Attachment_3_MCH_RCM_PSPEC.xlsx
XLSX spreadsheet 97 KB Posted
- Attached to
- MAGTF Common Handheld (MCH)
- Solicitation number
- M67854-18-R-2023
- Issued by
-
United States Marine Corps
About this file
This document outlines technical requirements for the MAGTF Common Handheld (MCH) system solicitation. Key details include that the MCH system will be a modular, man-portable equipment suite allowing warfighters to acquire targets in various conditions and control close air support and artillery/naval fire support missions. It will also serve as a secure, timely digital information processing and display system providing C2/SA information to tactical units using digital communications. The technical requirements specify performance criteria for the MCH system across various operational environments, including temperature, shock, vibration, EMI, and other factors. It also outlines security requirements for processing secret data in accordance with various DoD directives and standards. Compliance will be demonstrated through analysis, inspection, and testing of the MCH system and documentation.
Requirements Compliance Matrix
View the file
Other files
Show 40 more
50 files listed here. See the rest on GovTribe.
On GovTribe
Work with this file
- Download the original file
- Contacts named in this file
- Similar government files
- Ask GovTribe AI about this file
Text version
M67854-17-R-2604 MCH PSPEC
| MCH PWS Reference | MCH PSPEC Requirement Reference | MCH Requirement | Threshold / Objective | MCH PSPEC Verification Reference | MCH Verification | MCH Verification Method | Vendor Met (Yes / No) | Vendor validation of met requirement | Vendor rationale for requirement not met | Vendor plan to meet requirement if not currently met | |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.1 | The MCH System shall be fully operable without degradation at a continuous, ambient temperature of -40°F in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.1 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 502.6, Procedure II (Low Temperature) in its operational power-on configuration. Verify MCH System meets threshold temperature. If failure point has not yet been reached continue decreasing air temperature in 2 °F increments until MCH System failure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.2 | The MCH System shall be fully operable without degradation at a continuous, ambient temperature of 130°F in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T) | T | 4.2.1.2 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 501.6, Procedure II (High Temperature), in its operational power-on configuration. Verify MCH System meets threshold temperature. If failure point has not yet been reached continue decreasing air temperature in 2 °F increments until MCH System failure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.3 | The MCH System should be fully operable without degradation at a continuous, ambient temperature of 140°F in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (O) | O | 4.2.1.3 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 501.6, Procedure II (High Temperature) in its operational power-on configuration. Verify MCH System meets threshold temperature. If failure point has not yet been reached continue decreasing air temperature in 2 °F increments until MCH System failure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.4 | The MCH System shall be capable of being stored without suffering degradation at temperatures ranging from ambient to -40⁰F in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.4 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 502.6, Procedure I (Low Temperature). The system will not be in its transit case while under test for this procedure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.5 | The MCH System shall be capable of being stored without suffering degradation at temperatures ranging from ambient to 158⁰F in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.5 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 501.6, Procedure I (High Temperature). The system will not be in its transit case while under test for this procedure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.6 | The MCH System shall not suffer any degradation in performance following a submersion in salt water at a depth of 1.0 meter in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.6 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 512.6. The MCH System will be submerged to a depth of 1.0 meter for two 24-hour periods with a 24-hour drying time between each exposure. The MCH System will be assembled into its operational power-on configuration for verification. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.7 | The MCH System, within its transit case, shall not suffer any degradation of performance following a 30 minute submersion in salt water at a depth of 1.0 meter in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.7 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 512.6, Procedure I. The MCH System, within the transit case, will be submerged to a depth of 1.0 meter for 30 minutes. The MCH System will be stowed in its storage configuration during the test. The MCH System will be assembled into its operational power-on configuration for verification after the test. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.8 | The MCH System shall operate without degradation after exposure to rain for 2 hours in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.8 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 506.6, Procedure I. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.9 | The MCH System shall not suffer degradation after exposure to 6mm of frozen precipitation accumulation in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.9 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 521.4. The system will be assembled into an as-worn configuration. Perform the Glaze Ice procedure for 6mm ice thickness with the system powered off. Following test remove ice accumulation and power the system on to test for performance degradation. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.10 | The MCH System shall operate without degradation after exposure to blowing sand and dust in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.10 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 510.6, Procedures I and II. The system will be assembled into the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the procedures. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.11 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with CE101. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.11 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, sections CE101. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.12 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with CE102. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.12 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, sections CE102. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.13 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with CS101. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.13 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, section CS101. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.14 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with CS114. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.14 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, section CS114. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.15 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with CS115. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.15 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, section CS115. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.16 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with CS116. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.16 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, section CS116. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.17 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with CS118. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.17 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, section CS118. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.18 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with RE101. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.18 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, section RE101. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.19 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with RE102. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.19 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, section RE102. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.20 | In all authorized use cases, the MCH System shall meet the requirements in MIL-STD-461G in accordance with RS103. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.20 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-461G, section RS103. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.21 | The MCH system in its transit configuration shall not suffer degradation of performance due to the vibrations experienced during transportation in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.21 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 514.7, Procedure I. Vibration exposure shall be as identified in Figure 514.7E-1 of Annex E (General Minimum Integrity Exposure), with a duration of one hour for each of three orthogonal axes. Note: The testing procedure defined in Method 514.7 Procedure I is a representative test of multiple transit scenarios including aircraft, helicopter, and ground transportation. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.22 | The MCH system shall be operable without performance degradation in standard atmosphere conditions at an altitude of 25,000 ft. in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T) Note: Standard Atmosphere conditions are defined in MIL-STD-3013. | T | 4.2.1.22 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 500.6, Procedure II and temperature conditions at 25,000 feet obtained from MIL-STD-3013. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.23 | The MCH system should be operable without performance degradation in standard atmosphere conditions at an altitude of 42,000 ft. in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (O) Note: Standard Atmosphere conditions are defined in MIL-STD-3013. | O | 4.2.1.23 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 500.6, Procedure II and temperature conditions at 42,000 feet obtained from MIL-STD-3013. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.24 | The MCH System shall not suffer any degradation in performance (as a result of atmospheric pressure related effects) after being subjected to a military free fall operation conducted from 25,000 ft. Mean Sea Level (MSL) in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T) | T | 4.2.1.24 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 500.5, Procedure III. Procedure III will be conducted for two system configurations including a transit configuration (system in transit case) and the Marine-worn power-on configuration. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.25 | The MCH System should not suffer any degradation in performance (as a result of atmospheric pressure related effects) after being subjected to a military free fall operation conducted from 42,000 ft. MSL in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (O) | O | 4.2.1.25 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 500.5, Procedure III. Procedure III will be conducted for two system configurations including a transit configuration (system in transit case) and the Marine-worn power-on configuration. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.26 | The MCH System shall not suffer any degradation in performance following sudden changes in ambient air temperature of up to 35.6⁰F/min (T). | T | 4.2.1.26 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 503.6, Procedure I-B, between ambient air temperatures of -14°F and 122°F for a period of two (2) hours at each temperature. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during exposure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.27 | The MCH System should not suffer any degradation in performance following sudden changes in ambient air temperature of up to 50⁰F/min in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (O) | O | 4.2.1.27 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 503.6, Procedure I-B, between ambient air temperatures of -14°F and 122°F for a period of two (2) hours at each temperature. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during exposure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.28 | The MCH System shall operate without leakage during and after exposure to a salt fog environment in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.28 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 509.6. The MCH System will be exposed for two 24-hour periods with a 24-hour drying time after each exposure (two wet and two dry periods of 24 hours each). The system will be assembled into the Marine-worn power-off configuration during the exposure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.29 | The MCH System shall operate without degradation during and after exposure to a salt fog environment in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.29 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 509.6. The MCH System will be exposed for two 24-hour periods with a 24-hour drying time after each exposure (two wet and two dry periods of 24 hours each). The system will be assembled into the Marine-worn power-off configuration during the exposure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.30 | The MCH System shall not be degraded in performance after experiencing shock commonly induced during normal transportation in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.30 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 516.7, Procedure II-IV. The system will be stowed in storage configuration during procedures II and IV, and in a power-on configuration during procedure III. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.31 | The MCH System shall not be degraded in performance after experiencing shock commonly induced during normal maintenance in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.31 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 516.7, Procedure VI. The system will be in a power-on configuration during the procedure. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.32 | The MCH System shall not be degraded in performance after experiencing shock commonly induced during normal field operations in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.32 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 516.7, Procedure I. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during Procedure I. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.33 | The MCH System shall not suffer any degradation in performance when exposed to solar radiation of up to 1120W/m2 in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.33 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, method 505.6, Procedure I, Cycle A1. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.1.34 | The MCH System shall not suffer any degradation in performance between 0% and 95% humidity in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.1.34 | Test the MCH System in accordance with MIL-STD-810G Change 1, Method 507.6, Procedure II. Verify the system completes all functional verifications at the specified intervals during and after the test. | Test | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.1 | The MCH system shall be certifiable to process SECRET data in accordance with references including: DoD 8510.01 "Risk Management Framework for DoD Information Technology", DoDI 8500.01 "Cybersecurity" , DoDI 5000.02 "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System", CNSSI-1253 "Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems", CNSSP-7 "Policy On The Use of Commercial Solutions to Protect National Security Systems", CNSSP-11 "National Policy Governing the Acquisition of Information Assurance (IA) and IA-Enabled Information Technology Products" and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Rev.4 "Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations", NIST SP 800-59 “Guidelines for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System”, NIST SP 800-60, “Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories”; and Federal Information Processing Standards [FIPS] 199, “Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems." (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.1 | Analyze the following documentation and compare to MCH system security documentation and component configuration to verify that system is designed to process SECRET data: DoD 8510.01 "Risk Management Framework for DoD Information Technology", DoDI 8500.01 "Cybersecurity" , DoDI 5000.02 "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System", DoDI 5200.01 "DoD Information Security Program and Protection of Sensitive Compartmented | ||||||
| Information (SCI)", CNSSI-1253 "Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems", CNSSP-7 "Policy On The Use of Commercial Solutions to Protect National Security Systems", CNSSP-11 "National Policy Governing the Acquisition of Information Assurance (IA) and IA-Enabled Information Technology Products" and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53 Rev. 4 "Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations" , NIST SP 800-59 “Guidelines for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System”, NIST SP 800-60, “Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories”; and Federal Information Processing Standards [FIPS] 199, “Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems." | Analysis | ||||||||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.2 | The MCH system shall be designed to comply with either the NSA Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) Mobile Access or the Campus WLAN Capability Package, including any identified deviations to the solution that have been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.2 | Analyze the DAR and CSfC Capability Packages, including identified deviations, and compare to MCH CSfC documentation to include the completed compliance checklist for each CP. MCH system components will be CSfC certified. Inspect MCH system component NIAP test results to verify certification. | Analysis/Inspection | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.3 | The MCH system shall be designed to comply with the NSA Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) Data-At-Rest Capability Package, including any identified deviations to the solution that have been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.3 | Analyze the DAR and CSfC Capability Packages, including identified deviations, and compare to MCH CSfC documentation to include the completed compliance checklist for each CP. MCH system components will be CSfC certified. Inspect MCH system component NIAP test results to verify certification. | Analysis/Inspection | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.4 | The MCH system shall comply with NIAP Protection Profile (PP) guidance including the Mobile Device Fundamentals PP for the EUD, the Mobile Device Management and Agent PPs for the Mobile Device Management components, the Certification Authority (CA) PP for Certificate Authorities, the Extended Package for VPN Gateways and IPsec VPN Client PP for IPsec VPN client, Extended Packages for Wireless LANT Client and Wireless LAN Access Systems, Extended Package for Software File Encryption, and Application Software PP. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.4 | Inspect each MCH System Component NIAP PP evaluation test report to verify NIAP validation. Note: MCH system components will be NIAP certified against protection profiles. | Analysis/Inspection | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.5 | The MCH system shall exchange SECRET data over wireless media in accordance with the NSA CSfC Mobile Access or Campus Wireless LAN Capability Package composed solution guidance, including any identified deviations to the solution that have been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.5 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Capability Packages/identified tactical deviations. Demonstrate exchange of data by employing the assurance method specified in the Capability Package. | Analysis/Demonstration | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.6 | The MCH system shall exchange SECRET data over the wired USB tether in accordance with the NSA CSfC Mobile Access or Campus Wireless LAN Capability Package composed solution guidance, including any identified deviations to the solution that have been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. (T=O) Note: for wired communication, "securely" is achieved by physical security vice digital security. | T=O | 4.2.2.6 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Capability Packages/identified tactical deviations. Demonstrate exchange of data by employing the assurance method specified in the Capability Package. | Analysis/Demonstration | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.7 | The MCH system shall have provisions to detect if unauthorized changes are made to EUD security settings to meet security control SA-10 Developer configuration management from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4. (T=O) Note: Unauthorized changes are those made without explicit permission or approval. | T=O | 4.2.2.7 | Analyze security control SA-10 from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4 and compare to MCH system level documentation. Demonstrate that the MCH System will detect when a security setting is changed or security software is modified in an unauthorized manner, as shown on the Mobile Device Management console and through EUD log files. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.8 | The MCH system shall have provisions to detect if unauthorized changes are made to EUD security related software to meet security control SA-10 Developer configuration management from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.8 | Analyze security control SA-10 from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4 and compare to MCH system level documentation. Demonstrate that the MCH System will detect when a security setting is changed or security software is modified in an unauthorized manner, as shown on the Mobile Device Management console and through EUD log files. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.9 | The MCH system shall have provisions to detect if unauthorized changes are made to EUD security settings to meet security control SI-7 "Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity" from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.9 | Analyze security controls SI-7 from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4 and compare to MCH system level documentation. Demonstrate that the MCH System will detect when a security setting is changed or security software is modified in an unauthorized manner in accordance with guidance provided in security control SI-7 "Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity" from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.10 | The MCH system shall have provisions to detect if changes are made to EUD security related software to meet security control SI-7 "Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity" from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.10 | Analyze security controls SI-7 from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4 and compare to MCH system level documentation. Demonstrate that the MCH System will detect when a security setting is changed or security software is modified in an unauthorized manner in accordance with guidance provided in security control SI-7 "Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity" from NIST SP 800-53 revision 4.The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration | |||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.11 | The MCH system shall have provisions to log changes made to EUD security settings. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.11 | Per CNSSI 1253, SI-4: Information System Monitoring , demonstrate the MCH System will log when a security setting is changed as shown on the Mobile Device Management console and through EUD log files. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. Perform testing as a standard as well as an administrative user. | ||||||
| Demonstration | |||||||||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.12 | The MCH system shall have provisions to log changes made to EUD security related software. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.12 | Per CNSSI 1253, SI-4: Information System Monitoring , demonstrate that the MCH System will log when a security related software is changed as shown on the Mobile Device Management console and through EUD log files. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | ||||||
| Perform testing as a standard as well as a administrative user. | Demonstration | ||||||||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.13 | The MCH system shall have provisions to log if unauthorized attempts are made to change EUD security settings. (T=O) Note: Unauthorized means without explicit permission. | T=O | 4.2.2.13 | Per MDM PP, 4.3.3. Security Management (FMT) demonstrate that the MCH System will log when security settings is modified in an unauthorized manner, as shown on the Mobile Device Management console and through EUD log files. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. Perform testing as a standard as well as a privileged user. |
| Demonstration | ||||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.14 | The MCH system shall have provisions to log unauthorized attempts made to change EUD security related software. (T=O) Note: Unauthorized means without explicit permission. | T=O | 4.2.2.14 | Per MDM PP, 4.3.3. Security Management (FMT), demonstrate that the MCH System will log when security software is modified in an unauthorized manner, as shown on the Mobile Device Management console and through EUD log files. The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.15 | The MCH System shall have provisions to protect against unauthorized changes made to the EUD security settings (T=O). Note: Unauthorized means without explicit permission. | T=O | 4.2.2.15 | Analyze EUD and MDM vendor documentation on real-time integrity verification to detect an unauthorized change to the EUD security settings. Demonstrate that the MCH System will ensure the system software digital signatures are verified prior to the Application Processor system software is updated in accordance with the MA-CP (MA-EU-49). The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.16 | The MCH System shall have provisions to protect against unauthorized changes made to the EUD security related software (T=O). Note: Unauthorized means without explicit permission. | T=O | 4.2.2.16 | Analyze EUD and MDM vendor documentation on real-time integrity verification to detect an unauthorized change to the EUD security related software. Demonstrate that the MCH System will ensure application digital signatures are verified prior to installing new applications in accordance with the MA-CP (MA-EU-50). The system will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.17 | The MCH user shall be granted access to the EUD only after successfully authenticating to the device in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.17 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to MDF Protection Profile. Demonstrate proper authentication to the MCH EUD via the assurance method stated in the MDF PP 4.1.4 Authorization and Authentication and DoD Annex to MDF PP Table 3-1: Configuration Values minimum password length. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.18 | The MCH user shall be granted access to the EUD plain text data only after successfully authenticating to the device in accordance with composed solution guidance provided by the NSA CSfC DAR Capability Package including any identified tactical deviations to the solution that have been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.18 | Analyze the MCH EUD DAR solution documentation for compliance to the DAR Capability Packages and identified tactical deviations. Demonstrate authentication and subsequent access to and decryption of both layers of MCH EUD data encryption in accordance with the DAR CP requirements DAR-CR-2, DAR-CR 12, DAR-CR-13 DAR-CR-14, DAR-FE-2, and DAR PE-5.The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.19 | The MCH user shall be granted access to the EUD only after successfully authenticating to the device in accordance with composed solution guidance provided by the NSA CSfC Mobile Access or Campus Wireless LAN Capability Package including any identified tactical deviations to the solution that have been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.19 | Analyze the MCH EUD documentation for compliance to the Mobile Access or Campus WLAN Capability Package and identified tactical deviations. Demonstrate proper authentication to the MCH EUD in accordance with MA Capability Package requirement MA-EU-25. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.20 | The MCH user shall be granted access to the MCH applications only after successfully authenticating to these applications in accordance with composed solution guidance provided by the NSA CSfC Mobile Access or Campus Wireless LAN Capability Package including any identified tactical deviations to the solution that have been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.20 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the MA or Campus WLAN Capability Package and identified tactical deviations. Demonstrate proper authentication to the MCH services in compliance with the MA-EU-12 requirement. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.21 | The MCH system shall provide network device authentication in accordance with the NSA CSfC Mobile Access or Campus Wireless LAN Capability Package including any identified tactical deviations to the solution that have been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.21 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Mobile Access or Campus WLAN Capability Package and identified tactical deviations. Analyze documentation submitted to NSA to ensure all components of the MCH system are certified by NSA and the solution has been submitted and approved through the CSfC registration office. Demonstrate that after the two layers of device authentication, the MCH VPN EUDs require the user to authenticate to the tactical network using an AO approved method in accordance with MA-EU-12. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.22 | The MCH system shall securely transmit data via a wireless 802.11, Wi-Fi connection in accordance with EUD configuration guidance presented in the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.22 | In accordance with the MDF PP, section 5.2.1.2, Cryptographic Key Generation test, demonstrate secure data transmission via wireless 802.11 Wi-Fi connection by attempting to decrypt wireless data exchanged between the Mobile Device and other endpoints. Verify decryption using a packet sniffing and analysis tool to collect frames between a wireless access point and EUD and perform subsequent analysis of the exchanged packets. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.23 | The MCH system shall securely receive data via a wireless 802.11, Wi-Fi connection in accordance with EUD configuration guidance presented in the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.23 | In accordance with 5.2.1.2 Cryptographic Key Generation test steps in the MDF PP, test to ensure data is securely received via wireless 802.11 Wi-Fi connection by attempting to exploit wireless data exchanged between the Mobile Device and other endpoints. Test using a packet sniffing tool to collect frames between a wireless access point and EUD. | Test |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.24 | The MCH system shall securely transmit data via a wireless Bluetooth connection in accordance with EUD configuration guidance presented in the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.24 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate proper data transmission via Bluetooth via the assurance method stated in the Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.25 | The MCH system shall securely receive data via a wireless Bluetooth connection in accordance with EUD configuration guidance presented in the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.25 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate proper receipt of data via Bluetooth via the assurance method stated in the Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.26 | The MCH system shall securely transmit SECRET data via a wireless connection in accordance with guidance presented in the CSfC Mobile Access or Campus Wireless LAN Capability Package. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.26 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the MA or Campus WLAN Capability Package. Demonstrate proper authentication succeeds before data transmit via wireless connection to the EUD. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.27 | The MCH system shall securely receive SECRET data via a wireless connection in accordance with guidance presented in the CSfC Mobile Access or Campus Wireless LAN Capability Package. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.27 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the MA or Campus WLAN Capability Package. Demonstrate proper authentication succeeds before data receive via wireless connection to the EUD. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.28 | All modifications to the MCH EUD boot process shall be detected in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals, Mobile Device Management, and Mobile Device Agent Protection Profiles (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.28 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate boot process modification using test steps in 5.6.5.2 TSF Integrity Testing and subsequent logging via FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation in the MDF Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. Demonstrate the MCH EUD collects log information of any attempt to modify the boot process in accordance with FPT_TST_EXT.1 in the MDM PP and FPT_TST_EXT.2 in the MDM Agent PP. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.29 | All modifications to the MCH EUD boot process shall be logged in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals, Mobile Device Management, and Mobile Device Agent Protection Profiles (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.29 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate boot process modification using test steps in 5.6.5.2 TSF Integrity Testing and subsequent logging via FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation in the MDF Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. Demonstrate the MCH EUD collects log information of any attempt to modify the boot process in accordance with FPT_TST_EXT.1 in the MDM PP and FPT_TST_EXT.2 in the MDM Agent PP. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.30 | The MCH system shall allow the configuration of application privileges on the EUD by authorized administrators in accordance with the Mobile Access or Campus Wireless LAN CP. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.30 | Analyze MCH system level documentation for compliance to the Mobile Access or Campus WLAN CP. Demonstrate that MA CP specified 5.3.1 Access Control (FDP_ACF) assurance can be configured on the EUD by authorized administrators. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.31 | Updates to the MCH antivirus software shall not require internet connectivity. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.31 | Demonstrate that selected antivirus software can be updated without internet connectivity. | |
| Demonstration | ||||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.32 | Updates to the MCH host intrusion prevention software shall not require internet connectivity. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.32 | Demonstrate that selected host intrusion prevention software can be updated without internet connectivity. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.33 | The MCH user shall be prevented from tampering with the reporting of events from the device in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals, Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.33 | Analyze the MCH System Component NIAP MDF, MDM and MDM Agent PP evaluation test report to verify NIAP validation. Demonstrate prevention of tampering g with or disabling the reporting of events via the assurance method stated in the Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.34 | The MCH user shall be prevented from disabling the reporting of events from the device in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals, Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.34 | Analyze the MCH System Component NIAP MDF, MDM and MDM Agent PP evaluation test report to verify NIAP validation. Demonstrate prevention of tampering g with or disabling the reporting of events via the assurance method stated in the Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in an as-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.35 | When connected to the tactical networks, the MCH System shall use time synchronized with the tactical network. (T=O) Note: There are three basic types of synchronization methods for wireless networks. The first is relative timing and is the simplest. It relies on the ordering of messages and events. The basic idea is to be able to determine if event 1 occurred before event 2. Comparing the local clocks to determine the order is all that is needed. Clock synchronization is not important. The next method is relative timing in which the network clocks are independent of each other and the nodes keep track of drift and offset. Usually a node keeps information about its drift and offset in correspondence to neighboring nodes. The nodes have the ability to synchronize their local time with another nodes local time at any instant. Most synchronization protocols use this method. The last method is global synchronization where there is a constant global timescale throughout the network. | T=O | 4.2.2.35 | Analyze MDF PP, 5.6.4 Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM) for auditing requirements to inform test. Verify that time is synchronized with a tactical network when connected, and that all security logging and reports reflect the synchronized time. Change time on MCH EUD, Inspect logs, and re-verify. For compliance with MA CP, verify the EUDs are configured for all IP traffic, with the exception of IKE, network address configuration, time synchronization, and name resolution traffic required to establish the IPsec tunnel, to flow through the IPsec VPN client. (MA-EU-37) | Analysis/Inspection |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.36 | When not connected to the tactical network and if connected to a SAASM GPS, the MCH EUD shall use Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) from the SAASM GPS time code receiver. (T=O) Note: See CJSCI 6130.01E for UTC time standard directive. | T=O | 4.2.2.36 | Analyze security documentation for auditing requirements to inform test. Verify time is synchronized with SAASM GPS when the tactical network is disconnected, and that all security logging and reports reflect synchronized time. Change time on MCH EUD, Inspect logs, and re-verify. | |
| Analysis/Inspection | ||||||
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.37 | The MDM server shall securely validate remote attestation by the EUD in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals, Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.37 | Analyze security documentation for remote attestation capabilities. Test remote attestation feature by rooting an EUD that was previously enrolled and attested by the MCH MDM as secure. The rooted EUD should be noted as "compromised" on the MDM server User Interface. | Analysis |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.38 | The MDM system shall enforce the security critical policies specified in the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile on each MCH EUD. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.38 | Analyze security documentation for security critical policy enforcement capabilities. Test that the EUD, MDM Agent, and MDM Server can enforce critical policies listed in the NIAP MDF PP. | Analysis/Test |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.39 | The MCH system shall provide application updates via wired connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Management, NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile, and the MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (T) | T | 4.2.2.39 | Test application update functionality using FPT_TUD_EXT.2 Extended: Trusted Update Verification in the MDF PP. The operator will initiate a security update via wired connection. The operator will then confirm the successful completion of the security update on the required MCH Systems. The operator will then perform the test for an over the air connection The system(s) will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Test |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.40 | The MCH system should provide application updates via Over the Air connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile, Mobile Device Management, and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (O) | O | 4.2.2.40 | Test application update functionality. The operator will initiate a security update via wired connection. The operator will then confirm the successful completion of the security update on the required MCH Systems. The operator will then perform the test for an over the air connection The system(s) will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Test |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.41 | The MCH MDM shall validate the software version level of each connected EUD's operating systems via wired connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (T) | T | 4.2.2.41 | Demonstrate MCH MDM software version level validation of the EUD's OS via wired connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. The system(s) will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.42 | The MCH MDM shall validate the software version level of each connected EUD's MDM client via wired connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (T) | T | 4.2.2.42 | Demonstrate MCH MDM software version level validation of the EUD's MDM client via wired connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. The system(s) will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.43 | The MCH MDM shall validate the software version level of each connected EUD's MCH applications via wired connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (T) | T | 4.2.2.43 | Demonstrate MCH MDM software version level validation of the EUD's MCH applications via wired connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. The system(s) will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.44 | The MCH system should validate the software version level of each connected EUD's operating system via Over the Air connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles.(O) | O | 4.2.2.44 | Demonstrate MCH MDM software version level validation of the EUD's OS via Over the Air connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. The system(s) will be assembled in an as-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.45 | The MCH system should validate the software version level of each connected EUD's MDM client via Over the Air connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (O) | O | 4.2.2.45 | Demonstrate MCH MDM software version level validation of the EUD's MDM client via Over the Air connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. The system(s) will be assembled in an as-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.46 | The MCH system should validate the software version level of each connected EUD's MCH applications via Over the Air connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. (O) | O | 4.2.2.46 | Demonstrate MCH MDM software version level validation of the EUD's MCH applications via Over the Air connections in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals and Mobile Device Management and MDM Agent Protection Profiles. The system(s) will be assembled in an as-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.47 | The MCH EUD wipe functionality shall include cryptographically erasing all Data Encryption Keys in non-volatile memory in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals PP. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.47 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate the required KEK and DEK cryptographic erasure via the assurance method stated in the noted Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.48 | The MCH system wipe function shall overwrite all protected data in accordance with guidance provided by the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals PP. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.48 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate the wipe functionality via the assurance method stated in the noted Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.49 | The MCH system shall wipe protected data upon command in accordance with the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals PP. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.49 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate the wipe functionality via the assurance method stated in the noted Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.50 | The MCH system shall wipe sensitive data upon command in accordance with the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals PP. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.50 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate the wipe functionality via the assurance method stated in the noted Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.51 | The MDM client shall wipe MCH applications upon command in accordance with the NIAP Mobile Device Fundamentals PP. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.51 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate the application wipe functionality via the assurance method stated in the noted Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.52 | The MCH system shall be able to perform EUD wipe upon removal of the EUD MDM Client. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.52 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate the EUD wipe upon removal of the EUD MDM Client via the assurance method stated in the noted Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
| Par 4.3.2, Table 1 | 3.2.2.53 | The MCH system shall be able to perform EUD wipe upon removal of any of the EUD's security policies. (T=O) | T=O | 4.2.2.53 | Analyze MCH System level documentation for compliance to the Protection Profile. Demonstrate the EUD wipe upon removal of any of the EUD's security policies via the assurance method stated in the noted Protection Profile. The MCH System will be assembled in the Marine-worn power-on configuration during the demonstration. | Analysis/Demonstration |
This is the start of the file's text. The full file is on GovTribe.
File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .