Questions and Answers_Safety and Requirements TIM.xlsx
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This document is a comprehensive Questions and Answers (Q&A) file from NASA's Commercial Low Earth Orbit (LEO) Development Program Phase 2 Requirements and Safety Technical Interchange Meeting. The 126-question document covers critical safety, technical, and operational aspects of NASA's future commercial low Earth orbit destinations, focusing on requirements for commercial providers developing space stations and visiting vehicles. Key themes include safety review processes, hazard analysis, crew safety standards, payload integration, and NASA's evolving approach to commercial space infrastructure.
The Q&A addresses numerous technical details, such as NASA's expectations for safety boards, hazard control processes, fault tolerance requirements, and the transition from International Space Station operations to commercial destinations. Significant points include NASA's intent to provide initial transportation services, allow commercial providers flexibility in meeting safety requirements, and develop joint safety review processes. The document indicates NASA will release a draft RFP in spring/summer, with providers expected to propose innovative solutions for payload integration, safety protocols, and destination design while meeting NASA's core safety and operational standards.
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Q&As
| Question No. | Industry Questions | NASA Response | |
| 1 | Is there concern over different NASA chairs leading safety board reviews? | Detailed plans for joint boards will be worked post award with each partner to ensure best approach is optimized within the providers processes emphasizing pre-coordination/planning well before any safety review. Additionally details associated with NASA roles and responsibilities will be finalized post award aiming to reduce any impact or confusion with commercial providers. | |
| 2 | When does NASA plan to implement the CLD Joint Safety Reviews? | ||
| Will the review process timeline better account for a streamlined commercial approach? i.e. dedicated reviews and feedback outside of panel to limit adjudication time in panel. | Commercial provider is expected to develop a process to organize joint boards. The joint safety reviews are to start after Ph 2 contract award. NASA participation in Insight activities in Ph1 is per Provider invitation. |
| 3 | Assuming that on the NASA side astronaut corp is a made up of representatives from US and international partners, how are the international partners pulled into the safety reviews? | The Astronaut office does not typically directly support safety reviews. A designated Operations Safety team will be assigned to ensure the safety of the Crew. NASA is not expecting to specifically represent International Partners or their crew at SRBs or other forums. There may be some cases, depending on International agreements for each flight, where NASA may represent International Partner interests. |
| 4 | Does NASA envision ever getting to a point where some or all hazard assessment approval are delegated to the selected provider without going through the NASA process? | Although NASA is requiring a systematic safety review process, the Commercial provider should propose internal Provider lead processes that meet the intent in lieu of the specific NASA provided process if deemed to be more efficient. |
NASA desires to delegate hazard assessment and hazard report approvals to the Commercial provider once processes are established and verified and expect the areas of payload, cargo and material safety to be transitioned first.
| 5 | Does NASA plan to share CLDP-P-4007 and the CSRB Charter? | NASA is still finalizing these draft documents and can provide if needed. However, Charters are a NASA internal document identifying organizations roles and responsibilities and are expected to be updated once a Commercial Provider has been selected and agreements have been made on joint processes. |
| 6 | Do destination and VV hazard reports need to be submitted through a NASA-owned database (like IHS)? Will the NASA database be available for use/modification by CLD providers? | |
| NASA needs to have access to the joint data for joint board approvals, however, the Commercial Provider can propose to utilize an internal system that meets the intent and needs of the board. Depending on each Commercial Provider solutions, NASA may choose to develop an internal database to ease NASA internal reviews. This is not expected to be a structured database as IHS but more of a common repository for NASA to access without having to request access to multiple provider's databases. |
For Visiting Vehicle, data will be delivered per follow on Transportation contract guidelines (this may be IHS-TBD).
| 7 | The multiple boards, processes, documents/data required by this process results in a lot of overhead for the CLD providers. Has NASA taken that into account with regards to the CLDP budget? | The intent of utilizing a hazard assessment process if not to require unnecessary paperwork or overhead but to document a systematic approach for identifying and controlling hazards to ensure crew safety. NASA plans to work with each awarded Commercial Provider on joint review and data exchange processes that are efficient and reduce overhead. |
| 8 | Has NASA gone through the process flows outlines here? With Destination in charge of certain integration. With CCP in charge of certain items and vehicles, is the provider in charge of vehicle integration. Need worked out examples. | NASA is still evaluating key integration roles and responsibilities for the situation where NASA is providing Government furnished transportation which will be different than in a fully end to end service model. In both cases, NASA expects the commercial destination provider to be responsible for integrated hazards and operations between the transportation and destination vehicles. |
| 9 | Will someone need to be at every board or will this happen all at one meeting? | The intent is to have one meeting with all stakeholders for any particular phased safety review. |
| 10 | Is the Ops Control training video on the ISS Hazard System still valid for training? | NASA is evaluating if this video is applicable and can be shared. |
| 11 | Is the expectation for CLD partners to use the NASA OCAD database for all operational controls? Or is this suggesting providers develop their own version of an OCAD database and associated processes? | The desire is to have each provider develop their own tools and databases that meet the intent of the NASA OCAD database. The 3102 and Operations Standards (1150) lay out the importance and details of a rigorous closed loop process in place for ops control implementation. |
| 12 | For those VV hazards that are already in IHS, how do the CLD partners access these for integration? | NASA will be responsible for ensuring CLDP partners have access to required VV data. NASA is still evaluating roles and responsibilities, processes that will be used and how data will be shared for the situation where NASA is providing Government furnished transportation. |
