c.ATT 2 - 041717_Bldg_Sec_Policy_FINAL.pdf

Building Physical Security Requirements

For:

Fire, Administrative, and Other Facilities

Major Recreation Sites Explosive Magazines

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USDA Forest Service

Pacific Northwest Region Alaska Region Pacific Northwest Research Station

Building Physical Security Requirements April 17, 2017

Executive Summary Federal Agencies have been directed by a combination of Presidential, OMB, and National Security mandates to enhance building security. This document synthesizes the information from a range of directives and guidelines, and puts it in a cohesive format so that people who do not work with security on a daily basis can use it to figure out what they need to do. It was written to provide Forest Service engineers and facility managers a resource to help clarify the physical security requirements Forest Service facilities are expected to meet.

This document covers physical security requirements only. There are set standards for operational security, which includes items such as Occupant Emergency Plans, after-hours procedures, managing access within the facility, mail handling, etc. They are not addressed in this document.

Those items fall under the operation of the facility and should be handled accordingly.

Determining the Facility Security Level (FSL) is the first step in determining the measures that are required to protect a building. The FSL is comprised of five equally weighted security evaluation factors: Mission Criticality, Symbolism, Facility Population, Facility Size, and Threat to Tenant Agencies. A sixth factor – Intangibles – allows the assessor to consider other factors unique to the facility needs. Nearly all Forest Service facilities will rank out as either Level I or Level II, with only a handful of facilities ranking out higher.

A wide range of undesirable events has been assessed by the Interagency Security Committee to determine their potential likelihood and the countermeasures needed to mitigate the risk. The mitigation measures presented in this document cover the likely undesirable events that may affect Forest Service facilities within Regions 6 and 10 and the Pacific Northwest Research Station.

New construction is expected to meet the level of protection required by its Facility Security Level.

In some cases, site limitations may restrict standoff distances, or some measures may be too cost prohibitive. However, the required security measures should be identified as early in the process as possible, so that they can be incorporated into the project up front without the need for exceptions.

Leased facilities are also expected to meet these requirements. If, during the leasing process, it is determined that available facilities cannot meet minimum requirements, then the lease acquisition should be reconsidered. If there are no other options, the highest level of protection that is achievable should be implemented and documented.

For existing facilities, once the FSL is known, this document can be used to determine if a facility’s existing Level of Protection matches up with its required Level of Protection. If the existing does not match up with the required, then either a plan can be developed to improve the existing Level of Protection or the Designated Line Officer, which is the Forest Supervisor, can approve a variance to the required Level of Protection.

All facilities will require a physical assessment. An assessment should be done once every 5 years for Level I and II buildings, and once every 3 years for Level III buildings. Any facility can be reviewed at any time, if the situation changes and conditions warrant it.

The Union has not waived its bargaining rights pertaining to the policy. Recognizing that the circumstances under which this policy is applied will vary from one instance to the next and from one location to the next, any bargaining obligations implicated by the policy should be addressed at the time they arise, normally through the Agency’s notification of the Union through Article 8 or Article 11 procedures, or both.

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND AND DIRECTIVES

FACILITY SECURITY LEVELS (FSL)

FSL Matrix FSL Scoring Criteria Definitions

Mission Criticality Symbolism Facility Population Facility Size Threat to Tenant Agencies Intangible Factors

LEVEL OF PROTECTION (LOP)

VARIANCES

HISTORIC BUILDINGS

SECURITY REVIEW OCCURRENCE

SITE SECURITY CRITERIA

Level I – Minimum Level of Protection Level II – Low Level of Protection Level III – Medium Level IV – High

BUILDING DESIGN CRITERIA AND SECURITY FEATURES

Site Security Criteria

Signage Setback Vehicle Access to Site Controlled Parking Areas Clear Zones Landscape Design Storage, Container, and Receptacle Placement Restricted Areas Bollards and Barriers Fencing Site Lighting Utility Protection Propane Tanks

Structure Security Criteria Blast Resistant – Façade, Structure, Progressive Collapse Blast Resistance for Windows Air Intake and Ventilation System Protection

Facility Entrance Security Criteria Facility Entrance Considerations Perimeter Doors Access Control Systems

Interior Security Criteria Non-Public and Critical Areas

Security Systems Criteria

Video Surveillance Systems (VSS) Intrusion Detection System (IDS), General Duress Alarms Public Address System (PA) Emergency Communications Voice and Alarm Systems

Electronic Infrastructure Protection Battery Backed Up UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) Emergency Generators

Cyber Security Criteria Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS)

SPECIFIC FACILITY REQUIREMENTS

Reception Areas Laboratories Law Enforcement Offices Aircraft Sites Child Care Centers (CCCs) Hazardous Material Storage Buildings, Gas & Oil Houses Explosive Magazines Tree Coolers and Nursery Storage Coolers

ACRONYMS

DEFINITIONS

Introduction Federal Agencies have been directed by a combination of Presidential, OMB, and National Security mandates to enhance building security. Some of the guidelines apply to all Forest Service facilities, and some apply to certain types of facilities. Because so many documents cover security, it can become confusing as to what should actually be followed.

