Attachment 0009 - CONTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SPECIFICATION (DD254) - CNR - FINAL - 24 June 2021.pdf

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Security Classification Guide (SCG)

For The

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System

(SINCGARS)

Distribution Statement D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. DoD contractors only for

Administrative or Operational use effective upon date of approval. Other requests shall be referred to the Office of the Product

Manager (PdM), Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radios (MNVR), ATTN: SFAE-CCC-TRM, Building 6007, Aberdeen Proving

Ground (APG), MD 21005.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2

SINCGARS SCG

Issued By: Office of the Product Manager Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radios (PdM MNVR)

6007 Combat Drive

APG, MD 21005-5408

Approved By:

DANIEL P. HUGHES

MG, USA

Program Executive Officer Command Control Communications Tactical (PEO C3T)

6010 Frankford Street, APG, MD 21005-1848

Date: 27 March 2015

Project/Program Number: IT463746D555, 1C464751D282, 1C464701D488, 1C464751D098, PE 5211, 1410

Supersedes: SINCGARS SCG dated 06 February 2007

Action Officer: Mr. David F. Mandley

Project Leader

ATTN: SFAE-CCC-TRM, APG, MD 21005

COMM: 443-395-0978

Distribution Statement D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense (DoD) and US DoD contractors only for

Administrative or Operational use effective upon date of approval. Other requests shall be referred to the Office of the Product

Manager (PdM), Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radios (MNVR), ATTN: SFAE-CCC-TRM, Building 6007, Aberdeen Proving

Ground (APG), MD 21005.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1 – GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 4

1.1 Purpose 4

1.2 Authority 4

1.3 Application 4

1.4 Questions and Recommendations 4

1.5 Public Release 5

1.6 Definitions & Acronyms 5

1.7 Foreign Government Information 6

1.8 Foreign Disclosure 6

1.9 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 6

1.10 System Description 7

1.11 Reasons For Classification 7

1.12 References 7

1.13 For Official Use Only (FOUO) Caveat 8

SECTION 2 – OVERALL EFFORT 9

SECTION 3 – PERFORMANCE AND CAPABILITIES 11

SECTION 4 – SPECIFICATIONS 12

SECTION 5 – VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES 14

SECTION 6 – ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 20

SECTION 7 – HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 22

SECTION 8 – TRAINING, TESTING AND MAINTENANCE 23

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4

SECTION 1 – GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1.1 Purpose. The purpose of this SCG is to provide instructions and guidance on the security classification of information and material pertaining to the SINCGARS. In accordance with (IAW) Army Regulation (AR) 380-5, each classified system must have a

SCG to provide protection guidance as necessary. This SCG covers SINCGARS and its components but does not cover or replace

SCGs for any associated system or systems that interoperate with SINCGARS. The highest level of information classified by this

SCG is SECRET.

1.2 Authority. This SCG is issued under the authority of AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, 29 Sep

00, Executive Order (E.O.) 13526, 29 December 2009; and DoD Manual 5200.01, DoD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification and Declassification, 24 February 2012. It constitutes authority and may be cited as the basis for classification, regrading or declassification of information concerning the SINCGARS. Unless otherwise noted, the authority of the approving official on the title page classifies information or material identified as classified in this SCG. Information marked classified IAW the guidance provided in this SCG must be additionally marked with the following statement:

Derived from: SINCGARS SCG, (Insert date of approval)

Declassify on: (Date or event specifically mandated by this guide)

1.3 Application. Per AR 380-5, this SCG will be reviewed and updated for each subsequent version every five years, as a minimum, or sooner if circumstances dictate. If the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR), PM SINCGARS, recognizes an administrative or guidance change that must be made to the SCG, the required change will be made immediately and reported in writing by the OPR to

Program Executive Officer Command Control Communications Tactical (PEO C3T) Security Manager, ATTN: SFAE-CCC-CSO, 6010 Frankford Street, APG, MD 21005-1848 for review, processing and dissemination.

1.4 Questions and Recommendations. Questions concerning the content and interpretation of this SCG will be directed to the OPR.

If the security classification imposed by this SCG is considered impractical, documented and justified recommendations will be made through appropriate channels to the OPR. If current conditions, progress made in this effort, scientific or technological developments, advances in the state-of-the-art, or other factors indicate a need for changes, similar recommendations should be made to the OPR.

Pending a final decision, the information involved will be protected at either the currently specified level or the recommended level, whichever is higher. All users of this SCG are encouraged to assist in improving its currency and adequacy. Any over-classification or incorrect classification will be brought to the attention of the OPR, who will report these changes in writing to PEO C3T Security

Manager, ATTN: SFAE-CCC-CSO, 6010 Frankford Street, APG, MD 21005-1848.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5

1.5 Public Release. The fact that this SCG shows certain details of information to be unclassified does not authorize automatic public release. Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unauthorized disclosure or release of identical or similar information. Proposed public disclosures of unclassified information regarding SINCGARS shall be processed through appropriate channels for approval for publication. Within the Department of the Army, the procedures specified in AR 360-1, “The

Army Public Affairs Program” will be followed. Defense contractors will comply with DoD 5220.22-M (National Industrial Security

Program Operating Manual – NISPOM) and other contractual requirements. All information pertaining to the SINCGARS that is proposed for public release must undergo a formal security classification and policy review process prior to official public release into the public domain. All information requested for public release concerning the SINCGARS will be forwarded to the PEO C3T Public

Communications Directorate, ATTN: SFAE-CCC-CSO, 6010 Frankford Street, APG, MD 21005-1848, IAW AR 360-1, paragraph 5-

3, prior to public release.

