Appendix_N_-_Force_Protection.pdf

Solicitation FA4890-13-R-0007

Appendix N - 1

11 Dec 2013

APPENDIX N

GOVERNMENT COORDINATED

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL FORCE PROTECTION SECURITY

Location Date # Pages

Bogotá, Colombia May 2008 3

Riohacha, Colombia May 2008 2

Marandua, Colombia May 2008 2

San Jose del Guaviare, Colombia May 2008 3

Tres Esquinas, Colombia May 2008 4

San Andres, Colombia May 2008 2

Evacuation Plan Annex May 2008 4

* New studies and site surveys are being performed. Changes to individual sites will be updated when available. Additional information regarding the general threat state in Colombia may be obtained from the State Department’s web site.

Information in this appendix and the aforementioned web site should be used in proposals.

Bogotá - 1

Bogotá, Colombia

May 2008

Geo-Political

a. General

The capital of Colombia is Santa Fe de Bogotá, D.C. Bogotá is a district capital bordered on all sides by the Department of Cundinamarca. A major, cosmopolitan city with a population of six to seven million, Bogotá is located on a plateau in the Cordillera

Oriental at an altitude of 8,600 feet. The city is the economic, political, social, and cultural center of Colombia.

1) Terrain and Weather analysis

The climate of Bogotá is moderate, with an average temperature of 57F year round. The main dry season lasts from December to March, with a second dry season between July and September. The wettest months are April and October.

2) Local/Economic/Political History

Because of the size and cosmopolitan nature of Bogotá, a lack of familiarity with the Colombian culture and Spanish language on the part of the technicians will not be as noticeable as in other, more isolated sites. The technicians could, however, be identified.

(Police raids on guerrilla "safe houses" in the city have, in the past, resulted in the confiscation of a significant number of photographs and intelligence reports on U.S.

Government personnel stationed in Colombia.)

American, Delta, Continental airlines, and numerous foreign carriers, fly to and from Bogotá daily.

The Host Nation Command Center (HNCC) also known as Peace Panorama, is located in the Colombian Ministry of Defense (CAN) compound, which houses the

Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of the various armed forces. The compound is secured and controlled by the Colombian security forces. This compound is the location of the Mobile Air Surveillance System (MASS) Earth Station that is part of the MASS program.

Earth Station U.S. maintenance contractor personnel live in rented apartments in the city, within an area specifically designated by the MILGP.

Bogotá - 2

b. Threat Assessment

U.S. maintenance personnel assigned to Bogotá will be in a city with an extremely high crime rate, including a murder rate approximately nine times that of New

York City. Assaults, kidnappings, drug dealing, break-ins, and car thefts are commonplace; scams and minor crime are endemic.

Relevant statistical data, which may help to place Bogotá’s crime rate in perspective, include the fact that 4,580 people died violently in Bogotá during 1997. Of those, 2,885 were homicide victims. Firearms were used in 77% of the homicides. In addition, 1,350 people died in traffic accidents and 6,922 cars were stolen during the same timeframe. In 2007, Bogota had a murder rate of 20 persons per 100,000 inhabitants, with 1401 fatalities. It should be stated that these figures, both in terms of volume and rate, remain higher than equivalent US urban areas such as Philadelphia, Pa., Washington D.C, and Atlanta, Ga.

It should also be noted specifically that a significant risk exists for U.S. personnel arriving and departing Bogotá’s "El Dorado" airport. Over the past few years, U.S.

citizens have been assaulted, robbed and killed by taxi drivers transporting them to and from the airport.

c. Installation Vulnerability

Drug traffickers can be expected to take an interest in the earth station maintenance personnel assigned in Bogotá. It is considered likely that they will try to obtain information on the operations of the facility. Approaches may be expected to come in the form of maneuvering technicians into a compromising position, attempted bribery, and/or harassment and intimidation.

The FARC organization has urban guerrilla units in and around Bogotá. While the

FARC is on record that it considers U.S interests to be legitimate targets, it is considered unlikely that the guerrillas would specifically target the maintenance personnel.