As a result, the Building Physical Security Requirements was written to provide Forest Service engineers and facility managers a resource to help clarify the physical security requirements Forest Service facilities are expected to meet. This document condenses the physical security standards into a single location and describes the required standards so that people who do not work with security on a daily basis can use it to figure out what they need to do.

It defines the process used to determine the level of security a facility needs, and it provides the countermeasures the facility should meet based on its Security Level. It also provides guidance for how to deal with variances. This process applies to both proposed and existing facilities.

New construction, with few exceptions, is expected to fully meet the level of protection required by its Facility Security Level (FSL). In some cases, site limitations may restrict standoff distances, or some measures may be too cost prohibitive. However, the required security measures should be identified as early in the process as possible, so that they can be incorporated into the project up front without the need for exceptions.

Leased facilities are also expected to meet these requirements. The initial FSL determination for newly leased space shall be made as soon as practical after the identification of a space requirement, including succeeding leases. The determination should be made early enough in the space acquisition process to allow for the implementation of required countermeasures, or reconsideration of the acquisition caused by an inability to meet minimum physical security requirements.

For existing facilities, once the FSL is known, the document can be used to determine if a facility’s existing Level of Protection matches up with its required Level of Protection. If the existing does not match up with the required, then either a plan can be developed to improve the existing Level of Protection or the Designated Line Officer, which is the Forest Supervisor, can approve a variance to the required Level of Protection. Any time a facility undergoes a major renovation, these security standards should be reviewed and mitigating any deficiencies should be incorporated into the project.

Security activities tend to fall into one of two categories: physical or operational. Physical security is tied to the site itself: its landscaping, the locks, doors, windows, and the electronic systems used to keep the facility and its occupants safe. Operational security covers how people operate; it involves such things as key management, mail handling, after hours procedures, emergency plans, etc.

This document covers physical security requirements only. There are set standards for operational security; however, they are not addressed in this document. Those items fall under the management of the facility and should be handled accordingly.

The Union has not waived its bargaining rights pertaining to the policy. Recognizing that the circumstances under which this policy is applied will vary, any bargaining obligations implicated by the policy should be addressed at the time they arise, normally through the Agency’s notification of the Union through Article 8 or Article 11 procedures, or both.

Background and Directives The day after the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the President directed the Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Marshal’s Service to conduct a vulnerability assessment of federal facilities, with an emphasis on acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. The President directed the Department of Justice to assess federal office building vulnerability because of its expertise in court security. Prior to the completion of this assessment and the issuance of the DOJ Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities Report on June 28, 1995, there were no government-wide minimum standards for security at federal facilities.

Using Executive Order 12977, October 19, 1995, the President established the Interagency Security Committee (ISC). This multi-Department group developed the ISC “Security Design Criteria” to ensure that security becomes an integral part of the planning, design, and construction of new federal buildings, modernization projects, and lease agreements. The criteria consider security in all building systems and elements for every type of building occupied by Federal employees.

The ISC’s 2016 The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities directs the user to a set of standards that applies to all Government facilities whether they were owned or leased. These documents define the process to be used in determining the Facility Security Level of a building, and its Level of Protection, which serves as the basis for implementing protective measures.

There are two companion documents – Appendix A: Design-Basis Threat Report and Appendix B:

Countermeasures. The Design-Basis Threat Report goes through every possible action that the ISC can conceive of occurring at a federal facility and its potential of happening. The Countermeasures document details the mitigating actions that should be in place to prevent the design threats. Both documents are available on a need to know basis. Government users may request access by sending an email to ISCAccess@hq.DHS.gov with your full name, email address, the name of your agency, and the reason you need access.

Several of the countermeasures are based on technical documents created by other agencies. In addition, USDA has a set of security standards, and the Forest Service has some guidance on security measures. Many of those resources are cited throughout this document if further information on a topic is desired.

Because Forest Service facilities tend to have many of the same characteristics and threat potentials, this document standardizes the design requirements. If a site has a different threat level in one category than what it typically expected, then countermeasures can be modified to meet that threat level for that site. It should be understood that there are no guarantees that even the best countermeasures and procedures will fully protect our facilities from potential threats. However, experts in the physical security field recommend implementing these measures in order to protect our workforce, our visitors, and our facilities.

http://nodis3.gsfc.nasa.gov/displayEO.cfm?id=EO_12977_ https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ISC_Risk-Management-Process_Aug_2013.pdf mailto:ISCAccess@hq.DHS.gov

Facility Security Levels (FSL) Determining the Facility Security Level is the first step in determining the measures that are required to protect a building. This section describes each of those requirements so that personnel with responsibilities for security-related programs, projects, and/or operations are able to determine the FSL for a Federal facility.