| 13 | Does NASA plan to have resident quality and/or safety engineers at the CLD provider production locations? | Post contract award the Program will coordinate with the Provider on the best approaches to facilitate communication and maintain insight. NASA does plan to have some resident office personnel but the specific roles and responsibilities will need to be negotiated. Additional details will be shared in the CLDP Insight Plan that will be provided NLT the draft RFP. |
| 14 | Will NASA require providers to be AS9100 certified? | NASA expects the providers to be AS9100 Compliant not certified |
| 15 | Will the Safety History charts from Bill Shaffer be made available? | These charts were originally presented at the Aug 2024 CLDP Safety TIM. They are available at SAM.gov |
| 16 | Has any formal "gap analysis", or anything similar, been performed to demonstrate what the evolutions were to NASA's Human Spaceflight Safety process? Can they be quantified in terms of strength? Priority of changes? Some more insight into specifics would be great! | The best example of Human Spaceflight Safety process evolution relates to the ISS EVA ‘water-in-the-helmet’ event (a summary presentation of this event was given at Safety TIM #1 by Chris Hansen). The post-event investigation highlighted the need to reperform the safety hazard assessment of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) using the more rigorous ISS safety process. EMU safety was initially performed using the Shuttle Program safety process. The ISS Safety Process created six comprehensive hazard reports and identified five previously unidentified, program-level, non-compliance reports (NCRs). |
https://sma.nasa.gov/news/safety-messages/safety-message-item/iss-eva-23-suit-water-intrusion
| 17 | What was the philosophy of requirements levied in main document vs which are listed as best practices? | ||
| a. | What is listed as shall statements in newest revision as 30 new ones got added? | In general, NASA focused requirements on crew safety and/or specific capabilities needed on CLDs to meet NASA goals and objectives. Where possible, NASA intends to allow the Provider some flexibility to innovate in their approach to meeting the intent of a given requirement. Requirements that leaned towards "How" to accomplish non-safety-critical functions were moved to best practices. | |
| 18 | Will NASA provide the standards that are called out in the 1130? Or will the providers have to buy them? | NASA will provide all applicable NASA Standards as part of the RFP. The providers will need to purchase the Industry standards themselves. | |
| 19 | So far the 1130 and 3102 are available. When will the others (1101, 1102, 1140) be available? | 1101, 1102, and 1140 are being cleared for posting and will be made available as soon as possible. 1140 was baselined on 2/11/25 and will take the longest to clear through signature and public release processes. | |
| 20 | Are the requirements in the 1130 expected to be complete (show compliance) by IOC or in time for crew arrival? | The requirements outlined in 1130 represent all of the capabilities needed during the extent of the contract and do not represent what is required for Minimum Initial Operating Capability. NASA will provide more detailed definitions on Min IOC and Full Operating Capability (FOC) along with some general growth prioritization as part of the contract NLT draft RFP. | |
| 21 | Are the utilization updates applicable to IOC or FOC? | The requirements outlined in 1130 represent all of the capabilities needed during the extent of the contract and do not represent what is required for Minimum Initial Operating Capability. NASA will provide more detailed definitions on Min IOC and Full Operating Capability (FOC) along with some general growth prioritization as part of the contract NLT draft RFP. | |
| 22 | The current requirement id is R.CLDS.####. Would you be willing to change them to something that can be easier to identify them as CLDS or Cargo or Transportation or Utilization? | ||
| a. | For example, R.CLDS.####, R.CLD.####, R.CTS.####, R.CaTS.####, R.UTIL.#### | NASA will work closely with Commercial Providers to develop the most efficient manner to document, share and review data for certification and may make updates for final RFP. In order to stay on schedule to release a Draft RFP, NASA will limit editorial changes and concentrate on technical or clarity items. | |
| 23 | 8705.2c (human rating) was previously a reference doc and now is applicable. What was the reasoning for making it applicable and what is needed from providers? | NASA has incorporated applicable requirements from NPR 8705.2 into CLDP-REQ-1130. NPR 8705.2 should be listed only as a reference document. Updates to CLDP-REQ-1130 are in work to align these discrepancies. | |
| 24 | Will some reqs from App K be moved into the reqs section in Rev A or can we expect the current list to be stable? | A CLDP-REQ-1130 Rev A is planned for Draft RFP to address industry and internal NASA feedback. The Program goal is to reduce the number of requirements between baseline and Rev A of 1130. | |
| 25 | Is the Prop Sys Standard mandatory? Can the provider design their system as they want? | Providers may propose an Alternate Standard for any "meet the intent" standard. NASA is developing a new propulsion system standard based on recent lessons learned. CLDP may choose to include this as a "Meets the Intent" standard removing a number of stand alone requirements in a future revision. | |
| 26 | Are the CLDP requirements intended to augment or overhaul all of the SSP documentation? | The requirements are intended to be a tailoring of Human Rating and associated requirements with supplemental content to address Lesson's learned, Destination specific considerations and utilization support capabilities. CLDP requirements document tree will replace current SSP documentation for a future end to end service. Details on which documentation will be used for government provided transportation is still being evaluated with expected use of current or updated CCP/ISSP requirements documents. | |
| 27 | For the standards updates will there be opportunity for industry to comment prior to release? | It is NASAs intent to finalize requirements prior to draft RFP allowing industry ability to comment. If changes are made post Draft RFP, NASA will evaluate whether an industry comment period will be offered. | |
| 28 | When will CLDP-STD-1102 be made available? | CLDP-STD-1102 is planned to be posted by the end of March. | |
| 29 | What is the vision on how NASA will levy this 1102 requirement? Is it for NASA to tell the Payload developer or the CLD and the Payload developer? | ||
