AFHDBK_63-126.pdf

Air Force Nuclear Certification

Process Guide

NWC-HDBK 63-126

2 January 2013

OPR: AFNWC/NTS

Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Nuclear Technology and Integration Directorate

Surety and Certification Division Kirtland AFB, NM 87117

Nuclear Certification Process Guidebook

Chapter 1 The Nuclear Certification Process

Purpose of Guide Book

Introduction

Figure 1.1 DoD Nuclear Weapons System Safety Standards Figure 1.2 Phases of Nuclear Certification Figure 1.3 Nuclear Certification Elements and Processes

Nuclear Certification Process Owners

Chapter 2 The Identification Phase

Figure 2.1 Identification Phase

Overview

Primary Governing Directives

Identification Phase Process Owners Roles and Responsibilities

The Identification Phase Process

Figure 2.2 The Identification Phase Process

Figure 2.3 Nuclear Certification Impact Statement Coordination Form

Figure 2.4 NCIS Approval Letter example (no-impact) Figure 2.5 NCIS Approval Notification Letter example (with-impact)

Attachment 2.1 – Determining the Need to Engage the Nuclear Certification Process

Figure 2A.1.1 Is a NCIS Required Chart

Attachment 2.2 - Nuclear Certification Impact Statement

Appendix 2A.2.1 – How to Complete the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement

- Short Format

Figure 2A.2.1.1 Nuclear Certification Impact Statement – Short From

Appendix 2A.2.2 – How to Complete the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement - Detailed Format

Figure 2A.2.2.1 Detailed NCIS Format Figure 2A.2.2.2 Nuclear Certification Impact Statement –Long Form

Attachment 2.3 – Certification Requirements Plan Development Process

Figure 2A.3.1 Certification Requirements Plan Development

Attachment 2.4 – Building the Certification Requirements Plan

Figure 2A.4.1 Certification Requirements Plan Format Figure 2A.4.2 Certification Requirements Plan

Chapter 3 Administration Phase

Figure 3.1 The Administration Phase

Overview

Figure 3.2 Elements and Components of Nuclear Certification

Design Certification:

Operational Certification:

Administration Phase Completion

Figure 3.3 Administration Phase Completion

Attachment 3.1 - Compatibility Certification

Figure 3A.1 Compatibility Process

Appendix 3A.1.1 Aircraft Weapon System Nuclear Compatibility Certification Tasks

Figure 3A.1.1 Aircraft Weapon System Nuclear Compatibility Tasks

Appendix 3A.1.2 Ground Launched Missile/Warhead Compatibility Certification Tasks

Figure 3A.1.2 Ground Launched Missile/Warhead

Attachment 3.2 - Nuclear Safety Design Certification

Figure 3B.1 The Nuclear Safety Design Certification Process

Appendix 3A.2.1 Generic Outline for Nuclear Surety Evaluation

Attachment 3.3 - Weapon System Safety Rules (WSSR) Development

Figure 3C.1 WSSR Development Process

Appendix 3A.3.1 Operational Plan Data Document (OPDD)

Appendix 3A.3.2 Nuclear Safety Analysis Report (NSAR)

Appendix 3A.3.3 Technical Nuclear Safety Analysis (TNSA)

Appendix 3A.3.4 Safety Studies

Attachment 3.4 - Technical Order Certification

Figure 3.D.1 Technical Order Development and Certification

Attachment 3.5 – Operational Certification

Chapter 4 Fielding Phase

Figure 4.1 Fielding Phase Figure 4.2 Release Case Process Flow

Chapter 5 Sustainment Phase

Figure 5.1 Sustainment Phase

Sustaining Nuclear Compatibility Certification

Sustaining Nuclear Safety Design Certification

Sustaining Weapon System Safety Rules

Sustaining Technical Order Certification

Sustaining Operational Certification

Chapter 6 The Master Nuclear Certification List (MNCL)

Introduction

Figure 6.1 Problem Report

General MNCL Information Items in the MNCL

Figure 6.2 Name Plate Example

Using the Master Nuclear Certification List

Figure 6.3 MNCL Create New Account Figure 6.4 MNCL Disclosure and Distribution Page Figure 6.5 MNCL General Guidance Page Figure 6.6 MNCL Main Menu Page Figure 6.7 MNCL Date Range Search Figure 6.8 MNCL Print Select Figure 6.9 MNCL Select to Print

Chapter 7 Documentation and Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Certification

Chapter 8- Glossary of References and Supporting Information

References

Forms

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Terms

Chapter 1 The Nuclear Certification Process

Purpose of Guide Book

This guide book contains general information on the Air Force’s nuclear certification process and is not meant to replace existing directives or instructions governing the nuclear certification process. It is intended to supplement and clarify the process as described in AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program, by explaining its requirements and expectations. This Nuclear Certification Process Guidebook is not intended to tell you how to do your job nor provide you with “step-by-step” instructions like a cookbook, rather it is meant to be used as a tool to guide you through the process of attaining nuclear certification in accordance with AFI 63-125 and other applicable guidance. We have attempted to ensure that the guidance contained in this document does not conflict with any published nuclear certification or nuclear surety related Air Force publications (i.e., AFI 63-125, AFI 91-103, etc.). Conflicts between this Nuclear Certification Process Guidebook and cited Air Force guidance will be resolved in favor of the promulgated Air Force guidance.

