SSP_50101-RevB.docx

NASA-RSA Phase 2-3 Bilateral Integration and Verification Plan

International Space Station Program

Revision B

April 2012

National Aeronautics and Space Administration International Space Station Program Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas

SSP 50101

Revision B

1-1

REVISION AND HISTORY PAGE

[Also incorporates SSCD 010395R1, EFF. 06-27-11, and SSCD 010436R3, EFF. 11-12-09] 05-01-13

SSP 50101

Revision B

PREFACE

nasa-rsa phase 2-3 bilateral integration and verification plan SSP 50101, NASA-RSA Phase 2-3 Bilateral Integration and Verification Plan, is the main document that defines the joint Russian Space Agency (RSA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) integration and verification activities and identifies the organizational procedures involved in implementing the integrated verification requirements of the Russian Segment (RS) elements.

SSP 50101 equally applies to NASA and RSA. This document is under the control of the Space Station Control Board (SSCB), with the concurrence of the respective International Partners (IPs). Any changes or revisions will be approved by the SSCB and RSA.

v

INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM

nasa-rsa phase 2-3 bilateral integration and verification plan

CONCURRENCE

APRIL 2012

nasa-rsa phase 2-3 bilateral integration and verification plan

CONCURRENCE

april 2012 nasa-rsa phase 2-3 bilateral integration and verification plan

LIST OF CHANGES

april 2012 All changes to paragraphs, tables, and figures in this document are shown below:

SSPCB

Entry Date

Change

Paragraph(s)

February 1998

Baseline

All

April 2003

Revision A

All

April 2013

Revision B

All

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX

TABLE

FIGURE

introduction Purpose and scope of the document purpose SSP 50101, NASA-RSA Phase 2-3 Bilateral Integration and Verification Plan, documents the agreements between the Russian Space Agency (RSA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for the integration and verification of the Russian Segment (RS) into the International Space Station (ISS) as established in SSP 50107, NASA/RSA Joint Management Plan.

This document is the main document that defines the joint RSA and NASA integration and verification activities and identifies the organizational procedures involved in implementing the integrated verification requirements of the RS elements. The plan also identifies the required facilities, support equipment, services, test equipment, and reporting.

The activities defined in this plan address the verification tasks which flow from the verification requirements identified in SSP 41163, Russian Segment Specification, as required for the planning, implementation and control processes to confirm that ISS hardware and software items are compliant with specifications, properly function as integrated units, and are ready for intended use.

scope This document defines the data, products, tasks, and planning agreements for the integration and verification of the RS with the ISS, including interfaces with the United States On-orbit Segment (USOS).

This document includes the following:

shuttle flights to mir (rsa Phase 1) Phase 1 demonstrations that will be utilized in the verification of Phase 2/3 hardware and software will be pre-declared and follow the same rigor as Phase 2/3 verification activities.

For the Phase 1 integration and verification activities, RSA will provide complete access and visibility. This access includes any development testing or analysis that will be used in the production or verification of the Phase 2/3 ISS hardware, software, or operations. Phase 1 sets the foundation for the Space Station Science and Technology program. It provides opportunities for environment characterization and payload operations experience. Phase 1 will provide valuable experience and test data to greatly reduce the technical risks associated with construction and operation of the ISS.

precedence This document is prepared in compliance with SSP 50107 and the NASA-RSA Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America and the Russian Space Agency Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station. In the event of a conflict, the documents shall apply in the following order of precedence:

document preparation, maintenance, and release authority The U.S. and Russia share joint responsibilities for the preparation, maintenance, and release of this document, consistent with the requirements of SSP 50107. This document is subject to the NASA Space Station Program Control Board (SSPCB) for baseline authority.

It is agreed to provide two versions of this document - one in English and one in Russian. NASA will provide the English version and RSA will provide the Russian version. The English version is the official ISS Program version. If there is a discrepancy between the two versions, the English version will take precedence over the Russian version. Each participant is responsible for its own distribution. Each participant provides the last updated version within a reasonable time. During draft development phase, prior to the SSPCB baselining, the above procedures will be followed.

1-2 documents applicable documents The following documents include specifications, models, standards, guidelines, handbooks, and other special publications. The documents listed in this paragraph are applicable to the extent specified herein. Inclusion of applicable documents herein does not in any way supersede the order of precedence identified in Paragraph 1.3 of this document.