The FSL determination ranges from a Level I (lowest risk) to Level V (highest risk). Nearly all Forest Service facilities will rank out as either Level I or Level II, with only a handful of facilities ranking out higher. Risk assessments will be conducted at least once every 5 years for Level I and II facilities, and at least once every three years for Level III facilities and above. The FSL will be reviewed and adjusted, if necessary, as part of each initial and recurring risk assessment.

In establishing the FSL, it is important to consider factors that make the facility a target for adversarial acts (threats) as well as those that characterize the value or criticality of the facility (consequences). In 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (HSPD-20) identified 8 National Essential Functions, which are fundamental activities the Federal Government should be able to carry out at any point, including during a major disaster. The continuity of these fundamental activities, as well as primary mission essential functions are part of determining the “value” of a facility to the government.

In addition, the threat to facilities from criminal elements must also be evaluated in determining the FSL. Consideration must be given to the risk from such acts as theft, assault, unlawful demonstrations, workplace violence, and vandalism – acts that historically occur more frequently at Federal facilities than acts of terrorism.

FSL Matrix

The FSL matrix is comprised of five equally weighted security evaluation factors with corresponding points of 1, 2, 3, or 4 allocated for each factor. The following sections provide criteria to be used in evaluating each factor and assigning points. However, the factors cannot capture all of the circumstances that could be encountered. Thus, a sixth factor – intangibles – allows the assessor to consider other factors unique to the facility needs.

To use the FSL matrix, each of the factors is examined and a point value assigned based on the provided scoring criteria. The points for all factors are then added together and a preliminary FSL is identified, based on the sum. The assessor may then consider any intangibles that might be associated with the facility. The FSL may be adjusted by either a one-level increase or a one-level decrease after considering intangibles. An adjustment to the FSL may be made (and documented) accordingly, and a final FSL determined.

https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/nspd_51.pdf

Interagency Security Committee Facility Security Level Determination Matrix

FSL Scoring Criteria Definitions

Further definition of the factors and examples of the values associated with the factors is given below.

Mission Criticality The value of a facility is largely based on its mission. The more important a facility is to the mission of the Agency, the more attractive it is to adversaries to disrupt the mission. The Mission Criticality score is based on how critical the missions carried out by the tenants in the facility are (not by the tenant agencies overall). In a multi-tenant facility, the highest rating of any tenant should be used for this factor.

Very High: Houses personnel or specialized equipment necessary to identify or respond to large-scale or unique incidents such as Emergency Operations Centers and National Fire Caches High: Designated as a shelter in the event of an emergency incident; Regional Offices;

Biological/chemical research or storage of research and development quantities of chemicals, biohazards, explosives, and similar items.

Medium: Forest Headquarters or Supervisor’s Offices, District Offices Low: Work Centers

Symbolism The symbolism of a facility is based on both its attractiveness as a target and the consequences of an event. The symbolic value is based on both its external appearance and its well-known operations inside the facility. Transnational terrorists often seek to strike at symbols of the United States.

Domestic extremist groups or individuals may seek to make a statement against government control, taxation, policies, or regulation.

A facility with a large amount of land/acreage associated with it may be perceived as large and/or of high importance regardless of the size and number of buildings housed there. This potentially increases the facility’s symbolic value. If the land associated with the facility significantly contributes to target attractiveness, document the rationale and add one point, not to exceed the maximum of 4 points, to the symbolism score.

1. Very High: A nationally significant historical event has occurred at the facility or the facility has a very high tourist load such as Multnomah Falls Interpretive Center.

2. High: Popular tourist destinations such as Cape Perpetua Visitor Center; houses large numbers of personnel required to wear uniforms and/or perceived to be well protected, such as the Willamette SO.

3. Medium: Dominant, single Federal facility in a community or rural area. Readily identifiable as a U.S. Government facility either through external features, nature of public contact, or other operations. Readily identifiable, non-facility assets (such as Fleet vehicles) located at site.

4. Low: No external features or public contact readily identifying it as a U.S. Government facility.

Facility Population The Facility Population factor is based on the peak total number of personnel in government space, including employees, onsite contract employees, and visitors. The number should not include occasional transient peaks, such as public meetings, unless it is part of normal business, and the facility is intended for that type of use.

For instance, the Facility Population for a Dispatch Center should cover the amount of people it will house during fire activity, and not just the number it has during normal operations.

If there is a childcare center on-site, it automatically receives a “Very High” ranking with a point value of 4.

Facility Size The facility size factor is based on the square footage of all federally occupied space in the facility. If the entire facility is occupied, gross square footage should be used. If only a portion of the facility is occupied, then the assignable square footage should be used.