1.6 Definitions & Acronyms.

1.6.1 Definitions.

TOP SECRET: Information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

SECRET: Information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

CONFIDENTIAL: Information or material, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

1.6.2 Acronyms.

AMC: Army Materiel Command APG: Aberdeen Proving Ground AR: Army Regulation

ASC: Army Signal Command ATAIS: Army Tactical Automated

Information System

C2: Command and Control

CoS: Chief of Staff CCI: Controlled Cryptographic Item CECOM: Communications Electronics

Command

CFE: Contractor Furnished Equipment CNR: Combat Net Radio COMSEC: Communications Security

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6

COTS: Commercial Off-The-Shelf DA PAM: Department of the Army

Pamphlet

DoD: Department of Defense

E.O.: Executive Order ECM: Electronic Counter Measure ECCM: Electronic Counter Counter

Measure

EMP: Electro Magnetic Pulse FMS: Foreign Military Sales FOIA: Freedom of Information Act

FOUO – For Official Use Only GFE – Government Furnished Equipment GOTS: Government Off-The-Shelf

IA: Information Assurance IAVA – Information Assurance

Vulnerability Alert

IAVM – Information Assurance

Vulnerability Management

INFOSEC – Information Security IO: Information Operations IP: Internet Protocol

IS: Information System IT: Information Technology LOS: Line of Sight

MAC: Mission Assurance Category MD: Maryland MOU: Memorandum Of Understanding

MTTR: Mean Time To Repair NATO: North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

NDP 1: National Disclosure Policy 1

NETCOM: Network Enterprise

Technology Command

NISPOM: National Industrial Security

Program Operating Manual

NS: Network Systems

NSA: National Security Agency OCA: Original Classification Authority OPR: Office of Primary Responsibility

PdM: Product Manager R/T: Receiver/Transmitter SCG: Security Classification Guide

SINCGARS: Single Channel Ground

Airborne Radio System

VHF-FM: Very High Frequency –

Frequency Modulation

1.7 Foreign Government Information. There is no foreign government information associated with the SINCGARS program.

1.8 Foreign Disclosure. Any disclosure to foreign officials of information classified by this guide shall be in accordance with the procedures set forth in AR 380-10 and the National Disclosure Policy – 1 (NDP – 1). If a country with which the DoD has entered into a reciprocal procurement memorandum of understanding (MOU) or offset arrangement expresses an interest in this effort, a foreign disclosure review should be conducted prior to issuance of a solicitation. If it is known that foreign participation cannot be permitted because of the sensitivity of the effort, this fact should be stated.

1.9 Foreign Military Sales (FMS). SINCGARS is approved for FMS, in accordance with the Security Assistance Management

Manual, and including NSA approval of US Type 1 encryption: New Zealand, Greece, Netherlands, Italy and the SHAPE Technical

Center. The classification of end item is dependent on the hardware and/or technical information involved.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 7

1.10 System Description. SINCGARS is the primary U.S. Army Combat Net Radio (CNR). It is designed primarily for voice command and control (C2) for infantry, armor and artillery units. It is a Very High Frequency – Frequency Modulation (VHF-FM) radio system. SINCGARS employs frequency hopping as its primary means of communications against a hostile (jamming) environment and is capable of processing voice, analog and digital data in either the frequency hopping or single channel modes. In addition, SINCGARS offers embedded communications security (COMSEC) to encrypt and decrypt voice and data transmissions. All

COMSEC security protection falls under the authority of NSA.

1.11 Reasons For Classification.

1.11.1 All hardware, software and documentation, including drawings, photographs, specifications, etc., shall be classified in accordance with the information contained in this guide.

1.11.2 Information revealing the following shall be classified as noted in accordance with EO 13526, Section 1.4. These rationales will be used in the tables throughout this SCG in the “Reason” column:

1. Military plans, weapons systems or operations

2. Foreign government information

3. Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology

4. Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources

5. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism

6. US government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities

7. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism

8. Weapons of Mass Destruction

1.12 References.

a. E.O 13526, Classified National Security Information, dated 29 December 2009

b. DoD Manual 5200.01: Department of Defense (DoD) Information Security Program, Volumes 1 - 4; dated 24 February 2012;

including Volumes 2 &3, Change 2, dated 19 March 2013

c. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, dated 29 September 2000

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 8

e. Army Automated Tactical System (ATS) Security Classification Guide (SCG), CIO/G6, Network Enterprise Technology

Command (NETCOM) 9th Army Signal Command (ASC), Information Assurance and Compliance Directorate, dated September 2014

f. C-E LCMC Regulation 380-3, SCG Procedures, dated 31 July 2008

g. AR 25-55, The Army Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program, dated 1 November 1997

h. AR 360-1, The Army Public Affairs Program, dated 25 May 2011

i. AR 25-2, Information Assurance, dated 24 October 2007

j. AR 380-10, Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives, dated 22 June 2005

1.13 For Official Use Only (FOUO) Caveat. FOUO is not a security classification. Information that has not been given a security classification pursuant to the criteria in this guide, but which may be withheld from the public for one or more of the reasons cited in

Freedom of Information Act exemptions, AR 25-55, “Army Freedom of Information Act Program, shall be designated FOUO.

Information so designated in this guide that warrants FOUO markings will be handled and protected in accordance the above-cited regulation. Comparable instructions on handling and protecting FOUO information provided to contractors will be included in a separate clause of the contract or by an official notification (other than the DD Form 254, “Contract Security Classification

Specification, issued by the PCO through the ACO).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 9

SECTION 2 – OVERALL EFFORT

ELEMENTS LEVEL REASON DURATION REMARKS

2.1 Identification

2.1.1 Name U

2.1.2 National Stock No. U

2.1.3 Configuration U

2.1.4 Model Designation U

2.2 End Item

2.2.1 Hardware and Firmware (to include

ECCM, KGV-10, U-AXM, E-DRZ, E-HIXE-

/HIC, E-GTN, E-HKR and E-HND

COMSEC PWA/Chipset)

U

The E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-HIC, E-GTN and E-HND COMSEC PWA/Chipset and RT-

1523, RY-1523A, RT-1523B, RT-1523C, RT-

1523D, RT-1523E, RT-1523F, RT-1523G and

RT-1478D are Unclassified Controlled

Cryptographic Items (CCI) Classified Crypto

Keys will be stored in accordance with (IAW) the level of classification. Unclassified Crypto keys will be stored IAW approved CCI procedures for handling unclassified CCI items.

The KGV-10 hardware is accountable for as

TSEC (ALC4) until installed on a printed circuit board. When installed, the ECCM module, RT-

1439, and Airborne radios are unclassified.

When the ECCM module is installed in a RT-

1523 model without an E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-

HIX/E-HIC, E-GTN, E-HKR or E-HND

COMSEC PWA/Chipset, the radio is unclassified.,

2.2.2 Military Application U

2.2.3 Internal View U

2.2.4 External View U

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 10

2.2.5 Software

2.2.5.1 Operational Firmware U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemption 2a applies.

2.2.5.2 Hopset Program U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemption 2a applies.

2.2.6 System Safety Release Statement U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemption 2a applies.

2.3 Engineering Change Orders

2.3.1 Non-ECCM Hardware U

2.3.2 ECCM Hardware and Firmware (does

not include ECCM Fill Devices)

2.3.3 KGV-10, E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-

HIC, E-GTN, E-HKR, E-HND PWA/Chipset

See

Remarks

Technical operational and project reports dealing with the KGV-10, E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-

HIC, E-GTN, E-HKR or E-HND COMSEC

PWA/Chipset must be classified on the basis of content. Detailed information revealing cryptographic information must be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL and classified SECRET when revealing technical aspects. Detailed information can be obtained from the Director, NSA, ATTN: I524, Fort George Meade, MD

20755, to include drawings and unclassified aspects.

