CHAPTER 03 final.docx

cHAPTER 3 – TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Figures

Figure 3.1: Details of Mechanical Penetrations 18

Chapter 3 – Record of Revisions

3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS

This chapter describes the architectural and engineering design criteria used for various structures, systems, and components (SSCs) of the NBSR. Only those SSCs considered important for ensuring the operation of the facility and for the protection of NIST personnel and the public from an exposure to a radiological release are included here. Detailed descriptions of most SSCs and their functions are deferred to the relevant chapters of this SAR, as summarized in Table 3.1.

3.1 Design Criteria

3.1.1 Design of Structures

The structures important to operation of the NBSR include the Confinement Building and associated structures within, as well as attached to the building and the Liquid Waste Storage Facility. These structures and the surrounding area are fenced and controlled, restricting access by the public and other NIST employees.

3.1.1.1 Confinement Building and Associated Structures

See Chapter 6, section 6.1.2, for additional details.

3.1.1.1.1 Emergency Provisions

The maximum hypothetical accident (MHA) is postulated to be the complete blockage of flow to a single fuel element assembly, leading to a complete melting of the fuel plates with the release of all fission products to the Primary Coolant System. If fission products leak out of the Primary Coolant System, a major scram would occur as a result of high radiation levels in the ventilation system. This major scram would start a chain of automatic events: doors would close and the gaskets would seal and the shutoff valves for building penetrations would close; the normal ventilation system would shut off and the emergency ventilation system would start. The emergency ventilation system exhausts air from the Confinement Building through absolute filters (HEPA filters) and a charcoal filter bank, and then up the stack. A pressure differential sensor across the walls of the Confinement Building controls the operation of the emergency exhaust blowers after they have started. The system is designed to maintain the internal pressure at ¼ inch (0.6 cm) of water below atmospheric to assure that any leakage through the building walls is from the outside to the interior. Thus, the average exhaust rate is determined by the leakage from the outside through the confinement walls to the inside.

The leak rate requirements for the building are governed, in principle, by the maximum exhaust rate that can be tolerated from an emergency situation. The building was designed to be as tight as practicable with a conservative upper limit on the allowed in leakage rate set at 24 cubic feet per minute (cfm) for a pressure differential across the walls of one inch (2.5 cm) of water (0.27 meter3 per minute per cm). This leak rate is several times smaller than the rate at which the building would have to be exhausted to keep up with a rapidly falling barometer. On the other hand, a rising barometer would require very little or no gas to be exhausted. While the emergency exhaust system is maintaining the proper differential pressure across the Confinement Building walls, a large 5,000 cfm (140 meter3 per minute) internal recirculation system is filtering the building’s atmosphere through absolute filters and a charcoal filter. In this way, the fission products in the air within the building are rapidly removed.

Thus, the Confinement Building is not designed to be an absolute containment vessel, but rather, to confine the results of an accident and to control the rate and location at which any fission products are released.

3-3

3.1.1.1.2 Confinement Building Description

Drawings 4-3, 3-4, 3-5, and 9-GA-1 show the internal structures at various floor levels within the Confinement Building. The building has three levels: the basement where service equipment and storage facilities are located; the first floor where the reactor beams originate; and the second floor, which contains the control room and provides access to the top of the reactor. The ventilation systems in these three areas are separate so the air from one floor is not mixed with the air from another, thus limiting the spread of any airborne contamination.

The Confinement Building is of approximate cubed shape, measuring approximately 90 ft. (27 m) on a side. Additional details for the confinement building may be found in NBSR 9, section 3.1.2.1.

Basement Level

A detailed description of the basement level is given in NBSR 9, section 3.1.2.2. The Process Room contains most of the process equipment for the reactor, including heat exchangers and pumps, except for the secondary cooling system components. These are located in the secondary cooling pump building and the D-Wing.

First Floor Level

This floor is at the same level as the adjacent laboratories in Building 235 and details of the first floor may be found in NBSR 9, section 3.1.2.3.

Second Floor Level

This floor is level with the top of the reactor top shielding plug. The control room from which most activities in the building are coordinated is located on this floor along the east wall. The control room consists of three sections: the main section where the control panel is located, offices to the south, and a kitchen to the north. The control room has windows looking out over the reactor top. Offices are located on the west side of the second floor and a sizeable area adjacent to the north wall is reserved for a replacement cold box (see Chapter 10) for the cold sources on the first floor. Additional details may be found in NBSR 9, section 3.1.2.4.

