Atch_6a_-_DD_254_Handling_FOUO.doc

EXHIBIT A

GUIDANCE FOR HANDLING

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) INFORMATION

1. For OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) Explained. FOUO information is not classified according to Executive Order, but is exempt from disclosure to the public under exemptions 2 through 9 of the (FOIA). Do not consider or mark any other records FOUO. FOUO is not authorized as a form classification to protect national security interests.

2. Prior FOUO Application. A FOUO marking is not a conclusive basis for withholding a record under the FOIA. When such a record is requested, evaluate the information in it to determine if FOIA exemptions apply and whether a discretionary release is appropriate.

3. Time to Mark Records. Marking records when they are created gives notice of FOUO content but does not eliminate the need to review a record requested under the FOIA. Examine records with and without markings before release to identify information that needs continued protection and qualifies as exempt from public release.

4. Distribution Statement. Information in a technical document that requires a distribution statement according to AFI 61-204 must show that statement. The originator may also apply the FOUO marking, as appropriate.

5. How to Apply FOUO Markings:

a. Mark an unclassified document containing FOUO information “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” at the bottom, on the outside of the front cover (if any) on each page containing FOUO information, on the back page, and on the outside of the back cover (if any).

b. In unclassified documents, note that the originator may also mark individual paragraphs that contain FOUO information to alert the users and assist in the review process.

c. Mark an individual paragraph in a classified document that contains FOUO information, but no classified information, by placing “(FOUO)” at the beginning of the paragraph.

d. Mark an individual page in a classified document that has both FOUO and classified information at the top and bottom with the highest security classification of information on that page.

e. Mark an individual page in a classified document that has FOUO information, but no classified information, “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” at the bottom of the page.

f. If a classified document also contains FOUO information, or, if the classified material becomes FOUO when declassified, place the following statement on the bottom of the cover or the first page, under the classification marking. If declassified, review the document to make sure material is not FOUO and not exempt under the FOIA before public release.

g. Mark other records, such as computer printouts, photographs, films, tape, or slides, “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” or “FOUO” in a way that ensures the recipient or viewer knows the record contains FOUO information.

h. For FOUO material sent outside the DoD to authorized recipients, place and expanded marking to explain its meaning. Do this by typing or stamping the following statement on the document before transfer. This document contains information EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE UNDER THE FOIA. Exemption(s) applies (apply). (Further distribution is prohibited without the approval of (enter OPR).

6. Procedures for Releasing, Disseminating, and Transmitting FOUO Material. FOUO information may be sent within DoD components and between officials of DoD components and authorized DoD contractors, consultant, and grantees to conduct official business for the DoD. Inform recipients of the status of such information, and send the material in a way that prevents unauthorized public disclosure. Make sure documents that transmit FOUO material call attention to any FOUO attachments. Normally, FOUO records may be sent over facsimile equipment. To preclude unauthorized disclosure, consider such factors as attaching special cover sheets, location of sending and receiving machines, and availability of authorized personnel to receive the FOUO information. FOUO information may be passed to officials in other departments and agencies of the executive and judicial branches to fulfill a government function. Mark the records “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,” and tell the recipient the information is exempt from public disclosure under the FOIA and if special handling instructions apply.

7. Sending FOUO Information by United States Postal Service. Send records containing FOUO information in a way that will not disclosure their contents. When not mixed with classified information, individuals may send FOUO information by First Class Mail or Parcel Post. Bulky shipments, such as distribution of FOUO directives or testing materials, that otherwise qualify under postal regulations, may be sent by Fourth-Class Mail.

8. Electrically Transmitted Messages. Mark each part of an electrically transmitted message that contains FOUO information. Unclassified messages containing FOUO information must show the abbreviation “FOUO” before the beginning of the text.

9. Safeguarding FOUO Information:

a. During Duty Hours. During normal duty hours, place FOUO records in an out-of-sight location, if the work area is open to non-government people.

b. During Non-duty Hours. At the close of business, store FOUO records to prevent unauthorized access. File such material with other unclassified records in unlocked files or desks, etc., when the Government or a Government contractor provides normal internal building security during non-duty hours. When there is no such internal security, locked buildings, or rooms usually provide adequate after hours protection. If you desire additional protection, store FOUO material unlocked containers, such as file cabinets, desks, or bookcases.

