Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Response Risk Assessment Process for Chemical Incidents (September 2018).pdf

LLNL-TR-758734

Response Risk Assessment Process for Chemical Incidents

C. G. Campbell, B. Greenwalt, E. Raber, S. Mancieri, M. Dillon, P. Roy, H. Byrnes, S. Harris, K. Heidecker

September 24, 2018

Disclaimer

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.

i

Disclaimer

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is operated by Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.

ii

Department of Homeland Security Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Mark Kirk

Dev Jani

Puneet Khan

CAPT Michael Schwartz

Bobby Baker

CAPT Joselito Ignacio

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

CONTRIBUTORS

Chris G. Campbell

Robert Greenwalt

Ellen Raber

Sav Mancieri

Michael Dillon

Kamalpal (Paul) Roy

Heather Byrnes

Steve Harris

Kelly Heidecker iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary

1.0 Introduction 1

1.1 Background

1.2 How to Use This Document

2.0 The Response Risk Assessment (RRA) Process

2.1 Overview

3.0 Planning and Preparation

3.1 Identify Critical Stakeholders/Partners

3.2 Scoping Meeting

3.3 Kick-off Meeting

3.4 Establishing the Scenario

3.5 Information Gathering

4.0 Facilitated Focus Groups

4.1 Overview

4.2 Establish Meetings Required for Information Gathering

4.3 Define Objectives for Specific Meetings

4.4 Engaging/Scheduling Meetings

4.5 Facilitator Teams

4.6 Discussion Format

4.7 Initial Research Validation

4.8 Documentation

5.0 Collecting Information

5.1 Overview

5.2 Handling Sensitive Information

5.3 GatherING Information

5.4 Resources Used to Gather Data

5.5 Information Required from Geographical Areas or Venues

6.0 Using the RRA Dashboard to Input GATHEREd Information

6.1 Overview

6.2 How to use the RRA Dashboard

7.0 Informational Workshop

7.1 Overview

7.2 Present Results of Initial RRA

7.3 Capabilities Analysis

7.4 Initial Response Action Validation

7.5 Additional Documentation

file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-21-18.docx%23_Toc525296132 iv

7.6 Initial Workshop After-Action Report

8.0 Discussion-Based Tabletop Exercise Planning

8.1 Overview

8.2 Structure of Tabletop Exercise

8.3 Facilitator/Moderator Roles and Responsibilities

8.4 After-Action Report (AAR) & Lessons Learned

8.5 Identify Action Items, Priority, & Responsible Owner(s)

9.0 Enhancements

10.0 References ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 47

11.0 Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

Attachment A: Example Partners/Stakeholders List

Attachment B: Leverage Areas and Critical Actions

Attachment C: Kick-Off Meeting Agenda

Attachment D: Kick-Off Meeting Example Presentation

Attachment E: Pre-Questionnaire Library

Attachment F: RRA Dashboard Information Requirements

Attachment G: Sample Stakeholder R&R Data Request Form

Attachment H: Sample Informational Workshop Presentation

Attachment I: Template for Informational Workshop After-Action Report

Attachment J: Template for Tabletop Exercise After-Action Report v

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure ES-1. RRA Operational Framework and Overarching Critical Tasks

Figure 1-1. Components of the Nationals Preparedness System diagram from the DHS Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide - Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, illustrating the emergency response planning cycle (2012)

Figure 1-2. The three steps of the THIRA process (CPG 201, 2018)

Figure 2-1. Timeline/Flow of RRA Meetings Related to Seven Key RRA Process Actions

Figure 2-2. The Response Risk Assessment process is comprised of seven key actions

Figure 5-1. RRA information needs illustrated as the intersection of time, resources, and conditions in the area

Figure 6-1. RRA Dashboard concept of gathering inputs to produce standardized outputs for discussion.

Figure 6-2. RRA Dashboard initial startup worksheet page

Figure 6-3. RRA Dashboard Specific Scenario data entry page for internal scenario

Figure 6-4. RRA Dashboard Specific Scenario data entry page for external scenario

Figure 6-5. RRA Dashboard Community Capabilities data entry page

Figure 6-6. RRA Dashboard Community Capabilities data entry page (continued)

Figure 6-7. RRA Dashboard Emergency Warning data entry page for internal scenarios

Figure 6-8. RRA Dashboard Emergency Warning data entry page for external scenarios