Paramilitary organizations are in the same category as other narco-terrorist organizations in that they are involved in the same activity as the FARC.

d. Site Security Manning Organization

A U.S. Regional Security and Force Protection Supervisor stationed in Bogotá will periodically visit all MASS sites to verify effective security and force protection plan implementation. The Regional Security Supervisor shall attend MILGP Force Protection review council meeting and report findings to the ACC/AMIC representative in country

(The Radar Program Office in the Air Force Mission). The Regional Security Supervisor shall also attend weekly meetings with the Radar Program Office in the Air Force

Mission of the MILGP.

Bogotá - 3

e. Personnel Protection (Changed in Revision 1)

A driver/bodyguard and a non-armored vehicle for each U.S. maintenance contractor technician assigned to the Bogotá facility are recommended. The driver/bodyguard will:

- Protect the technician from street crime;

- Inhibit approaches from narcotics traffickers; and

- Handle any traffic problems (from finding one's way to traffic accidents) which might be troublesome for someone not familiar with Colombia in general and Bogotá in particular, especially if that person is not fluent in Spanish.

It is recommended that driver/bodyguards be armed with a .38 cal. revolver and carry a portable radio or cell phone and that both technicians and bodyguards have bulletproof vests available for their use, should it prove prudent.

Additionally, all contract personnel arriving in or transiting through Bogotá shall be picked-up from the airport, escorted to their hotel, and escorted back to the airport for departure. Radar program office personnel assigned to the Air Force section of the

MILGP will meet all personnel arriving in Bogotá from outside of Colombia. They will ensure personnel are provided transportation to their hotel and to the RSO and MILGP security briefings. Upon completion of the security briefings the contractors force protection personnel will assume force protection responsibilities for contractor personnel.

It is recommended that the U.S. maintenance technicians follow all Embassy

Regional Security Office (RSO) and MILGP restrictions and recommendations as they pertain to quarters and other restrictions.

f. Evacuation Plan. (Refer to evacuation plan annex)

Riohacha - 1

Riohacha, Colombia

(May 2008)

The MASS Site located at Riohacha is on the flat Caribbean coastal area of the

Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta in the Department of La Guajira. The MASS Site is located on a Colombian army base, which is home to the Mechanized Infantry Battalion #6, Cartagena. The base is located seven kilometers east of the city of Riohacha, the capital of the Department of the Guajira. Battalion Cartagena is a small base by U.S. standards.

It is bordered on the north by the Rio Rancheria, which is dry during several months of the year. To the south lays the road to Maicao, and the areas to the east and west are composed mostly of brush and woods. There are indigenous people living in the immediate area surrounding the base.

There are two guerrilla organizations and one paramilitary unit operating in the

Colombian Department of La Guajira: The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces

(FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The ELN operates in the southeastern part of the department and in the Department of Cesar along the Venezuelan border. The

FARC works out of the northern slope of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and along the north coast from the Palomino, Mengueo area to Riohacha. The groups operating in the immediate Riohacha area are:

The FARC has publicly stated that the U.S. Embassy, as well as U.S. interests and citizens, will be considered legitimate targets. In the past, this guerrilla group has made their presence known by establishing road blocks of not more than 30 minutes duration, killing several policemen, and has attempted several kidnappings, including an attempt on the Minister of Transportation. According to the local Colombian army commander, not all kidnappings are reported to the authorities. In many cases the family prefers to just pay the ransom for the return of their loved ones.

While an all out attack on the radar site is very unlikely, site personnel could easily be targeted when away from the site/base..

The contractor must furnish one driver/escort and a lightly armored vehicle to support the movement of US personnel in the area of the site.

Riohacha - 2

Elements of the Colombian Army and Air Force provide security for the Riohacha site and housing area.

e. Personnel Protection Plan

Based on the previously stated assumptions regarding housing/work arrangements in Riohacha, the following security arrangements are recommended.

1) Personnel.

Perimeter security and access control to the site is controlled by

Colombian military personnel.

