Attachment 7_MACC Cert Basis and Compliance Report Template 516C CN1-7_9 Jan 2020.xlsx
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Introduction
MIL-HDBK-516C
Airworthiness Certification Criteria
Certification Basis and Compliance Report Template
This workbook is a compilation of all airworthiness certification criteria, standards, and methods of compliance from MIL-HDBK-516C, in addition to all USAF approved Change Notices. Use this workbook to construct a Certification Basis and Compliance Report.
Distribution Statement A – Approved for public release; distribution unlimited, when not filled in.
When filled in, enter Distribution Statement appropriate for content.
Example: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only; Administrative and Operational Use, 23 Nov 2015. Other requests shall be referred to the Example Program Office.
| Legend |
| Blue highlight indicates a revision to MIL-HDBK-516C per USAF approved Change Notices (listed below). |
| Template Version History | Date Incorporated to MIL-HDBK-516C Template | Description of Change | |
| MIL-HDBK-516C | 12/12/14 | Base Document | |
| 516CN-1 | 5/20/15 | New paragraph, (4.4.6) | |
| 516CN-2 | 7/2/15 | New sections, (5.7 - 5.7.5) | |
| 516CN-3 | 7/20/15 | Edited paragraph, (5.1.8) | |
| 516CN-4 | 11/23/15 | Updated M.O.C of 100 Criteria in Section 6 | |
| 516CN-5 | 12/5/16 | Updated C, S, M.O.C., (9.1.1) | |
| 516CN-6 | 4/12/18 | Updated C, S, M.O.C., (5.3.2, 8.4.3.2, 8.4.4, 8.4.15 19.1.1, 19.1.5) | |
| 516CN-7 | 12/4/19 | Updated C, S, M.O.C. (4.4.4-6), Deleted 4.4.1-3 | Current |
Instructions to the Applicant
| Instructions to the Applicant |
| (Refer to AWB-005 for additional "process" guidance) |
1) Cover Page: Identify what document is being submitted (list below) and develop the appropriate cover sheet tab while hiding the other tabs that don't apply vaterrj: Cover Page Include the appropriate Cover Page and hid those that will not be used.
(1) MDS – Enter the Mission Design Series (MDS) for the platform (e.g. B-52H).
(2) Project Title – Title of the Project related to this effort.
(3) Program Office -- Enter the Organization
(4) Approval Date -- Enter the Approval Date
(6) Managing Office – Enter identification and contact information for the Program Manager (PM). Add signature blocks as needed for the CE and other coordinating offices.
(8) If not using ACT put NA as the ACT number on the PDF Cover Page; if using the PDF version.
(7) TAA Signature – The block for TAA signature must appear at the bottom of the page for those activities identified in USAF AWB-003 as requiring TAA approval.
(8) Distribution Statement -- Ensure the Distribution Statement is correct.
| Certification Basis |
| Compliance Report |
2) Signatures: Ensure that the appropriate signatures are included.
3) The System Information Tab: has two blank MS Word documents imbedded for the System Description and Limitations sections. These areas can be expanded as required.
4) Compliance Summary Tab: should be hidden for the Certification Basis submission and made visible for the Compliance Report. The Compliance Summary will automatically populate itself from the Compliance Column and the HRI entered in the Risk Acceptance Level Column in the 516 Section Tabs 4 to 20.
5) Document Summary Tab: should be hidden for the Certification Basis submission and made visible for the Compliance Report. This tab should be used to highlight critical/key documents that support the Compliance findings. Note: Summary tab is for higher level review than the documents referenced in for each criteria in 516 Section Tabs 4 to 20.
6) Tabs 4 Systems Engineering thru 20 Other Considerations: contain "Criteria" from MIL-HDBK-516C that are not to be altered in any way by the PM/CE. These criteria are to be listed as they appear in MIL-HDBK-516C.
7) Tabs 4 Systems Engineering thru 20 Other Considerations: contains "Standards" and "Methods of Compliance" MIL-HDBK-516C. These areas typically require some tailoring for the specific aircraft configuration.
8) Enter Distribution Statement appropriate for added content on the 'Introduction' tab.
9) For a Reportable modification, this document can be used within the program office. However, the PO shall submitt an ACT import template for a Certification Basis review and Compliance Report review.
Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.
Cert Basis (Cover Page) PDF Version: PDF CB Cover Page
CERTIFICATION BASIS
MDS:
| Project Title: |
| Program Office: |
| Approval Date: |
I declare that the substantiating data provided herein is accurate, complete, and shows the approved certification basis for this aircraft system configuration. All applicable criteria are clearly identified.
| Name |
| Program Manager |
| Date |
| Name |
| Chief Engineer |
| Date |
I have found this Certification Basis, in the Airworthiness Certification Tool Project Number , accurately reflects the applicable criteria that will be utilized during a future Compliance Report.
| Name |
| DTA |
| Date |
Distribution Statement D:
Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only; Administrative and Operational Use, 31 July 2012. Other requests shall be referred to the Program Office identified.
PROGRAM OFFICE to fill in; in Accordance with 5230.24 Distribution Statements on Technical Documents https://usaf.dps.mil/sites/22221/23230/Airworthiness/Templates/2D%20Certification%20Basis%20Cover%20Page.pdf Compliance (Cover Page) PDF Version: PDF CR Cover Page
COMPLIANCE REPORT
MDS:
| Project Title: |
| Program Office: |
| Approval Date: |
I declare that the substantiating data provided herein is accurate, complete, and where identified shows compliance to the approved certification basis for this aircraft system configuration. All non-compliant criteria are clearly identified.
| Name |
| Program Manager |
| Date |
| Name |
| Chief Engineer |
| Date |
I have found this Compliance Report accurately reflects compliance levels to the approved Certification Basis. Associated risk levels are accurate.
| Name |
| DTA |
| Date |
Distribution Statement D:
Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only; Administrative and Operational Use, 31 July 2012. Other requests shall be referred to the Program Office identified.