SECTION 3 – PERFORMANCE AND CAPABILITIES

3.1 Performance

3.1.1 Reliability U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemptions 2a & 4b

apply.

3.1.2 Availability U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemptions 2a & 4b

3.2 Capabilities

3.2.1 Communications Range U

3.2.2 EMC/Multiple Users U

3. 3 KGV-10, E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-

HIC, E-GTN, E-HKR, E-HND

PWA/Chipset Performance, Operating and

Signature Characteristics

KGV-10, E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-HIC, E-

GTN, E-HKR, E-HND PWA/Chipset must be classified on the basis of content. Detailed information revealing cryptographic information must be classified at least CONFIDENTIAL, and classified SECRET when revealing technical aspects. Detailed information on the

KGV-10, E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-HIC, E-

GTN, E-HKR, E-HND PWA/Chipset, to include drawings and unclassified aspects, can be obtained from the Director, NSA, ATTN: 1524, Fort George Meade, MD.

3.4 Reprogrammability of Radios and

Internet Controller

3.4.1 Radios: include RT-1523C, RT-1523-D, RT-1523E, RT-1523F, RT-1523G and RT-

1478D

3.4.2 Internet Controller (INC): includes AM-

7239C, AM-7239D and AM-7239E

3.5 Interoperability/Interfaces U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemption 4 applies.

SECTION 4 – SPECIFICATIONS

4.1 Physical Characteristics

4.1.1 Weight U

4.1.2 Dimensions U

4.1.3 Configuration specifications U

4.2 Technical Description

4.2.1 Non-ECCM Hardware U

4.2.2 ECCM Hardware and Firmware (does

not include ECCM Fill Devices)

U The E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-HIC, E-GTN and E-HND COMSEC PWA/Chipset and RT-

1523, RY-1523A, RT-1523B, RT-1523C, RT-

1523D, RT-1523E, RT-1523F, RT-1523G and

RT-1478D are Unclassified Controlled

Cryptographic Items (CCI).

TSEC (ALC4) until installed on a printed circuit board. When installed, the ECCM module, RT-1439, and Airborne radios are unclassified. When the ECCM module is installed in a RT-1523 model without an E-

DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-HIC, E-GTN, E-

HKR or E-HND COMSEC PWA/Chipset, the radio is unclassified. Any publication or dissemination outside the US Government must be cleared through appropriate disclosure channels.

4.2.3 ECCM Fill Devices (to include MX-

10579, MX-18290, AN/PYQ-10 and

AN/CYZ-7/10)

U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemption 2a applies.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 13

4.2.4 KGV-10, E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-

HIC, E-GTN, E-HKR and E-HND COMSEC

PWA/Chipset Theory of Operations

S

1.4c, g

10 years from deactivation and/or removal from the field.

Derived from MIL STD 188-241, dated

November 2012

4.2.5 Theory of ECCM Operation to include

ECCM Timing Diagrams, Synchronization and Acquisition Scheme, System Delays

1.4c, g

Derived from MIL STD 188-241 dated

November 2012

4.2.6 Non-complex computer problem, specification firmware technology description (Product Specification)

4.2.7 TRANSEC Key U

4.2.8 COMSEC Key See

Dependent on the classification of the key loaded. Classifications are determined by the

COMSEC custodian.

4.2.9 Hopset Information U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemption 2a applies.

4.3 Power Requirements U

4.4 System Design U

4.5 Environment Requirements U

4.6 Frequencies U

4.7 Transportability U

4.8 Software

4.8.1 GOTS U

4.8.2 COTS U

4.8.3 Application U

4.9 Module Performance Specifications U

4.10 Communications Range U

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 14

SECTION 5 - VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES

5.1 Nuclear Hardening U

5.2 Biological Hardening U

5.3 Chemical Hardening U

5.4 Signature Characteristics

(TEMPEST)

1.4g

TEMPEST information may reveal vulnerabilities.

5.5 Nuclear Weapons and

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)

Any information regarding EMP may reveal vulnerabilities.

5.6 System Vulnerabilities

the date the vulnerability is identified.

Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism are classified at the level that the system is accredited.

5.7 System Vulnerabilities to Counter

Measures

5.8 Information System Security

5.8.1 System/terminal passwords U

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 15

5.8.2 Unauthorized intrusions

5.9 Electronic Counter Measures/

Electronic Counter Counter Measures

(ECM/ECCM)

5.9.1 System Vulnerabilities to ECM

the date of published vulnerability report.

May also be declassified upon decommissioning and removal from the field

5.9.2 System ECCM effectiveness

5.9.2.1 System ECCM effectiveness U Unclassified when a vulnerability is not identified and associated with SINCGARS.

5.9.2.2 System ECCM effectiveness

including FH2 mode of operation

Classified only when a vulnerability is

May also be declassified upon decommission and removal from the field. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism are classified at the level that the system is accredited.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 16

5.9.3 Proposed fixes to ECM vulnerabilities

5.9.3.1 Proposed fixes to ECM

vulnerabilities

U Unclassified when a vulnerability is not

5.9.3.2 Proposed fixes to ECM

vulnerabilities

It is classified only when a vulnerability is identified by the fix and associated with the system. May also be declassified upon decommission and removal from the field.

5.10 Vulnerability Testing

5.10.1 Vulnerability test objectives

When specific details of objective indicate a specific vulnerability is suspected. May also be declassified upon decommission and removal from the field. Vulnerabilities or

5.10.2 Individual vulnerability test (test

instrument and raw data) U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemptions 2a, 4a, 4b, & 5a apply.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 17

5.10.3 Vulnerability test (vulnerability

analysis results) identified and associated with the system.

5.10.4 Specific vulnerabilities

5.10.5 Identification of the system not

applying a known patch to fix a vulnerability.

