Attachment 13 FWS-I Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria (FDSC) 24 May 2013.docx

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TRADOC

RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY & MAINTAINABILITY (RAM) ENGINEERING

Reliability Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria (FDSC)

For The

Family of Weapon Sights - Individual (FWS-I)

24 May 2013

Prepared For:

Night Vision, Sensors, and Lasers Branch, Soldier Division, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence

By:

TRADOC/ARCIC/AID/CARD/RAM Engineering Branch RAM Engineering Field Office - Benning

ATTN: ATCD-ENG-BE

Fort Benning, GA 31905-4500

Engineering, Scientific, Technical, and Analytical Services for the Combat Developments Community

CONTENTS

Page

RELIABILITY FAILURE DEFINITION and SCORING CRITERIA (FDSC) for the FAMILY OF WEAPON SIGHTS - INDIVIDUAL (FWS-I) i

1. FDSC CERTIFICATION.

24 May13

ALFREDO LARA DATE

Central Regional Manager, Acting TRADOC Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) Engineering Branch

2. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE.

a. This document provides the failure definition (FD) and scoring criteria (SC) that will be used to “score” incidents/events that occur during testing of the FWS-I. The end result of the scoring process is to provide “scored” data points which can be used for analysis of FWS-I reliability to determine if there is compliance with its established reliability requirements. Together, the FD and SC serve as a tool for directing/guiding Reliability Scoring Integrated Process Team (IPT) members through the test incident/event scoring process, with the intent of eliminating as much subjectivity from the process as is possible. The purpose of the FD is to define, from the user’s perspective, degraded FWS-I performance/functionality which, when evidenced by component or subsystem malfunction, is considered a failure. The purpose of the SC is to define a specific and agreed upon process for scoring incidents/events which occur during FWS-I testing. The scoring process involves the classification of each incident/event into the proper category (based upon its impact on the FWS-I’s operational performance/functionality) followed by charging the cause of the incident to a particular source. Definitions and explanations of/for specific terms used in this document are included at the end of the scoring criteria. These terms and the general content of this FDSC conform to current policy (as reflected in the TRADOC ARCIC document entitled Guidance for Developing Reliability Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria, 3rd Edition, April 2012).

b. This FDSC will be updated to refine it and/or add detail should the design of the FWS-I change significantly from what was envisioned at the time of FDSC preparation (which coincided with Capability Production Document (CPD) development), or if more definitive information is required to enhance/improve the scoring process. Any future updates of this document will be recertified and redistributed.

c. The Benning RAM Engineering Branch Field Office point of contact for the FWS-I Reliability FDSC is: Mr. Jess Gilmer (Phone: (706) 545-7865 / DSN 835-7865, e-mail: jess.gilmer.civ@mail.mil).

3. SCOPE OF FDSC. The FDSC for the FWS-I has been structured to support the assessment of “operational” reliability in accordance with Department of Defense (DoD) policy/documentation, which indicates that requirements for materiel systems be defined from the operational perspective, rather than focusing exclusively on the materiel. With regard to reliability, this means that both induced failure events attributable to (caused by) operational elements associated with storage, transportation, employment, and support of the FWS-I and inherent equipment failures of the device itself will be scored against (i.e., be charged to) the FWS-I for reliability evaluation purposes. Operational elements include the operator, technical documentation/manuals, maintenance personnel, training (e.g., procedures), accidents, and any applicable FWS-I support equipment (these elements are potential sources that can induce malfunctions of the FWS-I). Induced failure events are included in the evaluation of reliability to capture and convey the impact of deficiencies which are rooted in sources other than FWS-I hardware/software but ultimately manifest themselves in the form of FWS-I - related equipment malfunctions. The end objective in doing this is to place emphasis on the need to address/correct such deficiencies (i.e., those deficiencies that result in significant reliability-related problems, such as, perhaps, deficiencies in the form of errors or misleading information in instructional manuals or inadequate operator/maintainer training) before the system is fielded to the user. Failure events that are attributed to government furnished equipment (GFE) incorporated into the design of the FWS-I will also be scored against the sight unit (i.e., the GFE will be treated as an integral part of the system design). Thus, all failure events (malfunctions) impacting the functionality of the FWS-I will be included in the evaluation of FWS-I reliability (including those attributed to support equipment the FWS-I was designed to be compatible with) unless they are induced by or are the result of incidents that the Reliability Scoring IPT has deemed nonapplicable for the purpose of reliability scoring (e.g., malfunctions attributable to gross negligence or abuse, which constitute extraneous conditions that fall outside the scope of a viable/bonafide reliability evaluation effort). Battery failures will not be scored or evaluated against FWS-I reliability, as they have their own specific serviceability requirements to meet (e.g., service life); the only exceptions are events in which a battery causes damage to the FWS-I and subsequently generates a maintenance demand (e.g., equipment corrosion caused by the batteries that ultimately necessitate cleaning/replacement of the FWS-I battery contacts, and FWS-I damage caused by battery explosion).

4. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION.

a. The FWS-I is a weapon mounted long-wave infrared sensor that provides imagery (with aiming reticle boresighted to the host weapon) to support target engagement in battlefield conditions inclusive of daylight, darkness, limited visibility, and obscuration. It will facilitate increased target interdiction through rapid detection, recognition, and aiding in identification at greater ranges during periods of darkness and limited visibility. The sensor will be used with the M4 Carbine, M16A4 Rifle, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW), M136 AT4 Confined Space (CS) Shoulder Launched Munition (SLM), and M141 Bunker Defeat Munition (BDM), with the possibility of supporting MK16, MK17, and M14 weapons as the objective. Operator selectable reticles internal to the sensor will provide compatibility with each supported weapon. The sensor mounts forward of (and in-line with) the M150 Rifle Combat Optic (RCO) and M68 Close Combat Optic (CCO) used on individual Soldier weapons, thereby enabling its use without having to remove the day optic sight. This allows the same aiming Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to be used, in addition to mitigating the need for re-zero. It also has the capability to operate in a standalone configuration without the day optic and can be utilized in the hand held mode for scanning and surveillance. When combined with the Enhanced Night Vision Goggle III (ENVG III), the FWS-I provides Rapid Target Acquisition (RTA) capability through the wireless transmission of weapon video with reticle to the helmet mounted ENVG III display. In this mode the FWS-I video and reticle are spatially aligned with the existing ENVG III imagery displayed, facilitated by the helmet mounted RTA battery pack with integral processor that is provided as a subsystem of the FWS-I. This RTA battery pack also powers the ENVG III). The RTA capability enables rapid offensive targeting and Close Quarters Battle (CQB) type engagements by reducing up to 50 percent the Soldier’s time from target detection to effective engagement with their host weapon (the ENVG III display of transmitted FWS-I video and zeroed reticle allows the Soldier to fire the weapon without having to obtain eye relief or cheek weld as necessary in the direct view (conventional full sight) mode of use). This will improve Soldier lethality and survivability, in addition to enhancing Soldier effectiveness, by reducing their exposure to threat weapons. Soldiers can also shoulder the weapon and obtain proper sight picture through the day view optic and clip-on FWS-I components of the collective in-line sighting system, allowing for more stable, longer engagement shots using the optic’s reticle for aiming (the RCO provides a magnified view whereas the CCO is of unity vision).

b. The FWS-I will provide increased image resolution over greater ranges in comparison to the legacy Thermal Weapons Sight (TWS) systems it will displace/replace, in addition to having reduced size, power, and weight. Total system weight inclusive of primary batteries plus one additional loaded battery cassette, if required, will be ≤ 2 pounds. A battery cassette will be needed if the FWS-I design requires four batteries. An additional set of batteries will be included in the two pound maximum weight limit for the FWS-I if the design requires more than one set of batteries to achieve seven hours of operational time. As an objective the FWS-I may have a range finding capability compatible with the effective range of the host weapons it supports. It will utilize an operator replaceable commercially available battery power source and have a wired 3-button remote control which attaches directly to the weapon accessory rail. It is currently anticipated that when RTA functionality is enabled, the operator will be able to use the tethered remote to toggle through the RTA imaging modes (RTA Full Weapon Sight Imagery Mode, Picture-In-Picture Mode, RTA Spatially-Aligned Mode), manually re-align the weapon sight and goggle imagery (thereby maintaining proper spatial alignment for accurate engagements in the RTA mode), and control the polarity and zoom (magnification) of the FWS-I thermal image (although exact controls provided by the tethered remote when using RTA may change during ongoing system development). When RTA functionality is disabled, the tethered remote controls the FWS-I’s calibration, polarity, and zoom. The electronic zoom feature allows Soldiers to rapidly scan their area in the standard FWS-I view and then switch to a zoomed view for precise engagements. In addition to the critical features controlled remotely, the FWS-I will permit operator control and adjustment of the display brightness and gain, as well as selection of the aiming reticle that corresponds to the applicable host weapon. The sensor unit will have an Input/Output (I/O) port which serves as the interface for maintenance functions and external power. The FWS-I will be mission capable in all environments and remain operational in adverse weather conditions such as rain, fog, salt fog, snow, dust, and smoke. Lens elements will be protected by covers with lanyards or other suitable means. The FWS-I will have a soft water resistant carrying case with space for the sight, one M16A1/A2 mounting bracket, one spare loaded battery cassette, operator’s manual, lens cleaning materials, and quick reference card.

c. FWS-I supportability leverages lessons learned from the predecessor TWS program and may continue to utilize the maintenance/support concept implemented (in-place) for that system. Performance Based Logistics (PBL) will be considered and guide decision-making regarding maintenance concept implementation to potentially produce better outcomes and reduced support cost through increased reliability. Maintenance tasks associated with field level FWS-I repair under the Army Two Level Maintenance (TLM) System are anticipated to be limited to the replacement of easily accessible/replaceable components (knobs, objective lens cover, eyecup, mount, carrying case, dust caps, transit/storage case, etc.). FWS-I repair beyond these parts replacement actions must be performed by the next higher level (sustainment), wherein unserviceable/inoperable FWS-I units must be returned to the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) or the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Regional Support Centers for direct-exchange with a serviceable unit. The FWS-I may be equipped with built-in test (BIT) diagnostics to assist with detection of sensor unit faults.

