JSC_NS_JSC-17773_Preparing_Hazard_Analyses_for_JSC_Ground_Operations.pdf
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JSC 17773
Revision D
Foreword
This document provides general instructions for preparing hazard analyses for JSC ground equipment and operations. It contains a checklist to help the user to anticipate, identify, evaluate, and control typical hazards associated with ground operations; basic forms and instructions for preparing a hazard analysis. Reference links are also included for several hazard assessment techniques that will be useful in preparing a hazard analysis.
The document is intended to be an instruction document and is not a requirements document. It provides general information on how to prepare a hazard analysis to comply with JSC hazard analysis requirements in Chapter 2.3 of JPR 1700.1, “JSC Safety and Health Handbook” or JSC 20483, “JSC Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects, Guidelines for Investigators Proposing Research for Space Flight and Related Investigations (aka CPHS Redbook). It also provides references to assist the user in selecting the appropriate hazard evaluation tool(s), but it is not intended to be a comprehensive tutorial on risk identification and assessment techniques.
If you have any comments or suggestions for this document, please contact the Chief, Safety and Test Operations Division, mail code NS.
Approval:
___Original Signed By______ David T. Loyd Chief, Safety and Test
Operations Division
Change Record
Rev. Date Originator/Phone Description
A
B
C December
Dan L. Clem/483-4272 Revised document in plain English.
Updated examples and methodologies.
D March, Dan L. Clem/483-4272 Updated document to meet guidelines. Added clarifications throughout the document.
Removed obsolete appendices.
Added links to resource documents in section 14 and as used in the document. Added Safe Plan of Action.
Admin November
Dan L. Clem/483-4272 Updated cross references and links to JPR 1700.1.
Contents
1 WHO SHOULD FOLLOW THIS DOCUMENT?
2 WHAT IS A HAZARD ANALYSIS?
3 WHEN IS A HAZARD ANALYSIS REQUIRED?
4 WHEN TO START A HAZARD ANALYSIS
5 JOB HAZARD ANALYSIS (JHA) AND SAFE PLAN OF ACTION (SPA)
6 PROCEDURE FOR DOING A HAZARD ANALYSIS
7 ASSIGNING A RAC
8 CONTENTS OF A HAZARD ANALYSIS
9 FORMAT FOR A HAZARD ANALYSIS
10 REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF A HAZARD ANALYSIS
11 CONTROLLING OR ELIMINATING THE HAZARDS THAT ARE IDENTIFIED
12 TRACKING HAZARDS
13 HOW OFTEN MUST THE HAZARD ANALYSIS BE REVIEWED?
14 REFERENCES TO USE WHILE DOING A HAZARD ANALYSIS
APPENDIX A - COMPARISON OF HAZARD ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
APPENDIX B – JOB HAZARD ANALYSIS (JHA)
APPENDIX C – EXAMPLE HAZARD ANALYSIS
APPENDIX D – SAFE PLAN OF ACTION
1 Who should follow this document?
You should follow this document if your work at JSC falls within the scope of the JSC Safety & Health Handbook JPR 1700.1, Chapter 2.3 to create a hazard analyses for JSC ground operations or the CPHS Redbook for human research.
2 What is a hazard analysis?
It will be necessary to become familiar with a few simple terms so you can understand a hazard analysis.
Hazard – A hazard is any credible condition or exposure that could potentially cause harm to personnel, damage to property or the environment, or mission failure.* For example, wearing loose clothing in close proximity to rotating equipment is a hazard. A checklist which covers most of the hazards experienced at JSC is provided in NS-STO-CH01, General Hazard Identification Checklist.
*It is important to understand that all potential hazards must be identified when performing a hazard analysis. Failure to include potential hazards that are inherently controlled is a common mistake when preparing the hazard analysis. For example, assume you wish to perform a test on an aluminum bracket which has been designed to have 100% rounded edges. It is reasonable to assume that sharp edges would not be a hazard because they have already been “designed” out. However, the potential for sharp edges still remains, and should be considered in the hazard analysis nonetheless. This is because other factors such as incorrect machining (failure to remove sharp edges/burrs, etc.) or improper handling (creation of sharp edges when dropped, crushed, etc.) could still potentially expose workers to a sharp edge. In this instance, proper design, handling, and inspection of the bracket are controls used to protect against potential exposure to sharp edges, and should therefore be included in the hazard analysis. Another way to think about this is to ask which hazards could be present in a system if no precautions had been taken to eliminate or control them.