PROGRAM OFFICE to fill in; in Accordance with 5230.24 Distribution Statements on Technical Documents https://usaf.dps.mil/sites/22221/23230/Airworthiness/Templates/3E%20Compliance%20Report%20Cover%20Page.pdf System Information
Certification Basis:
vaterrj: Certification Basis Source:
For Commercial Derivative Aircraft (CDA), this section will also include the FAA Type Certification Data Sheet (TCDS) and any applicable Supplemental Type Certificates (STC), and the division between FAA and Department of Defense (DoD) certification.
| The certification basis defined by this document was derived from MIL-HDBK-516C, |
| Airworthiness Certification Criteria, dated 12 Dec 2014, and includes approved Change Notices referenced in the Introduction tab. |
System Description:
Limitations:
Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.
&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14&A
&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14&A
Compliance Summary
| Compliant | 0 |
| High Risk | 0 |
| Serious Risk | 0 |
| Medium Risk | 0 |
| Low Risk | 0 |
| Error | 0 |
| Total Criteria | Applicable Criteria | Compliant | Non Compliant | High | Serious | Medium | Low | Error | ||
| 4 | Systems Engineering | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 5 | Structures | 34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 6 | Flight technology | 206 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 7 | Propulsion & Propulsion Inst'l | 99 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 8 | Air Vehicle Subsystems | 295 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 9 | Crew Systems | 57 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 10 | Diagnostic Systems | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 11 | Avionics | 30 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 12 | Electrical Systems | 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 13 | Electromagnetic Environ Effects | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 14 | System Safety | 39 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 15 | Computer Systems & Software | 42 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 16 | Maintenance | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 17 | Armament /Stores Integration | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 18 | Passenger Safety | 19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 19 | Materials | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 20 | Air Transportability, etc. | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Totals | 958 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Listing of Noncompliant Criteria & SSRA Summary:
Non-Compliant Criteria System Safety Risk Assessment (SSRA) HRI # vaterrj: List all Non-compliant Criteria and associated System Safety Risk Assessment (SSRA). SSRA can have single Criteria Non-compliance or Multiple equating to one Risk
| SSRA #1Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #2Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #3Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #4Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #5Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #6Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #7Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #8Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #9Title (example only) | ||
| SSRA #10Title (example only) | ||
| etc. | ||
| etc. | ||
| etc. | ||
| etc. | ||
| etc. |
USAF AIRWORTHINESS RISK ACCEPTANCE MATRIX
Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.
&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14&A
&"Arial,Bold Italic"&14&A
Criteria Compliance Summary
Compliance Summary Compliant High Risk Serious Risk Medium Risk Low Risk Error 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doc Summary (Compliance Report)
Listing of Documents:
vaterrj: Instructions to the Applicant Please list all Critical/Key documents for each Mil-Hdbk-516 Section that make up the TACC/MACC Compliance Report substantiating data.
| Appears in 516 section | If Artifact Unavailable | |||||||||||||||||||
| Title Document | File Name | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | EDC | Criteria Impacted |
| Example Test Document | test1.pdf | x | x |
Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.
4 Systems Engineering Para# Mil-HDBK-516C Certification Criteria Applicable (Y/N) Rationale for Non-Applicable Criteria Standard Method of Compliance Substantiating Data References Program Office Responsible Engineer Compliant (Y/N) Risk Assessment Level for Non-Compliances (RHI) EZ Quicklook Comments (Is the package complete, data available, non-compliances and risks ID'ed) EZ Quicklook Implications/Impact EZ SME Compliance Assessment (Y/N) EZ Comments on Compliance
| (include rationale for any difference in risk assessment) | EZ Proposed Restrictions for Non-compliance | EZ Hazard & Predicted Severity | EZ TA comments | EZ TD comments | PO Response to SME Assessment | Applicable = 0 | NonApplicable = 0 | Non Compliant = 0 | Compliant = 0 | High = 0 | Serious = 0 | Medium = 0 | Low = 0 | Error = 0 |
| 4 | 4. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING |
EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL CERTIFICATION SOURCE DATA
1. Reliability, quality, and manufacturing program plans.
2. Contractor policies and procedures.
3. Durability and damage tolerance control plans.
4. Work instructions.
5. Process specifications.
6. Production/assembly progress reports.
7. Quality records.
8. Defect/failure data.
9. Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) documentation.
10. Tech data package.
11. As-built list to include part numbers/serial numbers for all critical safety items/components.
12. List of deviations/waivers and unincorporated design changes.
13. List of approved class I engineering change proposals (ECPs).
14. DD Form 250, Material Inspection and Receiving Report.
15. Configuration management plans/process description documents.
16. Diminishing Manufacturing Sources Plan.
17. Obsolete Parts Plan.
18. Test reports.
19. Test plans.
20. FAA Airworthiness Directives and Advisory Circulars.
21. Manufacturer-issued service bulletins.
22. Civil aviation authority certification plan.
23. Civil aviation authority certification basis.
24. Civil aviation authority certification report.
25. System Safety Analysis Report.
26. Counterfeit Prevention Plan.
CERTIFICATION CRITERIA, STANDARDS AND METHODS OF COMPLIANCE
The following criteria, standards and methods of compliance apply to all air systems and represent the minimum requirements necessary to establish, verify, and maintain an airworthy design.
