Attachment 9_CMO Planner Course Student Outline.pdf

M02ZSFD CMO Planner Officer Course M02ZSED CMO Planner Chief Course

Student Outlines s

Table of Contents

MAGTF Operations 100

CMO Functions, Components & Planning Considerations 101

Interorganizational Cooperation 102

MCPP Overview 103

Staff Integration 104

Civil Preparation of the Battlespace 105

Green Cell 106

CMO and the Targeting Process 107

CA/CMO Support to Operations in the Information Environment 108

CMO Planner Support to Problem Framing 109

CMO Planner Support to Course of Action (COA) Development 110

CMO Planner Support to COA War Game 111

CMO Planner Support to COA Comparison and Decision 112

CMO Planner Support to Orders Development 113

CMO Planner Support to Transition 114

Operational Assessment 115

Unit Readiness Planning (URP) 150

BLANK

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE CORPS CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SCHOOL

WEAPONS TRAINING BATTALION

TRAINING COMMAND

2301 LITTLE ROAD (C478)

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5036

STUDENT OUTLINE

MAGTF OPERATIONS

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNER OFFICER COURSE

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNER CHIEF COURSE

M02ZSFD

M02ZSED

JUNE 2020

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LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. Terminal Learning Objective. Given a mission, commander's intent, operations order, and CMO planning products

(e.g. CMO staff estimate, CMO COA graphic and narrative, and a synch matrix, etc.) support stability operations planning, to enable the commander's decision-making process by identifying instability and stability factors and to design activities to mitigate instability or reinforce stability factors within the operating environment in accordance with MCTP 3-03A. (CACT-PLAN-

2005)

b. Enabling Learning Objective. Without the aid of references, identify MAGTF capabilities, in accordance with MCDP

1-0, Ch 2. (CACT-PLAN-2005a)

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1. MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE

a. Introduction

(1) The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is the term used to describe the principal Marine Corps organization used across the competition continuum. MAGTFs are a balanced air-ground, combined arms task organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander that is structured to accomplish a specific mission.

(2) The MAGTF was formalized in MCO 3120.3, December

1963. It stated, “A Marine air-ground task force with separate air-ground headquarters is normally formed for combat operations and training exercises in which substantial combat forces of both Marine aviation and Marine ground units are included in the task organization of participating Marine forces.”

Expeditionary by nature, MAGTFs vary in size and capability according to their assigned or likely missions and are specifically equipped for rapid deployment by air or sea.

b. Core Elements. All MAGTFs consist of a command element

(CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element

(ACE), and a logistics combat element (LCE). Although MAGTFs differ in size and capabilities, standard procedures exist for organizing any MAGTF for planning and executing operations.

c. Modular and Expandable. A key feature of the MAGTF is its expandability. Crisis response may require a larger force than what can initially be brought to bear. Being able to expand the original force — rather than replacing it with a larger one — promotes continuity of operations. The MAGTF’s modular structure facilitates rapid expansion into a larger force as a situation demands by simply adding forces as needed to the core units of each existing element. In addition to its Marine

Corps units, a MAGTF may have attached forces from other services and nations, such as naval construction battalions or infantry/armor brigades.

(1) Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). A MEF is comprised of a MEF Headquarters Group, Marine Division, Marine

Air Wing and Marine Logistics Group. For example, the II Marine

Expeditionary Force (II MEF) is composed of a headquarters element, the 2D Marine Division, 2D Marine Aircraft Wing and the

2D Marine Logistics Group, all based on the East Coast.

(2) Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)

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(a) A MEB is larger than a Marine Expeditionary Unit

(MEU) but smaller than a MEF. The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the competition continuum and varies in size.

It is constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a brigade service support group. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer (usually a Major General or sometimes a

Brigadier General), is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint (or combined) task force (CJTF). MEB CEs will also function as the

MEF Forward, providing an additional CE option for the MEF.

Another characteristic is the ability to composite forward and merge rapidly deploying Marine Corps forces into a cohesive, agile MAGTF scaled to the mission.

Generic MEB Structure

(b) MEBs will often be formed in stride by forward deployed forces under a general officer-led MEB CE. Examples of this were demonstrated in relief operations in Haiti during

2010, where two amphibious ready groups (ARG)/MEUs composited to form a MEB. Furthermore, we have recently shown the ability of a CJTF-capable CE to deploy rapidly and command disparate composited forces during initial operations to resolve crises and relieve suffering in the aftermath of the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, as well as in the Philippines after

Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.