May be declassified upon decommission and

5.10.6 Vulnerabilities of GOTS and COTS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 18

5.10.6.1 Vulnerabilities of GOTS and COTS U Unclassified only when a vulnerability is not

5.10.6.2 Vulnerabilities of GOTS and COTS

May be declassified upon decommission and

5.11 Information Assurance Vulnerability

Alerts (IAVA)

5.11.1 Vulnerability Test Objectives

Applies when specific details of objective indicate a specific vulnerability is suspected.

5.11.2 Individual vulnerability test (test

instrument and raw data

U Mark as FOUO. FOIA exemptions 2a, 4a, 4b, & 5a apply.

5.11.3 Vulnerability Test (vulnerability

analysis results)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 19

5.11.4 Specific vulnerabilities which would

aid being defeated by an adversary

5.11.5 Identification of the system not using

a known patch to an open source

SECTION 6 – ADMINSTRATIVE DATA

6.1 Research and Development Program

Costs

6.1.1 Budget Year and Prior Year Dollars

and Quantities

6.1.2 Future Year and Total Dollars and

Quantities

6.2 Procurement, Production, and

Programming Costs & Schedules

6.2.1 Quantities

6.2.1.1 Assets or Programmed Quantities by

Theater or Command

6.2.1.2 Program Quantities for Budget Year, Authorization Year, and Prior Years

6.2.1.3 Future Year Quantities U

6.2.2 Total Procurement Costs

6.2.2.1 Budget Year, Authorization Year, and Prior Year Dollars

6.2.2.2 Future Year Dollars U

6.2.2.3 Total Procurement Dollars U

6.2.2.4 Program Unit Cost U

6.2.2.5 Design-to-Cost Goal and other Unit

Cost Estimates

6.2.3 Production and Delivery

6.2.3.1 Total Quantity Contracted U

6.2.3.2 Planned Production and Delivery

Schedules

6.2.3.3 Planned Delivery Rate U

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 21

6.2.4 Scheduling Dates

6.2.4.1 Contract Award U

6.2.4.2 Development Milestones U

6.2.4.3 Test Dates U

6.2.4.4 Fielding Dates U

6.2.4.5 Phase-out Dates U

SECTION 7 – HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE

7.1 End Item Hardware

7.1.1 Military Application U

7.1.2 Radio Hardware & Firmware (to

include ECCM, KGV-10, U-AXM, E-DRZ, E-HIX/E-HIC, E-GTN, E-HKR and E-HND

COMSEC PWA/chipset)

The E-DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-HIC, E-

GTN and E-HND COMSEC PWA/Chipset and RT-1523, RY-1523A, RT-1523B, RT-

1523C, RT-1523D, RT-1523E, RT-1523F

and RT-1478D are Unclassified Controlled

Cryptographic Items (CCI).

TSEC (ALC4) until installed on a printed circuit board. When installed, the ECCM module, RT-1439, and Airborne radios are unclassified. When the ECCM module is installed in a RT-1523 model without an E-

DRZ, U-AXM, E-HIX/E-HIC, E-GTN, E-

HKR or E-HND COMSEC PWA/Chipset, the radio is Unclassified.

Classified Crypto Keys will be stored IAW the level of classification. Unclassified

Crypto Keys will be stored IAW approved

CCI procedures for handling unclassified

CCI items. The AN/CYZ-7, AN/PYQ-10 and AN/CYZ-10 are CCI. The AN/GRM-

114B, AN/GRM-122 and ON-373/GRC are

Unclassified.

7.2 Software - Application U

7.3 INC Hardware and Firmware U

SECTION 8 – TRAINING, TESTING & MAINTENANCE

8.1 Training

8.1.1 Training Manuals U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemption 2a applies.

8.1.2 Training Operations U

8.2 Maintenance

8.2.1 Availability U

8.2.2 Concept U

8.2.3 Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) U

8.2.4 Maintenance Manuals U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemption 2a applies.

8.2.5 Maintenance Personnel Access, i.e., configuration files

U Mark as FOUO. FOIA Exemptions 2a & 4c

8.3 Testing

8.3.1 Test Equipment U The AN/GRM-114B, AN/GRM-122 and ON-

373/GRC are Unclassified.

8.3.2 Special Test Equipment U N/A. No special test equipment is required

8.3.3 Test Data

Test data is unclassified if it does not contain or reveal information classified elsewhere in this guide. Test data will be classified only if it contains or reveals information classified elsewhere in this guide.

CUI

CUI

CNR SOW

STATEMENT OF WORK (SOW)

FOR

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE

COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS

TACTICAL (PEO C3T)

COMBAT NETWORK RADIO (CNR )

Version 2.0

FEB. 5 2021

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICE

COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS

TACTICAL (PEO C3T)