5. FAILURE DEFINITION. The failure definition is comprised of two elements, these being (1) a list that defines the FWS-I’s essential functions and (2) formal definitions of what constitutes a failure. These elements are defined in the ensuing text (subparagraphs 5a and 5b, respectively).

a. Essential Functions. Essential functions represent the core operational functions/tasks the FWS-I must be capable of performing when employed/utilized by a trained representative Soldier in the operational environment (commensurate with the applicable operational factors/criteria depicted in the Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP)). The FWS-I has seven essential functions, which are defined below. These functions are characterized by statements that provide an overarching description of essential FWS-I tasks needed for the conduct of operations in the tactical environment.

(1) Attach/Mount. Securely attach/mount to the host weapon (and remain securely attached until removed by the operator.

(2) Zero / Boresight Align. The FWS-I must zero* to the strike of the projectile that is fired from the host weapon / boresight align* to the host weapon (i.e., to the appropriate target reference point associated with the bore of the weapon) in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

(3) Retain and Repeat Zero / Boresight Alignment. Retain* (i.e., maintain) zero / boresight alignment during field operations; and repeat* zero / boresight alignment after the weapon sight is removed and remounted on the same host weapon in the same place/location), as required to complete execution of the wartime scenario depicted by the FWS-I OMS/MP.

(4) Display Imagery. The FWS-I must display/provide via direct view mode (as well as wirelessly transmit to the ENVG III) imagery of sufficient clarity and resolution to enable the FWS-I user to scan/search for, detect, recognize, and observe personnel (and items of interest) during operational conditions (daylight, darkness, lighting in urban environments, adverse weather conditions, and limited visibility/obscuration).

(5) Orient/Aim. Permit the operator to accurately orient/aim* the host weapon in operational conditions to facilitate RTA and engagement at close-in ranges (e.g., CQB) and precision firing out to the effective range of each host weapon the FWS-I supports.

(6) Detach/Dismount. Detach/Dismount from the host weapon when removal procedure initiated by the operator.

(7) Power ENVG III. The FWS-I helmet mounted RTA battery pack assembly must provide proper power to the ENVG III electrical interface.

*NOTE: Only confirmed equipment failures/malfunctions (such as mechanical damage or verified electronic/electro-optic faults internal to the FWS-I) causing the inability to perform one or more of these essential functions will be scored against FWS-I reliability; zero/boresight-related problems due to equipment design deficiencies such as residual/excessive manufacturing tolerances in the contractor provided FWS-I mount (rail grabber), Military Standard (MIL-STD) 1913 Rail/Interface, host weapon mounting brackets / bracket assemblies, and/or the FWS-I itself (where no malfunction has occurred) will be scored as performance limitations (not reliability-related failures) subject to evaluation against the established standard(s) for the affected area(s) of performance/effectiveness. Likewise, aiming error inherent to the "system" (e.g., gunner-related/gunner-induced aiming error, and error associated with the host weapon itself) and that which can be attributed to certain environmental conditions is subject to being evaluated against performance/effectiveness, but will absolutely not be assessed against FWS-I reliability (as such sources of aiming error do not in any way constitute reliability-related failures).

