MetLife Protest CPO Determination.pdf

February 19, 2021

VIA EMAIL

Mr. Michael T. Layden Richard J. Prendergast, Ltd.

111 W. Washington St., Ste. 1100 Chicago, IL 60602 mlayden@rjpltd.com

RE: Protest of Award in RFP # 20-416CMS-BENF4-B-12595 and B-14561 (Group Life Insurance)

Dear Mr. Layden:

On September 25, 2020, you filed a protest on behalf of your client, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”), with respect to the Illinois Department of Central Management Services’ award to another offeror in the above-referenced procurement. You filed your protest pursuant to rules allowing “[a]ny person who has submitted a bid or proposal [to] protest a decision to . . . award to another person.” 44 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1.5550(a)(2). The Protest Review Office has considered your protest in light of provisions of law and rule applicable to your allegations. Based on that review, I grant your protest.

Facts

The Illinois Department of Central Management Services’ (CMS) published RFP #20-416CMS-BENF4-B- 12595 and B-14561 (collectively, “the Solicitation”1) on May 1, 2020. Prior to publishing the Solicitation, CMS engaged a consultant, The Segal Company, to help develop, evaluate, and score the Solicitation.

The Solicitation seeks a vendor “to provide a group life and accidental death & dismemberment (AD&D) insurance program for its employees and annuitants”. The insurance program “consists of a Basic Life program, where the State provides a life insurance benefit to all eligible employees and annuitants, and a Supplemental program” with four optional components: additional life insurance purchased by employees and annuitants, spouse life (life insurance for employees’ and annuitants’ spouses), dependent life (life insurance for employees’ and annuitants’ children), and AD&D insurance for employees and annuitants.

1 B-12595 is the BidBuy entry via which vendors submitted the technical part of their proposals. Vendors submitted pricing separately via B-14561.

To: Mr. Michael T. Layden Re: Protest of RFP #20-416CMS-BENF4-B-12595 Date: February 19, 2021

Offerors were to submit offers in two parts: a technical proposal and a price proposal. The technical proposal was worth a maximum of 600 points, while the price proposal was worth a maximum of 400 points. Section A.23 informed offerors, “The State determines how well offers meet the Responsiveness requirements. The State will rank offers, without consideration of price, from best to least qualified using a point ranking system (unless otherwise specified) as an aid in conducting the evaluation.” The Solicitation then set forth how the State’s evaluators would assign points to each proposal.

On May 20, 2020, CMS published Addendum 1, which revised the original price point section of the Solicitation as follows:

B.5. The total number of points for Price is 400. The Segal Company, Inc. will evaluate and score Pricing.

For the Basic Life program, the total number of points is 300. Distributed as follows:

Premium Rate: 115 points Administrative Fee/Rate: 180 points Interest Rate: 5 points

For the Supplemental program the total number of points is 100. Distributed as follows:

Supplemental Life (par) Administrative Fee/Rate: 35 points Interest Rate: 5 points Optional Life Premium Rate: 40 points Spouse Life: 10 points Child Life: 5 points AD&D: 5 points or Supplemental Life (non-par) Optional Life Premium Rate: 80 points Spouse Life: 10 points Child Life: 5 points AD&D: 5 points

The State will determine Price points using the following formula for Basic Life, Basic Life Administrative Fee, Supplemental Life Administrative Fee, Supplemental Optional Life, Supplemental Spouse Life, Supplemental Child Life and Supplemental AD&D:

Maximum Price Points X (Lowest Price/Offeror’s Price) = Total Price Points

The State will determine Price points using the following formula for Basic Life and Supplemental Life Interest Rate:

Maximum Price Points X (Offeror’s Price/Highest Price) = Total Price Points

The State will determine Price points using the following formula for Supplemental Optional Life:

(½ X Maximum Price Points) X (Offeror’s Price - Current Price)/(Lowest Price – Current Price) +

(½ X Maximum Price Points) X (Lowest Price/Offeror’s Price) = Total Price Points

Where “Price” equals the following:

For the Basic Life Premium Rate, it is the Total Annual Premium calculated in the Pricing Offer workbook.

For Basic Life Administrative Fee, it is the percentage of the Basic Life Premium Rate offered by the Offeror.

For Basic Life Interest Rate, it is the annual interest rate offered by the Offeror.

For Supplemental Life Administrative Fee, it is the percentage of the Supplemental Life Premium offered by the Offeror.