10. The Termination, Disposal, and Unauthorized Disclosure of FOUO:

a. Terminating FOUO Material. The originator or other component authority should remove FOUO markings or indicate on the document the markings no longer apply when circumstances show that the information no longer needs protection from public disclosure. When a record in no longer FOUO, tell all known holders, to the extent practical. Do not retrieve records in file or storage only for that purpose.

b. Disposing of FOUO Material. Destroy FOUO materials by shredding, in any type shredder, to preclude reconstruction.

c. Unauthorized Disclosure. The unauthorized disclosure of FOUO records is not an unauthorized of classified information. However, the Air Force and DoD contractor personnel have a duty to take reasonable actions to protect FOUO records under their control from unauthorized disclosure. Appropriate administrative actions should be taken to fix responsibility for such information protected by the Privacy Act (PA) may also result in civil or criminal sanctions against individuals or against the Air Force. Tell the organization about an unauthorized disclosure of its records.

11. Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI). UCNI is sensitive unclassified information subject to special handling as outlined in DoD Directive 5210.83. The likelihood of your company coming in contact with UCNI is remote. However, if the situation does arise, employees will protect the information in the same manner as FOUO information, contact the company Security Officer who, in turn, will obtain guidance from its Security Officer (30 SFS/SFAC).

EXHIBIT B

CONTRACTOR IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

FOR THE

BASE ANTI TERRORISM PROGRAM

1. Policy and Scope. Terrorism is criminal activity which can occur at anytime, anywhere, and involve any person or organization. Air Force policy is to protect, to the best of its ability, U. S. Air Force personnel, their dependents, facilities, and equipment form terrorists acts.

a. At Vandenberg AFB this includes non-Air Force and contractor organizations and their personnel working on the installation at the time of a terrorist action, planned or actual.

b. Based upon terrorist threat assessment guidelines, the existence, capability, and intentions of a terrorist organization committing an act of aggression on Vandenberg AFB is almost negligible. Nonetheless, there are no guarantees. We must be prepared. There is no better protection than prevention through training. Accordingly, the base anti terrorism program will be periodically exercised (tested). Air Force and non-Air Force organizations will be expected to participate in these occasional exercises (tests). Contractor organizations will also participate to the extent such participation does not interfere with accomplishment of its contractual obligations or participation has been expressly denied by a contracting officer.

2. Sources of Authority:

a. AFI 31-210, The Air Force Anti terrorism (AT) Program, as supplemented by HQ AFSPC.

b. 30 SW OPlan 207-94, Vandenberg AFB Installation Security Plan

3. General Information. The AF Anti terrorism Program is an established DoD policy to protect DoD personnel, dependents, facilities and equipment from terrorist acts. At Vandenberg AFB this also includes non-Air Force and contractor organizations and their personnel working on the installation. It further seeks to deter or prohibit the success of terrorist acts against the USAF community through the collection and dissemination of timely threat information, informative awareness programs and implementation of sound defense measures. These defense measures defined in four levels of terrorist threat conditions (THREATCONs). The four levels of THREATCONs are ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE and DELTA.

a. THREATCON ALPHA. A general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities exists, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable. Circumstances do not justify fully implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures, but certain measures from higher THREATCONs may be necessary based on intelligence reports, or as a deterrent. Installation commanders must be able to maintain this THREATCON indefinitely.

b. THREATCON CHARLIE. An incident occurs, or intelligence is received that indicates imminent terrorist acts against personnel and facilities. These measures are intended to be short term; maintaining them for a long time will probably create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

c. THREATCON DELTA. A terrorist attack occurred or intelligence indicates that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is a local condition.

4. High Risk Targets. High risk targets on Vandenberg AFB are USAF controlled and restricted areas, contractor closed areas, facilities that house command and control centers or equipment of indispensable value to accomplishment of the organization’s mission, and other targets designated which may be attractive for terrorist attack.

5. Notification Process. Notification from the Wing Command Post down to the contractor’s point of contact is directive in nature and cannot be changed. The contractor may, however, implement a notification process of its own choosing.

a. The 30 SW Command Post notifies the Commander, 30th Logistics Group

(30LG/CC).

b. The 30 LG/CC notifies the Commander, 30th Contracting Squadron

(30CONS/CC).

c. The 30 CONS/CC notifies the Chief, Contract Administration Flight

(30CONS/LGCA).

d. The 30 CONS/LGCA notifies the contractor’s predetermined point of contact

(POC).

6. THREATCON Defensive Measures. The terrorism THREATCONs listed below describe progressive levels of terrorist threat to Vandenberg AFB and its assigned and attached personnel. Implementation of defensive security measures is a responsibility of the Commander, 30th Space Wing (30 SW/CC). Directors or Program Managers of contractor organization will implement the defensive measures on a “best effort” basis. In other words, the contractor will provide uninterrupted operations support. THREATCON actions will be accomplished as a secondary initiative to accomplishment of the mission.

a. ALPHA:

(1) Brief all building occupants.