Threat to Tenant Agencies This factor should be viewed in terms of whether the nature of public contact is adversarial, or if there is a history of adversarial acts committed at the facility. Crime statistics and past or current credible threats to all tenants in a facility – including non-federal tenants – should be considered and the highest score used for the rating.

1. Very High: Tenant mission is controversial and routinely draws attention of organized protest groups; it is located in a high-crime area, or more than 10 incidents/year requiring law enforcement/security response for unruly or threatening persons onsite.

2. High: Public contact is occasionally adversarial; there is a history of demonstrations, or 5- 10 incidents per year requiring law enforcement/security response for unruly or threatening persons onsite.

3. Medium: Generally non-adversarial public contact, located in a low-crime area, or history of demonstrations or violence directed against the Agency (not the specific facility).

4. Low: Generally, little to no public contact, no history of demonstrations at the facility, or no history of violence directed at the facility or its occupants.

Intangible Factors The Forest Supervisor may raise or lower the FSL by one level, based on intangible factors.

However, the intangible factor should not be used to raise or lower the FSL in response to a particular threat. The FSL characterizes the entire building – concerns about specific threats should be addressed with specific countermeasures, even if they are over and above those required as the baseline for a particular security level.

Short-term events could also temporarily affect the factors evaluated here. Unless these events happen on a recurring basis, they should not affect the FSL determination. Instead, contingency plans should be developed to implement temporary measures until the event has passed.

It is important to document these intangible factors and the resulting adjustments made to the FSL score. The Forest Supervisor should document any intangible factors and the associated adjustment, and retain this information as part of the official security records for that site.

Finally, the FSL intangible adjustment is not to be used for the purposes of reducing the baseline and necessary security criteria. If a facility cannot meet the baseline level of protection, risk acceptance may be necessary.

Level of Protection (LOP) Each FSL corresponds to a level of risk that then relates directly to an LOP and associated set of baseline security measures. In general, the baseline LOP will correspond to the FSL as shown in the table below:

Facility Security Level Level of Risk Baseline Level of Protection IV High High III Medium Medium II Low Low I Minimum Minimum

A wide range of undesirable events has been assessed to determine their potential likelihood and the countermeasures needed to mitigate the risk. The mitigation measures presented in this document cover the likely undesirable events that may affect Forest Service facilities within Regions 6 and 10 and the Pacific Northwest Research Station.

There may be instances where the baseline risk for an undesirable event may be higher than the baseline LOP. In those cases, a physical security specialist or Agency Law Enforcement must identify the appropriate countermeasures that will provide an LOP equivalent to the risk.

Once the LOP is identified, an evaluation of current conditions at a site should be completed to identify existing countermeasures. If the existing countermeasures match up to the LOP, then they should be maintained. If they do not match up, the shortfalls should be identified and plans to address the vulnerabilities should be developed.

Variances There may be instances in which the physical limitations of a site may make achieving the appropriate LOP impossible. There may also be instances where it is impractical to meet the LOP due to its cost. For leased facilities, it may be determined that available facilities in the delineated area cannot meet the LOP, or that the terms of an existing lease might not allow the implementation of certain countermeasures.

If that is the case, then the highest achievable LOP must be identified and implemented. The additional amount of risk must be assessed and documented.

The physical security documentation for the site must clearly reflect the reason why the necessary Level of Protection cannot be achieved. The documentation should include the rationale for accepting the risk, the alternate strategies considered or implemented, and opportunities in the future to implement the necessary LOP. Variances must be approved by the Forest Supervisor.

Historic Buildings Historic buildings are addressed in the same manner as other existing buildings. Compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act must be coordinated with the State Historic Preservation Office consistent with established Agency procedures. Design alternatives for incorporating the necessary security measures into the historic property should be fully explored to balance historic preservation goals and security requirements.

Security Review Occurrence All facilities should be reviewed on a recurring basis. All Level I’s and II’s shall be reviewed every 5 years, and Level III’s every 3 years. Any facility can be reviewed at any time, if the situation changes and conditions warrant it.

Site Security Criteria Each facility is required to meet certain countermeasures based on its FSL. As could be expected, countermeasures become more detailed as the Security Level increases. The information below gives a general description of specific countermeasures for each Security Level required by the ISC.1

These are the baseline countermeasures for each level that are required to be met. These measures, as well as some additional countermeasures, are described in detail in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Definitions” section. Each countermeasure described in that section states for which FSL that countermeasure should be applied.

Level I – Minimum Level of Protection Site Security Criteria

1. Vehicle Access:

a. Limit the number of vehicle access points.

b. Designate employee and visitor parking areas.

c. Design site entrance and circulation controls to prevent high-speed approaches to buildings by vehicles.

d. Use vehicle gates to limit access to government vehicle parking. Locate Government owned vehicles in well-lit areas of fenced surface lots.

1. Landscaping: Minimize areas of concealment in and around parking areas and facilities. Apply

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles to the site.