Occupancy of the Building

The average occupancy is approximately 25 people during a normal working day. As expected, fewer people are in the building and the facility after hours. Both the facility and the confinement building have specific areas that are accessible only to authorized personnel. Emergency responders have resources available to them to locate personnel in any area of the building.

3.1.1.1.3 Structural Design Loads

Structural parameters presented here were used in the structural design calculations, based on the information given in the Structural Design Calculations, Book III, Volume 1, 2 and 3, Burns and Roe Inc.

Internal Pressure

The maximum internal pressure applied to the NBSR Confinement Building structure is 6 inches (15cm) of water that occurs during the building’s leak test when the building is purposely sealed and pressurized by external fans. The building is designed to withstand this pressure, with the resulting stresses remaining well within the bounds of all applicable structural design codes delineated in American Concrete Institute (ACI), American Institute for Steel Construction (AISC), Pre-stressed Concrete Institute (PCI) and American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) codes and standards.

External loads

Wind, snow, earthquake, soil pressures, and hydrostatic pressures generate external loads on the NBSR Confinement Building. In accordance with good design practice, applicable structural design codes, and site meteorological data, the design wind load is 25 psf (1,200 N/m2), i.e., approximately 100 mph (160 km/h), and the design snow load is 25 psf (1,200 N/m2). The structure was designed to meet the Building Officials and Code Administrators (BOCA) Codes for the area, and NBSR 16, section 2.5 concludes that the building would not be subjected to a lateral acceleration of greater than 0.1 g; the Virginia earthquake of August 23, 2011, the epicenter of which was approximately 100 miles from the site, produced lateral accelerations of less than 0.07 g at the four United States Geological Survey monitoring stations (http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shakemap/global/shake/082311a) in Gaithersburg. Soil pressure and hydrostatic pressures were calculated on the basis of the data that were obtained from analyzing the site test borings. A soil pressure of 95 psf (4,550 N/m2) was used for designing the structural walls, the storage pool, and the canal sidewalls.

Internal and Structural loads

The internal and structural loads in the NBSR Confinement Building result from the dead loads of the reactor proper, the building and reactor operational equipment, the structural components of the building itself, and the live loads of personnel, experimental equipment, and operational equipment. The dead load tabulation for the building structures, exclusive of the reactor is given in Table 3.2, and that for the reactor in Table 3.3. Table 3.4 has the live loads used in the design of the Confinement Building.

3.1.1.1.4 Building Structure Construction

The NBSR Confinement Building is a reinforced concrete structure on a driven steel pile foundation. Except for the main roof beams and eight 10-inch (25-cm) Wf beams in the central column, all interior beams and columns were poured in place. The roof beams are of Type IV pre-stressed steel reinforced concrete, as defined by the PCI Publication “Design Handbook: Precast and Prestressed Concrete.”

Above the lower floor, all loads are transmitted by the exterior walls or a large central column the biological shield and subpile room walls are an integral part. At the lower floor level, columns and shielding walls, 3 to 5 feet (1 to 1.5m) thick in most cases, give additional support far in excess of that needed for structural integrity.

Both structural and shielding requirements were considered in designing the exterior walls. The thickness, which resulted from these structural requirements, was far in excess of any shielding requirements and, therefore, the structural requirements were the controlling design parameters.

The roof of the building is designed for shielding from “sky shine,” from snow loading, and from the differential pressure loadings that occur during the building’s leak rate tests.

Foundation

The primary components of the foundation for the Confinement Building are 362 twelve-inch (30-cm) BP section steel piles (bearing piles) at 74 pounds per linear foot (110 kg/m) (Federal specification QQ-S-741a, Type I or Type II, ASTM A7 or A373 with an aggregate length for 12,550 feet). Each pile is of 95 tons (86,000 kg) capacity, driven to refusal by a hammer with a minimum of 15,000 foot-pounds per blow. Refusal was defined as a maximum penetration of 0.25” (0.6 cm) in the last five blows. Control test piles were individually inspected under the supervision of a registered Professional Engineer and in the presence of the Construction Engineer representing the General Service Administration (GSA). The test required that the net settlement at the top of the test pile be not more than 0.005 inch per ton under twice the design load of 95 tons (86,000 kg), and that the increment of settlement for any increment of load shall not exceed 0.01 inch per ton until twice the design load was applied.