For Supplemental Life Interest Rate, it is the annual interest rate offered by the Offeror.

For Supplemental Optional Life it is the Total Annual Premium calculated in the Pricing Offer workbook.

For Supplemental Spouse Life it is the Total Annual Premium calculated in the Pricing Offer workbook.

For Supplemental Child Life it is the Total Annual Premium offered in the Pricing Offer workbook.

For Supplemental AD&D it is the Total Annual Premium offered in the Pricing Offer workbook.

Proposals were opened on October 10, 2019. Two offerors submitted proposals: MetLife and Minnesota Life. After evaluation and scoring, CMS believed both offerors’ technical proposals received a score of 489 points out of a possible 600. In truth, an evaluator erred by assigning Minnesota Life more than the maximum number of points for an item, so Securian’s true score should have been 485.

After the original price proposals were opened and Segal evaluated them, Minnesota Life’s price score was 354.3, and MetLife’s was 339.1. CMS then invited both offerors to submit Best and Final Offers (BAFOs). The offerors’ BAFO points and CMS’s/Segal’s analysis of their prices are set forth in the table below2.

2 The table is a modified version of a spreadsheet CMS included in the procurement file. Certain words (e.g., administrative, premium, percentage, etc.) have been abbreviated to save space, but the offerors’ points and the substance of CMS’s notes have not been changed.

Topic Max Point

Value % of Total Criteria

Minn.

Life MetLife Notes:

B.5 Basic Life Program

300 30% Three elements: 38.3% to premium rate, 60% to administrative fee, 1.7% to interest rate

Three

Elements Premium Rate 115 Max. 115 pts for lowest prem. rate.

Other vendors’ pts reduced by %age diff. from lowest prem. rate to their prem. rate x 115.

115.0 101.1 Minn. Life = $0.29 prem. rate / $1000 of basic life face amount MetLife = $0.33 prem. rate / $1000 of basic life face amount

Administrative Fee

180 Max. 180 pts for lowest admin. fee.

Other vendors’ pts reduced by %age diff. from the lowest admin.

fee to their admin. fee x 180.

118.2 180.0 Minn. Life = 1.3% of prem. rate with admin. fee of $400,556 MetLife = 0.75% of prem. rate with administration fee of $262,965

Interest Rate 5 Max. 5 pts for highest interest rate.

Other vendors’ pts reduced by %age diff. from the highest interest rate to their interest rate x 5.

5.0 1.7 Minn. Life = 3% interest rate MetLife = 1% interest rate

B.5 Supplemental Life Program

100 10% Four elements: 80% to the supplemental life premium rate, 10% to spouse life premium rate, and 5% each to child life premium rate and AD&D premium rate.

Four Elements

Optional Life Premium Rate

80 Max. 40 pts for lowest annual prem. Other vendors’ pts reduced by %age diff. from lowest annual prem. to their annual prem. x 40.

Plus max. 40 pts for diff. from lowest annual prem. to current annual prem. Other vendors’ pts reduced by %age diff. from lowest annual prem. to current annual prem. compared to the diff. from their annual prem. to current annual prem. x 40.

80.0 38.0 Premium Rate Minn. Life age banded rate table results in annual premium of $44,921,653.

MetLife age banded rate table results in annual premium of $50,348,259.

Difference from Current Premium Minn. Life annual premium of $44,921,653 = $5,756,323 < current MetLife annual premium of $50,348,259 = $329,717 < current

Spouse Life Premium Rate

10 Max. 10 pts for lowest prem. rate.

Other vendors’ pts reduced by %age diff. from lowest prem. rate to their prem. rate x 10.

10.0 8.3 Minn. Life at $0.60 premium rate per $1000 of spouse life face amount MetLife at $0.72 premium rate per $1000 of spouse life face amount

Child Life Premium Rate

5 Max. 5 pts for lowest prem. rate.

Other vendors’ pts reduced by %age diff. from lowest prem. rate to their prem. rate x 5.

4.4 5.0 Minn. Life at $0.09 premium rate per $1000 of children life face amount MetLife at $0.08 premium rate per $1000 of children life face amount

AD&D

Premium Rate

5 Max. 5 pts for lowest prem. rate.

Other vendors’ pts reduced by the %age diff. from lowest prem. rate to their prem. rate x 5.