SSP 50057

Part I Space Station Control Center To Russian Space Agency Ground Segment Interface Control Document

SSP 50057

Part II Space Station Control Center to Russian Space Agency Ground Segment Interface Control Document

SSP 50065-01

Part I CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part I Volume 1: Radiation Hardware

SSP 50065-01

Part II CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part II Volume 1: Radiation Hardware

SSP 50065-02

Part I CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part I Volume 2: Water Quality Monitoring Hardware

SSP 50065-02

Part II CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part II Volume 2: Water Quality Monitoring Hardware

SSP 50065-03

Part I CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part I Volume 3: Air Quality Monitoring Hardware

SSP 50065-03

Part II CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part II Volume 3: Air Quality Monitoring Hardware

SSP 50065-04

Part I CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part I Volume 4: Microbiology Hardware

SSP 50065-04

Part II CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part II Volume 4: Microbiology Hardware

SSP 50065-05

Part I CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part I Volume 5: Health Maintenance System Hardware

SSP 50065-05

Part II CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part II Volume 5: Health Maintenance System Hardware

SSP 50065-06

Part I CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part I Volume 6: Countermeasure Hardware

SSP 50065-06

Part II CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part II Volume 6: Countermeasure Hardware

reference documents The following documents contain supplemental information to guide the user in the application of this document. These reference documents may or may not be specifically cited within the text of this document.

SSP 30482

Volume 1 Electric Power Specifications and Standards Volume 1: EPS Electrical Performance Specifications

SSP 30482

Volume 2 Electric Power Specifications and Standards Volume 2: Consumer Constraints

SSP 42121

Part 1 U.S. On-Orbit Segment Pressurized Mating Adapter-1 to Russian Segment FGB Interface Control Document Part 1

SSP 50065-01

Part I CHeCS to Russian Segment Interface Control Document Part I Volume 1: Radiation Hardware

SSP 50066

Part 1 Airlock To Russian Hardware Interface Control Document Part 1

SSP 50066

Part 2 Airlock To Russian Hardware Interface Control Document Part 2

SSP 50099

Performance Requirements Specification for Airlock Depress Pump

Part 2

SSP 52051

Volume 1 User Electric Power Specifications and Standards Volume 1: 120 Volt DC Loads

USA-ISS-TVIS/

97103 Acceptance Test Plan and Methodology for the Treadmill with Vibration Isolation and Stabilization (TVIS) System

No Number Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the United States of America and the Russian Space Agency Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station

2-5 verified hardware description general description The ISS consists of pressurized modules and unpressurized systems and elements that form a human base in low Earth orbit. The ISS provides science capabilities for microgravity, materials, life science research and development, and Earth and stellar observation, as well as other technology development and demonstration by the U.S. and the IPs.

The ISS development continues through three phases: Phase One (Shuttle flights to MIR), Phase Two (initial Station assembly with Russian hardware), and Phase Three (continued Station assembly with the IPs).

The ISS development is accomplished in stages using a pre-defined sequence of assembly flights. Every physical Station configuration shall be verified. The assembly sequence flight numbers will be used to reference the verification reporting. Changes within an assembly stage shall be considered in the verification of that stage.

Table 3.1-1 outlines all the U.S. and RS module top level drawing numbers for the U.S. and RS End Items for which verification data is reported.

table 3.1-1 Module top level drawings (page 1 of 2)

table 3.1-1 Module top level drawings (page 2 of 2)

united states on-orbit segment united states on-orbit segment pressurized modules The pressurized modules contain equipment to provide laboratory, habitation, logistics re-supply, and overall Station command and control functions.

The Nodes are pressurized, environmentally controlled elements that serve to connect the U.S. Laboratory Module and the IP modules to each other. With four radial ports and two axial ports each, the Nodes are the building blocks for the U.S pressurized elements for the Station.

The Cupola provides full hemispheric viewing for monitoring exterior Station activities such as Orbiter mating operations, Extravehicular Activity (EVA) and other operations as well as providing a control workstation for two crew members.

The U.S. Laboratory module provides a shirt-sleeve environment for research, technology development, and repair by an on orbit crew. The U.S. Laboratory consists of outfitted racks and standoffs contained in pressurized cylinders, capped end cones, and berthing mechanism.

united states on-orbit segment unpressurized elements The Integrated Truss Assembly (ITA) serves as the structural connection for the pressurized and unpressurized equipment and supports the utilities connections required between the pressurized and unpressurized elements via utility trays.

Photovoltaic solar cells provide the Station power source, which is distributed between the Station systems and users and is required for battery charging. The batteries are used to provide power during the night phase of the Station’s orbit. At each end of the truss are Photovoltaic (PV) power modules that track the Sun by means of rotary alpha and beta joints.