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(c) 1st MEB is embedded within I MEF and is regionally oriented to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and supports the Global Response Force (GRF). 2D MEB is a standing

CE located in Camp Lejeune, NC and regionally oriented on U.S.

Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and also supports the GRF. 3D MEB is a standing CE located in

Okinawa, Japan and is regionally oriented to U.S. Indo-Pacific

Command (INDOPACOM). Task Force 51 / 5th MEB is an integrated

U.S. Navy / USMC staff that acts as CENTCOM’s expeditionary response force.

(3) Marine Expeditionary Unit

(a) Usually the smallest type of MAGTF is the MEU.

The command element is the standing headquarters for the MEU, usually headed by a Colonel. The GCE is a battalion landing team (BLT), which is composed of an infantry battalion reinforced with tanks, artillery, engineers, amphibious vehicles, light armored vehicles, and other ground combat assets. The ACE is composed of a composite squadron of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft and an Air Traffic Control (ATC) and command and control detachment. The LCE consists of a Combat

Logistics Battalion (CLB) which handles the logistics and administration needs of the MEU. The specific makeup of the MEU can be customized based upon the task at hand; additional artillery, armor, or air units can be attached, including squadrons of MV-22B Osprey and AV-8B Harrier jets. There are usually three MEUs assigned to each of the U.S. Navy Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, with another MEU based on Okinawa.

(b) The MEUs, embarked aboard Navy ARGs, form

ARG/MEUs. The ARG/MEUs provide continuous, forward naval presence in key regions to conduct steady-state security cooperation, military engagement, and deterrence, as well as immediate response to episodic crises and contingencies. The

ARG/MEUs may also be called upon to support major operations and campaigns in a variety of ways, such as enabling the introduction of other forces, acting as the lead echelon for expansion to a larger formation, or providing the Geographic

Combatant Commander an inherently mobile and flexible sea-based reserve. When embarked aboard an ARG, which is commanded by a

Navy Captain (or Commodore), a support relationship is normally established between the MEU and the ARG.

(c) MEU CEs will often use an abbreviated form of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) to support operational planning. The rapid response planning process (R2P2), is a time-

100-6 constrained version of the MCPP. The R2P2 enables the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to plan and begin execution of certain tasks within six hours and is highly dependent on the use of standing operating procedures.

(4) Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF)

(a) When situations arise for which a MEU or other unit is either inappropriate or unavailable, a SPMAGTF is formed. A SPMAGTF may be of any size—but normally no larger than a MEU — with tailored capabilities required to accomplish a particular mission. It may be task-organized from non-deployed

Marine Corps forces or formed on a contingency basis from a portion of a deployed MAGTF. Regimental-level headquarters often assume the role as a SPMAGTF CE and may conduct training in anticipated mission skills prior to establishment. A SPMAGTF may deploy using commercial shipping or aircraft, inter-theater airlift, amphibious shipping, or organic Marine aviation.

(b) Frequently, SPMAGTFs have conducted sea-based security cooperation activities, such as Unitas, Southern

Partnership Station and Africa Partnership Station. Others have been formed to provide sea-based foreign humanitarian assistance or support to civil authorities or participate in freedom of navigation operations.

(c) An important type of SPMAGTF is an alert contingency MAGTF. Each of the MEFs usually maintain an alert contingency MAGTF as an on-call, rapid crisis response force. A

MEF commander may prescribe that an alert contingency MAGTF be ready to initiate deployment to any location worldwide within a certain number of days or hours, depending on the indications and warnings associated with an emerging crisis. Because it may need to deploy so rapidly, readiness is paramount. Equipment and supplies intended for use as part of an alert contingency

MAGTF are identified and, where appropriate, staged for immediate embarkation. The alert contingency MAGTF usually airlifts to a secure airfield and carries its initial sustainment. Deployment by air necessitates that the size and weight of an alert contingency MAGTF be kept to an absolute minimum. An alert contingency MAGTF may employ independently or in conjunction with amphibious, maritime prepositioning, or other expeditionary forces. The alert contingency MAGTF is often constituted around a MEB CE.