It is recommended that personnel travel outside the army base be limited to daylight hours only. During increased force protection condition only mission essential travel from 0800-1700 local time will be permitted. Government sponsored site visitors remaining on site for less than a week will limit trips to town to these hours unless approval is received through the RPO or the Government program manager.

2) Security tasks to be performed:

- Periodic site visits by the contractor U.S. Regional Security and Force

Protection Supervisor/Coordinator stationed in Bogotá

-Provide a driver/escort to support the movement of personnel between the airport to the site and on official business in the local area.

- Provide one lightly armored 4x4 vehicle.

- Develop and modify, as necessary, site security, training, and evacuation plans.

- Provide weapons and ammunition.

3) Equipment

Weapons: Weapons belong to HNSC

Kevlar Vest and Helmets: 1 ea. for all contract personnel and visitors.

An evacuation from Riohacha would probably be in response to a guerrilla attack on the base, general evacuation order for U.S. personnel to leave Colombia, or as the result of a natural disaster. It should be assumed that an evacuation would be executed by the FAC or by charter aircraft on a reimbursable basis.

Marandua - 1

Marandua, Colombia

Marandua is a Colombian Air Force Base located deep in Colombia’s eastern plains in the Department of Vichada. The base is currently manned by a Colombian

Army force of approximately 150 men and a contingent of some 20 members of the

Colombian Air Force.

The Department of Vichada is bordered on the north and east by Venezuela; on the south by the Department of Guainía; on the southwest by the Department of Guaviare; on the west by the Departments of Meta and Casanare; and on the northwest by the Department of Arauca.

There are no roads in the vicinity of Marandua. The only airstrip is on the base and, other than by foot, the only way in or out of the area is by air. Because Marandua is so isolated and insular, maintenance contractor technicians will be readily identifiable as

MASS-related personnel.

The GBR site is in a fenced compound located on the main base. Two sides of the compound are bordered by the base; the remaining two sides of the compound forma part of the outer perimeter of the base itself.

The radar site is secured and controlled by the Colombian Air Force (FAC). All access into the site is controlled by the FAC OIC. All personnel entering the site must be cleared by the FAC through the U.S. Military Group in Bogotá. GBR personnel live on base. Housing, food, and other logistical support have to be provided using air assets.

The principal threat on the base and, ultimately to maintenance contractor personnel, will come from the FARC’s 16 Front, which is based south of the area, and which derives much of its funding from the drug trade. The FARC has sufficient strength in the area to directly threaten the integrity of the base and the distances separating the

Marandua base from any support will virtually ensure that it will be on its own in the event of trouble.

Marandua is an isolated base and cannot be reasonably reinforced by troops moving by land. All reinforcements must arrive by air. The nearest facility to provide those reinforcements is 45 minutes away. However, enemy forces moving to attack the

Marandua - 2 base must move over open terrain where they are exposed to detection. The army and air force conduct continuous day and night surveillance, by land and by air, of the area.

The Colombian Military has responsibility for the security of the military base where the site is located and controls all access on and off the base. The FAC has the responsibility for the internal security of the radar site and housing complex and controls all access on and off.

Armed FAC guards control access 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Their instructions require that any person desiring entrance to the site, have prior approval from the senior FAC controller on site. A list of names and identification numbers of all personnel allowed access to the site is kept in the guard shack. The site manager updates this list on the day any visitors are to arrive.

Elements of the Colombian Army and Air Force provide security for the site. A commercial closed circuit camera system has been installed to assist in the security of the MASS radar site. Colombian Air Force (FAC) personnel will monitor the cameras.

1) - Periodic site visits by the contractor U.S. Regional Security and Force

Protection Supervisor/Coordinator stationed in Bogotá-

2) Equipment

Camera and Monitors: Four imaging and four thermal cameras are located around the site. Four monitors are located in the camera room to monitor camera operations.

Kevlar Vest and Helmets: 1 ea. For all contract personnel and visitors.

An evacuation from Marandua would probably be in response to a guerrilla attack on the base, or intelligence indicating an attack was imminent, general evacuation order for U.S. personnel to leave Colombia, or as the result of a natural disaster. If time allows, a charter flight would be used in evacuating the site. Any emergency evacuation would be supported by the FAC.

