrostatic Discharge

3.6.4.3 Electromagnetic Pulse

3.6.4.4 Electronic Attack

3.7 COMPUTER RESOURCES

3.7.1 Data Recording

3.8 SYSTEM QUALITY FACTORS

3.8.1 Reliability

3.8.2 Maintainability

3.8.2.1 Software Maintenance

3.9 DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CONSTRAINTS

3.9.1 Transportability & Mobility

3.9.1.1 Air Transport

3.9.1.2 Sea Transport

3.9.1.3 Rail Transport

3.9.1.4 Tactical Mobility

3.9.1.5 Reserved

3.9.1.6 Packaging

3.9.1.7 Job/Memory Aids

3.9.2 Emplacement

3.9.3 Reserved

3.9.4 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects

3.9.4.1 Spectrum Supportability

3.9.4.2 Electromagnetic Compatibility

3.9.4.3 Electromagnetic Interference

3.9.5 Marking

3.9.6 Workmanship

3.9.7 Environmental Protection

3.9.8 Power Systems

3.9.9 Mapping Standards

3.9.10 GPS

3.9.11 Army Standard Products

3.9.12 Software Architecture

3.9.13 Current Force Interfaces

3.9.14 Network Standards

3.10 PERSONNEL-RELATED REQUIREMENTS

3.11 TRAINING

3.11.1 Embedded Training and Training Aides, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations

3.11.2 Training Scenarios

3.11.3 Training Evaluation

3.11.4 Training with External

3.11.5 Safeguards

3.11.6 Reserved

3.12 LOGISTICS

3.13 DISTRIBUTED FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY

3.13.1 Network

3.13.1.1 Network Transport

3.13.1.1.1 Network Diameter

3.13.1.1.2 Number of Nodes

3.13.1.1.3 Quality of Service

3.13.1.1.3.1 ASoS Multi-Mission Launcher Unique Quality of Service

3.13.1.1.4 Offered Load

3.13.1.1.5 AD-Hoc Network

3.13.1.2 Voice Connectivity

3.13.1.3 Network Integration

3.13.1.4 Network Adaptation

3.13.2 Distributed Track Management

3.13.2.1 Track Management

3.13.2.1.1 Geodetic Registration

3.13.2.1.2 Common Tactical Air Picture

3.13.2.1.3 Track Capacity

3.13.2.1.4 Single Integrated Air Picture / Early Warning

3.13.2.1.5 Saturation Alleviation

3.13.2.1.5.1 Automatic Saturation Alleviation

3.13.2.1.6 Track Data Reporting Needs

3.13.2.2 Common Tactical Air Picture

3.14 RESERVED

3.15 SENSORS

3.15.1 Common Sensor Requirements

3.15.1.1 States and Modes

3.15.1.1.1 Long Term Storage

3.15.1.1.2 Short Term Storage

3.15.1.1.3 Transitions

3.15.1.2 Integration

3.15.1.2.1 ASoS Network

3.15.1.2.2 Air Picture

3.15.1.2.2.1 Geodetic Registration

3.15.1.2.2.2 Common Tactical Air Picture

3.15.1.2.2.3 Classification, Categorization, Typing, Discrimination and Identification

3.15.1.2.2.4 Sensor Control

3.15.1.3 Operations

3.15.1.3.1 Engagement Planning

3.15.1.3.2 Engagement Execution

3.15.1.3.2.1 Sensor Engagement Support

3.15.1.3.2.2 Kill Assessment

3.15.1.3.3 Force Protection

3.15.1.3.4 C4 Operations

3.15.1.3.5 Sustainment

3.15.1.3.6 GPS Failure

3.15.1.3.7 Plans

3.15.1.4 Air Defense Performance

3.15.1.4.1 Defense Effectiveness

3.15.1.5 Safety

3.15.1.6 Cybersecurity

3.15.1.7 Environmental Requirements

3.15.1.8 Computer Resources

3.15.1.9 System Quality Factors

3.15.1.9.1 Reliability

3.15.1.9.2 Maintainability

3.15.1.9.2.1 Software Maintenance

3.15.1.10 Design and Construction Constraints

3.15.1.10.1 Tactical Mobility

3.15.1.10.2 Emplacement

3.15.1.10.3 Electromagnetic Compatibility

3.15.1.10.4 Marking