6010 FRANKFORD AVENUE

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD 21005

Revision History

Revision Number

Date

Change and Rationale

Approved By

1.0

Initial version

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 General Scope 8

1.1 General Purpose 8

1.2 General Background 9

2.0 Applicable General Documents and References 11

2.1 Overview 11

2.1.1 General References 11

2.1.2 Systems Architecture and Test References 13

2.1.3 Material Fielding and Integrated Logistics Support References 14

2.1.4 Waveforms and Network Services References 16

2.1.5 Information Assurance References 16

2.2 Order of Precedence 18

3.0 General Requirements 18

3.1 Process and Reporting Requirements 18

3.1.1 Contractor Manpower Reporting 18

3.1.2 Invoice Receipt, Acceptance, and Property Transfer 18

3.1.3 Overarching Contract Documents 18

3.1.3.1 Project Management Plan – CDRL A010 20

3.1.3.2 Configuration Management Plan (CMP) – CDRL A011 20

3.1.3.3 Supply Chain Risk Management – CDRL B015 22

3.1.3.4 Cost and Data Reporting – CDRL A005, A006, A007, A017, A018, A019, A020 22

3.1.3.5 Monthly Progress Report - CDRL A003, A012 22

3.1.3.6 Quarterly Program Management Reviews (PMRs) and Report – CDRL A004, A014, A015 23

3.1.3.7 Work BreakDown Structure (WBS) – CDRL A008 24

3.1.3.8 Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) – CDRL A009 24

3.1.3.9 Bill Of Materials (BOM) - CDRL A001 24

3.1.3.10 Data Accession List (DAL) - CDRL A002 24

3.1.4 Processes 24

3.1.4.1 Security 24

3.1.4.2 Program Protection 24

3.1.5 Travel 26

3.1.6 Government Furnished Property/ Government Furnished Information (GFE/GFI) 26

3.1.7 Period of Performance 27

3.1.8 Place of Performance 27

4.0 Technical Requirements 28

4.1 Overview 28

4.2 CNR Requirements 31

4.2.1 Technical Support 31

4.3 Quality Requirements 32

4.3.1 Contractor Quality Management System (QMS) 32

4.3.2 Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) 32

4.3.3 Quality Management Reporting - CDRL A003 32

4.3.3.1 Corrective Action Reports (CAR) 32

4.3.3.2 QMS Status 32

4.3.3.3 QMS Nonconformities 32

4.3.4 Services 32

4.4 Engineering 33

4.4.1 Configuration Control 33

4.4.1.1 Engineering Review Board (ERB) 33

4.4.1.2 Configuration Control Board (CCB) 33

4.4.1.3 Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) – CDRL C001 34

4.4.1.4 Notice of Revision (NOR) – CDRL C002 34

4.4.1.5 Requirements for Design Change Notification – CDRL C003 35

4.4.1.6 Configuration Audit Summary Report and Certification – CDRL C004 35

4.4.1.7 As-Built Configuration List (ABCL) – CDRL C005 and C006 35

4.4.2 Hardware 35

4.4.2.1 Engineering Drawings, 3D Models, Level III Technical Data Package (TDP) - CDRL D001 35

4.4.2.2 Functional Specification (System) - CDRL D002 36

4.4.2.3 Baseline Description Document - CDRL D003 36

4.4.2.4 Interface Control Document (ICD) - CDRL D004 37

4.4.2.5 Interface Design Description (IDD) Interface Specifications - CDRL D005 37

4.4.2.6 Reliability Assessment and Supporting Documentation - CDRL D006, D007 37

4.4.2.7 Operational Availability – CDRL D008 37

4.4.3 Software 38

4.4.3.1 Computer Software Product: Commerically Available Privately Developed Software – CDRL E001 38

4.4.3.2 Software Version Description – CDRL E002 38

4.4.3.3 Software Testing 38

4.4.3.4 Security Verification Testing (SVT) – CDRLs E006, E007 39

4.4.3.5 Software and Programmable Logic Evaluation Report (SPLER) – E008 40

4.4.3.6 Waveform Porting Report – CDRL E009 40

4.4.4 Test, and General Engineering 40

4.4.4.1 Factory Acceptance Test 41

4.4.4.1.1 First Article Qualification Test (FAQT) Plan - CDRL C009 41

4.4.4.1.2 FAT Acceptance Procedure CDRLs C010 41

4.4.4.1.3 FAT Report CDRLs C011 41

4.4.4.2 Acceptance Test and Report (AT) CDRL C012 41

4.4.4.3 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) – CDRL C013 41

4.4.4.4 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Survivability – CDRL C014 41

4.4.4.5 High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) – CDRL C015 41

4.4.4.6 Environmental Testing Report – CDRL C016 42

4.4.4.7 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability – CDRL C017 42

4.4.4.8 Test/Inspection Report – CDRL C018 42

4.4.4.9 Information Packages – CDRL A013 42

4.4.4.10 Support Requirements for Government Led Testing 42

4.4.4.10.1 Qualification Testing (QT) 43

4.4.4.10.2 Performance Verification Test (PVT) 43

4.4.4.10.3 Customer Test (CT) Test Support 43

4.5 Certifications 43

4.5.1 NSA Certification CDRL C007 43

4.5.2 Spectrum Documentation CDRL C008 44

4.5.3 Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) Waveform Standards Conformance Test (WSCT) Assessment – CDRL E010 44

4.5.4 JITC Interoperability Assessment – CDRL E011 44

4.6 Information Assurance (IA) 44

4.6.1 Risk Management Framework (RMF) – B001 44

4.6.2 Anti-Tamper (AT) Plan- CDRL B002 44

4.6.3 Security Evaluation Document - CDRL B003 44

4.6.4 Software Assurance B004, B005 45

4.6.5 Information System Security (INFOSEC) Anonymity Plan – CDRL B006 45

4.6.6 TEMPEST 45

4.6.6.1 TEMPEST Control Plan – CDRL B007 45

4.6.6.2 TEMPEST Assessment Report - CDRL B008 45

4.6.6.3 TEMPEST Test Plan - CDRL B009 46

4.6.6.4 TEMPEST Test Evaluation Report – CDRL B010 46

4.6.7 Key and Certificate Management 46

4.6.7.1 Key and Certificate Management Plan - CDRL B011 46

4.6.7.2 Key Specification - CDRL B012 46

4.7 Program Protection Plan (PPP) 46

4.7.1 Critical Functionality Analysis (CFA) - CDRL B013 47

4.7.2 Program Protection Implementation Plan (PPIP) - CDRL B014 47

5. Logistics Requirements 48

5.1 Performance Based Logistics (PBL) CDRL G001 50

5.2 Logistics/Maintainability Demonstration Test Plan – CDRL G002, G003, G004, G005 51

5.2.1 System Support Package Components List (SSPCL) - CDRL G005 52

5.2.2 Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) - CDRL G006 52

5.3 Hardware Logistical Analysis Data CDRL G007 52

5.4 Maintenance Engineering 53

5.4.1 Maintenance Family Tree - CDRL G008 53

5.4.2 Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) - CDRL G009 53

5.4.3 Requirements for Provisioning and Other Procurement Screening Data - CDRL G010 54

5.4.4 Provisioning Parts List – CDRL G011 54

5.4.5 Requirements for Design Change Notice – CDRL C003 54

5.5 Technical Data 54

5.5.1 Request for Nomenclature - CDRL G014 54

5.5.2 Replenishment Spares Parts List – CDRL G015 54

5.5.3 Item Unique Identification (IUID) - CDRL G016, G017 54

5.5.4 Requirements for Engineering Data for Provisioning (EDFP) - CDRL G018 54

5.5.5 Critical Items List (CILC) - CDRL G019 56

5.5.6 Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortage (DMSMS) – CDRL G020 56

5.6 Technical Manuals 57

5.6.1 COTS Technical Manuals – CDRL G022 57

5.6.2 Technical Manuals (TM)-CDRL G023, G024, G025, G026, G027/Technical Bulletins (TB) - CDRL G028/Repair Parts and Special Tools List (RPSTL) CDRL G029 57

