NNG16544506R_SAS_Amendment_001.pdf

Solicitation No. NNG16544506R Amendment 001

The purpose of this amendment is to make changes to the solicitation.

Accordingly, the solicitation is hereby amended as follows:

1. Clause L.22 - GSFC 52.215-202 PROPOSAL PREPARATION – GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS (ORAL PROPOSALS)(APR 2016) Section (b)(1) - The page limitation for the Past Performance Volume is hereby increased to 30 pages.

2. Clause L.27 - GSFC 52.215-233 COST VOLUME INSTRUCTIONS (MAR 2016) -- Section (a) Paragraph 7 is hereby deleted in its entirety and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:

“A "subcontract" is any contract, purchase order, material order, interorganizational transfer, etc. that is a direct cost to this acquisition. The Offeror shall provide sufficient detail to support and explain all costs proposed. For the purposes of the Cost Volume, a Significant Subcontractor is defined as a subcontractor expected to exceed 25% or more of the Government Pricing Model (GPM) estimated Grand Total Value. A proposed Significant Subcontractor shall complete and submit Exhibits 2A, 2B, 4-7 and 9-11 and provide the same supporting information that is requested from the Prime Offeror. Significant Subcontractors may submit proprietary cost data, under separate cover, directly to the Government no later than the date and time specified in the instructions for receipt of proposals for this RFP. Non-Significant Subcontractors shall complete and submit Exhibit 2C and, if applicable, Exhibits 2D, 10A, and 10B, which should be included with the Prime Offeror’s Cost Volume proposal. However, Non-Significant Subcontractors may submit Exhibits 2C, 2D, 10A, and 10B, if deemed proprietary cost data, under separate cover directly to the Government no later than the date and time specified in the instructions for receipt of proposals for this RFP.”

3. Clause M.2 - GSFC 52.215-310 MISSION SUITABILITY FACTOR (FEB 2016) – Section (a) Paragraph 1, is hereby deleted in its entirety and the following is substituted in lieu thereof:

“The Offeror's technical approach, techniques and procedures that will be used to satisfy the requirements will be evaluated for completeness, effectiveness and efficiency. The Offeror's response to the critical sections of the SOW (Sections 3.1, 3.8, and 3.9) for its understanding of the inherent problems associated with the objectives of this procurement will be evaluated for completeness and effectiveness.”

4. ENCLOSURE 1 – PROJECT SCENARIO: ARM is hereby deleted in its entirety and the attached is substituted in lieu thereof.

5. ENCLOSURE 2 – PROJECT SCENARIO: SMA ANALYSIS is hereby deleted in its entirety and the attached is substituted in lieu thereof.

6. All other terms and conditions remain unchanged.

END OF AMENDMENT 001

ENCLOSURE 1

PROJECT

SCENARIO: ARM

RFP # NNG16544506R

Enclosure 1

NNG16544506R

Table of Contents

Contents

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Sample Problem Overview

1.2 Sample Problem Scope

1.3 Mission Description – ARM

2 SCENARIO TECHINCAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1 ARM Mission Assurance Scoping and Planning

2.2 ARM IV&V Rescope

2.3 Application of Efficiency

3 ACRONYM LIST

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Sample Problem Overview

This Systems and Software Assurance Services (SAS) Scenario for the NASA Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM) is defined to provide the Offeror an opportunity to illustrate a wide range of experience, skills, and efficient management and development processes for providing assurance services. Additionally, SAS bidders can demonstrate an understanding of the complexities of working the many aspects of a mission’s lifecycle within NASA Centers and changes in mission support requirements and schedules that often occur. This Scenario is unique in that it covers two distinct NASA Mission Directorates: Science and Human Exploration.

This Scenario depicts a fictitious ARM mission. This fictitious mission was developed to address needs of the SAS procurement activity and is based off the concept of an actual NASA mission. However, no data beyond this document is required or expected to be referenced in regards to mission details.