3.15.1.10.5 Workmanship

3.15.1.10.6 Environmental Protection

3.15.1.10.7 Army Standard Products

3.15.1.11 Personnel-Related Requirements

3.15.1.12 Distributed Functional Capability

3.15.1.12.1 Network

3.15.1.12.1.1 Voice Connectivity

3.15.1.12.1.2 Network Integration

3.15.1.13 Training

3.15.1.14 Logistics

3.15.2 Patriot Sensor Unique

3.15.2.1 Sensor Reorientation

3.15.2.2 Interceptor Datalink Support

3.15.2.3 Monitor Engagement

3.15.2.4 Engagement Termination

3.15.2.5 Air Defense Performance

3.15.2.5.1 Defense Effectiveness

3.15.2.5.2 Simultaneous Engagements

3.15.2.5.3 System Reaction Time

3.15.2.6 Design and Construction Constraints

3.15.2.6.1 Current Force Interfaces

3.15.3 Improved Sentinel Radar Unique

3.15.3.1 Stop and Stare Command

3.16 WEAPONS

3.16.1 Common Weapon Requirements

3.16.1.1 States and Modes

3.16.1.1.1 Long Term Storage

3.16.1.1.2 Short Term Storage

3.16.1.1.3 Transitions

3.16.1.2 Integration

3.16.1.2.1 ASoS Network

3.16.1.2.2 Common Tactical Air Picture

3.16.1.2.3 Launcher Control

3.16.1.2.3.1 Launcher Status

3.16.1.2.3.2 Launcher Control Commands

3.16.1.2.3.3 Launcher Position and Orientation

3.16.1.2.3.4 Launcher Re-Orientation

3.16.1.3 Operations

3.16.1.3.1 Current Operations

3.16.1.3.1.1 Engagement Planning and Execution

3.16.1.3.1.2 Force Protection

3.16.1.3.1.3 Sustainment

3.16.1.3.1.4 GPS Failures

3.16.1.3.2 Plans

3.16.1.4 Air Defense Performance

3.16.1.4.1 Defense Effectiveness

3.16.1.5 Safety

3.16.1.6 Cybersecurity

3.16.1.7 Environmental Requirements

3.16.1.8 Computer Resources

3.16.1.9 System Quality Factors

3.16.1.9.1 Reliability

3.16.1.9.2 Maintainability

3.16.1.9.2.1 Software Maintenance

3.16.1.10 Design and Construction Constraints

3.16.1.10.1 Tactical Mobility

3.16.1.10.2 Emplacement

3.16.1.10.3 Electromagnetic Compatibility

3.16.1.10.4 Marking

3.16.1.10.5 Workmanship

3.16.1.10.6 Environmental Protection

3.16.1.10.7 Army Standard Products

3.16.1.11 Personnel-Related Requirements

3.16.1.12 Distributed Functional Capability

3.16.1.12.1 Network

3.16.1.12.1.1 Voice Connectivity

3.16.1.12.1.2 Network Integration

3.16.1.13 Training

3.16.1.14 Logistics

3.16.2 Patriot Launcher Unique

3.16.2.1 Air Defense Performance

3.16.2.1.1 Defense Effectiveness

3.16.2.1.1.1 Maintain Patriot Fire Unit Effectiveness

3.16.2.1.1.2 Simultaneous Engagements

3.16.2.1.1.3 Reaction Time

3.16.2.2 Design and Construction Constraints

3.16.2.2.1 Current Force Interfaces

3.16.3 Reserved for ASoS Multi-Mission Launcher Unique

3.17 SYSTEMS

3.17.1 Common System Requirements

3.17.1.1 Geodetic Registration

3.17.1.2 Common Tactical Air Picture

4 VERIFICATION

4.1 METHODS OF VERIFICATION

4.2 CLASSES OF VERIFICATION

4.2.1 Analysis

4.2.2 Contractor Verification, Software/Hardware-in-the-Loop (S/HWIL), and Range Testing

4.2.2.1 Contractor Verification Testing

4.2.2.2 Software/Hardware-in-the-Loop (S/HWIL) Testing

4.2.2.3 Range Testing

4.2.2.4 Reserved

4.2.3 System Qualification Testing

4.2.3.1 Environmental Verification

4.2.3.1.1 Natural Environments

4.2.3.1.2 Induced Environments

4.2.3.1.2.1 Vibration and Shock

4.2.3.1.2.2 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects

4.2.3.1.3 Environments Due to Enemy Action

4.2.3.1.3.1 Electronic Attack Testing

4.2.3.1.3.2 Nuclear Environment

4.2.3.1.3.3 Chemical, Biological, Radiological Contamination Survivability Environment

4.2.3.2 Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability Verification Testing

4.2.3.2.1 Reliability Verification

4.2.3.2.1.1 Reserved

4.2.3.2.1.2 System Reliability Verification

4.2.3.2.2 Maintainability Verification

4.2.3.2.3 Fault Detection/Fault Isolation Verification

4.2.3.3 Reserved

4.2.3.3.1 Reserved

4.2.3.3.2 Reserved

4.2.4 Safety Verification

4.2.4.1 Emitted Radiation

4.2.4.2 Safety Conformance Testing

4.2.4.3 Safety Design Limits

4.2.5 Demonstrations

4.2.5.1 Logistics Demonstration (LD)

4.2.5.2 Mobility and Deployment Demonstration

4.2.5.3 March Order and Emplacement Demonstration

4.2.5.4 Transportability Demonstration

4.2.6 Government Interoperability Verification

4.2.7 TEMPEST Verification

4.2.8 Cybersecurity

4.2.9 Quality Conformance Inspection

4.2.9.1 In-Process Inspections

4.2.9.2 Inspections Covered by Subsidiary Documents

4.2.9.3 Acceptance Test and Inspection

4.2.9.3.1 Software Acceptance

4.3 REQUIREMENT CROSS REFERENCE

4.3.1 Requirement Compliance Criteria

4.3.2 Requirement/Verification Cross-Reference Matrix

5 RESERVED

6 NOTES

6.1 GLOSSARY

6.2 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

7 RESERVED

8 JTMC BRIDGING CAPABILITY

8.1 JOINT TRACK MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY BRIDGE

8.2 RESERVED FOR FUTURE JTMC REQUIREMENTS (E.G., CID, LINK-16, TRACK SERVER)

9 INTERPRETATION OF MAINTAIN EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS

List of Figures

Figure 3-1 States and Modes

Figure 8-1 Joint Track Management Capability Architecture Diagaram

List of Tables

Table 2-1 Government Documents

Table 2-2 Non-Government Publications

Table 3-1 Illustration of External Interfaces

Table 3-2 Rain Conditions

Table 3-3 Negligible Risk Values for CBR Contaminants

Table 3-4 EMR Fields

Table 4-1 Requirement Verification Cross Reference Matrix

1 Scope

1.1 Identification

This specification is for the Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) System of Systems (ASoS). Section 10 of this document is a separately published classified section that contains values for classified data. Classified data values in this specification have been replaced by “<Cxy>”. The x qualifier denotes whether the classified data is a classified value (V), classified table (T), or classified figure (F). The y qualifier corresponds to an entry found in Section 10. In several instances in this document where performance requirements are assigned, the performance metric refers to a set of functional requirements. The performance metric may be probability based or time based. In these instances, the combined set of functions must be performed within the overall probability metric or within the overall time budget for the set. In these instances, a single requirement specifies the performance metric and subsequent requirements define the individual functions to be performed within the bounds of that metric. The performance metric requirement includes a letter designator (e.g.