Users should address any questions regarding the nuclear certification process or this guidebook to the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center Certification Management Branch (AFNWC/NCSC). Comments and/or suggestions for improving the guidebook should be sent via e-mail to mnclsuggest@kirtland.af.mil. Please indicate in the subject line: “Nuclear Certification Process Guidebook Suggestion” and include the desired wording and rationale for any proposed changes or additions in the text of the message.

Introduction

Nuclear Certification is a determination made by appropriate government agencies that an Air Force nuclear weapon system is safe for use with nuclear weapons; that the nuclear weapons are compatible with the delivery platform or item of support equipment; and whether any operational restrictions need to be placed on the weapon system to ensure compliance with the four DoD nuclear weapon system safety standards (Figure 1.1) and compatibility requirements. This determination must be in place before the nuclear weapon system achieves operational status. The determinations to nuclear certify an item is made only after the successful completion of a systematic sequence of tests, studies, inspections, qualifications and administrative activities.

There are a myriad of players engaged either directly or indirectly in the Air Force nuclear certification program and process. Several agencies have responsibilities aligned with overall nuclear certification program policy and oversight while others are more directly involved in the execution of the process that leads to an operationally certified weapon system or piece of equipment.

The importance of the Nuclear Certification program, and its associated processes, cannot be overstated. It is a key element of the Air Force Nuclear Surety Program. Nuclear certification helps to ensure that our weapon systems, support equipment and software are in compliance with DoD nuclear weapon system safety standards by validating that positive measures are in place to prevent the deliberate or inadvertent pre-arming, launching, or releasing of weapons, except upon execution of emergency war orders or when directed by competent authority, in all normal and credible abnormal environments. The systematic application of the Air Force Nuclear Certification Program and its associated processes ensures all procedures, software, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations are certified before conducting operations with nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon systems. The program is part of the Air Force Operational Safety, Suitability and Effectiveness (OSS&E) program directed by AFI 63-1201, Life Cycle Systems Engineering. Failure to recognize the requirement to certify equipment associated with nuclear weapon systems can jeopardize the integrity, reliability and safety of these vital systems.

Four DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Standards shall serve as the foundation for all nuclear weapons safety matters

Figure 1.1 DoD Nuclear Weapons System Safety Standards

There shall be positive measures to:

The Air Force Nuclear Certification Process consists of four phases: Identification, Administration, Fielding, and Sustainment (Figure 1.2). The Identification Phase describes the actions taken by the by the Single Manager and/or the Lead/Using Command (hereafter referred to as the Major Command or MAJCOM) to identify the need for an item to be nuclear certified and to initiate the certification process. The Administration Phase includes all the actions necessary for the Single Manager/Program Office to obtain or continue the nuclear certification of the weapon system or item of support equipment. It is during this phase that the new weapon system, support equipment item, piece of hardware or software, or modification effort, is under development by the program office/contractor.

During the Fielding Phase the Program Office will release the new or modified weapon system, support equipment item, hardware, software, or procedures for the use with or in support of a nuclear weapon system or its subsystems. The Sustainment Phase begins when the fielding process is complete. During this phase the operational weapon system is monitored for changes that would alter its nuclear certified status. Subsequent sections of this Nuclear Certification Process Guidebook will examine each phase in detail.

Prevent

DELIBERATE

prearming, arming, launching, or releasing of nuclear weapons, except upon execution of emergency war orders or when directed by competent authority

Prevent nuclear weapons involved in accidents or incidents, or jettisoned weapons, from producing a nuclear yield

Prevent

INADVERTENT

pre-arming, arming, launching, or releasing of nuclear weapons in all normal and credible abnormal environments

Ensure adequate security of nuclear weapons, IAW to DoDD 5210.41, Security Policy for Protecting

Nuclear Weapons

Figure 1.2 Phases of Nuclear Certification

The Air Force Nuclear Certification Program has two major elements: Design Certification and Operational Certification (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3 Nuclear Certification Elements and Processes

Design Certification consists of four processes that must be satisfied for a system or item to be considered Design Certified (Figure 1.3). These processes are: Compatibility Certification; Nuclear Safety Design Certification, Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group developed Weapon System Safety Rules (WSSR), and the certification and verification of appropriate technical data.

Operational Certification consists of four areas that must be satisfied for a system or item to be considered Operationally Certified (Figure 1.3). They include: task qualification training, Personnel Reliability Program certification, nuclear surety training, and successful completion (Ready rating) of a MAJCOM conducted Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection.

Nuclear Certification is granted by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), the Air Force’s nuclear certification authority, when the system is Design Certified and at least one operational unit is Operationally Certified. In some cases only specifically identified components of the Design Certification or Operational Certification elements will need to be satisfied in order for a system or item to be Nuclear Certified. Specific certification requirements will be determined on a case by case basis based on information provided to the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Certification Management Branch by the Single Manager/Program Office in the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (NCIS) and detailed in the Certification Requirements Plan (CRP).