Figure 6-9. RRA Dashboard Fire Assignments data entry page

Figure 6-10. RRA Dashboard HAZMAT Capabilities data entry page

Figure 6-11. RRA Dashboard Medical Assignments data entry page

Figure 6-12. RRA Dashboard Transportation Assignments data entry page

Figure 6-13. RRA Dashboard Output - Critical Task Timing/Resource Summary

Figure 6-14. RRA Dashboard Output - Summary Plots file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220518 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220518 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220518 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220518 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220520 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220521 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220522 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220522 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220523 file://///dopad-fs/dopad/EFA/Special%20Projects/DHS%20Projects/RRA%202018/RRA%20Templates/Document%20Sections/Consolidated%20DRAFTS/DHS%20Final%20COMMENTS/Final%20From%20TID/FINAL%20RRA%20Process%20for%20Chemical%20Incidents_09-20-18_tc_HGB.docx%23_Toc525220523 vi

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 3-1. Summary of Select Modeling Systems

Table 4-1. Facilitator Team Roles and Responsibilities

Table 5-1. Timing of Critical Actions and Decisions

Table 5-2. Information to be Gathered During Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Response Periods

Table 5-3. Example Planning and Response Agencies

Table 5-4. Potential Resources for Background Research and Information Gathering

Table 8-1: Possible Meeting Attendees

Table 8-2: Facilitator Teams for Tabletop Exercise

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has invested significant effort to assess whether cities and communities across the nation have the capabilities to respond effectively in the event of a potential chemical hazard release, terrorist attack, or natural disaster. The DHS strategy per Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) is articulated in the National Preparedness Goal (2015) and efforts to achieve that goal require a capabilities-based planning approach.

In an effort to assess these capabilities, Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL) received funding from DHS to develop a Response Risk Assessment (RRA) process for potential chemical hazard events. The objective of the RRA process is to gather the essential information and data to evaluate limitations in overall response capabilities using rigorous quantitative analyses that focus on minimizing casualties. At the end of the process, a city or venue should be equipped with the actions it needs to take to meet capability standards articulated under the DHS national preparedness strategy.

The RRA process uses the operational framework displayed in Figure ES-1 as a model to examine the emergency response system in detail, from initiation of an incident through definitive medical care. This operational framework is consistent with DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Response Frameworks, particularly the core capabilities, Emergency Support Functions (ESF) (DHS, 2016) and National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) (DHS, 2017). The process framework is also consistent with the mission of the Department of Homeland Security Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office (DHS, 2018).

Figure ES-1. RRA Operational Framework and Overarching Critical Tasks

Five municipalities across the nation worked with LLNL and DHS to implement demonstration projects that took place in partnership with local agencies, organizations, and other key stakeholders at the state and federal levels. Following the conclusion of the demonstration projects, LLNL prepared this document as a manual to guide users in implementing a Response Risk Assessment (RRA) for potential chemical hazard events.

In addition to providing the background and foundation of the RRA approach, this document takes the reader through each part of the entire RRA process. Key timelines, meetings, and analysis actions are discussed and summarized in tables and figures.

Critical information requirements to establish response timelines, assess population exposure, and consider capacity limitations that could increase casualties are presented in a manner that the RRA facilitator may employ to guide discussions with partners. Community partners may then establish actions for continual improvement in emergency response planning.

To get facilitators off to a running start, examples of materials, tools, questionnaires, presentations, and templates used in an RRA are provided in the Attachments. They are encouraged to freely use and duplicate these materials.

Finally, the document includes a summary of RRA enhancement areas and improvement opportunities identified by individuals, agencies, municipalities, and organizations involved in the demonstration projects. These nine enhancements are highlighted in Section 9.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

To ensure that the United States is prepared to respond effectively to a potential chemical hazard release, terrorist attack, or natural disaster, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established a set of National Preparedness Priorities that focuses on a capabilities-based planning approach (DHS, 2006). Capabilities-based planning focuses on planning under uncertainty, since the next danger or disaster can never be forecast with complete accuracy. As a result, the nation has been engaged in planning and preparing for the full spectrum of existing hazards—a process which builds capabilities that can be applied to a wide variety of incidents.

Capabilities-based planning is used to identify a baseline assessment of homeland security efforts by comparing current capabilities against the Core Capabilities List defined in the DHS National Response Framework (DHS, 2013) and the critical tasks associated with those Core Capabilities. This approach identifies gaps in current capabilities and focuses efforts on identifying and developing priority capabilities and tasks. These priority capabilities are articulated in a homeland security strategy and Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan outlined in the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) (DHS, 2013). The 2013 HSEEP report defines the Core Capabilities as “distinct critical elements necessary to achieve the specific mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.”

