DHS Chemical Defense Strategy (December 2019).pdf

December 20, 2019

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

CHEMICAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security' s highest priority is to protect the American people from threats to their security. The DHS Chemical Defense Strategy establishes a clear strategic vision that achieves and advances our Department' s essential mission in protecting American safety and security from chemical threats and incidents.

The Nation faces a complex threat landscape, especially from the evolving nature of the chemical threat, whether from accidental release or terrorist attack. We face adversaries and technologies that are constantly evolving. The Department will build on the considerable institutional progress it has made since its formation, and seek innovative and resourceful ways to address the challenges of securing the Nation from chemical incidents. We will lead coordinated, integrated homeland security initiatives across this Nation and the globe to meet the chemical threats of today and the future. The Department's dedicated operators an~ personnel will safeguard against chemical threats both foreign and domestic, respond to national emergencies and contingencies, and preserve the Nation's prosperity and economic security.

I am pleased to present this DHS Chemical Defense Strategy.

Sincerely, Chad F. Wolf Acting Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Chemical Defense Strategy (“Strategy”) establishes a departmental approach to combating chemical threats and incidents. It implements DHS’ roles and responsibilities under current national strategic guidance, to include the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism. This Strategy connects DHS’s efforts to the larger national chemical defense apparatus—across the federal government and with state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) authorities, the private sector, and individual Americans.

DHS must understand the threat landscape and any associated risks. DHS will work with its partners in coming to common understanding of threats and to get the right information to the right people in a timely manner. DHS will use all assets at its disposal to accomplish this, including tools to pinpoint emerging threats domestically or abroad. DHS will provide early warning to the Homeland Security Enterprise as information becomes available.

DHS will examine its current and planned chemical defense-related activities to strengthen the Department’s posture. Where possible, activities will be integrated to improve efficiency and effectiveness. Where gaps exist, DHS will take measures to close them. DHS will be able to more rapidly develop and deploy capabilities as the landscape evolves.

DHS seeks to deter, detect, and disrupt chemical attacks at all points in an attack pathway, from conceptualization to use. DHS efforts will convince adversaries that their chemical attack will fail, and that if they are able to successfully carry out a chemical attack, the effects will be minimal, and they will be caught and prosecuted. DHS will restrict access to chemical weapons materials and the knowledge to produce chemical weapons through security measures, investigations, detection of materials during transportation, and point-of-sale monitoring and restriction. DHS’s efforts and resources will aid federal, SLTT, and international partners in disrupting chemical attacks, working both domestically and internationally to protect the Homeland.

Chemical preparedness must be a shared responsibility of individuals, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, and all levels of government. However, DHS will take a leadership role in training and equipping partners, conducting response exercises, and ensuring response and recovery efforts are integrated. Further, DHS will work with its partners on public messaging that results in lives saved and property protected.

This Strategy paves the way for DHS to harden security against chemical threats, plan for and address emerging threats, better support first responders, and enable faster recovery following any large-scale incident. By working with key stakeholders in chemical ii defense, the Nation will be better prepared. DHS will forge partnerships to strengthen public, private, and international cooperation in chemical defense.

DHS will use this Strategy as an aid in making investment decisions relating to precious departmental resources and to measure the extent to which outcomes are achieved.

Ultimately, the Strategy will enable DHS to act faster and more efficiently—a tenable goal for the Nation’s third largest federal department—when it comes to making America safer and more secure.

Goal 1: IDENTIFY, ASSESS, AND COMMUNICATE CHEMICAL RISKS ACROSS THE

HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE

• Objective 1.1: Identify current, emerging, nontraditional, and forecasted chemical threats.

• Objective 1.2: Collect, monitor, and analyze data and information related to chemical threats.

• Objective 1.3: Characterize and forecast chemical risks within geographic areas and economic sectors, including fixed sites, potential terrorism targets, and commodity flow within the chemical supply chain.

• Objective 1.4: Collaborate with SLTT governments, private sector partners, and other key stakeholders to prioritize and share timely, accurate, and actionable information.

Goal 2: ALIGN, ENHANCE, AND INTEGRATE DHS CHEMICAL DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES

• Objective 2.1: Assess DHS chemical defense capabilities and conduct gap analysis against current and emerging threats and risks.

• Objective 2.2: Optimize capabilities development, acquisition, and knowledge management across DHS and with federal interagency partners.

• Objective 2.3: Align DHS regulatory compliance programs, voluntary programs, and associated guidance with threat assessments and Department-wide strategic outcomes.

Goal 3: DETER, DETECT, AND DISRUPT CHEMICAL ATTACKS

• Objective 3.1: Deter adversaries from pursuing, executing, or facilitating chemical attacks.