2. Site Lighting: Install exterior lighting at entrances and exits. See the Lighting section in the “Design Criteria and Security Features” section for more details.

Structure Security Criteria

1. Air Intakes: Fresh air intakes shall be located to prevent easy ground or roof access. Provide emergency shutdown, shelter-in-place, and evacuation procedures.

2. Emergency Generator Protection: If an emergency generator is used, secure against unauthorized access and locate the emergency generator and fuel tank at least 25’ away from loading docks, entrances, and parking areas.

Facility Entrance Security

1. Access Control: Keys are an acceptable access control system for Level I facilities.

2. Visitor Access Control: Entrances are open to the public during business hours. After hours, visitor entrances are secured, and have a means to verify the identity of persons requesting access prior to allowing entry into the facility.

3. Perimeter Doors and Door Locks: Secure doors with non-removable hinges and high-security mechanical locks. Forest Service Yale locks cannot be used for facility access. See Perimeter

1 ISC– The Risk Management Process Appendix B: Countermeasures. September 2016 (For Official Use Only)

Doors and Access Control Systems in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” section for details.

4. Emergency Exit Doors: Emergency exit doors shall be secured using an automatic door closer and exit hardware that is compliant with the applicable life safety codes and standards.

Interior Security Criteria

1. Public Access: Use signage to designate non-public areas and establish procedures to prevent unauthorized access.

2. Security of Critical Areas: Secure utility, mechanical, electrical, and telecom rooms with locks and establish procedures to limit access to authorized personnel only. Secure access to interior space from the roof with locks.

3. Public Accessible Restrooms: Control access to public restrooms.

Security Systems Criteria

1. Provide an emergency phone connection via POTs (Plain Old Telephone, or analog) line or VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) if main phone system is disabled.

2. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Monitoring: If an IDS is utilized, monitor at a central station with notification to a building manager or designated Point of Contact. See Intrusion Detection Systems in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” section.

3. Duress Alarms: Implement duress procedures for emergency situations. If a duress alarm is installed, it shall have an internal bell system and external dial out capability. See Duress Alarms in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” section.

Cyber Security Criteria

1. Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS): If a BACS is in use, there needs to be documentation kept on site describing its components and their function. Ensure that the Forest Service network cannot be accessed from the BACS. Disable guest/anonymous accounts. Secure physical access to devices and cabling, and actively manage remote and/or wireless access into the BACS. See BACS in “Design Criteria and Security Features” section for details.

2. BACS Infrastructure: Ensure systems are up to date and maintained. Ensure that disposal of devices does not release sensitive data. Create and test incident response plans.

3. If external access to BACS is required (through a DSL internet connection), coordinate with CIO to secure access to the system.

Level II – Low Level of Protection Site Security Criteria

1. Vehicle Access:

e. Limit the number of vehicle access points.

f. Designate employee and visitor parking areas.

g. Design site entrance and circulation controls to prevent high-speed approaches to buildings by vehicles.

h. Use vehicle gates to limit access to government vehicle parking. Locate Government owned vehicles in well-lit areas of fenced surface lots or in segregated levels of parking lots.

2. Landscaping: Minimize areas of concealment around parking areas and facilities. Establish a clear zone and restrict landscaping from obstructing views of the VSS cameras or interfering with the lighting or intrusion detection system. Apply Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles to the site.

3. Site Lighting: Install exterior lighting at entrances, exits, parking lots, ware yard areas and VSS locations. See the Lighting section in the “Design Criteria and Security Features” section for more details.

4. Restricted Areas: Use trees, hedges, berms, or any combination of these elements to create buffer zones to separate public areas and other functions.

5. Storage, Receptacle, and Container Placement: Locate Hazardous Material lockers in a restricted area away from loading docks, entrances, and uncontrolled parking. Position trash containers, mailboxes, donation/recycle containers, vending machines or other features that could conceal devices away from building exterior or entry points.

Structure Security Criteria

1. Blast Resistance – Façade and Structure: Use construction materials that have inherent ductility (can bend, flex or move, and fails only after considerable deformation occurs) and which are able to respond to load reversals (rebound and/or uplift forces). Design and locate building docks to minimize the effects of blast on building structure and to vent explosive forces and gases.

2. Windows:

a. Utilize acceptable shatter resistant film meeting performance condition “3b” or an acceptable glazing system to reduce glass fragmentation hazards.

b. Provide blinds, curtains, or other window treatments that can be used to prevent visual observation into the facility.

c. Monitor all operable ground floor windows with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

3. Air Intakes: Locate fresh air intakes to prevent easy ground or roof access and secure grilles from tampering or removal. Provide emergency shutdown, stay in place, and evacuation procedures.

4. HVAC Controls: Protect HVAC controls from unauthorized access.

5. Emergency Generator Protection: If an emergency generator is used, secure against unauthorized access and locate the emergency generator and fuel tank at least 25 feet away from loading docks, entrances, and parking areas.