4.1 4.1 Design criteria.
4.1.1 4.1.1 Requirements allocation.
Criterion: Verify that the design criteria, including requirements and ground rules, adequately address airworthiness and safety for mission usage, full permissible flight envelope, duty cycle, interfaces, induced and natural environment, inspection capability, and maintenance philosophy.
| Standard: Allocated high level airworthiness and safety requirements down through the design hierarchy are defined. Allocated design criteria for all system elements and components result in required levels of airworthiness and safety throughout the defined operational flight envelope, environment, usage and life. | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of process documentation verifies allocation of airworthiness and safety requirements and design criteria. Traceability is documented among requirements, design criteria, design and verification. Consistency between design criteria and airworthiness and safety requirements is confirmed by inspection of documentation. |
References: Appropriate design criteria paragraphs of JSSG-2000, JSSG-2001, JSSG-2005, JSSG-2006, JSSG-2007, JSSG-2008, JSSG-2009, JSSG-2010, and others
MIL-STD-882
SAE ARP4761
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.1.2 | 4.1.2 Safety critical hardware and software. |
Criterion: Verify that airworthiness and safety design criteria are adequately addressed at component, subsystem and system levels, including interfaces, latencies, software and information assurance.
| Standard: Safety critical software and hardware (including Critical Safety Items (CSIs)) are identified. Design criteria and critical characteristics of safety critical software and hardware are defined, substantiated and documented in sufficient detail to provide for "form, fit, function and interface" replacement without degrading system airworthiness. Design criteria and critical characteristics of safety critical software and hardware incorporate relevant security requirements and mitigation techniques needed to ensure safety of flight. | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation verifies that a process is in place to adequately identify safety critical software and hardware, CSIs, and associated design criteria and critical characteristics at the component, subsystem and system levels. Inspection of documentation verifies that safety critical software and hardware, CSIs, and associated design criteria and critical characteristics resulting from this process are documented. Inspection of documentation verifies that security requirements and mitigation techniques that affect flight safety are incorporated into safety critical software and hardware and CSIs. |
References: Appropriate design criteria paragraphs of JSSG-2000, JSSG-2001, JSSG-2005, JSSG-2006, JSSG-2007, JSSG-2008, JSSG-2009, JSSG-2010, and others
MIL-STD-882
SECNAVINST 4140.2
Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group (JACG) Aviation Critical Safety Item Management Handbook Joint Aeronautical Commanders Group (JACG) Aviation Source Approval and Management Handbook
AMCOM REG 702-7
DoDM 4140.01
SAE AS6081
SAE AS6174
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.1.3 | 4.1.3 Commercial derivative aircraft. |
Criterion: Verify that, for commercial derivative air vehicles, the air vehicle's certification basis addresses all design criteria appropriate for the planned military usage.
| Standard: Commercial derivative aircraft has been assessed for its suitability for the intended military application and determined to be airworthy and safe. Limitations appropriate to the intended military usage and environment are identified. | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of certification data and analyses substantiates that the military air vehicle is airworthy and safe for its intended military usage and environments. Military air vehicle airworthiness certification data addresses all equipment, usage, and environments not covered by the commercial certification. |
References: Appropriate design criteria paragraphs of JSSG-2000, JSSG-2001, JSSG-2005, JSSG-2006, JSSG-2007, JSSG-2008, JSSG-2009, JSSG-2010, and others.
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.1.4 | 4.1.4 Failure conditions. |
Criterion: Verify that safety of flight related failure conditions have been adequately addressed in the design criteria.
| Standard: Safety of flight failure conditions (including applicable single point failures) have been identified. No single safety of flight failure condition results in a "Catastrophic" severity (i.e., death, permanent total disability, monetary loss equal to or exceeding $10 million or loss of air vehicle) with a frequency greater than "improbable" (i.e., a rate of less than one event per one million flight hours). | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of the hazard analysis verifies that safety critical hazards have been identified and that catastrophic failures are no more frequent than improbable. Analysis of the design verifies that the required level of safety is achieved. Operating limitations are defined. The analysis includes ground rules and assumptions. |
References: MIL-STD-882
NAVAIRINST 5000.21
NAVAIRINST 5100.3
AR 385-10
AR 385-16
DoDI 5000.36
SAE ARP4754
SAE ARP4761
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.1.5 | 4.1.5 Operating environment. |
Criterion: Verify that the air system is designed to operate in the natural and induced environments for which it is intended.
| Standard: The air system design criteria includes the intended natural and induced environments. The air system, including the air vehicle and control station equipment, is qualified to operate in the intended natural and induced environments (e.g., temperature, humidity, precipitation, icing, fungus, salt fog, particulate and liquid contamination, shock and vibration, and explosive atmosphere). | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation verifies that the air system intended natural and induced environments are documented. Analysis, demonstration and test verify that equipment provides required function and performance within the envelope of intended natural and induced environments without imposing a safety of flight risk. Inspection of qualification test results verifies that equipment is qualified for its intended environments. |
References: JSSG-2005: 3.2.3, 4.2.3
MIL-HDBK-310
MIL-STD-810 provides guidance on environmental qualification MIL-HDBK-87213: 3.2.3 provides guidance on environmental requirements for cockpit display equipment.