b. Failure Categories/Classifications. A test incident/event that is a malfunction of the FWS-I sensor unit, its integral mounting hardware/system, or helmet mounted RTA battery pack assembly (with integral RTA processor unit) will be scored as a “failure” for the purpose of FWS-I reliability evaluation (regardless of whether the incident was operationally induced or not). Exceptions are those incidents that the Reliability Scoring IPT body deems not applicable to FWS-I reliability (to include failures attributed to gross negligence or abuse). Design deficiencies that cause performance limitations (e.g., inability of the FWS-I to provide recognition capability of personnel out to the required ranges) where no malfunction or detectable equipment degradation has occurred will not be scored as reliability-related failures; incidents such as these are performance oriented and are expected to be evaluated under the applicable performance category (i.e., against the applicable FWS-I performance requirement, such as the required percentage of personnel-size recognition events at the specified ranges). A reliability-related failure of the FWS-I that is caused by, or directly attributable to, another “primary” incident/event (i.e., a preceding malfunction of the FWS-I or component thereof) is subject to being scored as a dependent malfunction (DM). Failures of the FWS-I (other than DMs) that do not result in the loss or significant degradation of an essential function will be scored as non-essential function failures (NEFFs); those that cause the inability to perform one or more essential functions (or which significantly degrade essential functionality to an operationally unacceptable level) will be scored as essential function failures (EFFs) for assessment against the FWS-I threshold and objective reliability requirements. EFFs which cause the inability to perform one or more of the overarching essential functions (or which severely degrade a function to the point where its remaining/residual utility is deemed operationally inadequate/unacceptable) will be further classified as a system abort (SA) event. SAs represent a subset of the EFF classification category and will be scored/assessed against the applicable FWS-I reliability requirements. Exceptions are those failure events that adversely impact on essential functionality which the FWS-I operator promptly corrects/rectifies through the execution of prescribed troubleshooting and corrective action procedures without using any spare parts/components (thereby restoring the functionality which was lost or degraded); such failures will be classified as rapidly recoverable events (RREs) provided their frequency of occurrence and associated corrective maintenance time does not exceed the limits defined in paragraph 6c(1) of the FDSC. At the discretion of Reliability Scoring IPT voting members (based on input from test personnel and/or subject matter experts), frequently recurring failures of a particular type (or an excessively high frequency of failures in general) that cumulatively consume an excessive amount of mission time for execution of operator level immediate corrective maintenance may result in a higher level of failure classification (even an EFF or SA) being assigned to address/convey the overall cumulative impact of the failures, in the event that the adverse impact on operations is great enough. More in-depth discussion/explanation of these failure categories is provided in paragraph 6c(1).

6. SCORING CRITERIA. The scoring criteria outlines the process that is to be used to classify test incidents/events into proper categories based upon their impact on the FWS-I’s operational performance/functionality, and to subsequently charge the cause of the incident to a particular source.

a. Scoring Procedure. The scoring procedure (illustrated in Figure 1) is defined below. It is of the multiple choice format and is applied by reading the applicable statements and then executing associated directives. It is essential that Reliability Scoring IPT members know and understand the definitions and explanations of scoring process terms (as provided in paragraph 6c(1)) before scoring is initiated.

#1 Select the appropriate category below and proceed as directed.

- Incident is an "Event or Failure Not Applicable to FWS-I Reliability, Availability, or Maintainability (RAM);" proceed to #2

- Incident is a "Non-Failure Event Applicable to FWS-I Maintainability" that Does Not Involve a Reliability-Related Failure (i.e., a Malfunction); proceed to #3

- Incident is a "Reliability-Related FWS-I Failure Event;" proceed to #4

#2 Assign event to appropriate category in the following list, then proceed to the next test incident/event.

- Pretest Checkout/Inspection/Activities

- Equipment Modification

- Test Peculiar Event

- Abuse

- Unrelated Damage

- Other Non-RAM Related Events

#3 Identify event as one of the following, then proceed to next test incident/event.

- Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)

- Scheduled Maintenance

- Cosmetic Maintenance

- Routine Operating Procedure (Performed by User as Prescribed in Operator’s Instructional Material)

- FWS-I Performance Limitation

#4 Assign incident/event to the applicable failure category in the list provided below (or categories in the list, if the incident was an EFF that resulted in an SA), then proceed to #5 (if FWS-I BIT diagnostics were involved) or to #6 (if BIT diagnostics were not involved). Notice: The FWS-I Relationship Matrix (Appendix A) provides amplified (expanded) criterion to assist Reliability Scoring IPT members in classifying malfunctions as EFFs and SAs.

- DM

- NEFF

- EFF

- SA

- RRE

#5 Assign the appropriate FWS-I BIT scoring category (in the list provided below) to the applicable incident/event, then proceed to #6. Notice: Events/Failures must be “detectable” by BIT diagnostics in order for BIT detection failures to be assigned.

- BIT False Alarm

- BIT Detection Failure

- BIT Detection Success

#6 Charge the cause of the failure event to one of the following sources, then proceed to the next test incident/event.

- Primary Failure

- Quality Control

- Power Source

- Contractor Furnished Hardware

- Contractor Furnished Software

- BIT Diagnostics

- Government Furnished Equipment (as/if applicable)

- Operator

- Technical Documentation

- Field Maintenance Personnel

- Sustainment Maintenance Personnel

- Training

- Contractor Furnished Support Equipment

- Government Furnished Support Equipment

- Accident

- Unknown

b. Instructions for Supplementary Test Data Collection. Supplementary test data is critical to the successful evaluation of a system’s RAM performance but is not required to be formally scored under current TRADOC RAM policy. Even though this supplementary data is not formally scored, it can be used by the evaluator to assess the overall suitability of the system. Maintenance and logistics related information is characteristic of supplementary test data that needs to be collected but not scored (the demand for maintenance/logistics support is an outcome of the associated failure event - not an event that requires scoring consideration). Scoring personnel may also need some of this information and data to make final determinations regarding the categorization of reliability-related failures. Supplementary data elements that need to be recorded include (but are not restricted to) those identified below (definitions of terms associated with supplementary test data are provided in paragraph 6c(2)).