| a. | 1102 is standards for NASA heritage to give standards of what exists and let others built toward and providers have if NASA wants to fly heritage hardware. | NASA expects to move to new CLD Provider-specified interface in the future that will be delivered as part of the contract but wants to ensure a portion of CLD capability can accommodate heritage hardware. The intent of CLDP-STD-1102 is to provide the details to support heritage Mid-Deck Locker payloads. The quantities NASA requires for this capability will be provided in the draft RFP. | |
| 30 | One condition that requires VV to ctrl the Destination is "the remote capability would prevent a catastrophic event" during integrated ops. Is it acceptable to down-select Catastrophic hazards that allow specific VV control? Clarification needed on the extent of this req, with examples? | NASA is evaluating updates to this requirement in CLDP-REQ-130, Rev A | |
| 31 | Will the cargo capability requirements be moved to the new crew/cargo transport acquisition and not in the CLD Phase 2 acquisition? How will that all work and be integrated? | The cargo requirements currently documented in 1130 will not be removed but will not be applicable for NASA government furnished transportation phase. NASA will levy crew and cargo transportation requirements during the transition phase through a separate contract. CCP and ISSP documentation is expected to be utilized for that future contract. After transition to End-to-End Services, the cargo transportation requirements in CLDP-REQ-1130 will be applicable. | |
| 32 | Can you confirm the implicit requirement that seems to be driving from NASA provided transport, and Unpressurized payloads for the need for robotic arm capability? | ||
| a. | With NASA provided transportation now, it explicitly drives need for robotic arm based on existing fleet. | NASA has requirements for interfaces to support external payloads but has intentionally left flexibility for the Provider to innovate with respect to manipulation and installation with the transportation vehicle provider. An external robotic arm capability is a valid option to leverage existing transportation capability to deliver external payloads. |
External payload capability is not planned to be required as part of the CLD Minimum IOC but optional.
| 33 | Visiting Vehicle certification strategy for CLD stations -- what is NASA's expected role in commercial logistics to commercial stations? | Overall logistics for the CLD is the responsibility of the CLD Provider. However, with NASA providing initial crew and cargo transportation, the CLD provider will have to identify up/down mass requirements for NASA transportation vehicles. NASA will provide additional information in the Draft RFP. For NASA provided crew and cargo transportation, NASA and CLD provider will negotiate up/down manifest. | |
| 34 | How does NASA integration plan fit with CLD providers integration plans? Is this only for NASA payloads? | NASA is providing our initial plan for integrating NASA/OGA payloads/facilities but recognizes this will need to be modified post award to accommodate CLD provider plans and processes. NASA will be requesting a Provider specific Utilization Integration Plan be provided as part of the RFP. | |
| 35 | Will NASA impose any requirements on the CLDP provider regarding the structure of online payload support tools similar to OPTIMIS, IPV, etc.? | NASA will be releasing an Operations Standard as part of the Draft RFP that will outline the types of tools needed for flight and ground operations including utilization. The CLD provider will have the opportunity to propose how they will meet the intent of this standard and what tools, facilities and processes will be utilized. | |
| 36 | For NASA payloads being tended by non-NASA crew, is it expected that the MSFC payload ops center would be communicating directly with the crew? What is the providers role compared to NASA’s role with respect to real-time payload ops? | This is an area of future work but CLD Provider proposal and capability will help determine these roles and responsibilities. At a minimum, the CLD Provider will be responsible for the overall timeline and use of on orbit resources providing the boundaries in which NASA crews can operate. | |
| 37 | Can we confirm the payload integration process slides are posted to Sam.gov. Currently not seeing them posted? | Yes, the charts are available on sam.gov. | |
| 38 | For NASA provided transportation to/from the CLD for NASA payloads, if there is excess space available for CLD’s other customer payloads, how will that work? | NASA expects to provide a portion of the capability of each crew and cargo vehicle to the CLD Provider for use for CLD operations and/or other customer needs. Details are still being worked and will be provided NLT Draft RFP. | |
| 39 | Step 4 "Safe the ISS" - were "safe configurations" pre-defined, so that multiple "end item safe states" can be engaged with a single input (high stress situation and all), or the "common cause failure" stance disallowed this. Any guidance for Sys Safety to help define "safe state"? | “Safe the ISS” simply refers to all the actions needed to work the particular emergency. Those actions and configurations are not pre-defined, but there is general guidance for things like hatch closures and ventilation changes. | |
| 40 | Can you talk about considerations of where crew return vehicles are? | ||
| a. | What happens if situation happens in usual muster area? | The location of each crew’s return vehicle dictates the emergency muster location. If the emergency occurs in the muster location, then the crew goes to the other crew’s muster location. We currently only have two muster locations: Node 2 and FGB. | |
| 41 | What has been the evolution of the Emer Masks and PBA? | Over the last several years, the GFE Emer Masks have been replaced by either oxygen PBAs, air PBAs, or COTS 3M respirators. As of last week, the ISS program no longer uses Emer Masks for any emergency. The Emer Masks are in stowage and waiting to be trashed. PBAs have remained the same as when they were used on Shuttle and are still similar to masks used on all commercial aircraft. The one addition a few years ago was to add bottles that contain air instead of pure oxygen. Compressed air, instead of oxygen, is safer during a fire emergency. Oxygen bottles are still maintained for depress cases. | |
| 42 | Will there be an opportunity for the providers to propose alternate standards or to tailor 1130 requirements to meet or exceed the intent? | Yes, a process is being developed by CLDP for providers to provide submissions, and will be shared when ready NLT Draft RFP. NASA expects Commercial Providers to propose alternative standards or approaches that meet NASAs intent. | |
| 43 | Utilization requirements are less specific regarding external payloads. Can NASA speak to priorities with respect to External Accommodations / use cases? | Capabilities required to support NASA external payloads are captured in the 1130. Prioritization of users is not yet known and will not be required as part of the initial operating capability. | |