3.3 5.0 Minn. Life at $0.03 premium rate per $1000 of AD&D face amount MetLife at $0.02 premium rate per $1000 of AD&D face amount

Total 400 40% 335.9 339.1

Here, too, an error resulted in Minnesota Life’s score being artificially high. Minnesota Life should have scored 14 fewer points for the administrative fee, giving it a score of 321.9.

The administrative fee made up 45% of the maximum number of price points, more than any other single factor. Both offerors reduced their administrative fees in their BAFOs, Minnesota Life from 1.5% to 1.3% and MetLife from 1.0% to 0.75%. It appears neither offeror changed any elements of its pricing besides the administrative fee between the initial price proposal and the BAFO. MetLife’s comparatively low administrative fee meant MetLife scored the maximum of 180 points on that item, while Minnesota Life scored 104.2 (corrected from the erroneous initial score of 118.2). But for the administrative fee points, Minnesota Life’s price score – that is, its score based primarily on premium costs – was significantly higher than MetLife’s (217.7 vs. 159.1).

CMS then asked both offerors to submit a second BAFO, but both indicated their previous offer was their best and final. Ultimately, then, CMS believed the scores were:

MetLife Minnesota Life Technical Points (max. 600) 489 489 Price Points (max. 400) 339.1 335.9 Total 828.1 824.9

When the above calculation errors are factored in, the true scores are:

MetLife Minnesota Life Technical Points (max. 600) 489 485 Price Points (max. 400) 339.1 321.9 Total 828.1 806.9

Despite MetLife outscoring Minnesota Life, CMS and Segal’s price analysis led CMS to conclude that Minnesota Life’s proposal would be more advantageous to the State because its proposal “results in projected costs that are $8.4M lower than current, with projected savings of over $42.0M over the five-year contract whereas, MetLife’s proposal results in projected costs which are $116K higher than current, with projected increased premiums of $579K over the five-year contract term. Although the basic administrative charge carried a little more weight, the overwhelming benefit to the State is the difference in basic premium cost.” CMS also noted its belief that the offerors’ technical scores were the same, which suggested they were equally qualified, and concluded the apparent difference between the offerors’ final scores – 3.2 points out of a maximum of 1,000 – was minimal.

On September 11, 2020, Notice of Award to Securian was published. That same day, MetLife asked CMS via email for the scoring tabulations. CMS responded:

The two proposals received were both very competitive. The scoring was essentially a tie. Both Vendors received a score of 489 points for the technical portion of the proposal. The final pricing scores were Met Life – 339.1, Minnesota Life – 335.9. Given the relative minimal difference in total scoring, the State selected the Minnesota Life proposal which results in projected costs that are $8.4M lower than current as the most advantageous and best value to the State. The overwhelming benefit to the State was the difference in basic premium cost.

MetLife filed a protest . Securian requested and received leave to file a response to the protest.

Thereafter, MetLife filed a supplemental protest on.

Arguments

MetLife raises several arguments in its protest and supplemental protest. It first argues that CMS’ decision to award to Securian was arbitrary, erroneous, and contrary to law because CMS violated section 20-15(g) of the Procurement Code and section 1.2015(f)(3) of the CPO-GS Rules when it “improperly disregarded the comprehensive pricing methodology set forth in the RFP and awarded the contract to Securian based on one arbitrary pricing component – basic premium rates.” MetLife points out that Segal, CMS’s consultant, “determined that the true cost of the Program could not be determined by looking at a singular factor, but involved a comprehensive methodology of multiple components, including administrative fees, premium costs and interest rates. When MetLife was found to provide the best overall value to the State under its own expert’s methodology, the State decided to ignore its own scoring methodology and focus solely on “basic premium cost” to determine which vendor to select.”

MetLife further argues CMS’s focus on basic premium cost in the end was arbitrary in and of itself, but was particularly so when considering the Solicitation’s price scoring methodology weighed basic premium cost less heavily than administrative fees: Basic Life Premium Rates were worth 115 points, while the administrative fee was worth 180 points. By designing the price scoring system that way, Segal “determined that administrative fees was [sic], by far, the most critical component to consider when determining which Program would be most advantageous to the State.”

MetLife further argues CMS violated section 1.2015(f)(3) of my Rules when it failed “to apply the correct methodology set forth in the RFP, which resulted in a windfall of points to Securian.” MetLife points out that it should have received 14 more points than Securian if CMS had “applied the correct methodology set forth in the RFP to determine Securian’s score.” Minnesota Life’s administrative fee in its BAFO was 1.3%, and MetLife’s was 0.75%, so the points should have worked out as follows:

Maximum Price Points X (Lowest Price/Offeror’s Price) = Total Price Points MetLife: 180 x 0.75/0.75 = 180 points Securian: 180 x 0.75/1.30 = 103.84 points

MetLife contends the real price differential is statistically significant.

