GTL Consldtd Reply 05-30-14

GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

STATE PURCHASING DIVISION

In the Matter of:

GLOBAL TEL*LINK

CORPORATION

Protestor.

GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION,

Agency.

DOAS FILE NO.

RFP NO. 46700-GDC0000609

Department of Administrative Services State Purchasing Division Attn: Assistant Commissioner- Procurement 200 Piedmont Ave., SE Suite 1308, West Tower Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9010 Facsimile: (404) 657-8444 Email: protests@doas.ga.gov

GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION’S CONSOLIDATED REPLY

IN SUPPORT OF ITS APPEAL AND PROTEST OF CORRECTIONS

E-REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL NUMBER 46700-GDC0000609

GTL1 hereby files its Consolidated Reply in Support of its Appeal and Protest of

Corrections E-Request for Proposal Number 46700-GDC0000609.

1 GTL incorporates all abbreviations and exhibits previously used in its initial protest of e-RFP 46700- GDC0000609. Additional exhibits not previously referenced in GTL’s initial protest are attached hereto.

mailto:protests@doas.ga.gov

I. THE RELEASE OF THE FCC ORDER CREATED UNCERTAINTY THAT

WAS NEVER RESOLVED, CAUSING THE FINAL BIDDERS TO USE

INCONSISTENT REVENUE ASSUMPTIONS AND MAKING

COMPARISONS IMPOSSIBLE.

Although DOAS is required to provide clear instructions to bidders to facilitate an

“apples to apples” comparison of bids,2 the confusion regarding the interpretation of the

Federal Communications Commission’s September 26, 2013 Order regarding inmate calling services rates (the “FCC Order”)3 prevented such a comparison here.

The confusion relates to whether telecommunications companies may take a commission on interstate calling revenue collected from inmates. This issue is the subject of an appeal to the FCC’s Wireline Competition Bureau (WCB), and the ultimate outcome of that proceeding is unclear.4 This lack of clarity led the bidders here to submit bids with conflicting assumptions regarding which types of revenue were to be included in commissions. 5 Specifically, Securus submitted a bid that omitted commissions on interstate calls, while GTL and Telmate’s bids included such commissions.6 The State demanded interstate calls be included in the gross revenue that will be subject to commissions, and further guidance from the WCB is not likely to come for another 6-12 months.

2 GPM § 3.5.7.

3 Appeal and Protest of Department of Corrections E-Request for Proposal Number 46700-GDC0000609 by GTL (“GTL Protest”) at Ex. 11.

4 The FCC Order was the subject of controversy even before it was officially issued. Shortly after the FCC approved the proposal, Securus issued a press release addressing the FCC’s effort “to eliminate interstate commissions that we presently pay to prisons and jails.” See Securus Press Release, “FCC Seeks to Implement Below-Cost Inmate Calling Rates,” Aug. 13, 2013 (available at http://bit.ly/1pxWqIS, last accessed 05/28/14), attached hereto as Exhibit 58.

5 Compare GTL Protest at Exs. 26-28.

6 Id.; see also section II(1), infra.

http://bit.ly/1pxWqIS

DOAS had an opportunity to halt the proceedings pending further guidance on the FCC Order. Indeed, the day the FCC Order was formally issued, DOAS sent an email acknowledging that the parties would need time to analyze the order, that it would be revising the RFP, and that it would give the offerors time to revise their proposals.7 Two weeks later, however, DOAS announced that it had “decided to move forward on the

RFP and not wait for the eventual settlement of the many issues the FCC Order has created.”8

This decision to move forward in a nebulous regulatory environment forced the process into uncharted waters, as the offerors were allowed to go forward with bids incorporating mutually-exclusive assumptions. There was no way for DOAS to compare these bids on an equal basis, yet they still proceeded with the selection process. That process was therefore by definition fundamentally flawed and was a disservice to the taxpayers of Georgia.

Instead, the most prudent course of action is for DOAS to wait for further guidance from the WCB, and once such guidance is provided, re-issue the RFP consistent with those clarifications. While it is true that GTL would continue to service

GDC’s calling needs during this interim period, the downside risks of proceeding headlong into a cloud of confusion more than justify a brief delay. Given the potential duration of the contract at issue, GDC could feel the effects of miscalculation here for the better part of a decade.

The upside to waiting for further direction by the FCC is clear. By allowing the regulatory process to run its course, DOAS can revisit the process in a few months, 7 See GTL Protest at Ex. 10.