5.7 Transportation and Packaging 58

5.7.1 Special Packaging Instructions – CDRL G030 58

6. Sustainment 59

6.1 Depot Level Support 60

6.1.1 Core Depot Assessment (CDA) Data Report, Organic Depot Support Package – CDRL H001, H002 60

6.1.2 Public-Private Partnership (P3) Plan CDRL H003 60

6.1.3 Tooling Drawings – CDRL H004 61

6.1.4 Depot Level Test Fixtures – CDRL H005 61

6.2 Warranty 61

6.2.1 Warranty Procedures - CDRL H006 62

6.2.2 Turn Around Times (TAT) 62

6.3 Repairs 62

6.3.1 Non-Warrantied Repairs 62

6.3.2 Failure Summary and Analysis Report CDRL H007 62

6.4 Test, Maintenance, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) and Special Test Equipment (STE) List - CDRL H008 63

7. Training Support Package (TSP) 63

7.1 Training Support Package, OPNET CDRL F001, F002, F003, F004, and FLMNET CDRL F005, F006, F007, F008 64

7.2 FSR Training Development, CDRL F009, F010, F011 64

7.3 FSR Training Implementation 65

7.4 FSR Training Equipment 65

8. Safety Assessment Report (SAR) 66

8.1 CNR Radio Set SAR CDRL A021 66

9. Security 68

9.1 Access 68

9.2 Security Classification Guides (SCG) 69

9.3 Antiterrorism (AT)/Operations Security (OPSEC) 69

9.3.1 AT 69

9.3.2 Information Security (INFOSEC) 70

9.3.3 OPSEC Plan - CDRL B016 71

9.3.4 OPSEC Training 71

9.3.5 IA Awareness 71

9.3.6 Threat Awareness Reporting Program (TARP) 72

9.6 Information Technology (IT) Sensitive Duties 73

9.7 Subcontractors Facility Clearance 73

9.8 Foreign Subcontractor 73

9.9 Visit Authorization Letter (VAL) for Qualified Employees 74

9.10 Handling of Classified Material or Information 74

9.10.1 Control and Safeguarding 74

9.10.2 Storage 75

9.10.3 Transmission of Classified Material 75

9.10.4 SIPRNET Access 75

Appendix 1 – Provisioning and Other Pre-Procurement Screening Data 77

Appendix 3 – Repair Parts and Special Tools List (RPSTL) 96

Appendix 4 – Design Change Notice (DCN) 99

Appendix 5 – Engineering Data for Provisioning (EDFP) 102

Appendix 6 – Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) Preparation Instructions 105

Appendix 7 – Core Depot Assessment (CDA) Input Data Requirement 107

Appendix 8 – Packaging Instructions 114

Acronyms 117

1.0 General Scope 8

1.1 General Purpose 8

1.2 General Background 9

2.0 Applicable General Documents and References 11

2.1 Overview 11

2.1.1 General References 11

2.1.2 Systems Architecture and Test References 13

2.1.3 Material Fielding and Integrated Logistics Support References 14

2.1.4 Waveforms and Network Services References 15

2.1.5 Information Assurance References 16

2.2 Order of Precedence 17

3.0 General Requirements 18

3.1 Process and Reporting Requirements 18

3.1.1 Contractor Manpower Reporting 18

3.1.2 Invoice Receipt, Acceptance, and Property Transfer 18

3.1.3 Overarching Contract Documents 18

3.1.3.1 Project Management Plan – CDRL A010 19

3.1.3.2 Configuration Management Plan (CMP) – CDRL A011 19

3.1.3.3 Supply Chain Risk Management – CDRL B015 21

3.1.3.4 Cost and Data Reporting – CDRL A005, A006, A007, A017, A018, A019, A020 21

3.1.3.5 Monthly Progress Report - CDRL A003, A012 22

3.1.3.6 Quarterly Program Management Reviews (PMRs) and Report – CDRL A004, A014, A015 22

3.1.3.7 Work BreakDown Structure (WBS) – CDRL A008 23

3.1.3.8 Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) – CDRL A009 23

3.1.3.9 Bill Of Materials (BOM) - CDRL A001 23

3.1.3.10 Data Accession List (DAL) - CDRL A002 23

3.1.4 Processes 24

3.1.4.1 Security 24

3.1.4.2 Program Protection 24

3.1.5 Travel 25

3.1.6 Government Furnished Property/ Government Furnished Information (GFE/GFI) 26

3.1.7 Period of Performance 26

3.1.8 Place of Performance 26

4.0 Technical Requirements 27

4.1 Overview 27

4.2 CNR Requirements 30

4.2.1 Technical Support 30

4.3 Quality Requirements 31

4.3.1 Contractor Quality Management System (QMS) 31

4.3.2 Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) 31

4.3.3 Quality Management Reporting - CDRL A003 31

4.3.3.1 Corrective Action Reports (CAR) 32

4.3.3.2 QMS Status 32

4.3.3.3 QMS Nonconformities 32

4.3.4 Services 32

4.4 Engineering 32

4.4.1 Configuration Control 32

4.4.1.1 Engineering Review Board (ERB) 32

4.4.1.2 Configuration Control Board (CCB) 33

4.4.1.3 Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) – CDRL C001 33

4.4.1.4 Notice of Revision (NOR) – CDRL C002 34

4.4.1.5 Requirements for Design Change Notification – CDRL C003 34

4.4.1.6 Configuration Audit Summary Report and Certification – CDRL C004 34

4.4.1.7 As-Built Configuration List (ABCL) – CDRL C005 and C006 34

4.5 Hardware 35

4.5.1 Engineering Drawings, 3D Models, Level III Technical Data Package (TDP) - CDRL D001 35

4.5.1.1 Functional Specification (System) - CDRL D002 36

4.5.1.2 Baseline Description Document - CDRL D003 36

4.5.1.3 Interface Control Document (ICD) - CDRL D004 36

4.5.1.4 Interface Design Description (IDD) Interface Specifications - CDRL D005 36

4.5.1.5 Reliability Assessment and Supporting Documentation - CDRL D006, D007 37

4.5.2 Operational Availability – CDRL D008 37

4.5.3 Software 37

4.5.3.1 Software Product Specification (SPrS) – CDRL E001 37

4.5.3.1.1 Computer Software Product: Commerically Available Privately Developed Software – CDRL E002 37

4.5.3.2 Software Version Description – CDRL E003 38

4.5.3.3 Software Testing 38

4.5.3.4 Security Verification Testing (SVT) – CDRLs E007, E008 39

4.5.3.5 Software and Programmable Logic Evaluation Report (SPLER) – E009 39

4.5.3.6 Software Design Description (SDD) – CDRL E010 39

4.5.3.7 Waveform Porting Report – CDRL E011 41

4.5.3.8 Software Requirements 41

4.5.4 Test, and General Engineering 41

4.5.4.1 Factory Acceptance Test 42

4.5.4.1.1 First Article Qualification Test (FAQT) Plan - CDRL C009 42

4.5.4.1.2 FAT Acceptance Procedure CDRLs C010 42

4.5.4.1.3 FAT Report CDRLs C011 42

4.5.4.2 Acceptance Test and Report (AT) CDRL C012 42

4.5.4.3 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) – CDRL C013 42

4.5.4.4 Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Survivability – CDRL C014 43

