Gus_Solomon_Building_Class_A_Report.pdf

Fire alarm report for:

Gus J. Solomon building US District Courthouse

620 SW Main St Portland OR 97201

Prepared by:

Western States Fire Protection 13896 Fir St

Oregon City, OR 97045

Onsite Electrician/technician

Michael Brooks LEA4062/NICET II Kevin Heine LEA1142

The following report references a request by the General Services Administration (GSA) concerning project number ROR00120

In reference to the scope of work assigned, on May 21 & 22, 2013, an inspection of the Fire Alarm Control Panel, peripherals and wiring, led to the following conclusions:

1. Fire Alarm Control Panel (FACP) – Initiating A. The fire alarm control panel is a Simplex 2001-8006 type and does have the capability of being wired Class “A” (4-wire) if the correct initiating subcomponents were installed. Technicians found that modules currently installed are designed specifically for Class “B” (2-wire) initiating devices only.

B. The FACP has 40 initiating zones, utilizing 20 Simplex 2001-1017 Box Circuit Modules. This specific design does not allow for the installation of a 4-wire McCulloh (pre-Class “A” term) loop devices and the technician found field wiring to be consistent with class “B” wiring.

i. Smoke detectors (None found with class “A” configuration)

1. Wiring appears to be in EMT raceway and is predominantly TFFN, 16 gauge although FPL, FPLP and THHN are present in the main control panel as well

2. Numerous measurements in the field indicate the presence of 25VDC on one half of the circuit and an End of Line (EOL) resistor of 3.3K ohms on the other half, consistent with Simplex 2001 wiring schemes.

3. Smoke detectors all appear to be Simplex brand although there are 3 different styles and types; none are of the 4-wire variety, all inspected by the technician appeared to have only one EMT conduit servicing the back box.

4. Heat detector and smoke detector in the basement appear to be wired in a 2-wire configuration and both seem to be a recent addition as compared to the age of the other devices installed (circa 85 vs. early 2000’s).

5. Ground fault detection is present on the FACP and all circuits grounded indicate at the control panel.

ii. Manual Pull Stations (None found with class “A” configuration)

1. These appear to be installed as 2-wire, class “B” devices and are single action, Simplex 2099-9201 type and mounted near all major points of egress, consistent with the design criteria of the day. All appear to be installed in EMT raceway and appear to have their own zones. Pull stations inspected by technician had only one EMT servicing the back box.

2. Some appear to be over 48” in height from the ground and may not be ADA compliant.

iii. Duct Detectors

1. Appear to be 4 wire devices but are not wired class ”A” and have local fan control relays as well. Power appears to be provided by the FACP power supplies and is typical for an installation of this type.

2. Duct detectors cause an alarm condition on the FACP as this style of panel does not have a “Supervisory” level indicator.

iv. Waterflow devices and tamper switches (None found with class “A” configuration)

1. Wet System

a. Southeast stairwell floor controls contain tampered butterfly valves and appear to contain at least one set of dual wire switches. The connections appear to have been made inside the conduit or in the LB’s, as there were no termination boxes installed at the valves.

b. Connections in the installed junction boxes are wholly inadequate for supervision as the flow switches inspected were wired in parallel to the tamper and have no supervision.

2. Basement pump room, city connection and reserve holding tank

a. All valves with the exception of the city isolation and the basement riser appear to be chained and locked in their appropriate positions.

b. Tampers on the city isolation and basement riser OS&Y valves are not wired correctly and lack proper supervision by the FACP. There is at least one butterfly valve in the basement overhead with supervision.

c. Basement and main waterflow appear to be a combination of retard chamber and pressure switch and a flow switch (near the reserve tank).

d. Reserve tank levels, pressures and other conditions are not monitored by the FACP and are maintained by building maintenance staff and/or APOGEE.

e. Fire pump controllers (electrical and diesel) are all local only and do not appear to be monitored by the FACP.

3. Penthouse/attic Dry Pipe Valve (DPV)

a. Terminations for the isolation valve were made in the LB at the base of the valve and not in a termination box.

b. Inspection of the pressure switches shows supervision with the

EOL wired at the switch, however the tamper/low air circuitry is questionable as there are two wires and an EOL in the junction box.