8 See GTL Protest at Ex. 12.

allowing the bidders to submit bids on an equal basis. DOAS can then make the best decision for GDC in a more certain regulatory environment.

Under these circumstances, DOAS’s and GDC’s options appear to be binary.

Either they can acknowledge that their own read of the regulations and the presumptions of the offerors are, at best, based on regulations that have not been finalized. Or, as further discussed below, the State can hold firm in its view of the regulations and strike Securus’s bid for being conditional and Telmate’s for falling quite short of being responsive.

II. SECURUS

1. Securus Did Not Include Interstate Calls from the Commissions from the Outset

Securus attempts to skirt around its conditional bid, claiming it never excluded interstate calls from its gross revenue calculations but simply stated it would comply with the FCC’s guidance. Even now, Securus makes clear that its payment to the State for commissions would be conditioned on any subsequent action or clarification by the

FCC concerning its September 26, 2013 Order. This is, by definition, a conditional bid.

Securus also cannot rely on its initial proposal as it never included interstate calls in the calculation of commissions to GDC. After the FCC Order was issued, the State immediately halted the bid process in order to fully evaluate the ramifications of the

FCC Order.9 GDC requested the offerors’ stance on the FCC Order, and Securus indicated to GDC that it “support[ed]” GDC’s interpretation regarding commissions and if adjustments were necessary to comply with the FCC Order, it would work with GDC to

9 GTL Protest at Ex. 10.

ensure compliance.10 However, several months prior to this request, Securus issued a press release on its interpretation of the FCC Order, noting “the FCC seeks to eliminate interstate commissions that [it] presently pay[s] to prisons and jails.”11 Even though

Securus took this position well before its initial response to the RFP, it failed to mention this at the time GDC requested such information and failed to note that its interpretation deviated from GDC’s definition of gross reviews as required by the GPM.

It is evident that Securus intended to exclude interstate commissions at the outset and ultimately, if caught, would fall back on the uncertainty created by the FCC Order for justification.

Moreover, Securus had a duty to clearly note its exception to GDC’s interpretation of “gross revenues” based on Securus’s interpretation of the FCC Order.12

After GDC re-commenced the procurement process, it issued clarifications to each bidder, requesting alternate proposals based on GDC’s interpretation of the FCC

Order.13 GDC made clear that this clarification did not change its interpretation of the types of calls included in the commission calculations.14 If Securus believed that its definition of “gross revenue” had changed based on the FCC Order, it had a duty to clarify such definition with GDC. Securus, however, did not clarify its position until pressed by GDC, and only then did it make its true intentions known. Securus’s bid remained, at all times, conditional and should not be considered.

10 Email from K. Eismann to J. Pytelewski re: Securus Response to FCC Order dated September 5, 2013, attached as Exhibit 59.

11Ex. 58.

12 GPM § 4.5.3.

13 GTL Protest at Exs. 13-15.

14 Id. at Ex. 15.

2. Securus Failed to Unequivocally Withdraw Its Conditional Bid.

Even Securus’s own representations to the GDC undermine its contention that it

“simply informed GDC that if the FCC permits payment of commission on interstate calls, Securus will pay them, and that if the FCC prohibits interstate commission, Securus could not pay them.”15 Securus made clear that its proposal was conditional on

GDC’s acceptance of its exclusion of interstate phone calls from the commission calculation, which it secretly withheld from the outset:

On the conference call, GDC asked for Securus to verify that our final BAFO commission percentage rate calculation will be paid on gross revenues as defined in the RFP and to tell GDC what call types are included. Securus verified that we understood the definition of gross revenues in Attachment O…If agreed to by GDC, the following call types and associated gross revenues would be included in the commission percentage calculation.

• Local, Intralata/Intrastate, Interlata/Intrastate and International16

This “clarification” was not conditioned on the outcome of the FCC Order,17 but rather changed the terms GDC required from the beginning.

Securus also claims that it “agreed to withdraw and remove any reference to the possible exclusion of [interstate] calls from its BAFO clarification response.”18 Securus, however, did not unequivocally do so. After GDC made clear that Securus’s conditions to its bid were unacceptable, Securus responded:

15 Resp. of Securus Technologies, Inc. to the Appeal and Protest Filed by Global Tel*Link Corporation (“Securus Br.”) at 2.