4.5.4.5 High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) – CDRL C015 43

4.5.4.6 Environmental Testing Report – CDRL C016 43

4.5.4.7 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability – CDRL C017 43

4.5.4.8 Test/Inspection Report – CDRL C018 43

4.5.4.9 Information Packages – CDRL A013 43

4.5.4.10 Support Requirements for Government Led Testing 43

4.5.4.10.1 Qualification Testing (QT) 44

4.5.4.10.2 Performance Verification Test (PVT) 44

4.5.4.10.3 Customer Test (CT) Test Support 44

4.6 Certifications 44

4.6.1 NSA Certification CDRL C007 45

4.6.2 Spectrum Documentation CDRL C008 45

4.6.3 Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) Waveform Standards Conformance Test (WSCT) Assessment – CDRL E004 45

4.6.4 JITC Interoperability Assessment – CDRL E005 45

4.7 Information Assurance (IA) 45

4.7.1 Risk Management Framework (RMF) – B001 45

4.7.2 Anti-Tamper (AT) Plan- CDRL B002 45

4.7.3 Security Evaluation Document - CDRL B003 46

4.7.4 Software Assurance B004, B005 46

4.7.5 Information System Security (INFOSEC) Anonymity Plan – CDRL B006 46

4.7.6 TEMPEST 46

4.7.6.1 TEMPEST Control Plan – CDRL B007 46

4.7.6.2 TEMPEST Assessment Report - CDRL B008 47

4.7.6.3 TEMPEST Test Plan - CDRL B009 47

4.7.6.4 TEMPEST Test Evaluation Report – CDRL B010 47

4.7.7 Key and Certificate Management 47

4.7.7.1 Key and Certificate Management Plan - CDRL B011 47

4.7.7.2 Key Specification - CDRL B012 47

4.8 Program Protection Plan (PPP) 47

4.8.1 Critical Functionality Analysis (CFA) - CDRL B013 48

4.8.2 Program Protection Implementation Plan (PPIP) - CDRL B014 48

5. Logistics Requirements 49

5.1 Performance Based Logistics (PBL) CDRL G001 51

5.2 Logistics/Maintainability Demonstration Test Plan – CDRL G002, G003, G004, G005 52

5.2.1 System Support Package Components List (SSPCL) - CDRL G005 52

5.2.2 Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) - CDRL G006 52

5.3 Hardware Logistical Analysis Data CDRL G007 53

5.4 Maintenance Engineering 54

5.4.1 Maintenance Family Tree - CDRL G008 54

5.4.2 Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) - CDRL G009 54

5.4.3 Requirements for Provisioning and Other Procurement Screening Data - CDRL G010 54

5.4.4 Provisioning Parts List – CDRL G011 54

5.4.5 Requirements for Design Change Notice – CDRL C003 54

5.5 Technical Data 55

5.5.1 Request for Nomenclature - CDRL G014 55

5.5.2 Replenishment Spares Parts List – CDRL G015 55

5.5.3 Item Unique Identification (IUID) - CDRL G016, G017 55

5.5.4 Requirements for Engineering Data for Provisioning (EDFP) - CDRL G018 55

5.5.5 Critical Items List (CILC) - CDRL G019 56

5.5.6 Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortage (DMSMS) – CDRL G020 56

5.6 Technical Manuals 58

5.6.1 COTS Technical Manuals – CDRL G022 58

5.6.2 Technical Manuals (TM)-CDRL G023, G024, G025, G026, G027/Technical Bulletins (TB) - CDRL G028/Repair Parts and Special Tools List (RPSTL) CDRL G029 58

5.7 Transportation and Packaging 59

5.7.1 Special Packaging Instructions – CDRL G030 59

6. Sustainment 59

6.1 Depot Level Support 60

6.1.1 Core Depot Assessment (CDA) Data Report, Organic Depot Support Package – CDRL H001, H002 60

6.1.2 Public-Private Partnership (P3) Plan CDRL H003 61

6.1.3 Tooling Drawings – CDRL H004 61

6.1.4 Depot Level Test Fixtures – CDRL H005 61

6.2 Warranty 62

6.2.1 Warranty Procedures - CDRL H006 62

6.2.2 Turn Around Times (TAT) 62

6.3 Repairs 62

6.3.1 Non-Warrantied Repairs 62

6.3.2 Failure Summary and Analysis Report CDRL H007 62

6.4 Test, Maintenance, and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) and Special Test Equipment (STE) List - CDRL H008 63

7. Training Support Package (TSP) 63

7.1 Training Support Package, OPNET CDRL F001, F002, F003, F004, and FLMNET CDRL F005, F006, F007, F008 64

7.2 FSR Training Development, CDRL F009, F010, F011 64

7.3 FSR Training Implementation 65

7.4 FSR Training Equipment 65

8. Safety Assessment Report (SAR) 66

8.1 CNR Radio Set SAR CDRL A021 66

9. Security 68

9.1 Access 68

9.2 Security Classification Guides (SCG) 69

9.3 Antiterrorism (AT)/Operations Security (OPSEC) 69

9.3.1 AT 69

9.3.2 Information Security (INFOSEC) 70

9.3.3 OPSEC Plan - CDRL B016 71

9.3.4 OPSEC Training 71

9.3.5 IA Awareness 71

9.3.6 Threat Awareness Reporting Program (TARP) 72

9.6 Information Technology (IT) Sensitive Duties 72

9.7 Subcontractors Facility Clearance 73

9.8 Foreign Subcontractor 73

9.9 Visit Authorization Letter (VAL) for Qualified Employees 73

9.10 Handling of Classified Material or Information 74

9.10.1 Control and Safeguarding 74

9.10.2 Storage 74

9.10.3 Transmission of Classified Material 75

9.10.4 SIPRNET Access 75

Appendix 1 – Provisioning and Other Pre-Procurement Screening Data 76

Appendix 3 – Repair Parts and Special Tools List (RPSTL) 94

Appendix 4 – Design Change Notice (DCN) 97

Appendix 5 – Engineering Data for Provisioning (EDFP) 100

Appendix 6 – Maintenance Allocation Chart (MAC) Preparation Instructions 103

Appendix 7 – Core Depot Assessment (CDA) Input Data Requirement 105

Appendix 8 – Packaging Instructions 112

Acronyms 115

1.0 General Scope Comment by BARBARA, Jeffrey M (Jeff) CIV USARMY PEO C3T (USA): @carla russo our thoughts on history of getting to the requirement? Comment by Carla RUSSO: Agree,we need to start with some background.Describe the program,and the radio before going into why we need to upgrade. Then discuss the specifics.