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2. MAGTF CAPABILITIES. As described above, MAGTF capabilities vary with the size of the MAGTF. The remainder of the class will address MAGTF capabilities as they relate to the MEU with an emphasis on civil-military operations (CMO).

a. MEU Mission Essential Tasks. MEUs are trained and certified to operate across the competition continuum. Missions include:

(1) Advance force operations

(2) Maritime interdiction operations (MIO) including visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS)

(3) Amphibious assault

(4) Amphibious raid

(5) Humanitarian assistance (HA)

(6) Stability operations

By design, the MAGTF provides great flexibility in force tailoring to meet specific mission requirements. However, this flexibility can come at great cost to cohesion and habitual command relationships. The "ad-hocery" necessary to create a MAGTF headquarters and task organize its elements can preclude leveraging the strength of a previously well-oiled machine. Today the Marine Corps has standing MEB CEs, but that has not always been the case. Past debate has centered around the perception that, institutionally, the

Marine Corps consistently violated the principle of "training in peace like you will fight in war" by using ad hoc MAGTF headquarters for operational deployments. Heralding a logical concern that continues to this day, Major Barlow, USMC, argued to stop "robbing Peter to pay Paul" with ad hoc

MAGTF staffs in his 1964 Gazette article, "Staff the Fire

Brigade NOW." At this early point in MAGTF history, one already sees recommendations to maintain full time MEU and

MEB staffs for critical continuity and cohesion. There is ample evidence that waiting to build a team only when conflict requires one is not the best way to move into a fight. CMO are an inherent command responsibility. What challenges are faced without a full-time CMO planner on staff?

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(7) Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)

(8) Airfield / port seizure

(9) Theater security cooperation (TSC) activities

(10) Aviation operations from expeditionary shore-based sites

(11) Joint and combined operations

(12) Tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP)

(13) Expeditionary strike

b. Command Element. The MEU CE will typically consist of approximately 250 personnel who represent a wide array of capabilities and force enablers. Among the capabilities is a

CMO planner (by T/O an E-7), but more frequently a small

(usually 4) civil affairs (CA) team. Other related capabilities include information operations personnel, public affairs, combat camera, judge advocate(s), law enforcement personnel – capabilities to enable CMO.

c. Ground Combat Element. The GCE will typically consist of approximately 1,200 personnel centered around the BLT. Their capabilities are primarily focused on offensive, defense and stability tasks as well as MEU-specific requirements. These include amphibious assaults, amphibious raids, airfield seizure, NEO, HA, embassy reinforcement and TSC (e.g., Security Force

Assistance). The GCE will often execute populace and resources control tasks such as facility security, vehicle and personnel check points, etc.

d. Aviation Combat Element. The ACE will typically consist of approximately 500 personnel centered around a composite squadron. The exact make-up of airframes embarked may vary based on aircraft availability, projected mission sets and shipping. Regardless, the ACE is prepared to fulfill the six functions of Marine aviation. Other tasks may be the transportation of personnel and supplies supporting CMO.

e. Logistics Combat Element. The LCE will typically consist of approximately 300 personnel centered around the CLB.

LCE capabilities are designed to support the MAGTF with 15 days organic sustainment. Specific capabilities which impact and facilitate CMO include:

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(1) Transportation operations

(2) General engineering operations

(3) Earth moving

(4) Construction and repair

(5) Electrical support

(6) Water purification, production, storage, and distribution

(7) Health services

(8) Explosive Ordnance Disposal

(9) General services (postal, ammo)

(10) Humanitarian assistance

(11) Evacuation control center operations

f. Equipment. A numerical list of a typical MEU table of equipment is beyond the scope of this class. However, notable end items the CMO planner should be familiar with include:

assault amphibious vehicles, medium tactical vehicles, high mobility multi-wheeled vehicles, light armored vehicles, MV-22 tilt rotors, CH-53E helicopters, UH-1 Hueys, and RQ-21 small tactical unmanned air systems. Additionally, CMO planners should consider the ARG/MEU ability for power generation and water production. While not all inclusive, these platforms and capabilities all have CMO application.

g. Amphibious Ready Group. The ARG is the most frequently employed type of amphibious task force (ATF) organization that is formed to conduct amphibious operations. Together the

ARG/MEU comprise an Amphibious Force (AF).

(1) An ARG consists of a minimum of three ships, usually an amphibious assault ship (LHD or LHA), an amphibious transport dock ship (LPD) and an amphibious dock landing ship (LSD).

(2) In addition to the ships, the principal Navy elements of the ARG are a Naval Beach Group element that includes Beachmasters who control the movement of personnel and equipment across the beach, Assault Craft Unit (ACU) elements

100-10 that bring the landing craft, both Landing Craft Air Cushion

(LCAC) and Landing Craft Utility (LCU) that move equipment and personnel from the ship to the shore, the Tactical Air Control

Squadron (TACRON) element that provides aviation control, a

Fleet Surgical Team (FST) that provides enhanced medical support and a Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) element that provides airborne search and rescue, vertical replenishment, air and sea defense and limited assault support.