• Objective 3.2: Deny illicit access to dangerous chemicals, including toxic industrial chemicals, chemical weapons precursors, and specialized knowledge related to their use.

• Objective 3.3: Implement passive and active measures to detect materials, people, and finances related to chemical threats in U.S. supply chains, borders, transportation networks, and other vulnerable targets.

• Objective 3.4: Dismantle illicit networks contributing to chemical threats.

iii

Goal 4: STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PARTNER

PREPAREDNESS AGAINST CHEMICAL INCIDENTS AND ENABLE INTEGRATION

WITH FEDERAL RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

• Objective 4.1: Promote a global culture of chemical security.

• Objective 4.2: Train and equip domestic and international partners to prevent and respond to chemical incidents.

• Objective 4.3: Coordinate, integrate, and routinely exercise SLTT responses to chemical incidents, including integration with federal response efforts.

• Objective 4.4: Enhance the survivability and ensure the continuity and timely restoration of operations of critical infrastructure and SLTT jurisdictions following a chemical incident.

• Objective 4.5: Empower the general public with information on actions to take following a chemical attack, thereby limiting casualties and facilitating mitigation measures.

• Objective 4.6: Strengthen the Department’s ability to support response and recovery prior to and following a large-scale chemical incident.

INTRODUCTION

Background

The modern chemical industry is a vital component of an advanced industrial economy and the transnational supply chains that support it. Several thousand U.S. chemical facilities—from small companies to national laboratories—use, manufacture, store, repackage, distribute, transport, or deliver chemicals in a complex, global chain that affects other critical infrastructure sectors. From computer chips for biotechnology devices to the development of synthetic fibers that make firefighters’ clothes water and heat resistant, chemicals are used in the products and processes that impact our daily lives. The manufacturing, storage, or transportation infrastructure, however, can pose a danger as sources of a large-scale chemical release. In 2013, the ammonium nitrate explosion at the West Fertilizer Company storage and distribution facility in West, Texas, resulted in 15 human deaths, approximately 160 injuries, and approximately 150 buildings damaged or destroyed. In the same year, at Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, a 74-car freight train carrying Bakken Formation crude oil derailed, resulting in a fire and the explosion of multiple tank cars, 42 deaths, and destruction of all but 3 of 39 downtown buildings.

Chemical facilities are predominantly prepared for accidental releases and aware of theft, deliberate misuse, and sabotage of the industry’s products. However, these large-scale events may overwhelm their ability to respond in a timely manner to mitigate harm and save lives. Response and recovery from these large-scale accidental events are costly in terms of manpower, required supplies and equipment, waste management, and site remediation.

The deliberate use of chemicals to adversely impact human health also poses serious homeland security concerns. In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese doomsday cult, used Sarin nerve agent in Tokyo’s subway trains. North Korean operatives in 2017 assassinated the half-brother of Kim Jong Un in Malaysia using nerve agent. Ricin (a toxic protein extracted from the beans of the castor-oil plant) was used in 2003 in letters addressed to the White House and the Dirksen Senate Office Building. A similar event occurred in 2013 when suspected ricin-laden letters were addressed to the White House, the Secretary of Defense, and a U.S. Senator. In 2018, the fourth-generation nerve agent

Vision: A resilient Nation that is safe and secure from accidental chemical releases and chemical attacks.

Novichok was used in an attempted assassination of a dissident Russian agent and his daughter with subsequent accidental exposure of two British citizens months later.

Although these past events resulted in small numbers of casualties (one death in Malaysia, one in the United Kingdom, 12 exposed in Tokyo with one death) or no exposures or no resulting health effects, these events highlight the knowledge and interest to use chemicals for nefarious purposes. The law enforcement, hazardous materials, and emergency medical response to chemical incidents as well as disruption of critical infrastructure is significant and, over time, very expensive with the required remediation and recovery of impacted communities. These events, as well as the recent emergence of fentanyl and other drugs as potential weapons of terror, also show the wide range of potential chemical threats and how those threats have rapidly shifted over time.

The properties of chemical weapons and other general toxic chemicals make them of particular concern for causing widespread and persistent effects in the event of a deliberate or accidental release. Ranging from high-purity chemical weapon agents to widely available commercial chemicals with many household and industrial uses, the range of chemicals of concern is long and regularly evolving. State and non-state actors alike have deployed chemical weapons or toxic industrial materials/toxic industrial chemicals (TIM/TIC) in a variety of offensive uses. Unlike radiological or nuclear threats, chemical agents are often impossible to detect prior to their release. And, unlike biological exposure outcome timelines which could be elongated due to their necessary incubation period, symptoms of chemical exposure may manifest within seconds.