1.1 General Purpose

The purpose of this Statement of Work (SOW) is to provide support for and procure a modernized RT-1523E/F/G Combat Net Radio (CNR ) Receiver Transmitter (RT) on behalf of Program Executive Office Command Control Communications - Tactical (PEO-C3T), Project Manager Tactical Radios (PM TR), Product Manager (PdM) Waveforms.

This SOW establishes and defines the non-specification requirements necessary for the successful execution of the CNR program. The CNR requirements and configurations are specified in the CNR Performance Requirement Document (PRD), which is references at contract Section J, Attachment XXXXX.

Under the terms of the SOW, The Contractor shall provide Advanced System Improvement (ASIP) CNR radio sets or an alternative configuration that meets all requirements in the SINCGARS Operational Requirements Document (ORD) dated 14 August 1998, the CNR Envelope (physical, electrical performance, environmental, and waveform) and the CNR specifications and standards as a minimum requirement for the CNR (Baseline System). To reduce the logistical impact to the field, any product must use the existing CNR Installation Kits for mounting on Army vehicles. The contractor shall be responsible for completing and obtaining approval for all First Article Tests (FAT), Interoperability Tests, and Qualification Tests (QT) (for proposed enhancements) IAW this SOW prior to delivery of the first unit on this contract. Comment by Sweigart, Shannan L CTR USARMY PEO C3T (USA): Do we have this document available to provide? If not, recommend that you obtain and have it ready if its requested. Comment by BARBARA, Jeffrey M (Jeff) CIV USARMY PEO C3T (USA): I see no actual requirement here. Please start with the requirement

The Contractor shall provide product support, services and deliverables for all Combat Network Radio (CNR ) sets procured under the production contract in accordance with (IAW) this Statement of Work (SOW) to provide for Modernized CNR secure voice software-defined radio sets. The requirements of this SOW pertain to all versions, variants, and configurations of the CNR Radio Set and both dismounted and all mounted radio set configurations; to include maintaining fit with the CNR Legacy Tray, associated vehicular installation kits, and ancillaries. Comment by Carla RUSSO: Should Scope open with background on who PdM WF/PMTR are and what SINCGARS is?

The scope of this document is as follows:

· Section 1 of the SOW provides the purpose and background.

· Section 2 lists general documents and references for CNR .

· Section 3 describes the general contract requirements and scope

· Section 4 describes technical requirements

· Section 5 describes logistics requirements

· Section 6 describes sustainment requirements

· Section 7 describes training requirements

· Section 8 describes safety requirements

· Section 9 describes security requirements

The Contractor, as an independent contractor and not as an agent of the Government, shall provide the necessary resources (except those furnished by the Government) to accomplish tasks of the type set forth below.

The Government will provide the property, information, and/or material for the performance of this Task Order as follows: SINCGARS version 3.1 software and associated CDRLs will be made available via the JTNC IR.

All equipment received as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) shall be accounted for, in accordance with FAR Part 45 and Government approved contractor internal property controls. Per DFARS 252.211-7007, receipt, accountability, and reporting of Government Furnished Items shall be recorded/updated in the Procurement Integrated Enterprise Environment (PIEE) Government Furnished Property (GFP) Module. These controls will be established and maintained to manage all property provided as GFE, purchased or otherwise acquired for use in supporting the PM TR Mission COR (IAW CLIN 0001 and DFARS PGI 245.103-72).

Contractor employees performing services under this contract shall be controlled, directed and supervised at all times by management personnel of the Contractor. The Contractor's management shall ensure that employees properly comply with the performance standards outlined in this Statement of Work (SOW) and as required by the Contracting Officer (KO) or the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). Contractor employees shall perform independent of and without the supervision of any Government official.

Actions of contractor employees may not be interpreted or implemented in any manner that results in any contractor employee creating or modifying Federal policy, obligating the appropriated funds of the U.S. Government, overseeing the work of Federal employees, providing direct personal services to any Federal employee or otherwise violating the prohibitions set forth in Parts 7.5 and 37.1 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The Government shall control access to the Government facilities and shall perform the inspection and acceptance of delivered products and completed work and tasks.

1.2 General Background

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) are Combat Net Radio (CNR ) systems currently used by the United States (US) military and allied military forces. SINCGARS enables secure Very High Frequency (VHF) communication capability, providing both voice and data handling capability in support of Command and Control (C2) operations. It is used primarily for voice transmission of C2 between surface and airborne C2 assets, but can. also be used to transmit and receive secure data, including Position Location Information (PLI) within a network via Radio Based Situational Awareness (RBSA) and to function as a digital data radio. It operates in the Very High Frequency (VHF) band, and can be used in either single channel (SC) or frequency hopping (FH) configurations. It enables communications with tactical enablers such as aviation, fires, coalition, host nation, or other adjacent units that use legacy or modernized SINCGARS.

The Project Manager Tactical Radios (PM TR), Product Manager Waveforms (PdM WF), has a requirement for the modernization, updated fielding, and logistics support of the currently fielded hardware based SINCGARS Advanced System Improvement Program (ASIP) RT-1523E/F/G radio systems by Fiscal Year (FY) 24 in order to meet the Secret Cease Key Date (CKD) for the current Saville Crypto. The modernization will replace the Communications Security (COMSEC) and Transmissions Security (TRANSEC) Cryptographic algorithms embedded in Army Tactical Radios to enhance Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) capabilities.

This programmatic engineering change will use an approach to allow for future upgrades and to reduce obsolescence issues. Functionally, this will enable the CNR to operate as originally intended by bringing into compliance the SINCGARS vocoder, Communications Security (COMSEC),…