(3) From the perspective of the CMO planner, an invaluable capability the ARG brings is fresh water production.

For example, the LHA/D can produce 200,000 gallons per day, the

LSD 60,000 gallons per day, and the LPD 17 72,000 gallons per day!

(4) Noncombatant Evacuation and Medical. In the past twenty years over 20,000 American and partner nation citizens whose lives were in danger in a host nation have been evacuated by U.S. Marines from amphibious ships to a safe haven.

Additionally, the ARG/MEU team can provide significant assistance in response to humanitarian and disaster events.

Medical capabilities include:

(a) ARG

1. 7 physicians and 3 dentists

2. 5-9 operating rooms/7-25 intensive care beds

3. 730-800 ward and triage beds

(b) MEU

1. 2 physicians and 2 physician assistants

2. 78 corpsmen/Shock trauma platoon

3. casualty evacuation/30-bed evacuation ward

REFERENCES:

MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations

MCRP 1-10.1, Organization of the United States Marine Corps

HQMC ARG and MEU Overview

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Notes:

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MARINE CORPS CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SCHOOL

WEAPONS TRAINING BATTALION

TRAINING COMMAND

2301 LITTLE ROAD (C478)

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5036

STUDENT OUTLINE

CMO FUNCTIONS, COMPONENTS & PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNER OFFICER COURSE

CIVIL-MILITARY OFFICER PLANNER CHIEF COURSE

M02ZSFD

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a. Terminal Learning Objectives

(1) Given a mission, commander's intent, CPB planning support products and as a member of a Civil-Military Operations

Working Group, integrate Civil-Military considerations into the planning process to support the commander's decision making by providing an understanding of the civil environment and the nature of the problem in order to identify an appropriate solution, in accordance with MCTP 3-03A. (CACT-PLAN-2001)

b. Enabling Learning Objectives

(1) Without the aid of references, identify CMO components, in accordance with JP 3-57. (CACT-PLAN-2001k)

(2) Without the aid of references identify CA activities in accordance with JP 3-57, Appendix A. (CACT-PLAN-2001af)

(3) Without the aid of references, identify Military

Government Operations activities, in accordance with JP 3-57.

(CACT-PLAN-2001ag)

(4) Without the aid of references, identify CA supported activities in accordance with JP 3-57, Appendix A. (CACT-PLAN-

2001ah)

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1. INTRODUCTION. While serving as a CMO planner, you must consider the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions

(IPI). Other planners may not realize that most activities undertaken by the MAGTF have elements of CMO present in them.

CMO planners identify, evaluate, and incorporate civil considerations into courses of action (COAs) that support the commander’s mission by synchronizing, harmonizing, and building synergy between multiple military and civil entities, focusing on the stabilization of the operational environment (OE). At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare, during all military operations, CMO facilitate unified action between military forces and nonmilitary entities within the operational area (OA). CMO may include activities and functions normally performed by the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions or operations. They may also occur in the absence of other military operations. CMO are conducted across the conflict continuum and the range of military operations in three primary categories:

(a) Military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence.

(b) Crisis response and limited contingency operations.

(c) Large-scale combat operations.

2. CMO FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS. Commanders conduct CMO in order to attain unified action between the military and civilian counterparts during the execution of operations. Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, Marine

Corps, and multinational operations with the operations of other

USG departments and agencies, non-governmental organizations

(NGOs), international organizations (e.g., the United Nations

[UN]), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.

Synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating all partner efforts with those of the MAGTF in a whole-of-government approach, is essential to obtaining a unified objective of stabilization.

a. CMO Functions. CMO functions are those activities performed by Marine forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between the MAGTF and IPI by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or

HN. CMO are conducted in order to facilitate unified action in

101-4 operations, the ultimate purpose of which is to establish, restore, or maintain a stable operating environment.

b. CMO Components. The components of CMO are broad categorizations consisting of the supporting actions required to achieve CMO objectives. Each CMO component consists of CMO activities, which are service capabilities that support the overall CMO goals and objectives through the execution of assigned missions and tasks. Each service has the responsibility to establish their own capabilities to support

CMO. As depicted below, the three components of CMO include civil-military relations, enabling operations, and information management.

(1) Civil-military relations are established, restored, or maintained by executing the CMO activities of interorganizational cooperation and IPI relationships.

(a) Interorganizational cooperation are those activities and interactions between USG, partner nations, NGOs, and international organizations, the private sector with IPI

(See JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation).