14 CFR 23.1309, 25.1309, 27.1309, 29.1309
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.1.6 | 4.1.6 Flight and safety critical functions. |
Criterion: Verify that the air systems design criteria identify flight and safety critical functions, and their degraded and failed modes and states. Verify that the air system and air vehicle detect and respond appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to flight and safety critical function degraded states or failures.
Standard: The design criteria identify flight and safety critical functions, modes and states for the air system, including the air vehicle. The air system design criteria identify flight and safety critical function degraded states and failures.
The air system detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to flight or safety critical function degraded states or failures.
The air vehicle detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to air vehicle flight or safety critical function degraded states or failures, with or without operator intervention.
The air vehicle detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s) between the operator and air vehicle.
The air vehicle response to loss of command and control data link is appropriate and safe for the airspace in which the air system will be operated.
The air system detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to the sense and avoid function for the airspace in which the air system will be operated, with or without operator intervention.
The air system (including air vehicle) responses to flight and safety critical function normal and degraded states or failures, and loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s):
a. Activate appropriately and in a timely manner,
b. Activate only when needed,
c. Safely transition to pre-determined modes and states (see also 6.2.2.4 of this document),
d. Activate pre-determined procedure(s) for restoring functionality,
e. Alert airspace control or air traffic control, as necessary, and
f. Prevent entry into pre-defined keep-out airspace or over-flight of pre-defined surface regions (see also 11.1.1.5 of this document).
(For information, see also 6.2; 8.3.10; 11.1.1 and 11.2.3; Section 15; and 17.2.9 of this document.)
Method of Compliance: Verification methods include analysis, test, simulation, demonstration, and inspection of documentation.
Inspection of documentation verifies that design criteria and processes identify flight and safety critical functions, modes and states; flight and safety critical functions degraded states and failures; and loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s). Inspection of documentation verifies that design criteria and processes ensure air system responses are appropriate for the intended airspace.
Analysis verifies that flight and safety critical functions, modes and states for the air system, including the air vehicle, are identified.
Analysis verifies that flight and safety critical function degraded states and failures are identified.
A combination of ground testing and simulation verifies that the air system (including air vehicle) detects and responds appropriately, predictably, safely and in a timely manner to: (1) flight or safety critical function normal and degraded states or failures, with or without operator intervention, (2) loss of flight and safety critical command and control data link(s), and (3) sense and avoid function, with or without operator intervention. This testing and simulation verifies that the air system (including air vehicle) responses:
a. Activate appropriately and in a timely manner,
b. Activate only when needed,
c. Safely transition to pre-determined modes and states,
d. Activate pre-determined procedure(s) for restoring functionality,
e. Alert airspace control or air traffic control, as necessary, and
f. Prevent entry into pre-defined keep-out airspace or over-flight of pre-defined surface regions.
(For information, see also 6.2.2.4, 6.2.2.8, and 6.2.2.9 of this document.)
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.1.7 | 4.1.7 Flight termination system. |
Criterion: Verify that the flight termination function, if incorporated into the design, is safe, secure and reliable.
| Standard: Design criteria ensure that the flight termination function operates reliably and in a timely manner when commanded. The flight termination function results in a defined air vehicle flight state (e.g., zero lift, zero thrust). The likelihood of uncommanded flight termination is remote. A minimum of two operator actions is required to execute the flight termination function. | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation verifies that design criteria are in place to ensure that the flight termination function operates reliably and appropriately, and only when required. Inspection of test and simulation data verifies that the flight termination function operates appropriately, only when required, and results in the expected defined flight state(s). Inspection of analysis documentation indicates that the flight termination function operates reliably. |
Reference: RCC 319-14
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.2 | 4.2 Tools and databases. |
4.2.1 4.2.1 Tool and database processes.
Criterion: Verify that all tools, methods, and databases used in the requirements management, design, risk control and assessments of safety are applied appropriately and exhibit accuracy commensurate with their application.
| Standard: Processes are in place to ensure that all analysis, modeling and simulation tools and databases are of appropriate accuracy and fidelity, are validated for the intended applications, and are configuration controlled. Requirements definition/traceability, design and performance analysis tools, prediction methods, models and simulations are applied appropriately, and exhibit accuracy commensurate with their applications. | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation verifies that processes are in place to ensure that tools and databases are validated and under configuration control. Inspection of documentation verifies that analysis tools, models, simulations and databases are applied appropriately. Inspection of documentation verifies that analysis, modeling and simulation tools and databases are of appropriate accuracy and fidelity for the intended applications. Inspection of documentation verifies the validation basis of design analysis, models and simulations is substantiated and based on actual hardware/software test data. |
Inspection of documentation verifies that the design analysis, modeling and simulation tools are substantiated by and based on actual test data (when available). Actual system verification results are compared with design analysis, modeling and simulation tool results and databases for validation purposes.
References: Appropriate design criteria paragraphs of JSSG-2000, JSSG-2001, JSSG-2005, JSSG-2006, JSSG-2007, JSSG-2008, JSSG-2009, JSSG-2010, and others.
MIL-HDBK-470
MIL-STD-3022
ADS-51-HDBK
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.3 | 4.3 Materials selection. |
4.3.1 4.3.1 Selection of materials.
Criterion: For Army and Navy air systems, verify that the material selection process uses validated and consistent material properties data, including design mechanical and physical properties such as material defects, and corrosion and environmental protection requirements (see also Section 19, Materials; Section 5, Structures; and Section 7, Propulsion; Section 8, Air Vehicle Subsystems of this document).
| Standard: Material selection process uses materials covered by an industry specification, government specification (Military or Federal) or other specifications as approved by the procuring agency. | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of documentation confirms that materials are adequately covered by either: |
a. An Aerospace Materials Specification (AMS) issued by the SAE Aerospace Materials Division,
b. An ASTM standard published by ASTM International (formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials),
c. A government (Military or Federal) specification, or
d. Other specifications as approved by the procuring agency.