Type of Unscheduled Maintenance Demand Generated by Each Failure Event that Occurs

Specialty (MOS), and Level of Maintenance Required to Perform Each Scheduled/Unscheduled Maintenance Action Clock-Hours of Active Maintenance Time Required to Perform Each Scheduled and Unscheduled Field Maintenance Action Active Maintenance Man-Hours Required to Perform Each Scheduled and Unscheduled Field Maintenance Action Type and Number of Logistics Demands Generated by Each Failure Event

Units/Parts/Components Replaced, Repaired, or Required as a Result of Each Logistics Demand Operating Hours Accrued on FWS-I at Time of Incident/Malfunction

c. Definitions and Explanations. Definitions and explanations of/for specific terms used in this document are provided below.

(1) Terms Associated with Scoring Process Diagram.

Event or Failure Not Applicable to FWS-I RAM: A category used by the Reliability Scoring IPT to identify/group those events that should not be included in the FWS-I RAM evaluation; these events are not related to (and have no impact on) RAM. The assignment of events to this category should in no way be construed to imply that they are invalid or insignificant, as they can impact on other functional areas of system evaluation (e.g., human factors or system effectiveness). This category includes the pretest checkout/inspection of equipment (as well as other pretest activities), equipment modifications, test peculiar events, abuse, unrelated damage, and other non-RAM related events. For general information (to promote continuity and understanding), this scoring category had previously been referred to as the “No Test” category under past (superseded) FDSC development guidelines.

Pretest Checkout/Inspection/Activities - Events observed/detected during the designated pretest checkout/inspection or other pretest activities. Pretest events are not scored against system RAM, as they have occurred outside of the actual test “phase” (i.e., they have occurred before the test has actually started; ideally, a Test Incident Report (TIR) should be written to declare the official start of test). All events detected after the pretest period will be scored on their own merit; those failure events for which the source has definitively/conclusively been traced back to pretest activities (but which may not have been detected during the pretest checkout/inspection) are subject to being scored as not applicable to RAM.

Equipment Modifications - Events involving maintenance actions associated with the installation/incorporation of modified/upgraded software or hardware. These events have no applicability to RAM unless the original software or hardware was nonfunctional (or was malfunctioning) prior to being upgraded/replaced as part of the “modification.” In those cases where there is applicability to RAM, the event of removing and replacing a faulty item (as well as the reloading of upgraded software) will be scored on its own merit; chargeable maintenance time will be estimated based on the man-hours and clock-hours that it would take to restore the system to its original functional condition. Any subsequent malfunctions of the upgraded software or modified/redesigned hardware component(s) will be scored on their own merit.

Test Peculiar Events - Events consisting of malfunctions and maintenance efforts caused by equipment that is not part of the system being tested (e.g., test peculiar tools or instrumentation) or by people that are not official test participants (i.e., people other than operators or maintainers). Examples of test peculiar events include engineering evaluations conducted to analyze the cause of malfunctions, malfunctions and/or maintenance efforts caused by engineering evaluations, periodic equipment evaluations conducted as part of the test plan (which do not constitute maintenance actions), as well as malfunctions of test peculiar instrumentation caused by system equipment and malfunctions of the system caused by test peculiar tools or instrumentation. Events related to test peculiar diagnostic equipment used in lieu of the actual diagnostic equipment which will be used to support the system in the field are scored on their own merit. Since test peculiar events are not attributable to the system being tested, they have no applicability to its RAM.

Abuse - Events in which official test participants (operators or maintenance personnel) cause damage to the system (FWS-I) either willfully or through gross carelessness/negligence (a decision for the Reliability Scoring IPT members to make after considering the facts). This category also includes (covers) any incidents in which the tester directs the deliberate abuse of the system (e.g. a test excursion to over-stress/exceed the performance/design limits of the system), whether called for by the test plan or not. Events attributable to abuse will not be scored against the system, as they provide no viable indication of its ability or inability to function reliably in the operational environment.

Unrelated Damage - Events in which FWS-I damage is caused by natural phenomena (e.g., lightning, earthquakes, etc.) or other influences that are beyond the control of official test participants (e.g., FWS-I operations and maintenance personnel). Because the source of these events is external to the system being tested, it is inappropriate for them to be included in the evaluation of RAM (unless the system design was engineered to withstand/resist the damage incurred, in which case the event should be considered applicable to RAM). Accidents caused by sources internal to the “system” (such as operator or maintainer error) do not constitute unrelated damage and are scored on their own merit.