(b) IPI cooperation are the activities of establishing relationships with IPI and obtaining the cooperation of the IPI in achieving stability within a given region.

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(2) Enabling operations include Civil Affairs Operations

(CAO), medical civil-military operations (MCMO), military government, military police (MP) activities, engineer activities, military information support operations (MISO), Public Affairs (PA) activities, cyberspace operations, and sustainment activities.

(3) Information Management are activities that promote situational understanding of the OE, specifically as it applies to the civil component.

3. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS. CAO are actions planned, coordinated, and executed by CA forces, assessed to enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.

a. CA Core Competencies. The intent of CMO and Civil

Affairs Operations (CAO) is to enhance stability, set conditions for the mitigation or defeat of threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing local government capability or enhancing its capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats.

CA core competencies and functions are executed within the scope of CAO. CA forces have three core competencies that focus on the civil component - civil affairs activities, military government operations, and civil affairs supported activities.

b. Civil Affairs Activities. Civil Affairs activities are specifically planned, executed and assessed by CA forces, and provide unique capabilities to the commander. They consist of the following functions:

(1) Civil Reconnaissance. CR is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. CR focuses specifically on the civil component, the elements of which are best represented at the tactical level by using civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). CA

Marines or other forces can conduct CR, as required. Examples of other units and assets that can conduct CR are engineers, medical, MP, and unmanned aircraft systems. CR is conducted by tactical CA teams based on the established civil information collection plan to support the higher unit’s mission and begins

101-6 prior to deployment. Potential sources of civil information that a coordinated CR plan considers include:

(a) Observations of maneuver forces supporting CA teams in the conduct of offensive operations.

(b) Debriefings to forces involved in medical civic action, and veterinary civic action regarding attitudes of the local population.

(c) Debriefings to Marines involved in daily convoy operations.

(d) Ongoing ASCOPE assessments of the battlespace that identify measures of effectiveness trends.

(e) CA interaction with IPI spheres of influence, including: Local government officials, Religious leaders, and

Tribal or clan leaders.

(2) Civil Engagement. Civil engagement is a function as well as a tactical task of Civil Affairs. Civil engagement is the planned and targeted activities in which CA forces deliberately focus on the interaction with the IPI, unified action partners and other civil entities. CA forces conducts civil engagement to positively promote and influence the relationship between military forces and the civil component.

This enhances the commander’s understanding of the civil component and legitimizes the MAGTF’s mission. Civil engagement may be in person or by other means of communication. The purpose of civil engagement, as a function, is to:

(a) Inform or seek information and facilitate operations.

(b) Coordinate efforts and collaborate with the civil component.

(c) De-conflict operations between the civil populace and military.

(d) Resolve conflict and mitigate the impact of military operations on IPI.

(e) Influence actions by civil entities and develop civil considerations.

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(3) Civil Information Management. The CIM process is continuous, occurs across the range of military operations and develops timely and accurate civil component information critical to the commander’s understanding and planning. The primary role of CIM is to provide civil information to the supported commander and their staff by updating the Common

Operational Picture (COP). CIM is a critical process that helps the commander to develop the civil component of the OE. CIM is a process whereby data relating to the civil component of the operational environment is planned and collaborated, gathered, consolidated (collated and processed), analyzed, produced into information products, and shared. The intent of civil information management is to keep most of this information unclassified and easily shared with non-U.S. Government partners. The secondary role of CIM is to share civil information with interagency, NGO, IO and the IPI.

(4) Civil-Military Operations Center. The CMOC serves as one of the primary coordination interfaces for U.S. forces with IPI, unified action partners and the interagency. The CMOC is a function that is performed by all CA Marines. However, it is important to note and clarify that unlike the U.S. Army, Marine CA units are not organized by Table of Organization and

Equipment to provide the supported commander the manpower and equipment to form the nucleus of the CMOC. CMOCs require over the horizon and non-traditional communications capabilities

(e.g., WhatsApp, Instagram) to most effectively conduct interagency collaborative planning and coordination, integrate

101-8 nonmilitary stakeholders to synchronize and harmonize operations, and coordinate plans and operations with the civil component of the operational environment. A CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks associated with the mission and augmented by assets (e.g. engineer, medical, transportation) available to the supported commander and unified action partners.