MetLife also argues CMS wrongly concluded Minnesota Life’s “proposal would save the State millions of dollars” because that conclusion does not take into account “all components that affect the cost borne by the State.” “MetLife won the Basic Life Program portion of the proposal (i.e., the portion of the Program paid for by the State) by nearly 19%,” and, in the Solicitation, Segal identified the Basic Life Program as the biggest driver of value to the State. Therefore, “the selection of a vendor that costs the State significantly more money under the plain terms of the RFP cannot be construed as the ‘most advantageous to the State,’ which further requires reversal of the contract award. 30 ILCS 500/20-15(g).”

Relatedly, MetLife contends CMS’s focus on basic premium cost was particularly inappropriate “given the fact that the RFP allows and/or requires basic premium cost to be modified throughout the life of the contract. Indeed, the RFP states that ‘[e]ach year, Vendor shall recommend to Agency any changes to premium rates, if Vendor believes changes are necessary”’ and that the ‘Agency may at any time initiate discussions with Vendor to revise the premium rates if [the] Agency finds it necessary to revise premium rates.’ Ex. A, D.3.6.3.4 Thus, premium rates are not fixed and can be amended during the term of the arrangement. Accordingly, awarding the contract to Securian based on a component that Securian can alter at any time during the term of the contract is illogical[.]”

MetLife further argues it relied on the price methodology in the Solicitation when it calculated its pricing.

“Had MetLife known that the State would arbitrarily choose to place all its weight on ‘basic premium cost,’ MetLife would have structured its proposal accordingly.”

In its supplemental protest, MetLife argues it was not really “tied” for technical points with Minnesota Life because one evaluator awarded Minnesota Life 40 points on a section with a maximum of 30 points.

Had the evaluator assigned only the 30 available points, Minnesota Life’s average score for the Administration section would have gone from 254 to 250, thus changing Securian’s overall score from 489 to 485. MetLife also argues the evaluators “impermissibly evaluated Securian based on its performance as the current vendor rather than the contents of its proposal.” MetLife alleges one evaluator assigned Securian 31 more points than MetLife and did not provide many comments to support his scores, while the comments he did provide suggest he considered Securian’s current performance rather than its proposal: “Securian provides all necessary reports and forms on an [sic] going basis.”

As a remedy, MetLife requests I reverse the State’s decision to award the contract to Minnesota Life and direct CMS “to re-evaluate the RFP submissions and re-award the contract consistent with the evaluation criteria of the RFPs and the applicable provisions of the Procurement Code and Illinois Administrative Code.”

In response, CMS argues the Procurement Code and my Rules do not “require the State to award to the highest-scoring vendor in all circumstances.” In CMS’s view, “[b]oth the Code and its rules require only that an award be made to the offeror whose proposal is determined in writing to be the most advantageous to the State, ‘taking into consideration price and the evaluation factors set forth in the request for proposals.’ 30 ILCS 500/20-15(g); 44 Ill. Adm. Code 1.2015(h).” CMS contends this rule means awards for competitive sealed proposals “are not required to be entirely based on the RFP’s evaluation factors; the evaluation factors must simply be taken into consideration. Accordingly, the State is allowed some discretion to determine that the highest scoring proposal is not in fact the most advantageous to the State and issue an award based on other factors.” CMS repeats the analysis that led it to award to Minnesota Life, i.e., “that Securian’s proposal would result in lower overall costs to the State and participating members.” While “Segal Consulting identified that although MetLife’s proposal received more points based on the RFP’s scoring criteria, Securian’s proposal nevertheless resulted in a lower overall program cost based on Segal’s analysis.” CMS argues MetLife “appears to disregard the difference in cost that would be charged to employees. While CMS acknowledges that the costs to be incurred by the State was the primary focus of the RFP, as evidenced by the additional weight given to that pricing component in the scoring tool, CMS cannot fully ignore the impact to employees when determining the proposal that is most advantageous to the State. Pursuant to the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971 (Act), “it is the policy of the State and in the best interest of the State to assure quality benefits to members.” 5 ILCS 375/5. The Act further requires that contracts entered into for life insurance benefits shall be based on, among other factors, “premiums, fees, or charges as related to benefits.” Id.