Other Non-RAM Related Events - Events for which a TIR might be initiated by the test activity, but which have no bearing on FWS-I RAM evaluation/assessment. Examples of non-RAM related events include suggested improvements, reports of inadequate test procedures, unusable or unacceptable replacement parts which were discovered prior to or during installation, test delays, general information regarding the condition of system equipment/components where no reliability-related failure (malfunction) has occurred, and suggested human factors improvements.

"Non-Failure" Event Applicable to FWS-I Maintainability: Events consisting of maintenance actions that are performed for reasons other than to correct a reliability-related failure/malfunction. Performance limitations associated with the FWS-I are also included in this category, as maintenance can/may be required to overcome the effects of a limitation (depending on the particular way in which a limitation may manifest itself) in order to continue with system testing (although maintenance type actions generally won’t eliminate the root cause of the performance limitation). These events are not related to (and have no impact on) reliability. Maintenance type actions in this category are preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS); scheduled maintenance actions; cosmetic maintenance; routine operating procedures; and maintenance executed to overcome limitations in FWS-I performance, which would involve the temporary restoration of lost or degraded system functionality induced by a design deficiency.

Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS) - Events (actions) that the operator is required to perform in accordance with the procedures defined as PMCS in the FWS-I technical documentation (operator’s instructional material), which are necessary to retain the system (i.e., FWS-I) in proper/functional condition. This category does not include corrective type maintenance that is performed by the operator to correct deficiencies detected during PMCS, as such actions are required to either remedy a “failure” or execute a routine operating procedure; thus, the action does not qualify as “PMCS.”

Scheduled Maintenance - Periodic preventive maintenance actions defined in the system’s technical documentation that are to be performed at prescribed intervals to retain the FWS-I in proper operational condition (e.g., evacuation, purging, or similar functions that may be performed periodically to retain the FWS-I in proper operational condition). This category does not include corrective maintenance that is performed during the scheduled maintenance period to fix known deficiencies (as such actions are executed to remedy “failures,” and thus, do not qualify as “non-failure events”).

Cosmetic Maintenance - Maintenance-type actions that are not related to a failure, which are executed exclusively for the purpose of correcting cosmetic deficiencies/ anomalies -- not for the purpose of restoring lost or degraded functions, as such actions are the result of “failure” events. Potential examples of cosmetic maintenance include the deburring of a rough metal surface or sharp edge to prevent personal injury, and the refinishing of a surface (or surface area) to restore the proper protective finish or camouflage pattern (obviously premature failure/wear of a protective finish/coating should be regarded as a failure event (of the appropriate failure classification) rather than cosmetic maintenance).

Routine Operating Procedures - Tasks that do not involve immediate corrective action procedures which the operator can quickly and readily perform (as prescribed in the operator’s instructional material); a task that is required to correct a malfunction does not constitute a routine operating procedure, as such is in conflict with the definition of “failure.” The intent of assigning incidents/events to this category is to prevent the system from being penalized for needing a minor operator action that can generally be considered a normal, routine operating procedure. Examples of routine operating procedures include: Battery power source replacement; routine adjustments (to include returning sensor unit settings to the default via the Reset Mode, as applicable); calibration; alignment (of FWS-I and ENVG III for RTA); and the rerunning of beginning operations/initialization procedures as might occur during power-up of the FWS-I, to include the recycling of power during start-up (as/if necessary) but definitely not later during the actual execution of tactical field operations when/where the recycling action would constitute a non-routine immediate corrective action procedure, for which the score of RRE would be assigned). Another example of a routine operating procedure would be cleaning of the FWS-I eyepiece or objective lens to remove moisture, dust, fog, and other debris; although cleaning of these items will undoubtedly be required during the conduct of tactical operations, and may require immediate action to regain vision through the FWS-I, such cleaning actions will generally be considered routine unless there is continual fogging and/or build-up of moisture requiring excessively frequent removal, which the Reliability Scoring IPT may construe as a serious performance limitation for which redesign of the affected areas of the FWS-I may be required/recommended). A routine procedure that occurs at an excessively high rate can, if the constant interruption becomes a significant problem during field operations, prompt Reliability Scoring IPT members to classify the cumulative/collective effect of those recurring incidents as a failure event (e.g., an NEFF or even a more severe type of failure) if warranted, or if more appropriate, an operationally oriented performance limitation that is due to a severe design shortcoming.

FWS-I Performance Limitation - Inability of the FWS-I to meet a specified performance criterion where no malfunction (reliability-related failure) has occurred; such limitations are attributable to design deficiencies/shortcomings rather than reliability-related failures and may require maintenance to overcome (work through or around) the limitations in FWS-I performance by providing temporary restoration of lost or degraded system functionality/capability induced by the root cause design deficiency. Examples of potential performance limitations would be the following, where in each case no malfunction or equipment/functional degradation caused the limitation to occur:

Inability to achieve the required percentage of personnel-size target recognition events at the specified ranges during nighttime and limited visibility conditions.