Hazard Control – Hazard controls are measures taken to eliminate a hazard or reduce the likelihood that a hazard will result in a harmful event. Hazard controls are the design features, procedures, and personal protective equipment used in a system to remove hazards altogether or reduce the likelihood that a mishap can occur. In the above example, a cover placed over the rotating equipment, or a written procedure which prohibits loose clothing, are examples of hazard controls.
System – A system is any combination of equipment, resources, personnel, and procedures needed to perform an operation. Systems can range in complexity http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/docs/revK/JPR1700-1ch2-3K.pdf http://www6.jsc.nasa.gov/safety/Checklists/docs/TSO/GeneralHazardIdentification.doc from very simple to extremely complex. For example, the people, processes and equipment needed to maintain and operate a grinding wheel station used to sharpen tools is a relatively simple operation, whereas the people, processes and equipment used to remove and service the Space Shuttle main engines is an extremely complex operation – but, nonetheless they are both systems.
Hazard Analysis – A hazard analysis is an organized method for identifying hazards and hazard controls used in a system at any point in its life cycle.
Simply put, the hazard analysis lists each potentially harmful event that could credibly occur in a system, the worst-case result for each event, and all the measures that are taken to prevent or reduce the likelihood of its occurrence.
3 When is a hazard analysis required?
You must do a hazard analysis if your operation falls under the requirements of OSHA -29 CFR 1910.119, “Process Safety Management”*, or as required by Chapter 2.3, paragraph 5 of JPR 1700.1 (current version), “JSC Safety and Health Handbook.”
* See 29 CFR 1910.119 for specific chemicals and quantities that fall under these requirements. NOTE: JSC/Houston does not currently maintain any processes which are subject to the Process Safety Management regulation. However, specific processes at
WSTF are subject to this regulation. See WSTF Standard Instruction 25SW-0005 for applicability of PSM hazard analysis requirements and associated WSTF processes which must adhere to the PSM regulation.
4 When to start a hazard analysis
You should start your hazard analysis in the early design stages and add to it as design and operational details are available. Adding hazard controls to a system during its initial design phase is usually less expensive and more effective than adding controls after the system is built. It is still possible to perform a hazard analysis on an existing system, but it is likely to cost more and not work as well.
5 Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) and Safe Plan of Action (SPA)
JHAs are required for hazardous jobs per Chapter 2.3 of JPR 1700.1 (current version), “JSC Safety and Health Handbook.” SPAs or equivalent are required as a part of certain JHAs as described in the same chapter. Appendix B lists the steps and format for a JHA, which follows the format and methodology of OSHA pamphlet 3071, “Job Hazard Analysis.” Appendix C provides an example hazard analysis. Appendix D lists the steps and suggest format for an SPA.
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9760 http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/docs/revK/JPR1700-1ch2-3K.pdf http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/docs/revK/JPR1700-1ch2-3K.pdf http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/docs/revK/JPR1700-1ch2-3K.pdf http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/docs/revK/JPR1700-1ch2-3K.pdf http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3071.html
6 Procedure for doing a hazard analysis
The specific steps for doing a hazard analysis depends on the hazard analysis technique(s) used. Some hazard analyses are done by a single safety analyst or engineers, while others are done by teams. Many times, a team approach is best because of the synergy of the team in identifying hazards.
The general steps for doing a hazard analysis are:
1. Determine who will provide input and review for developing the hazard analysis. Include those with direct knowledge of the research or testing to be performed, equipment, its operation and design, and the hazards associated with the system. This will include:
Designers
Maintenance personnel
Construction personnel
Operations personnel
Principle investigators
Safety personnel
Any others who might have knowledge of the system
2. Determine the best hazard analysis technique to use. You may use any of the techniques listed below or any other technique as required by the complexity of your system. It is important to choose an analytical technique that will identify all the hazards in the system being analyzed. For example, a FMEA is not the best choice for a system involving human interaction because it only considers hardware failures, and not the interaction between personnel, equipment or environment. Other techniques, such as the What-If Analysis, are available which consider these factors. Conversely, a FMEA is excellent for identifying individual system components that could create a hazardous condition if they were to unexpectedly fail.
There are many hazard analysis techniques available (see Section 13).
Consulting safety personnel on the decision of which technique to use will help you chose the most effective analytical tool for your situation.
Here are some of the more common hazard analysis techniques used at JSC.