Storage Pool and Canal

The wall of the storage pool and canal was formed from sheet piling of the continuous interlock type steel, conforming to ASTM A-328. The reinforced concrete pool and canal walls are designed to tolerate a wet soil pressure of 95 psf (4,550 N/m2) per foot below floor level and a hydrostatic head of 62.4 psf (3,000 N/m2) per foot below floor level. The sheet piling was needed to protect the adjacent foundation areas during construction. When the pool is filled, the internal and external pressures partially cancel each other. For dry soil, where the pressure is 65 psf, the walls are essentially unloaded.

Building Leak Proofing

In addition to the normal design features for preventing inward leakage from ground water, and rain, the NBSR Confinement Building was designed to prevent the outward leakage of radioactive materials.

Waterproofing the building is an essential element in leak proofing. A five-ply membrane waterproofing system consisting of five layers of fabric and six layers of pitch covers all exterior basement walls of the building and extends continuously under all basement foundations to form a complete seal. The waterproofing on outside walls that are exposed to damage by back fill is covered by ½ inch (1.3 cm) thick insulating fiberboard (Federal Specification LLL-I-535). All horizontal portions of the waterproofing, except those under concrete slabs, are covered with a ¾ inch (1.9 cm) thick (minimum) layer of Portland cement mortar. Horizontal surfaces of the waterproofing under concrete slabs are protected by 1 inch (2.5 cm) of concrete.

All construction joints, including the roof slab to wall joints, have in them a 6 inch x 3/16 inch (15 cm x 0.5 cm) bulbed polyvinyl chloride water stop. Water stops located in expansion joints have a strength of not less than 1800 psi (12.4 MPa) and an elongation of not less than 350% when tested in accordance with ASTM D-412, and a cold-bend brittle temperature of not higher than -20ºF (-29ºC) when tested in accordance with ASTM D-746.

Preparing and coating the surface of the building’s wall was a major facet of the design and construction techniques used to assure a leak-tight building. All walls received the following elastomeric coatings: rust inhibitive primer for ferrous metal surfaces; polychloroprene, i.e. Neoprene, primer for concrete and concrete-masonry unit surfaces; fabric reinforcing sheet and polychloroprene sheet for sealing strips and cracks; polychloroprene adhesive for polychloroprene sheet; polychloroprene body coats for all surfaces; and, chlorosulfonated top coating, e.g. Hypalon, for all surfaces. The body coats were applied in alternate black and red coats to verify complete coverage with each coat. Any point in the surfacing system that showed pinholes, blisters, or other discontinuities was removed down to the body coats and recoated.

This coating system ensured a continuous15 to 20 mil (4 to 5 micron) elastomeric membrane over all containment surfaces, effectively closing any porosity of the masonry structure.

Standards of Materials

The pertinent parts of the GSA Specification for this project (Project No. 18112) are discussed here. This specification covers most of the materials used in the Confinement Building.

Reinforcing steel specified for the NBSR building conformed to Federal Specification QQ-S-632, Type II, and intermediate grade billet steel with deformation conforming to ASTM specification A-305, and a design tensile strength of 20,000 psi (138 MN/m2). All field splices in reinforcing steel were lapped a minimum of 30 bar diameters. All dowels were embedded in concrete for a minimum of 30 bar diameters.

Coarse aggregate for concrete was specified to Federal Specification SS-A-281b, class 2 or C-33, sized in accordance with ACI-613, Table 2. Portland cement was specified to Federal Specification SS-C-192d or C-150. All structural concrete had specified 28-day compression strength of 3,000 psi (21 MN/m2). The proportion of cement, aggregate, and water was determined according to ACI-318, Method 2 as modified. The measuring, mixing, and delivering of ready mixed concrete with inspection and certification followed the ASTM C-94 requirements. Slump samples were taken in accordance with ASTM C-172 and tested under direction of the Construction Engineer in accordance with ASTM C-143. Slump was required to be within the recommended limits of ACI-613, Table I. Samples taken for strength tests showed that, in all cases, the specified strength was met or exceeded.