Items requiring Nuclear Certification . In accordance with AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program, nuclear capable weapon systems, hardware, software, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations must be nuclear certified prior to conducting operations involving nuclear weapons or weapon systems. The following is a general categorical listing of items taken from AFI 91-103, Air Force Nuclear Safety Design Certification Program, that require certification because of their role in a nuclear weapon system. The status of a particular nuclear certified item can be verified by consulting the Master Nuclear Certification List (MNCL) maintained on the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center website (https://wwwmil.nwc.kirtland.af.mil).

NOTE: When items do not clearly fall into any of the categories identified, contact the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Certification Management Branch at Kirtland AFB, NM for guidance.

Combat and non-combat delivery vehicles Operational & support equipment used to move, support, store, handle, load, and unload or mate and de-mate nuclear weapons Hardware and software components that directly interface (electrically or physically) with a nuclear weapon, critical component, certified software, or are identified in a current launch activation path

Operational and maintenance hardware and software used to command and control critical functions and perform status reporting

Items that could degrade the nuclear command, control and status reporting capability Nuclear Weapon Maintenance Handling and Storage Facilities critical facility systems and facility lifting and suspension systems used to lift, support or move nuclear weapons (i.e.

cranes, hoists, suspended frames)

Non-specialized equipment modifications that impact:

o Primary structure o Electrical and hydraulic power systems o Load bearing capacity o Steering and braking capability o Positive control features o AFI 91-107, Design, Evaluation, Troubleshooting, and Maintenance Criteria for

Nuclear Weapon Systems-directed design criteria Test equipment that o Verifies proper operation of critical circuits of a combat delivery vehicle or directly interfaces with nuclear weapons or operationally certified critical components o Is used to operationally certify, decertify, or verify proper operation of applicable items identified in AFI 91-103, Air Force Nuclear Safety Design Certification Program, paragraph 4.1, unless other means of verification are used o Is used in special test or maintenance programs to identify system anomalies or failures Tamper Detection Indicators (TDI) used in an operational system, or in a non-operational environment for storage or transportation Nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon system technical order procedures (to include ICBM

OPCERT and DECERT procedures IAW AFI 91-103)

Items not requiring Nuclear Certification General purpose hand tools o Pliers, wrenches, screwdrivers, measuring tools, magnifiers, nondestructive inspection equipment, vacuum cleaners, connector removal and pin straightening/removal/insertion tools, etc

Manually operated hydraulic jacks, pallet jacks, and wheeled pry bars (J-Bars) Bridge plates, platforms, shoring ramps Common multi-purpose non-specialized test equipment such as multi-meters, decade resistance boxes, impedance bridges unless the equipment directly interfaces with nuclear weapons or is part of an end item that is nuclear safety design certified

Certain field-level modifications to non-specialized equipment o That clearly do not impact braking, steering, lifting, power train or load carrying/restraint systems or safety design o Add-on radios, fire extinguishers, truck bed liners, camper shells, sirens, Foreign

Object Damage (FOD) magnets or containers, etc Depot and intermediate-level test equipment if the critical circuits of the tested items are verified at the organizational level before use with nuclear weapons Delivery, loading, mating, maintenance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal training equipment.

Items considered Nuclear Certified when used for their intended purposes and in their original unmodified condition

Bombs and warheads are certified by the Department of Energy (DOE) DOE- provided test and handling equipment as long as the item is used for the specific purpose intended and in its intended operating environment Individual bomb roller assemblies Commercial Truck-Tractors which meet requirements identified in the Master Nuclear

Certification List Tie-down chains, cables, straps and adjusters used for restraint during transportation

Nuclear Certification Process Owners

Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center’s, Nuclear Capabilities Directorate (AFNWC/NC) is the Air Force’s Office of Primary responsibility (OPR) and manager for Nuclear Certification.

The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Certification Management Branch; (hereafter referred to as the Certification Management Branch) is the Air Force centralized manager for nuclear weapon system certification. This branch’s responsibilities include:

Managing the Air Force’s Nuclear Certification Program Providing technical guidance to Single Managers, Program Offices and MAJCOMs Evaluating Nuclear Certification Impact Statements (NCIS) Developing Basic Certification Requirements Plans (CRP) and coordinating the

Final CRP with the appropriate process owners Ensuring required certification actions are completed Granting Nuclear Certification based on completion of all Certification

Requirements Plan identified Design and Operational Certification requirements Providing Sustainment Phase support to process owners Managing and conducting Nuclear Certification Process Training Developing, deploying, and maintaining the Master Nuclear Certification List

(MNCL)

Developing Air Force directives governing nuclear certification Implementing AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program

The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Surety Engineering Branch (hereafter referred to as the Surety Engineering Branch) is the Air Force independent technical authority for delivery system nuclear surety and compatibility. This branch:

Provides technical direction for nuclear surety and aircraft compatibility to ensure weapon system design certification Chairs and/or co-Chairs weapon system and the Aircraft Monitor and Control

(AMAC) Project Officer Groups (POGs) Provides independent evaluation of nuclear weapon systems, subsystems and components for compliance with DoD and USAF nuclear safety instructions and specifications to the Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC)