16 GTL Protest at Ex. 27 (emphasis added) .

17 As stated above, even assuming Securus’s position that its clarification was conditioned on the outcome of the FCC Order, this too was conditional.

18 Securus Br. at 3.

Securus understands GDC’s definition of gross revenues and that GDC does not agree to Securus’ exclusion of interstate call revenues from commissionable Gross Revenues…Finally, while Securus agrees to withdraw/remove the referenced Items 1, 2 and 3 from our March 12, 2014 BAFO clarification response, the adjustment mechanism as described to GDC on the March 10, 2014 conference call was explained to account for any material alteration…19

The only thing Securus “withdrew” or “removed” was its clarification that its proposal excluded interstate phone calls. As stated above, Securus intended to withhold interstate calls from the commission calculation all along, and never provided an unconditional bid as required by the GPM. This “withdrawal” simply reverted back to

Securus’s previous proposal which excluded interstate calls from commission calculations.

Securus failed to make clear whether or not it was now including interstate phone calls in its commission calculation, and instead provided an intentionally evasive response in order to provide it with some wiggle room in the future. Thus, its bid should be stricken from consideration by the State.

3. Securus’s Bid Was Not the Best Value to the State

Securus takes the bold position that – at the end of the day – its proposal offered the best value and is entitled to the ITS contract. This contention completely misconstrues Securus’s bid in its continual effort to hide the ball regarding the true nature of its bid. Securus, from the beginning, intended to exclude interstate phone calls from its commission calculation, based on its interpretation of the FCC Order. The benefits calculated by the State for Securus’s bid are based on inflated numbers given this exclusion. Securus, if awarded the ITS contract, would skim the revenue for

19 GTL Protest at Ex. 56.

interstate phone calls off the top before distributing funds to the State – essentially offering the State a higher percentage of commissions from a smaller pie.20 Securus’s bid with respect to the commission percentages does not offer a true comparison of the bids to determine which entity provided the best value.

Securus also downplays this commission percentage differential by heavily relying on its monthly minimum guarantee (“MMG”). The goal of the RFP is to maximize commission, not provide a low “safe” guarantee. The MMG should be the absolute minimum amount the State should receive, not the maximum. Securus’s bid flips this notion on its head, as its calculation of commissions to the State would never be higher than its proposed MMG. GTL offers a greater benefit to the State as the potential calls included in its commission calculations includes interstate calls, where

Securus does not. In essence, Securus’s bid ultimately provides a ceiling or cap on the amount of revenue to the State where GTL’s bid has none.

III. TELMATE

1. Telmate Response Recognizes that It Lacks Experience to Handle the Scope of the ITS Contract.

In its Response to GTL’s Appeal and Protest, Telmate concedes that it lacks any prior experience with correctional facilities or departments comparable to the GDC.

Telmate continues to lean on its experience with individual counties and two smallish state corrections departments, Montana and Oregon, in its unavailing attempt to show that it is qualified to support a correctional system of the GDC’s magnitude. As

GTL plainly illustrated in its Protest, Telmate’s three references—a county in Oklahoma

20 This further supports GTL’s position that the State should wait until the FCC clarifies its position on its Order issued September 26, 2013, as the parties had different interpretations on the FCC Order and its implications for the ITS contract, which GDC recognized from the outset.

and the state departments of corrections (“DOC”) for Montana and Oregon—combined constitute less than half of the GDC’s inmate population.

Telmate’s inexperience also is clear from a hardware perspective. For example, not only does the Montana DOC have fewer inmates (1,717) than GDC (60,000), it has a mere 126 telephones, less than GDC (approximately 3,000) by an order of magnitude.

The Oregon DOC (1,154) and the Oklahoma County facility (1,243) each have fewer than half as many telephones as GDC.21 Whether viewed from an inmate population perspective or a hardware perspective, Telmate simply cannot show that it has experience supporting a DOC that even approaches the scale of the GDC.

Knowing that it lacks sufficiently comparable experience, Telmate continues its campaign of distraction by introducing two irrelevant observations dressed up as counterarguments.

The first is to point out that DOAS, which was administering this bid process, removed the word “size” from the stated requirement that bidders “provide three (3) customer references . . . comparable in size and scope as requested by GDC.” Without elaboration, DOAS stated that it was “removing the word ‘size’ because it caused confusion.”22 The revised requirement reads, in part:

Contractor shall provide three (3) customer references where Contractor provides the equipment and services comparable to the requirements in this RFP as well as comparable in scope as requested by GDC. . . . Contractor shall include the following information for each reference: . . . total number of completed calls each month . . . and number of inmate telephones.