The central Thermal Control System (TCS) heat rejection function is provided by means of radiators. These radiators reject excess thermal energy generated by the pressurized modules, external payloads, and other elements. The external TCS transport media is a single-phase ammonia working fluid, with loops operating at single temperature interface conditions.

Unpressurized Cargo Carriers (UCCs) are used for resupply and return of externally stored logistics cargo that do not require, or are not intended for, pressurized environment. The UCCs consist of Unpressurized Logistics Carriers (ULCs) and Dry Cargo Carriers (DCCs).

united states ground system The ISS Ground System consists of the ground facilities, hardware, and software utilized in performance of the ground based support functions to the on-orbit Space Station.

The Ground System also provides external interface functional support to the Orbiter space transportation system, launch/landing site facilities, ground communications systems, and orbiting communication systems.

russian segment The RS provides the primary building framework of the ISS. The RS provides all or part of the following services and capabilities:

functional cargo block The Functional Cargo Block (FGB) is a self-sufficient orbital vehicle that provides propulsion, guidance, navigation and control, communications, electrical power, and thermal control systems. The FGB contains a pressurized volume that provides a stable environment to house the systems’ internal components. The FGB provides docking ports to accommodate both Russian and U.S. flight elements.

Docking compartment 1 The Docking Compartment (DC) 1 consists of a pressurized spherical compartment with docking ports at either end. It can be used as an airlock for EVAs that use Russian space suits.

service module The Service Module (SM) contains all the systems necessary for independent operations and serves as a habitat and laboratory. The SM assumes attitude control and reboost responsibility. There are docking ports on the forward end of the SM and a docking port on the aft end. Russian resupply vehicles will use the aft port for docking to the ISS.

MINI RESEARCH module 1 Mini Research Module (MRM) 1 consists of pressurized compartment with docking ports at either end. The MRM1 module is frequented by the crew and its primary mission is to provide facilities to perform materials processing.

The MRM1 will be delivered to the ISS by the Shuttle and transferred from the Shuttle and docked to the FGB nadir port using the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System (SRMS) and Space Station Remote Manipulator System (SSRMS).

The Power and Video Grapple Fixture (PVGF) is mounted on the MRM1 to facilitate berthing by the SSRMS. The MRM1 to PVGF interface consists of structural, mechanical, power, and video interfaces.

MINI RESEARCH MODULE 2

The MRM2 consists of a pressurized spherical compartment with docking ports at either end. It can be used as an airlock for EVAs after DC1 separation and MLM docking. It will be equipped with the modified cargo boom and scientific equipment.

soyuz vehicle The RS provides the means to return the crew to the Earth, in the event of an emergency, via the Soyuz Vehicle. Each Soyuz Vehicle, which is a self-contained spacecraft, provides a capability to return three healthy crewmembers or one injured crewmember with an attendant.

cargo vehicle The RS provides the means to re-supply and re-boost the ISS via the Cargo Vehicle. Each Cargo Vehicle, which is an unmanned Progress family spacecraft, provides a capability to re-supply the ISS, as well as provide re-boost capability to higher orbits.

There are two modifications versions of the Progress Cargo Vehicle; Progress M and Progress M1. Progress M represents an existing vehicle design of the vehicle used for the Phase 1 Mir Space Station. Progress M1 is a design modification of Progress M with increased fuel resupply capability for the ISS.

MULTIPURPOSE LABORATORY MODULE

Multipurpose Laboratory Module (MLM) provides:

Also MLM delivers European Robotic Arm (ERA) and enables ERA activation and checkout and Russian science program (internal and external payloads).

<RESERVED>

<RESERVED>

<reserved> rsa ground system The RSA Ground System consists of the ground facilities, hardware, and software utilized in performance of the ground based support to the on-orbit Space Station. The RSA Ground System also provides external interface functional support to the RSA space transportation system, launch/landing site facilities, ground communications systems, and orbiting communication systems.

russian to u.s. system nomenclature matrix Table 3.5-1 outlines the Russian to U.S. system nomenclature and functions.

table 3.5-1 matrix of russian to u.s. system nomenclature

Control

Systems

Mechanisms

X

Thermal Control System

X

Ventilation System

X

Water Supply System

X

Atmosphere Revitalization System

X

Onboard Complex Control System

X

Motion Control System

X

Radio Command System

X

TV System

X

Audio Communication System

X

Radio Tracking System

X

Onboard Telemetry System

X

Antenna Feeder Unit

X

Power System

X

Crew Hygiene

X

Crew Health Care

X

Space Suit Orlan ‘M’

X

Propulsion

X

Fire Detection and Fire Suppression

X

Maintenance and repair means

X

3-6 verification policies and processes verification program roles and responsibilities Figure 4.1-1 represents the NASA-RSA integration and verification planning document relationships.

figure 4.1-1 nasa-rsa verification planning document relationships rsa responsibilities RSA is responsible for the verification of all RSA provided elements and subsystems, including both hardware and software. It is RSA’s responsibility to ensure that the elements that make up the RS meet all the requirements of SSP 41163 and Interface Control Documents (ICDs). RSA is also responsible for supporting the cooperative efforts of joint ISS verification, as defined in this document.

RSA is additionally responsible for verification of all RSA-supplied hardware that is installed in U.S. elements and for the certification of all RSA hardware that is launched in the Space Shuttle cargo bay.

In accordance with SSP 50146, NASA/RSA Bilateral S&MA Process Requirements for International Space Station, RSA is responsible for implementation of the safety requirements and plans to insure successful delivery and use of the elements and payloads for the Space Station, and certification of the elements and payloads RSA provides.

RSA is responsible for providing Verification Compliance Matrices (VCMs) (see Table 4.3.3.3-1), which show the traceability of each SSP 41163 and other joint requirements (see Table 4.2.1.2-1 and Figure 4.3.3.2-1) to the appropriate closure document. RSA will also provide access to the detailed documentation, such as test or analysis reports, which show the closure of SSP 41163 and other joint document requirements.

nasa responsibilities NASA is responsible for the overall integration and verification of the ISS, including management of the integration of the efforts of all IPs. NASA is also primarily responsible for ensuring that the USOS meets all of the requirements of SSP 41162, Segment Specification for the United States On-Orbit; RPO-0218, RSA/NASA Requirements On The U.S. Segment; the ICD joint requirements; and that the U.S. Ground System meets all of the requirements as specified in SSP 54500, International Ground System Specification Document, Appendix F.

In accordance with SSP 50146, NASA is responsible for implementation of the overall safety requirements and plans established for successful flight of the Space Station.

NASA is responsible for providing to RSA access to the traceability information, and detailed closure documentation that shows the closure of verification requirements for the RSA requirements imposed on the USOS. See Table 4.2.1.2-1, Table 4.2.1.2-2, Table 4.2.1.2-3, and Figure 4.3.3.2-1.

NASA is responsible for maintaining the traceability between SSP 41163 and SSP 41000, System Specification for the International Space Station.

level of nasa involvement in rsa verification Verification involvement by NASA will be at SSP 41163 and ICD level. NASA will not duplicate any verification activities performed by RSA. RSA will provide access to NASA for visibility into verification data, including test reports, analyses reports, and test procedures. In order to meet its responsibility for Stationlevel integration and verification, NASA needs to have access to technical verification data from each of the IPs, including RSA. For example, NASA will be required to gather verification data from all IPs in order to perform Station-level thermal analysis and Station-level structural dynamic analysis.

This data exchange will be accomplished using the mutually agreed to SSP 50137, NASA/RSA Bilateral Data Exchange Agreement, List, and Schedule.

RSA will provide to NASA verification traceability information for all requirements of SSP 41163 and other joint documents, as described in Paragraph 4.3.3.3 of this document. This data will be available in accordance with the schedule defined in Paragraph 4.9. This data will be entered into the Program Verification Information System (PVIS) and will provide pointers to the detailed verification report documentation. The detailed verification reports that document the closure of RS verification requirements will be made accessible to NASA on an “as-requested” basis.

level of rsa involvement in NASA verification Verification involvement by RSA will be defined in RPO-0218 and in Section 4 of the ICDs. RPO-0218 contains requirements which have been formulated for application to the USOS for standard operations, repair work, and/or off-nominal situations. RPO-0218 is under the control of the Space Station Control Board (SSCB), and any changes or revisions will be accomplished using the NASA/RSA joint configuration management process only. (See Appendix R of D684-10046-01, Configuration Management Handbook.) When NASA/RSA intends to change U.S./Russian documents that should affect these requirements, NASA/RSA has to initiate the joint configuration change process mentioned above.

NASA will provide RSA read-only access to the PVIS database for viewing the verification traceability data for the USOS and Station-level verification activities. The detailed verification reports that document the closure of USOS and Station-level verification requirements will be made available to RSA on an “as-requested” basis.

joint responsibilities NASA and RSA are jointly responsible for verifying that their respective systems, when integrated, meet all of their functional and performance requirements. NASA and RSA are jointly responsible for the verification of interfaces between their elements and subsystems. Each participant is responsible for ensuring that their interfaces are compliant with the requirements established in the NASA-RSA ICDs. Notification of compliance with interface verification requirements will be coordinated in accordance with Paragraph 4.3.3.4 in this document.