3.1.1.1.5 Penetrations Comment by Myers, Thomas J.: If only technical errors are corrected in this section, then it may be inferred that any existing penetration of the confinement building must satisfy these design details. That is highly unlikely. Waiting for management answer; inquired in 1/2014 and 2/2015. NO specific design criteria, e.g. sleeves, per management. DONE.

Tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively, set out the purpose, number, size, and type of the Confinement Building penetrations for electrical conduits, piping and other mechanical components.

Penetration design details

Each penetration must meet two distinct sealing criteria; first, the sealing of the penetrating member to the concrete walls of the building, and second, the internal sealing of any leak paths through the penetrating member.

Exterior Seals

All original pipe, conduit and tubing are sealed to the building as shown in Figure 3.6. The penetration number and the flange that is welded to it are inserted in the concrete. The outer surface of the flange is flush with the finished inside surface of the concrete. The joint between the flange and the concrete surface is then caulked and sealed with fiber-reinforced neoprene. Finally, the entire outer surface of the penetration is coated with the neoprene hypalon system described in building leak proofing in the Section 3.1.1.1.4.

Original door frames and air-system plena are sealed to the building as shown in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, respectively, and noted in Table 3.6 as “D” and “C”. Steel plates with continuously welded joints were invested in the concrete and the frames or plena were, in turn, fixed to those plates with continuous welds. All exposed welds were then caulked with a hypalon caulking compound, and coated with the neoprene-hypalon system described in the previous Section. All voids in the doorframes were filled with closed-cell urethane, which was foamed into place.

Interior Seals

All original electrical penetrations were sealed internally to the building as shown in Figure 3.9. After all conductors were in place, a sealing compound (CHICOX Fiber A05, Crouse-Hinds Company, Syracuse, New York) was poured in to the sealing box under sufficient hydrostatic head to force it into all voids between the conductors and the conduit’s inner walls.

Rubber-seated butterfly valves or dampers seal all the ducts and waste lines internally. All these devices were specified and tested to bubble-tight specifications.

Cryogenic service penetrations were sealed prior to 2004 with the same closed-cell urethane material that was used in the doorframes. This material is foamed in place to assure that the voids between the pipes that pass through this penetration are completely filled, and that there is intimate contact with an air-curing silicon rubber compound (Dow Corning RTV102) which is carried up onto the surface of the pipes to form a minimum radius of ¼ inch (0.6 cm).

All access and exit doors are sealed to their frames by inflatable rubber gaskets, as shown in Figure 3.7. Whenever these doors are automatically closed in an emergency, an internal seal pressure of approximately 20 psi (0.14 MPa) inflates the gasket and forms a sealing surface approximately an inch (2.5 cm) wide around the entire perimeter of the door. The large truck door is mechanically restrained to prevent it from being pushed away from the seal when the gasket is inflated.

Inspection of Penetrations

All new building penetrations are inspected independently of the leakage rate tests or included in the leakage rate tests as part of the normal maintenance of the building and systems.

3.1.1.1 Other Structures

Liquid Waste Collection Facility

The Liquid Waste Collection Facility is located in underground vault in front of Building 235 and collects light water from selected drains in the laboratory wings and the Confinement Building. This facility consists of a 1,000-gallon (3,800-liter) tank, two 5,000-gallon (18,900-liter) tanks, various filters, and related pumps and valves. Water collected is sampled and analyzed for its radioactive constituents and then filtered prior to release to the sanitary sewer. Credit is taken for the daily NIST site release volume of approximately 219,000 gallons (830,000 liters) to meet the concentration limits for radioactive constituents.

3.1.1.3 Provisions to Avoid or Mitigate Consequences of Fire and Explosion The Confinement Building and most structures therein are built of steel and concrete and/or aluminum and are highly fire-resistant. In addition, the following features reduce both the likelihood and consequences of a fire:

1) The large volume of water in the reactor vessel would protect the core from a fire.

2) Inventories of flammable materials (e.g., paper, wood, solvents.) in the building are controlled and minimized for industrial safety. With the assistance of trained personnel, non-essential combustible materials are identified and removed.

3) There are fire detection and alarm systems throughout the building. Pull boxes within the building provide for manual notification. The building is equipped with fire extinguishers.

4) Closed circuit cameras survey certain areas from the control room.