[A]) and each functional requirement in the set of corresponding functions is followed by the letter designator in square brackets. Each paragraph ends with a unique identifier, <SS_xxxx>, for reference purposes. <SS_7477>

1.2 Overview Discussion

1.2.1 ASoS Program Description

ASoS represents a fundamental change in how air defense forces will be configured and deployed. ASoS will provide the capability to form operational task forces that are tailored for a specific mission profile. The netted and distributed architecture provides the flexibility to establish a multi-echelon common command and control capability that enables dynamic battlefield reconfiguration of the task force in order to adjust to a changing environment. ASoS integrates Air and Missile Defense (AMD) components (current and future sensors and weapons) with an ASoS developed IAMD Battle Command System (IBCS). The IBCS capability provides the communications network and distributed command and fire control functionality that enables the net-centric ASoS architecture. Existing sensor and weapon components will be integrated with the IBCS capability. In order for non-ASoS (i.e., legacy) systems to interoperate with an ASoS task force, the IBCS will provide backward compatibility via legacy interfaces such as Link 16. IBCS Track Management (TM) functionality provides distributed data fusion of measurement level sensor data for situation awareness, track evaluation, and engagement. This distributed TM capability is one of the key enablers for extended range and non line-of-sight intercept of aerial threats using fire control quality data with the most appropriate weapon to successfully complete the mission. The net-centric architecture allows deployment and employment of Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations (METT-TC) tailored forces of mixed sensors and weapons that are all controlled through the IBCS. The network-enabled architecture and IBCS will enable dynamic defense design and task force reorganizations as conditions on the battlefield change while continuing with ongoing tactical operations. IBCS provides the capability for interdependent, network-centric operations that link Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense protection to the supported force scheme of operations and maneuver. Additionally, it encompasses the full range of command and fire control functions AMD forces must execute as part of their battlefield integration mission (internal to the AMD warfighting entity task force, battery, or platoon team), as well as between the AMD warfighting entity and the supported force and the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) IAMD. At each echelon, ASoS command and control will be similar in configuration and capabilities while tailored to allow for organizing AMD forces in accordance with METT-TC. At lower echelons, ASoS command and control will consist of a minimal number of vehicles with a standardized configuration housing the components. At higher echelons, additional shelters and vehicles may be added to enable the broader mission of the higher echelon commensurate with that echelon's span of control and wartime mission. <SS_197>

1.2.2 IAMD ASoS Definition

The IAMD architecture includes the common battle command functionality in the ASoS Command Post along with the ASoS Sensor and Weapon Platforms: the IAMD Battle Command Systems (IBCS) Command Post at all Army AMD echelons; Sensors - including the ASoS Patriot Sensor and ASoS Improved Sentinel which belong to a task force, and THAAD, which is separately deployed and can provide Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) track data;

Weapons - including the family of interceptors associated with the Patriot system and the family of interceptors associated with the ASoS Multi-Mission Launcher that may be task organized with ASoS sensors and command and control. There may be multiple instances of these participants, including either one or more ASoS Command Posts (CP) controlling the Task Force which can vary in size from a minimum engagement package to a battalion task force. The Plug and Fight Interface capability for non-CP components is provided via an integrated Plug and Fight Kit or by co-location with a CP or relay that contains the Plug and Fight Interface Functionality, to create the netted, distributed / net-centric architecture.