NASA and RSA are jointly responsible for defining the verification requirements (see Paragraph 4.2.1) for the RS of the ISS. These requirements will be documented and approved in Section 4 of SSP 41163.

verification process This section establishes the processes by which SSP 41163 requirements are verified and integrated into the overall Space Station Verification process.

verification requirements specification verification requirements The ISS Specification Tree is shown in Figure 4.2.1.1-1. SSP 41000 specifies the requirements for the entire ISS. Functional requirements are decomposed and allocated to each of the six on-orbit segment specifications and SSP 54500.

figure 4.2.1.1-1 iss specification tree This Specification Tree does not necessarily include all the applicable and/or reference document numbers as well as their exact titles.

Design requirements are documented in Section 3 of SSP 41163. Verification requirements are developed in response to the design requirements and are documented in Section 4 of SSP 41163. RSA and NASA personnel have jointly developed the Section 4 verification requirements for each SSP 41163 Section 3 requirement, based on the guidelines established in the RSA-NASA Memorandum of Mutual Understanding for Russian Segment Specification, SSP 41163, Section 4. The purpose of the Section 4 requirements is to provide a definition of the Russian verification method for each Section 3 requirement.

interface control documents The requirements and design implementation agreements for the interfaces between the RS and the USOS are defined in the ICDs. NASA and RSA are each responsible for verifying that its respective half of the interface meets its requirements and is designed in accordance with the appropriate ICD.

If stand-alone verification of each half of a mating interface is not sufficient for verifying that the ICD requirements are met, joint verification activities will be performed. Joint verification activities are defined as those activities that require the active participation of both parties beyond the simple exchange of hardware, software, data or interface simulations, or tooling. RSA and NASA are jointly responsible for the successful completion of joint verification activities.

Joint verification requirements are defined in Section 4 of Part 1 of the ICDs. Each ICD will include a verification table. The verification table will define the requirements for which joint verification activities are required. A verification requirement statement will be written in Section 4 of Part 1 of the ICD, for all interface requirements for which a joint verification activity is required. (NOTE: For joint verification activities, visibility into lower level specification documents will be required.) Table 4.2.1.2-1 shows an example of the proposed Section 4 of Part 1 of the ICD interface verification table.

For ICD requirements that are applicable to the USOS and do not require a joint verification activity, an “X” will appear in Section 4 of Part 1 of the ICD verification table, indicating that it is a USOS. individual verification requirement. Individual verification methods for these requirements will be identified by NASA in an Interface Verification Visibility Report (IVVR), which will be exchanged between NASA and RSA on a scheduled basis. For ICD requirements that are applicable to Russia and do not require a joint verification activity, a verification requirement statement will be included in the table, along with an identification of the method of verification.

For joint verification requirements, a verification statement will be prepared and included in Section 4 of Part 1 of the ICD. These requirements will be included in the document outside of the verification table. This is necessary to allow NASA to load this data into the Requirements and Traceability Management database.

table 4.2.1.2-1 example Interface control document part 1 interface verification table

VERIFICATION METHOD

U.S. Methods A - Analysis I - Inspection D - Demonstration T - Test NA - Not Applicable

I,A

T

T

The IVVR will contain a table that provides RSA with visibility into the interface verification activity performed by NASA. An example of this verification table is shown in Table 4.2.1.2-2. The table provides a cross reference between the ICD requirements and the NASA Specification to which they are applicable. The table will show the NASA verification methods for individually verifying the applicable ICD requirements. The table will include the individual verification requirement text from the USOS specification. This information is provided for interface verification visibility.

Verification reporting information will be exchanged and reviewed at mutually-agreed program reviews, as defined in Paragraph 4.9 of this document.

In addition to the IVVR, NASA will prepare a separate cross reference matrix showing the traceability of all of the FGB ICD requirements to the FGB specification, and to SSP 41163. An example of this table is shown in Table 4.2.1.2-3.

table 4.2.1.2-2 example interface verification visibility report

table 4.2.1.2-3 example interface control document section 3 requirement cross reference table

table 4.2.1.2-4 EXAMPLE SHUTTLE INTERFACE CONTROL DOCUMENt REQUIREMENTS VERIFICATION MATRIX MRM1-Shuttle Requirements Verification Matrix (RVM) for ICD-A-21541-MRM1