Appendix A lists the descriptions, uses, advantages, and disadvantages of these techniques:
What-If Analysis
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Fault Tree Analysis
Event Tree Analysis
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
3. Conduct the hazard analysis by:
Breaking the system into subsystems
Identifying hazards with each subsystem
Identifying hazards at subsystem interfaces
Determining the worst credible mishap, if all controls failed
Determining the Risk Assessment Code (RAC) for the event with no controls
Determining what controls are in place
Determining the worst credible event with all the existing controls in place
Determining the RAC with all controls in place
Determining if any further work is required based on the RAC
Determining how the presence of the hazard control will be verified
Writing the report
7 Assigning a RAC
Use the RAC matrix and descriptions in chapter 2.3, paragraph 2.3.9 of JPR 1700.1, “JSC Safety and Health Handbook.” This process is used to assign a RAC code both before and after controls are implemented.*
To use the matrix:
a. Find the “consequence” or the worst-case outcome of a mishap from the hazard along the left side of the matrix.
b. Find the “likelihood” that you expect the mishap to occur across the top of the matrix. The qualitative definitions are usually preferred and the probabilities are merely added as an example.
c. Find the RAC in the box where the “consequence” and “likelihood” cross.
d. Use the table after the matrix to determine what action to take based on the
RAC.
*It is important to note that the likelihood code must be reduced following implementation of controls, but the “consequence” code will remain the same. [This is because the worst-case outcome for a particular hazard does not change after controls are in place, only the probability of its occurrence.] For example a hazard assigned a RAC code of IB1 before controls can be reduced to IE4 after controls (likelihood can be reduced from B to E), but cannot be reduced to IIE5 (consequence of event cannot be reduced from I to II).
8 Contents of a hazard analysis
As a minimum, your hazard analysis must contain:
a. The system’s name and location.
http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/main_lib.html http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/main_lib.html
b. The hazards of the system and their causes. Include hazards from human factors as well. You must also consider hazards of interfaces between systems, and interfaces between the equipment and the facility.
c. The consequence of each hazard if it were to cause a mishap. For example, death, major injury, minor injury, or estimated property damage and dollar amount.
d. Any existing engineering or administrative controls for each hazard.
e. Proposed engineering or administrative controls for each hazard, if the existing controls are inadequate.
f. Verification methods for each control to explain how the presence of each control will be confirmed (e.g., review of procedures, inspections, etc.).
g. What would happen if the engineering or administrative controls were to fail.
h. A qualitative evaluation of the possible safety and health effects before and after the controls are in place.
i. Who was on the team that did the hazard analysis.
j. When the system was last analyzed.
k. A qualitative evaluation of the risk before and after the hazard controls are in place. This is the risk that management will have to accept.
9 Format for a hazard analysis
The format of the hazard analysis can vary depending on the analysis technique used. However, it must contain the items called out in Paragraph 7. A sample hazard analysis is included in Appendix C. You can find more examples at:
http://www6.jsc.nasa.gov/safety/hazard/index.htm.
10 Review and approval of a hazard analysis
You can find the required approvals in paragraph 2.3.8, chapter 2.3, of JPR 1700.1.
11 Controlling or eliminating the hazards that are identified
You must use at least one of the steps shown below to eliminate or control all the hazards that were identified in the hazard analysis:
a. Eliminate or minimize the hazard through use of engineering (design) controls, such as substitution for less hazardous materials and equipment, use of guards and interlocks, and isolation of hazards from personnel and equipment, where feasible.
b. If it is not feasible to eliminate or minimize the hazard through use of engineering controls, then the hazard potential must be mitigated by administrative controls or personal protective equipment. Use of administrative controls and PPE must be clearly called out in the actual procedures. It will also be necessary to update training requirements as necessary to cover operational hazard controls.
http://www6.jsc.nasa.gov/safety/hazard/index.htm
c. Accept the residual risk. This may require approval of upper management depending on the RAC code after all controls are in place. Contractors may not accept risk for NASA.
See Chapter 3.2 of JPR 1700.1 (current version) for more information.
12 Tracking hazards
All open hazards must be tracked until they are resolved as described in Chapter
3.5 of JPR 1700.1.
13 How often must the hazard analysis be reviewed?
See paragraphs 2.3.14 and 2.3.15, chapter, 2.3 of JPR 1700.1 for requirements on maintaining and reviewing hazard analyses.