1.2 Sample Problem Scope

For this Scenario, the Mission Description is the target mission that will receive IV&V assurance services support. Assume that the mission development timeline is 5 years. Assume that the Mission has just completed a successful System Requirements Review, as defined in NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5E. Assume that the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) for both the Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) and Solar arrays is TRL 6.

1.3 Mission Description – ARM

Objectives Rendezvous with, capture, and redirect an entire near-Earth asteroid (NEA), with a mass of up to ~1,000 t, into a stable lunar orbit by the first half of the next decade.

• Demonstrate high--‐power Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP).

• Demonstrate the ability to capture large non--‐cooperative objects in deep space.

• Stimulate the detection and characterization of small NEAs.

• Use assets already under development (SLS and Orion) as a first step to using these new capabilities even deeper in space.

Mission Overview

• Utilizes a 40 kW solar electric propulsion system to rendezvous with a NEA and redirect it to translunar space in the 2021 timeframe.

• Utilizes 50--‐kW--‐class solar arrays current under development by the Space Technology Mission Directorate’s (STMD) Solar Array System program.

• The storage orbit for the redirected asteroid is a stable distant retrograde orbit (DRO) in the Earth--‐ Moon system with an orbit altitude of ~70,000 km above the lunar surface.

Asteroid rendezvous, capture, and redirect operations build on past mission experience

Asteroid Redirect Vehicle (ARV) The ARV is composed of two modules to enable parallel development, assembly, and testing: a Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP) Module, and a Mission Module. The Mission Module is comprised of an Avionics Module, the sensor suite and the capture mechanism. The SEP Module includes all of the power and propulsion for the ARV. The Avionics Module includes all other spacecraft bus functions.

The SEP Module The asteroid redirect mission is enabled by high--‐power solar electric propulsion. Solar electric propulsion missions always show better performance at higher power levels and this mission is no different. Mission design trade studies indicate that the best combination of asteroid mass and flight times are obtained at the highest power levels. The study, therefore, selected the highest solar array power level that could reasonably be available for launch in this decade. That corresponds to about 50-kW, which is the upper end of the 30--‐kW to 50--‐kW range of power levels currently under development in two Solar Array System (SAS) development activities sponsored by NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD). A 50‐kW solar array beginning-of-life at 1 AU would enable operation of a 40-kW electric propulsion system at end‐of-life with appropriate margins. The 40-kW input power would be processed by multiple, magnetically shielded Hall thrusters operating in parallel with a specific impulse of 3,000 s. Because the asteroid redirect mission is enabled by these technologies it is an ideal platform to meet the needs of STMD’s SEP Technology Demonstration Mission. The asteroid redirect mission would demonstrate deployment and operation of a new class of large lightweight, high-specific-power, flexible‐blanket solar arrays in space along with the operation of a high-power, high-performance electric propulsion system.

The ARV configuration is dominated by the need to be able to store up to 12 metric tons of xenon. This is significantly greater than the 0.43 t of xenon launched on the Dawn mission, which is the largest xenon propellant load launched to date. Commercial communication satellite manufacturers typically launch only a few hundred kilograms of xenon used for orbit raising and station keeping maneuvers.

Consequently, there are no existing tanks that meet the needs of the asteroid redirect mission, so a new tank development is required. The study team identified a solution that minimizes the development risk and cost and provides the lightest tank mass. This approach uses a composite overwrapped pressure vessel with a seamless aluminum liner design made using existing industry manufacturing techniques.

Capture Mechanism Multiple options for the capture mechanism were considered and evaluated. A non--‐ rigidized, inflatable capture bag approach was selected for this study to assess feasibility. The capture bag approach effectively deals with the range of asteroid mechanical property uncertainties and would work equally well if the asteroid was a rubble pile or solid rock. Importantly, this concept is testable in a 1--‐g environment enabling verification and validation of the system before launch. Other concepts were received from industry that may also be feasible, but these have not yet been examined in detail.

