SSP_50754-RevA-DCN001-EAR99.docx

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REVISION AND HISTORY PAGE

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SSP 50754, Revision A DCN 001 October 15, 2009 ii

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM

Crew monitoring requirements for the h-II transfer vehicle

CONCURRENCE

January 16, 2008

ARES/PI&C

Book manager org

/s/Edward J. Jablonski

16 Jan ‘08 signature

DATE

ARES/PI&C

book manager

ORG

/s/Lowell Koenig

16 January 2008

SIGNATURE

DATE

NASA/OM

manager, HTV Crew Monitoring PRoject

ORG

/s/Michael Berdich

1/16/08

SIGNATURE

DATE

ARES/PI&C

data management org

/s/ Sharon E. Hock

16 Jan 2008

SIGNATURE

DATE

iv

PICB

DCN 001

1.7.2, 1.7.3, 1.7.3.1, 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.1.5, 3.2.3.4, 4.3.1.1, 4.3.1.2, 4.3.1.3, 4.3.1.4, 4.3.2.1.1, 4.3.2.2.1, Appendix A, Appendix C, Table 1.7.3-1 va

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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1.21 INTERACTING DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE HCM SYSTEM 1-1

TABLE PAGE

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The additional capability to be provided by HCM is not intended to be used as a means to meet the requirements of the HTV specification and will be used by the crew to support planned HTV operations as well as to assist in the response to potential Off Nominal Situations.

The HCM System Requirements Document will be used to document integrated requirements for crew monitoring resulting from bilateral National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)/ JAXA agreements as needed regarding implementation of capabilities required to support nominal HTV operations.

1.7.1 HTV Flight Phase Definition

Table 1.7.1-1 defines the applicable HTV Flight Phases for the HCM system and the mapping of the HCM flight phases to the operational phases as defined in SSP 50273, Paragraph 3.1.6.

Table 1.7.11 HCM FLIGHT PHASES

1.7.2 MONITORING VOLUME DEFINITION

The monitoring volume, also referred to as the Inner Capture Volume (ICV), is a 3-D shape that is constrained by the following:

· Position and size of the ICB

· ISS attitude errors

· ISS camera errors

· Elbow joint angle constraints (hypo- and hyper-extension).

The ICV results from using the two ISS cameras to monitor the ICB. This volume is used by the crew to determine if the HTV is ready to mode to free drift. The ICV can only monitor the FRGF position (not velocity, attitude, nor attitude rate). The ICV is larger than the ICB because of ISS and camera rigid body and flex errors.

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1.7.3 ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions are used in the creation of this document:

A. Communication with the ground may be unavailable at any time during Integrated Operations as defined in SSP 50273, Paragraph 3.1.6.1.

B. During SSRMS operations, the ISS crew will monitor the clearance between the ISS structure and the SSRMS using standard flight robotic procedures.

C. SSRMS Hot Backup capability will be functional at HTV 1.

D. The HCM system will utilize the HTV Hardware Command Panel (HCP) capabilities as defined in SSP 50273, paragraph 3.2.1.8.6.

E. The HCM system will be zero fault tolerant.

F. The number of crew will not exceed three (shown by Table 1.7.2-1 flight phase below).

table 1.7.3-1 the number of crew by flight phase

*M/N indicates M crewmembers, possibly N needed for this flight phase

1.7.3.1 ISS FLIGHT ATTITUDE

The design of the HCM system assumes that the attitude at any point on the non-articulated portion of the on-orbit Space Station, including camera boom mounting locations and SSRMS base attach points will be within the tolerances shown in SSP 50273, paragraph 3.2.7.1 and SSP 41162, Segment Specification for the United States On-Orbit Segment, paragraph 3.2.1.1.1.75, except the following:

A. The attitude range is +/-1.0 degree per axis of the commanded attitude.

B. The attitude rate range is +/- 0.02 degrees per second per axis to the Space Station Local Vertical / Local Horizontal (LVLH) coordinate system during flight phases 1, 2, 3 (exception in C. below), 6, and 7.

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C. The attitude rate range is +/- 0.01 degrees per second per axis to the Space Station LVLH coordinate system when the HTV is located and holding within the Inner Capture Box (ICB) during flight phase 3, for a minimum of 30 minutes.

