Attachment 14_SAF Student Outline.pdf

USMC

STABILITY ASSESSMENT

FRAMEWORK MOBILE

TRAINING TEAM

(1st CAG)

BLANK

Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) Mobile Training Team

M02HFUM

Student Outlines

Table of Contents

Introduction and Stabilization and SAF 100

SAF Component 1: CPB 101

SAF Components 2, 3, and 4: Analysis, Design, and Execution 102

Scenario Background and ASCOPE

CPB and SAF Templates

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

MARINE CORPS CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SCHOOL

WEAPONS TRAINING BATTALION

TRAINING COMMAND

2301 LITTLE ROAD (C478)

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5043

STUDENT OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION TO STABILIZATION AND STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK COURSE

JANUARY 2021

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LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. Terminal Learning Objective. Given a mission, commander's intent, operations order, and CMO planning products

(e.g., CMO staff estimate, CMO COA graphic and narrative, and a synch matrix, etc.), support stability operations planning, to enable the commander's decision-making process by identifying instability and stability factors and to design activities to mitigate instability or reinforce stability factors within the operating environment in accordance with MCTP 3-03A. (CACT-

PLAN-2005)

b. Enabling Learning Objectives

(1) With the aid of references, define stabilization, in accordance with JP 3-07 Ch 1. (CACT-PLAN-2005a)

(2) With the aid of references, define stability, in accordance with JP 3-07, Ch 1. (CACT-PLAN-2005b)

(3) With the aid of references, define stability assessment framework, in accordance with MCWP 3-03, Ch 3. (CACT-

PLAN-2005c)

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PART 1 - STABILIZATION

1. OVERVIEW

a. Definition of Stabilization. According to JP 3-07, “Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster HN resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.”

With the publication of the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review and DoDD 3000.05, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in conjunction with the Department of State (DoS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) defined stabilization as a “political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process where locally legitimate authorities and systems can manage conflict peacefully and prevent the resurgence of violence.”

b. Competition Continuum

(1) Competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations. As states and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests, they continually compete for diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage. The competition continuum describes the states of cooperation, adversarial competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict to distinguish strategic relationships between actors throughout the operational environment. The categories of the competition continuum allow planners the ability to broadly frame military activities across campaigns, operations, and the operational environment with aligned objectives. The three categories are not always linear; can begin within any of the categories;

consist of activities that accelerate, surge, or decrease capabilities; and can occur simultaneously.

(2) Deterrence applies across the competition continuum, though in different fashions according to the situation. With the strategic security environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent competition, wars can disrupt political, social, and economic structures, networks, and institutions to the point it is often impossible to simply return to a pre-conflict state. Destruction of government and societal institutions can create conditions for intense competition among internal, regional, and global actors seeking to retain or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within a new order. Protracted, subversive, and clandestine threats from state and non-state actors who employ a variety of irregular

100-4 warfare methods can originate from countries with which the U.S.

is not at war. As the competition between one or more adversaries expands or increases, the U.S. activities may also increase to counter. In some cases, violence may erupt, resulting in a U.S. intervention to de-escalate the violence and return to stability. As part of the nation’s expeditionary force in readiness, the MAGTF conducts assigned missions across the competition continuum.

c. Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

(1) Stabilization typically requires the expertise of civil affairs (CA) in civil-military operations (CMO), however, all Marines and elements of the MAGTF can conduct CMO. CMO are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). CMO support U.S. objectives for host nation (HN) and regional stability.

(2) Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) are actions planned, executed, and assessed by CA forces that enhance awareness and shape the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment, identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society, or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. CAO require coordination with other interagency partners (especially the DoS and USAID), international organizations, non-governmental organizations

(NGOs), and the private sector. Civil affairs forces work with and through the indigenous populations and institutions. Civil affairs forces assess the civil environment, identify and engage with key authorities and other influential civilians, build civil relationships, identify factors fostering instability, and conduct CAO to achieve the commander’s objectives or build partnership capacity in support of operational goals.

2. STABILITY

a. Traditionally, stability activities are described in general terms. They may outline the different sectors in which work should take place, but they don’t offer any guidance on how success would be measured. What is needed is a way to measure the state of stability at the beginning of operations and then a way to measure stability during and after the stability activities are completed. Generally, the use of “stoplight”

100-5 charts and other methods are anecdotal and based on guesses and hunches.

b. According to Joint Publication 3-07 Stability, stability can be described as the overarching characterization of the effects created by activities of the U.S. Government (USG) outside the U.S. using one or more of the instruments of national power to minimize, if not eliminate, economic and political instability and other drivers of violent conflict across one or more of the five USG stability sectors (i.e., security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure).

c. Stability functions associated with a joint campaign plan are nested down to population-oriented tactical tasks (See

Table 1, below). When conducting stability activities, the

MAGTF normally executes the stability tasks through the assignment of population-oriented tactical tasks to subordinate units. For more information on population-oriented tactical task, see MCDP 1-0.