The capture process itself is dominated by the spin state of the target. At relatively slow spin-rates of <

0.2 rpm (periods > 5 minutes) about one or more axes, the problem is relatively straightforward and small forces, < 0.1 g, are transmitted back to the spacecraft. At spin rates an order of magnitude higher, up to about 2 rpm (spin period of 30 seconds), the problem is more challenging. For this case, the study team identified a feasible approach in which the capture bag is closed tightly around the asteroid over a few minute period. Residual cross--‐axis spin is managed by force‐controlled winches to keep accelerations reflected back to the spacecraft to less than 0.1 g while the RCS thrusters are used to de‐tumble and then despin the spacecraft/asteroid combination.

Avionics Module To reduce the cost and schedule for the flight system implementation, flight--‐ qualified, deep--‐space avionics and sensors were identified that would work well for the asteroid redirect mission. This includes avionics and core flight software from the Soil Moisture Active/Passive (SMAP) project, the Mars Science Laboratory, and a sensor suite that could include instruments derived from the Origins-Spectral Interpretation-Resource Identification-Security-Regolith Explore (OSIRIS--‐REx) mission.

Sensor Suite The sensor suite supports optical navigation, asteroid characterization, and asteroid capture. The following sensors are currently in the ARM reference design:

• Wide‐field camera – used for long range optical navigation

• Medium--‐field camera – used for close range mapping of the asteroid

• Visible and IR Spectrometer – used for chemical characterization of the asteroid

• Laser Altimeter – used for asteroid characterization and mapping and for final autonomous control of the capture event

Safe Lunar Storage Orbit Retrieval of the asteroid is accomplished by using the SEP system to make small adjustments to the asteroid’s orbit in order to target a lunar gravity assist maneuver enabling capture into the Earth--‐Moon system. The 40--‐kW SEP system provides a few hundred meters per second velocity change to the 1000--‐t asteroid over the three to five year return trip. This redirection is only possible for asteroids that naturally return close to the Earth--‐Moon system in the timeframe of interest. The lunar gravity assist provides a velocity change of ~1,600 m/s, which is sufficient to capture the asteroid into the Earth--‐Moon system. An additional ~60 m/s is provided by the SEP system to transfer the asteroid to the long--‐term--‐ stable, lunar distant retrograde storage orbit. The asteroid size and composition would be selected such that it could not survive an Earth atmospheric entry. The long--‐term stable orbit is targeted to make the asteroid available as a destination for multiple future missions.

2 SCENARIO TECHINCAL REQUIREMENTS

The following sections identify the separate/individual technical scenarios that the offeror shall need to address. Note that the offeror is not to perform any actual mission assurance analysis work in response to the RFP.

2.1 ARM Mission Assurance Scoping and Planning

In this sample problem, the Offeror is presented with the new Mission (ARM) for an upcoming Government Fiscal Year.

The Planning and Scoping is performed to identify the IV&V scope as well as the effort required to provide Mission Assurance services to the ARM. Scoping is typically assessed by element, behavior, risks to mission success, critical events, or any other discriminator deemed appropriate by the Offeror.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Describe the methodology that will be used to identify and prioritize the critical system and software elements of the non-crewed component of ARM.

2. Specify the system and software elements requiring Missions Assurance based on their criticality.

3. Assess and identify the required analysis tasks, and resulting IV&V products, to provide the necessary Mission Assurance and reduce risk to Mission Success. It should be clear how the proposed tasks directly contribute to reducing risk to Mission Success and providing the necessary Mission Assurance.

2.2 ARM IV&V Rescope

During the course of an IV&V Project, re-scoping and re-planning of the Mission Assurance services may be warranted due to events outside of the IV&V Project’s control. The IV&V project must continually assess the scope and IV&V plan to ensure that the necessary Mission Assurance services are being provided to the Mission.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Determine and identify what risks and impacts would be experienced by the IV&V project in the event that the ARM Preliminary Design Review (PDR) is slipped approximately one year. Summarize how the IV&V plan will be adjusted to respond to the delay.

2. Through your Mission Assurance activities and information received from the Mission Project, you have determined that an in-scope critical element will require more assurance than originally planned. Identify how you will adjust your plan to provide the necessary assurance for the element.