If an approved specification for the product is not available, an acceptable draft specification has been prepared.
References: JSSG-2001
JSSG-2006
MIL-HDBK-516: Sections 19, 5, 7 and 8
MMPDS-08
CMH-17
ADS-13-HDBK
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.4 | 4.4 Manufacturing and quality. |
| 4.4.1 | Reserved | Reserved | Reserved | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4.4.2 | Reserved | Reserved | Reserved | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4.4.3 | Reserved | Reserved | Reserved | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4.4.4 | 4.4.4 Quality system. |
Criterion: Verify that the quality system ensures that each air system conforms to its approved design and is in a condition for safe operation.
Standard: The quality system addresses procedures for:
- Design data control
- Document control
- Supplier control
- Manufacturing process control
- Inspection and testing
- Inspection, measuring, and test equipment control
- Inspection and test status
- Nonconforming product and article control
- Counterfeit parts control
- Corrective and preventive actions
- Handling and storage
- Control of quality records
- Internal audits
- In-service feedback
- Corrective actions for quality escapes
- Issuing authorized release documents Method of Compliance: Compliance is determined by inspection of the program Quality Plan or Quality Manual and examples of inspection and test records and Material Review Board records.
References:
SAE AS6081
SAE AS6500
SAE AS6174
SAE AS9100
FAR Part 46, "Quality Assurance"
14 CFR 23.601-23.605, 25.601-25.603, 27.601-605, 29.601-29.605
FAR 21.137
FAA Advisory Circular 21-43A
MIL-HDBK-896A
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.4.5 | 4.4.5 Nondestructive inspections. |
Criterion: Verify that nondestructive inspection (NDI) processes assure conforming parts.
| Standard: Nondestructive testing procedures address acceptance and rejection criteria. Adequate test pieces with known defects are available to nondestructive inspection (NDI) personnel. Procedures address the certification, recertification, and decertification of nondestructive testing personnel. | |
| Method of Compliance: Compliance is determined by inspection of NDI procedures and operator certification processes. |
References:
JSSG-2006: A.3.11.6, A.4.11.6
MIL-HDBK-1783
SAE ARP5089
SAE AS6081
SAE AS6174
FAA Advisory Circular 21-43A
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
| 4.4.6 USAF ONLY, 516CN-7 | 4.4.6 Verify that safety-related items (Critical Safety Items, flight critical items and Safety Critical Items, and Safety of Flight Items) conform to their approved design. | Standard: The quality of safety-related items, whether furnished by the prime contractor, supplier, or sustainment organization, is controlled to ensure conformance with design. The manufacturers of the items have identified Key Characteristics (including critical characteristics associated with CSIs), mapped them to corresponding critical manufacturing processes, and instituted critical manufacturing process controls, inspections, and testing procedures to ensure each safety-related product or part conforms to its approved design. | Method of Compliance: For safety-related items, initial design conformance is verified by inspection of First Article Inspection reports, First Article Test reports, or other manufacturing records that prove design conformance. Controls for ensuring the quality of safety-related items are verified by inspecting manufacturing process control plans (including work instructions) and inspection and test procedures. |
References:
AS6500
AS9100
| MIL-HDBK-896A | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.5 | 4.5 OperatorÆs and maintenance manual/technical orders. |
4.5.1 4.5.1 Procedures and limitations.
Criterion: Verify that processes are in place to identify and document normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes.
| Standard: Operator handbooks or manuals identify all normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes. Warnings, cautions and notes are identified in such a manner as to attract attention and set them apart from normal text. When an unsafe condition is detected and annunciated, the operator's manual has clear and precise corrective procedures for handling the condition. | |
| Method of Compliance: Inspection of operator handbooks or manuals process documentation describes procedures for developing normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes from system technical data. Process descriptions include methods for updating this information as needed. For Army and Navy, inspection of operating handbooks and manuals verifies that they include all normal and emergency procedures, limitations, restrictions, warnings, cautions and notes. The USAF confirms operator manual accuracy and completeness through other sections contained within this document. |
References: MIL-HDBK-516: 9.4, Human performance
MIL-STD-38784
MIL-DTL-85025
NAVAIRINST 13034.1
14 CFR 23.1541, 23.1581, 25.1541, 25.1581, 27.1541, 27.1581, 29.1541, 29.1581
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.5.2 | 4.5.2 Technical data. |
Criterion: Verify that processes are in place to identify and document the technical data, and that the technical data are consistent with the defined functional and product baseline.
| Standard: Process is defined, documented and implemented to establish and update product requirement, design, manufacturing, and maintenance data, which are used to generate technical manuals (e.g., flight manuals, operator's handbooks, maintenance manuals). Maximum timelines to accomplish updates are consistent with the criticality of the change activity (e.g., an identified safety hazard, or a "performance based" change having a safety effect). | |
| Method of Compliance: The adequacy of establishment and change processes for technical data is verified by inspection of process documentation. Inspection of examples of revised design or maintenance data verifies traceability to change events. |
References: MIL-STD-38784
14 CFR 23.21, 23.601, 23.1301, 25.21, 25.601, 25.1301
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.5.3 | 4.5.3 Maintenance of safety. |
Criterion: Verify that procedures are in place for establishing and maintaining air system flight safety, as affected by product design changes, safety issues, changes in operations, maintenance, transportation or storage.