Stability Functions and Tasks

U.S. Institute for Peace & DoD Stability End States

• Safe and secure environment

• Social well-being

• Sustainable economy

• Rule of law

• Stable governance

Through

Joint Stability Functions

• Security

• Foreign Humanitarian assistance

• Economic stabilization and infrastructure

• Rule of law

• Governance and participation

By Means Of

MAGTF Stability Tasks

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• Establish civil security

• Provide foreign humanitarian assistance

• Support and/or provide restoration of essential services

• Support establishment of civil control

• Support economic and infrastructure development

• Support to governance

As a Result Of

Population-Oriented Tactical Task

• Advise

• Assess the population

• Assist

• Build/restore infrastructure

• Contain

• Control

• Coordinate with civil authorities

• Cordon

• Enable civil authorities

• Exclude

• Influence

• Occupy

• Reconnoiter

• Secure

• Train

• Transition to civil control

Table 1

d. Stability goals must be linked to the causes of instability. To be successful in stabilization, you must:

(1) Use the population’s perceptions to help identify and prioritize the root causes of instability.

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(a) Although there are numerous descriptions of instability, a common description would be, “Instability results when the factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability of the host nation to mitigate these factors.” JP 3-07 states

“Stability is achieved through the process of stabilization through the balanced application of the instruments of national power in partnership with the host nation (HN) and local communities.”

(b) Identification and prioritization of the root causes of instability requires collecting information from the local population. How best to collect the data and analyze it are essential components of SAF.

(2) Develop and design activities to diminish these root causes.

(3) Incorporate the perceptions of the population when measuring the impact of the activities on diminishing the root causes of instability. Data collection continues as activities are implemented to provide a feedback loop. This allows you to determine whether your activities are diminishing the root causes of instability and, more importantly, fostering overall stability.

3. FACTORS OF INSTABILITY AND STABILITY

a. Factors of Instability

(1) Grievances. Grievances can foster instability.

People have needs that are not being met, or they perceive that their interests are being threatened. Examples include ethnic or religious tensions, political repression, population pressures, and competition over natural resources, etc. Greed can also foster instability.

(2) Key Influences - means and motivations. Although there can be many grievances, they do not foster instability unless there are key influences with both the means and the motivation to translate these grievances into instability.

Transforming grievances into violence requires dedicated leadership, organizational capacity, and resources. If key influences lack these resources, they will not be able to foster instability. Means and motivations are critical variables that contribute to grievances becoming causes of instability. Key influences (KI) are selected individuals, groups, assets, infrastructure and socio-cultural belief sets or factors

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(people, places, things), which could have a significant influence on friendly mission accomplishment and should be considered in operational planning and execution. KI are not limited to “key individuals” or “key actors.” As an example, a key influence may be an annual event in the community (thing) or a pilgrimage location (place). It is important to understand that KI may be more than individuals or groups.

(3) Events - windows of vulnerability. Events are situations that can trigger instability. Even when grievances and key influences are present, instability is unlikely unless a window of vulnerability links grievances to influences or particular actors (KIs) with the means and motivation to create instability. Windows of vulnerability may include an invasion, highly contested elections, natural disasters, the death of a key leader, and economic shocks.

b. Factors of Stability

(1) Resiliencies. Resiliencies can foster stability.

Examples may include ethnic or religious cohesion, open political process, economic prosperity, and the rule of law.

These factors foster the ability of the population to manage frustrations.

(2) Key Influences - means and motivation. Key influences are selected individuals, groups, assets, infrastructure and socio-cultural belief sets or factors

(people, places, things) with the means and motivations to transform grievances into stability. Just as certain people in key positions can foster instability, other actors might have the means and motivation to rally people around non-violent procedures to address grievances. An example of this is a religious leader who advocates for peaceful co-existence between opposing groups.

(3) Events - windows of opportunity. Windows of opportunity are situations that have the potential to foster stability. An election can be a window of vulnerability or a window of opportunity, if conducted peacefully and both sides feel they had the opportunity to participate in a free and fair election.

4. INSTABILITY/STABILITY DYNAMICS

a. Grievances, key influences, and events interact. In many cases, government and social resiliencies suppress the

100-9 forces of instability. If these resiliencies are diminished, or don’t exist, instability can result. A good example of this process is the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina where the per-capita murder rate in New Orleans soared. Why?