14 References to use while doing a hazard analysis
Any of the following for references can be used:
a. System drawings
b. Other hazard analyses which have reviewed similar or like systems
c. Functional and physical interfaces
d. Previous history of the system or process
e. OSHA – 29 CFR 1910 for general industry and 29CFR 1926 for construction
f. Other appropriate standards
g. OSHA pamphlet 3071, “Job Hazard Analysis”
h. NPR 8715.3, “NASA General Safety Program Requirements”
i. NPR 8000.4, “Risk Management Procedural Requirement”
j. NASA STD 8719.7, “Facility System Safety Guidebook”
k. JPR 1700.1 (current version), “JSC Safety and Health Handbook”
l. MIL-STD 882, “Systems Safety Program Requirements”
m. “Probabilistic Risk Assessment Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and
Practitioners”
n. NS-STO-CH01, “TSO General Hazard Identification Checklist”
o. fault-tree.net –PRA, Event Tree, and Fault Tree information http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/JPR1700-1ch3-2.doc http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/JPR1700-1ch3-5.doc http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/JPR1700-1ch3-5.doc http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owastand.display_standard_group?p_toc_level=1&p_part_number=1910 http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=10593 http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3071.html http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/main_lib.html http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/main_lib.html http://standards.msfc.nasa.gov/public/public_query_NASA_stds.taf http://jschandbook.jsc.nasa.gov/ http://safetycenter.navy.mil/instructions/osh/milstd882d.pdf http://iss-www.jsc.nasa.gov/nwo/sma/most/bbt_docs/fta/pra_guide.pdf http://iss-www.jsc.nasa.gov/nwo/sma/most/bbt_docs/fta/pra_guide.pdf http://www6.jsc.nasa.gov/safety/Checklists/docs/TSO/GeneralHazardIdentification.doc http://www.fault-tree.net/
Appendix A - Comparison of Hazard Analysis Techniques
The following table lists the hazard analysis techniques covered in this document along with the advantages and disadvantages.
Technique Summary Of Method Uses Advantages Disadvantages
What-If Analysis What-if analysis is a problem solving approach that uses loosely structured questioning to (1) suggest anomalies that may result in accidents or system performance problems and (2) make sure the proper safeguards against those problems are in place.
Useful for any type of system, process, or activity
Most often used when the use of other more precise methods (e.g. FMEA, HAZOP) are not possible.
What-if analysis is frequently combined with a checklist analysis to add structure to the analysis.
A very inexpensive tool to estimate the seriousness of some system concerns
Good when you don’t have a lot of time to make decisions
Good for contingency planning
Not as formalized as the other safety tools
May give scenarios which are not realistic
Hazard and Operability Study
(HAZOP)
The HAZOP analysis technique is a facilitated, real time approach that uses special guidewords for (1) suggesting departures from design intents for sections of systems and (2) making sure that the proper safeguards are in place to help prevent system performance problems.
Used for finding safety hazards and operability problems in continuous process systems, especially fluid and thermal systems.
Also used to review procedures.
Looks at process deviations
Uses a synergistic team approach
Breaks systems into manageable pieces
Also identifies operability, maintenance, and environmental hazards
Looks at most of the possibilities during the analysis and can limit the number of causes that are investigated further.
Good for systems that involve some kind of “flow” such as fluid flow through a pipe or electron flow through a wire
Requires a team of more than one person
May be time-consuming
Is expensive to perform
Requires good documentation
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA)
FMEA is a “bottoms up” reasoning approach best suited to reviews of mechanical and electrical hardware systems. The FMEA technique (1) considers how the failure modes of each system component can result in system performance problems and (2) makes sure the proper safeguards are in place. A quantitative version of the FMEA is known as the Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
Used for reviews of mechanical and electrical systems (e.g. Auxiliary Power Units, Guidance and Navigation Control)
Often used to make planned maintenance and inspection more effective.
Sometimes used to gather information to troubleshoot system anomalies.
Good for specific, critical or hazardous subsystems to tell you what can fail and what the result of the failure will be
Is very systematic approach
Looks at every component to determine failure effects
Only looks at hardware and not at operations
Too laborious and time-consuming to use on an entire building
Only looks at hazards associated with failures, not those associated with normal operations
Only looks at the hardware failures, not the interaction between personnel, equipment or environment
Does not identify all hazards associated with a system, even if it identifies all single point failures
Fault Tree Analysis FTA is a “top down” deductive technique that graphically models how logic relationships between equipment failures, human errors, and external events can combine to cause a specific undesirable event of interest. Probabilities and frequencies can be added to the analysis to quantitatively estimate risks.
Suited to almost every type of risk assessment, but best used to focus on the basic causes of specific system failures of relatively complex combinations of events. May be used for any level of detail if performing qualitative analysis.
Often used for complex electronic, control, or communications systems.