San Jose - 1

San Jose del Guaviare, Colombia

May 2008

San Jose del Guaviare, a city of 50,000, is the capital of the Department of Guaviare and is located in Colombia’s southeastern plains. It is bordered on the northwest by the

Department of Meta, on the southwest by the Department of Caquetá, on the southeast by the Department of Vaupés, and on the northeast by the Department of Guainia. The area, known as “Los Llanos”, is composed of flat, low-lying savannas, which lack any notable topographical features. Most of the area is covered with grass, ribbons of gallery forests along the creeks and rivers, and scattered islands of woodland. Rivers are numerous and, in wet season, voluminous. The principal economic activity in the area is agriculture and cattle ranching.

1) Local/Economic/Political History

Few people from outside the Department of Guaviare come to this area. While any stranger will stand out in this environment, the lack of familiarity with the local culture and the Spanish language on the part of maintenance contractor personnel will make them even more readily identifiable and extremely vulnerable.

The following security recommendations are based on the fact that work and residence arrangements in San Jose are similar to those in Riohacha. Maintenance contractor will reside and work on a Colombian Army base. That base is the home of the

Infantry Battalion “José Joaquín París”. Elements of the battalion will control access to the base. Due to the current security situation, it is recommended that travel outside the base be restricted to official mission essential travel only during daylight hours only, as the threat in San Jose is significantly higher than Riohacha.

The radar site inner perimeter is secured and controlled by a Colombian Air

Force (FAC) security detachment. Outer perimeter is secured and controlled by

Colombian Army (CA).

While it is considered unlikely that the FARC will attempt to overrun the

Joaquín París base due to the size of the unit stationed there, it should be noted that the

FARC has previously overrun two military bases. The Las Delicias military base, located in the Department of Vichada, was overrun in 1996 by 150 FARC guerrillas, who either killed or kidnapped the entire garrison. Seventy soldiers were held captive by the FARC for nine months and only released when the Colombian government agreed to

San Jose - 2 demilitarize the area for a month. In 1997, 200 FARC guerrillas overran the military garrison at Patascoy, killing eleven and capturing eighteen.

The FARC has a history of establishing roadblocks and robbing, killing, and kidnapping individuals who fall under their control; of engaging military units in combat;

and of attacking security force garrisons. They can be expected to continue to carry out such activities, and would certainly target maintenance contractor personnel, given the opportunity. The road between Villavicencio and San Jose, the only land transportation route from Bogotá to San Jose, is one of the most dangerous in Colombia.

A secondary threat to maintenance contractor lies in the general population of the area. The region has extensive plantations of coca and many people in the area depend on the drug trade to make their living. The area around San Jose was the scene of a popular uprising in 1996, after Colombian anti-narcotics police began fumigating the plantations. Any attempts to interfere with the drug trade will certainly generate hostility.

In addition, a large portion of the population of San Jose is known to be guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers.

Based on the previously stated assumptions regarding housing/work arrangements in San Jose, the following security arrangements are recommended:

1) Personnel

Drivers/bodyguards with significant police or military-related experience in the areas of defensive driving, execute protection, intelligence, and counter-surveillance. These bodyguard/drivers will provide the manning level required to support 24/7 site operations. It is recommended that travel off the army base be limited to mission essential trips during the hours of 0800-1700 local time.

No perimeter security guards are required since perimeter protection and access control is provided by the host nation.

2) Security tasks to be performed:

- Periodic site visits by the contractor U.S. Regional Security and Force

Protection Supervisor/Coordinator stationed in Bogotá

-Provide a driver/escort to support the movement of personnel between the airport to the site and on official business in the local area.

- Provide one lightly armored 4x4 vehicle.

- Develop and modify, as necessary, site security, training, and evacuation plans.

San Jose - 3

3) Equipment

Weapons: Weapons belong to HNSC

Camera and Monitors: Four imaging and four thermal cameras are located on the tower. Four monitors are located in the camera room to monitor camera operations.