Chemical incidents also typically require special protective and decontamination equipment for first responders to save lives and pursue terrorists. Given the low incidence of such attacks and the broad range of potential targets, such equipment is not guaranteed to be readily available in any given incident. Many localities may not be equipped or prepared for the medical and logistical needs of a mass-casualty chemical attack, quickly exceeding the capabilities of first responders and private authorities in the impacted area. In many cases, the agents involved will persist in the environment and deny access to the area for long periods of time. The health, safety, and security of thousands of citizens may be affected without the intervention and assistance of the Federal Government and greater Homeland Security Enterprise in providing a timely and effective response to the chemical event. Faced with this range of threats and uncertainty about the future, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must maintain a flexible and predictive approach to chemical defense that anticipates future issues and prepares itself and its partners to face them.

The 2017 National Security Strategy recognizes the dangers from hostile state and non-state actors trying to acquire chemical weapons and calls for preventing chemical attack.

It tasks the U.S. Government with bolstering efforts to detect chemical agents and to keep them from being used against the Homeland. It calls for better integration of intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency management operations to ensure that first responders have the information and capabilities to respond to chemical threats. Other national strategies and presidential directives, such as the National Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, direct federal actions to strengthen the ability of the United States to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from chemical attacks. These directives assign DHS responsibilities for managing chemical incidents and for coordinating domestic federal efforts related to these incidents.

DHS has a key role in securing the United States from chemical incidents, whether deliberate or accidental. This DHS Strategy lays out a unified DHS approach to chemical defense of the Homeland and provides for an integrated departmental effort that is linked to the larger U.S. Government approach and at the state, local, territorial, and tribal level (SLTT). The Strategy will allow DHS to leverage resources and share information across its Components to provide greater efficiencies and effectiveness in addressing chemical threats.

The central theme of DHS’s Strategic Plan FY2020-2024 is relentless resilience.

Following this theme, this Strategy focuses on measures to harden security against chemical threats, plan for and address emerging threats, support first-responder efforts, and enable recovery to restore communities after a large-scale incident. In all the actions taken in support of this Strategy, DHS will forge partnerships to strengthen public, private, and international cooperation in chemical defense.

In this Strategy, DHS will pursue an approach to addressing the chemical threat spectrum that is focused on finding early indicators of emerging dangers, adapting to emerging threats whether they appear in the form of novel chemicals or known agents combined with new technologies like unmanned aerial systems or nanotechnology, and ensuring information sharing across the federal chemical defense enterprise and the front-line operators most likely to be responsible for responding to a chemical incident at the local level.

Purpose and Scope

This Strategy provides guidance on key actions the Department will take to defend the Nation from chemical threats caused by deliberate action and large-scale accidents. It broadly addresses DHS chemical defense activities and programs to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from chemical incidents. It describes support to federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial operators and agencies, as well as the private sector. It also provides guidance on integration of DHS programs and activities with those of the broader Homeland Security Enterprise. This includes DHS, SLTT authorities with responsibility for law enforcement and other security-related activities, and federal interagency partners with responsibility for Homeland security missions including, but not limited to, the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, Transportation, and Health and Human Services; the Intelligence Community; U.S. Postal Service; and the Environmental Protection Agency.

This Chemical Defense Strategy supersedes the “DHS Strategy for Improving the National Response and Short-Term Recovery from a Catastrophic Chemical Attack” of August 2012.

Guiding Principles

• Unity of Effort: Close collaboration and coordination within DHS and the broader national chemical defense enterprise is essential to protecting the Homeland from the wide and dynamic range of chemical risks. No single department, agency, or jurisdiction can perform this mission alone.

• Prepared and Resilient Communities: Private sector and other nongovernmental partners are critical in all phases of the chemical defense mission, from denying terrorists access to dangerous chemicals and precursors to response after a chemical incident. In implementing the goals and objectives of this Strategy, DHS will ensure integration with nongovernmental partners wherever possible.

• Coordination with Related Mission Areas: Chemical defense relies on capabilities in related mission areas such as Counter Improvised Explosive Device, biodefense, cybersecurity, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) more generally, Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems, and counterterrorism. As part of implementing the broad missions of the Department, DHS will work across the Department to ensure that capabilities and initiatives are synchronized for maximum effect.

• Compliance with U.S. Treaty Obligations and Export Control Regimes: DHS will responsibly comply with U.S. obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and related laws and conventions through implementation of this Strategy. Additionally, cooperative efforts with foreign partners will transfer technologies and information within the requirements of U.S. export control laws and regulations.