3.1.2 Design of Systems

The systems important to safe operation of the NBSR include the Reactor Control System, coolant systems (specifically the Primary Coolant System), the Reactor Safety System, the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems and their actuation systems, the instrument air system, the electrical distribution system, and the liquid waste system. In addition to the confinement building discussed in the previous section, the ESF systems include the ventilation system for the confinement building and the emergency cooling system. The coolant systems includes the Primary Coolant System, , the Primary Coolant Purification System, and the D2O Experimental Cooling System.

All mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation & control (I&C) systems were designed and constructed in accordance with the standards and codes at the time of their installation at the NBSR. All piping and pipe supports were designed, purchased, fabricated and installed in accordance with the standards prevalent at the time of their purchase (1963 thru 1966), e.g. American Standards Association (ASA); American Welding Society (AWS); American Standards for Testing Materials (ASTM).

Interior electrical work including, cables, cable trays, electrical power and control equipment, instrumentation, grounding and communication systems is designed and installed per: American Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE); National Board of Fire Underwriters (NBFU); National Electrical Code (NAC, NBFU No. 70); National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA); Edition Electric Institute (EEI); Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association (IPCEA); American Standards Association (ASA); American Society for Testing Materials(ASTM); National Electrical Safety Code; National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA’s) “Code for Protection Against Lightning;” and, the rules and regulations of the local utility companies. Switchboards and associated equipment were installed in accordance with the NEC, AIEE, and NEMA standards of the time (1963 thru 1966).

3.1.2.1 Reactor Control System

See Chapter 7.

3.1.2.2 Primary Coolant System

See Chapter 5.

3.1.2.3 Engineered Safety Feature Systems

See Chapter 6.

3.1.2.4 Reactor Safety System

See Chapter 7.

3.1.2.5 Electrical Distribution System

See Chapter 8.

3.1.2.6 Instrument Air System

See Chapter 9.

3.1.2.7 Liquid Waste System

See Chapter 11.

3.1.3 Design of Major Components

This section discusses the design considerations for the Reactor Vessel and its core. All mechanical, electrical and I&C components used in various systems described in the previous section were procured and installed in accordance with the industry standards and codes at the time of their installation.

3.1.3.1 Reactor Vessel and Core Comment by Myers, Thomas J.: This information is elsewhere. Purpose of inclusion here, other than strict adherence to 15.37? DONE.

The reactor vessel is designed and installed in strict conformance with the following Codes, Standards, Specifications and regulations:

· American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (B&PVC), Section VIII.

· ASME Code Cases 1270N and 1273N.

· American Standards Association (ASA).

· American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM).

· Aluminum Association (AA).

· American Welding Society (AWS).

Experimental Facilities in the Reflector Chapter 10 describes the experimental facilities in detail.

Reactor Control The shim safety arms are fabricated in accordance with “Specifications for N.I.S.T. Reactor Shim Safety Rods.”

D2 O Cooling Water Reservoirs Should there be a major rupture of the Process Room piping that would drain the Reactor Vessel, D2O will be held in two places within the reactor vessel itself (Figure 3.15), the Inner Reserve Tank (IRT), an annular-shaped tank, located in the top reflector, and the D2O Holdup Pan, which holds water around exterior of the lower fueled section of the fuel assemblies.

3.1.3.1.1 Reactor Design Considerations

Pressure The reactor is operated with a cover of helium gas on the top of the vessel at a pressure of 3 to 5 inches (7.6 to 12.7 cm) of water.

Piping Reactions The vessel and its associated piping are free to move under the influence of thermal expansion. Only the reactions from the bellows-type CO2 seals are transmitted to the vessel. Sliding pad-type supports absorb most of the force from all reactions resulting from primary system flow in the external piping. The resulting loads on the vessel are small and, in conjunction with all other loadings, do not raise stress levels above the maximum allowable working stress for the various reactor sections.

Impact Loads No impact loads are transmitted to the vessel. The shim safety arm shock absorbing systems are mounted on the biological shield so that only the extremely small reactions between the outer races and the balls of the safety arm bearings are transmitted to the vessel. The pressure surges that might be generated in the NBSR by power transients are small, and would not cause pressure in the vessel to exceed the 50 psig (0.35 MPa) design value.

Seismic Loads The vessel was designed in accordance with BOCA Codes for seismic. The combined stress levels resulting from this loading plus all other design loads were well within the allowable limits for the various vessel sections. This horizontal acceleration is in the range of a VII to VIII earthquake on the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale (Geology, Seismology and Hydrology of NBSR Site, September 1981).