Failure of FWS-I to maintain a constant zero (within required milliradian tolerance) after detachment from and reattachment to the same host weapon in the same mounting location.

Failure/Inability to retain proper boresight alignment with any of the compatible host weapons for the duration of the wartime scenario depicted by the FWS-I OMS/MP.

The system’s inability to remain operable when using the primary commercial battery at temperatures within the required range with greater than the allowed reduction of battery life.

Emission of non-Soldier initiated FWS-I noise that is detectable by the average human ear at a distance beyond the required distance/radius allowed.

Inability of the FWS-I to provide a recognizable image within the required time limits (over the full operating temperature range) after FWS-I power is applied and after being switched from stand-by to full on.

Blooming present in FWS-I display (e.g., such as might be caused by a hot barrel and hot iron sights).

Inability of the FWS-I to provide/perform a required capability because the requisite functionality has not yet been incorporated/designed into the system (e.g., at a time when testing is ongoing early-on in the system development/acquisition process).

Generally, a true design deficiency cannot be eliminated through the execution of a typical maintenance-type repair action; instead, some form of equipment (hardware/firmware/software) redesign/modification will be required to remedy the problem (design deficiency) that is causing the limitation in performance (although corrective maintenance such as the reprogramming of system firmware/software (as applicable) could potentially serve as a means by which to temporarily overcome the adverse effects associated with recurring software-induced limitations, in order to continue with system testing). A clear/specific indicator of a design deficiency would be the inability of the system to meet a particular performance criterion at any time (inclusive of the pretest equipment checkout). A potential qualifier that can be applied to assist in distinguishing between true design shortcomings (which will be manifested as performance limitations) and reliability-related failures is that the shortcoming should be present (i.e., exist), at least potentially, across the entire spectrum (or majority) of FWS-I systems tested (this could definitely apply in situations where the suspected shortcomings/limitations are software-related/driven; use of the same input data (parameters/values/settings) or operator actions should produce the same adverse results over and over on each system); if such is not the case, then careful/in-depth evaluation of the noted deficiency should be conducted before classifying it as a performance limitation instead of a failure event.

Reliability-Related FWS-I “Failure” Event: An event applicable to reliability that is characterized by a malfunction in which the FWS-I (or component of thereof, to include the helmet mounted RTA battery pack and integral RTA processor) fails to perform properly (i.e., fails to perform its intended function(s) properly). Performance limitations caused by design deficiencies do not constitute reliability-related failure events and will not be scored as such. In order for a “shortcoming” of the system (FWS-I) to be included in the evaluation of reliability, the system must first be capable of performing the function(s) that the shortcoming pertains to (or impacts on), as reliability is a measure of the ability to repeatedly perform a function (or functions) over a specified period of time. Therefore, if the system is incapable of performing a particular function as it is required to do, because of a design deficiency, then a malfunction has not (cannot have) occurred because the system was incapable of performing the function from the beginning. Any test incident/event that is a malfunction of the system (FWS-I) in any way will be scored as a “failure” for the purpose of reliability evaluation (unless the Reliability Scoring IPT body deems the incident/event not applicable to reliability). Incidents meeting the definition of a reliability-related “failure” will be scored in accordance with the ensuing failure classifications to address the severity and effect of the incident/event. The process of scoring an incident as a particular type of failure typically does not attempt to discriminate or assess the cause of the failure (unless sufficient evidence exists to indicate that the incident may be a dependent malfunction, in which case the cause must be considered up front); the cause/source is normally assigned after the failure has been scored, by referencing the established incident/event chargeability categories. However, the FWS-I with its RTA capability provided through use of the helmet mounted ENVG III “heads-up” display poses a unique scoring situation that will absolutely require up-front consideration of the failure source (FWS-I versus ENVG III) to ensure that incidents/malfunctions specific to the ENVG III are identified, culled-out, and thereby not scored against the FWS-I for RAM evaluation purposes (since the ENVG is an already-fielded system with its own unique set of RAM requirements). The physical and functional separation point between the two systems, for RAM scoring consideration, is at the interface where the RTA battery pack assembly (with integral RTA processor) mates to the ENVG III Helmet Mount Wiring / Fiber Optic Harness Assembly. Any failure events specific to this harness assembly, the ENVG III sensor unit or its mounting hardware will not be included in the FWS-I RAM evaluation unless the event was confirmed to have been directly attributable to an element of the FWS-I. Each failure of the FWS-I (or component thereof) generates a maintenance demand, regardless of the type of failure that ends up being scored (it should be noted that, although corrective maintenance may end up being deferred, even until such time that testing of the FWS-I may have been completed, the malfunction will still be classified as a failure event). Events in which the FWS-I helmet mounted RTA battery pack assembly with integral RTA processor fails to properly provide power to the ENVG III electrical interface (at the battery box junction) are subject to being scored as failure events chargeable to the FWS-I for RAM evaluation purposes. Failures of ENVG III equipment (hardware/software) to provide RTA attributes (imagery and zeroed reticle properly transmitted from the FWS-I) for viewing will be charged to the ENVG III for RAM evaluation purposes (commensurate with an update of its Reliability FDSC which addresses the RTA function).