Facility Entrance Security Criteria

1. Access Control: Limit the number of building entry points to the fewest number practical.

Access control may be provided through either an ePACS (electronic Physical Access Control System) or mechanical locking system. If there is an existing proximity card system in place, it may remain in place. If there is a need to replace the system, it shall be replaced with a Linc Pass compatible system that can be integrated into the USDA security system. See Access Control Systems in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” section for details.

2. Employee Access Control: Provide a means to secure employee entrance doors and to verify the identity of persons requesting access prior to allowing entry in the facility by either physical or electronic means.

3. Visitor Access Control: Design public areas in such a manner that visitors must either be approved for unescorted access to non-public areas or be escorted at all times.

4. Perimeter Doors and Door Locks: Secure doors with non-removable hinges and high-security mechanical or electronic locks. Forest Service Yale locks shall not be used for facility access.

See Perimeter Doors and Access Control Systems in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” section for details.

5. Control of Keys and Access Media: Implement a formal key control program. If an ePACS is in place, ensure it has the ability to electronically disable lost or stolen access media.

6. Emergency Exit Doors: Emergency exit doors shall be secured using an automatic door closer and exit hardware that is compliant with the applicable life safety codes and standards.

Provide VSS coverage.

Interior Security Criteria

1. Public Access: Accommodate publicly accessible retail and mixed uses through such means as separating entryways. Use signage to designate non-public areas and establish procedures to prevent unauthorized access.

2. Security of Critical Areas: Secure utility, mechanical, electrical, and telecom rooms, with high-security locks. Establish procedures to limit access to authorized personnel only. Prevent access to interior space from the roof.

3. Publicly Accessible Restrooms: Control access to public restrooms.

4. Interior Public Spaces: Use construction materials that have inherent ductility (can bend, flex or move, and fails only after considerable deformation occurs) and which are able to respond to load reversals (rebound and/or uplift forces).

5. Mail Rooms: Use construction materials in the mail screening and receiving areas that have inherent ductility (can bend, flex or move, and fails only after considerable deformation occurs) and which are able to respond to load reversals (rebound and/or uplift forces).

Security Systems Criteria

1. Video Surveillance System (VSS) Coverage: Provide VSS coverage of locations where money transactions take place and at personnel entrances and exits. Record VSS views using a digital medium. Post signage at the entrance of the location where coverage exists.

2. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS): Provide IDS on perimeter entry and exit doors, and operable ground floor windows. Monitor at a central station with notification to a building manager or designated Point of Contact.

3. Emergency Communications: Provide an emergency phone connection via POTs (Plain Old Telephone, or analog) line or VoIP (Voice over IP) if main phone system is disabled.

4. Duress Alarms: Provide duress buttons in reception areas and at every location that handles cash transactions. Provide an audible bell at a monitored location in building and interconnection to a central station monitor with notification to a building manager or designated Point of Contact.

5. Security Systems General Operation: Provide uninterruptible emergency power to essential electronic security systems for a minimum of 1 hour of battery backup. Some security items require more than 1-hour back up and have internal batteries. See Electronic Infrastructure Protection in “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” below. Conduct security system performance testing annually. Implement a preventive maintenance program for all security systems. Any critical component that becomes inoperable must be replaced or repaired within 5 business days.

Cyber Security Criteria

1. Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS): If a BACS is in use, there needs to be documentation kept on site describing its components and their function. Ensure that the Forest Service network cannot be accessed from the BACS. Disable guest/anonymous accounts. Secure physical access to devices and cabling, and actively manage remote and/or wireless access into the BACS. See BACS in “Design Criteria and Security Features” section for details.

2. BACS Infrastructure: Ensure systems are up to date and maintained. Ensure that disposal of devices does not release sensitive data. Create and test incident response plans.

3. If external access to BACS through a DSL internet connection is required, coordinate with CIO to secure access to the system.

Level III – Medium Site Security Criteria

1. Vehicle Access:

a. Separate employee, visitor, and Government vehicle parking.

b. Limit the number of vehicle access points.

c. Design site entrance and circulation controls to prevent high-speed approaches to buildings by vehicles.

2. Controlled parking areas:

a. Limit parking to employee vehicles, authorized visitor vehicles, and government vehicles.

b. Use gates to limit access to authorized vehicle parking and other restricted areas.

Locate Government owned vehicles in well-lit areas of fenced surface lots or in segregated levels of parking lots.

c. Screen visitor vehicles before entry into the controlled parking area.

d. If the site has underground or in-building parking, control vehicle access to the parking area.

3. Pedestrian entrances: Provide vehicle barriers to protect pedestrian entrances from penetration by a vehicle. Monitor pedestrian access to parking areas utilizing guard force or

VSS.