Thermal Loading Condition Comment by Myers, Thomas J.: Check Chapter 4. Other than that and NBSR * docs, I have no documentation readily available to support these statements.

In designing the vessel, consideration was given to the loadings resulting from constraining forces or members, and from both steady state and transient thermal conditions, including emergency conditions.

The low heating rates that the vessel experiences due to steady-state heating, and the excellent thermal conductivity of the aluminum, combine to yield negligible stresses from internal temperature gradients. Areas of distinct interest for thermal expansion are the grazing tube-to-shell joints and the responses of the grazing tubes’ columns due to restraint on their ends. Both these areas and the resulting stresses were considered in designing the vessel, and do not exceed the stresses allowed by the Code.

The NBSR vessel is fabricated entirely of aluminum alloys. Therefore, there are negligible stresses resulting from differential expansion between dissimilar materials.

Also, the very small temperature differentials between the components of the coolant and vessel cause insignificant thermal-transient loadings.

3.2.1 Wind Loading

The design wind load on the building structure, based on 100-mph (160 km/h) wind, is taken as 25 psf (1,200 N/m2).

3.2.2 Snow and Ice Loads

See NBSR 16.

3.3 Water Damage

See NBSR 16.

3.4 Seismic Damage

See NBSR 16

3.5 Inspections, Testing and Maintenance

The NBSR structures, systems, and components whose integrity is important to preventing the release of radioactive material, preventing core damage, and controlling reactivity, are designed to facilitate inspections, testing, and maintenance. Some examples include

· Acceptance of fuel elements.

· Visual inspection of material condition of all in-core components.

· A pressure test of confinement building to ensure compliance with the allowed leak-rate specification.

· Verification of shim blade drop times.

· Channel checks and calibrations of the nuclear and process safety systems.

There are written, and reviewed, procedures for conducting inspections and tests of all systems. Also, approved written procedures are followed for maintaining major equipment, such as control devices (Chapter 12).

3.5.1 Specific Inspection and Testing Activities

3.5.1.1 Confinement Building Leakage Rate Tests

The Confinement as opposed to the containment concept was shown to mitigate the worst reactor incident that results in a negligible overpressure. The Confinement Building and its ventilation systems were designed to provide sufficient confinement or retention of radioactive gases so that they can be filtered and passed up the stack at a reasonably low rate for subsequent atmospheric dispersion. The tighter the building, the slower the gas or internal atmosphere needs to be pumped through the filter and the stack. See Chapter 6 and Chapter 13 for further details.

3.5.1.3 Building Drains Monitoring

All liquid waste in the reactor building is treated as potentially contaminated. Therefore, the drains in the reactor building are carefully limited and controlled. See Chapter 11 for further details.

3.6 References

Geology, Seismology and Hydrology of the National Bureau of Standards Research Reactor Site, Gaithersburg, Maryland, September 1981.

NBSR 9 – Final Safety Analysis Report on the National Bureau Of Standards Reactor.

NBSR 9A – Supplement A of the Final Safety Analysis Report on the National Bureau Of Standards Reactor, October 1966.

NBSR 9B – Supplement B of the Final Safety Analysis Report on the National Bureau Of Standards Reactor, December 1966.

NBSR 9 Addendum 1 – Final Safety Analysis Report on the National Bureau Of Standards Reactor, November 1980.

Structural Design Calculations, Book III, Volume 1, 2 and 3 by Burns and Roe Inc.

Technical Specifications for the National Bureau of Standards 20 MW Research Reactor

Table 3.1: Design Dead Loads (Structures)

I T E M

Roof Precast Sections 4” slab Roofing and Insulation 3000-gallon D2O Tank 20-ton Crane 2nd Floor 12” slab Concrete Beams 2Disassembly Caves at 20 Tons Comment by Myers, Thomas J.: ??

15 Ton Annular Crane Pump Room Roof 1st Floor 5 ft. slab 15 ft. slab Concrete Beams

3-6 ”. slabs Mezzanine Floor 8” slab Beams 2”-4” slab Neutron Guide Penetration Wall Monitor and Fan Rooms 6” Slab 24” Fill Corridor 6” Slab D-xxx Comment by Myers, Thomas J.: Which floor?