3. For each of these events, the Offeror shall provide a summary of what steps will be taken to address the changes and how the existing IV&V plan will be affected. The Offeror shall also provide information regarding any coordination with other offices and/or supporting functions within the IV&V Program if applicable.

2.3 Application of Efficiency

Occasionally, an IV&V Project will encounter a situation where a potential budget surplus is identified as the result of the Mission Assurance services being executed to a high degree of efficiency thereby leading to a cost underrun (surplus) on the IV&V Project.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Provide a recommendation as how to best address the budget surplus of approximately $100,000. The Offeror shall summarize what actions would be taken to address the surplus and how existing plans will be affected.

2. Provide information regarding any coordination with other offices and/or supporting functions within the IV&V Program if applicable.

3 ACRONYM LIST

ARCM Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission ARM Asteroid Redirect Mission ARV Asteroid Redirect Vehicle AU Astronomical Unit DRO Distant Retrograde Orbit IV&V Independent Verification & Validation LGA Lunar Gravity Assist NEA Near Earth Asteroid NPR NASA Procedural Requirements OSIRIS-REx Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security, Regolith Explorer PDR Preliminary Design Review SAS Systems and Software Assurance Services SEP Solar Electric Propulsion SMAP Soil Moisture Active/Passive STMD Space Technology Mission Directorate

ENCLOSURE 2

PROJECT SCENARIO:

SMA ANALYSIS

RFP # NNG16544506R

Enclosure 2

Table of Contents

Contents

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Sample Problem Overview

1.2 Sample Problem Scope

1.3 Task Description

2 SCENARIO TECHINAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1 Criticality Analysis

2.2 Hazard Analysis

2.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

2.4 Risk analysis and Certification Support

3 ACRONYM LIST

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Sample Problem Overview

This SAS Scenario for the provision of Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) analysis support provides the Offeror the opportunity to demonstrate their understanding of the NASA SMA mission as well as present their skills and experience in performing SMA analysis. The Offerors can also illustrate how their processes, management and technical, will provide a robust and efficient solution to the challenge presented to them. Additionally, this scenario presents the challenge of working with in a new NASA approach to developing launch vehicles. It will require a strong understanding of NASA’s development life cycle processes, the role of SMA in the development processes and how that role shifts when placed in the role of providing analysis in support of a development effort in which NASA is not intimately involved.

This Scenario makes use of the current Commercial Crew Program (CCP) and addresses a fictitious request to provide specific SMA analysis support to CCP. The request was developed to address needs of the SAS procurement activity and is based off the actual CCP. However no data beyond this document is required or expected to be referenced in regards to request specifics.

1.2 Sample Problem Scope

For this Scenario, the scope of the problem is limited to providing support to CCP for two development partners. The work will only address the flight vehicles (launch vehicle and transport vehicle).

1.3 Task Description

NASA's Commercial Crew Program is a partnership between the agency and aerospace industry to develop and fly human space transportation systems. The goal is to develop safe, reliable and cost-effective access to and from the International Space Station and low-Earth orbit.

The CCP approach to obtaining flight systems differs from the approaches used by NASA in the past.

While NASA continues to pursue its own development efforts, the CCP effort is intended to facilitate the development of a U.S. commercial space flight industry while providing NASA short-term support for servicing the International Space Station.

NASA's Prior Approach for Obtaining Crew Transportation Systems:

• NASA devised requirements for a crew transportation system that would carry astronauts into orbit, and then the agency's engineers and specialists oversaw every development aspect of the spacecraft, its support systems and operations plans.

• An aerospace contractor was hired to build the crew transportation system to the design criteria and the standards NASA furnished.

• NASA personnel were deeply involved in the processing, testing, launching and operation of the crew transportation system to ensure safety and reliability. The space agency owned the spacecraft and its operating infrastructure.

• Every spacecraft built for humans, from Mercury to Gemini and Apollo to the space shuttle and American section of the International Space Station, was built and operated using this model.