(1) Grievances: The New Orleans Parish has a high concentration of disenfranchised males. Sixty percent don’t graduate from secondary schools and do not have good jobs. They can work at minimum wage jobs - if they can find work - or they can turn to criminal activity.

(2) Key influences: disenfranchised young men with the availability of guns (the means) and motivations caused by unemployment, frustration and sense of neglect.

(3) Event: The hurricane destroys neighborhoods, people are displaced, and many lose all their possessions. Ability for law enforcement to perform their societal functions were diminished.

(4) What resiliencies are there? The local government and NGOs are devastated, state government is not able to meet the population’s needs, and FEMA is ineffective. This situation fostering instability ended only when the Louisiana National

Guard and JTF Katrina forces deployed. If you have grievances, key influences, and a window of vulnerability, you will likely have instability. This happens everywhere - not just in the third world.

b. The Stability Process. There is an inverse relationship between the drivers of instability and the development of local societal and institutional capacity. As the factors of instability weaken, social and institutional strength increases.

At the point where the strength of the institutions and social structures is greater than the drivers of instability, the responsibility for leading the local area can be passed to the local leaders (a tipping point).

c. Instability is Local; Conditions Change

(1) The factors that foster instability are usually local factors. The perceptions of the local population are often different from those in other areas. The more unstable the area, the more people will rely on what is close to them, i.e., family, clan, tribe.

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(2) Conditions change. What might have been true six months ago may no longer be true. The population is the center of gravity for stability activities and stabilization.

5. OBSTACLES TO STABILIZATION

a. Output Reporting. Output measures (measures of performance – MOPs) are factors that can be easily quantified, such as the number of wells dug, schools built, or police officers trained. It is always easier to collect this sort of data. The problem with these measures is they do not really measure changes in the environment - whether stability is decreasing or increasing.

b. Planning by Lines of Operation / Lines of Effort. Lines of operation (LOOs) and/or lines of effort (LOEs) are typically used for strategic and operational planning. However, unless they are informed by local perceptions, they will not reflect the reality of the root causes of instability at the tactical level. LOOs/LOEs are top-down planning/guidance. They require bottom-up input leading to refinement.

c. Lack of Baseline Data. Stability activities should have clear and well-integrated goals based on an accurate baseline assessment.

d. Failure to target the root causes of instability. It is common to address symptoms of a problem and/or jump to solutions without looking to understand the reasons why the problem exists.

e. Lack of a standardized assessment process.

Stabilization has not had a standardized assessment process that allows civilian and military personnel to develop a common tactical view of the causes of instability in their AO.

f. Local Population. The failure to make the local population the focal point for Stabilization.

g. Working together

(1) Civilian programs and military operations are not always linked, synched or harmonized. Often, there are different perspectives that miss the middle. Different organizations involved in promoting stability have different perspectives or lenses on how to foster stability in troubled areas.

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(2) In Afghanistan for example, USAID focused primarily on long-term development. Typical metrics included the number of children attending school, the linear amount (e.g. miles) of roads built, or the percentage of the population with access to health care. At the same time, the DoD focused on combat operations. Their typical metrics were the number of Afghan security forces trained, and the number of insurgents killed, etc. Neither of these metrics had a long-lasting effect or impact on stability. In fact, as an example, the outcomes between 2007-2008 were:

• 40% increase in civilians killed in ISAF military operations

• 33% increase in IEDs

• 119% increase in attacks on Afghan Security

Forces

• 36% decrease in support for the Afghan Government

(since 2006)

• Decreased NGO presence in South and East

Another method was needed that combined the perspectives of all entities engaged in stabilization work. The Tactical Conflict

Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF) provided for a common perspective. SAF is an evolution of TCAPF.

6. STABILIZATION ≠ DEVELOPMENT

a. Many people make the mistake of equating development with stabilization. However, research has found little evidence to support the following myths:

• Reconstruction and “modernization” efforts have an inherent stabilizing effect

• Poverty and a lack of reconstruction are important causes of conflict

• Aid projects help “win hearts and minds” and increase public support for the indigenous government and foreign military forces

b. We have seen that the DoDD 3000.05 definition of stabilization does not focus on development. Rather, it emphasizes the political nature of managing conflict, and the integration of civilian-military processes where locally legitimate authorities and systems can manage conflict peacefully and prevent the resurgence of violence. On the other hand, “development” in a global context lacks a clear definition

100-12 but is often linked with human development and international efforts to reduce poverty and inequality and improve health, education, and job opportunities around the world.

(1) A variety of data can be used to describe what is also often referred to as international development, including a country’s gross domestic product or its average per-capita income, literacy and maternal survival rates, as well as life expectancy, human rights and political freedoms. The Oxford

Department of International Development describes development as a “holistic and multi-disciplinary field with the goal of improving livelihoods and achieving greater quality of life for humans.” International development seeks to implement long-term solutions to problems by helping developing countries create the capacity to provide sustainable solutions to their problems.