6” Slab Basement 6” Floating Slab (excluding reactor & pool area) 3’ Fill under Floating Slab 3’ Concrete Pile Cap under Building Walls Above 1st Floor Below 1st floor Exhaust Stack Internal Columns D2O Storage Tank Pit Spent Fuel Storage Pool Canal

TOTAL

D E A D L O A D (Thousands of Pounds)

22 Comment by Myers, Thomas J.: Correct load for correct crane? Crane was not installed, so this may be incorrect.

1226 Comment by Myers, Thomas J.: Update from 2011 analysis?

13,207 34,008

3-23 Table 3.2: Design Dead Loads (Reactor)

ITEM DEAD LOAD

(Thousands of Pounds)

Table 3.3: Confinement Building Design Live Loads

Other

TOTAL 13,022

Table 3.4: Design Information for Primary Coolant System Components

Primary Heat Exchangers (HE-1A, HE-1B and HE-1C)

(ASME B&PV Code, Section VIII) Plates: 316 type Stainless Steel Frame: Carbon Steel Gaskets: Nitrile Primary and Secondary sides design Pr. & Temp: 150 psi at 200°F

Hydrostatic Test Pressure: 225 psi Each HE designed to remove 35x106 BTU per Hour.

Primary flow:

4,800 gpm Temp. Range:

114°F to 100°F Secondary flow:

5,000 gpm Temp. Range:

84°F to 98°F Plate & frame type design with primary flow through welded plate cassettes and Secondary Flow between cassettes held by gaskets.

HE-1C is spare but can be readily put in the line, when required.

Primary Piping, Pipe Fittings and Valves

(ASME/ANSI B31.1)

6061 T6 Aluminum.

Several control valves and valves at the heat exchangers are Stainless Steel Valve Gasket and Diaphragm: Hypalon Design Pressure:

125 psi

Hydrostatic Test Pressure: 187.5 psi

All pipe fittings are forged 6061 T6 aluminum.

Certified welders make all welds. Welds are radiographed and accepted on the basis of ASME codes.

D2O Main Circulating Pumps (Total 4 units) Stainless Steel

Shutdown Pumps (Total 2 units) Stainless Steel

D2O Purification heat exchanger (HE-2)

(ASME B&PV Code, Section VIII) Plates: 316 type Stainless Steel Frame: Carbon Steel Gaskets: Nitrile Primary and Secondary sides design Pr. & Temp: 150 psi at 200°F

Hydrostatic Test Pressure: 225 psi Each HE designed to remove 1.18 x106 BTU per Hour.

Primary flow:

65 gpm Temp. Range:

100°F to 90°F Secondary flow:

170 gpm Temp. Range:

84°F to 98°F Plate & frame type design with primary flow through welded plate cassettes and Secondary Flow between cassettes held by gaskets.

Reactor Vessel

(ASME B&PV Code, Section VIII)

Reactor vessel is unpressurized except for small pressure of 4 inches of water due to helium blanket.

TYPICAL PENETRATION DETAILS

THRU CONFINEMENT WALLS

NOTES: DETAIL “A” APPLIES TO THE INSIDE FACE OF WALLS OF THE CONFINEMENT BUILDING AT ALL PIPE & CONDUIT PENETRATIONS. DETAIL “B” APPLIES TO THE OUTSIDE FACE OF THE CONFINEMENT WALLS AT ALL PIPE & CONDUIT PENETRATIONS WHERE MEMBRANE WATERPROOFING IS REQUIRED.

LISTED AS SEAL TYPES “A & “B” IN TABLES 3.5 AND 3.6.

Figure 3.1: Details of Mechanical Penetrations

NOTE: LISTED AS SEAL TYPE “D” IN TABLE 3.6.

Figure 3.2: Details of Door Seals

Figure 3.3: Details of Air Plena Seals

TYPICAL PENETRATION DETAIL THROUGH CONFINEMENT WALLS

Figure 3.4: Details of Electrical Penetrations

Figure 3.14: Reactor Vessel – Elevation View

Figure 3.5: Reactor Vessel – Elevation View Figure 3.15: Reactor Vessel – Plan View

Figure 3.6: Reactor Vessel – Plan View image1.png image2.png image3.wmf oleObject1.bin image4.png image5.png image6.png