| 44 | When will information be made available about how the transportation vehicles will be offered for the initial years mentioned and how transition from those to any new vehicles would occur, and also how on-ramping new transportation vehicle(s) would occur? | Detailed plans for government provided transportation or other services are being defined and will be provided as soon as possible but NLT Draft RFP. | |
| 45 | Draft RFP in Spring? Or Summer? | Please see the following website for RFP questions https://www.nasa.gov/johnson/jsc-procurement/cldc/ | |
| 46 | Does NASA have a line by line comparison of previous CCP 1130 (rev F) to latest CLDP-1130 baseline? And metrics on added/deleted requirements and specifications? | NASA does not plan to provide line by line changes between revisions of any document prior to draft RFP. | |
| 47 | Was any consideration/comparison to the Gateway docking standard (GDSS) included in CDSS development? | Yes, CLDP worked closely with the same team that developed the GDSS and mirrored the standard in many areas with minimal differences to support current visiting vehicles and remove unnecessary requirements only applicable to exploration. | |
| 48 | Is there a mapping of deltas between CDSS and IDSS? | Please see the following website for RFP questions https://www.nasa.gov/johnson/jsc-procurement/cldc/ | |
| 49 | Why is there a separate NASA docking standard versus included in IRD for initial transportation phase, and fully within provider end to end service for final phase? | With the original end to end services approach, IRDs were considered to be in the domain of the integrating provider. The docking standard was to facilitate integrating heritage vehicles into any CLD | |
| 50 | This obviously has national security issues. And possible threats from the competition who are not our national allies. If I have active security clearance, can I get more insight from NASA, the responsible party who is holding valuable cyber threat information? | This information cannot be provided at this time. Your security official would need to officially request a briefing through the NASA security office. Upon approval from that official, a briefing could be scheduled to provide you with cyber threat information at the appropriate security clearance level. | |
| 51 | Are there going to be ops controls that only the USG crew have awareness of, trained in, have access to? Or, are all on-orbit crew trained uniformly, normalizing the knowledge of combatting cyber threats and vulnerabilities? No surprises? No suspicion amongst crew? | There is a potential for classified payload operations that would limit knowledge to a need to know basis. Generic operations should be available to everyone. Training and operations for sensitive material will be worked on a case by case basis as required. | |
| 52 | Is it true that NASA IT Security has examples of "so called bad actors" trying to get unofficial access to NASA assets and perhaps contractor assets? | This information cannot be provided at this time. Your security official would need to officially request a briefing through the NASA security office. Upon approval from that official, a briefing could be scheduled to provide you with cyber threat information at the appropriate security clearance level. | |
| 53 | Re: quality planning Can you speak to your experience in CCP with relationships of provider and NASA and how that effected quality? Can you speak to your experience in CCP with relationships of provider and NASA and how that effected quality? | NASA and commercial provider quality engineering and quality assurance relationships on NASA's Commercial Crew Program took many forms. From informal emails and weekly chats/panels, to time-sensitive formal splinters with program management and senior executives at quarterly program reviews. These relationships allowed for quality professionals to identify and communicate quality risks and concerns to decision makers. Similarly, NASA and future CLD Providers will need to develop a working relationship with the right touch points to be successful. | |
| 54 | Should we assume that if a NASA crewmember is involved in the mission, NASA personnel/authority should be included throughout the mission? | NASA will maintain some authority over NASA crew and NASA crew activities as outlined in the contract. Details will be provided NLT Draft RFP. | |
| 55 | Confirming on acoustics that the intent was to show examples of things JSC Acoustics has been involved in verifying, JSC Acoustics doesn't need to verify all CLD acoustic requirements, correct? | For CLDP, providers are responsible for developing their own approach for ensuring that the integrated CLD complies with the allocated requirements from NASA. NASA will maintain insight into all areas based on risk levels. The JSC Acoustics Office does expect to review the verification artifacts as part of certification. | |
| 56 | How does NASA's HH&P member get involved with commercial safety review panels/boards? | NASA plans to have the NASA Health & Medical Technical Authority as a voting member of the CLDP SRB participating in all joint board activities. | |
| 57 | If Ops controls are the only option, do we have to have HH&P's concurrence or approval? | Similar to any hazard control, Operational controls will need joint board approval. NASA will have HMTA and FOD membership on the CLDP SRB assessing for crew safety concerns. | |
| 58 | How do we control these HH&P "hazard" where failure tolerance is not applicable? | For those subjects where a Failure Tolerant strategy does not apply, CLDP recognizes use of relevant standards and margins (i.e., DFMR) to control Hazards. When the subject is well understood, like Acoustics, this may be considered fully compliant. However, uncertainties with the human system are frequently larger than with purely electrical, mechanical, or structural systems; for subjects such as Decompression Sickness, the joint SRB will determine whether it is appropriate to document the risk as a Safety Non-Compliance / Variance. | |
| 59 | Are there requirements for humidity levels from a human performance standpoint? | Humidity only becomes a relevant issue for human performance/safety when ability to maintain core body temperature is in question; however, the humidity range of 25% - 75% for optimal crew comfort and performance (i.e., habitability) is documented in CLDP-REQ-1130. Note that humidity is related to other potential Hazards such as ESD (if too low) or condensation / free fluid (if too high). |
Note the applicable reqt in 1130: [R.CLDS.252] HABITABLE ATMOSPHERE and Appendix E Table E-1 60 Do crew survival methods have to be verified? Verification of crew survivability methods (e.g., Breathing Mask, Fire Extinguisher) will be focused on implementation and functionality. Both 1130 and 3102 requirements define expectations for crew survivability. Per human rating, crew survivability is above & beyond fault tolerance- Crew Survivability is the space after all hazard controls have failed.