| Standard: Processes are defined, documented, and implemented to establish and accomplish timely updates to operator and maintenance manuals as made necessary by product design changes, identified safety issues (e.g., Category I Deficiency Reports), changes in operational concepts, usage, maintenance concepts, transportation, or storage. Current updated technical data are used to effect technical manual revisions. Maximum timelines to incorporate changes in manuals are based on the effect of the change and the severity of the identified hazard. | |
| Method of Compliance: The adequacy of establishment and change processes for operator and maintenance manuals is verified by inspection of process documentation. Inspection of examples of revised operator and maintenance manuals (i.e., change pages) verifies traceability to change events. |
References: JSSG-2001: 3.3.5.1, 3.3.7.1 JSSG-2009: Appendix I
MIL-HDBK-515
MIL-STD-1530
MIL-STD-1796
MIL-STD-1798
MIL-STD-3024
NAVAIRINST 13034.1
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.6 | 4.6 Configuration management (CM). |
4.6.1 4.6.1 Functional baseline.
Criterion: Verify that the functional baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.
| Standard: The functional baseline is properly documented, approved and brought under control by a Configuration Management Process. | |
| Method of Compliance: The Configuration Management Plan (CMP) is defined and implemented in accordance with the contract. Inspection of documentation verifies that the functional baseline has been documented and approved. |
References: MIL-HDBK-61: 5.5 Configuration Baselines; 6 Configuration Control MIL-STD-961: Appendix A
NAVAIRINST 4130.1
14 CFR: 23.21, 23.601, 23.1301, 25.21, 25.601, 25.1301
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.6.2 | 4.6.2 Allocated baseline. |
Criterion: Verify that the allocated baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.
| Standard: The allocated baseline is properly documented, approved and brought under control by a Configuration Management Process. | |
| Method of Compliance: The Configuration Management Plan is defined and implemented in accordance with the contract. Inspection of documentation verifies that the allocated baseline has been documented and approved. Inspection of the engineering release documentation verifies adequate capture of the allocated baseline. |
References: MIL-HDBK-61 5.5 Configuration Baselines; 6 Configuration Control MIL-STD-961, Appendix A
NAVAIRINST 4130.1
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.6.3 | 4.6.3 Product baseline. |
Criterion: Verify that the product baseline is established and under configuration control to preclude unauthorized changes.
| Standard: The product baseline is properly documented, approved and brought under control by a Configuration Management Process. | |
| Method of Compliance: The Configuration Management Plan is defined and implemented in accordance with the contract. Inspection of documentation verifies that the product baseline has been documented and approved. Inspection of the approved engineering documentation and engineering release system verifies adequate capture of the product baseline. |
References: MIL-HDBK-61: 5.5 Configuration Baselines; 6 Configuration Control MIL-STD-961: Appendix A
NAVAIRINST 4130.1
14 CFR 23.21, 23.601, 23.1301, 25.21, 25.601, 25.1301
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 4.6.4 | 4.6.4 Safety critical item configuration management. |
Criterion: Verify that all safety-critical items are tracked and under configuration control.
| Standard: A configuration status accounting (CSA) system is adequately documented and maintained and tracks the configuration of safety-critical items. | |
| Method of Compliance: CSA process documentation is verified by inspection. Inspection of CSA records and reports for CI/CSCIs verifies accuracy of the configuration status accounting system and that the system is able to track and record changes to the configuration. |
References: MIL-HDBK-61: 7, Configuration Status Accounting
14 CFR 23.21, 23.601, 23.1301, 25.21, 25.601, 25.1301
0 0 0 0
Distribution consistent with Distribution Statement listed on 'Introduction' tab.
5 Structures Para# Mil-HDBK-516C Certification Criteria Applicable (Y/N) Rationale for Non-Applicable Criteria Standard Method of Compliance Substantiating Data References Program Office Responsible Engineer Compliant (Y/N) Risk Assessment Level for Non-Compliances (RHI) EZ Quicklook Comments (Is the package complete, data available, non-compliances and risks ID'ed) EZ Quicklook Implications/Impact EZ SME Compliance Assessment (Y/N) EZ Comments on Compliance
| (include rationale for any difference in risk assessment) | EZ Proposed Restrictions for Non-compliance | EZ Hazard & Predicted Severity | EZ TA comments | EZ TD comments | PO Response to SME Assessment | Applicable = 0 | NonApplicable = 0 | Non Compliant = 0 | Compliant = 0 | High = 0 | Serious = 0 | Medium = 0 | Low = 0 | Error = 0 |
| 5 | 5. STRUCTURES |
The air vehicle structure, herein referred to as the aircraft, includes the fuselage, cockpit, wing, main and tail rotor, proprotor, empennage, tail pylon, structural elements of landing gear, the control system, control surfaces, drive system, rotor control systems, radomes, antennas, engine mounts, nacelles, pylons, thrust reversers (if not part of the engine), inlets, aerial refueling mechanisms, shipboard related airborne apparatus/devices (fixed wing catapult and arresting components; rotary wing/tiltrotor recovery assist, securing probe/harpoon system components and backup structure), structural operating mechanisms, structural provisions for seats, equipment, medical evacuation equipment, storage and on-board facilities payload, cargo, personnel accommodations, etc.
EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL CERTIFICATION SOURCE DATA
1. Design criteria.
2. Loads analyses.
3. Internal load and stress analyses.
4. Materials, processes, corrosion prevention, nondestructive evaluation and repair data.
5. Results from any design development tests conducted.
6. Proof test results.
7. Flutter, mechanical stability and aeroservoelastic analyses.
8. Loads wind tunnel test data.
9. Flutter wind tunnel test data.
10. Ground vibration test results.
11. Damage tolerance and durability analyses.
12. Component/full-scale static and fatigue test results.
13. Live fire test results and ballistic analysis.
14. Bird strike test and analysis results.
15. Arresting wire strike test and analysis results.
16. User and maintainer manuals or equivalent.
17. Flight operating limits.
18. Strength summary and operating restrictions.
19. Damage tolerance and durability test results.
20. Full-scale durability test results.
21. Functional test results.
22. Flight loads test results.
23. Instrumentation and calibration test results.
24. Control surface, tabs and damper test results.
25. Thermoelastic test results.
26. Limit-load rigidity test results.
27. Flight flutter test results.
28. Mass properties control and management plan (interface).
29. Weight and balance reports (interface).
30. Inertia report.
31. Design trade studies and analyses.
32. Fuel system test results.
33. Results of actual weighing
34. Weight and balance handbook, or equivalent.
35. Hazard analysis.
36. Environmental criteria and test results.
37. Vibration and acoustic test results.
38. Aircraft tracking program.
39. Landing gear and airframe drop test plans and results.
40. Mechanical stability test plans and results.
41. Whirl test plans and results.
42. Tie-down test plans and results.
43. Structural description report.
44. Tipover and rollover stability analyses.
45. External store interface and release data.
46. Ground and/or air transport rigging procedures, interface loads, and associated inspections.
47. Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) documentation.
48. Ground and rotor blade clearance dimensional data.
49. Loss of lubrication testing.
50. Heat generation/rejection analysis.
CERTIFICATION CRITERIA, STANDARDS AND METHODS OF COMPLIANCE
The following criteria, standards and methods of compliance apply to all air systems and represent the minimum requirements necessary to establish, verify, and maintain an airworthy design.
The documents referenced under any criterion, standard and/or method of compliance may provide other standards which are applicable. In addition to the specifically enumerated criteria, standards and methods of compliance, structures are checked for a variety of 14 CFR references and Airworthiness Circulars. Due to the complexity of different design configurations, each section in 14 CFR 23 and 25 should be consulted for applicability.
5.1 5.1 Loads.
5.1.1 5.1.1 Design flight and ground loads.
Criterion (Army, Navy and Air Force): Verify that the loads used in the design of the aircraft include the maximum, minimum and most critical combination of loads that can result from authorized ground and flight loading conditions for the air vehicle. These include loads during piloted or autonomous maneuvers, loss of control maneuvers, gusts, pressurization, turbulence, take-off, landing, catapult (if applicable), shipboard and land based arrestments (if applicable), ground operations, maintenance activity, systems failures from which recovery is expected (to include rapid depressurization) and loads expected to be seen throughout the specific lifetime of usage.
| Standard (Army, Navy and Air Force): Flight loading conditions are based on aircraft response to pilot induced or autonomous maneuvers, loss of control maneuvers, pressurization and turbulence. These conditions consider both required, and expected to be encountered, critical combinations of configurations, gross weights, centers of gravity, thrust, power, altitudes, speeds, critical combinations of control system (surfaces and rotor system) deflections, control input variation and environmental factors and are used in the design of the aircraft. Flight loading conditions reflect symmetric and asymmetric flight operations and are established for both primary and secondary structural components by selection of flight parameters likely to produce critical applied loads. Symmetric and asymmetric flight operations include symmetric and unsymmetrical fuel and payload loadings and adverse trim conditions. Such loads also address normal and failure modes of operation, including rapid pressurization (Navy only) and depressurization, and loads expected to be seen throughout the specific lifetime of usage. | |
| Method of Compliance (Air Force): Verification methods include analysis and inspection of documentation. Multiple variables and factors account for development of maximum and minimum load factors. The following compliance paragraphs are applicable to all standards. |
a. Load factor selection considers the following items:
(1) Mission and flying techniques employed to execute the required mission.
(2) Weapon types and possible delivery methods.
(3) Anticipated weight and power plant growth.
(4) Maximum speed and time spent at maximum speed.
(5) Utilization of external stores and external fuel tanks.
(6) Training.
(7) Past experience with similar types of aircraft, mission, etc..
b. Load factors are defined which include appropriate ranges for symmetrical, asymmetrical, directional maneuvers, and atmospheric turbulence for each configuration. Analysis verifies that the load factors are attainable by the air vehicle.
Method of Compliance (Army and Navy): Verification methods include analyses and inspection of documentation, wind tunnel tests, simulation, and flight testing. Compliance is shown for each combination of configurations at all critical altitudes, gross weights, centers-of-gravity, thrust, power, control input variation, and payload conditions.
References: (Navy/Air Force fixed wing) JSSG-2006: A.3.1.1, A.4.1.1; A.3.1.2, A.4.1.2; A.3.2.9, A.4.2.9; A.3.2.11, A.4.2.11; A.3.2.12; A.3.2.17, A.4.2.17; A.3.4.1, A.4.4.1; A.3.4.1.1-15; A.4.3.12 (Army rotary wing) ADS-10-SP, ADS-24 (cancelled), ADS-27-SP, ADS-29 (cancelled), ADS-51-HDBK, ADS-64-SP (inactive), AR-70-62 (Navy rotary wing) As identified in the Air Vehicle Performance Specification (AVPS) Addendum for the respective air vehicle and/or AR-56, AR-89, MIL-D-23222
14 CFR 23, 25, 27, 29
STANAG 4671: USAR 321
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 5.1.2 | 5.1.2 Use of probabilistic vs deterministic loads. |
Criterion: Verify that the limit loads used in the design of dynamic components and elements of the airframe subject to deterministic design criteria are the maximum and most critical combination of loads that can result from authorized ground and flight use of the air vehicle. These include loads during maintenance activity, system failures from which recovery is expected, and loads experienced throughout the specific lifetime usage.