In 2012, Congress appropriated DHS funding to conduct demonstration projects (as part of HSEEP) to analyze community-level response capabilities during an emergency chemical hazard release. Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL) was tasked with developing a DHS Response Risk Assessment (RRA) process (with objectives linked to the Core Capabilities), develop a Chemical Defense Framework, and team up with local jurisdictions to carry out these projects in the field. As a result, LLNL and DHS established partnerships with five cities chosen from a competitive field of municipal applicants as the demonstration project locations.

Each of these projects had a slightly different focus. Three out of the five (Baltimore, Houston, and Boise) included a comprehensive risk assessment, which included a threat, vulnerability, and consequence analysis. Each demonstration project concluded the project by implementing a Tabletop Exercise (TTX). These exercises, designed to test community response capabilities based on a chemical hazard release scenario, provided the nation’s community emergency managers and first responders with additional knowledge, skills, and tools to act swiftly and competently, protect lives, and restore peace of mind in response to a large-scale chemical incident. This document has been developed as a follow-up effort to those demonstration projects. It summarizes the necessary steps to analyze response capabilities in a user-friendly format that includes templates and guidance tools.

The RRA process is also consistent with the mission of the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, which it describes as “to counter attempts by terrorists or other threat actors to carry out an attack against the United States or its interests using a weapon of mass destruction.” In particular, the RRA process meets the CWMD strategic goals to enhance national capabilities, support partnerships and close capability gaps, and to develop innovative technologies to meet partner requirement and improve operations (DHS, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2018).

1.1 BACKGROUND

The strategic foundation for the RRA was established through the National Preparedness Goal (DHS, 2015), an initiative that established the National Preparedness System aimed at achieving community-wide preparedness throughout the country.

Figure 1-1. Components of the National Preparedness System diagram from the DHS Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide - Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, illustrating the emergency response planning cycle (2012).

Response planning in the National Preparedness System must be viewed as a continuous cycle as illustrated in Figure 1-1. Identifying potential risk and hazards in combination with scenario-based analysis leads to estimating capacity requirements. Estimating those requirements is followed by building and planning for the resources required to implement an effective response. Then, the capabilities must be tested and validated.

That involves not only assessing current needs and capabilities, but also challenging and continuously improving upon core capacities. The improvement opportunities may then be incorporated into risk identification and capability planning to strengthen emergency response.

The RRA process is most closely associated with the Identifying & Assessing Risk, Estimating Capability Requirements, and Validating Capabilities components of the National Preparedness System (Figure 1-1).

Its focus is to examine response capabilities and perform a detailed review to generate requirements, thereby informing the development of solutions throughout all five mission areas of the DHS National Preparedness Goal (DHS, 2015), but particularly in prevention, protection, and response.

The specific approach of the RRA process evolved from the DHS Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process (Figure 1-2), a guidance that was developed to implement the Identifying & Assessing Risk section of the National Prevention System. [THIRA is fully outlined in the agency’s third edition of the THIRA and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 (DHS, 2018)].

Consequently, the approach driving the RRA process is most easily described using the THIRA flow diagram in Figure 1-2 below. It has three major steps:

◼ Identify threats and hazards of concern

◼ Give threats and hazards context

◼ Establish capability targets

Figure 1-2. The three steps of the THIRA process (CPG 201, 2018)

Step 1 is a data gathering step focused on the unique factors of the community. It is broken into three subcategories identifying sources, possible agents, and possible community areas of concern (“targets”).

Step 2 combines the data into a set of realistic scenarios.

Step 3 examines the community’s response system and compares against the scenarios to select those that will challenge critical parts of the system to allow analysis and gap identification. For this reason, the scenarios selected may not be those considered the most likely, but instead are those possible scenarios that pose the most difficulty.

Pre-incident planning is critical for an effective RRA and must be based upon credible scenarios and information that has the appropriate level of confidence, such as quantities of deployable resources associated with an implementable emergency response plan. Exercising response plans help to identify opportunities for continual improvements that enhance the plan’s effectiveness. As established in the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201 (2018), response planning must be viewed as a continuous cycle as illustrated in Figure 1-1.

1.2 HOW TO USE THIS DOCUMENT

This document is organized as a manual to train facilitators how to implement a comprehensive RRA for a given geographical area or venue. It was developed as a follow-up effort to the RRA demonstration projects conducted by LLNL in five cities across the United States. The document summarizes the necessary steps a team needs to take to analyze a geographical area or venue’s response capabilities. In addition, the document includes many of the materials (such as templates, guidance tools, and checklists) used in the process. It also trains the user how to input gathered information into the RRA dashboard tool by showing a series of screenshots of the dashboard and data entry points.