(5) CMO Planning. CMO planners and CA staff support provide a dedicated capability and are nested within the tables of organization of the MAGTF. CA planning support is provided in the following ways: The G-9/S-9, as a primary staff officer, is responsible for the planning, integration and assessment of civil considerations into the Marine Corps Planning Process

(MCPP). The planning encompasses both current and future operations. Courses of action are developed through the MCPP that support the end states and desired outcomes of the commander. The key to successful G-9/S-9 staff support is ensuring the civil component within the operating environment is factored into planning and is subsequently captured in branches and sequels based on the anticipated or realized outcomes of current operations. The G-9/S-9 is designated to provide the commander with actionable civil information that will increase the commander’s awareness and understanding of the civil component, ensure efficient use of finite resources, and harmonize the efforts of unified action partners, IPI, and interagency within the operational environment.

c. Military Government Operations. According to DoDD

2000.13, CAO includes activities that establish civil security, provide support to governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S.

military authority. Military government is established when, through the course of military operations, replacement or sustainment of civil authority is required to maintain stability and governance. When force is necessary, and a territory is occupied, the occupying force imposes military authority in accordance with the law of land warfare.

(1) Transitional Military Authority. Civil administration in occupied territory encompasses the establishment of a transitional military government authority, as directed by SecDef, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the populace of a territory that U.S.

forces have taken from an enemy by force. Transitional military authority exercises the functions of civil administration in the

101-9 absence of a legitimate civil authority and until such time as a civil government can be established. CA forces support or conduct transitional military authority by applying civilian sector expertise to conduct government operations that are normally the responsibility of civilian authorities. Within its capabilities, the occupying force must maintain an orderly government in the occupied territory and must have, as its goal, the creation of a legitimate and effective civilian government.

During transitional military authority, the following terms apply:

(a) Military Governor. A military governor is the military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander’s government or superior.

(b) Military Government Ordinance. A military government ordinance is an enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

(c) Governance. Governance is a requirement for obtaining a stable population-centric operational environment.

Transitional military authority enables commanders to achieve civil control and stability and enable civil security.

Department of State (DoS) has the lead on foreign policy and controls most of the resources which can be used under Title 22, 4 USC, Chapter 32 (Foreign Assistance Act).

(2) Support to Civil Administration

(a) Support to civil administration is assistance given to a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government, interim civilian authority or supporting a reconstructed government.

SCA occurs when military forces support DoS in the implementation of interim civil authority or U.S. foreign policy in support of host nation internal defense and development. SCA are military operations that help to stabilize or continue the operations of a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population.

SCA supports the U.S. instruments of national power abroad through executing tasks affiliated with cooperative security, SC, and FID as a function of stability activities.

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(b) The CA responsibilities during SCA missions are designed to support the commander’s operational and support function with respect to the continuity of government in a foreign nation (FN)/host nation (HN). Generally, these include:

1. Identifying, validating, or evaluating FN/HN essential service infrastructure.

2. Assessing the needs of the IPI in terms of the CA functional areas.

3. Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the CA functional areas.

4. Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.

5. Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations.

6. Participating in the execution of selected

SCA operations as needed or directed.

7. Performing quality control assessments of

SCA operations and costs.

8. Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.

9. Coordinating and synchronizing transition of

SCA operations from military to indigenous government or international transitional government control.

10. Initiating or refining CIM process with geospatial projects that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities.

(c) Civil Affairs Forces SCA Capabilities. The conduct of SCA requires a high degree of knowledge of how civilian systems function, plus the specialized skills needed to carry them out. While a MAGTF may have a trained staff member to carry out certain functional specialty related tasks, it is likely that expertise may have to come from other agencies

(e.g., USAID, Department of Agriculture, U.S. Army, National

Guard, etc.). Civil affairs functional specialists advise and assist the commander and can coordinate, with subordinates or civilian counterparts. These functional specialty areas support

101-11 planning of interagency efforts or HN efforts. They can also support joint force components requiring such capabilities.

There are six civil affairs functional areas that are critical to SCA: rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public education and information, and public health and welfare.

d. Civil Affairs Supported Activities. CA supported activities are those functions in which CA plays a key planning, coordinating, or synchronizing role, but for which they are not the proponent or primary executor. These missions are executed through a combination of capabilities provided by elements of the MAGTF or Joint force. CA knowledge and expertise of the civil dimension of the battlespace provides commanders the necessary tools to execute military operations with minimal impact by or on the civilian populace. In the current and predicted future operating environment the MAGTF will conduct these missions that are population centric and require CA capabilities. CA supported activities include; foreign assistance (FA), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), populace and resources control (PRC), civil-military engagement (CME).