| 61 | If system is 2 fault tolerant, do we have to worry about crew survival methods? | |
| a. | Does it show up in hazard report space or is it in CERD? | |
| b. | Wouldn’t emergency criteria adds extra hazard tolerance and verification to provider and visiting vehicle? | |
| c. | Specifically worried about delta certifications and extra cost | Yes per human rating, crew survivability is above & beyond fault tolerance- Crew Survivability is the space after all hazard controls have failed. |
a. Crew survivability is captured in the hazard report (e.g. field data as captured in 3102)
b. Controls to prevent the hazard are not impacted. With respect to emergency criteria, integrator(Destination) is responsible for end to end safety.
c. It's required via 1130/3102. Provider can take credit in hazard report. CERD is not applicable to free flying destinations.
Visiting vehicles may be impacted based on their assessments.
Delta cert with GFS transportation is TBD.
| 62 | Do providers have to find requirements and add them up for loss of crew and crew survivability methods? | 1130 and 3102 define expectations for crew survivability | |
| 63 | Will there be guidance provided on how NASA would like Non-compliances to be handled or is it up to the provider? | ||
| a. | Specifically related to non-safety NCs as in 3102 | Yes, NASA will provide guidance as part of 3102, Rev A NLT Draft RFP | |
| 64 | Now that NASA has actual field data to compare against the 217F conservative results, have you found any consistent k-factors or adjustments that reconciles 217F's approach consistently for component types? Or should we just move away from 217F to Bayesian/Weibull, etc.? | K-factors for ISS originated from the Fischer-Price Study. Bayesian updating was implemented because the original estimates did not reflect actual performance. Mil-HDBK-217 is outdated. | |
| 65 | Will NASA share reliability data gathered in ISS operations for use in our own reliability analyses? | NASA is evaluating what reliability data can be shared. | |
| 66 | Will an R&MWG be set up for CLDP with all of the review/approval authority noted in these slides? | This is not currently planned but could be considered based on CLD Provider processes and proposal. | |
| 67 | Were components retired based on the predictions? Or were components operated until identifiable death? Were any hazardous situations caused by the death of a component, predicted or not? Did these types of situations drive updates to the System Safety artifacts? | Systems were redesigned based on PM/LLI/manifest/Crew time impacts. Run to failure for LLI is an option if the failure doesn't create a hazard or damage other equipment. Leakage of hazardous substance has the potential to create hazards… e.g. Pre-treat. Yes, updates to maintenance/ leakage response were added. | |
| 68 | Does NASA require CLD contractors to comply with and be certified to ISO-9001? | AS9100 will be levied instead of ISO 9001. Compliant, not certified in Contract | |
| 69 | The one on one sessions - will those be able to be virtual? | Yes the one-on-one sessions may be virtual | |
| 70 | In the context of Safety requirements, how do you define “mission“? For example, does a failed microscope equate to loss of mission? |
| Related/duplicate question: How do you define mission? Is it only crews safely on a CLD, all utilization systems are functioning, or something in between? | Loss of utilization capability is not considered as part of general 2FT strategy and will be handled as part of payment structure. Need to discuss this. | ||
| 71 | Yesterday, it was mentioned NASA have expanded the "control capabilities" that VVs have on the Destination during Catastrophic hazards. Today's slide mentioned that NASA will not control VV nor Destination. Is this scaled? Is it cart blanche? Contradictory. Clarification needed. | NASA does not operate nor control the Destination nor the VV. The Destination commander may make real time decisions regarding the safety of the Destination or VV. The Destination commander may or may not be a NASA crewmember. | |
| 72 | The safety approach slide states NASA will not operate visiting vehicles ….that has changed with the new acquisition approach of NASA operating cargo/crew vehicles to the CLD - at least initially. How does this change the safety approach? Who owns the safety integration? | NASA will provide transportation as GFS for an initial timeframe, but will not operate it. The VV provider will continue to operate the VV within the NASA certification and collaborate with the CLD provider and with NASA in accordance with system and interface requirements and the various contracts. | |
| 73 | Has NASA benchmarked private commercial mission safety approaches (such as Polaris Dawn) to compare/provide input to the CLD safety approach? | Polaris Dawn is not available for review. If data is made available it will be included in the data set for lessons learned/benchmarking. Commercial Crew and Private Astronaut Missions were assessed as a part of the development process for 3102. | |
| 74 | Can you speak to NASA’s process for reviewing and accepting DFMR? Is DFMR rationale documented within the hazard reports? Does DFMR require review by other boards/panels outside of the CSRB/STRB? | 3102 describes the process for documenting DFMR control strategy in HRs (similar process as ISS). The HR with the identified DFMR controls will be reviewed as part of the phased safety reviews with the joint boards/panel. Discussions at the reviews should include rationale for using DFMR as a control strategy (especially if it's a newly identified DFMR application). A revision to 3102 is in work to expand on additional guidance for Commercial Providers with DFMR examples from cross programs. | |
| 75 | Can NASA share the traceability mapping between derived 1130 safety requirements and the applicable 8705.2 Human Rating requirements? | Team will look into ability of sharing the traceability matrix. | |