Serves as the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) voting member to the Air Force Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group (NWSSG) and provides technical advisors to support NWSSG studies as necessary

Reviews Nuclear Certification Impact Statements and Certification Requirements Plans for compatibility certification requirements

Evaluates and recommends aircraft nuclear systems compatibility (develops the Nuclear Compatibility Certification Statement (NCCS) when appropriate to document aircraft compatibility certification)

Manages the Nuclear Hardness Database system Conducts independent evaluations of support systems such as: Ground Support

Equipment, Suspension & Release Gear, Weapon System Secure Storage (WS3) system, Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF), and Storage and Maintenance Facilities, for compliance with DoD and USAF nuclear safety instructions and specifications for the Air Force Safety Center (AFSC)

Ensures nuclear weapon surety during maintenance operations Reviews Nuclear Certification Impact Statements and Certification Requirements

Plans for Design Certification requirements

An element of the Surety Engineering Branch, the Engineering Liaison Section (NCSSE), is co-located with USAFE/A4 (A4W) at Ramstein Airbase, Germany and is the in-theater technical authority for the NATO nuclear surety program. ELO provides in-country AFMC engineering and logistics expertise for the NATO nuclear surety effort. ELO is the authority for compatibility certification of non-US NATO weapon systems, support equipment and procedures in compliance with AFPD 16-6, International Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements, and Nonproliferation Agreements; AFI 16-601, Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements and Nonproliferation Agreements; and ACO Directive 80-76, NATO Nuclear Certification.

The 708th Nuclear Systems Squadron (708 NUSS) manages Air Force nuclear weapons logistics from cradle to grave. This organization

Serves as the POC for Air Force nuclear logistics issues Serves as a member of the Air Force Use Control Project Officers Group (POG) Co-chairs the Code Management System oversight committee Serves as the Air Force Nuclear Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) agent Serves as the Air Force Agent for Joint Nuclear Weapons Publications System

(JNWPS)

Manages the DoD Unsatisfactory Reporting Program for the Air Force Serves as the Technical Content Manager and Technical Order Management Authority

TCM/TOMA for Air Force Nuclear Weapons Technical Data

Air Force Chief of Safety (AF/SE)

Oversees the Air Force Nuclear Surety Program The Air Force Safety Center, Weapons Safety Division (AFSEC/SEW) is responsible for implementing the Air Force Nuclear Surety Program

Air Force Safety Center Weapons Safety Division (HQ AFSEC/SEW) is responsible for the Air Force Nuclear Surety Program. The Air Force Safety Center:

Implements and manages the USAF Nuclear Safety Certification Program as outlined in AFI 91-103, Air Force Nuclear Safety Design Certification Program

Publishes design and evaluation criteria according to AFI 91-107, Design, Evaluation, Troubleshooting and Maintenance Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems; AFMAN 91- 118, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems; and AFMAN 91-119, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software

Evaluates Nuclear Weapons Systems for compliance with USAF nuclear surety requirements and provides nuclear safety design certification for hardware, software, and procedures to be used with nuclear weapons

Manages and provides the chairman for the USAF Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group and Weapon System Safety Rules development process as detailed in AFI 91- 102, Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules

Oversees the Air Force Nuclear Surety Inspection Program as detailed in AFI 90-201, The Air Force Inspection System. Reviews Nuclear Certification Impact Statements and Certification Requirements Plans for Nuclear Safety Design Certification and Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group requirements

The Single Manager (SM), Systems Group Manager, Product Manager (herein referred to as Single Manager) is responsible for program execution of an approved weapon system program. The Single Manager:

Identifies items requiring nuclear certification and provides assessments to the AFNWC Certification Management Branch in the form of a Nuclear Certification Impact Statement

Notifies the MAJCOM whenever weapon system software, firmware, facilities, procedures and hardware have been nuclear certified and are ready for release to the field

Notifies the MAJCOM whenever a nuclear certified system has been decertified Develops acquisition strategies that include nuclear certification for any new, modified or additional nuclear capability Supports the fielding, sustainment, maintenance and configuration control of nuclear hardware and software Appoints a Nuclear Certification Manager (NCM) to provide oversight and management of the program office’s nuclear certification activities Serves as the Office of Primary Responsibility for implementation of the approved

Certification Requirements Plan

Nuclear Certification Manager (NCM)

Serves as the primary representative within the program office for day-to-day management and execution of the Nuclear Certification Program

Coordinates support from engineering, logistics, test, structures, weapons, plans, and programs to ensure a nuclear capability is obtained and sustained

Manages nuclear certification training for program office personnel Coordinates the development of nuclear certification requirements with applicable organizations, including contractors, AFNWC, Air Force Safety Center, test agencies, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), MAJCOM, and higher headquarters

Monitors the weapon system nuclear certification process to maintain weapon system configuration and certification

The Lead or Using Command (hereafter referred to as the Major Command (MAJCOM) unless a specific delineation is required) oversees and manages the Operational Certification elements of the Nuclear Certification Program. The MAJCOM:

Authorizes the release of new or modified certified items for operational use Provides operational support and expertise to the Single Manager for identifying and conducting operational testing required for modifications to current nuclear certified hardware or software items

Supports technical data certification and verification activities

Conducts initial Nuclear Surety Inspections to establish a unit’s Operational Certification prior to employing a new or modified weapons system

Conducts periodic nuclear surety inspections and other periodic inspections as required by DoD and Air Force instructions

Ensures funding requirements to obtain and maintain nuclear certification are included in the Planning, Programming and Execution budget submissions. (AFPD 10-9, Lead Command Designation and Responsibilities for Weapon Systems)

User

Verifies certification status and configuration of all hardware and software prior to use Identifies and documents deficiencies Establishes and maintains operational certification sustainment training and personnel certifications as directed by Air Force and MAJCOM guidance.