D. The attitude rate range is +/- 0.005 degrees per second per axis to the Space Station LVLH coordinate system during flight phases 4 and 5 (assuming nominal capture scenario), for a minimum of 180 seconds.

1.8 document overview This document establishes HCM system requirements and identifies the requirement verification strategy. Table 1.8-1 presents an outline of the major sections of this document.

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The HCM system shall provide the ISS crew with the capability to monitor the critical HTV status parameters, as defined in SSP 50350-ANX1, Robotic Workstation CCTV Screen Overlay Requirements, Annex 1, paragraph 3.1.1, concerning dynamic overlays, during the HTV Flight Phases defined in this document’s paragraph 0.

Rationale: Hazard identification data will be displayed on the RWS, HCP and PCS, as appropriate. An example of the type of data to be monitored would be to use Relative Global Positioning System solutions to verify that the HTV Rendezvous Sensor has locked onto the correct reflector at initial acquisition along the R-bar.

3.1.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND DISPLAY TIMING

The HCM system shall provide the ISS crew with the capability to view the information to assist with the identification of a hazard associated with the HTV, as defined in SSP 50273, paragraph 3.2.1.3.3.8, without requiring the ISS crew to take actions to inquire on safety status.

Rationale: In order to maximize crew efficiency, critical information planned to be monitored during a particular phase of flight shall be displayed without a query.

3.1.3 DELETED

3.1.4 Display Timing

A. The HCM system shall accommodate the latency from the HTV Proximity Communications System (PROX) output to the ISS interface and to the display of data on the PCS as defined in SSP 50273, paragraph 3.2.1.3.3.7.b.

Rationale: SSP 50273 defines the latency requirement for data to be provided to the PCS.

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B. The HCM system shall accommodate a latency of less than 3.5 seconds from the PROX output to the ISS interface and to the display of data on the RWS monitors.

Rationale: This latency needs to be defined and bounded to fully understand the total crew response time and develop verification requirements.

C. The HCM system shall accommodate a latency of less than 71 milliseconds from the MSS or ISS camera acquisition of the real-time view to the display of the video on the RWS displays as shown in SSP 41000 paragraph 3.2.1.1.8.2.

Rationale: The 71 milliseconds latency is necessary to ensure that the crew has the most recent camera views displayed on the RWS of the HTV in order to accurately assess the vehicle’s systems and performance in as close to a real-time manner as possible. This latency needs to be defined and bounded to fully understand the total crew response time and develop verification requirements.

3.1.5 HTV STATUS AND Command monitoring

A. The HCM system shall provide to the ISS crew the capability to view the information necessary to determine that the proper conditions exist for the crew to send a command.

Rationale: The design and implementation process will determine which information needs to be provided to the crew. Any necessary conditions that affect the decision to send a command need to be provided to the ISS crew to enable them to take the appropriate action. The status of any parameter of a visiting vehicle’s systems that the ISS crew has the capability to change should be provided to the ISS crew for monitoring. At a minimum, that status should be presented to the ISS crew at the same display level as the command. Any subsidiary parameters changed by sending a command do not necessarily need to be displayed. In addition, any parameters required to decide whether a command should be sent or not need to be provided to the crew. For example, if the crew can command the abort type from a PCS, the status of the abort type must be displayed on the PCS. Any information that is required for crew to decide whether to change the abort type or not must also be displayed on the PCS.

B. The HCM system shall provide to the ISS crew the HTV state. The HTV state is defined in SSP 50273, paragraph 3.2.1.3.4.1.

Rationale: The ISS crew needs to know the state of the HTV to be able to make appropriate decisions. The state of the HTV is provided in the HTV telemetry and includes, but is not limited to, abort mode, communication status, attitude, and attitude rates, etc.

C. The HCM system shall provide to the ISS crew the status of commands sent to the HTV.

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3.2.3.4 HTV FRGF reference point monitoring

This requirement applies to flight phases 4 (ICB – Free Drift Initiation) and 5 (Capture) The HCM system shall provide the capability for the ISS crew to visually determine the position of the HTV FRGF reference point as defined in the SSP 50438, Part 1, Figure 3.5.2.4.1-1 with respect to the monitoring volume as defined in paragraph 1.7.2 to support initiation of the free drift command. Monitoring of this volume will be done using the camera pairs listed in Table 3.2.3.4-1.

table 3.2.3.4-1 Camera pairs for the monitoring volume

Rationale: By comparing visual information to HTV telemetry the ISS crew would have additional situational awareness to evaluate whether the HTV is in the correct configuration for capture by the SSRMS.