Finding the causes of catastrophic, top-level events such as death or system destruction in complex systems
Can use before a mishap or after a mishap
Can be tied to numerical solutions to determine the probability of occurrence
Can be one of the most thorough analyses performed if the information on the system is well defined.
Must know many of the hazards in order to define a catastrophic, top-level event
Requires knowledge of fault tree techniques
The major disadvantage of a FTA is that it is very labor intensive and very expensive to perform. It also requires good documentation of the system.
Event Tree Analysis ETA is an inductive technique that uses decision trees to model outcomes of and initial and subsequent events that can combine to cause specific undesirable event of interest.
Probabilities and frequencies can be added to the analysis to quantitatively estimate risks.
Suited to almost every type of risk assessment, but best used to focus on possible consequences of events for which there are many safeguards in place.
Often used for modeling sequential events.
End events need not be foreseen
Multiple Failures can be analyzed
Single-point failures can be identified
System weaknesses can be identified
Zero-gain system features can be identified
Operating pathways must be anticipated
Does not distinguish between partial failures/successes
Co-existing initiating events are not considered
Sequence-dependent events not modeled well
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
A PRA is a technique that usually combines both FTA and ETA to quantitatively estimate the risk of a complex system with many dependencies.
A complex methodology used when there are many system interactions and relative risk rankings are a desired result.
Defines the magnitude (severity) of the possible adverse consequence(s), and
Defines the likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each consequence.
Not useful for processes with little or no previous probability data, i.e. human medical research, clinical trials, etc.
Risk Assessment
Tool
Types of Results
Types of Activities or
Systems Used For
Level of Effort / Complexity
Required
Level of Expertise
Required for Analysis Teams
Provides Qualitative Accident
Descriptions
Provides Quantitative Risk Characterizations
Provides Relative
Importance of Accident
Contributors
Provides Recommendations
What-If Analysis √ √
All Medium Low to medium
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA)
All, especially mechanical and electrical systems
Medium to high Medium
Hazard and Operability Analysis
(HAZOP)
All, especially fluid and thermal systems
Medium to high Medium
Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA)
All
Medium to high Medium to high
Event Tree Analysis
(ETA)
All
Medium to high Medium to high
Integrated Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA)
Complex, integrated systems High High
Appendix B – Job Hazard Analysis (JHA)
1 What is a JHA?
A job hazard analysis is a method of performing a hazard analysis on each specific task performed in the workplace. This appendix follows the format and methodology of OSHA pamphlet 3071, “Job Hazard Analysis.”
2 Get employees involved in doing JHAs
Employees must be involved in the JHA. Not only does this show that the supervisor is interested in the employee’s safety, the employee has the most intimate knowledge of the job being analyzed.
3 Where should I start?
You start a JHA by asking the following questions:
What job has the highest injury or illness rates?
What job has the highest close call rates?
Is the job a new job that has never been done before?
Has the job changed?
Have I looked at the job and the general conditions that might affect how the job is being done?
Have I developed a checklist for the job?
After you have answered these questions, follow the steps in paragraphs 6 – 10.
4 Begin by asking questions
Ask questions such as:
Are there materials on the floor that could trip a worker?
Is lighting adequate?
Are there any live electrical hazards at the job site?
Are there any explosive hazards associated with the job or are they likely to develop?
Do tools, including hand tools, machines, and equipment, need repair?
Does excessive noise in the work area hinder worker communication and increase the risk of hearing loss?
Is fire protection equipment readily accessible and have employees been trained to use it?
Are emergency exits clearly marked?
Are trucks or motorized vehicles properly equipped with brakes, overhead guards, backup signals, horns, steering gear and identification, as necessary?
Are all employees operating vehicles and equipment properly trained and authorized?
Are employees wearing proper personal protective equipment (PPE) for the jobs they are doing?
Have any employees complained of headaches, breathing problems, dizziness, or strong odors?
Is ventilation adequate?
Does the job involve entry into a confined space?
Have there been any tests for oxygen deficiency and toxic fumes?
Are there systems that require lockout/tagout procedures?
Does this job require special handling procedures for chemicals or pyrotechnics?
Are there any other questions that might be appropriate?
5 Break down the job into specific steps that are required to do the job.
List each step of the job in order of occurrence as you watch the employee doing the job. Make sure that you record enough information about the task to be able to analyze the task properly, but not in too much detail.
Identify hazards associated with each job task
Ask questions such as:
Is the worker wearing clothing or jewelry that could get caught in the machinery?
Are there fixed objects that may cause injury, such as sharp machine edges?
Can the worker get caught in or between machine parts?