Other Process Owners

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) directs nuclear-related acquisition programs, except ICBMs, and sets policy and guidance for managing nuclear capable/certified weapon systems and nuclear certified mission support products. ICBM acquisition programs are directed through the Undersecretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition.

Office of the Inspector General (AF/IG) manages Air Force nuclear inspection policy and provides oversight of inspection policy implementation. Ensures MAJCOMs follow Nuclear Surety Inspection guidance.

Deputy for Nuclear Operations (AF/A3SN) is the focal point for the AF nuclear mission. Provides nuclear policy and guidance, develops Force Structure and ensures the stockpile support meets Combatant Commander (COCOM) needs. Manages the Planning and Programming for AF nuclear weapons, tracks force readiness and nuclear issues in the field, inspection trends, and major upgrades.

Director of Operational Capability Requirements (AF/A5R) ensures the need for nuclear certification is addressed in: 1) the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)/Capability Development Document (CDD)/Capability Production Document (CPD) for a new nuclear-capable weapon system, or for a major modification to the same; and/or 2) the AF Form 1067 for modifications to a new or existing nuclear-capable system. Coordinates with the appropriate MAJCOM(s) to identify the cost and time impact of nuclear certification as early as possible in the Requirements Generation Process.

Directorate of Security Forces (AF/A7S) establishes policy and guidance on nuclear security;

prioritizes and plans the upgrade and installation of nuclear security sensor systems through the Base Physical Security System program.

Directorate of Maintenance (AF/A4M) monitors compliance/non-compliance with the USAF Nuclear Certification Program; reviews USAF policy and guidance for daily unit management of nuclear capable/certified weapon systems and equipment.

Chapter 2 The Identification Phase

Figure 2.1 Identification Phase

Overview

The Identification Phase begins (Figure 2.1) when the Single Manager, in conjunction with the appropriate Major Command(s) and HQ USAF Director of Operational Requirements (if required):

Identifies a requirement for a new nuclear capable weapon system; (example: a new land based strategic deterrent (ICBM) or a new aircraft system), or support equipment item (example:

replacement for the MHU-141 munitions trailer)

Identifies the need to modify an existing nuclear certified weapon system, facility, support equipment, hardware or software item, etc.

Identifies a requirement to nuclear certify an existing non-nuclear certified weapon system (example: B-1 bomber)

The Single Manager and/or appropriate MAJCOM determine the impact the effort will have on the item’s nuclear certification status or in the case of a new weapon system or equipment item determine if the item requires nuclear certification (Figure 2.1, Block 1).

When it is determined that an item requires nuclear certification or will change the status of a previously certified item, the Single Manager, or appropriate MAJCOM, documents the impact in a Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (NCIS) (Figure 2.1, Block 2) which is sent to the Certification Management Branch or review and action.

In response to the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (NCIS), the Certification Management Branch, in conjunction with the process owners, defines exactly what actions are required to attain or maintain nuclear certification of the weapon system or item. The Certification Management Branch develops and coordinates the nuclear certification requirements, roles, responsibilities, and schedules in a Basic Certification Requirements Plan (Figure 2.1, Block 3). The Single Manager is responsible for developing the Final Certification Requirements Plan which provides the specific details for achieving the certification requirements identified in the Basic Certification Requirements Plan.

Following final coordination and signature of the Certification Requirements Plan by the process owners, the action agencies execute the plan and the process transitions to the Administration Phase of the nuclear certification process.

Primary Governing Directives

Nuclear Certification is a very broad program that impacts a wide range of Air Force programs and organizations, and it is beyond the scope of this document to list every directive pertinent to the Identification Phase of the Nuclear Certification process. Listed below are many of the more common, general directives pertinent to the Identification Phase.