<SS_12723>

ASoS will provide enhanced capabilities listed below:

a. Common Net-Centric AMD Battle Command with an expanded IFC Engage on Remote (EOR) capability that can use sensor data from one or more sensors to support engagement from one or more weapons

b. Common Net-Centric AMD Battle Command will provide the capability to implement the engagement concept referred to as Engage on Network (EON) that employs the use of fire control quality data within the Integrated Fire Control Network to conduct an engagement.

c. Initial wide area, layered defense vs. Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) and Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBMs)

d. AMD Situational Awareness/Situational Understanding (SA/SU) for JIIM with enhanced net centric Common Operational Picture at all echelons

e. 360-degree extended range Cruise Missile (CM)/Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) engagements

f. Common joint track management process for development, support and maintenance of a common Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP), providing an air picture at each component capable of supporting autonomous functions serving the net

g. Enhanced Combat Identification (CID)

h. Improved intra- and inter- service communications and data distribution <SS_195>

The IAMD program will employ an incremental acquisition approach to develop and field required capabilities. The Army IAMD program will network existing systems by networking the components (sensors and weapons) using Plug and Fight interface kits; while future weapon and sensor components will be designed to be integrated as components within the ASoS architecture. IAMD capabilities will address the five overarching capability gaps identified in the Joint, Interagency, Multi-National Air and Missile Defense Mission Area (JAMA) Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) as shown below:

1. Cannot defeat the full spectrum of potential air and missile attacks on the homeland.

2. Cannot adequately defend Combatant Commander (COCOM) critical assets against the array of cruise missile, ballistic missile and rockets, artillery and mortar (RAM) threats.

3. Inability to adequately protect Joint maneuvering forces from reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition threats.

4. Inability to effectively or efficiently integrate Joint, Interagency and Multinational air and missile defense capabilities

5. Cannot readily deploy (inter-theater) or rapidly transport (intra-theater) theater missile defense systems. <SS_196>

1.2.2.1 Net-Centric Architecture

The architecture of the ASoS will be net-centric & jointly extensible to support a logical measurement-based composite track fusion capability at all nodes, including functionality that is distributed in such a manner as to enable the processing and distribution of information in order to ensure that resources (sensor, weapon, CP) perform their operations in support of the needs of the local & logical net rather than only in support of a single command structure.

Thus resources are available to serve the net. Sensors and weapons will be available for dynamic tasking by any authorized CP (e.g., to support tracking or interceptor datalink needs).

The CP-launcher relationship (ownership) can be changed dynamically. Launchers will be available to be commanded through a single command chain. The architecture distributes functionality among the CPs and Plug and Fight Kits in order to facilitate this net-centricity.

This means that the IAMD architecture will function as a system of components (CPs and sensors and weapon platforms enabled by Plug and Fight capabilities) that can be deployed in any combination as needed to support mission accomplishment. A CP that has the ‘control relationship’ with a launcher (or group of launchers) will be able to command the launch of a missile from that launcher. <SS_12724>

1.2.2.2 Plug and Fight Interface Functionality Distribution

There are several types of sensor and weapon component situations for Plug and Fight interface kit integration that exist in the ASoS. Primarily there are three types of roles that ASoS sensor and weapon platforms play in the architecture. Consequently, the Plug and Fight Kit functionality will need to support those ‘roles’. Those roles are ‘sensor’ (providing track data to the IFC Net), ‘weapon’ (providing missile launch capability) and ‘interceptor datalink support’ (providing interceptor datalink support to a missile in flight). With the platforms of the ASoS, there are both pure enactment of these roles and combinations of these roles. The ASoS Improved Sentinel fulfills only the ‘sensor’ role. The Patriot Launcher control capability fulfills only the ‘weapon’ role (acting in this manner as an IFC net interface to the Patriot Launchers). The ASoS Multi-Mission launcher fulfills the ‘weapon’ and ‘interceptor datalink’ roles. And finally, the ASoS Patriot Sensor fulfills the ‘sensor’ and ‘interceptor datalink support’ roles. It is envisioned that an independent interceptor data link device will be developed that can be used for interceptor data link support to interceptors in flight thereby providing greater flexibility for launcher and sensor placement. <SS_12725>

1.2.3 ASoS Mission

ASoS enables the ASoS Task Force (TF) to detect, acquire, identify, destroy, or nullify, and conduct kill assessment of aerial threats with emphasis on deterring or defeating TBMs (SRBM and MRBM), CMs, Air to Surface Missiles (ASMs), UASs, manned platforms, and Large Caliber Rocket (LCRs) in a netted and distributed theater of operations. <SS_8848>