Can the worker be injured by reaching over moving machinery parts or materials?
Is the worker off-balance at any time?
Is the worker positioned at the machine in a way that is potentially dangerous?
Is the worker required to make movements that could cause hand or foot injuries, repetitive motion injuries, or strain from lifting?
Can the worker be struck by, lean against, or strike a machine part or object?
Do suspended loads or potential energy pose a hazard?
Can the worker fall from one level to another?
Can the worker be injured from lifting objects, or from carrying heavy objects?
Do environmental hazards, such as, dust, chemicals, radiation, welding rays, heat or excess noise, result from the performance of the job?
Repeat the job observations as often as necessary until you have identified all hazards.
6 Evaluate the hazard that you have identified.
Remember to look at possible events that could cause an injury or illness from each of the hazards identified. Some typical questions you might use to evaluate the hazards are:
Is the worker wearing protective clothing and equipment, including safety belts or harnesses that are appropriate for the job?
Does it fit properly?
Has the worker been trained to use appropriate PPE?
Are work positions, machinery, pits or holes, and hazardous operations adequately guarded?
Are lockout procedures used to deactivate machinery during maintenance procedures?
Is the flow of work improperly organized?
How are dusts and chemicals dispersed in the air?
What are the sources of noise, radiation and heat?
What causes a worker to contact sharp surfaces?
Why would a worker be tempted to reach into moving machine parts?
7 Recommend controls for each hazard
Use the most reliable controls possible.
Review the controls with the employee doing the job to determine whether the job could be done differently to eliminate the hazards, or whether training is needed to recognize hazards.
If safer and better job steps can be used, list each new step.
List exactly what the worker needs to know to do the job using the new methods.
If hazards are still present, try to reduce the necessity for doing the job or the frequency of doing the job.
8 What do I do after I complete a Job Hazard Analysis?
Review the JHA each year or when any conditions or operations change.
EXAMPLE JOB HAZARD ANALYSIS
ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE
NASA-LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS
Hazard Analysis for the Chisel Sharpening Operation
At the B-10 Technical Services Shop
DOCUMENT NUMBER
CSO-HA-001
DATE
4/2/08
PREPARED
BY:
FACILITY LEAD: Adam Baumer
APPROVED
FACILITY MANAGER Anita Cash-Grant
DIVISION MANAGER Rick O’Shea
NASA/NS SAFETY Cole Minor
FACILITY SAFETY ENGINEER Rusty Steele
AUTHORIZE
D
RELEASE
BLDG. 10 FACILITY MANAGER Anita Cash-Grant
NO. OF PAGES:
REVISIONS
REVISION
LETTER/DATE
PREPARER
BRANCH
APPROVAL
PROGRAM
APPROVAL
AUTHORIZED
ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE HAZARD ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Hazard Analysis for the for the Chisel Sharpening Operation
At the B-10 Technical Services Shop
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This is a hazard analysis for the chisel sharpening operation at the B-10 Technical Services Shop.
2.0 PURPOSE
The purpose of this Hazard Analysis is to ensure that all potential hazards present when performing this task in the B-10 Technical Services Shop are mitigated to the highest possible degree, or eliminated.
3.0 SCOPE
This integrated hazard analysis covers the facility, equipment, resources, personnel and procedures used to conduct the chisel sharpening operation at the B-10 Technical Services Shop.
4.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
Facility Hazard Analysis, B10-HA (Building 10 B-10 Technical Services Shop).
5.0 SUMMARY
The hazard analysis performed for this test shows that there are no uncontrolled hazards associated with performing this operation at the B-10 Technical Services Shop.
HAZARD CAUSE EFFECT RAC CONTROLS RAC VERIFICATION DISPOSITION
Trips/Slips Elevated cables & hoses on floor & work areas Injury IIIA2
Inform personnel of trip hazard
IIID5
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Restrict access to hazardous areas
Step 2.0 on Procedure.
Controlled
Route cords & hoses away from walk pathways & tape to floor.
Step 2.1 on Procedure
Controlled
Wipe any oil off of floor
Step 2.2 on Procedure
Controlled
Eyes impacted by flying object
Fragments/shards produced during nominal grinding or shattered chisel/ grinding wheel
Blindness IA1
Face shield worn at all times
ID3
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Safety shroud over grinding wheel Eye guard between grinding surface and worker
Body impacted by flying object
Fragments/shards produced during nominal grinding or shattered chisel/ grinding wheel
Serious injury IIA1
Face shield worn at all times
IID4
Step 2.0 on Procedure.
