TE-25_Final_Exercise_Report_(FER)_(Example).pdf

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MISSION COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM

400 KEARNY AVENUE

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

REPLY TO THE

ATTENTION OF:

ATZL-CTM 4 May 2015

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander (ATZL-CTM), Mission Command Training Program, 400 Kearny Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

FOR Commander, EN BDE (Unit)

SUBJECT: Warfighter 15- ? (FER)

1. References.

a. (U//FOUO) CJFLCC (I (US) CORPS) OPLAN 1504, 12 November 2014

b. (U/) (U) 420 EN BDE OPORD 420-15-0042 0600012 April 2015

c. The Army Universal Task List, FM 7-15, Change 10 29 June 2012

d. TRADOC Regulation 350-50-3, Mission Command Training Program, 24 June

e. Unit Commander Training Objectives

2. Manning Analysis.

a. Authorized

b. Current manning

c. Current augmentation

d. Currently deployed

e. Manning impacts on Training Objectives

3. Mission Essential Task (MET)

Mission Essential Task (MET) Unit Commanders Assessment

MET #

MEP Exercise CDR Assessment (T/P/U)

POST-Exercise CDR Assessment (T/P/U)

Conduct Mission Command 1 Plans and Control Mobility Operations 2 Plans, Coordinate and Synchronize BDE OPS 3 Conduct Log Cell Operations 4 Plan and Manage Protection or Infrastructure Construction Operations

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ATZL-CTM-D

SUBJECT: Warfighter 15-? Final Exercise Report

4. Observations and Analysis.

a. Conduct Mission Command

(1) Planning in a time constrained environment.

(a) Observation: EN core staff did not effectively manage planning in a time constrained environment.

(b) Support Mission Essential Task:

(c) Analysis: While planning for the Gap Crossing, the XO gave the staff guidance to limit planning during night shift. This led to a break down in essential staff functions and inability to properly synchronize with adjacent units. Staff sections received limited guidance. The CUOPS Battle Desk gave verbal WARNORDs to the subordinate units with little to no follow up via a written order. Key leadership did not participate in the rehearsals and were not fully engage in synchronization efforts during parallel planning with the maneuver unit. The lack of synchronization stemmed from the inability of the staff to maintain a total picture of the brigade's critical assets.

This led to a lack of situational understanding of the holistic view of bridging assets and the ability of the brigade to provide engineer support options to the Corps Commander.

(d) Recommendation: Continue to execute verbal WARNORDs, but execute either MDMP or RDSP and provide a synchronized written product. The XO should coordinate and direct the work of the staff to facilitate 24-hour operations. The Commander, XO and S-3 should be present at all rehearsals concerning a decisive operation to maintain situational awareness and provide Commander's guidance when needed. Good Commander's guidance is imperative to planning in a time constrained environment, in addition to collaborative and parallel planning.

(Reference: FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, pg. 2-5, para 2-32, pg. 9-44, para 9-208, pg. 12-6, para 12-55.)

(2) Establish a Command Post.

(a) Observation: Distributed staff limited the COIC's ability to exercise battle drills and effectively conduct mission command.

(b) Support Mission Essential Task: Analysis: Initially there was no integration of staff sections on the CUOPS floor, therefore the COIC could not effectively collaborate or exchange information. The physical positions of the S-3 and OPS SGM in the COIC did not allow them to see the overall operational picture.

(c) Recommendation: Integrating warfighting functions into the COIC floor will better facilitate cross functional staff integration. The S-3 needs to be present on COIC floor only when a situation dictates he provides direct guidance.

(d) The XO and/or OPS SGM should remain on COIC floor, but should reposition themselves behind the staff and Battle Captain, better enabling them to provide recommendations and overall guidance to the staff. (Reference: FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, Chapter 1, page 1-3.)

(3) Running Estimates.

(a) Observation: EN BDE Staff Running Estimates improved as WFX 15-?

progressed.

(b) Support Mission Essential task:

(c) Analysis: Initially, the running estimates lacked sufficient detail to allow the commander to make informed decisions. However, as the exercise progressed, the running estimates (specifically sustainment section) significantly improved.

Running estimates are living documents that the staff maintains throughout all operations. It is essential that the staff properly updates the running estimates to ensure the commander has the most current information readily available and able to make informed decisions. Subordinates can also use running estimates to inform the commander in the absence of the primary Staff Officer.

(d) Recommendation: The 420 EN BDE CP SOP must outline running estimate requirements for all staff sections to include their running estimate formats developed on CPOF during this exercise. The unit should continue to maintain versions of the running estimate on a portal or shared drive and in analog formats for use in digitally restricted operating environments. (Reference: ADP 5.0, The Operations Process, page 14, para 61, 17 May 2012.)

b. Plan & Control Mobility Operations

(1) Reconnaissance.

(a) Observation: 420 EN BDE failed to task organic assets to execute the implied mission of reconnaissance to gain technical information prior to 230 EN BN movement.

(b) Support Mission Essential Task:

(c) Analysis: 420 EN BDE did not develop CCIR prior to EN BN movement along MSR CAVENNE resulting in several enemy engagements over a 24 hour period. The Staff posted CCIR o/a 091030APR15, but did not translate CCIR into executable technical information required from engineer reconnaissance, nor did the BDE ever deploy reconnaissance to answer the EN BDE Commander's requirements.

(d) Recommendation: The engineer coordinator or designated staff officer develops Essential Elements of Information (EEi) and provides them for incorporation into the JC Plan during the Plans/Targeting Working Group (EN BDE is not conducting an internal IC or Intel I OPS Working Groups). (References: ATTP 3- 34.23, Engineer Operations - Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team, Chapters 4 and 5, paragraph 5-19, 8 July 2010; FM 3-34.170, Engineer Reconnaissance, Chapter 3, paragraph 3-60 through 3-61, 25 March 2008).

(2) Obstacle Intelligence.

(a) Observation: EN BDE Staff did not conduct obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) or synchronize actions with a CJFLCC Engineer Staff Obstacle Plan.

(c) Analysis: 420 EN BDE did not produce a consolidated obstacle overlay identifying all existing and proposed friendly obstacles, control measures (obstacle zones, restrictions, and lanes), situational obstacles with the associated Named Area of Interest (NAI) or Targeted Area of Interest (TAI), and decision points. The BDE S-2 section did not track the known and suspected enemy obstacles on the SITEMP. The lack of these critical products did not facilitate a proper level of situational understanding for the BDE Commander and Staff as well as the subordinate units. In addition, the obstacle overlay did not include sustainment locations and routes applicable to engineer operations.

(d) Recommendation: The entire staff must participate in the continuous

IPB process. The BDE Staff should continue to identify all obstacles on the SITEMP, but should further improve the obstacle overlay product and share that product with the higher headquarters ENCOORO. Between the Engineer Brigade and the ENCORD, the engineers should make recommendations for the obstacle zones, belts, and obstacle restricted areas that support the CJFLCC scheme of maneuver taking into special consideration the freedom of maneuver of the Corps Reserve. (Reference: ATTP 3-34.23, Engineer Operations - Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team, page 4- 3, para 4-4 and page B-1 and B-3, para B-1 through B-2.)

c. Plan, Coordinate & Synchronize BDE

(1) Planning, Coordination & Synchronization

(a) Observation: EN BDE shift change brief lacks a clear purpose.

(c) Analysis: At a minimum, the purpose of this brief is to inform the incoming shift of current unit status, significant activities that occurred during the previous shift, and significant decisions I events anticipated during the next shift.

However, each staff section is providing different levels of data ranging from administrative tasks to operational reporting. The staff should use their running estimates to inform the command post as it includes the specific warfighting function understanding and visualization of the operation. The running estimate also includes risk and recommendations.

(d) Recommendation: EN BDE adopt Table 1-1, Sample Shift- Change

Briefing from FM 6-0 and update the unit SOP to reflect this format. Change the administrative shift change format into one that focuses on the operation and codify the updated slide format into the unit SOP. (Reference: FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, Chapter 1, pages 1-10 through 1-11, paragraphs 1-52 through 1-54, and Chapter 8, page 8-1, para 8-3 through 8-4.)

d. Conduct Log Cell Operations.

(1) Conducting logistics operations

(a) Observation: Sustainment COP I Dashboards use for decision-making.

(c) Analysis: The Sustainment section used adequate Sustainment common Operating Picture or sustainment tracking I dashboard slides on CPOF and on analog products. However, no sustainer briefed the commander the 'so what' or 'what does this mean to us' that would have given the commander the situational understanding of his sustainment status facilitating effective decision-making. In particular, the commander never fully understood the location and status of the extra ribbon bridge bays in the supply system, even as the wet gap crossing began.

(d) Recommendation: Continue updating and posting a Logistics COP

(LCOP) or sustainment dashboard. Improve how the Sustainment WFF will provide advice to the commander on just the relevant information on pertinent equipment statuses, and those effects on current and future operations. (References: ADP 4-0, Sustainment, 31 July 2012; ADP 5-0, The Operations Process.)

e. Plan & Manage Protection or Infrastructure Construction Operations.

(1) Protection Operations

(a) Observation: Unit does not have a completed protection running estimate or established protection priorities; nor have they completed a scheme of protection to mitigate risk during operations.

(c) Analysis: Each step of MDMP uses developed running estimates.

During MDMP step 1 the protection running estimate is developed. During step 2 a recommended CAL and initial protection priorities originate. Step 3 produces the initial scheme of protection, then an initial DAL develops during step 4.These products should be refined throughout the MDMP process, resulting in the completion of Annex E (Protection) during step 7 (orders production) of the MDMP.

The protection staff maintains these products throughout operations to support planning in time constrained environments and provide situational awareness across Warfighting functions.

(d) Recommendation: Create and maintain these products as outputs from your protection working group to ensure sustainment of protection planning throughout the operation. (Reference: ADRP 3-37, Protection, Chapter 2, pg. 2-1, 28 February 2013.)

5. Trends Informing the Larger Army of Engineer Brigades.

a. Engineer Brigades in Deliberate Wet Gap Crossings: Combined Arms wet gap crossing doctrine and overall understanding continues to challenge warfighters, to include the roles and responsibilities of the Engineer Brigade as the Crossing Area Engineer for a Corps or Division.

b. Army Observation: Orchestrating a deliberate wet gap crossing requires a complex breakdown of terrain and responsibilities and must include input and synchronization of all Warfighting Functions, multiple BCTs and Division and/or Corps enablers. However, Corps and Division headquarters typically decentralize the mission planning and execution of a deliberate wet gap crossing to a maneuver BCT. This eliminates any substantial role for the Engineer Brigade Commander to serve as the Crossing Area Engineer, and reduces the support that the Engineer Brigade could provide the combined arms team to plan and resource the operation utilizing the experience and expertise of an entire Engineer Brigade Staff.

c. Army Analysis: Combined Arms deliberate wet gap crossing operations under enemy contact still do not register in the minds of planners as an effort requiring more than just one BCT worth of combat power. While a BCT is capable of making a deliberate crossing with augmentation, this type of crossing normally requires a higher headquarters to drive the planning, synchronization, coordination, and command and control since it generally involves more than one BCT and multiple enabling units to include Fires, Military Police, Engineers, and Chemical. (ATTP 3- 90.4, para. 4-2, 10 August 2011) Engineer Brigades can provide not only the bridging assets required to get across a wet gap greater than 65 meters, but can also provide the expertise to conduct the detailed planning essential to move the necessary combat power vital to the supported maneuver forces to achieve the far side bridgehead objectives. In the role of a Crossing Area Engineer, an Engineer BDE CDR can provide assessments and recommendations to the supported DIV or Corps Commander on the status of multiple crossing areas, and status of critical bridging assets.

d. Army Recommendation: Engineer Brigades (or Maneuver Enhancement

Brigades) should serve as the Crossing Area Engineer for deliberate wet gap crossing operations to support Corps and Divisions. Corps and Divisions must consider that opposed deliberate wet gap crossings will require more than one BCT of combat power with multiple enabling brigades in support. (References: ATIP 3-34.23 Engineer Operations-Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team, para. 6-51,8 July 2010, ATTP 3- 90.4,Combined Arms Mobility Operations, para. 4-56, 57, 58, 1O August 2011)

6. OPSGRP Points of Contact. See enclosure 1.

7. Point of contact this document. COG/Team, COM: 913-684-2111 (DSN 552).

Encl FIRST M. LAST OPSGRP-? Points of contact COL, IN

Chief, Operations Group

CF: DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (ATZL-MCK-L) (w/encl)