(2) Post 30 SW VA 207-3, THREATCON warning (ALPHA).

(3) Secure unused buildings, rooms, and storage areas.

(4) Make periodic checks of parking areas for unknown or suspicious vehicles.

(5) Identify all unknown or suspicious persons in facilities and work areas.

(6) Check all work areas at the beginning and end of each work day.

b. BRAVO:

(1) Continue all actions required by THREATCON ALPHA.

(2) Post 30 SW VA 207-4, THREATCON warning (BRAVO).

(3) Move vehicles and objects such as crates, trash containers at least 25 meters (82 feet) from buildings and critical resources, especially those of a sensitive nature.

(4) Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles, POV and GOV, and check vehicles prior to operation.

(5) Where feasible, check at least 50% of all handcarried items by visitors (briefcases, boxes, etc.) brought into buildings or critical resources.

c. CHARLIE:

(1) Continue all actions required by THREATCONs ALPHA and BRAVO.

(2) Post 30 SW VA 207-5, THREATCON warning (CHARLIE).

(3) Limit entry points to buildings and facilities to the absolute minimum.

(4) Search all handcarried items brought into facilities and buildings.

(5) Deny entry of vehicles to parking lots in or around mission critical resources.

d. DELTA:

(1) Continue all actions required by the previous THREATCONs.

(2) Post 30 SW VA 207-6, THREATCON warning (DELTA).

(3) Identify all vehicles within operational or mission critical support areas.

(4) Make frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and parking area.

(5) Minimize all administrative journeys and visits.

EXHIBIT C

30TH SPACE WING

ITEMS OF CRITICAL INFORMATION

Definition: The term “undisclosed” means there is no evidence that information associated with a specific item has been previously approved for release to the public, i.e., PA has not reviewed nor sanctioned the release, and there is an absence of “open source” documentation which could otherwise be used to suggest that the same information can be found in the public domain.

1. Communication frequencies used to support special operations

2. Call sign rosters or other listings which identify personnel assignments or postings

3. Undisclosed system capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities

4. Communication equipment layouts/drawings which reveal location of lines and specialized equipment, including E-Mail/LAN configuration and critical junctions for fiber optic transmission terminal locations

5. Unique vulnerabilities associated with specific computer system(s), program(s), or network(s) which allows unauthorized penetration of files

6. Vulnerabilities regarding an organization’s ability to accomplish its mission, i.e., limiting factors such as lack of available munitions, critical personnel and/or specialized equipment

7. Contingency, deployment and base support plans

8. Diagrams/blueprints of mission critical facilities

9. Details of security systems used to protect resources

10. Resource protection surveys which identify deficiencies/vulnerabilities of mission critical facilities

11. Present and contingency fuel requirements for launch and base support operations

12. Schedules of operational movement of toxic propellants, satellite vehicles, and aircraft with respect to military operations, exercises and missile operations

13. Information which associates schedule of events, transportation itinerary and deployment messages

14. Undisclosed details of mobility/deployment support requirements, i.e., facts regarding types, numbers of weapons, medicine, etc.

15. Undisclosed instrumentation capabilities, limitations, specifications and operational guidelines

16. Details relating to capabilities and limitations of current or future weapon/space systems which reveals undisclosed technical or military critical information

17. Results of surveys/tests and evaluations which identify vulnerabilities/weaknesses of mission critical or sensitive systems

18. Response tactics used by the Security Police, i.e., anti-terrorism, anti-robbery, anti-hijacking, and countermeasures used during threat conditions

19. Information compiled from either sole source or multiple sources which can enable an adversary to determine actual manning strength of the Wing and its ability to support missions, i.e., unit manpower documentation (UMD), Automated Security Clearance Approval System (ASCAS) roster, qualification/training reports, mobility lists, recall lists, etc.

20. Details relating to visits/itineraries of 14th AF/CC, 30th SW/CC, and VIPs

21. Status of war reserve materials, i.e., mobility gear, deployable arms and munitions, etc.

22. Contractor proprietary information or information which the contractor has identified as critical information to their company’s success

23. Contractor performance evaluations which describes or correlates to a limiting capability for the Wing to successfully complete a program, project or mission

24. Undisclosed research, development or technical information clearly identified as not intended for dissemination to the public domain

25. Information describing purpose, target or customer of intelligence information

26. Unclassified, but undisclosed information identifying sources, methods, capabilities of intelligence collection methods

Attachment 6a, 576 LSS

FA4610-17-R-0011