Strategy Development and Coordination

Under the sponsorship of the DHS Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), the DHS CWMD Office led development of this Strategy through the DHS Chemical Coordination Group (CCG), an action officer level intradepartmental body of chemical defense and CWMD experts, strategists, and policy analysts. The CCG includes representatives from the following DHS Offices and Components:

• Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

• Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

• Federal Emergency Management Agency

• Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers

• Management Directorate

• Office of Intelligence and Analysis

• Office of International Affairs

• Office of Legislative Affairs

• Office of Operations Coordination

• Office of Partnership and Engagement

• Office of Public Affairs

• Office of State and Local Law Enforcement

• Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans

• Science and Technology Directorate

• Transportation Security Administration

• U.S. Coast Guard

• U.S. Customs and Border Protection

• U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

• U.S. Secret Service

The Strategy is a product of a structured process that reviewed the threat, considered risk analysis, inventoried DHS chemical-defense-related programs, and analyzed potential gaps. The framework underlying the Strategy combines the traditional prevent-protect-respond-recover capabilities spectrum as well as WMD pathway defeat model adapted from the Department of Defense’s Joint Publication 3-40. By analyzing DHS chemical defense capabilities from the perspectives of both the U.S. Government and domestic partners and those of potential state and non-state adversaries, the Strategy comprehensively reflects the scope of the chemical defense mission space.

WMD pathways consist of networks or links among individuals, groups, organizations, governmental entities, etc., that promote or enable the development, possession, and/or proliferation of WMD and related capabilities. These pathways encompass ideas, materials, technologies, facilities, processes, products, and events. Monitoring and controlling WMD pathways is essential in denying actors of concern access to WMD technology, knowledge, materials, expertise, and weapons. A generic WMD pathway continuum includes several steps, such as conceptualization, infrastructure and expertise development, production, weaponization, deployment, and use. Detection of chemical threats early in the pathway to an attack is very difficult, since, in some cases, infrastructure and expertise development, facility preparation, and production may be concealed within industrial or agricultural production (dual-use facilities, equipment, expertise, technologies, trade, and materials); the natural landscape; academic institutions; state-run chemical and pharmaceutical laboratories; “dark web” sites; or facilities such as private homes, rental apartments, or industrial warehouses. WMD actors may, at any point along the proliferation continuum, effectively bypass one of the steps by acquiring (by theft, barter, or purchase) the capability, thereby accelerating the WMD development process. DHS should be prepared to counter these activities at every stage of the continuum to minimize chemical WMD risk.

Implementation

DHS will use the DHS Chemical Defense Strategy and corresponding Implementation Plan to coordinate departmental resources and achieve the specified outcomes during the next 5 years, beginning with actions taken in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 and associated budget processes for FY 2021, including out-year projections through 2029. The CCG

Executive Council, consisting of DHS Office and Component leaders at the Assistant Secretary level or above, will receive annual progress reports from the CCG regarding the implementation of this Strategy. In FY 2020, DHS will develop the companion Implementation Plan, including outlining lead and support roles, responsibilities, programs, and timelines for meeting the Strategy’s goals and objectives. DHS will use the Chemical Defense Strategy and the Implementation Plan to support capability gap analyses and requirements generation.

GOAL 1

IDENTIFY, ASSESS, AND COMMUNICATE CHEMICAL RISKS

ACROSS THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE

The risk of chemical incidents, whether an accidental release or the deliberate act of a terrorist network, extremist group, or a lone actor, is not merely theoretical. Over the past four decades, multiple groups and individuals have attempted to develop or improvise such weapons and, in some cases, have deployed them against military and civilian targets. In addition, chemical incidents at chemical plants and during transport continue to occur. To prepare for the accidental hazards and deliberate chemical threats the United States faces today, as well as those that it may face in the future, including fourth-generation agents and other new chemical agents, DHS must understand the risks associated with the chemical sector and with chemical weapons, those who might use them, and pathways through which adversaries could acquire, develop, or weaponize dangerous chemicals. DHS will draw on the full range of our Nation’s and partner nations’ capabilities to characterize these risks, understand how they may evolve, and share information about them with operational partners. DHS will use existing and newly developed tools to identify threats and risks, aligned to the greatest risks in a particular geographic area or industrial sector.

By employing novel data mining and analytical methods and integrating disparate data sources, from domestic commercial databases and streams of commerce to real-time intelligence reporting from abroad, DHS will provide early warning of chemical threats emerging within the Homeland or those with the potential to reach our shores. Sharing threat and risk information with federal, first responder, private sector, and international partners ensures that the most up-to-date information is in the hands of the people best positioned to counter or respond to chemical threats. Hand in hand with analysis of threat information is understanding the vulnerabilities within U.S. industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, transportation systems, and the broader community. Using analysis derived from threat and risk information, DHS will analyze vulnerable infrastructure and potential targets and communicate recommended preparedness actions to partners as appropriate. Disseminating threat information, particularly to SLTT, private sector, and international partners, requires all DHS Components to closely scrutinize classification levels to ensure the broadest possible distribution of information while protecting sensitive sources and methods.