Kevlar Vest and Helmets: 1 ea. for all contract personnel and visitors.

e. Evacuation Plan (Refer to evacuation plan annex)

An evacuation from San Jose would likely be in response to a general evacuation order for U.S. personnel in Colombia or the San Jose area, civil disturbance or natural disaster, or an immediate danger resulting from guerrilla activity.

The most likely method of evacuation would be via commercial air from the San

Jose airport or by government air from the Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police base in the city to Bogotá. Security personnel shall also assist with the development and maintenance of the evacuation plan.

Tres Esquinas - 1

Tres Esquinas, Colombia

Geo-Political.

The MASS site is located on the Colombian Air Force Base at Tres Esquinas in

Colombia’s southern plains in the Department of Caqueta. The base is manned by Air

Force, Army, Navy and counter-narcotic personnel and is one of the nations most remote and vulnerable military installation. The base was built in 1932 to support operations against Peru and to help develop the region. The Departments (States) bordering

Caqueta are Meta and Guaviare to the northeast Vaupes on the east, Amazonas on the southeast, Putumayo to the south, and Huila on the west.

2) Local/Economic/Political History

Tres Esquinas is an isolated Colombian Air Force Base located in the southern plains of Colombia in Caqueta Department. Many of the locals who work on the base must spend weeks at a time on the base and return to their houses infrequently to

Florencia, Larandia, or Bogotá.

The principal economic activity in the area is agriculture, cattle ranching, and fishing. Few people from outside the area come to Tres Esquinas because there are only three ways to arrive at Tres Esquinas: by walking, by air, and/or by river.

The guerrillas control the area. Many of the locals remain as sympathizers to the guerrillas because they are so far removed from the Colombian economic and political structure that they depend on whatever they can to make a living. Widespread unemployment and poverty creates an environment conducive to growing drugs. In addition, abuse of alcohol and drugs contributes to the incidence of violence.

There is a threat to U.S. personnel from assassination, if targeted. The area is remote and a small unit operation designed to accomplish the objective could be carried out before the base would have sufficient time to react. This threat, while real, has been minimized. The site is located on an active Air Force Base that has 24-hour security and controlled access. U.S. personnel rarely travel outside the confines of the radar site and are restricted to remaining within the secure confines of the base.

The most likely threat to the site would be a small unit operation designed to harass site personnel, or damage site equipment. Due to the close proximity and location of the site on the southern boundary, an area that provides access, cover, and

Tres Esquinas - 2 concealment, this would be the most likely course of action. Because of its location, the site is vulnerable to indirect fire attack, harassment or sniper fire.

The military constantly patrols the base but these activities are increased when there is threat of attack against it.

The Tres Esquinas MASS site is located on a FAC Air Force Base. The radar site, which includes the radar dome, operations center and living area, is surrounded by an earthen berm approximately 8-foot high. The compound is square in shape and at each corner of the berm there is a guard tower approximately 17-feet high, providing three levels of observation and a reinforced fighting position manned by a guard. In the center of each berm there is also a reinforced two man-fighting position with overhead cover.

Approximately 25m inside the earthen berm, the compound is protected by an 8-foot high fence; a black tarp has been attached to the fence to obscure observation of activities within the compound. The 8-foot high fence has three rows of barbed wire and a strand of razor wire atop it making the total height 11 feet.

There are two gates located in the north fence, a walk through gate and a vehicular gate that allow access to the compound. An armed host nation guard is posted at the walk through gate to control foot and vehicle access into the site. The vehicular gate is used only for the delivery of fuel or large cargo and is kept locked when not in used.

Mounted on the radar tower are eight security cameras, four day and four night.

These cameras are monitored from the control room by the Colombian Air Force (FAC) guard and provide 360-degree observation of the area surrounding the site. The cameras are new and functional.

There is an emergency bunker where contract personnel will seek protection in the event of an attack. It is equipped with a medical chest and a DSN telephone. US personnel visiting the site also carry an IMARSAT phone for emergency use.

The compound, being a Colombian Air Force installation, is also afforded the protective measures taken by the Army to protect its own assets.