Accordingly, while the State’s costs may be the primary focus, to fully satisfy the policy of assuring quality benefits to its members, CMS must consider the cost impact to those members when determining which proposal is most advantageous to the State. In its analysis, Segal determined that Securian’s proposal would result in total annual savings for members of approximately $4.3 million, for a 5-year savings of approximately $21.3 million.”

In response to MetLife’s supplemental protest, CMS admits MetLife is correct about the calculation errors, but argues the additional arguments “are not material to the State’s ultimate decision that Securian’s proposal is the most advantageous to the State. Although correction of the errors identified in Item 1 and Item 3 would increase the point differential between MetLife and Securian, the scoring differences are not significant enough for CMS to ignore that, despite the final scoring totals, Segal’s analysis indicates that Securian’s proposal would result in overall cost savings to the State and its members.”

Minnesota Life also filed a response to MetLife’s protest in support of CMS’s decision. Minnesota Life argues I must show deference to what Minnesota Life characterizes as the State Purchasing Officer’s decision to award and not overturn it unless it was arbitrary, capricious, clearly erroneous, or contrary to law, which Minnesota Life argues it was not. Minnesota Life contends that under Illinois law, decisions to award will not be overturned unless there is a showing of fraud or illegality, which is not present here.

In Minnesota Life’s view, the Solicitation’s scoring tool was “a preliminary tool for the evaluators (not the SPO to use merely ‘as an aid’ under the RFP,” and the State “may,” but does not have to, award to the vendor that scores the highest number of points. Moreover, the Solicitation’s pricing structure was so complex that “the potential for wide variation and the number of possible permutations of how such pricing could be presented were impossible for the State to know in advance,” so the true cost and value of vendors’ proposals “could not be fully discerned until actual proposals were received such that the actual, varied components could be considered and compared in context.” Accordingly, Minnesota Life argues, the State was to use the scoring tool as an aid, but the scoring tool “did not preclude the State SPO from considering how price and cost would affect the State in real life. Minnesota Life further argues Illinois law gives the SPO the discretion and the duty to make an award independently taking into account price and other evaluation factors – “[I]t is the State SPO’s duty alone to conduct the ultimate review and evaluation of the proposals, using Price and the published criteria, to determine and document what award (if any) is most advantageous to the State.” As a result, Segal’s evaluation did not relieve the State of its duty to evaluate and score proposals “and ultimately for the State SPO to determine which proposal was ‘most advantageous to the State’ as required by law.” Minnesota Life further contends, “[A]fter full review of proposals, with pricing as received, by the evaluation team and the State SPO, it was determined by the State that the structure developed for scoring the relatively complex price factor did not provide consideration for the full costs of the program to the State. When the State fully evaluated both the technical and price factors based on the proposals as received, the State determined, as required by law, that the Minnesota Life proposal offered the best actual pricing and was the most advantageous overall proposal.”

Applicable Law

Protests must include “a statement of reasons for the protest specifically identifying any alleged violation of a procurement statute, a procurement rule or the solicitation itself, including the evaluation and award (conclusions with supporting facts and arguments may not be sufficient).” 44 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1.5550(c)(5)(C). In determining the appropriate outcome, I consider “the seriousness of the procurement deficiency, the degree of prejudice to other parties or to the integrity of the competitive procurement system, the good faith of the parties, the urgency of the procurement, and the impact of the recommendation on the State agency's mission.” Id. at 1.5550(f).

“[R]equests for proposals shall state the relative importance of price and other evaluation factors.

Proposals shall be submitted in 2 parts: the first, covering items except price; and the second, covering price. The first part of all proposals shall be evaluated and ranked independently of the second part of all proposals.” 30 ILCS 500/20-15(e).

Each RFP must include “a statement of when and how price should be submitted.” 44 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

1.2015(d)(3). “The RFP shall state all of the evaluation factors, including price, and their relative importance. . . . [A]ll price subfactors and their relative ranking must be shown in the RFP.” Id. at 1.2015(f)(1). Evaluations “shall be based solely on the evaluation factors set forth in the RFP, except as communicated in advance to each proposer with opportunity to make necessary adjustments to the proposal.” Id. at 1.2015(f)(3). “Numerical rating systems shall be used unless another scoring tool is authorized by the SPO. Any scoring tool shall reflect the evaluation criteria and ranking set forth in the RFP and any subfactors available at the opening.” Id. “Awards shall be made to the responsible offeror whose proposal is determined in writing to be the most advantageous to the State, taking into consideration price and the evaluation factors set forth in the request for proposals.” 30 ILCS 500/20- 15(g); 44 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1.2015(h).