21 See, Telmate LLC’s Resp. to Protest of Global Tel*Link Corporation (“Telmate Br.”) at Ex. E.

22 Telmate Br. at Ex. D at 34.

Telmate ascribes great significance to this one-word modification, boldly asserting that the change means that “GDC expressly rejected [facility inmate population] as a factor in this procurement.”23 This baseless claim has no support in the available record.

Moreover, the fact that after GDC’s change to the RFP bidders still were required to state the total number of completed calls and total number of inmate telephones in use at the facilities of their allegedly comparable customers plainly indicates that GDC and

DOAS had not “rejected” such quantitative considerations as “factor[s] in this procurement”; in fact, the exact opposite is true. Telmate’s statement that “GDC cares about the vendors’ demonstrated ability to provide the requested services, not the ‘size’ of the offerors’ customers” is similarly baseless and off-point.

Telmate’s second red herring here introduces a false ability-experience dichotomy. Because it cannot cite actual evidence that it can handle a customer comparable to GDC (as no such evidence exists), it is left with the untested claim that it nevertheless has the “ability” to meet the GDC’s demands.24 The reality is that neither

Telmate nor DOAS nor anyone else knows whether Telmate in fact has that ability because Telmate has never attempted to service a customer remotely comparable to

GDC. Telmate’s claim that its “infrastructure is only 15% allocated at the present time”

23 Telmate Br. at 2. Telmate appears to be confused about which Georgia agency is directing this bid process. This confusion is of some substantive relevance to Telmate’s slightly incoherent statement that “[a]ll of GTL’s arguments . . . call for DOAS to substitute its own judgment (or, more accurately, GTL’s judgment) for that of GDC. GDC is, of course, in the best position to judge the proposals because it has managed the inmate telephone service contract for many years, it developed the RFP requirements in this case, and it evaluated the proposals received.” (Telmate Br. at 1-2.) “[O]f course,” DOAS is tasked with overseeing the procurement process and has broad discretion and authority to “substitute its own judgment” by determining if the NOIA should be revised, cancelled, re-evaluated, re-awarded, or re-solicited. See, O.C.G.A. § 50-5-1, et seq.; GPM §§ I.2.1; 6.5.6 at Table 6.10.

24 Telmate Br. at 2 has no meaning, at the very least, until it has been subjected to the added stress of a system like GDC’s, something that has never happened.

Finally, Telmate continues to simply ignore the fact that, in terms of revenue and calling patterns, county-level facilities are incomparably different from GDC facilities.

As explained in GTL’s Protest and supported by the Gibson Affidavit, inmates in county facilities often have nearly twenty-four hours of daily telephone access, while those in the GDC system are restricted to an average of 13.2 hours per day and also are subject to a restrictive call-allow list.25 Because of the unlimited telephone access county inmates enjoy, call volume may be as high as two to three calls per day; by contrast, GDC inmates typically make just two to three calls per month.26 By failing to comment on these well-demonstrated, fundamental differences between county facilities and the

GDC, Telmate effectively concedes that it is unqualified for lack of comparable experience.

Telmate, in its bidding before DOAS and again in its Response to GTL’s Protest, has done nothing to demonstrate it is actually qualified to provide inmate telephone services to GDC or rebut GTL’s arguments to the contrary. Instead, Telmate decided to attempt to create a cloud of confusion to distract DOAS from Telmate’s inexperience, a strategy that, if Telmate ultimately secures this contract, does not portend well for the

GDC and the citizens of Georgia.

2. Telmate’s Response Confirms that the Assumptions Underlying its Bid Were Unreasonable.

Section 2.4.1 of the Georgia Procurement Manual requires DOAS to identify and accept only responsible bids. Unfortunately, in accepting Telmate’s wholly

25 GTL Protest at 11, Ex. 35 at ¶¶ 3-5.

26 Id. at ¶¶ 3-4.

unsupportable assumption of a 300% increase in call volume, DOAS failed to meet this basic goal of the procurement process.

Telmate attempts to defend its fantastical projection of a 300% increase in call volume by arguing that the projection was based on a few new billing options and the fact that the RFP will for the first time allow inmates to call most mobile telephones.