3.2.3.5 SSRMS Joint Angle monitoring

This requirement applies to flight phase 5 (Capture).

The HCM system shall provide the capability for the ISS crew to determine an impending violation of SSRMS elbow joint angle limits to assure grapple completion within the capture limits.

Rationale: The monitoring of the elbow angle limits during the capture operation is being required to constrain the monitoring volume within the limits of the SSRMS reach and loads limits.

This requirement applies to flight phases 6 (Release – HTV Control System Enable) and 7 (HTV Control System Enable – 200 meters).

The HCM system shall provide the ability for the ISS crew to visually determine when to command an abort such that the HTV performs the abort before the HTV reference point as defined in SSP 50438, Part 1, paragraph 3.5.2.4.2 exits the manual abort corridor as defined in SSP 50438 Part 1, paragraph 3.5.2.4.2.

Rationale: Visual notification to the crew to command a manual abort is necessary to ensure that action is taken before the HTV can violate ISS or visiting vehicle requirements.

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4.1.1 Responsibility for verifications

NASA is responsible for verifying that the HCM fulfills the performance and constraint requirements set forth within this specification.

4.1.2 Special tests and examinations

Not applicable.

4.2 Requirement Verification cross reference matrix

The requirement verification cross reference matrix is not required for this specification. This specification has a one-to-one correspondence between section 3 and section 4. The requirements in section 3 (requirements start with 3.1.1) each have a corresponding section 4 verification paragraph that uses a 4 prefix added to the section 3 paragraph number. (Example requirement paragraph 3.1.1 has a corresponding verification paragraph 4.3.1.1.)

4.3 System Requirements verification

4.3.1 Data for Monitoring

4.3.1.1 Availability of Monitoring Data

Verification shall be by test. The data displayed on the HCM will be compared to the model output data of HTV simulation. Verification of this requirement shall be considered successful when the test shows that the specified status parameters are correctly presented to the ISS crew on the systems the ISS crew will use for monitoring the HTV.

4.3.1.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND DISPLAY TIMING

Verification shall be by demonstration, test and analysis. Verification of this requirement shall be considered successful when a demonstration and test show that the data was presented to the ISS crew without query, and analysis of the demonstration and test results show that the ISS crew can correctly identify hazardous conditions of an HTV approach and departure.

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4.3.1.3 DELETED

4.3.1.4 Display Timing

A. Verification shall be by inspection. Inspection shall consist of reviewing the test setup used to evaluate the other HCM requirements that include command latency and review of the operation timeline, operator execution and HTV behavior using flight equivalent PCS, flight software and displays. The verification shall be considered successful when the results of the inspection show that the HCM simulation incorporates telemetry latency from PROX output to ISS PCS as specified in this requirement.

B. Verification shall be by inspection. Inspection shall consist of reviewing the test setup used to evaluate the other HCM requirements that include command latency and review of the operation timeline, operator execution and HTV behavior using flight equivalent RWS, flight software and displays. The verification shall be considered successful when the results of the inspection show that the HCM simulation incorporates telemetry latency from PROX output to ISS RWS as specified in this requirement.

C. Verification shall be by inspection. Inspection shall consist of reviewing the test setup used to evaluate the other HCM requirements that include command latency and review of the operation timeline, operator execution and HTV behavior using flight equivalent RWS, flight software and displays. The verification shall be considered successful when the results of the inspection show that the HCM simulation incorporates video latency from MSS or ISS camera output to ISS RWS as specified in this requirement.

4.3.1.5 Command monitoring

A. Verification shall be by demonstration and analysis. The demonstration shall present data to the ISS crew and allow them to execute commands based on the data presented. The demonstration shall be performed using flight equivalent RWS, flight software, and displays. Analysis of this demonstration shall indicate whether or not the status of any parameter of the HTV’s system that the ISS crew has an ability to change is provided to the ISS crew for monitoring. The verification shall be considered successful when it has been demonstrated that the correct data is presented to allow the crew to execute the proper commands and analysis of the demonstration shows that any parameters of the HTV’s system that the ISS crew can change are provided in displays to the crew.