Commercial Crew Program's Approach for Obtaining Crew Transportation Systems:

• NASA's engineers and aerospace specialists work closely with companies to develop crew transportation systems that can safely, reliably and cost-effectively carry humans to low-Earth orbit, including the International Space Station, and return safely to Earth.

• Interested companies are free to design the transportation system they think is best. For the contracts phase of development and certification, each company must meet NASA’s pre-determined set of requirements.

• The companies are encouraged to apply the most efficient and effective manufacturing and business operating techniques throughout the process.

• The companies own and operate their own spacecraft and infrastructure.

• The partnership approach allows NASA engineers insight into a company’s development process while the agency’s technical expertise and resources are accessible to a company.

In support of this new approach, NASA CCP has requested that the IV&V Program provide assurance support for the certification of the CCP partner’s systems. The NASA IV&V Program SMA Support Office (SSO) has been asked to provide specific Safety and Reliability Analysis (SRA) services to identify hazards and critical items associated with the function and operation of the partner vehicles. The results of these analyses will used to develop risk data to support possible changes in the design or operations of the vehicles as well as to support certification of the vehicles.

The primary analyses to be performed include, Criticality Assessments (CA), Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (FMEA). The results of all analysis will be shared with the CCP to provide further insight into the safety and reliability of the partner vehicles.

2 SCENARIO TECHINAL REQUIREMENTS

The following sections identify the separate technical scenarios that the Offeror shall need to address. Note that the Offeror is not to perform any actual SMA analysis work in response to the RFP.

2.1 Criticality Analysis

The criticality analysis is performed to allow the SSO to independently assess the role of identified system elements within the partner vehicles. The output of this analysis is used to drive the other analyses efforts, i.e., HA and FMEA.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Evaluate CCP partner technical documentation, including but not limited to, artifacts such as, vehicle system level requirements, vehicle subsystem level requirements, hardware requirements, software requirements, system and subsystem design documents, software design documents, architectural descriptions, user interface requirements, fault tolerance requirements, etc. in order to assess impacts to Safety and Mission Assurance planning and analyses under this Task Order and provide review findings to NASA for consideration.

2. Provide a description of the approach to performing a Criticality Assessment on the CCP vehicle elements to determine if the elements are Critical or Non-critical.

3. Provide a staffing profile, including labor categories, that is capable of performing the identified analysis. Provide rationale for the proposed skill mix.

2.2 Hazard Analysis

The hazard analysis will be performed as a task separate from the hazard analysis being performed by the development partners. The intent is to develop a more in-depth understanding of the hazards being presented by the partners as well as ensuring that no hazards are left unidentified to the extent possible.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Describe the approach to performing a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for all Flight Critical elements sufficient to identify the catastrophic hazards and single-point failures needing to be addressed through the design/development process to support the partner vehicles preliminary design review(s).

2. Describe the approach to comparing and contrasting the SSO developed HA with the CCP partner developed HA to identify any possible gaps between the two sets of hazards.

2.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Similar to the HA, the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) will be performed independent of the development partners efforts. The intent is to develop an independent understanding of the failure modes and the impacts to the system. This includes determining if there are modes that do not meet CCP reliability requirements, modes that represent single-point failures or modes where the design does not meet failure tolerance requirements.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Describe the approach to conducting a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for all Flight Critical elements of the partner vehicles.

2. Describe the approach to comparing and contrasting the SSO developed FMEA with the partner developed FMEA for the purposed of identifying gaps in the two sets of analyses.

2.4 Risk analysis and Certification Support

The results of the SRA provide insight into possible risks associated with the partner vehicles. The intent of this task is to assess those risks and provide the results of that assessment to the CCP SMA providing them with additional insight into potential partner vehicle risks.

1. Describe the approach to identifying CCP system risks as well as the approach for identifying and communicating mitigations for these risks.

3 ACRONYM LIST

CA Criticality Analysis CCP Commercial Crew Program FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis HA Hazard Analysis NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration PHA Preliminary Hazards Analysis SMA Safety and Mission Assurance SRA Safety and Reliability Analysis SSO SMA Support Office