(2) The difference between stabilization and development, then, is primarily defined by the goals they pursue. Stabilization aims to reduce the sources of conflict to establish the proper conditions for long term development to take place, while development aims to improve livelihoods over the long term. In some cases, the specific activities conducted may be very similar – but only if the key issues driving instability in an area also happens to be a developmental problem. For example, if conflict over limited water resources is driving instability in an area, part of the solution may entail digging additional wells, repairing irrigation infrastructure, improving water quality, etc. These activities will also undoubtedly have a positive developmental impact, but that impact is incidental to the primary purpose of the program.

In other cases, the activities undertaken to stabilize an area may be very different from typical developmental activities.

For example, in a conflict environment, stabilization objectives may necessitate that an insurgent leader be killed or captured.

Alternatively, stabilization objectives may necessitate postponing normal development activities that would likely create near-term instability, such as promoting non-traditional employment opportunities for women in a very conservative society.

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PART 2 – STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

1. STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW

a. The Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) is an analytical, planning, and programming tool designed to support the Civil Affairs (CA) methodology and non-lethal targeting approaches used during MAGTF operations. SAF helps Marines and civilian practitioners identify sources of instability and stability (SOI/S) and design programs or activities that address

SOI/S and measure their effect in fostering stability.

b. Stability assessment framework is a holistic analytical, programming, and assessment tool that reflects on lessons learned and best practices, but focuses on “understanding” and integrating multiple stability perspectives into planning and assessment to:

• Understand the local population and environment

• Realize how to influence the local environment

• Implement activities to foster stability

• Measure the effectiveness of activities in fostering stability

c. SAF Components. The SAF methodology has four basic components, complementing both the CA methodology and the Marine

Corps Planning Process.

(1) Civil Preparation of the Battlespace (CPB). The goal of the CPB component in SAF is to gather information in order to see the causes of conflict and instability in the local environment through the eyes of the local population.

(2) Analysis. The goal of the Analysis component is to understand how to mitigate the local conditions that are fostering instability by identifying the root causes of instability.

(3) Design. The goal of the Design component is to create activities that foster stability in the local environment.

(4) Execution. The goal of the Execution component is to implement and measure the effectiveness of activities in fostering stability over time and space.

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d. SAF – The Process. Broken out, SAF has distinct steps or “variables” within each of the four components.

(1) CPB

• Collect civil considerations

• Determine cultural dynamics

• Record instability and stability factors.

(2) Analysis

• Identify and prioritize the root causes of instability based on their importance to the local population

• Develop objectives, a statement of the conditions that will diminish the identified problem

• Determine measures of effectiveness (MOEs) -

Identify indicators (signs) that will show whether activities are diminishing the causes of instability

• Choose Data Sources: Plan how you will collect the data about MOEs

• Record analysis data

(3) Design

• Identify Activities: Develop activities that will directly address the root causes of instability that were identified by the local populace

• Determine measures of performance (MOPs) -

Identify indicators that measure whether activities have been completed to standard

• Choose Data Sources: Plan how you will collect the data on MOPs

• Record design data

(4) Execution

• Implement and Measure Impact: Collect and analyze data over time to determine whether the root causes of instability are diminishing or have been eliminated

• Transition activities

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e. According to MCDP 1, Warfighting, “The military profession is a thinking profession… Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its conduct requires flexibility of thought.” SAF does not take the place of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

It simply adds a tool to do what is already tasked. It encourages warfighters to include population-focused information into their planning and execution processes. It is also a good way to gather atmospherics because it uses structured questions.

In this way it supports and complements the commander’s decision-making cycle.

2. COMPONENT ONE: CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

a. In SAF methodology, CPB is the first component of the process. During CPB, SAF examines the following three

“variables” to achieve a heightened understanding of the battlespace:

(1) Understanding the Operating Environment. This includes collection and analysis of civil considerations (ASCOPE

- areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events) and operational variables (PMESII - political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure) and crucially, their relevance to the local population. Unlike a typical

ASCOPE/PMESII product, SAF does not simply generate a list of facts about the operating environment; it analyzes relevant factors further as it relates to local population perceptions and the MAGTF mission.

(2) Understanding the Cultural Environment. This includes understanding the tribes, clans, religion, language, and customs and how they foster stability and instability.