Telmate offered its experience with a handful of much smaller contracts – mostly county jails – as examples purportedly showing that such an increase in GDC’s much larger prison system was possible. The only thing Telmate’s other contracts prove, however – and what should have been readily apparent to DOAS – is that Telmate has never taken on a project anywhere near the scale of Georgia’s prison system.

Telmate cites to its contract with Oklahoma County, a system with only 1,994 inmates – 3.3% the size of GDC – claiming a 158% increase in gross revenues over the course of five years. Even if true, this statistic is irrelevant to whether an immediate

300% increase in call volume in Georgia is reasonable. Even assuming that gross revenues and call volume are an analogous statistic, 158% is the highest increase cited, meaning that Telmate has never seen anything like a 300% increase in call volume on any of its contracts. Plus, as GTL explained in its initial brief, there are numerous structural factors that make call volume in county jails generally much higher than in state prison systems.27 County jail statistics are simply not helpful in projecting state prison call volume. Telmate cites unspecified increases28 in four other counties with whom it has contracts, but they are unhelpful for the same reasons.

27 See GTL Protest at 23-24.

28 Telmate refuses to show the percentage increase for each contract. Instead they just say the range is 10- 150%. Thus it is possible – and given Telmate’s lack of candor, probable – that the other counties cited are closer to 10% than 150%.

Telmate also cites a 68% increase in call volume in the Oregon prison system as

“particularly relevant” because its unspecified “restrictions” are supposedly similar to

Georgia’s.29 First, at the risk of stating the obvious, an increase in 68% is a far cry from

300%. Second, although Telmate claims that Oregon has 14 calls per inmate per month on average, a 68% increase means that Telmate started with 8.4 calls per inmate per month when it began providing services in Oregon in 2012, whereas it would begin with an average of 3 calls per inmate per month here. Even assuming Oregon is an analogous example, GTL’s projected increase of 66% (increasing from 3 to 5 calls per inmate per month) is a far more reasonable projection here.

GTL showed in its Appeal and Protest brief that it could pay the state 86% of what Telmate was offering on 60% of the projected call volume. Telmate tries to dismiss this as a “meaningless number” because the MMG is paid regardless of revenue. To the contrary, the number is significant because Telmate’s false assumption of call volume changed the economics of its entire bid – it was as if Telmate was permitted to assume it was servicing a department of corrections more than twice the size of GDC. The MMG must bear some relation to actual call volume30 – yet Telmate’s did not. Had GTL chosen to make the same fantastical assumptions, it could have conceivably increased its MMG and its commission rates even higher than Telmate’s.

Telmate argues that regardless of the unreasonableness of its projections, the

MMG “protects GDC’s interests” because GDC will receive the MMG for the duration of the contract. However, the MMG is intended to be the floor, not the ceiling – it is what

29 See Telmate Br. at 4.

30 See GPM § 2.4.1 (“The RFQ process identifies the lowest priced responsive and responsible bidder(s) for contract award; provided, however, no contract award will be made to the bidder with the lowest cost if the state entity determines the low cost bidder cannot clearly perform the contract requirements.”).

should minimally come to the state under this contract. DOAS’s task was to maximize the state’s commissions, yet by accepting a bid based on unreasonably inflated projections, DOAS has limited the upside of what it can reasonably expect to gain through this deal.

Finally, Telmate argues that their unreasonable call volume assumption cannot be used against them at this stage because call volume was not a scored component of the RFP. This is a disingenuous argument, as call volume necessarily drove the economics of Telmate’s bid – as noted above, Telmate’s response equated call volume and gross revenues as essentially the same statistic.31 If Telmate’s projected call volume was not a reliable number, then it necessarily had a spillover effect rendering all of their revenue numbers invalid.

Despite the above information being readily available to DOAS in the bidding process, DOAS permitted Telmate’s unreasonable assumption of a 300% call increase.

In doing so, DOAS allowed Telmate an unfair advantage by artificially inflating its score on projected financial benefit to the State, one of the factors used to make its determination. Telmate’s bid should instead be rejected as unreasonable, and the contract should be awarded to GTL for the reasons set forth herein.