The site is guarded and access controlled by the host nation military under the terms of the agreements between Colombia and the United States. The Colombian

Military (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Counter-Narcotic) has responsibility for the security of the military base where the site is located and controls all access on and off the base. The FAC has the responsibility for the internal security of the radar site and housing complex and controls all access on and off.

Tres Esquinas - 3

Armed FAC guards control access 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Their instructions require that any person desiring entrance to the site, have prior approval from the senior FAC controller on site. A list of names and identification numbers of all personnel allowed access to the site is kept in the guard shack. The site manager ensures this list is updates on the day any visitors are to arrive.

e. Personnel Protection

The following guidelines regarding off site/base travel are used in Tres Esquinas:

The FAC Controller commander is responsible for the personnel protection of all contract personnel when on the site. Off the compound but still on the installation, the

Air Force Base Commander will be responsible for contract personnel. The site manager or designated representative is responsible to coordinate directly with the Base

Commander to ensure that site contract personnel are complying with local restrictions regarding movement inside the perimeter of the site/base.

1) Security tasks to be performed.

Periodic site visits by the contractor US Regional Security and

Force Protection -Supervisor/Coordinator stationed in Bogotá

Develop and modify, as necessary, site security, training, and evacuation plans.

Provide weapons and ammunition.

2) Equipment

Weapons belong to HNSC

Cameras and monitors: 4 Infrared imaging and 4 thermal cameras are located on the Radar tower. 4 Monitors located in the camera room and controlled by HN personnel.

Kevlar Vests and Helmets: 1 ea. for all contract personnel and visitors.

f. Evacuation Plan (Refer to evacuation plan annex)

An evacuation from Tres Esquinas would likely be in response to a general evacuation order for U.S. personnel in Colombia or the Tres Esquinas Base, civil disturbance or natural disaster, or an immediate danger resulting from guerrilla activity.

Tres Esquinas - 4

The most likely method of evacuation would be via charter flights or Colombian

Air Force aircraft. Security personnel shall also assist with the development and maintenance of the evacuation plan.

San Andres - 1

San Andres, Colombia

San Andres is located approximately 225 nautical miles from Panama City, Panama. The island, in the Caribbean basin, is home to tropical weather in nature with two predominate seasons; rainy and dry. The island does receive a significant amount of rainfall during parts of the year, up to fifteen inches in a day, and encounters winds gusting above forty-five knots. The island can suffer severely from hurricanes.

1) Terrain

San Andres is a tropical island and the facility is located on the highest point of the island. The facility encompasses approximately five acres and rolls gently down hill to the south. The single canopy jungle is cleared on three sides (N, W, E) beyond a second fence line and the southern secondary fence has growth (up to six feet) right up to the fence. There are Colombian facilities within the MASS site compound as well as to the west and east. Several coconut trees and some shrubbery spot the sloping hillside inside the compound, looking to the south. The hilltop has some soil, but frequent rock outcroppings are present within the compound. There is a single line approach up a medium grade semi-improved road to get to the facility.

b. Threat assessment

The installation is located in the center of the island, on a mountaintop, supported by

Colombian Army and Air Force personnel. The historical profile from the 200 series indicates that the site is relatively secure from overt or clandestine attack. The most significant threats are to MASS Program personnel in town and in their residence. It is well known that the civil government is compromised with narco-trafficking connections, and San Andres has been a major transshipment hub for people transporting drugs.

Common criminals: Although not direct threats to site operations, common criminals pose a threat to all employees. Since unemployment is now over 30%, criminal activity has been on the increase.

The most significant threats at San Andres are the crime in the city, which is fostered by unemployment, and innuendo which MASS personnel are directly responsible. The

San Andres - 2 secondary threat is the potential subversion of MASS personnel by coercion or other means.

Elements of the Colombian Army and Air Force provide security for the San Andres site.

Perimeter security and access control to the site is controlled by Colombian military personnel.