4. Landscaping: Minimize areas of concealment around parking areas and facilities. Establish a clear zone and restrict landscaping from obstructing views of the VSS cameras or interfering with the lighting or intrusion detection system. Apply CPTED principles to the site.

5. Site Lighting: Install exterior lighting at entrances, exits, parking lots, walkways from parking areas to entrances, VSS locations and ware yard areas. See the Lighting section in the “Design Criteria and Security Features” section for more details.

6. Restricted Areas: Provide fences, walls, gates, or other barriers to prevent unauthorized access to restricted areas and monitor with VSS or guard patrols. Use access control and IDS.

7. Storage, Receptacle, and Container Placement: Locate Hazardous Material lockers in a restricted area away from loading docks, entrances, and uncontrolled parking. Position trash containers, mailboxes, donation/recycle containers, vending machines, or other features that could conceal devices away from building exterior and entry points. Monitor storage area utilizing guard force or VSS. Control access to areas.

Structure Security Criteria

1. Blast Resistance: Use a combination of setback, site planning, façade hardening, and structural measures to provide a medium level of façade protection. For buildings 4 stories or taller, use a combination of the above to prevent progressive collapse or the loss of any single exterior column or load bearing wall. Design and locate building docks to minimize the effects of blast on building structure and to vent explosive forces and gases.

2. Blast Resistance Materials; Use construction materials which have inherent ductility (can bend, flex or move, and fails only after considerable deformation occurs) and which are able to respond to load reversals (rebound and/or uplift forces).

3. Blast Resistance – Under Building Parking: Implement architectural or structural features that deny contact with exposed primary vertical load members.

4. Windows:

a. Utilize acceptable shatter resistant film meeting performance condition “3b” or an acceptable glazing system to reduce glass fragmentation hazards.

b. Provide blinds, curtains, or other window treatments that can be used to prevent visual observation into the facility.

c. Operable windows are not allowed on the ground floor. Monitor ground floor windows with IDS.

5. Air Intakes: Locate fresh air intakes to prevent easy ground or roof access and secure grilles from tampering or removal. Provide emergency shutdown, stay in place and evacuation procedures, and protect accessible air intakes with fencing. Monitor with VSS or guard patrols.

6. HVAC systems: Provide separate isolated HVAC systems in reception areas, loading docks, mailrooms and other locations susceptible to a Chemical/Biological/Radiological (CBR) attack.

7. HVAC Control: Protect the system controls from unauthorized access. Install an emergency shut-off and exhaust system for air handlers. Control movement of elevators and close applicable doors and dampers to seal building.

8. Biological Filtration: Use a Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV) 10 particulate filter on all exterior air-handling units. Use a MERV 13 particulate filter on all air-handling units in reception areas and mailrooms.

9. Protection of Water Supply: Secure handles, control mechanisms, and service connections at on-site publicly accessible locations with locks or other anti-tamper devices.

10. Emergency Generator: If an emergency generator is used, secure against unauthorized access.

Locate the emergency generator and fuel tank at least 25’ away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. Generators must be protected from physical access by fences, gates, walls, or other means.

Facility Entrance Security Criteria

1. Access Control: Limit the number of building entry points to the fewest number practical.

Access control shall be provided through an ePACS. If there is an existing proximity card system in place, it may remain in place. If there is a need to replace the system, it shall be replaced with a Linc Pass compatible system that can be integrated into the USDA security system. See Access Control Systems in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” section for details.

2. Employee Access Control: Provide an electronic access control for employee entrance doors without a guard post in conjunction with VSS coverage.

3. Visitor Access Control: Design public areas in such a manner that visitors must either be approved for unescorted access to non-public areas or escorted at all times.

4. Occupant Screening: Provide an X-ray and metal detector area for screening all occupants – and their property – that do not possess an acceptable ID for access to the facility. Design the system to minimize queuing caused by screening, visitor processing, and access control system throughput.

5. Mail/Package Handling and other Deliveries: Provide an X-ray screening area for all mail and packages at either a loading dock or an existing screening location if there is no loading dock.

6. Perimeter Doors and Door Locks: Secure doors with non-removable hinges and high-security mechanical or electronic locks. Forest Service Yale locks shall not be used for facility access.

Emergency exit doors shall be secured using an automatic door closer and exit hardware that is compliant with the applicable life safety codes and standards. Provide VSS coverage. See Perimeter Doors, Access Control Systems, and Video Surveillance Systems in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” section for details.

7. Control of Keys and Access Media: Implement a formal key control program and ensure it has the ability to electronically disable lost or stolen access media.

Interior Security Criteria

1. Space Planning: Locate critical systems and areas at least 25’ away from loading docks, entrances, mailrooms, personnel and package screening locations, and uncontrolled parking areas.

2. Blast Resistance: Implement architectural or structural features, or other countermeasures that deny contact with exposed primary vertical load members.

