ENCLOSURE_2_-_Project_Scenario_-_SMA.pdf

ENCLOSURE 2

PROJECT SCENARIO:

SMA ANALYSIS

RFP # NNG16544506R

Enclosure 2

NNG16544506R

Table of Contents

Contents

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Sample Problem Overview

1.2 Sample Problem Scope

1.3 Task Description

2 SCENARIO TECHINAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1 Criticality Analysis

2.2 Hazard Analysis

2.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

2.4 Risk analysis and Certification Support

3 ACRONYM LIST

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Sample Problem Overview

This SAS Scenario for the provision of Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) analysis support provides the Offeror the opportunity to demonstrate their understanding of the NASA SMA mission as well as present their skills and experience in performing SMA analysis. The Offerors can also illustrate how their processes, management and technical, will provide a robust and efficient solution to the challenge presented to them. Additionally, this scenario presents the challenge of working with in a new NASA approach to developing launch vehicles. It will require a strong understanding of NASA’s development life cycle processes, the role of SMA in the development processes and how that role shifts when placed in the role of providing analysis in support of a development effort in which NASA is not intimately involved.

This Scenario makes use of the current Commercial Crew Program (CCP) and addresses a fictitious request to provide specific SMA analysis support to CCP. The request was developed to address needs of the SAS procurement activity and is based off the actual CCP. However no data beyond this document is required or expected to be referenced in regards to request specifics.

1.2 Sample Problem Scope

For this Scenario, the scope of the problem is limited to providing support to CCP for two development partners. The work will only address the flight vehicles (launch vehicle and transport vehicle).

1.3 Task Description

NASA's Commercial Crew Program is a partnership between the agency and aerospace industry to develop and fly human space transportation systems. The goal is to develop safe, reliable and cost-effective access to and from the International Space Station and low-Earth orbit.

The CCP approach to obtaining flight systems differs from the approaches used by NASA in the past.

While NASA continues to pursue its own development efforts, the CCP effort is intended to facilitate the development of a U.S. commercial space flight industry while providing NASA short-term support for servicing the International Space Station.

NASA's Prior Approach for Obtaining Crew Transportation Systems:

• NASA devised requirements for a crew transportation system that would carry astronauts into orbit, and then the agency's engineers and specialists oversaw every development aspect of the spacecraft, its support systems and operations plans.

• An aerospace contractor was hired to build the crew transportation system to the design criteria and the standards NASA furnished.

• NASA personnel were deeply involved in the processing, testing, launching and operation of the crew transportation system to ensure safety and reliability. The space agency owned the spacecraft and its operating infrastructure.

• Every spacecraft built for humans, from Mercury to Gemini and Apollo to the space shuttle and American section of the International Space Station, was built and operated using this model.

Commercial Crew Program's Approach for Obtaining Crew Transportation Systems:

• NASA's engineers and aerospace specialists work closely with companies to develop crew transportation systems that can safely, reliably and cost-effectively carry humans to low-Earth orbit, including the International Space Station, and return safely to Earth.

• Interested companies are free to design the transportation system they think is best. For the contracts phase of development and certification, each company must meet NASA’s pre-determined set of requirements.

• The companies are encouraged to apply the most efficient and effective manufacturing and business operating techniques throughout the process.

• The companies own and operate their own spacecraft and infrastructure.

• The partnership approach allows NASA engineers insight into a company’s development process while the agency’s technical expertise and resources are accessible to a company.

In support of this new approach, NASA CCP has requested that the IV&V Program provide assurance support for the certification of the CCP partner’s systems. The NASA IV&V Program SMA Support Office (SSO) has been asked to provide specific Safety and Reliability Analysis (SRA) services to identify hazards and critical items associated with the function and operation of the partner vehicles. The results of these analyses will used to develop risk data to support possible changes in the design or operations of the vehicles as well as to support certification of the vehicles.

The primary analyses to be performed include, Criticality Assessments (CA), Hazard Analysis (HA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analyses (FMEA). The results of all analysis will be shared with the CCP to provide further insight into the safety and reliability of the partner vehicles.

2 SCENARIO TECHINAL REQUIREMENTS

The following sections identify the separate technical scenarios that the Offeror shall need to address. Note that the Offeror is not to perform any actual SMA analysis work in response to the RFP.

2.1 Criticality Analysis

The criticality analysis is performed to allow the SSO to independently assess the role of identified system elements within the partner vehicles. The output of this analysis is used to drive the other analyses efforts, i.e., HA and FMEA.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Evaluate CCP partner technical documentation, including but not limited to, artifacts such as, vehicle system level requirements, vehicle subsystem level requirements, hardware requirements, software requirements, system and subsystem design documents, software design documents, architectural descriptions, user interface requirements, fault tolerance requirements, etc. in order to assess impacts to Safety and Mission Assurance planning and analyses under this Task Order and provide review findings to NASA for consideration.

2. Provide a description of the approach to performing a Criticality Assessment on the CCP vehicle elements to determine if the elements are Critical or Non-critical.

3. Provide a staffing profile, including labor categories, that is capable of performing the identified analysis. Provide rationale for the proposed skill mix.

2.2 Hazard Analysis

The hazard analysis will be performed as a task separate from the hazard analysis being performed by the development partners. The intent is to develop a more in-depth understanding of the hazards being presented by the partners as well as ensuring that no hazards are left unidentified to the extent possible.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Describe the approach to performing a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) sufficient to identify the catastrophic hazards and single-point failures needing to be addressed through the design/development process to support the partner vehicles preliminary design review(s).

2. Describe the approach to comparing and contrasting the SSO developed HA with the CCP partner developed HA to identify any possible gaps between the two sets of hazards.

2.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Similar to the HA, the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) will be performed independent of the development partners efforts. The intent is to develop an independent understanding of the failure modes and the impacts to the system. This includes determining if there are modes that do not meet CCP reliability requirements, modes that represent single-point failures or modes where the design does not meet failure tolerance requirements.

The Offeror shall provide the following responses in their proposal:

1. Describe the approach to conducting a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for all Flight Critical elements of the partner vehicles.

2. Describe the approach to comparing and contrasting the SSO developed FMEA with the partner developed FMEA for the purposed of identifying gaps in the two sets of analyses.

2.4 Risk analysis and Certification Support

The results of the SRA provide insight into possible risks associated with the partner vehicles. The intent of this task is to assess those risks and provide the results of that assessment to the CCP SMA providing them with additional insight into potential partner vehicle risks.

1. Describe the approach to identifying CCP system risks as well as the approach for identifying and communicating mitigations for these risks.

3 ACRONYM LIST

CA Criticality Analysis CCP Commercial Crew Program FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis HA Hazard Analysis NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration PHA Preliminary Hazards Analysis SMA Safety and Mission Assurance SRA Safety and Reliability Analysis SSO SMA Support Office