Standard (Navy and Air Force): Only where deterministic values have no precedence or basis, is a combined load-strength probability analysis to predict the risk of detrimental structural deformation and structural failure used. In those cases, the airframe may not experience detrimental structural deformations with a probability of occurrence equal to or greater than that specified in the AVPS Addendum for the respective air vehicle. The resulting limit design loads are the maximum loads anticipated on the aircraft during its lifetime of service (see 5.1.1).
Standard (Army): Limit design loads are the maximum loads anticipated on the aircraft during its lifetime of service. For rotorcraft, the air vehicle structure is designed for load factors and airspeeds such that the structural design envelope exceeds the aircraft aerodynamic capability or operational limits. Limit loads for certain dynamic components may also require consideration of altitudes between sea level and service ceiling.
Method of Compliance: Verification methods include analysis, test, demonstration and inspection of documentation.
a. Correlated ground and flight loads analyses are provided in which details of magnitudes and distribution of all applied external loads are identified for multiple air vehicle configurations, weights, center of gravity, and maneuvers covering all attainable altitudes, speeds and load factors. Service and maximum loads expected to be encountered are established for operation under all flight conditions. Wind tunnel tests are utilized for development of aerodynamic loads. Stiffness and ground vibration tests are utilized to update flexibility vs. rigid characteristics of loads analytical model. Flight controls and aerodynamic flight tests are utilized to update aircraft simulation models. Loads calibration tests are utilized to develop ground/flight load equations. 80% and 100% flight loads surveys/demonstrations are utilized to correlate analytical model and to substantiate the design loads.
b. For rotorcraft, loads analysis is performed for design load conditions specified in ADS-29 (cancelled). Structural demonstration flight testing is performed in accordance with ADS-24 (cancelled)) to demonstrate the safe operation of the aircraft to the maximum attainable operating limits consistent with the structural design and to verify that loads used in the structural analysis and static tests are not exceeded at the structural design limits of the airspeed and load factor envelope, or if analytical loads are exceeded during structural demonstration testing to establish the allowable flight envelope and the critical conditions for strength, rigidity, and operation.
c. For Navy rotorcraft, loads analyses are performed for conditions specified in sections 3 and 4 of the AVPS Addendum and/or AR-56. Ground and flight testing is performed in accordance with section 4 of the AVPS, AR-89 and MIL-D-23222 to demonstrate compliance with design requirements and to demonstrate safe operating limits.
References: (Navy/Air Force fixed wing) JSSG-2006: A.3.1.1, A.3.1.2, A.3.2.14.3, A.4.1.1, A.4.1.2, A.4.2.14 (Army rotary wing) ADS-10-SP, ADS-24 (cancelled), ADS-27-SP, ADS-29 (cancelled), ADS-51, ADS-64-SP (inactive), AR-70-62 (Navy rotary wing) As identified in the AVPS Addendum for the respective air vehicle and/or AR-56, AR-89, MIL-D-23222
14 CFR 23, 25, 27, 29
STANAG 4671: USAR 321
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 5.1.3 | 5.1.3 Foreign object damage (FOD). |
Criterion: Verify that loads used in the design of the airframe include loads due to FOD from birds, hail, runway, taxiway, and ramp debris.
| Standard: The aircraft is designed to withstand the impact of FOD during any phase of taxi, takeoff, flight and landing without loss of the air vehicle, incapacitation of the pilot or crew and without detectable or undetectable damage to structural elements that result in reductions in structural strength below ultimate load carrying capability throughout the flight envelope (including maneuvers). The aircraft, including main and tail rotor systems, is designed to ensure the capability of continued safe flight and landing following impact; windshields are designed to withstand impact, without penetration; and fairings that may be used to shield or enclose flight critical components (for example, flight control computers) are designed with sufficient strength to ensure capability of continued safe flight and landing. | |
| Method of Compliance: Verification methods include analysis, test, and inspection of documentation. Probabilistic analyses are performed to address FOD occurrences. Lab tests such as bird strike tests are performed to validate analytical model(s) and/or structural capabilities. |
References: (Air Force fixed wing) JSSG-2006: A.3.2.1; A.3.2.18, A.4.2.18; A.3.2.22, A.4.2.22; A.3.2.24, A.4.2.24 (Army rotary wing) ADS-10-SP, ADS-24 (cancelled), ADS-27-SP, ADS-29 (cancelled), ADS-51, ADS-64-SP (inactive), AR-70-62 (Navy rotary wing) As identified in the AVPS Addendum for the respective air vehicle and/or JSSG-2006: A.3.2.24, A.4.2.24; AR-56, AR-89, MIL-D-23222
14 CFR 23, 25, 27, 29
STANAG 4671: USAR 321
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||
| 5.1.4 | 5.1.4 Repeated loads. |
Criterion: Verify that the air vehicle structure is designed such that all sources of repeated loads are considered and included in the development of the service loads spectra and do not detract from the airframe service life or dynamic component retirement intervals.
Standard…
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