The facilitator should follow all the steps outlined in this process to ensure that the RRA is both complete and consistent with the standard procedures of conducting RRAs across diverse range of geographical areas, communities, specific venues, and/or specific threats. However, simply following procedures alone will not ensure a successful completion of the RRA. A thorough effort by the facilitator to gather the required information is essential to establish a credible scenario and execute a rigorous RRA for discussion with key partners/stakeholders.

Following the introductory section, this document presents the RRA process in the following sections:

The RRA Process, Planning and Preparation, Facilitated Focus Group Implementation, Collecting Information, Entering Data into the RRA Dashboard, Informational Workshop, and Tabletop Exercise

Planning. Instructions on implementing the tabletop exercise—the last event in the RRA process—is not covered in full, as it is beyond the scope of this document’s focus.

Because the RRA process involves several key actions taking place concurrently, the document includes cross-references in order to provide facilitators with a “big picture” look at what needs to take place during each stage of the process.

2.0 THE RESPONSE RISK ASSESSMENT (RRA) PROCESS

2.1 OVERVIEW

The RRA process is designed to evaluate the capacity and the capabilities of venues and geographical areas to respond to a chemical spill or release. The evaluation is implemented through gathering information using research, direct interaction, and facilitated focus group discussions with partners and stakeholders. Next, that information is entered into a RRA dashboard tool that the assessment team can use to conduct specific analyses in a range of areas. These analyses identify a venue or geographical area’s capacity limitations by measuring to what degree it could properly respond to the spill/release (based on current capabilities) in the event of a hypothetical yet realistic scenario developed by the facilitators.

As illustrated in Figure 2-1 below, various meetings with different purposes and objectives are required to implement the RRA process. These include the scoping meeting, kick-off meeting, facilitated focus groups, and informational workshop, all of which lead to a tabletop exercise that uses a scenario to test a venue or geographical area’s response capabilities. In addition, there are seven actions that are key to completing RRAs: Initial Research, Partner Engagement, Problem Definition, Information Gathering, Information Vetting, Capabilities Analysis, and Capabilities Testing. The “Seven Key Actions” row in Figure 2-1 shows that many actions overlap with one another, meaning that at many points in the RRA process, up to four actions may be taking place concurrently (such as during the kick-off meeting and facilitated focus group sessions).

The RRA project team will engage the partners/stakeholders through a series of structured meetings summarized in Figure 2-1. The partners/stakeholders that attend the scoping meeting will suggest additional attendees for each of the subsequent meetings (See Attachment A for a list of possible partners/stakeholders). The meetings should accomplish the following tasks: 1) establish the focus of the project, 2) gather the critical information required for the RRA, and 3) analyze capability limitations.

The RRA process starts with a scoping meeting (convened by the host entity) and is followed by a kick-off meeting. Other key activities taking place in these early stages include conducting initial research, defining the problem, and gathering information to prepare for the facilitated focus groups. Note that the information gathering stage (which takes place from the scoping period all the way through to the conclusion of the informational workshop) is by far the largest and serves as the foundation for all work that follows.

One major part of the information gathering period is the facilitated focus groups. They provide the opportunity for additional information gathering, validation of current knowledge, assessment of existing capabilities, and the continued building of cooperation and trust among key partners/stakeholders. These facilitated focus group discussions will be followed by informational workshops that bring together all key partners/stakeholders to review potential system-wide response limitations.

Figure 2-1. Timeline/Flow of RRA Meetings Related to Seven Key RRA Process Actions

Meetings Scoping Kick-Off Facilitated

Focus Groups Informational

Workshop Tabletop Exercise

Objective(s)

Meet with project sponsor and initially identified partners/ stakeholders to focus the RRA process and identify additional partners/ stakeholders.

Establish rapport and project acceptance with community/ venue leaders and decision makers.

Agree on RRA project needs and scope.

Meet in focused groups of decision makers and boots-on-the-ground type professionals organized by ESF or type of contribution to response efforts.

Gather information on response capabilities.

Validate gathered information by discussing inputs and results of a prepared initial RRA. Analyze resource interdependencies and identify opportunities to expand capabilities.

Test response capabilities using a predefined scenario.

Scenario is given to attendees at beginning of meeting and RRA is conducted through discussion of response actions.

Identify response limitations and establish improvement actions.

Attendees

• Core RRA Team

• Project Sponsor

• Initially Identified Partners /

Stakeholders

• Core RRA Team

• Expanded Partners &

Stakeholders

• Community/

Venue Leaders

• Decision Makers

• Larger RRA

Team

• Decision makers

• Boots-on-the-ground professionals

• Larger RRA

Team

• Expanded Partners/

Stakeholders

• Community/

Venue Leaders

• Decision Makers

• Larger RRA

Team

• Expanded Partners/

Stakeholders

• Community/

Venue Leaders

• Decision Makers

Seven Key

Actions

Initial Research

Partner Engagement

Problem Definition

Information Gathering

Information Vetting

Capabilities Analysis

Capabilities Testing

The process depicted in Figure 2-1 supports gathering the information required for the outputs summarized in the seven key actions of the RRA process. Figure 2-2 below illustrates the structure of the process through the seven key actions, which are listed in blue boxes across the top of the figure. The main activities that must be accomplished for each key action are listed in the underlying columns.

Figure 2-2. The Response Risk Assessment process is comprised of seven key actions

Identify Key Aspects of

City/Venue

Identify Scenario

Options

Invite Decision Makers &

Stakeholders

Review Regulatory & Emergency Management

Jurisdiction

Collect Capacity/Capability Targets & Estimates

Information Vetting

Initial Assessment of

Available Plans, Capacities/ capabilities, &

Resources

Perform Modeling & Calculations for Exposure

Footprint for Scenarios

Identify Response Limitations

Challenge Response

Capacities/ Capabilities

Analyze Resources

Interdependencies

Initial Research

Vet & Refine Scenarios With

Stakeholders

Identify Capacity/ Capability

Limitations

RESPONSE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Information Gathering

Partner Engagement

Problem Definition

Engage Partners for Project

Acceptance

Establish Scenario(s)

Capability Analysis

Establish Response

Capacities/ Capabilities

Explore Response

Limitations (choke points)

Prepare Initial Questionnaire

Define Potential Chemical

Incident(s)

Identify ID Critical Infrastructure, Potential

Targets, Supporting Infrastructure, & Vulnerable

Populations

Assess proximity to potentially hazardous exposure

Identify Local Chemical

Inventories

Identify Key Decision Makers

& Stakeholders

Capability Testing

Test Response Capacity/

Capability Limitations

Establish Improvement

Actions

Agree on Project Needs and

Scope

Agreements & Improvement

Plans

Prioritize Improvement

Actions

Specifically, RRA is a process that examines the emergency response systems in a community that are called upon when responding to a mass casualty chemical incident. It assumes an incident has occurred and identifies those functions which will be overwhelmed, a dynamic that causes additional risk to the impacted population. The RRA procedure addresses the four overarching leverage areas highlighted in Figure ES-1 (Prime the Pump, Early Recognition, Stop the Exposure, and Treat the Wounded) through an operational framework (also featured in Figure ES-1) that assists in defining agency roles, critical actions, and associated tasks.

The Operational Framework is a model to examine the emergency response system in detail, from initiation of an incident through definitive medical care. This framework is consistent with DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s National Response Frameworks, particularly the core capabilities, Emergency Support Functions (ESF) (National Response Frameworks, 2013) and National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) (NIMS, 2017). (See Attachment B for a cross-reference between critical actions of the RRA Operational Framework, FEMA Core Capabilities, and primary ESF).

This manual presents the RRA process in the following sections: Planning and Preparation, Focus Group Implementation, Collecting Information, Entering Data Into the RRA Dashboard, Informational Workshop, and Tabletop Exercise Planning. Instructions on how to implement the tabletop exercise— the last event in the process—is not covered as it is beyond the scope of this manual’s focus.

3.0 PLANNING AND PREPARATION

The project team begins the RRA process by convening a series of meetings with the project sponsor, project team, and project coordinators for the geographical area or venue as necessary. This sets the stage, establishes rapport, and builds effective working relationships. However, even before the first meeting takes place, the facilitator and core team must take stock of the greater community that have overlapping or similar mandates concerning chemical risk planning and emergency response.

3.1 IDENTIFY CRITICAL STAKEHOLDERS/PARTNERS

As a first step, the project team should craft a contact list for key partners and stakeholders, including participants from applicable federal, state, and local agencies. Regional and multi-agency commissions, task groups, and non-governmental entities should also be included if their participation is key to addressing resource or knowledge gaps. This “whole community” approach ensures all aspects of a community’s response network are included and addressed. Based on stakeholder input, the project team develops an initial Roles, Responsibilities, and Resources (R&R) matrix for the participating agencies, which will be vetted by the stakeholders/partners (at the informational workshop) prior to the final Tabletop Exercise (TTX).