Analysis

I see two main problems with this procurement. First, it appears the pricing formula in the Solicitation might not have adequately captured or accounted for all factors of importance to the State. Second, once CMS reviewed the vendors’ pricing and realized the Solicitation’s shortcomings, it attempted to make up for them by awarding to the lower-scoring vendor. The second problem leads me to grant MetLife’s protest.

Agencies must base evaluations “solely on the evaluation factors set forth in the RFP, except as communicated in advance to each proposer with opportunity to make necessary adjustments to the proposal.” Id. at 1.2015(f)(3)(emphases added). Moreover, the numerical rating system agencies use to assign points, rank offerors, and make awards is not merely an “aid” that an agency can disregard if the system produces suboptimal results. My Rules require agencies to use a numerical rating system to score requests for proposals “unless another scoring tool is authorized by the [State Purchasing Officer (SPO)]” prior to the RFP’s publication, which did not happen here. 44 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1.2015(f)(3). Consistent evaluation and scoring standards are a critical component of fair and open competition. Publishing evaluation factors and the scoring formula in the Solicitation allows all offerors know how their proposals will be evaluated, how best to position and present their offers, and how to price their goods and services competitively.

Unfortunately, CMS’ consultant, Segal, seems to have created a pricing formula for the Solicitation that might not have adequately captured or accounted for all factors of importance to the State. The pricing formula appears to have overstated the importance of administrative fees while understating the importance of premium costs to both the State and State employees. The administrative fee, which the State pays, accounted for 60% of the total points for the Basic Life program (180/300), 45% of all price points (180/400), and 18% of total points (price points plus technical points, 180/1000), a significantly greater percentage than any other single pricing factor. However, as CMS admits in its response to the protest, CMS needed to consider the premium cost impact not just to the State, but State employees, when determining which proposal was most advantageous overall.

The problem, though, is this: If the premium cost impact to State employees was a critical factor, it should have been accounted for on the front end of the procurement – i.e., when creating the pricing formula in the Solicitation – not on the back end after pricing proposals were opened. MetLife is correct when it argues CMS, by making the Basic Life administrative fee worth more points than any other single cost factor, represented to offerors that the Basic Life administrative fee was the most important cost factor. Both MetLife and Minnesota Life relied on that representation when structuring not just their price proposals, but their BAFOs as well. Significantly, the only pricing element either offeror changed in its BAFO was the administrative fee, which suggests both tried to take advantage of that factor’s importance to the overall price score. MetLife might have been able to reduce its administrative fee further than Minnesota Life because MetLife built higher premium prices into the rest of its offer.

However, the Solicitation’s formula encouraged both MetLife and Minnesota Life to do that. It was not fair to the offerors to, in effect, change the pricing formula after CMS realized the Solicitation’s shortcomings. CMS should have awarded to the vendor that scored the most points under the numerical rating system that was actually in the Solicitation: MetLife.

Determination

MetLife has identified a serious and significant procurement deficiency. 44 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 1.5550(f).

While Minnesota Life will be prejudiced if CMS cancels the procurement or awards to MetLife, MetLife will be equally prejudiced if CMS cancels the procurement, and MetLife will be prejudiced if CMS is permitted to contract with Minnesota Life. Based on the foregoing and the factors in section 1.5550(f) of my Rules, then, I grant MetLife’s protest.

CMS now has two options. One, CMS may award to MetLife. Two, the Solicitation may be canceled if CMS, in consultation with and after written approval from the SPO, determines cancellation to be in the best interest of the State because the Solicitation was inadequate, the Solicitation “did not provide for consideration of all factors of significance to the State,” or “proposed amendments to the solicitation would be of such magnitude that a new solicitation is desirable.” 1.2040(b)(1)(D), (E), and (C).

Sincerely, Ellen H. Daley Chief Procurement Officer for General Services cc: Jennifer Klein, Senior State Purchasing Officer, CMS Tom Sestak, Agency Purchasing Officer, CMS John E. Schmidt, III, Schmidt & Copeland, John@SchmidtCopeland.com

Collin M. Bruck, Richard K. Prendergast, Ltd., cbruck@rjpltd.com