ATTACHMENT_7_-_FY20_NTD_BAA_topics.pdf

HDTRA1-18-S-0002

2020 Topic Call

ATTACHMENT 7: LIST OF TOPICS

TOPIC: NT-20-DET-01

ENABLING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR THREATS

DTRA seeks innovative research and development on nuclear threat detection technologies.

Nuclear threat detection is identifying, locating and tracking of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon delivery systems, and special nuclear materials (SNM) via means that excludes ionizing radiation detection. Solutions may include, but are not limited to: the capability to detect and track personnel defending or guarding a nuclear weapon or SNM; enhanced capabilities to identify individuals or vehicles associated with a nuclear weapons enterprise and/or operations; technologies that assist military forces in their counter-WMD missions;

and the capability to find nuclear weapons and keep them at risk. Weapons and SNM may be in or out of state controlled custody.

One of many possible mission scenarios involves the differentiation between nuclear and conventional weapon systems. In the initial stages of conflict, being able to differentiate nuclear weapon delivery systems from conventional to enable more informed targeting decisions.

Another possible mission scenario would be that tactical ground teams are searching for the location of a nuclear weapon in or out of state control in an area too large for traditional detection means.

TOPIC: NT-20-DET-02

DISPOSABLE DOSE RATE NODES

DTRA is seeking disposable (i.e., low cost and single use) dose rate nodes that can be distributed in an environment of interest for area monitoring and warning. Proposed solutions must be rugged and able to withstand IP69 in final form. The final prototype must demonstrate field operational life of one year or more. The basic configuration must provide an alarm at 2 mR/hr. and transmit that alarm for a minimum for 1 hour at a distance of at least 1 kilometer. The final prototype must be able to demonstrate a design that could be distributed in quantities sufficient to monitor an area. The nodes must be able to be released

10s of meters through the air from a ground vehicle traveling at 50 km/hr. and/or be vertically dropped from the air. These solutions may include, but are not limited to:

High-drop impact for potential air deployment

Solar power enhancement, Advanced power management, Long range transmission, Radio backscatter technology to extend transmission range and functional lifetime.

TOPIC: NT-20-DET-03

LARGE AREA SEARCH ON AN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM

DTRA is seeking solutions for large area detector optimized search between 100-1000 meters above ground level (AGL) on a fixed-wing unmanned aerial system (UAS). Using capabilities consistent with a typical government off-the-shelf UAS such as the Stalker (5 lb capacity, 15 m/s cruise speed, autonomous day/night/all-weather operation) to conduct detection and mapping of human health hazardous radiological environments. This platform must be able to delineate the 10 mR/hr gamma isodose line from 150 m AGL. This effort would develop the software and hardware required to integrate with the aerial platform. The system must be modular, rugged, and compatible with multi-mission, autonomous UASs, and capable of covering a search area equivalent to a 100km^2 area in 8 hours at 500 m AGL. Of interest will be coordinated multi-UAS aerial search and neutron sensitivity. The end state must provide a sensor prototype integrated onto an identified platform working semi-autonomously in a field environment.

The final prototype must be designed such that the functionality could easily be transferred to other UAS platforms

TOPIC: NT-20-DET-04

PLUME DETECTION

DTRA seeks the capability to detect, track and visualize the hazards from large-scale releases of radioactive materials. These plumes, clouds or debris could be generated by a nuclear accident or weapon, and could be located over land or maritime environments.

DTRA seeks to utilize means that exclude ionizing radiation detection with the exception of the ship-board scenario described below. Solutions may include, but are not limited to, electro-optical detection, radar or other technical viable means.

One of many possible scenarios is to enable land-based forces to maneuver around plumes, advoiding contamination and radiation intake.

Another possible scenario is for sea-based entities to be able to avoid steering into a plume contaminating their ships. Additionally, detection of fallout deposited on the surface of water is desirable to allow freedom of movement of maritime vessels.

Another related plume-detection scenario would be for ship-board detection using zero consumable, continuous air sampling with the intended application to be mountable-to-ship masts and operated in an at-sea environment. The system must provide an alarm that will allow sufficient time to maneuver the host ship out of the area to protect high air flow-rate and high volume particulate concentrators from developing radiation levels that could become a maintenance personnel health hazard. The final intended use would be for outdoor use with ingress protection IP69 and will not allow for the use of consumables while requiring maintenance no more than once a year. This application may be based on traditional ionizing radiation detection

TOPIC: NT-20-DET-05

FINDING GROUND MOBILE NUCLEAR THREATS

Many potential adversaries have developed or are developing ground mobile nuclear weapons delivery systems. These systems generally are comprised of wheeled or tracked vehicles that carry or launch anything from short range to intercontinental range ballistic missiles or long-range tube or rocket artillery. These deployed mobile ground systems are often serviced by other vehicles that perform various support functions.

Finding these mobile and missile delivery systems at hidden nuclear weapons garrisons and mobile launch sites located deep within a given territory makes detection difficult. However, they are relatively easy to detect during movement or during resupplying activities.

DTRA seeks capabilities to find and track deployed ground mobile nuclear threats, either via direct detection, without reliance upon detection of ionizing radiation, or via detection of their nuclear weapon enterprise support systems and components so they may be held at risk.

Proposal submissions may include means to elicit identifying responses from targets of interest and shall include a concept of operations for employment of the proposed capability.

TOPIC: NT-20-DET-06

DUAL CAPABILITY MILITARY UNIT AND EQUIPMENT DISCRIMINATION

Many foreign units and their associated equipment are capable of operating with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Determining which units are dual capable and if dual capable equipment is being used to deliver or service nuclear weapons would allow greater capability to find and target nuclear threats or nuclear threat activities, enhance early indications and warning of deployment or use, provide counter-threat strike prioritization, and potential avoidance of unnecessary infliction of collateral damage.

DTRA seeks novel technologies to differentiate between dual capable units and dual capable equipment outfitted with or servicing nuclear weapons without reliance upon detection of ionizing radiation. Submissions may include means to elicit identifying responses from targets of interest and shall include a concept of operations for employment of the proposed capability.

TOPIC: NT-20-DET-07

ENABLING ALGORITHMS FOR NUCLEAR THREATS ANALYSIS AND MAPPING

US Forces conducting radiological/nuclear force protection and consequence management operations require a wide range of integrated sensor platforms and situational awareness tools for enabling mission execution. US Forces must be able to quickly identify and characterize potential threats and hazards and share information horizontally and vertically within their organizations. To develop the detailed understanding of the situation necessary for response, they must rely on many different types and sources of data and information. Recent advances in multisource sensors (including but not limited to CBRN detectors, threat-imaging platforms, LIDAR, etc.) and networked data collection platforms provide more and varied data sources available for analysis; however, current multisource data analysis remains ad-hoc. Platforms currently combine data together to display independent data streams for real-time command decision making and data combination often occurs through post-processing.

DTRA seeks novel real-time algorithms to analyze multisource CBRN tactical edge data and consequence management contextual data (land-use data, emergency service points of interest, etc.) for both CBRN force protection and post radiological/nuclear incident response missions. Algorithms should enhance response forces' ability to develop a clear and concise understanding of their environment and provide direction for reaction and response. DTRA will consider both multisource radiation (gamma, neutron, scintillator, semiconductor, imagers, etc.) specific algorithms and non-radiation based contextual algorithms.

Radiation-specific algorithms should prioritize and combine detector feeds (which can include ground based, airborne, and/or maritime platforms) to provide users with a single real-time picture detailing threat or hazard location, radioisotope, count rate, confidence level, intervening material, and other pertinent information instead of disparate data streams unique to each detector. Full detector characterization may not be available prior to data synthesis; therefore, algorithms able to maximize situational awareness and enhance identification in real-time without full detection characterization will be preferred. If algorithm requires detector characterization, radiation-specific solutions should provide flexibility to quickly integrate additional radiation detectors leveraging the detector characterization outputs from GADRAS. Preference will be given to algorithms not requiring full detector characterization leveraging novel computing and analysis techniques to enhance radioisotope identification and localization otherwise not available from independent detector information.

Solutions for non-radiation contextual algorithms may include contextual data mapping and visualization for resource prioritization; hazards source location and strength from triangulation of multiple imaging sensor readings; and shielding and occluding material reconstruction from multiple heterogeneous sensors, to include imagers.

Solutions that are compatible with existing situational awareness tools used by the

Department of Defense CBRN forces, such as Mobile Field Kit CBRN (MFK-CBRN) or

Tactical Assault Kit (TAK) will be given preference. Solutions will be evaluated against the computational resources required (ex: a mobile solution with less operational relevance that may be selected over one that requires high performance computing and processing delays).

All assumptions about available networked sensors shall be clearly defined. Computing resources required, particularly high performance computing requirements and any post-processing of data, shall be clearly defined.