(1) Foreign Assistance. Foreign assistance (formerly

Nation Assistance) is aid given by the United States to other countries to support global peace, security, and development efforts, and provide humanitarian relief during times of crisis.

It is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative for the United

States and vital to U.S. national security. The military may support foreign assistance through a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports diplomacy, informational, and economic instruments to promote U.S. national interests. These activities often include SA, FID, and other

Title 10, USC programs and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by USG departments and agencies. The Chief of Mission (COM) is the senior diplomatic representative in a

HN. The combatant commander (CCDR) may conduct CMO to support the COM and enhance HN legitimacy. CMO may be performed as the main effort of, or a supporting effort. The HN, USG, international organizations, or NGOs may see value in MAGTF logistical capabilities: vehicles and fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft to deliver humanitarian assistance (HA) or medical services. The MAGTF should provide military support discreetly to maintain the neutrality of nonmilitary organizations. CMO missions generally benefit the HN government by ensuring local authorities receive public credit for helping the civilian populace. When the COM approves foreign assistance activities, CMO planners should integrate CMO with COM objectives.

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(2) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) consists of DoD activities conducted outside the United States (U.S.) and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease hunger or privation. FHA activities range from supporting security cooperation (SC) and related programs to conducting limited contingency operations in support of another USG department or agency. These activities are governed by various statutes and policies and range from steady-state engagements to limited contingency operations. FHA includes foreign disaster relief

(FDR) operations and other activities that directly address humanitarian need and may also be conducted concurrently with other DoD support missions such as dislocated civilian support, security operations, and foreign consequence management (FCM).

FHA operations (including FDR operations) are normally conducted in support of United States Agency for International Development

(USAID) or DoS.

(3) Populace and Resources Control. PRC measures are designed to assist the host nation (HN) government or de-facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder mission accomplishment. PRC is primarily the responsibility of the HN government or de-facto authorities, and PRC measures are an integral part of military operations across the range of military operations (ROMO). CMO planners should identify and evaluate existing HN PRC measures to make educated recommendations to the commander. It is also important to assess the effectiveness of the PRC control measures as those measures are implemented.

(a) Populace Control. Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures may include the following:

1. Establish border security, including customs procedures to prevent trafficking of persons, to regulate immigration and emigration, and to establish control over major points of entry.

2. Establish identification procedures, including securing documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, birth certificates, and driver’s licenses.

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3. Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement, including curfews, movement restrictions, and travel permits.

4. Institute policies regarding the regulation of air and overland movement.

5. Relocate the population as necessitated by military operations.

6. Establish transitional political authority and interim civil administration.

(b) Special Categories of PRC. There are two special categories of populace control - dislocated civilian operations and noncombatant evacuation operations.

1. Dislocated Civilian Operations. Dislocated civilian (DC) operations are actions required to move civilians out of harm’s way or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster. The disaster may be natural, such as a flood or an earthquake, or man-made, such as combat operations, social or political strife, or technological hazard. The requirement to conduct DC operations may occur across the ROMO. Legal and political considerations define subcategories of DCs. CMO planners must consider the subcategories of DCs in order to understand how to describe the DC operation to their higher headquarters. Subcategories of DCs include:

a. Displaced Person. A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country.

b. Refugee. A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, or is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.

c. Evacuee. A civilian removed from his place of residence by military direction for reasons of security or the requirements of the military situation.

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d. Stateless Person. Civilian who has been denationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed.

e. War Victim. A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe civilians suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of their homes because of war. War victims may be eligible for acclaim against the United States under the Foreign Claims Act.

f. Internally Displaced Persons. Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.

g. Returnee. A displaced person who has returned voluntarily to their former place of residence.

h. Resettler. Subset of a refugee or an internally displaced person - a civilian wishing to return somewhere other than previously owned home or land within the country or area of original displacement.

i. Migrant. A person (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or

(2) has fled their native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution.

2. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. A noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) is directed by the DoS or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the

Department of Defense (DoD), whereby non-combatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens as designated by the DoS (JP 3-68).

(c) Resources Control. CMO planners should consider resources control measures to facilitate the MAGTF’s mission and the commander’s intent. Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources control targets specific sectors of a nation’s material wealth and economy, including natural resources, food and agriculture, 101-15 immoveable property, finances, cultural, and critical infrastructure. Resources control measures may include:

1. Mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land or property.

2. Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.

3. Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources (e.g. licensing).

4. Protection / security of strategically important institutions, e.g., government buildings and archives, museums, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities.