3. Telmate’s Response Confirms that Its Proposal Included Hidden Fees, Deeming its Initial Proposal Non-Responsive

Telmate does not dispute that its initial proposal included hidden fees that were explicitly prohibited by the RFP. Instead, it contends that its hidden fees were not necessarily “hidden” because GDC ultimately discovered the fees and asked for clarification. Getting caught did not relieve Telmate of the obligation to clearly note any

31 See Telmate Br. at 4-5, attempting to justify its assumption of a 300% increase in call volume in Georgia with a 158% increase in gross revenues in Oklahoma County, OK.

exception it had to the mandatory questions of the RFP, which it failed to do. 32

Telmate’s initial responses to questions J.1.20 and J.4.7 unequivocally state that

Telmate: “Read, agree[d], and will comply” for those mandatory questions.33 As the

RFP makes clear, this response should only be used when the contractor is “in full compliance with the section or numbered item.”34 Telmate’s failure to clearly note these exceptions violated the clear terms of the RFP that no additional hidden fees should be included, and its response should have been stricken from consideration as nonresponsive.

Telmate attempts to downplay its violation of the RFP, relying on GDC’s “broad discretion” to ignore such violations.35 GDC, however, does not have broad discretion when it comes to nonresponsive answers that would provide the offeror with a competitive advantage. The GPM makes clear that the type of bid submitted by Telmate should have been thrown out at the outset: “Exceptions to a solicitation which give a supplier a competitive advantage or which cause the supplier to fail to meet a mandatory requirement cannot be accepted.”36 Instead, GDC allowed Telmate to continue in the bid process despite its violation of basic procurement rules.

Telmate also cites several “deficiencies” with GTL’s initial proposal as support for its contention that GDC had discretion to allow Telmate to clarify its proposal.37

32 GPM § 4.5.3.

33 GTL Protest at Ex. 8.

34 RFP at Attachment J (emphasis added).

35 Telmate Br. at 7.

36 GPM § 4.5.3 (emphasis added).

37 Telmate Br. at 7.

Contrary to Telmate’s hidden fees “exceptions,” GDC’s clarifications to GTL did not center on hidden fees or any other aspect that could potentially provide GTL with a competitive advantage.38

Telmate was not in full compliance in its initial response, which GDC recognized.

At that point, Telmate’s initial proposal should have been deemed non-responsive, and

GDC’s failure to strike Telmate’s response was in error.

4. Scoring Errors Further Demonstrate the Need to Postpone the Award of the ITS Contract

In its brief, Telmate contends that GTL was not prejudiced by any scoring error that occurred. However, given the failure by DOAS and Praeses (which has yet to respond to GTL’s Open Records Request dated May 6, 2014) to produce all documents requested, the effect of the scoring issues raised by GTL in its initial brief is unknown, and the award should be delayed until all documents have been produced.

Furthermore, scoring errors involving GTL’s evaluation were not limited to a

“one-point discrepancy.”39 GTL’s upfront “financial incentive” provided $2,000,000 for year one; $500,000 for year two; and $500,000 for year three.40 Telmate, on the other hand, indicated it would provide $1,000,000 each year for three years. While both of these proposals total an incentive of $3,000,000 over the course of three years, GDC failed to consider the time value of money, which clearly demonstrates GTL should have won on the financial incentive. The more money received upfront initially, the better benefit to the State, especially considering budget unpredictability. Under the

38 See, Telmate Br. at Exhibit J (asking GTL to: (1) provide a list of all contracts held in the last 5 years; (2) clarify if a call can be terminated when a three-way call is detected; and (3) explain its interpretation of the Georgia Unclaimed Property Act).

39 Telmate Br. at 8.

40 GTL Protest at Ex. 28.

proposals, GTL would consistently provide GDC with more money than Telmate and

Securus:

Total Money to the State Based on Financial Incentives

Year One Year Two Year Three

GTL $2,000,000 $2,500,000 $3,000,000

Telmate $1,000,000 $2,000,000 $3,000,000

Securus $1,000,000 $1,500,000 $2,000,000

Even though GTL clearly provided a better financial incentive than Telmate, it received the exact same score for the financial incentive. This clearly had a prejudicial effect on

GTL’s score, and further supports GTL’s position that the RFP should be re-bid or awarded to GTL as the most responsive and responsible bidder.

CONCLUSION

GTL recognizes that the GPM only allows an oral presentation during the

Commissioner’s formal review of the protest. GPM § 6.5.8. However, GTL is more than willing to participate in an oral presentation at this stage should DOAS desire to do so.

For the reasons stated above, the RFP must be canceled or awarded to GTL as the most responsive and responsible offeror.