| 76 | When will NASA provide the safety threshold? | The current CLDP safety requirements approach removes the requirements for quantitative safety threshold metrics. (i.e. there will be no levied Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission) | |
| 77 | It’s still not clear whether NASA will or will not enforce NASA’s safety requirements for Visiting Vehicles on non-NASA missions. | For a purely non NASA mission, NASA will evaluate Integrated Hazards and requirements that impact the safety of the crew or destination. | |
| 78 | An earlier slide said that CLDP-REQ-3102 "Includes requirements for identification and analyzing of Destination survival method", but the version released with this TIM states that there are no requirements for providing DSMs. Is this indicative of a change in a future revision? | Destination survival methods are not required. If a provider proposes a destination survival method, then an analysis of the proposed method is required to ensure that the Government Crew Member risk exposure is acceptable. | |
| 79 | When do you recommend formal Hazard control process? Is the phase 3 Safety Review sufficient for this? | CLDP-REQ-1130 is written at a high level. Hazard analysis is part of the process to define (allocate and decompose) the implementation level requirements needed for a specific design. A phase hazard analysis approach commensurate with design maturity that starts early to inform preliminary design is essential to arrive at a complete requirements set prior to proceeding to detailed design and/or system procurement. | |
| 80 | When would you recommend formal config management of the Hazard controls. Is Phase 3 safety review sufficient or is it expected earlier? | Configuration management of controls needs to be in place as soon as the Preliminary Hazard Analysis and/or HRs are generated. This effort supports traceability between controls and requirements and will also allow for new requirements to be discovered. Ph III is too late to start any type of configuration management. | |
| 81 | Please clarify NASA CCP’s role in requirements verification and safety reviews for commercial cargo vehicles. | CCP will be responsible for certification of existing and any new Crew Visiting Vehicles for CLDs. ISS Program will be responsible for certification of cargo VVs until ISS end of life. NASA is evaluating future roles and responsibilities post ISS. | |
| 82 | Would CLD Program Office request CPP Office to certify new Visiting Vehicles (cargo or crew)? Who owns the certification process for the new VVs? | CCP will be responsible for certification of existing and any new Crew Visiting Vehicles for CLDs. ISS Program will be responsible for certification of any new cargo VVs until ISS end of life. NASA is evaluating future roles and responsibilities post ISS. | |
| 83 | Is NASA expecting that all CLD-1130 requirements are satisfied by CLD's initial operating capability (IOC)? If not, is there a subset of 1130 that is viewed as required by IOC and another set that is anticipated to be "phased capability". | All 1130 requirements are not expected to be completed prior to Minimum Initial Operation Capability. NASA will provide additional detail on Minimum IOC and FOC associated with utilization NLT Draft RFP. Detailed breakdown of safety and design requirements between each phase will need to be negotiated based on the provider proposes. | |
| 84 | Could you please indicate the major changed between SSP 30599 and 3102? | Major changes include: addition of crew survivability, expansion on DFMR process and guidance, Joint Safety Reviews and roles and responsibilities of Commercial Providers to stand up their own panel/board. | |
| 85 | The backup slides refer to an 1130 reliability requirement Destination Reliability (0.996) - Is this included the latest revision of 1130? Or planned for a future release? | No, there is not a quantitative reliability requirement in CLDP-REQ-1130. It is recognized that quantitative reliability forms an important part of understanding maintenance needs for crew time, stowage, and spares. Reliability backup slides provide a reference assessment of a quantitative requirement. It is not implemented for this Program. NASA recognizes that Providers may consider an internal metric and the data provides a reference on what would be defined. | |
| 86 | If an Ops control does not involve a USG crew, does it have to be reviewed and approved by FOD SMEs? | NASA plans to have the FOD as a voting member of the CLDP SRB participating in all joint board activities. FOD along with all panel members review all controls, including ops controls. | |
| From One-on-One Meetings |
| 87 | Confirm the hierarchy of specifications for CLD visiting vehicles. Confirm understanding that CLDP-REQ-1130 takes precedence over all docs listed in Sec 2.0 and is the top-level driving requirement spec going forward. | CLDP-REQ-1130 will take precedent where applicable. Transportation requirements within 1130 will not be applicable until end to end services. Visiting Vehicle provided as government transportation will utilize the requirements levied on that follow on contract. |
| 89 | What is the applicability of these requirements when USG personnel/material are not involved? | Requirements that are specific to USG crewmembers are written as such to reflect NASA's requirements for their crewmembers. Applicability of those functions, characteristics, constraints, or performance parameters to other crewmembers is left to the provider's discretion in designing to their needs and business case(s). Requirements that apply to all souls on board do not contain language limiting them to USG crewmembers. |
| 90 | Does certification against the requirements for USG personnel need to be completed prior to first CLD mission, or only first CLD mission incorporating USG personnel/equipment? | Guidance on when requirements must be met will be provided in the Draft RFP. |