At the conclusion of the kick-off meeting (detailed in Section 3.3), the project team will have a more complete list of partners/stakeholders to contact for follow-up focus group meetings (detailed in Section 4). These partners/stakeholders will include applicable federal, state, regional, and local government agencies, private sector partners (e.g., large venue management, industrial facilities) and relevant non-profit organizations. Regional and multi-agency commissions or task groups should also be included if their participation is key to addressing resource or knowledge gaps among the other partner agencies.

3.2 SCOPING MEETING

The scoping meeting is the initial gathering of the sponsor, RRA project team, and project coordinators.

It is the first opportunity for the project sponsor to meet face-to-face with key identified project coordinators for the geographical area or venue hosting the project. During this meeting, the project sponsor will work with the project coordinators to define the RRA objectives, develop a list of potential additional participating agencies based on the scope of the project [i.e., Office of Emergency Services (OES), Fire/Hazardous Materials, Emergency Medical Service (EMS), law enforcement, etc.], and identify the high-level agency participants that should be invited to the kick-off meeting. Additionally, the project coordinators will work with the project sponsor during the scoping meeting to establish the project schedule and develop the format for the kick-off meeting.

The facilitator, working on behalf of the project sponsor, will schedule a brief (1-2 hour) meeting between the project sponsor, the RRA project team, and the pre-identified key project coordinators for the geographical area or venue. These key project coordinators should include program leads from the geographical area or venue (i.e., local OES Preparedness program lead, local Emergency Management Agency planning lead, and the geographical area/venue’s general manager). The facilitator guides the flow of the meeting and ensures that the following goals are accomplished or scheduled for further discussion via additional meetings, teleconferences, or email.

3.2.1 Scoping Meeting Goals

1. Introduce the project and overall objectives to the project coordinators

2. Define the objectives for the planning meeting (which can be collaborative between federal and city-level agencies)

3. Collectively identify local, regional, state, and federal agencies relevant to the project scope. If available, identify point of contacts (POCs) for the kick-off meeting.

4. Establish a project schedule

5. Develop the format for the kick-off meeting (including when, where, length, presentation style, possible presenters, etc.)

3.3 KICK-OFF MEETING

The kick-off meeting is the initial contact and first official engagement for the various officials and stakeholders involved in the RRA. Goals of this meeting include establishing credibility, agreeing on the needs and scope of the analyses, obtaining acceptance with decisionmakers and stakeholders, and making contacts to identify technical stakeholders who will provide information in the following phases of the RRA. This is a meeting to decide how the RRA procedure will be performed, as well as to set the stage for improving the geographical area or venue’s response capabilities by implementing the RRA itself. It is not a place to provide analyses or solutions.

3.3.1 Kick-off Meeting Goals

1. Introduce the project and overall objectives to the partners and stakeholders

2. Employ transparency and integrity to build rapport and trust

3. Establish typical roles and responsibilities for groups and individuals involved in an RRA

4. Continue to identify local, regional, state, and federal agency POCs

5. Ensure partner resources are available for facilitated focus groups

3.3.2 Format/Participants

The kick-off meeting is typically a short (1-2 hour) meeting between the project sponsor, the core team [e.g., facilitator, technical specialist(s), logistics team lead, and any additional support personnel deemed necessary], the project coordinators, and key partners/stakeholders identified during or subsequent to the scoping meeting. At the conclusion of the kick-off meeting, the project team will have a more complete list of partners/stakeholders (agencies and/or POCs) to contact for follow-up facilitated focus group meetings. Presentations for the kick-off meeting should include, at a minimum, a welcome presentation (which would include at least one slide on the meeting objectives), and a presentation by the project sponsor. A list of the typical meeting participants is provided in Attachment A.

3.3.3 Review of Objective and Process

During the kick-off meeting, participants review the objectives of the project and the process that the RRA project team (now made up of the project sponsor, project coordinators, and the core team) has developed for accomplishing the RRA objectives. It is essential that the partners/stakeholders understand and agree to the objectives, and that they are in alignment regarding the operations plan for implementing the entire process.

When reviewing the objectives, participants discuss the internal incident management communication processes. They also assess and discuss the information-sharing capabilities between the public, private sector partners, and federal, state, regional, and local government agencies. Additionally, participants share their agency’s roles, responsibilities, and resource capabilities. It is imperative—both throughout the meeting and during all interactions—that the project sponsor and facilitator emphasize to the participants that cross-agency collaboration will be necessary. Such collaboration will ensure the project’s success, as well as generate subsequent benefits to the community as a whole.