Controlled Safety shroud over grinding wheel Leather apron worn at all times
Pinch & crushing points
Body/clothing caught in grinding wheel Serious injury IIA1
Loose clothing not permitted
IID4
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Tool rest and guards in use and properly adjusted
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Lockout/Tagout used during maintenance
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Sharp edges Contact with chisel edge or metal filings
Laceration IIA1
Safety gloves and goggles worn during all operations
IID5
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Excessive Touch
Temperature
Contact with hot chisel/sparks/filings
Burns IIIA2
Safety gloves and goggles worn during all operations
IIID5
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Fire & Explosion
Sparks created during grinding ignite combustibles
Death or serious injury, facility destruction, or loss of major systems.
IA1
Storage of flammable / combustible materials not allowed in area
ID3
Step 2.8 in Procedure
Controlled
Combustible materials spills cleaned prior to grinder operation
Step 2.2 on Procedure
Controlled
Gloves and clothing made of fire-resistant materials
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Fire detection and suppression systems available.
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Noise Exposure
Excessive noise levels (>85dBA) produced during grinding operations
Permanent hearing loss
IIA1
Hearing protection worn during grinding operations
IID4
Step 2.2 on Procedure
Controlled
Electrical Shock
Exposure to > 50 volts from exposed wires, short, energized equipment during maintenance operations
Death, severe burns
IA1
Proper design of electrical circuits including GFI, enclosed wiring, loading
ID3
Certification of facility design
Controlled
Damaged / exposed wiring identified and corrected before operating
Step 2.0 on Procedure
Controlled
Workers Lockout/Tagout trained
Review of training log
Appendix D – Safe Plan of Action
1 What is an SPA?
An SPA determines how to do each job with the least risk to your safety and health. It's a process that looks objectively at all aspects of a job or task to identify:
The conditions under which the job is performed.
Each step involved in performing the job.
The potential hazards associated with each job step.
Changes to the job that can eliminate or reduce its hazards.
2 Which jobs should I analyze?
Safe plan of action priority may go to jobs that:
Have high rates of accidents, injuries, or near misses.
Are new or have new processes or procedures.
Are the subject of employee complaints or concerns.
Have been cited for OSHA violations in the organization or the industry.
Have had accidents in workplaces with similar processes, equipment, etc.
Where the JHA may not be adequate to address the risks of a specific situation.
3 Where should I start?
Create a checklist for each job to look at things like:
Trip, slip, and fall hazards.
Condition of tools and equipment.
Fire, electrical, and explosion hazards.
Whether employees are properly trained.
The presence and use of appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE).
4 Break the job down into a series of steps
As an employee performs each task, list each step, in order. Focus on what the worker does rather than how well the worker performs. The step-by-step description might include:
Inspecting and putting on PPE.
Organizing the work area and materials needed for the job.
Inspecting and turning on any equipment.
Performing the task (e.g., lifting, sanding, etc.).
Turning off the equipment.
5 Identify the Potential Hazards in Each Job Step.
A careful analysis of each job step can identify hazards in areas like:
Selection and use of PPE.
Machine guarding.
Awkward standing, reaching, and other movements that could cause injury.
Risks of falls or falling objects.
Sharp, hot, or other possibly dangerous objects.
Dust, noise, and other environmental hazards.
6 Look for Ways to Reduce Identified Hazards.
The key to safe plan of action is to find ways to eliminate or reduce the hazards identified in each job step. Ways to reduce or eliminate hazards could include:
Doing the job differently (e.g., new or combined steps).
Reorganizing the work area to minimize awkward positions and reaches.
Substituting less hazardous materials.
Changing from manual to mechanical techniques.
Adding, improving, or changing training.
Changing tools or equipment.
Changing or adding PPE.
Doing the task less often.
Below is a suggested SPA form. Other similar forms are acceptable.
SAFE PLAN OF ACTION (Continuation)