5. Establishment of procedures to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.

6. Implementation of rationing and distribution programs for key commodities such as food and fuel.

7. Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent arms smuggling and stop contraband, such as drugs and natural resources.

8. Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.

9. Freezing financial accounts of enemy combatants. Common resources control areas and measures.

(4) Civil-Military Engagement. CME is a formal program of record initiated by United States Special Operations Command

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(USSOCOM) to address specific shaping operations that support global SOF contingency plans. CME is a supporting effort to

USSOCOM for countering violent extremist organizations. CME requires continuous coordination with the GCCs and Theater

Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) to identify requirements and integrate actions into the theater campaign plan (TCP). As defined, CME facilitates efforts by the interagency, host nation authorities, international and nongovernmental partners, and the private sector to establish, sustain, or enhance civil capabilities and capacities that mitigate or eliminate civil vulnerabilities to local and regional populations. CME is a globally synchronized and regionally coordinated program of country-specific and regional actions executed through and with indigenous and U.S. interagency partners to eliminate the underlying conditions and core motivations for local and regional population support to violent extremist organizations and their networks. Marines should be aware of this program, however, most CME support originates from U.S. Army Special

Operations Command (USASOC).

4. CMO PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing about that future. CMO planning must be responsive to strategic guidance established in the Unified

Command Plan; the Global Employment of the Force; and CJCSM

3110.01, 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). The resulting global and regional or theater regional campaign plans will describe goals, supporting objectives, and end states that will involve CMO contributions. CMO planners must understand national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater military objectives. They must also have a clear understanding whether DoD is the lead or supporting USG department and agency during planned operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) will assist in developing this understanding and applying it to planning and execution. Should the MAGTF operate as a part of a CJTF, the process of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) would be applicable.

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b. Other Planning Considerations

(1) The adherence to strategic guidance and consistent messaging should be reflected in the planning process and considered when planning information-related activities and similar activities of the country team and may influence and inform the various organizations and partner countries that may be involved in the given operation. For example, when planning for and conducting MCMO, the commander and staff must consider the health threat posed by the regional and local factors, including climate, geography, fauna (animals), flora (plants), and the indigenous population, as well as it impacts a contributing factor to social, political, and economic stability.

(2) CMO are designed to shape HN personnel, international organizations, NGOs, and IPI opinions and subsequent behavior. For example, Information Operations (IO) is the integration of information-related capabilities (IRCs) with other lines of operation (LOOs) to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversaries and potential adversaries’ decision-making processes, while protecting those of the U.S. CMO planners should take into consideration military’s relationships with foreign civilians and facilitate operations by working with whole-of-government, HN national and regional governmental institutions, international organizations, and NGOs to:

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(a) Encourage human rights, freedom, and democracy with U.S. national interests.

(b) Improve public education systems and institutions.

(c) Build rapport with cultural and religious leaders.

(d) Establish, support, or improve public health and sanitation.

(e) Encourage economic stability by advising labor, procurement, and contracting authorities.

(f) Restore civilian supply, public safety, and transportation.

(g) Support USG and HN government efforts to combat criminal activity and its impact on the civilian populace and economy.

5. CIVIL-MILITARY MEDICINE. Civil-military medicine (CMM) is a discipline within operational medicine comprising public health, veterinary, and medical issues that involve a civil-military interface (foreign or domestic), including medical and veterinary defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) activities, medical and veterinary elements of security cooperation activities, and medical civil-military operations

(MCMO).

a. Medical Civil-Military Operations. MCMO are health-related activities in support of a commander that establish, enhance, maintain, or influence relations between the joint or multinational force and HN, multinational governmental authorities and NGOs, international organizations, and the civilian populace to facilitate military operations, achieve

U.S. operational objectives, and positively impact the health sector. MCMO consist of the following subsets: peacetime medical elements of security cooperation activities; FHA;

disaster response and disease outbreak response in a permissive environment; pre-conflict (health-related) civil-military activities; and, (health-related) civil-military activities during major campaigns and operations and post-conflict stabilization efforts.

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b. CA use of MCMO. Usually performed by civil affairs forces, medical and veterinary personnel will support MCMO in activities that build and strengthen HN capacity in the public health sector or agricultural sectors. Typically known as

Medical Civil Assistance Programs (MEDCAPs – or sometimes

Medical Readiness Training Exercise or MEDRETES), Dental Civic

Assistance Programs (DENTCAPs), and Veterinary Civic Assistance

Programs (VETCAPs), the use of health services has historically proven to be a valuable low-risk asset in support of CMO.

Support to MCMO may consist of the following:

(1)…