ASoS contributes to third dimensional SA/SU. This includes actions and capabilities that provide visualization and understanding of activities or events occurring in the third dimension battlespace. Situational awareness encompasses seeing and knowing the airspace and the objects that fly or may fly in the airspace as part of a Common Operational Picture (COP)/ Common Tactical Picture (CTP). Situational understanding is applying analysis and judgment to the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) and the COP/CTP, in order to draw timely and accurate METT-TC conclusions. <SS_8854>

ASoS contributes to airspace management. This includes actions and capabilities that enable fires and manned and unmanned airspace users in the JIIM environment while protecting friendly forces, ensuring the synchronized use of airspace, and enhancing the battle command of forces using that airspace. <SS_8855>

ASoS contributes to operational force protection. This includes performing actions and capabilities that support and synchronize JIIM and Army contributions to the overall defensive protection stance. <SS_8856>

1.2.4 Definitions

1.2.4.1 Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense System of Systems

A “system” that encompasses common command and control; radars, sensors, communications, generators, launchers, missiles, etc. being brought forward into the ASoS environment with or without modifications, and the new components that are under development; and provides the capability to defeat Air and Missile threats to the tactical and operational theater mission forces. <SS_6103>

1.2.4.2 ASoS Command and Control

The ASoS C2 described in this System Specification will be a component of a larger architecture that integrates existing and future Army and JIIM sensors and weapons for the conduct of future air and missile defense operations. The materiel solution for ASoS C2 is composed of two parts. The first part of ASoS C2 is termed the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System or IBCS. The IBCS is comprised of two subsystems: the IBCS CP and the IBCS Common Plug and Fight Interface Kits (P&F Interface Kits). The second part of ASoS C2 is the component-unique adaptation necessary to integrate sensor and launcher components with the Common IBCS P&F Interface Kits. The P&F-enabled components of the architecture are connected via an Integrated Fire Control Net or IFC-Net.

The IFC-Net consists of the transport layer (radios) and associated net management software resident in the IBCS Common P&F Interface Kits. <SS_7457>

1.2.4.3 ASoS Task Force

A temporary grouping of AMD units equipped with ASoS components, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific AMD operation or mission. <SS_6125>

1.2.4.4 IBCS Command Posts

Configurable facilities used by ASoS commanders to control task force operations and conduct staff activities. Configurable CPs will support commanders as they organize to meet changing situations and requirements of different operations. IBCS CPs will be configurable to support Army AMD mission command operations from platoon to the AAMDC. <SS_6107>

Commanders organize their CPs with functional and integrating cells, as defined below, and man these cells with personnel from their staff sections. <SS_730>

Integrating cells group personnel and equipment to facilitate functional cell activities.

Additional definition of integrating cells can be found in Field Manual 6.0 and the AMD Task Force Concept of Operations. <SS_6809>

The Current Operations Integrating Cell is responsible for assessing the current operations and processing engagements. The functions of the Current Operations Integrating Cell include:

a. conducting the on-going air battle,

b. assisting subordinate units,

c. performing short term planning in response to changing operational conditions and battlefield dynamics,

d. planning and supporting execution of unit and force protection services,

e. providing changes in enemy status, air and missile defense warnings, and observed trends in enemy actions, and

f. conducting logistics, maintenance, and personnel functions. <SS_3560>

The Plans Integrating Cell is responsible for the planning activity that focuses on “the next battle.”

The functions of the Plans Integrating Cell include:

a. receipt, analysis and decomposition of higher headquarters orders,

b. receipt of commander's guidance

c. development of products and schedules to drive the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) through all staff sections

d. development, evaluation, and recommendations of courses of action (COA)

e. IPB to estimate enemy capabilities, intents, limitations, and operating parameters

f. development of personnel and logistics estimates for the courses of action bei