DoDD 3150.2, DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program DoDI 5030.55, DoD Procedures for Joint DoD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Life-Cycle Activities AFI 10-601, Operational Capability Requirements Development AFPD 63-12, Assurance of Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness AFI 63-101, Acquisition and Sustainment Life Cycle Management AFI 63-103, Joint Air Force-National Nuclear Security Administration (AF-NNSA) Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Management AFI 63-104, The SEEK EAGLE Program AFI 63-114, Quick Reaction Capability Process AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program AFI 63-1101, Modification Program Management AFI 63-1201, Life Cycle Systems Engineering AFI 91-101, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program AFI 91-102, Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules AFI 91-103, Air Force Nuclear Safety Design Certification Program AFI 91-107, Design, Evaluation, Troubleshooting, and Maintenance Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Systems AFMAN 91-118, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems AFMAN 91-119, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software Master Nuclear Certification List (MNCL) [https://wwwmil.nwc.kirtland.af.mil/mncl/index.cfm] MOU No. DE-GM04-2001AL77133, Agreement on Division of Responsibilities for Aircraft Monitor and Control (AMAC) System Design

Identification Phase Process Owners Roles and Responsibilities

The Single Manager (SM) is responsible for obtaining and maintaining nuclear certification for weapon systems, and mission support products, etc., for which he/she is responsible. The Single Manager identifies those items requiring or impacting nuclear certification through the development and submittal of the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement to the Certification Management Branch. The Single Manager is also responsible for completing the Certification Requirements Plan.

The Nuclear Certification Manager (NCM) serves as the Single Manager’s point-of-contact for day-to-day management of the Nuclear Certification Program within the Program Office, assists the Single Manager in developing and coordinating the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement and Certification Requirements Plan.

The Certification Management Branch, as the Air Force’s office of primary responsibility (OPR) for nuclear certification, reviews and coordinates Nuclear Certification Impact Statements, develops the Basic Certification Requirements Plan, and coordinates and approves the final Certification Requirements Plan for implementation.

The MAJCOM establishes system requirements and identifies operational certification requirements.

The Identification Phase Process

Figure 2.2 The Identification Phase Process

The Identification Process can be initiated in several ways:

The Single Manager (or the appointed Nuclear Certification Manager) initiates the Nuclear

Certification Identification Process for a number of reasons to include:

Product improvements, upgrades, modifications, new requirements, etc. (Figure 2.2 block 1), or

Design, maintenance or operational issues experienced with existing nuclear weapon systems discovered while sustaining nuclear certified items (identified through DULL

SWORDS, Material Deficiency Reports (MDR), Quality Deficiency Reports (QDR), etc.)

(Figure 2.2 block 2)

In all cases the Single Manager (or Nuclear Certification Manager) completes an

Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) and forwards it to the appropriate MAJCOM(s) for review, validation, approval/disapproval (accomplished in conjunction with HAF/XOR IAW AFI 63-131, Modification Program Management; and AFI 10-601, Operational Capability Requirements Development,).

The MAJCOM can initiate the Identification Process (Figure 2.2 block 3) by:

Completing an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that

- Identifies a new requirement, or

- Adds an additional capability requirement (Refer to Defense Acquisition Guidebook http://akss.dau.mil/dag/

Completing a Combat Capability Document (CCD) to field an urgent, interim solution to a warfighter’s non-nuclear capability on a nuclear certified system.

Completing an AF Form 1067, Modification Proposal at following URL: http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/af1067.xfd for deficiencies in warfighter capability

If the Single Manager initiated the process, the MAJCOM must review and validate the activity.

Regardless of how the effort is initiated, the MAJCOM must coordinate new requirements, modifications or deficiencies with HAF/XOR before submitting the appropriate document(s) to the Single Manager.

NOTE – Field units can initiate modifications to nuclear certified systems or items by completing an AF Form 1067, Modification Proposal at following URL: http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/af1067.xfd, then forwarding the request to the appropriate

MAJCOM.

After receiving the appropriate documents from the MAJCOM, the Single Manager (or Nuclear Certification Manager) will review the documents for MAJCOM recommendation (Figure 2.2 block 4). If the MAJCOM approves of the proposed change, modification, or upgrade, then the Single Manager (or Nuclear Certification Manager) determines if the requirement affects the configuration of a nuclear certified item

In the case of a modification to an existing item, the Single Manager may convene a Configuration Control Board (CCB) to assist in making a certification impact determination.

In the case of a new requirement, The Single Manager may form a team to conduct the new acquisition process

If the MAJCOM disapproves the change, modification, or upgrade, the Single Manager (or Nuclear Certification Manager) can either reengage with the MAJCOM or cease all activity regarding the Single Manager initiated request.

The Single Manager is responsible for identifying items requiring nuclear certification and assesses modifications to determine if nuclear certification is affected or required.

It is imperative to the success of the nuclear certification process, that the identification or determination of whether the new requirement or modification requires nuclear certification is accomplished early in the process. The Single Manager must:

Consult with functional experts Consider the new requirement or modification and its impact on the Design and Operational

Certification elements of the nuclear certification process before deciding that nuclear certification is not required (refer to Attachment 2.1)

If the Single Manager determines the new requirement/modification (Figure 2.2 block 5)

Requires/Impacts nuclear certification, the Single Manager finalizes the Engineering Change Proposal (Figure 2.2 block 7), initiates a Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (Attachment 2.2) (Figure 2.2 block 8), and then forwards it to the Certification Management Branch.

Does not require nuclear certification, the Single Manager can either

Follow procedures for completing Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (Figure 2.2 blocks 7-11) (Attachment 2.2), explaining why certification actions are not required, then forward to the Certification Management Branch.