(3) Understanding Instability/Stability Dynamics. SAF is the tool for identifying local perceptions. Understanding the grievances and resiliencies of the local population, who and what the key influences are, their motivations towards enhancing stability or fomenting instability, what means they have at their disposal, and what kinds of events might foster instability and stability is key to the situational awareness.

b. Local Perceptions. By working with the local population, it is possible to foster stability in unstable regions. The first requirement is to understand what the population views as the causes of instability. This information enables us to identify and prioritize the causes of instability and design activities to mitigate them. The activities carried

100-16 out have to make a difference to the population! Only by addressing the local population’s perceptions can stability occur.

c. Data Gathering

(1) In the 21st century, data is gathered on all aspects of life at unprecedented levels. The mere act of carrying a

“smartphone” enables the collection and dissemination of massive amounts of data. Stability-focused data can be gathered through surveys, polling data, social media, etc. A consistent source of data and the core of the SAF process is to ask the local population to identify local problems. A questionnaire of four carefully crafted questions serves to gather initial data and monitor the impact of activities in fostering instability.

(2) The SAF Questionnaire is designed for use at the tactical level to facilitate discussions with locals to identify local causes of instability. Each answer creates a data point that the staff can use to statistically measure local perceptions of the causes of instability. The four questions are:

• Has the number of people in the village changed in the past year?

• What is the most important problem facing the village?

• Who do you believe can solve your problems?

• What should be done first to help the village?

Remember to always ask, “Why?” as it provides the context for the answers provided.

(3) After interviewing local people, the data is entered into an Excel spreadsheet. Data entry is facilitated through the use of drop-down menus.

3. COMPONENT TWO: ANALYSIS. The primary purpose of analysis is to narrow relevant factors to a lessor number of issues that are indeed actual sources of instability or to identify stability factors. The Excel spreadsheet used to log data has embedded macros that create pie charts. This allows responses to the SAF Questionnaire to be laid over a map to visually identify the differences among neighborhoods. For example, responses to the question “What is the most important problem facing the village?” may reveal different answers in different neighborhoods. Potable water may be the largest issue in one

100-17 area, while security is the most important problem in a different area. The following paragraphs relate to the columns of the (In)Stability Matrix that is used in the SAF process.

a. Causes of instability. The first step of Analysis is determining the causes of instability. Consider symptoms vs.

Causes. The mistake can be made of targeting the “obvious” symptoms instead of targeting the underlying causes. For stabilization to be successful, the root cause(s) of symptoms must be addressed. Sometimes, it may be necessary to target symptoms to stabilize a situation or to collect information that identifies the underlying cause(s) of instability.

b. Objective. The objective is a statement of conditions that will diminish or eliminate the identified problem.

c. Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness measure the effectiveness of an activity against a determined objective. They are crucial for determining the success or failure of stability programming. Changes can be very subtle and might take time - possibly an entire rotation or longer to observe.

d. Data Sources. The methods for monitoring the MOEs are planned in the Analysis phase.

4. COMPONENT THREE: DESIGN

a. In the next step of SAF CA Marines design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities. Activities designed to foster stability must meet the criteria of the Stability

Fundamentals - they must simultaneously increase support for the government, decrease support for malign actors, and increase societal and institutional capacity.

b. If they meet the first set of criteria, they should also meet a range of criteria called “Design Principles.” A good activity should meet the following criteria:

• Fits into the local political and cultural context

• Includes the local government and population in the design process

• Allows the local government and population to implement it

• Increases existing governmental or civil society capacity

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• Is flexible

• Supports Other Governmental Agencies (OGA), International Organizations (IO), and Non-governmental Organization (NGO) programs

• Strengthens government accountability and transparency

• Allows for a quick response to unforeseen crises

(violence, natural disasters, etc.)

c. In the Design component of SAF, designers plan what

Measures of Performance and their related data sources to monitor to show progress.

5. STABILITY MATRIX

a. The Stability Matrix is a tool to assist with the

Analysis and Design steps. The Stability Matrix helps ensure that each problem is thought through before jumping straight to implementing specific activities.

b. The columns of the Stability Matrix and their purpose are:

(1) Source of Instability – A very brief (often just a couple words) description / consolidation of the grievances or problem / issue area, as identified by the population.

(2) Causes (Perception) - A more specific statement or statements of the problem. The answer should come from asking the follow-up question “WHY” when using the SAF Questionnaire.

Use quotes from the population.

(3) Causes (Systemic) – The systemic causes of these grievances – i.e. the root problems or issues that may lie behind the population’s statements. This step helps ensure we are addressing the real problems with our activities, not just symptoms.

(4) Objective – A statement of the conditions that will diminish or eliminate the identified problem. Often this is simply the reverse of the grievance and its associated conditions.

(5) Measures of Effectiveness – impact indicators measure the effectiveness of the activities against the objective.

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(6) MOE Data Sources – Sources for the data that will track the impact indicators.