| 91 | Please check our understanding of the Fault Tolerance for Hazards: |
For any identified hazard in the hazard analysis A Critical Hazard requires 2 verifiable passive or active controls in the design such that… Fault 1 → implement Control 1 Control 2 remains for fault tolerance A Catastrophic Hazard requires 3 passive or active verifiable controls in the design such that… Fault 1 → implement Control 1 Fault 2 → implement Control 2
| Control 3 remains for fault tolerance | Understanding is correct. There are also cases where DFMR would apply. Alternate design margins and compatibilities with environment where FT doesn’t apply, but used as an alternate control strategy. | |
| 92 | Looking for clarity on fault tolerance requirements for ground crew and general public safety (distinct from on-orbit crew safety). |
For example, for an uncrewed cargo vehicle designed to burn up on reentry… Do systems engaged in vehicle reentry need to be 2 Failure Tolerant for Public Safety (ensuring the vehicle enters in its designated reentry footprint)? or
| Is 1 Failure Tolerance sufficient to meet the intent of Critical Hazards (ensuring the mission is completed)? | Outside the scope for CLDP and reentry covered by FAA standards/requirements and analysis should be driven by compliance to governing regulations. | ||
| 93 | For cargo requirements documents that are heritage from ISS (e.g. 50833), are those requirements being updated based on ISS experience or expected to be levied as-is? | NASA is developing a new heritage visiting vehicle interface requirements document/standard to ensure compatibility between new destinations and visiting vehicles. This will be provided at draft RFP or earlier for industry review. This document is based on heritage SSP 50808 and other ISS requirements. Design requirements associated with environment needs of NASA cargo/equipment will be similar to past requirements but have been updated based on lessons learned where applicable. Expect follow on transportation contracts to limit changes from ISS to ensure readiness for 2029. | |
| 94 | Is it possible for NASA to provide a more readable diagram of the one shown on slide 11 (integrated operations comm links)? In addition, can NASA annotate where they expect encryption on these various comm links? | Working to get it in 1130 Rev A | |
| 95 | In R.CLDS.544 Rationale it says "Two validated indications of fire means that there are two independent indications of fire. " Does/ could independent mean the same sensor at different times, same sensor type in different locations, or two different sensing methods (different detection physics)? | Yes there are systems that use time separate indications. It is possible to use one sensor to perform 2 tasks/indications | |
| 96 | Is NASA planning to provide Medevac services for the all CLD crewmembers on the pad, SAR for aborts or off-nominal entries, or for off-nominal landing? This will drive expenses if each CLD provider is doing this separately. | NASA is still evaluating the government provided services that will be provided for government furnished flights. This data will be provided at industry day or draft RFP. It is expected NASA will provide similar services as are provided for CRS and CCtCaP contracts with some exceptions. | |
| 97 | Is a Flight Medicine Specialist the same as a board certified Aerospace Med specialist? A JSC Flight Surgeon? | Expectation is to have a board certified med specialist and will get captured in req space | |
| 98 | Is there an expectation for regular particulate monitoring aboard a CLD? | If the requirement for filtration is met, additional particulate monitoring requirements will not be levied. | |
| 99 | Will the CLD be creating and maintaining platforms for payload integration such as IHS, Orbit, etc.? Or will the heritage processes still be used? | NASA is seeking efficiencies and innovative solutions with the goal of streamlining data collection between Payload Developers, CLDP, and the Providers and will be interested in what solutions Providers may offer. |
In general, NASA does not want to mandate a tool set but allow industry to innovate in this area. NASA is considering offering during transition access to heritage NASA tools as part of a government offered service (GTA).
100 Can NASA expand on responsibilities for NASA payload integration? Who is responsible for levying the various requirements documents to NASA payloads (e.g. CLD-REQ-1130, CLD-STD-1102, etc.)? Who will receive requirements verification submittal for NASA Payloads and review/approve? The Utilization Integration Plan will elaborate on roles/responsibilities for payload integration. This is planned to be publicly shared at draft RFP or potentially earlier. 1130 and 1102 are documents that NASA is levying onto the CLD provider; they are not interface requirement documents for NASA payloads. For payload interface requirements, the expectation is that the owner of the infrastructure (destination hardware, environment, etc.) will need to levy interface requirements and review approvals for the payloads operating in the infrastructure/environment. This document is planned to be provided at draft RFP or earlier.
The responsibility is on the CLD or facility owner to verify requirements with each payload.
101 Regarding non-NASA payloads, can NASA expand on the expectations for levying NASA requirements, verifications, and processes? Is the CLD provider expected to create a separate process/requirements documents? Is there flexibility in developing their certification processes? For payload interface requirements, the expectation is that the owner of the infrastructure (destination hardware, environment, etc.) will need to levy interface requirements and review approvals for the payloads operating in the infrastructure/environment.
It is a do no harm principle for all payloads.