Reliability-Related FWS-I "Failure" Classifications:

Dependent Malfunction - A failure event involving the FWS-I that is caused by (directly attributable to) another “primary” incident/event (i.e., a preceding/prior malfunction of the FWS-I). To be classified as a dependent malfunction, analysis of the failure event must positively confirm that it occurred as the direct result of a specified primary (prior) event. A dependent malfunction could occur, for example, as the result of a primary event involving the failure of a part that resulted in a functionally related component of the FWS-I being overstressed to the point where it failed nearly concurrently with (or very shortly after) the initial item. A more specific example would be a case where hardware item(s) in the FWS-I mounting hardware (such as one or more screws/bolts, or nuts) vibrate loose, thereby allowing the remaining hardware to become overstressed, ultimately resulting in FWS-I sensor unit becoming detached and falling to the ground (causing it to become inoperable). In such cases, the primary incident (the hardware vibrating loose) would be scored/classified as a failure event, whereas the subsequent failure of the sensor unit falling and sustaining damage would be scored as a dependent malfunction, since one event occurred as a direct result of the other. The score ultimately assigned to the primary incident will be based on the overall impact/severity of both incidents on FWS-I functionality. If the impact of the dependent/second malfunction was greater than that of the primary incident, then the score assigned to the primary incident should reflect that level of severity (based on the secondary failure’s functional impact). Dependent malfunctions can occur as a series of repetitive incidents that are attributable to a single identified “primary” event. Repetitive malfunctions must have a common cause that has been positively identified, corrected, and verified through subsequent testing (conducted after the corrective action has been implemented) in order for them to be scored as dependent events. A potential example of a repetitive malfunction would be the recurrence of uncommanded FWS-I sensor unit power-downs (i.e., inadvertent instances of power loss) requiring the operator to recycle the power switch to regain use of the FWS-I, due to an internal electronic-type fault (e.g., a loose component or inadequate solder connection, or perhaps loose foreign object debris which interrupts electrical connectivity) in the system. In this case, one failure event would be charged to the faulty internal component (or root-cause source for allowing the foreign debris into the system), while each of the subsequent repetitive incidents of power loss would be scored as a DMs, since they are attributable to the primary failure (realizing that the root-cause (primary) failure would not likely be corrected on-the-spot in an operational scenario prior to completion of the ongoing tactical mission, thereby allowing inadvertent instances of power loss to occur).

Non-Essential Function Failure (NEFF) - A “failure” event that renders the FWS-I (or subsystem/component thereof, to include the helmet mounted RTA battery pack assembly and integral RTA processor) incapable of performing one or more non-essential functions, but which does not adversely/significantly impact on the ability to perform an essential function. Examples of potential failure events that constitute NEFFs (as established through detailed coordination with the capability developer and by referencing predecessor system TWS technical manual content) follow below. As a note of understanding, failure events that constitute NEFFs are not limited exclusively to those identified below, as any manifestation of failure event involving the FWS-I that has no significant adverse impact on essential functionality is considered nonessential (and will be scored as such).

Remote key/button pad remains functional but is unable to be attached/affixed to host weapon, or fails to remain attached/affixed to host weapon during tactical operations.

Key/Button pad integral to the FWS-I sensor unit is damaged/inoperable (Note: Incident can be scored as an NEFF only if all “like” functions deemed mission essential are provided/accessible through the remote key/button pad (otherwise the incident will be scored at a higher level).

RTA Full Weapon Sight Mode and/or RTA Picture-In-Picture Mode unable to be selected or fail(s) to appear in ENVG III display (due to a malfunction of the FWS-I and not the goggle); incident scored as an NEFF provided the root cause source problem does not preclude selection of the RTA Spatially-Aligned Mode.

Polarity indicator inoperable/malfunctioning (the polarity is visually discernable to the operator).

Automatic Gain Control (AGC) inoperative (NEFF provided manual control is available and in functional status).

AGC-On indicator inoperative.

Reticle line color automatic adjust feature inoperable (NEFF provided manual control is available and in functional status).

State of charge (battery life) indicator is inoperative or malfunctioning (if so equipped).

Low battery warning indicator is inoperative or malfunctioning.

FWS-I sensor unit symbology display issues (e.g., symbology located in incorrect place, missing, incorrect information, etc.) not significantly impacting on or impeding the execution and performance of essential functions.

Spare battery cassette/cassette case, if required, damaged/unserviceable.

I/O port cover or retaining lanyard damaged/unserviceable/missing.

Anomalies (operational defects or cosmetic blemishes) that cause no operationally significant degradation of the…