(7) Activities – The things that will be done to achieve the identified objective. The previous steps are necessary to accurately understand the issue being addressed. This left-to-right process helps avoid the natural tendency to jump straight to solutions, without adequately thinking through the problems and the goal for addressing them. Activities should be linked primarily to systemic causes, though in some cases it may also be necessary to address symptoms (perceived causes), if only to help the population see near-term improvements in the situation.

(8) Measures of Performance - output indicators determine whether an activity has been implemented. Although impact indicators are far more important, due diligence requires output indicators – so the implementation of activities and progress towards their completion is tracked.

(9) MOP Data Sources – Sources of data to obtain the information identified in the output indicators.

6. COMPONENT FOUR: EXECUTION

a. The fourth component of SAF deals with executing the stability activities developed. This includes finalizing the stability matrix and submitting it into MAGTF operations as a non-lethal targeting package, monitoring and evaluating the activity’s execution, and transitioning the activity.

b. Monitoring and Evaluation. There are three levels of evaluation: MOP, MOE and overall stability. The first asks, “Have your activities been completed?” This is the MOP from the stability matrix. For example, if the objective is to increase police effectiveness, activities might include:

• Training the police

• Conducting joint patrols

• Investigating police corruption

MOPs determine whether these activities have been completed.

The second asks, “Has your stability program objective(s) been achieved?” This is the MOE(s) on the stability matrix. As in the above example, the objective is, “increase police effectiveness.” An example of a MOE might be more information provided to the police by the population. Overall stability;

rather than measuring the effect of individual activities, it

100-20 takes into account the effect of ALL the activities conducted over a longer period of time, as well as the influence of external factors. The third question is the big picture question. “Is overall stability increasing?” Ask the same questions as in the Design phase.

• Is there more support for the government?

• Is there less support for malign actors?

• Is institutional and societal capability and capacity increasing?

c. Transition. The final step of the entire SAF process is to transition operations and to redeploy MAGTF assets to other contingencies or back to CONUS for retrofit and reassignment.

As alluded to earlier, initial transition criteria are established when activities are submitted for implementation;

however, more definitive transition criteria will be established as operations progress and the M&E process determines most realistic circumstances based on progress and overall MAGTF transition criteria.

7. BENEFITS OF SAF. SAF:

a. Helps provide a common, prioritized view of the sources of instability in your AO.

b. Fosters more effective programming because the population identifies:

• The activities they think will lessen instability

• What they think are the priorities

• What they think is a successful activity

c. Provides a measure of the impact (Effect) and not just the output (Performance) for each activity.

d. Improves the effectiveness of Stability Operations by:

• Providing data for trend analysis

• Fostering the forwarding of instability data to successor units

e. Empowers the tactical units that are the focal point for successful stabilization.

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f. Provides a simple and useful decision-making tool for commanders.

g. Provides operations in the information environment themes that resonate with the local population.

Key: Our activities are based on knowledge—not assumptions!

h. Some Thoughts. “Good deeds” without considering all the ramifications can end up having unintended consequences that malign actors will take advantage of. These become their

“talking points.” One activity done alone may have some impact on instability, but activities that are aligned to the goal of decreasing instability will have a multiplier effect. Always remember that the population is the entity experiencing instability and that it is their perceptions that matter. “We see things not as they are, but as we are” (Anaïs Nin). It is difficult to step outside our own assumptions and experience.

SAF is a data collection and analysis process designed to help us see what is from the local perspective.

REFERENCE:

DoDD 3000.05, Stabilization

2018 Stabilization Assistance Review

Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum

JP 3-07, Stability

MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, w/ Change 2

MCWP 3-03, Stability Operations

MCTP 3-03A, MAGTF Civil-Military Operations

MCCMOS Training Circular, Civil Preparation of the Battlespace

U.S. Institute for Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction

Operational Culture for the Warfighter, 2nd Edition

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Notes:

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WEAPONS TRAINING BATTALION

TRAINING COMMAND

STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK COMPONENT 1: CIVIL PREPARATION OF

THE BATTLESPACE

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a. Terminal Learning Objective. Given a higher headquarters order(s), commander's initial planning guidance, and an area of operations, conduct Civil Preparation of the

Battlespace (CPB), to provide a comprehensive understanding of the civil operating environment that informs decision makers of possible civil actions that may affect MAGTF missions in accordance with MCTP 3-03A. (CACT-PLAN-2002)

(1) Given a vignette, planning guidance, and with the aid of references, define the civil operating environment, in accordance with the PE checklist. (CACT-PLAN-2002a)

(2) Given a vignette, and planning guidance, and with the aid of references, analyze the civil operating environment, in accordance with the PE checklist. (CACT-PLAN-2002b)

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PART 1 – ASSESS THE CIVIL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

1. CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (CPB). Civil Affairs

(CA) Marines must be equipped to assess the civil environment, identify civil considerations, and integrate them throughout the planning process and tactical execution. A clear understanding of the operational environment enhances decision-makers’ situational awareness and their ability to determine mission requirements. CPB is particularly suited to support SAF in designing programs or activities that support MAGTF goals and objectives for stabilization.

a. Purpose. CPB is an analytical method used to examine the Civil Operating Environment (COE). CPB analyzes different aspects of civil information and assesses the civil impact of friendly, adversary, external actors, and the local populace on

MAGTF operations. The purpose of CPB is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the civil operating environment in order to develop a civil environment model that informs decision-makers of possible civil actions that may impact MAGTF missions.

b. Steps. The following are the four steps of the CPB process and the outputs of step 1. Each step in the process is refined continually to ensure that the CPB products are accurate and relevant in decision-making:

(1) Define the Civil Operating Environment

(a) Collect civil considerations “ASCOPE” data.

(b) Organize / incorporate operational variables

“PMESII” data.

(2) Analyze the Civil Operating Environment

(3) Develop a Civil Environment Model

(4) Determine Civil Actions

c. At the conclusion of step 1, Marines have evaluated, filtered, and recorded civil information for further collection and analysis. This commonly used format provides a ready means for both collectors and analysts to further evaluate and analyze civil information that may factor into the commander’s decision-making process or impact MAGTF actions.

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d. Civil Preparation of Battlespace within Stability

Assessment Framework. While CPB is a four-step process, the

“CPB” component within SAF focuses on using the results of CPB steps 1 and 2 - collecting information on the civil environment and analyzing that information. The results of CPB steps 3 and

4 can be used to enhance SAF, but are not necessary to executing a good SAF process. Regardless, both SAF and CPB closely examine the following three variables to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the battlespace:

• The civil operating environment (ASCOPE / PMESII data)

• The cultural environment (Applying operational culture principles)

• Instability and stability dynamics (Data gathered and analyzed through indirect methods - area studies, embassy data, etc., and direct methods - civil reconnaissance, civil engagements, etc.)

While step 2 of CPB is technically “analysis,” detailed stability analysis is a separate step within the SAF process and will be further examined in a separate lesson.

2. CPB STEP 1: DEFINE THE CIVIL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT. This step focuses on collecting and categorizing civil information.

This is a disciplined approach to gathering and organizing civil information, categorizing, and recording the results - the “what do I see?” approach to looking at information. This effort may begin by reviewing existing HHQ order(s), intelligence and

“Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace” products, reliable internet sources, and/or an area study of the designated area of operations (AO) to be further refined using civil consideration matrices. At a minimum, information will be categorized using civil considerations (ASCOPE) as the baseline. While this step will likely be limited by time, information collection is continuous.

a. Information Requirements

(1) Evaluate existing databases and determine intelligence and information gaps relating to the civil environment. Collect materials and submit RFIs.

(2) Filter to ensure that information gathered for further analysis is relevant to the mission and operating environment, and to eliminate the information that is not relevant.

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(3) Record information, recording is simply taking the filtered information and putting it into written/graphical format arranged with other similar information.

b. Organize the Information Gathered

(1) Organize information based on civil considerations:

(a) Areas - where do people live, work, play? These include political boundaries, religious boundaries, social boundaries, criminal enclaves, agricultural regions, industrial centers, education centers, and/or trade routes as examples.

(b) Structures - why are structures important to the people? These include government structures, religious structures, medical structures, warehouses, bridges, markets / shopping structures, airports and/or seaports.

(c) Capabilities - what capabilities are resident in the AO? These include sewer, water, electricity, academic, trash, medical, security and/or other capabilities.

(d) Organizations - what are the different groups in the area? These include political factions, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, social groups, religious organizations, media groups, and/or criminal groups.

(e) People - how do people organize and interact?

These include political leaders, religious leaders, community leaders, business leaders, community professionals, education professionals, law enforcement leaders, and/or military leaders.

(f) Events - when and what events are important to the people? These include holidays, carnivals, religious celebrations, weather events (e.g., monsoon), harvest periods, and/or migratory events (e.g., Hajj).

(2) If time allows, further categorize ASCOPE information utilizing operational variables (PMESII):

(a) Political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government, to include political structure (both formal and informal).

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(b) Military variable includes the military capabilities of all security forces (HN, insurgents, local militia, and police).

(c) Economic variable consists of general economic categories of the AO (energy, raw materials, labor distribution, income/food distribution, goods/services, and illicit markets).

(d) Social variable describes societies within an operational environment (a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture and share a sense of identity).

(e) Information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, distribution and reliance on data, media and knowledge systems (both civilian and military) by the local communities.

(f) Infrastructure variable includes the basic facilities, services and installations needed for a community or society to function.

(g) The finished product for step 1 is a collection and collation of civil considerations (ASCOPE) further organized using operational variables (PMESII) as seen in Figure 1-1 below:

Fig. 1-1

3. CPB STEP 2: ANALYZE THE CIVIL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT. As described previously, the CPB effort within the SAF process focuses on three “variables” – the operating environment as captured by civil factors and their relevance to operations, the cultural environment, and instability and stability dynamics.

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a. Civil Factors and Relevance

(1) There are a number of models that can be used to describe the operating environment. The ASCOPE / PMESII construct is population-focused rather than enemy-focused which makes it the ideal starting point for SAF. In addition, the civil factors and relevance matrix is designed to highlight those factors impacting the MAGTF (both positively and negatively) as they relate to stability dynamics. While there may be numerous civil factors that are relevant to MAGTF operations, the SAF process filters these factors by asking a basic question; “how does it (the identified factor) affect stability?”

(2) The below example represents an approach to examine the civil consideration “Areas.” Looking at “areas” within the collected ASCOPE/PMESII data from step 1, the analysts might ask:

(a) Areas/Political. What is the political situation in the AO? What are the political boundaries? What is significant?

(b) Areas/Military. What military (or paramilitary) capabilities are in the AO? What are the military boundaries?

What is significant?

(c) Areas/Economic. What are the key and decisive areas of economic activity?

(d) Areas/Social. What is the social climate in the

AO? What are the key and decisive social factors that affect the AO - ethnic enclaves, crime districts, etc.

(e) Areas/Information. How is information collected and/or disseminated in the AO? What are the key and decisive information requirements in the AO?

(f) Areas/Infrastructure. What are the key and decisive elements of infrastructure in the AO? Where are the key and decisive elements of infrastructure located?

(3) After examining the particular factors and their relevance to operations the final SAF requirement is to ask how that factor and its relevance affects stability. This matrix is a living document and is intended to be developed throughout the

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CPB process, information will be added, subtracted, modified, etc. The example shown in Figure 1-2 below illustrates “areas” from the ASCOPE/PMESII data:

Fig. 1-2

b. Cultural Factor Analysis. Here the analyst is trying to take abstract and intangible concepts of culture and determine the nature and scope of its impact. Culture is the shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influences a person’s and a group’s actions and choices. Note that there can be much overlap between cultural factors and the other broad categories of civil information, and this should be part of the

“synthesis” element of the analysis.

(1) All MAGTF operations impact the environment in which they are conducted. Similarly, the operational environment will have an impact on MAGTF operations. Significant cultural factors can be “Key Influences” as powerful as the tangible “Key

Influences” (Physical Environment and/or Infrastructure, and

Individuals and/or Groups).

(2) An approach to help organize analysis of cultural factors, is the use of the five dimensions of operational culture developed by the former USMC Center for Advanced

Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) and described in their publication Operational Culture for the Warfighter.

(a) There is no singular approach to applying a cultural lens to the data collected in step 1. Every situation will require careful consideration based on commander’s intent and guidance and the nature of the MAGTF’s operations. CA

Marines should endeavor to apply cultural perspective-taking (to

“see” and “feel” others’ behavior/actions in the frame of that person’s culture) and cultural interpretation (the process by

101-9 which understanding and meaning is derived) to the information they have gathered. The point of this approach is to minimize

“mirroring,” i.e. viewing the information from a U.S. Marine, Western mentality. When applying a cultural filter to the information collected, a good approach is to consider the relevant questions posed in Appendix B of Operational Culture for the Warfighter. Operational culture factors derived from this effort are compiled and included into the Civil Environment

Factors and Relevance Matrix.

(b) Applying a cultural lens to the ASCOPE/PMESII data will result in a greater understanding of key and relevant cultural factors affecting MAGTF operations. Regardless of the approach taken, each of the 5 cultural dimensions has factors that must be addressed to develop the most comprehensive list of known and relevant factors at this point in the CPB process.

The example shown in Figure 1-3 below illustrates some of these questions.

Fig. 1-3

c. Instability and Stability Dynamics

(1) Information gathered from the ASCOPE/PMESII factors and relevance matrices as well as the cultural analysis can be further synthesized and categorized as potential grievances or resiliencies. Instability can occur through unresolved grievances, destabilizing events and key influences that seek to take advantage of them. Although there can be many potential grievances, they do not all necessarily foster instability unless key influences with both the motivation and means to

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“windows of vulnerability” are often…