PROJECT NUMBER/PROJECT NAME
LOCATION
WORK ORDER NUMBER
1. Enter the job/task in the space provided and divide the task into individual steps, as appropriate.
2. In the Hazard column, list all possible hazards anticipated in each individual step of the task or job.
3. In the Safe Plan column, provide the corrective actions that will be taken to prevent the hazards.
4. In the Resources column, list the equipment and resources that are needed to achieve the Safe Plan.
5. Each team member involved in the development of this SPA must sign in the spaces provided at the bottom.
DESCRIBE THE JOB OR TASK
Step Individual task steps Hazard/Reaction to change Safe plan Equipment and resources
SAFE PLAN OF ACTION (Continuation)
PROJECT NUMBER/PROJECT NAME
LOCATION
WORK ORDER NUMBER
1. Enter the job/task in the space provided and divide the task into individual steps, as appropriate.
2. In the Hazard column, list all possible hazards anticipated in each individual step of the task or job.
3. In the Safe Plan column, provide the corrective actions that will be taken to prevent the hazards.
4. In the Resources column, list the equipment and resources that are needed to achieve the Safe Plan.
5. Each team member involved in the development of this SPA must sign in the spaces provided at the bottom.
DESCRIBE THE JOB OR TASK
Step Individual task steps Hazard/Reaction to change Safe plan Equipment and resources
SAFE PLAN OF ACTION CHECKLIST
A new SPA is required if the job scope or work conditions change.
Required permits
Confined space
Scaffold
Hot work
Lockout/Tagout
Excavation
Master work permit
Dipping permit
Critical lift
Hold order/Caution order
Hazards Safe plan
Slips, trips, falls
Inspected for trip hazards Hazards marked Tools and material properly stored
Extension cords properly secured Work zone free of debris Additional information below
Pinch points List potential pinch points:
Working near mobile equipment Hand/body positioning Additional information below
Hand hazards List sharp tools, material, equipment: Deburring tool PPE
Protected sharp edges as necessary Additional information below
Heavy lifting/ Ergonomic hazard
Reviewed proper lifting technique Identified material requiring lifting equipment
Hand protection required Proper tools/equipment Additional information below
Other Crane or other lifting equipment
Signalman assigned Tag lines in use Area around crane barricaded
Lifting equipment inspected Personnel protected from overhead load
Required PPE
Hard hat
Safety vest
Eye protection
Safety glasses
Face shield
Chemical goggles
Welding hood
Hand protection
Work gloves
Cut-resistant
Nitrile gloves
Surgical gloves
Rubber gloves
Electrical-insulated gloves
Arm sleeves
Cryogenics
Foot protection
Sturdy work boots
Safety toe boots
Rubber boots
Rubber boots covers
Dielectric footwear
Respiratory protection
Dust mask
Air-purifying
Supplied air
SCBA
Emergency egress
Coveralls
Cotton coveralls
Tyvek
Poly-coated Tyvek
HV Nomex suite
Vehicular traffic or heavy equipment
Traffic barricades Cones Signs Flagman Lane closure
Communication with equipment operator Additional information below
Fire hazard
Permit Two (2) 10- b (or equivalent) fire extinguishers Fire watch
Adjacent area protected Unnecessary flammable material removed
Additional information below
Hands and power tools
Inspected general condition GFCI in use Identified PPE required for each tool
Reviewed safety requirements in operators manual(s) Guarding Additional information below
Electrical Lockout/Tagout Confirmed that equipment is de-energized Flash zone defined
Reviewed electrical safety procedures PPE identified
Heat stress potential Heat stress monitoring (>70 °F) Liquids available Cool-down periods
Sun screen Reviewed heat stress symptoms Additional information below
Cold stress potential Proper clothing (i.e., gloves, coat, coveralls) Wind chill <32 °F
Reviewed cold stress symptoms Warm-up periods Additional information below
Noise >85 dB
Noise >110 dB
Hearing protection is required: Ear plugs Ear muffs Both
Additional information below
Ladders Inspected general condition before use Ladder inspected within last quarter
Ladder tied off Proper angle and placement Reviewed ladder safety
Excavations
Permits Inspected prior to entering by competent persons Proper sloping/shoring
Pedestral Trench box Access/egress provided Protection from accumulated water
Confined space Engineered shoring
Scaffolds Inspected general condition before use by competent person Properly secured
Guardrails/toe boards Footings Materials stored on scaffold
Working with chemicals
Reviewed MSDS hazards and precautions Proper containers and labels
HazCom training PPE
Underground utilities Reviewed as-built Subsurface surveys Received digging permit
Complied with all clearance steps
Overhead utilities
Power de-energization required Insulation blankets required Additional spotters required
Required clearance distance = ft Safe work zone marked
Environmental Air emissions Water discharge Hazardous wastes Other wastes
Pollution prevention Waste minimization Asbestos Lead
Work at elevation
Descr be fall protection if over 6 feet:
F.O.D. Received F.O.D. Training
Nomex
Saranex
Natural or site hazards
Weather Terrain Adjacent operations or processes
Biological (insects, rodents, snakes, Lime Disease)
Other Safe Plan
Materials/Tools/ Equipment
File details come from the government source that posted it.