Objective 1.1: Identify current, emerging, nontraditional, and forecasted chemical threats.

Sub-Objectives:

1.1.1 Implement new methods of chemical threat identification.

1.1.2 Integrate disparate data types to inform decision makers and operators.

1.1.3 Incorporate chemical threats identified by other federal agencies operating in the chemical defense mission space into DHS threat assessments.

Outcome: DHS has a full range of tools, and processes for developing new ones, to understand current and anticipate future chemical threats.

Objective 1.2: Collect, monitor, and analyze data and information related to chemical threats.

Sub-Objectives:

1.2.1. Collect, monitor, and analyze data on chemical threats regarding state and non-state actors on their intent, capabilities, plans, operations, targets, financing, and support.

1.2.2. Collect, monitor, and analyze data on chemical risks from potential industry incidents through all elements of chemical production, transport, storage, and use.

1.2.3. Provide decision makers and operators actionable information.

Outcome: DHS understands the range of chemical incident risks as well as adversary capabilities and behavior necessary to inform long-term programs and activities and to provide early warning of potential chemical attacks.

Objective 1.3: Characterize and forecast chemical risks within geographic areas and economic sectors, including fixed sites, potential terrorism targets, and commodity flow within the chemical supply chain.

Sub-Objectives:

1.3.1. Develop and maintain chemical industry risk characterization and forecasting tools to inform risk, crisis action planning, and consequence management.

1.3.2. Characterize geographic areas and economic sectors with highest chemical industry risks and forecast the risks for accidental incidents and chemical attacks at specific sites and in the commodity flow chain.

1.3.3. Establish baselines against which transnational and domestic commodity flow anomalies indicating a chemical threat can be detected.

1.3.4. Assess representative soft target/crowded place vulnerabilities to identified chemical threats and apply generalized methodologies to specific high-value locations and special events.

1.3.5. Based on chemical risks, identify, characterize, and visualize the mode or mechanism of a chemical attack, distribution, or release.

Outcome: DHS understands the range of risks to the United States from incidents in the chemical supply chain and industrial sectors.

Objective 1.4: Collaborate with SLTT governments, private sector partners, and other key stakeholders to prioritize and share timely, accurate, and actionable information.

Sub-Objectives:

1.4.1 Communicate chemical incident risk assessments across DHS, and with SLTTs as appropriate.

1.4.2 Maintain methodologies for collecting from and disseminating to SLTT governments and private sector partners information about chemical incident risks, vulnerabilities, and threats.

1.4.3 Provide law enforcement task forces, regional fusion centers, SLTT governments, and private sector partners immediate chemical incident threat indicators and warnings.

Outcome: DHS and SLTT and private sector partners seamlessly communicate the most important and actionable information on chemical incident risks, threats, and vulnerable targets.

GOAL 2

ALIGN, ENHANCE, AND INTEGRATE DHS CHEMICAL

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

DHS’s approach to defending the Homeland from state and non-state actor use of chemical weapons or deliberate chemical agent releases emphasizes “defense in depth,” in which individuals or groups must pass through multiple layers of security to instigate a chemical attack. As the primary law enforcement operator at several of these layers—air and maritime pathways, land borders and ports of entry, and transportation systems— DHS plays a vital role in the national chemical defense system. As a result, it is essential that DHS requirements, capabilities, and operations be closely coordinated and synchronized internally. This will maximize the ability of the Department to work effectively and collaboratively with other federal agencies and SLTT front-line operators in the domestic interior that form the first line of defense for communities at risk of suffering from chemical incidents.

To maximize the effectiveness of the dozens of chemical defense programs and activities across the Department, DHS will examine current and planned chemical defense capabilities, understand any deficiencies, and carry out the full range of activities to close those gaps. DHS programs will be integrated across the Department to ensure requirements are based on the same threat and risk picture. DHS will use proven, integrated methodologies to identify nonmaterial solutions to fill gaps wherever possible using a wide array of policies, regulations, tactics, techniques, and procedures. If material solutions are needed, DHS will apply effective research and development methods, rigorously test new capabilities in operational environments, and then deploy capabilities to operational Components as rapidly as possible. DHS will collaborate across the DHS enterprise and the Federal Government on the development of new technologies to address identified gaps and prioritize the use of government off-the-shelf (GOTS) and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions. Understanding that other Departments have large stakes—and budgets—allocated toward research in chemical-related fields, DHS will seek to leverage partnerships with these agencies and the private sector. DHS will leverage Department-level planning resources to identify and incorporate integrated chemical-specific requirements across all aspects of the chemical defense mission to ensure that planning holistically accounts for pre- and post-event stages.