The Colombian Air Force personnel responsible for support of the San Andres operation are very cooperative. Given this dialogue exists within the existing cross-cultural social hierarchy and relationship; we would anticipate that the posted positions inside the compound would be manned, and a patrol would be launched to investigate any attempt at a site penetration. Given the low probability of threat by any group, and a higher likelihood of single individual action, the current situation and support are adequate. Of greater or more significant interest is the likelihood of support from local civil authorities after an incident at employees’ residences.

With the current threat environment on the island, it is safe to assume that any potential threats will be directed towards the Colombian technicians as well as the U.S. personnel, with the Colombians being the most vulnerable.

Anyone associated with this radar site is deemed by local personnel to be DEA or CIA.

Take care in the area that you frequent on the island. Do not frequent the same establishment 2 days in a row. All eyes are watching site personnel even though we may not notice. You will not talk about the site or what goes on here. You are here to maintain a communications facility and that is all. You do not know what is done with this equipment and you will not speculate about it with anyone.

2) Tasks to be performed by the Contract Security Personnel.

- Periodic site visits by the contractor US Regional Security and Force Protection

Supervisor/Coordinator stationed in Bogotá

- Develop and modify, as necessary, site security, training, and evacuation plans.

f. Evacuation Plan (Refer to evacuation plan annex)

An evacuation from San Andres would probably be in response to a general evacuation order for U.S. personnel to leave Colombia, or as the result of a natural disaster. It should be assumed that an evacuation would be executed via commercial air or government-provided air or sea support.

Evac Plan Annex - 1

Evacuation Plan Annex

This evacuation plan annex applies to the evacuation of any of the radar sites in

Colombia and serves as a guide for how those evacuations are to be conducted. The contractor is responsible for fine-tuning this guide as required.

a. Assumptions

In order for this plan to be viable, the following assumptions will be made:

The political situation in Bogotá, Colombia, will be stable.

The Bogotá, International Airport or an airport under friendly control will be operational.

The US Embassy, MILGP or the Program Security Manager will be able to provide an aircraft large enough to accommodate U.S. personnel on the site.

Host Nation Security Forces will be available to provide protection and escort from the site to the evacuation staging area.

b. General

The concept of personnel protection will be prevention and avoidance. This will be accomplished by a professional working relationship with host nation and US

Embassy security agencies, and the radar site military agencies. Based on intelligence, the emphasis will be on evacuating prior to an emergency rather than reacting to an incident or conducting an evacuation under pressure.

The only person to order an evacuation will be the U.S. Ambassador, his representative (USMILGP/MAAG) or the US regional security and force protection supervisor. The FAC will be in charge of the site during an evacuation, they will control all communications outside the site and make contact with the USMILGP/MAAG and

Program Security Manager (PSM) in Bogotá who will coordinate for a flight, if required and initiate any out-of-country communications.

At this time the only means planned for evacuation from the radar site is via air from the nearest airfield to Bogotá, using either contracted, USMILGP, or charter air assets. At Tres Esquinas, site personnel will link up with Army personnel attached to

Joint Task Force South staff and evacuate together. Each space occupied by a MASS member is one less space for a military member.

An integral part of the plan is to be prepared for evacuation at all times. In order to comply with this portion of the plan, all personnel remaining on site overnight will receive an emergency procedures briefing and pack a “bugout” bag. The “bugout bag” will contain passport, money, important/sensitive documents, any required medication, Evac Plan Annex - 2 plane tickets, orders, other travel documents, identification cards, blanket, water, and portable communication assets.

All of the host nation agreements make the host nation responsible for safety and security of site personnel while on the MASS sites and the military bases they are a part

of. Security outside of the military base is usually the responsibility of the contractor. It is expected that local commanders will assist in the evacuation of MASS personnel as required.

c. Command and Control

Non-Duress (Precautionary or Activity Imminent) Evacuation may be ordered by the U.S. Ambassador or his representative (USMILGP) as a measure in response to likely terrorist activity or a natural disaster.

An Evacuation Under Duress will be initiated by the Colombian Air Force.