2. Signal circuits/outputs A. The panel was initially installed with as a voice evacuation system and still has a tape player installed for that purpose. This portion of the system appears to have been abandoned and is currently used only to send the oscillator “whooper” output to the speakers. The original voice microphone and floor controls still exist and appear to function correctly. During alarm conditions all bells, whoopers (speakers) and strobes indicate as a general alarm (no floor above/below/fire floor sequencing).

[Technician noted the 7th floor bell in NE elevator lobby failed during signals testing]

i. 4” Speakers (Note: Author uses Style “Z” and “Y” in this section to remain consistent with the installation practices of the time).

ii. These were installed to facilitate the voice evacuation system (mentioned above). None of the speakers inspected were wired Style “Z” (class “A”) and the system does not appear to be configured for this type of wiring.

iii. Numerous measurements in the field indicate the presence of 25VAC on one half of the circuit and an EOL resistor of 15K ohms, consistent with Simplex 2001 Style “Y” wiring schemes.

iv. Only one conduit present feeding the back boxes installed and wiring appeared to be shielded PVC coated type.

v. Manual voice evacuation (PA system) does appear to function normally.

vi. 10” Bells (Note: Author uses Style “Z” and “Y” in this section to remain consistent with the installation practices of the time).

1. All bells inspected were wired Style “Y”, had control voltage of 24vdc on one side of the circuit and an EOL resistor of 15K ohms present on the other side, consistent with Simplex 2001 Style “Y” wiring schemes.

2. Only one conduit present feeding the back boxes installed and wiring appeared to be THHN or TFFN solid 12ga or equivalent.

B. NAC’s

i. FACP room and Basement

1. Both of these NAC panels are Simplex 4009 type and are configurable for 4-wire (class “A” signals) but neither appear to have these modules installed.

2. FACP room 4009 appears to have a motherboard/solder issue as any strain against TB2 causes all four NAC circuits to indicate open. The 4009 automatically clears this fault as strain is removed.

3. The FACP NAC appears to monitor and trip the 5th floor NAC panels.

4. Basement NAC appears to only drive horn/strobes located in the SE corner of the basement.

ii. 5th floor

1. There are two NAC panels located in the NE electrical room. Although these panels are configured as class “B” panels, the EOL’s were terminated at terminal boards in the panels. All configurations and jumper settings indicate that these NAC’s are not wired in a Class “A” configuration, however modification on these floors would appear to be the easiest, since the return wire have already been run. Locations of strobes, correct candela settings and proper placement for ADA would require an engineering evaluation.

2. As noted by the GSA representative, raceways are not separated by 4 foot for feed/return wires. Technicians found little evidence of installed raceways providing correct spacing for this wiring method throughout the building.

3. Strobes appear to be synchronized with an AMSECO device located near the upper NAC

3. DACT

A. This device has the capability to be wired class “A”, however it is currently installed class “B” but the interconnecting wires are not supervised back to the FACP as the EOL for zone 2 of the DACT is currently located at the terminal board.

B. It does not appear that the FACP is monitored for trouble conditions by the DACT and subsequent review of signals sent to the monitoring station confirmed this. The DACT itself will provide a trouble signal, but only based upon its own system integrity (battery, zones, A/C power loss ect.).

C. It does not appear that any of the interfacing relays are wired fail-safe but are wired fail secure.

4. Door locks A. During signals testing, egress could not be made onto several floors from the stairwells. Normally this is not a problem as egress from inside the floor can be gained through the use of panic hardware. During an emergency condition however, fire fighters may need to gain access via stairwells and elevators to perform search and rescue. This may not be possible without proper configuration, although fire department has access to key via a Knox Box, non-emergency providers will not gain access to these secure areas.

B. The only point of egress from the main 1st floor lobby after hours is via the NE employee basement door, as all other doors are locked with no publically available override or Request To Exit (REX).

5. Elevator Recall A. Elevator recall appears to be handled via relays from the FACP and not by local relays in the elevator control rooms or lobby smokes. It appears that any alarm will recall elevators.

B. It was noted that control wiring for the elevator appears to transverse the FACP cabinets and is therefore being used as a raceway for high voltages.

6. Fireman’s Phones and Jacks A. These are all wired class “B” and appear to be working fine. These systems are tested by maintenance staff on a regular basis.