Objective 2.1: Assess DHS chemical defense capabilities and conduct gap analysis against current and emerging threats and risks.

Sub-Objectives:

2.1.1. Establish and maintain the DHS Chemical Coordination Group to enhance coordination and unity of effort of chemical defense functions across DHS operational and support Components.

2.1.2. Assess and maintain an inventory of DHS chemical defense capabilities and identify interconnections, shared mission space, and information-sharing pathways across DHS operational and support Components.

2.1.3. Assess existing DHS chemical defense capabilities against identified chemical threats and risks relative to identified vulnerabilities.

2.1.4. Determine gaps in DHS chemical defense capabilities, as well as interagency gaps that could be addressed under DHS authorities, against specific risks or threats and in relation to identified vulnerable targets.

2.1.5. Implement a DHS CWMD Common Operating Picture.

Outcome: DHS understands its capabilities to defend against chemical threats and is working to address gaps.

Objective 2.2: Optimize capabilities development, acquisition, and knowledge management across DHS and with federal interagency partners.

Sub-Objectives:

2.2.1. Understand the existing chemical defense capabilities of Federal Government and

SLTT partners to avoid duplication and to leverage acquisitions of already developed capabilities.

2.2.2. Synchronize DHS chemical defense research and development needs with federal interagency, SLTT, private sector, and international partners.

2.2.3. Rapidly develop, acquire, and field new capabilities to mitigate emerging threats and meet Component urgent mission needs.

2.2.4. Advise DHS, federal interagency, and SLTT partners in a coordinated and collaborative fashion on the development of chemical defense plans, guidance, and best practices.

2.2.5. Use DHS-wide and U.S. Government-wide acquisition vehicles to avoid duplication during development of new capabilities addressing identified gaps.

Outcome: DHS efficiently maintains and procures chemical defense capabilities that complement Federal Government and SLTT partner capabilities in a cost-effective manner. DHS can identify emerging chemical threats and target vulnerabilities and rapidly acquire and deploy defenses against them.

Objective 2.3: Align DHS regulatory compliance programs, voluntary programs, and associated guidance with threat assessments and Department-wide strategic outcomes.

Sub-Objectives:

2.3.1 Review regulatory compliance programs in the context of chemical threat, risk, and vulnerability assessments and make changes, if needed, in accordance with administrative policy and procedures.

2.3.2 Engage SLTT and private sector partners to review voluntary programs in the context of chemical threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment and determine how to best serve the needs of the gaps they identify.

Outcome: DHS regulatory and voluntary chemical security programs are designed, reviewed, and implemented to meet the chemical incident threat.

GOAL 3

DETER, DETECT, AND DISRUPT CHEMICAL ATTACKS

The most effective approach to countering chemical attacks is to stop them before they can occur. Whether threat actors assess the use of chemical agents would not succeed, cannot obtain the materials, or their plans are uncovered prior to attack, a chemical attack is prevented. Following this approach, DHS seeks to deter, detect, and disrupt chemical attacks at all points in an attack pathway, from conceptualization to use. DHS efforts will convince adversaries that their chemical attack will fail, and that if they are able to successfully carry out a chemical attack, the effects will be minimal and they will be caught and prosecuted. DHS will restrict access to chemical weapons materials and the knowledge to produce chemical weapons through security measures, investigations, detection of materials during transportation, and point-of-sale monitoring and restriction.

Understanding that the chemical industry is a global one, DHS will work through interagency partners to apply best practices. As an adversary’s plan moves along the attack pathway, DHS will detect the materials, the planning, and any support provided to carry out an attack. DHS will exploit travel, passenger, and biometric databases to track the movement of individuals associated with chemical threat networks and use data analytics to identify threat-based trends related to technological development, illicit procurement, financial transactions, and terrorist travel. Understanding that adversaries make use of Internet technologies and operate across borders, DHS will leverage the same technologies and platforms to track, monitor, and dismantle adversary networks before they can be used for malicious purposes. Finally, DHS’s efforts and resources will aid federal, SLTT, and international partners in disrupting chemical attacks, working both domestically and internationally to protect the Homeland.

Objective 3.1: Deter adversaries from pursuing, executing, or facilitating chemical attacks.

Sub-Objectives:

3.1.1. Publicize DHS chemical defense capabilities and demonstrate their effectiveness while protecting sensitive operational security information.