The FAC OIC (Or the senior American visitor) will as soon as possible communicate the situation to the MASS Regional Security Manager who will immediately inform the US

MILGP Force Protection Officer (FPO) of the situation. He will also coordinate for a flight, if required and initiate any out-of-country communications with prior approval of the US MILGP.

d. Non-Duress Evacuation

Non-Duress (Precautionary or Activity Imminent) Evacuation may be ordered by the U.S. Ambassador or his representative (USMILGP/MAAG) as a measure in response to likely terrorist activity or a natural disaster. (The concept of safeguarding site personnel is prevention and avoidance with emphasis on evacuating prior to an emergency rather that reacting to an incident or conducting an evacuation under pressure.)

Upon notification of an evacuation order from the USMILGP, the senior

American visitor on site or the FAC Officer in charge (OIC) will alert all visitors to report to the pre-designated location. During a non-duress situation, site personnel will report to the operation center for accountability. In the case of a base alert, site personnel will report to the emergency bunker. The senior American on site will a get a 100% accountability of all site personnel, inform them of the situation, and have the U.S.

personnel prepare for evacuation.

The senior American on site will establish communications with USMILGP, and/or the PSM to coordinate the evacuation aircraft. He will lead the site personnel through pre-evacuation preparations. Upon arrival at the evacuation site at Tres

Esquinas, they will link up with Army personnel attached to the Joint Task Force South

Staff and proceed to the base passenger terminal. The FAC will transport site personnel

Evac Plan Annex - 3 under escort to the waiting aircraft for immediate departure to Bogotá or an airfield within range of the evacuation aircraft and under friendly control.

A Precautionary or Activity Imminent Evacuation may be ordered by the U.S.

Ambassador or his representative (USMILGP) as a measure in response to likely terrorist activity or a natural disaster.

The required immediacy of the evacuation will be determined jointly between

U.S. Embassy assets and the senior American on site and the FAC site manager based on local host nation security force intelligence. Preference for evacuation will be via a contracted flight.

There is one methods of moving to the staging area at the base passenger ramp from the radar site:

Assisted vehicle movement (Colombian Military Escort)

e. Evacuation Under Duress

Evacuation Under Duress will be initiated by the FAC Officer in Charge (OIC) in the event of an armed attack or terrorist activity directed against the site or military base.

Word of mouth or the base siren will initiate Evacuation Under Duress. On hearing the alarm or being told to move to the evacuation assembly point, all personnel will secure their “bugout bag” and assemble in the bunker in the living quarter’s area.

Site personnel are to stay inside the bunker and not participate in any way with the defense of the radar site or the base.

The required immediacy of the evacuation will be determined jointly between the

U.S. Embassy assets and the FAC OIC based on local host nation security force intelligence.. Personnel outside the site will be recalled.

Should evacuation of site personnel be necessary during fighting, the Base

Commander will determined the time that could be feasible, and that would be after the fighting has subsided and only during daylight hours. This is due to the fact that the site can only be accessed by air and it would be extremely dangerous for aircraft to land during the night while the fighting is going on.

Depending on the severity, duration and timing of the activity, an evacuation of this type could be a temporary removal from the radar site, or a complete removal from the area.

Any removal of U.S. personnel from the Air Force Base will be under the direct control and with the approval of the Base Commander or his designated representative.

Evac Plan Annex - 4

There is one methods of moving to the base passenger ramp/staging area at the airport from the radar site:

Assisted vehicle movement (Colombian Military Escort)

f. Evacuation Communications

During evacuation, operations communications with supporting agencies will be a priority mission. Communications systems will be prioritized as follow:

Primary: DSN Phone

Secondary: SATCOM phone, Cell phone where available

Alternate: Local HN Military communications systems

Contingency: Local HN Military communications systems

Emergency: VHF and/or URC-200 (for use with overhead A/C)

Not under duress:

Secondary: Via SATCOM, Cell phone where available

Alternate: Local HN Military communication systems.

Under duress:

Alternate: Via SATCOM, Cell phone where available

Emergency: VHF and/or URC-200 (for use with overhead A/C)

Priority of communication is with the MLGRP Security Officer and ACC AMIC.