This 30th day of May, 2014.

/s/ Kimberly K. Anderson Josh Belinfante Kimberly K. Anderson Matthew T. Parrish

Alexander Denton

ROBBINS ROSS ALLOY BELINFANTE

LITTLEFIELD LLC

999 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Suite 1120 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Telephone: 678-701-9381 Facsimile: 404-601-6733

Attorneys for Protestor Global Tel*Link Corporation

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this date, the undersigned certifies that a copy of this Consolidated Reply, together with all attachments, is being furnished via email to:

J. Matthew Maguire Parks, Chesin & Walbert, PC 75 14th Street, NE, 26 Floor Atlanta, GA 30309 mmaguire@pcwlawfirm.com

Dept. of Admin. Services State Purchasing Division Attn: Assistant Commissioner- Procurement 200 Piedmont Ave., SE Suite 1308, West Tower Atlanta, Georgia 30334-9010 Facsimile: (404) 657-8444 Email: protests@doas.ga.gov

Bruce P. Brown 309 North Highland Ave., NE Suite A Atlanta, GA 30307 bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com

This 30th day of May, 2014.

/s/ Kimberly K. Anderson Kimberly K. Anderson

ROBBINS ROSS ALLOY BELINFANTE

LITTLEFIELD LLC

999 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Suite 1120 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 Telephone: 678-701-9381 Facsimile: 404-601-6733 mailto:mmaguire@pcwlawfirm.com mailto:protests@doas.ga.gov mailto:bbrown@brucepbrownlaw.com

EXHIBIT 58

5/30/2014 Securus - FCC Seeks to Implement Below-Cost Inmate Calling Rates - Press Releases https://securustech.net/press-releases/-/asset_publisher/JBo9KqWeTcqo/blog/fcc-seeks-to-implement-below-cost-inmate-calling-rates;jsessionid=314F9FD18… 1/1

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Press Releases

8/13/13

« BackFCC Seeks to Implement Below-Cost Inmate Calling Rates

Dallas, August 13, 2013/PRNewswire/-- Securus Technologies, Inc., a leading provider of inmate communications services, indicated that it would oppose the Federal

Communications Commission’s (FCC) proposal to dramatically reduce inmate calling rates, eliminate payments to prisons and jails for commissions, and weaken corrections-related security. On Friday, August 9, 2013, the FCC approved, by a 2-1 vote, with a strong dissent from one Commissioner, an Order imposing unprecedented rate regulation on the inmate telecommunications industry, the final version of which is expected to be released in the next thirty days.

“I have been in telecommunications for over 41 years and have been involved in regulation for that entire time – and have never seen the FCC ignore facts and impose a solution that prices services below the cost of providing those services, and in addition, strips prisons and jails of dollars that will eliminate funding for victims assistance, inmate welfare and health programs, and will likely result in weaker security features that help to keep society safe,” said Richard A. Smith, Chief Executive Officer and

President of Securus Technologies.

“This drive by the FCC to reduce what inmates pay for calling at any cost may lead to deaths of inmates, witnesses, friends/family members of victims, and of officers that protect us as the FCC seeks to eliminate interstate commissions that we presently pay to prisons and jails. I lay that responsibility directly at the feet of the FCC – with this wrongheaded order advancing with only one purpose – to give inmates below-cost calling privileges. We continue to stand with the vast majority of our law enforcement and corrections brothers and sisters and will oppose the proposed order that the FCC discussed in their meeting and in their Press Release.”

Commissioner Pai of the FCC expressed his concern for the proposed Order and dissented, but was outvoted by the democrat-appointed Commissioners, Clyburn and

Rosenworcel, who approved the contents of the Order.

“In its Press Release, the FCC referred to prices of more than $17.00 for one 15-minute call – that very high, atypical rate is absolutely done to exaggerate the facts. Our average interstate call across all facilities is only $4.00, with higher rates at smaller facilities and lower rates at larger facilities – a far cry from $17.00 per call,” said Smith. “I have seen the FCC and inmate advocacy groups continue to quote $30.00, $50.00, and $60.00 calls – all inflated dramatically to get the attention of the FCC and advocacy groups – in an unfair way to carriers like Securus.”