3.1.2. Identify, implement, and publicly message protective measures for critical infrastructure owners and operators.

3.1.3. Publicize DHS, SLTT, and private sector improvements to whole community resilience to chemical incidents.

3.1.4. Analyze the chemical signatures of materials to attribute their source.

Outcome: DHS chemical defense and response capabilities deter adversaries from pursuing or conducting chemical attacks.

Objective 3.2: Deny illicit access to dangerous chemicals, including toxic industrial chemicals, chemical weapons precursors, and specialized knowledge related to their use.

Sub-Objectives:

3.2.1. Enhance the security of highest risk chemical facilities and those that handle chemicals of interest.

3.2.2. Prevent the illicit spread of chemical weapons precursors, equipment, and specialized knowledge from the private and academic sectors.

3.2.3. Enforce U.S. export law to control proliferation of chemical weapons material and technical information.

3.2.4. Interdict importation into the United States of unauthorized dangerous chemicals and chemical weapons precursors along the border and at ports of entry.

3.2.5. Ensure DHS reviews under the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United

States incorporate chemical defense equities.

Outcome: DHS denies potential adversaries in the United States and overseas access to dangerous chemicals and specialized technical knowledge that could be used to develop chemical weapons.

Objective 3.3: Implement passive and active measures to detect materials, people, and finances related to chemical threats in U.S. supply chains, borders, transportation networks, and other vulnerable targets.

Sub-Objectives:

3.3.1. Screen for and detect illegal transportation of chemicals in transportation networks.

3.3.2. Integrate chemical detection and analysis capabilities with border and maritime security operations.

3.3.3. Analyze integrated information source data for indicators and warnings of a potential chemical incident and provide timely reports to leadership and operators.

Outcome: DHS will exploit network technologies, data analytics, and modern detection technologies to interdict chemical weapons, equipment, and precursors that threaten the United States and its interests.

Objective 3.4: Dismantle illicit networks contributing to chemical threats.

Sub-Objectives:

3.4.1. Establish strategic and working-level relationships with interagency, SLTT, and international partners in law enforcement, customs, and finance addressing and investigating chemical threats.

3.4.2. Apply advanced analytical methods to financial, commercial, and other relevant databases to detect and disrupt networks contributing to the acquisition or proliferation of chemical weapons.

3.4.3. Conduct investigations pertaining to importation of chemical weapons and their precursors with interagency, SLTT, and international partners at land, air, and sea ports of entry; along borders; and within the United States.

Outcome: DHS maintains robust relationships with interagency, SLTT, and international partners at strategic and operational levels addressing chemical threats to detect and disrupt the networks needed to acquire or develop chemical weapons and use them against the United States or its interests.

GOAL 4

STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PARTNER

PREPAREDNESS AGAINST CHEMICAL INCIDENTS AND

ENABLE INTEGRATION WITH FEDERAL RESPONSE

CAPABILITIES

Chemical incident preparedness must be a shared responsibility of individuals, communities, private and nonprofit sectors, and all levels of government. DHS approaches the response to and recovery from chemical incidents as a team effort through a system that is locally executed, state, territorial, or tribally managed, and federally supported. While DHS views SLTT operators as the first line of defense, the Department does have a significant role in SLTT preparedness for chemical defense, especially during the times before and immediately following an incident. This is the window of time when federal resources of any kind are not yet mobilized and available.

DHS enables SLTT to build capabilities to effectively provide crisis and consequence management until federal assistance arrives. Since the responsibilities and capabilities for chemical defense rely so heavily on local first responders, and chemical weapons and precursors are so difficult to detect in streams of commerce, DHS works to foster a culture of chemical preparedness both within the United States and among allies and partners.

DHS’s efforts will enhance partner understanding of chemical risks from accidents and deliberate attack, including potential threat actors. Improving awareness goes beyond identifying risks and extends to DHS efforts to enhance local preparation for, response to, and ability to recover from chemical incidents. DHS will take an active role in training and equipping partners, conducting and participating in response exercises, and ensuring efforts are integrated. Because of the nature of chemical threats and the difficulties involved with detection, front-line operators must rely on their training and operational experience to detect and respond quickly and safely. This will require long-term DHS investment in programs to improve SLTT response efforts as these capabilities cannot be generated instantly in the aftermath of a chemical attack or incident. Understanding the public’s key role during the response to a chemical incident, whether at an industrial facility, during the transport of chemical materials, or in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, DHS will work with its partners to aid in communicating how the public can best act to save lives and protect property during such incidents.