The facilitator guides the agenda and flow of the meeting, following the format for the kick-off meeting established during the scoping meeting. (A kick-off meeting agenda template and example presentation template are included in Attachments C and D. The presentation can be modified to meet the needs of the specific RRA and kick-off meeting).

At a minimum, the presentation should include project goals and objectives, local/venue maps and pictures, and current demographic information.

3.3.4 Agenda

Kick-off meetings should include the following topics:

1. Welcome and introductions (project sponsor, RRA project team, project coordinators, partners/stakeholders)

2. Operational security [classification of project materials, how to handle Federal For Official Use Only (FOUO) information, protecting shared information]

3. Meeting objectives

4. Project introduction and objectives (presented by project sponsor)

5. Review of roles, responsibilities, and resource capabilities of relevant agencies

6. Discussion of key concerns from participants, as well as what they hope to gain from participation in the project

7. Identification of a wider selection of key participants and agency POC

Based on input (given from partners/stakeholders) during the kick-off meeting regarding roles, responsibilities, and resources, the project team develops an initial R&R matrix for the partners/ stakeholders. This matrix will be vetted during facilitiated focus groups that are held prior to the informational workshop.

3.4 ESTABLISHING THE SCENARIO

Prior to collecting information from the facilitated focus groups, an initial scenario is developed. This initial scenario will determine the relevant RRA participants, as well as the nature of the information that will be needed from each participant. A credible initial scenario is developed with a sophisticated understanding and knowledge of the geographical area or venue involved, potential chemical hazards in the area, established emergency response scenarios in existing plans, general weather conditions, and major population areas nearby. When facilitators have the proper security clearances, it is recommended to engage the Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC), a

DHS facility that may be able to provide relevant Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA) materials.

While specific CTRA results are classified, a Subject Matter Expert (SME) may review the material and assist in determining if initial generalized scenarios could be credible.

The facilitator gathers the information required for the RRA based on the initial draft scenario. For example, required information will be different depending on whether the exercise is planned for an incident occurring at an outdoor venue versus inside a building or facility. The necessary data and information will also depend on the chemical(s) of concern and exposure pathway(s). This document has been prepared to facilitate the collection of information required to complete a rigorous RRA.

Prior to the facilitated focus groups, simple scenario modeling is required to display a contamination plume and assess population exposure. ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres), an EPA hazard modeling program commonly used to plan for and respond to chemical emergencies, can be used for this purpose. This document discusses model selection and compares some of the more common approaches used to generate plots, as well as the information required for the selected scenario. Model inputs will include the release location, chemical hazard(s), wind speed and direction, weather conditions, and other pertinent details associated with the release. Output plots, overlaid on maps, should show an example of the extent of potentially impacted population(s) and exposure levels.

This information will help facilitate discussion with partners and stakeholders (USEPA, 2017).

3.4.1 Initial Scenario Modeling

To help gather information needed to conduct a meaningful RRA, the RRA project team prepares a set of draft scenarios to review during the facilitated focus group discussions. Developing an initial scenario is an effective tool to drive discussions with partners/stakeholders on how a geographical area or venue can improve its emergency response procedures. By working through the scenario and reflecting upon lessons learned from the emergency response effort, partners/stakeholders will identify pertinent information for the RRA on potential areas of improvement. The example to the right (Scenario #1) illustrates the benefits of this exercise.

As capability-based planning requires a collection of diverse scenarios, the draft scenarios should reflect a range of chemicals (and their release amounts/rates), locations, weather conditions (such as wind direction), times of day, seasons, and/or special events (such as major sporting events)—as well as hone in on specific chemicals, locations, and release scenarios.

Using one or more modeling systems (see next paragraph), visual aids and other products should be created. The specific aids that are developed should be determined from needs that are identified from the focus groups. These could include:

◼ plots that show the chemical exposure (in the form of a plume) on a map (commonly used)

◼ videos showing how the chemical plume evolves over time

◼ maps of casualty risks (the likelihood that an injury or fatality will occur at a given location)

◼ casualty maps (expected number of people injured or killed at various locations)

It can be helpful to integrate these aids into a geographic display system (such as Esri [Earth Science Research Institute] Geographic Information Mapping system software or the Google Earth online tool) so focus group participants can examine the potential impacts in particular areas. Other modeling analyses (in the form of data/information/presentations) that may be of interest include the total number of people potentially affected, locations in which sensors are expected to be triggered, the expected number of casualties, and the response and medical system loads (e.g., 911 calls, hospital beds, emergency room visits). Finally, it can be helpful to develop aids that show the potential outcomes for various critical decisions (e.g., sheltering).