3. Public Access: Accommodate publically accessible retail and mixed uses through such means as separating entryways. Use signage, stanchions, counters, furniture, knee walls, etc., to establish physical boundaries to control access to non-public areas.

4. Restrooms: Place restrooms so that occupants and visitors will be screened prior to gaining access.

5. Security of Critical Areas: Secure utility, mechanical, electrical, and telecom rooms with electronic access control and IDS to control and monitor access. Prevent access to interior space from the roof using locks and IDS.

Security Systems Criteria

1. VSS Coverage: Provide Color HDMI VSS coverage of locations where money transactions take place, screening checkpoints, personnel and vehicle entrances and exits, reception areas, restricted areas, air intakes, loading docks, and storage, receptacle and container areas.

Record VSS views using a digital medium. Post signage of VSS surveillance when required.

2. IDS: Provide IDS on perimeter entry and exit doors, and all ground floor windows. Monitor at a central station with notification to law enforcement or security responders.

3. Duress Alarms: Provide duress buttons in reception areas and at every location that handles cash transactions. Provide an audible bell at a monitored location in building and interconnection to a central station monitor with notification to a building manager or designated Point of Contact.

4. Provide an emergency phone connection via POTs (Plain Old Telephone, or analog) line or VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) if main phone system is disabled.

5. Building Communication System: Provide a communication system for security and emergency announcements.

6. Security Systems General Operation: Provide uninterruptible emergency power to essential electronic security systems for a minimum of 1 hour. Some security items require more than 1 hour backup and have internal batteries. See Electronic Infrastructure Protection in the “Building Design Criteria and Security Features” section below for details. Conduct security system performance testing annually. Implement a preventive maintenance program for all security systems. Any critical component that becomes inoperable must be replaced or repaired within 72 hours.

Cyber Security Criteria

1. BACS: If a BACS is in use, there needs to be documentation kept on site describing its components and their function.

2. BACS Access: Ensure that the Forest Service network cannot be accessed from the BACS. Deny access by default/allow access by exception when there is a need. Ensure unique identifications and passwords for all individuals with a need to access the system. Secure physical access to devices and cabling, and actively manage remote and/or wireless access into the BACS. See BACS in “Design Criteria and Security Features” section for details.

3. BACS Infrastructure: Ensure systems are up to date and maintained. Ensure that disposal of devices does not release sensitive data. Backup critical data to alternate site and ensure that it is encrypted. Create and test incident response plans.

4. If external access to BACS through a DSL internet connection is required, coordinate with CIO to secure access to the system.

Level IV – High Regions 6 and 10, and the Pacific Northwest Research Station do not currently own any Level IV facilities (however, the Edith Green – Wendall Wyatt, which houses the Region 6 Regional Office and the Research Station Director’s Office, and the Hurff Ackerman Saunders Federal Buildings, which houses Region 10 Regional Office, are Level IV facilities). If the security level of any facilities changes to where it would rank as a Level IV, it will be handled as a special case.

Building Design Criteria and Security Features The following information provides further detail regarding the requirements listed above. In some instances, the information will apply to all Facility Security Levels. In others, it will only apply to certain security levels. The requirements and the level they pertain to are listed in the Table below, with each requirement described in more detail in the following sections.

Requirement Level I Level II Level III Site Security Criteria

Signage X X X Setback, Vehicle Access to Site X X X Controlled Parking Areas X Clear Zones X X Landscape Design X X X Restricted Areas X X Storage, Receptacle, and Container Placement X X X Bollards and Barriers X X Fencing X X Site Lighting

Entrances and Exits X X X Parking Lots, Ware yards, and VSS Locations X X Pedestrian Walkways X

Utility Protection X X Propane Tanks X X X

Structure Security Criteria Building Blast Resistance X X Windows – Blast Resistance X X Air Intake and Ventilation System Protection X X X Emergency Generator Protection X X X

Facility Entrance Security Criteria Facility Entrance Considerations X X X Doors X X X Access Control X X X

Interior Security Criteria Non-Public and Critical Areas X X X

Security Systems Criteria Video Surveillance System (VSS) Monitoring X X

Locations where money transactions take place X X Personnel entrances and exits X X Reception Areas X Vehicle entry/exit points, Restricted Areas X Loading docks, Air Intakes, Receptacle Areas X

Burglar/intrusion alarm systems (IDS) X X Duress Alarm X X X Public Address System X X Emergency telephone – VoIP or POTS backups X X X

Electronic Infrastructure Protection UPS emergency backup power X X Backup Generator As needed As needed

Cyber Security Criteria Building Automation and Control Systems (BACS) X X X

Site Security Criteria

Signage The following signage requirements apply to all security levels.

Where the interaction with visitors is customer-service oriented and signage improves the ability of customers to locate the facility, use distinctive external signage. Otherwise, keep external signage identifying the facility to a minimum2.

When…