“We have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in our business in customer service and in creating our proprietary inmate calling platform – the best in the industry– and we need the FCC to act in a balanced way and set cost-based rates that include commissions. As we clearly showed the FCC, calling rates include funding for prison programs that help reduce recidivism, provide needed services to innocent victims, while at the same time providing a high level of security controls to prevent inmates from conducting criminal activity while they are incarcerated.” The FCC ignored the cost data supplied by Securus and set below-cost rates. These rates will have a chilling effect on competition and may leave smaller correctional facilities without competitive choices. We are disappointed and frustrated by the FCC’s discussion and Press Release on the potential Order on Friday, August 9, 2013, and believe that we will defeat it in the Courts.

About Securus

Securus Technologies, Inc. is the leading provider of detainee communications and information management solutions, serving approximately 2,200 correctional facilities and more than 850,000 inmates nationwide. Securus' sole focus is the specialized needs of the corrections and law enforcement communities. Securus is headquartered in

Dallas, Texas, and has regional offices in Montreal, Quebec; Atlanta, Georgia; and Melbourne, Florida. For more information, please visit the Securus website at www.securustech.net

For more information, contact:

Richard Smith, (972) 277-0665

Source: Securus Technologies, Inc.

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EXHIBIT 59

Kimberly Anderson

From: Keith Eismann [keismann@securustech.net] Sent: Thursday, September 05, 2013 1:26 PM To: Pytelewski, Janet Subject: Securus Response to FCC Order Attachments: Securus Response to Pending FCC Order.pdf

Jan, Within the attachment I have provided Securus response to your request for information regarding the pending FCC Order. Please let me know if you have any further questions.

Keith

Keith R. Eismann Sr. DOC Account Executive Securus Technologies, Inc.

keismann@securustech.net Office/Cell: (210)385‐2350 www.securustech.net Technical Support: 866‐558‐2323 Friends & Family Customer Support: 800‐844‐6591

SECURUS~

Keith R. Eismann

Sr. DOC Account Executive 24 Reynosa

San Antonio, Texas 78261 210-385-23350

September 5, 2013

Janet Pytelewski Official Issuing Officer Department of Administrative Services 200 Piedmont Avenue Suite 1308, West Tower Atlanta, GA 30334

REF:Securus Response to Pending FCCOrder

Dear Ms. Pytelewski, Please accept this letter as Securus' response to your request for feedback regarding our opinion/position on the pending FCCruling (Order).

First and foremost Securus does not believe that the impending FCCOrder should be cause for any delay in the GDC'sexisting eRFP and selection of a new ITSprovider.

For many years DOC'sacross the Country have made adjustments to their inmate calling rates and contracts in response to State Utility Commission rate caps. In each of these cases, the DOCsand the inmate telephone system (ITS) providers have made mutually agreeable amendments to existing contracts in order to become compliant with mandated rate changes or rate caps. As an example, the Georgia Public Utility Commission imposed a rate caps for inmate calls within the State of Georgia. MC!,the provider of the ITSto the State of Georgia at that time, re-negotiated the contract with the GDCand implemented compliant rates. Securus respectfully requests that the GDCallow for these same type of mutually negotiated adjustments be made in the new ITScontract.

As of this date, the FCChas not released a final Order. We do however expect that the Order will be released within the next 30 days and we expect that this Order will become effective in December of 2013. Securus will comply with the Order. Securus and other ITSproviders as well as customers will likely appeal the Order by filing federal lawsuits. Securus will take these actions because we do not believe that the Order will be in the best interest of the corrections industry and will likely have adverse impacts to programs supported by commissions we pay back to the industry as well as the overall security of the services we provide.

Our analysis indicates that the largest negative impact will be to our smaller clients at the City and County level. As we have in the past, we will always support our client base and intend to act on their behalf in protesting the Order.

SECURUS~

With regard to Rates and Commissions specific to the GDC,we firmly support the rates that have been selected by the GDCfor implementation under the new contract. The interstate rates are very close to those as noted by the FCCwithin their press release and expected to be within the final Order. At any point during the contract term, should these rates and/or commissions need to be adjusted, Securus will work with the GDCto comply with the changes and ensure that the overall impact to the GDCis minimal, that the security of the system remains intact and that services to the friends and family members continue without interruption.

We are committed to supporting our client base and submit that if the GDCbecomes our client, we will always do what we believe is right for the GDC,the ITSuser community and the ITSindustry.

Should have you have any further questions regarding this issue, please let me know.

Keith R.Eismann Sr. DOCAccount Executive Securus Technologies, Inc.