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B. Verification shall be by demonstration. The demonstration shall provide information to the ISS crew. Demonstration to be performed using flight equivalent RWS, flight software and displays. The demonstration shall be considered successful when the HTV state (e.g., abort mode, communication status, attitude and attitude rate) is shown to be presented to the ISS crew on the HCM displays.

C. Verification shall be by demonstration. The demonstration shall include display of data to the crew of the commands sent, and confirmation of command receipt and execution. The demonstration is to be performed using flight equivalent RWS, flight software, and displays. The demonstration shall be considered successful when the status of commands sent to the HTV is shown to be presented to the ISS crew in displays that will be used for monitoring.

4.3.2 MONITORING REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1 General Monitoring Requirements

4.3.2.1.1 Visual Monitoring conditions

Verification shall be by analysis. The analysis shall include range measurements under various worst case lighting conditions with the crew verifying they can visually monitor the HTV using the sources designated for monitoring it in any orientation at ranges up to the specified distance. Verification shall be considered successful when analysis shows that for the range of lighting conditions and using the sources designated for monitoring the HTV, the ISS crew has the capability to visually monitor the HTV under the specified conditions.

4.3.2.1.2 Relative Motion Monitoring During Abort

Verification shall be by testing. The testing shall include measurement of distances from the ISS to the HTV in which the crew can determine that the HTV has a positive opening rate. The verification shall be considered successful when the tests show that the HCM system provides the crew with the capability to determine whether the HTV has a positive opening rate during abort operations, from initiation of the abort until the HTV reaches the specified distance from the ISS.

4.3.2.1.3 Alternate Range and Range Rate Monitoring Capability A. Verification shall be by testing. The verification shall be considered successful when the testing shows that telemetry values for PROX range and range rate are correctly displayed from PROX on the RWS screen.

B. Verification shall be by inspection and demonstration. The verification shall be considered successful when the inspection shows that the PROX range and range rate are 4-4 provided using the same reference points as the HTV navigation telemetry, and, the demonstration verifies this.

4.3.2.2 Monitoring During Approach Operations

4.3.2.2.1 Range Monitoring During Approach

Verification shall be by test. The test shall measure the range of the HTV with respect to the LRRCS. Verification shall be considered successful when the test shows that the HCM system can be used to visually compare the range of the HTV in the LRRCS to the HCM vehicle outline.

4.3.2.2.2 Corridor Monitoring During Approach Operations

A. Verification shall be by demonstration. The demonstration shall include a crew trial using a simulation of HTV and ISS dynamics and camera views of the HTV with the dynamic overlay of the corridor on the RWS, and include both correct positioning and positioning outside of the corridor. The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstration shows that the ISS crew can determine the HTV azimuth and elevation within the corridor centerline so as to be able to take appropriate action.

B. Verification shall be by analysis. The analysis shall use crew trials using a simulation of HTV and ISS dynamics and camera views of the HTV with the dynamic overlay of the corridor on the RWS to display HTV positions within normal approach and approach that would result in issuing an abort command. The verification shall be considered successful when analysis of the results show that the crew can: a) identify the HTV reference point for manual abort (that is, the center of the HTV navigation lights) in relation to the HTV dynamic corridor on the RWS overlays, and, b) initiate a manual abort when the HTV navigation lights exit the HTV dynamic corridor.

4.3.2.2.3 Attitude Monitoring During Approach Operations

Verification shall be by demonstration. The demonstration shall include a crew trial using a simulation of HTV and ISS dynamics and camera views of the HTV with the dynamic overlay of the corridor on the RWS and include various attitudes of the HTV in both day and night conditions. The verification shall be considered successful when the results of the demonstrations show that the crew can visually determine the HTV attitude as specified using the HCM system.

4.3.2.2.4 Maneuver Monitoring

Verification shall be by demonstration. The demonstration shall include a crew trial using a simulation of HTV / ISS dynamics and camera views of the HTV with the dynamic overlay of the corridor on the RWS and include various maneuvers of the HTV. The verification shall be considered successful when the demonstrations show that the crew can successfully determine

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Appendix a – Acronyms and abbreviations

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