No additional requirements being levied. Still need to meet CLD requirements. Depending on awardee that may change. Expectations based on 3102 and details will be worked out post contract award to ensure commercial flexibility.
| 102 | What is the scope of NASA's Utilization Integration Plan? Is it expected for CLD provider's to have their own utilization integration plan as well? | The scope of NASA's Utilization Integration Plan begins with selection of the payloads and includes all integration steps we envision as necessary to integrate NASA or NASA-sponsored payloads and facilities through launch, on -orbit execution and return. The scope does not include Provider utilization/payloads with exception of cases where NASA's crew or facilities may be needed to perform NASA utilization. NASA will be requesting the Provider's to propose their own Utilization Integration Plan as it pertains to NASA or NASA-sponsored payloads. |
| 103 | Is the Heritage Payload Interfaces Standard derived from SSP 57000 (Pressurized Payload Interface Requirements) & SSP 57003 (External Payload Interface Requirements)? | CLDP-STD-1102 (Heritage Payload Interfaces Standard) was derived from SSP 57000 for pressurized payloads. The scope of this document was limited to pressurized payloads. |
| 104 | How many heritage/EXPRESS Rack locations does NASA require the CLD to provide? Does each EXPRESS/heritage location require the same services that EXPRESS Rack currently provides (e.g., is vacuum exhaust and/or gas required at each rack, or can a subset of locations provide those capabilities)? How many single, double and quad locations will be required for NASA’s use? | NASA is still evaluating the number of lockers, types, usage rates and other increment specific payload information to be proposed as a NASA minimum buy. This information is intended to be provided at the draft RFP timeframe, or earlier. |
| 105 | Can NASA provide more information on the C&DH interfaces and protocols required for NASA payloads (i.e. 1553, ethernet, discrete T&C, etc.). | NASA has not specified this type of detail as it would drive a design solution. For heritage lockers, 1102 speaks about some capabilities that the design has to be compatible with. |
Defer to 1130 Rev A; intent is to take the feedback and consider including in 1130
| 106 | Can NASA expand on the expected integration and division of responsibilities between the CLD utilization team and the CLD provider payload team? Will these roles be separate for NASA payloads and non-NASA payloads, leading to different payload processes? What is the expected integration with the PAYCOM, RAM, and POPS roles with the same roles provided by the CLD provider? Will there be limits on real-time payload communication between CLD providers and NASA astronauts? Is the HOSC expected to be staffed to support CLD? | NASA has drafted a Utilization Integration Plan which includes payload operations and expected roles and responsibilities between the Provider and NASA. The goal of NASA's Utilization Integration Plan is to provide how we currently envision NASA vs. Provider's roles/responsibilities for integrating and operating NASA payloads. The Provider will be asked propose their own Utilization Integration Plan as it pertains to NASA or NASA-sponsored payloads, and NASA will revisit any updates needed to NASA's plan based on the Offeror(s)' proposals. |
| 107 | Recommend NASA creates a journey map to flesh out how the payload integration process would work with different types of payloads. | NASA has drafted a Utilization Integration Plan which includes a "journey map" detailing applicability for all types of payloads, to be shared at draft RFP. |
| 108 | Does a CSP flying non-NASA payloads and/or non-NASA astronauts have the latitude to alter their phased safety process? | As long as the overall process doesn't impact NASA payloads/NASA astronauts and the habitable environment, NASA does not see the process changing for payloads. There is room for streamlining, but have to meet the minimum requirements for 3102. |
Do not harm type assessment.
| 109 | Can NASA clarify what it defines as Loss of Mission? | LOM for NASA is typically more so inability to support a crewed mission for a designated mission duration, loss of services, and other critical functions. Loss of mission typically tied to critical hazards because it's tied to loss of services vs loss of crew event. NASA is still evaluating whether there will be a LOM metric or requirement but is proposing to handle this as part of final mission success payment structure. |
| 110 | Is the expectation that the Destination meet the same MMOD PnP requirement threshold as stated for CCP in 1130? | CLDP has the requirements for Destination MMOD PnP in 1130 (as well as VV MMOD PnP). R.CLDS.383 addresses PNP for the Destination. R.CLDS.467 addresses PNP for Crewed Visiting Vehicles. |
| 111 | For "NASA PRA utilized for failure tolerance variances", does this imply that the Provider's PRA cannot be used as part of the acceptance rationale for NCR submittal? | The provider's PRA can be used as acceptance rationale, in the case that their PRA, in comparison to NASA's independent PRA, confirms that their numbers are within the appropriate range. |
Assess the risk and reliability in the same manner as the provider PRA.
| 112 | Will the MMOD risk evaluation require results for Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv)? | CLDP process is not defined at the moment, but the MMOD results in terms of specific end states and use of the MSCSurv code is included as part of the existing ISS process. |
| 113 | Can NASA share a few discrete examples of expectations and deltas for how safety process and requirements will be applied in scenarios where NASA will be “sharing” the Destination with another customer? (i.e. non-NASA payloads onboard when NASA crew present, another non-NASA visiting vehicle arriving or present when NASA crew mission taking place, etc.?) | Expectation of providers is assessing for all crew; non-NASA vs NASA is really to focus the CSRB reviews, but in the end it is a still do not harm assessment |
| 114 | Recommend NASA creates a journey map to flesh out how the joint boards and safety review process would work with different types of scenarios that explore the mainstream and extremes. | Key aspects to be add to the process post contract award |
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