When large-scale chemical incidents occur or are anticipated based on credible and imminent warning, DHS will ensure cross coordination between prevention, protection, and response and recovery efforts. Planning, consequence management, and response to a chemical incident require a common understanding of the extent and nature of anticipated impacts on human health, the environment, and critical infrastructure. They also require an awareness of how those impacts will challenge the delivery of the response core capabilities, identification of the requirements for and tools available to mitigate those challenges, and robust decision support processes to facilitate response and recovery efforts.

Objective 4.1: Promote a global culture of chemical security.

Sub-Objectives:

4.1.1 Coordinate with interagency partners to provide chemical security expertise and best practices to international organizations and partner nations.

4.1.2 Promote security and threat awareness in U.S. chemical industry's operations outside the United States.

4.1.3 Share threat trends in commercial activity and best practices in trade control systems with international organizations.

Outcome: DHS contributes to raising chemical security awareness and best practices in partner nations and the international chemical industry.

Objective 4.2: Train and equip domestic and international partners to prevent and respond to chemical incidents.

Sub-Objectives:

4.2.1 Determine interagency, SLTT, and international partner capability gaps and establish a common prioritization across DHS for assistance to fill those gaps.

4.2.2 Provide equipment, training, and concept of operations development assistance to

SLTT operators responsible for chemical defense missions in areas prioritized by

DHS.

4.2.3 Provide technical assistance to SLTT operators and coordinate federal response mechanisms to help adjudicate technical issues.

4.2.4 Train international partners to prevent and respond to chemical incidents in areas prioritized by DHS.

Outcome: DHS sustainably trains and equips SLTT and international partners to prevent, respond to, and take initial actions to recover from chemical incidents in alignment with DHS authorities. DHS, SLTT, and private sector partners have a shared understanding of the respective roles of federal and local entities in addressing chemical risks and threats.

Objective 4.3: Coordinate, integrate, and routinely exercise SLTT responses to chemical incidents, including integration with federal response efforts.

Sub-Objectives:

4.3.1 Raise awareness of federal agency roles and responsibilities among SLTT entities and available resources for assisting first responders before, during, and after a chemical incident.

4.3.2 Assist domestic partner characterization and assessment of chemical incidents to facilitate response efforts.

4.3.3 Coordinate federal chemical incident response planning with SLTT partners.

4.3.4 Conduct chemical response exercises that integrate SLTT and private sector partner response requirements and highlight federal response efforts.

4.3.5 Ensure Department-wide exercise lessons learned are developed and improvement areas tracked to resolve shortfalls.

Outcome: DHS maintains high readiness to support SLTT partners in response to large-scale chemical incidents and is fully integrated in SLTT preparedness efforts.

Objective 4.4: Enhance the survivability and ensure the continuity and timely restoration of operations of critical infrastructure and SLTT jurisdictions following a chemical incident.

Sub-Objectives:

4.4.1. Ensure development of critical infrastructure and SLTT chemical incident response protocols and concepts of operations.

4.4.2. Provide resources for recovery from chemical incidents in the specific instances allowed by federal law.

Outcome: DHS is capable of assisting critical infrastructure owners and SLTT jurisdictions in defending against, and recovering rapidly from, chemical incidents.

Objective 4.5: Empower the general public with information on actions to take following a chemical attack, thereby limiting casualties and facilitating mitigation measures.

Sub-Objectives:

4.5.1. Develop guidelines on how the public can best respond to varied chemical incident scenarios.

4.5.2. Provide SLTT and private sector partners with public chemical response information tailored to their locality.

4.5.3. Develop publicly available information products for chemical incident responses and make subject matter experts available for public engagements.

Outcome: DHS has robust partnership with SLTT and private sector partners to inform public on appropriate responses to chemical incidents.

Objective 4.6: Strengthen the Department’s ability to support response and recovery prior to and following a large-scale chemical incident.

Sub-Objectives:

4.6.1 Holistically analyze DHS chemical incident response and recovery capabilities and synchronize capabilities requirements with federal partner plans.

4.6.2 Coordinate DHS Component workforce protective measures, including medical countermeasures, policy, and guidance documents relevant to chemical weapons, pharmaceutical-based agents, and other emerging threats.

4.6.3 Directly support SLTT response and recovery efforts following a chemical incident in the circumstances specified by law.

Outcome: DHS has the response and recovery core capabilities to fully execute critical activities in a large-scale chemical incident to save lives, preserve critical infrastructure, and protect the environment.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCG Chemical Coordination Group COTS Commercial off-the-shelf CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction DHS Department of Homeland Security FSLTT Federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal FY Fiscal Year GOTS Government off-the-shelf R&D research and development SLTT state, local, territorial, and tribal TIM/TIC toxic industrial materials/toxic industrial chemicals UK United Kingdom U.S. United States USG United States Government WMD weapon of mass destruction