Develop the visual aids using one or more modeling systems and modelers. As there is no single modeling system that is best for all scenarios and product types, care should be taken to select the most appropriate resources to use based on the nature of the draft scenarios and desired products. The next few paragraphs briefly summarize some important considerations when selecting the modeling system/modeler. Table 3-1 below provides a brief summary of select modeling systems and tools. This summary is not comprehensive; other modeling systems can also be used.

Physics-based modeling uses mathematical relationships to predict the consequences of a given scenario. These systems commonly contain the following:

◼ Source term submodel (predicts how much, how fast, and in what form the chemical is released into the environment)

◼ Fate and transport submodel (predicts where the released chemical goes, how it is transformed and diluted)

◼ Human exposure submodel (predicts how many people are expected to receive a chemical exposure)

◼ Health effect submodel (predicts the consequences of a chemical exposure)

Even within a given modeling system, these submodels can vary greatly in complexity and realism. As a general rule, the more complex and/or realistic a submodel is, the more closely its results will reflect the scenario being modeled. However, these systems require more input information and user expertise to run and correctly interpret the results. To reduce the user/modeler burden, these systems commonly rely on default information and in-house databases.

Since no model can predict the consequences of an event with complete accuracy, trade-offs are inherently built into every system. Therefore, the model’s intended purpose should be considered when evaluating the modeling system output. One important distinction is the difference between modeling “at risk” areas where consequences might occur vs. “affected” areas where consequences are likely to occur. Due to the challenge of obtaining reliable information during an emergency, many submodels intended for response are designed to predict the areas and populations that are “at risk” so that protective actions can be applied to as many potentially affected people as possible. Consequently, systems using such submodels often overpredict the size of the geographical areas and number of people who would potentially be affected.

Table 3-1. Summary of Select Modeling Systems

3.5 INFORMATION GATHERING

Although it is presented in a later section of this document, gathering the information required to complete an RRA takes place throughout the majority of the assessment process. It begins in the pre-planning (Scoping) phase and is only complete once the informational workshop has concluded (see bottom of Figure 2-1).

Modeling System

The Orange Book (Emergency Response

Guidebook)

ALOHA

(Areal Locations of

Hazardous Atmospheres)

HPAC

(Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability) Aeolus

Developer U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA)

U.S. Department of Defense / Defense Threat Reductions

Agency

(DOD/DTRA)

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

Availability Publicly available https://www.phmsa.dot.go v/hazmat/erg/emergency-response-guidebook-erg

Publicly available https://www.epa.gov/cameo/ aloha-software

Not publicly available

Request support from DTRA

Not publicly available

Request support from the

U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency

Intended User

First responders, planners

Advanced first responders, advanced planners, modelers

Advanced first responders, advanced planners, advanced modelers

LLNL modelers

Description The widely used Orange Book provides guidance on potential (at risk) impact areas and initial response actions.

Orange Book guidance is based on detailed modeling of transportation accidents, historical weather, chemical transportation patterns, and predictions of impacted areas for thousands of scenarios.

The Orange Book requires minimal scenario information and user expertise.

The ALOHA model provides scenario-specific estimates of potential (at risk) impact areas. When combined with a separate exposure submodel, ALOHA can estimate the number of people at risk.

ALOHA has moderately realistic (a) source term and

(b) fate and transport submodels.

ALOHA requires a moderate amount of scenario information and user expertise.

The HPAC model can provide scenario-specific estimates of population at risk (common) or affected

(unusual).

HPAC has a large variety of submodels that range in capability, realism, and complexity.

HPAC typically requires a significant amount of scenario information

(depends on the submodels used).

To reduce input requirements, HPAC commonly uses previously developed default information (e.g., urban terrain) and in-house databases (e.g., weather).

The Aeolus model can provide scenario-specific estimates of populations at risk (common) or affected

(unusual).

Aeolus uses an advanced fate and transport submodel to provide highly detailed estimates in complex urban areas.

To provide high-fidelity results, Aeolus requires highly detailed input information.

To reduce input requirements, Aeolus commonly uses previously developed default information (e.g., urban terrain) and in-house databases (e.g., weather).

https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/erg/emergency-response-guidebook-erg https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/erg/emergency-response-guidebook-erg https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/erg/emergency-response-guidebook-erg https://www.epa.gov/cameo/aloha-software https://www.epa.gov/cameo/aloha-software

4.0 FACILITATED FOCUS GROUPS

4.1 OVERVIEW

As a key part of the RRA process, the project team will convene several facilitated focus group meetings (each with a specific set of partner/stakeholder…