-or -

Cease all nuclear certification activities (Figure 2.2 block 6)

If the Single Manager is unsure as to whether nuclear certification is required or not, the Single Manager should follow the procedures for completing the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (Attachment 2.2), and forward it to the Certification Management Branch.

The Certification Management Branch receives the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement from the Single Manager for review (Figure 2.2 block 8/9). The Certification Management Branch will distribute the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement to each process owner for their review and coordination. The coordination package includes:

The original Nuclear Certification Impact Statement

A list of proposed certification actions

Nuclear Certification Impact Statement Coordination Form which contains suspense dates and other information for the process owners (Figure 2-3)

Figure 2.3 Nuclear Certification Impact Statement Coordination Form

Each process owner will, within five working days of receipt:

Confirm receipt of Nuclear Certification Impact Statement

Provide an initial indication of certification impact (Yes or No)

Process and Process Owners

Process Owners

Compatibility Certification

AFNWC Surety Engineering Branch US Aircraft , ELO for non-US NATO aircraft ICBM Program Office – ICBM systems

Safety Design Certification HQ AFSEC/SEW

Rules Development HQ AFSEC/SEW

Technical Data TOMA TPO for NATO

Operational Certification MAJCOM OCA and HQ USAFE for NATO

Since the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement serves as the source document for determining the impact the program effort has on nuclear certification it is important that it addresses the program effort in enough detail to allow the process owners to make an informed determination and to substantiate the recommended certification approach. The Certification Management Branch will return the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement to the Single Manager when additional information is required to make a certification determination.

Within 30 days from receipt of the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement Coordination Forms from the process owners, the Certification Management Branch will determine if the new system, procedure, or modification has a nuclear certification impact.

If the hardware or software modification effort has no impact on the certified status of the system, or there is no need to further engage the certification process for the new weapon or support system development effort, the Certification Management Branch will notify the Single Manager via a Nuclear Certification Impact Statement Approval Notification Letter (No Impact) (Figure 2- 4). This letter will identify any administrative requirements that need to be accomplished by the Certification Management Branch, or other process owners (i.e., updating the Master Nuclear Certification List or Nuclear Compatibility Certification Statement), and that no further certification actions are required by the Program Office.

If it is determined that the modification or new weapon system development effort will require nuclear certification, the Certification Management Branch will prepare a Basic Certification Requirements

Plan (CRP) and obtain coordination from the appropriate process owners (Figure 2.2 block 9). The Single Manager will be notified that a Basic CRP is being developed by the Certification Management Branch via the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement Approval Notification Letter (with impact).

(Figure 2-5)

If a process owner determines that their process is impacted by the modification or new development effort the process owner will, by the suspense date indicated in the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement Coordination Form, identify the specific certification requirements that need to be met in order for their certification process to be satisfied. These requirements will be provided to Certification Management Branch and will be incorporated into the Basic Certification Requirements Plan. The review process generally takes about 2-3 weeks from initial receipt of the Nuclear Certification Impact Statement. Below are examples of certification requirements that could be identified in a process owner’s response:

Must demonstrate compliance with AFMAN 91-118, Para. 2.43 through 2.54

Design to requirements of MIL-HDBK-1784, Mobility, Towed and Manually Propelled Support Equipment

Successfully complete Belgian Block Road Test

Perform fault tree or nuclear safety cross check analysis

Submit nuclear safety requirements compliance matrix

The Basic Certification Requirements Plan (CRP) provides the Single Manager with an outline of the nuclear certification approach to follow to obtain nuclear certification for the modification or new system development effort. It is a planning document that identifies process owner certification requirements that must be accomplished by the program office and other agencies, required supporting data, and appropriate evaluation criteria needed to obtain certification from the process owner. The Basic Certification Requirements Plan (Attachment 2.3) serves as the baseline document for the Single Manager to develop the CRP. Its format is the same as the Single Manager developed Certification Requirements Plan.

Once the process owners have coordinated and approved the Basic Certification Requirements Plan, the Certification Management Branch will forward it to the Single Manager (Figure 2.2 block 9). The Single Manager uses the Basic CRP to develop the Certification Requirements Plan (CRP) (Figure 2.2 block 10). The Certification Requirements Plan defines the processes, activities, and tasks that will be accomplished to meet the certification requirements. It details the actions, roles, responsibilities, and schedules necessary to accomplish nuclear certification activities.

In developing the Certification Requirements Plan the Single Manager should evaluate and coordinate trade-offs, risk acceptance, etc., with the Certification Management Branch before submitting it for review and coordination.

The Single Manager returns the completed draft version of the Certification Requirements Plan to the Certification Management Branch for review and approval (Figure 2.2 block 10). The Certification Management Branch will distribute the draft plan to the process owners for their review and coordination. Issues will be resolved and a finalized Certification Requirements Plan will be approved by the process owners and the Certification Management Branch (Figure 2.2 block 11-12).

The Single Manager’s Draft Certification Requirements Plan’s cover page will be marked in the upper left hand corner as shown below to indicate the draft status of the plan. This step in the process may require producing one or more iterations of the Draft CRP. If necessary, iterations of the Draft CRP will be identified by the “Date”. When agreement is obtained between the Single Manager and all applicable process owners, the Certification Requirements Plan will be considered finalized.

CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PLAN

CONTROL NUMBER: NWC“YearMoXXX”

Original /Draft (“Date”)

When all coordination is complete and signatures are obtained, the Certification Management Branch approves (signs) the CRP and returns it to the Single Manager for execution. A copy of the CRP will be sent to all appropriate process owners. The approved Certification Requirements Plan cover page will be marked as indicated below.

Original /“Date”

The Certification Requirements Plan is a program office planning document which is required to be kept current. Schedules or other programmatic changes may drive changes to the nuclear certification requirements and schedules laid out in the CRP and these will need to be captured and documented accordingly. The Certification Management Branch will process changes to the Certification Requirements Plan in a manner similar to the initial creation of the plan. Since a change in one area may drive changes to other elements of the certification process, each revision of the CRP will be coordinated with all process owners whether or not their specific area are directly affected.

For example, the Program Office developed Nuclear Surety Evaluation (NSE) needed to satisfy the Nuclear Safety Design requirement is also used as the basis for the Surety Engineering Branch developed Technical Nuclear Safety Analysis that is used for the Nuclear Weapon System Safety

Group (NWSSG) in support of various nuclear weapon system safety studies. If the timeline for the Nuclear Surety Evaluation changes and there is a safety study requirement identified in the CRP it may delay the completion of the Technical Nuclear Safety Analysis (TNSA) which could in turn drive changes to the NWSSG schedule and ultimately affect the overall certification need date. This kind of change affects at least three process owners: Air Force Safety Center, the Surety Engineering Branch, and the MAJCOM.

The process of coordinating revisions may require producing one or more iterations of plan in draft form. When agreement is obtained between the Single Manager, process owners, and the Certification Management Branch, the CRP revision will be considered finalized.

Each revision of the CRP will:

Be marked on the cover page as shown below

Be signed by the Single Manager, the Certification Management Branch, and appropriate process owners

Identify changes using a vertical black line in the left margin of the affected paragraph or table entry

Contain a summary of changes paragraph immediately behind the cover page

Revision “X” /“Date”

Figure 2.4 NCIS Approval Letter example (no-impact)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

498TH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS GROUP

February 8, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR KC/YBC/ADCD

ATTENTION: Jackson Whole, Nuclear Certification Manager

FROM: Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Certification Management Branch

(AFNWC/NCSC)

SUBJECT: NCIS Approval Notification

Reference: Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (NCIS), YB-96 Offensive Avionics Systems (OAS) Flight Computer Program (FCP) Flux Targeting Checksum and Bomb Function “0” Patches, 2 May 2005

1. Based on the information provided in reference above, the applicable nuclear certification process owners have determined that there are no impacts to the Nuclear Design or Operational Certification elements of the nuclear certification process defined in AFI 63-125, Nuclear Certification Program for the YB-96 OAS FCP Flux Targeting Checksum and Bomb Function “O” Patches except for administrative changes. These administrative changes include: 1) Update to the Nuclear Compatibility Certification Statement (NCCS), 2) Update Computer program Identification Number (CPIN) for software listed below, and 3 ) remove instructions and warning regarding the Flux targeting Checksum software Function “0” from the Technical Order, 1B-YB-96-30-1, page 2-16, step 4, and YB-96-30-4, page 7-6. Therefore, this memorandum provides our concurrence with the subject NCIS that no further nuclear certification actions are required.

2. My POC for this subject is Judley Engineer, Judley.Engineer@kirtland.af.mil , DNS 246-5566.

JOHN D. DIVISIONCHIEF, GS-14-DAF

Chief, Certification Management Branch cc: AFNWC/NCSS

HQ AFSEC/SEW

HQ ACC/SEW

Figure 2.5 NCIS Approval Notification Letter example (with-impact)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

498TH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS GROUP

February 8, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR OC/ALC/ABCD

ATTENTION: Donald Tramp, Nuclear Certification Manager

FROM: Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Certification Management Branch

(AFNWC/NCSC)

SUBJECT: NCIS Approval Notification

Reference: Nuclear Certification Impact Statement (NCIS), Widget Replacement for MHU-196, 20 May 2005

1. Based on the information provides in reference above, the applicable nuclear certification process owners have determined that there are impacts to the Design and/or Operational Certification elements of the nuclear certification process defined in AFI 63-135, Nuclear Certification Program. Therefore, this memorandum provides our concurrence with the subject NCIS that nuclear certification actions are required. These impacts will be addressed in the Basic CRP where the top level certification requirements, roles and responsibilities are defined. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Certification Management Branch will prepare the Basic CRP and obtain coordination from all the process owners within XXX days.

2. My POC for this subject is Judley Engineer, Judley.Engineer@kirtland.af.mil, DSN 256-5566.

JOHN D. DIVISIONCHIEF, GS-14-DAF

Chief, Certification Management Branch cc: SPO NCM Compatibility Cert POC Safety POC Operational Cert POC

SNL/2912 POC

Attachment 2.1 – Determining the Need to Engage the Nuclear Certification Process

Any new nuclear capable weapon system or nuclear weapon system support equipment (hardware or software), to include…